The US Military Today

Chet Richards

Boyd 2008November 7, 2008Prince Edward Island

A few problems

The length of the conflict in Iraq now exceeds our participation in WW II

The length of the conflict in Afghanistan now exceeds all nations’ participation in WW II.

The likely outcome of Iraq will be a Shi’ite Islamic theocracy allied with Iran

The likely outcome of Afghanistan will be restoration of Taliban rule … or worse

Our total bill for these conflicts will be between 3 and 5 trillion dollars

It wasn’t for lack of resources

0

100,000

200,000

300,000

400,000

500,000

600,000

700,000

800,000

1948195019521954195619581960196219641966196819701972197419761978198019821984198619881990199219941996199820002002200420062008

$ Millions 2008

DoD Total Obligational Authority*

*Includes plus-ups to the base budget but does not include supplementals for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Sources: 1948- 2006, National Defense Budget Estimates for FY2008 (The Greenbook), pp. 62-67; 2007-2009, W. Wheeler, “Understand, Then Contain America’s Out-of-Control Defense Budget,” in America’s Defense Meltdown, pp. 219-244.

Cold War Average

Or because we faced some credible threat

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

China RussiaCuba Iran N. KoreaAll to LeftU.S.

W. Wheeler, “Understand, Then Contain America’s Out-of-Control Defense Budget,” in America’s Defense Meltdown, p. 223, citing IISS 2008. US figure includes plus-ups.

US DoD Spending Compared to Possible Opponents’

States & non-states wage war

States & non-states wage war

1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

3 GW

Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu

(and before)

Peace of Westphalia

State-vs-state— only “legal” form

of war

2 GW

Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc.

Nuclear Weapons

ProliferateFall of USSR

1GW

state vs. state

The “generations of war” model

Ideological purpose

New commo & transport networks

4 GW

The Utility of Military Force

Conventional weapons and forces

– Approx. 20 division equivalents, 3200 tactical fighter/attack aircraft, 200 ships

Nuclear warfare

– 14 Ballistic missile submarines, 120 bombers, 10,000 warheads

Counterinsurgency

Intelligence

Privatization

Conventional warfare

Not between nuclear-armed powers

– No major wars between Israel and Arab states after 1973, India & Pakistan after 1971, or USSR & USA or China & USA, etc.

– Does not rule out occasional sparring

Non-nuclear states are either

– US allies, or

– Extremely weak

Conclusion: Conventional forces are expensive and largely useless

Nuclear warfare

World is awash in nuclear weapons and material*

– Russia: 15,000; US: 10,000; France: 348; Britain 200; China 200; Israel: 75-200; Pakistan: 60; India: 40-50; N. Korea: 5-12

Major nuclear inventories can obviously be downsized

But NOT eliminated

– Would make large-scale conventional war possible again, even inevitable

*Source: Bruce G. Blair, “Primed and Ready,” The Defense Monitor, Center or Defense Information, May/June 2007.

Counterinsurgency

Governments can often defeat insurgencies in their midst by:

– Better governance, or

– Eliminating troublesome minorities, or

– Some combination of both

Outside powers, however, have rarely defeated insurgencies on foreign soil

– And attempts to do so often compromise the legitimacy of the local government in the eyes of its own people

Sources include: Gompert, D. C. (2007). Heads we win: the cognitive side of counterinsurgency (COIN); RAND counterinsurgency paper No. 1. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation. Van Creveld, M. (2007). The changing face of war. New York: Ballentine. Sullivan, P. L. (2007). War aims and war outcomes: Why powerful states lose limited wars. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(3): 496-524.

Intelligence

Most military problems since end of WW II can be tagged as “intelligence failures”

– Misunderstood who we were fighting and what they were fighting for

Obvious solution is better intelligence, but

– Extremely difficult to do

– Doesn’t justify large budgets

– Runs into problem of “telling truth to power”

– Seen by military as a supporting element for operations, whereas at the national level, the converse should be true.

For example

“There were larger problems with contract linguists than poor management and expense … Several Iraqi translators turned out to be part of the insurgency; these translators supplied information about operations of our soldiers to insurgents.” (127)

“An Iraqi citizen who told the police about a house suspected of holding hostages might well discover he was talking to a confederate of the kidnappers.” (173)

Steven K. O’Hern, The Intelligence Wars, Lessons from Baghdad. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008)

Privatization

Our (largely) public system isn’t working.

– $700+ BN/yr = rest of world, combined

– 7 years in Afghanistan, nearly 6 in Iraq

– More of same will only produce more of same, but at higher cost.

Our opponents are already privatized.

– non-state

– cellular, networked, distributed, global

– low cost of entry (and exit)

Rate of evolutionary change is a function of the amount of variation present in the population (Fisher’s Law).

Why privatize?

Bankrupt companies can go out of business.

Markets unleash competition.

– variety, rapidity, initiative, creativity

Privatization has a long military history.

– privateers & mercenaries

– British East India Company(1600-1858)

– PMCs today

Nothing less will force the amountof change that we need.

As Van Creveld suggests, it’s goingto happen anyway.

Robert Clive, early proponent of privatization

What’s going to happen to armies?

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)

Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres

Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)

Much of the task of defending society against nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces

Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)

Van Creveld, Transformation of War

What’s going to happen to armies?

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)

Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres

Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)

Much of the task of defending society against nontrinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces

Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)

Van Creveld, Transformation of War

What’s going to happen to armies?

Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the difference between armed forces and civilians (194)

Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres

Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population, and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of subversion is likely to be serious (211)

Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological complexity (cost) of military forces

Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other (not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)

Van Creveld, Transformation of War

Sign-off sermonette

It is far from clear whether “good intentions plus stupidity” or “evil intentions plus intelligence” have wrought more harm in the world.

Dörner, The Logic of Failure, 8

A great nation is like a great man: When he makes a mistake, he realizes it. Having realized it, he admits it. Having admitted it, he corrects it … He thinks of his enemy as the shadow that he himself casts.

Tao Te Ching (Mitchell trans., 61)

Questions?

Comments?

Accolades?

T

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