The View From TehranThe View From Tehran

Mehrzad BoroujerdiMehrzad Boroujerdi

Department of Political ScienceDepartment of Political Science

Maxwell School of CitizenshipMaxwell School of Citizenship

Syracuse UniversitySyracuse University

Who Rules Iran?Who Rules Iran?

A Byzantine political structure with multiple nodes of power: A Byzantine political structure with multiple nodes of power: Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, Expediency Council, Assembly of Religious Experts, Parliament, President, Council Assembly of Religious Experts, Parliament, President, Council of Ministers, National Security Council, and others…of Ministers, National Security Council, and others…

A collective leadership highly prone to difficulties formulating a A collective leadership highly prone to difficulties formulating a national governing consensus (my estimate is that there is a national governing consensus (my estimate is that there is a group of 300 individuals who are the real “political group of 300 individuals who are the real “political heavyweights”)heavyweights”)

Yet among all nodes, Ayatollah Khamenei is the most Yet among all nodes, Ayatollah Khamenei is the most powerful individual. He appoints close to 100 important powerful individual. He appoints close to 100 important political personalities, plus an additional 300-500 Friday political personalities, plus an additional 300-500 Friday Prayer leaders, Leader’s representatives, etc. Prayer leaders, Leader’s representatives, etc.

Mapping the Governance Structure Mapping the Governance Structure

Mapping the Governance StructureMapping the Governance Structure

The Supreme LeaderThe Supreme Leader

Ayatollah Ali KhameneiAyatollah Ali Khamenei

Supreme Leader since June 1989Supreme Leader since June 1989

And his tentacles…And his tentacles…

And: The President and His CabinetAnd: The President and His Cabinet

Political Characteristics (I)Political Characteristics (I)

Effects of the revolution: Its utopian stupor, hybrid ideologies, jagged Effects of the revolution: Its utopian stupor, hybrid ideologies, jagged constituenciesconstituencies, and an , and an inchoate grammar of legitimacy have created a inchoate grammar of legitimacy have created a myriad of theological anachronisms and political contradictions in the myriad of theological anachronisms and political contradictions in the state. state.

Hyper-politicization, parallel institutions, intense factionalism, and a Hyper-politicization, parallel institutions, intense factionalism, and a lack of transparencylack of transparency

Profound cultural, economic, and demographic transformations of the Profound cultural, economic, and demographic transformations of the post-revolutionary era have granted the political sphere a degree of post-revolutionary era have granted the political sphere a degree of sophistication previously unimaginable.sophistication previously unimaginable.

The urban (61%), literate (80%), and young (median age of 24) nature The urban (61%), literate (80%), and young (median age of 24) nature of Iran’s population has precipitated a revolution of rising expectations.of Iran’s population has precipitated a revolution of rising expectations.

Yet while the challenges generated by the above dynamics have Yet while the challenges generated by the above dynamics have challenged the regime, its 29-year track record indicates it can be challenged the regime, its 29-year track record indicates it can be flexible and creative enough to ride the waves.flexible and creative enough to ride the waves.

Political Characteristics (II)Political Characteristics (II)

Political dynamics in the Iranian provinces are complex due to ethnic Political dynamics in the Iranian provinces are complex due to ethnic divides and tribal allegiances. Thus, provincial politics have important divides and tribal allegiances. Thus, provincial politics have important ramifications for overall internal political developments in Iran.ramifications for overall internal political developments in Iran.

The The parliament lacks power;parliament lacks power;

the judiciary and the Guardian Council, accountability;the judiciary and the Guardian Council, accountability;

the civil service, dexterity;the civil service, dexterity;

and the press, freedom.and the press, freedom.

The conservative camp has deep economic and social roots, solid The conservative camp has deep economic and social roots, solid organizational strength, and an army of foot soldiers (e.g., pensioners organizational strength, and an army of foot soldiers (e.g., pensioners affiliated with charity foundations, Basij forces).affiliated with charity foundations, Basij forces).

Disagreements among Iranian elites are mainly aired around economic Disagreements among Iranian elites are mainly aired around economic policies rather than foreign policy.policies rather than foreign policy.

The Iranian leadership has a “public discourse of statecraft” and a The Iranian leadership has a “public discourse of statecraft” and a “private language of negotiation.”“private language of negotiation.”

U.S.-Iranian RelationsU.S.-Iranian Relations

Twenty-nine years: Five U.S. Presidents and Six Iranian Twenty-nine years: Five U.S. Presidents and Six Iranian PresidentsPresidents

Are mutual views based on concrete facts … or based on Are mutual views based on concrete facts … or based on political whims and paranoia? Gary Sick has argued that both political whims and paranoia? Gary Sick has argued that both sides share a moralistic air of self-righteousness in foreign sides share a moralistic air of self-righteousness in foreign policy matters; both are inclined to ideological rigidity and a policy matters; both are inclined to ideological rigidity and a sense of moral superiority; and each perceives itself as the sense of moral superiority; and each perceives itself as the indispensable state.indispensable state.

The nuclear cleavage has obscured more promising The nuclear cleavage has obscured more promising approaches to U.S.-Iranian relations.approaches to U.S.-Iranian relations.

Relevance of IdeologyRelevance of Ideology

Ahmadinejad’s raucous diplomacy has again revived the argument Ahmadinejad’s raucous diplomacy has again revived the argument that Iranian foreign policy is based on absolutist ideological that Iranian foreign policy is based on absolutist ideological principles.principles.

Yet, serious analysis shows that Iran bases foreign policy Yet, serious analysis shows that Iran bases foreign policy decisions not on religious ideology but on national interest (See decisions not on religious ideology but on national interest (See Azerbaijan-Armenia, Russia-Chechnya, India-Pakistan, etc.) Azerbaijan-Armenia, Russia-Chechnya, India-Pakistan, etc.)

The Iranian leadership is not irrational or crazy, nor do they suffer The Iranian leadership is not irrational or crazy, nor do they suffer from a martyrdom complex. They are indeed ambitious -- but very from a martyrdom complex. They are indeed ambitious -- but very pragmatic.pragmatic.

The varied political transformations of many of the students who The varied political transformations of many of the students who took over the U.S. Embassy demonstrate ideology’s flexibility. took over the U.S. Embassy demonstrate ideology’s flexibility.

The “Blame America and Israel Game” hardly resonates on the The “Blame America and Israel Game” hardly resonates on the Iranian street. After three decades, normal life no longer sustains Iranian street. After three decades, normal life no longer sustains intense revolutionary attitudes.intense revolutionary attitudes.

Ramifications for the Policy Options DebateRamifications for the Policy Options Debate

1) Zero enrichment option1) Zero enrichment option• DangerDanger: Iran will leave the NPT.: Iran will leave the NPT.• CommentComment: This ship has already left the port. : This ship has already left the port.

Iranians consider it a non-starter.Iranians consider it a non-starter.

2) Multi-national enrichment option2) Multi-national enrichment option• DangerDanger: Iran will master the technology and then : Iran will master the technology and then

will develop weapons in secret.will develop weapons in secret.• CommentComment: I believe Iran would probably accept : I believe Iran would probably accept

this option but would insist that the enrichment this option but would insist that the enrichment takes place on its soil. takes place on its soil.

Conclusions (I)Conclusions (I)

1)1) External pressure can’t bring about a regime change.External pressure can’t bring about a regime change.

2)2) You must start talking to Iran unconditionally and must engage You must start talking to Iran unconditionally and must engage the whole spectrum of political power, not just imprudently the whole spectrum of political power, not just imprudently picking and choosing “moderates” or “pragmatists.” The picking and choosing “moderates” or “pragmatists.” The neglected or presently weaker groups will do their best to torpedo neglected or presently weaker groups will do their best to torpedo the other faction’s efforts at any type of rapprochement. Spoiling the other faction’s efforts at any type of rapprochement. Spoiling the efforts of one’s rivals, including members of one’s own the efforts of one’s rivals, including members of one’s own faction, is common and can take place in the form of managed faction, is common and can take place in the form of managed leaks (i.e., revealing the 1985-1986 Iran-Contra affair) or public leaks (i.e., revealing the 1985-1986 Iran-Contra affair) or public criticism. criticism.

3)3) Iranians don’t necessarily like their regime, but they love their Iranians don’t necessarily like their regime, but they love their country. You must stress commitment to Iran’s territorial integrity.country. You must stress commitment to Iran’s territorial integrity.

4)4) Talks with Iran would involve a diplomatic marathon. At least a Talks with Iran would involve a diplomatic marathon. At least a year would be needed for preliminary agreements.year would be needed for preliminary agreements.

Conclusions (II)Conclusions (II)5)5) Assess Iran’s rising power in the region realistically. The U.S. can’t Assess Iran’s rising power in the region realistically. The U.S. can’t

create a regional order that excludes Iran: too big in terms of create a regional order that excludes Iran: too big in terms of geography, economy, population, and military might to be left out. geography, economy, population, and military might to be left out. Iran uses anti-Americanism to combat its exclusion.Iran uses anti-Americanism to combat its exclusion.

6)6) Sequence the negotiations and opt for incremental confidence Sequence the negotiations and opt for incremental confidence building measures: building measures:

A.A. Afghanistan & Iraq (withdrawing of forces, Afghanistan & Iraq (withdrawing of forces, placing placing permanent bases in Iraq)permanent bases in Iraq)

B.B. NuclearNuclear

C.C. Arab-Israeli conflictArab-Israeli conflict

7)7) It would be advisable for the next administration to wait until June It would be advisable for the next administration to wait until June 2009 to see who becomes Iran’s President. 2009 to see who becomes Iran’s President.

8)8) Ahmadinejad’s potential rivals (Karoubi, Khatami(s), Ghalibaf and Ahmadinejad’s potential rivals (Karoubi, Khatami(s), Ghalibaf and Velayati) will all be more moderate on the nuclear issue.Velayati) will all be more moderate on the nuclear issue.

Lastly: Ahmadinejad’s FutureLastly: Ahmadinejad’s Future

Factors working in his favorFactors working in his favor::

Potent combination of nationalism and populismPotent combination of nationalism and populism

Elimination of important potential rivals (Larijani, Haddad-Elimination of important potential rivals (Larijani, Haddad-Adel)Adel)

Factors working against himFactors working against him::

Deteriorating economic conditionsDeteriorating economic conditions

In addition to the reformists, many influential conservatives In addition to the reformists, many influential conservatives (Rezaei, Larijani, Ghalibaf, Mahdavi Kani, etc.) now believe (Rezaei, Larijani, Ghalibaf, Mahdavi Kani, etc.) now believe that Ahmadinejad has overplayed his hand with the nuclear that Ahmadinejad has overplayed his hand with the nuclear issue (this is a generation that still remembers what happened issue (this is a generation that still remembers what happened when Iran overplayed its hand in the Iran-Iraq War) and has when Iran overplayed its hand in the Iran-Iraq War) and has been reckless in his domestic policies.been reckless in his domestic policies.