"The [Untold] Tillman Story" Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing (7/06/10)

8/9/2019 "The [Untold] Tillman Story" Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing (7/06/10)

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Tillman] did go on to say that she has no facts nor paper, no information to confirm herbelief, which I thought was gracious of her, because I know of no facts to confirm her

belief. And I know of no one else who has any facts or paper to confirm her belief. (p. 178, HOC 8-01-07)

But, although Rumsfeld asserted, I would not engage in a cover -up, given the incrediblycozy relationship between former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former VicePresiden t Dick Cheney and General McChrystal, its impossible to believe Rumsfeld wasn ttold of fratricide on April 23rd by McChrystal.

MR. SCAHILL: I've talked to former Bush administration officials that have describedan incredibly cozy relationship between former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,former Vice President Dick Cheney and General McChrystal, where General McChrystalwas essentially reporting directly to Rumsfeld and Cheney on operations, and they were

effectively carving JSOC out of the broad er military chain of command.

MR. SCAHILL: I've also heard from people that Cheney helped coordinate thetestimony of General McChrystal about the death of Pat Tillman in Afghanistan, whichwas determined to be a friendly-fire incident, and that Cheney actually colluded withGeneral McChrystal to attempt to cover up that death. (NPR Terry Gross radio interviewwith Jeremy Scahill 12-16-09 )

Chairman Waxman said, Our focus has been to look up the chain of command, Wehave tried to find out what the White House knew about Corporal Tillmans death. Today we will be examining the actions of the senior leadership at the Department of Defense. what did the senior military leadership know about Corporal Tillmansdeath, when did they know it, and what did they do after they learned it?

Chairman WAXMAN. Our focus has been to look up the chain of command, Wehave tried to find out what the White House knew about Corporal Tillmans death. Today we will be examining the actions of the senior leadership at the Department of Defense. Much of our focus will be on a Personal For message, also known as a P 4,

that Major General Stanley McChrystal sent on April 29, 2004. (p. 2+, HOC 8-01-07)

Chairman WAXMAN. I want to begin the questioning by framing the issue for us.The basic point that we want to learn is what did the senior military leadership knowabout Corporal Tillmans death, when did they know it, and what did they do after theylearned it?
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Chairman Waxman said much of the Committees focus will be on a Personal Formessage, also known as a P 4, that Major General Stanley McChrystal sent on April 29,2004. to Gen. Abizaid, Gen. Brown, and General Kensinger . The purpose of this P 4was to warn President Bush that it was, highly probable or highly possible that anongoing investigation was about to conclude that Corporal Tillman was killed by his ownunit. McChrystal wrote, I felt it was essential that you received this info rmation as soonas we detected it in order to preclude any unknowing statements by our countrys leaderswhich might cause embarrassment if the circumstances of Corporal Tillmans deathbecame public.

At our last hearing [4-24-07] we reviewed a document known as a Personal For, or a P 4 memo. This memo was sent on April 28, 2004, by Major General Stanley McChrystal,the Commander of the Joint Task Force in Afghanistan, where Corporal Tillman was

killed in 2004. This was 4 days before the memorial service, at which the Tillmansand the Nation were told Pat Tillman was killed by hostile fire. And this was an entiremonth before the Pentagon told the Tillman family and the public that Corporal Tillmanwas killed by U.S. forces.

General McChrystal sent this P 4 memo to three people: General Abizaid, from CentralCommand; General Brown, from U.S. Special Operations Command; and GeneralKensinger, from the Army Special Operations Command. The purpose of this P 4 wasto have one or more of these generals warn President Bush, the Secretary of the Army,and other national leaders that it was, highly probable or highly possible that an ongoing

investigation was about to conclude that Corporal Tillman was killed by his own unit. General McChrystal explained why this P 4 message was so important. He stated, I feltit was essential that you received this information as soon as we detected it in order to

preclude any unknowing statements by our countrys leaders which might causeembarrassment if the ci rcumstances of Corporal Tillmans death became public.

(p. 29, HOC 8-01-07)

Chairman Waxman said, For todays hearing, we invited all of the recipients of the P 4 todetermine how they responded. Did they, in fact, alert the White House? Did they alert theArmy Secretary, the Secretary of Defense? Did they pass it up the chain of command?Congressman Cummings asked, I want to ask how is it possible that you didnt knowbefore May 20th that Corporal Tillman died by friendly fire?

Well, this P4 memo was sent on April 29th, 1 week after Corporal Tillmans death.
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need to wait 6 days for a P4! General Brown himself said, It would have been simple for me to pick up the phone and call the General. Instead of focusing on the P4, it would have made moresense to focus on the phone calls. The P4s a red herring; the real information flow was viaphone or face-to-face, without leaving a written trail.

When asked when he first learned about Pat Tillmans friendly fire death, General Myersstuck with I cant recall specifically but he knew right at the end of April that there wasa possibility of fratricide

General MYERS. Yes. The best I can determine, once I got the letter from thecommittee and talked to some of the folks on my staff, is that I knew right at the end of April that there was a possibility of fratricide in the Corporal Tillman death, and thatGeneral McChrystal had started an investigation. So when he [Abizaid] called, if he

called later than that, then I would already have known that. (p. 33, HOC 8-01-07)

GEN Meyers: I cant recall specifically, but it is entirely likely that it i s exactly as he[Abizaid] recalls it.

GEN Meyers: What I would normally do, if I thought the Secretary [Rumsfeld] did notknow that, I would so inform the Secretary. I cannot recall whether or not I did that.

(p. ?, HOC 8-01-07)

When asked when he learned of Pat Tillmans fratricide, Secretary Rumsfeld also usedcreative variations of I dont recall: I just dont have any recollection I simplydo not know I dont remember precisely how I learned that he was killed.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Well, I dont remember. he assumes I was told on or after May20 th. Whether I was told before that, I just dont have any recollection I dont recallwhen I was told, and I dont recall who told me I simply do not know when I firstlearned of the possibility of fratricide I dont remember precisely how I learned thathe was killed. It could have been internally, or it could have been through the press.

(p.?, HOC 8-01-07)

General Abiziad (former Commander CENTCOM) said that the high-priority P4 somehowwent astray for some nebulous reason, It wasnt the first P 4 that went astray and itwasnt the last one. But it happened, and that is all I can say about that. It is verydifficult to come to grips with how we screwed t his thing up, but we screwed this thing up.

Gen ABIZAID: It have been transmitted efficiently and quickly. It was not. It should


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have been transmitted the day after the P 4 arrived in my headquarters. But as I havetestified, there was a problem somewhere between the 28th, and I guess that probably theearliest I would have told the chairman is the 6th. But I called him from Qatar. I was inQatar the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th. And when I called him I was embarrassed about it. AndI do take responsibility for the fact that my headquarters screwed up. I didnt punishanybody. We fixed the problem. It wasnt the first P4 that went astray and it wasnt thelast one. But it happened, and that is all I can say about that. (p. 202, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. Ive received some very interesting P 4s; and sometimes theywould say, Make sure the President knows , or make sure this happens or that happens.There is an interesting thing about the P 4 that says, Deliver during normal duty hours;and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely message ina timely fashion through the most secure channels. And, again, it went to Tampa. I wasforwarded. It didnt get tome in a timely fashion, forward. Thats a problem t hat was

strictly in my command. (p. 223, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. It is very difficult to come to grips with how we screwed thisthing up, but we screwed this thing up. Clearly, General McChrystal knew by the 29ththat there was a high probability, as he described in his message, that there was friendlyfire. The message that General McChrystal sent to me, which was delivered late forproblems that took place at my headquarters as a result of problems that took place atmy headquarters, undoubtedly delayed the information being relayed to the chairman inthe manner that it should have been.

When I discovered the problem, I relayed it to the chairman in as timely a manner as Icould, given the circumstances. But it was clear that somewhere between the 29th andthe and the period where I notified the chairman that this P 4 just hadnt gone to me. Again, no excuses can be offered, but I can tell you a couple of facts. General

McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely fashion. That theinformation flowed poorly through the chain of command to include me is a problem of the chain of command, both administrative and operational. It should have been handled

better and it wasnt. From that, a lot of other bad things may have flowed.(p. 221, HOC 8-01-07)

General Abiziad testified that General McChrystal only told him that Pat Tillman wasKIA, and never told him about the potential fratricide: On the 22nd, the incidentoccurred. I believe on about the 23rd, General McChrystal called me and told me that


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Corporal Tillman had been killed in combat, and that the circumstances surrounding hisdeath were heroic. I called the chairman and discussed that with the chairman

General ABIZAID. On the 22nd, the incident occurred. I believe about the 23rd ,General McChrystal called me and told me that Corporal Tillman had been killed incombat , and that the circumstances surrounding his death were heroic. I called thechairman and discussed that with the chairman. Throughout that period I was in Iraq,Qatar, etc. On the 28th, I went to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, I also had the chanceto talk to the platoon leader, who was Corporal Tillmans platoon leader, and I asked himabout the action, and he gave no indication that there was a friendly fire issue.

(p. 31, HOC 8-01-07)

But Gen Abizaid and Gen McChrystal s testimony about when they were told of Tillmansfratricide are contradictory. McChrystal says he learned of fratricide on the 23 rd , yetAbizaid says McChrystal told him only that Tillman was killed in action. Someone was nottelling the truth. And, as discussed previously, on April 24thMcChrystal was given verbalconfirmation of fratricide, making all the talk by the generals about potential fratricidesheer nonsense!

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: Corporal Tillman was killed on the 22nd of April I arrivedback into Afghanistan from a meeting in Qatar with General Abizaid on about the 23rd,and I was informed, at that point, that they suspected that friendly fire might have beenthe cause of death, and they had initiated what we call a 15 6, or an investigation of that.

And so, we initially were waiting for the outcome of that initial review before we wentforward with any conclusions. So, it was a well-intended intent to get some level of truth before we went up. (p.17, SASC 6-02-09 )

Note: see General McChrystal & General Abizaid Gave Contradictory Testimony atCongressional Hearings for more detailed evidence that McChrystal and/or Abizaid perjuredthemselves during Congressional testimony. Also see DoD IG Timeline and FraticideNotification notes .

Supposedly, Abizaid first received word of potential fratricide when he finally found theP4 after a week s delay [somewhere between 10 and 20 days] : On the 29th, GeneralMcChrystal sent his message, it is my recollection probably the 6th, it is a guess, Icant be sure exactly the date, I called the chairman. I told the chairman about havingreceived G eneral McChrystals message that friendly fire was involved. I said that itwas important that the leadership know. And between the chairman and me I mean, itsclear that the leadership up above us is the Secretary and the President .
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On the 29th, General McChrystal sent his message, and it went to my headquarters inTampa, and it was not retransmitted for reasons of difficulties with our systems withinthe headquarters until the 6th at the earliest, and it could have been later that I received it.But it is my recollection then on the 6th, probably the 6th, it is a guess, I cant be sureexactly the date, I called the chairman. I told the chairman about having received GeneralMcChrystals message that friendly fire was involved.

Chairman WAXMAN. What did you say to him about this P4 memo?

General ABIZAID. I cant remember exactly what I said to him. I said it is clear thatthere is a possibility of fratricide involving the Tillman case; that General McChrystal hasappointed the necessary people to investigate to determine precisely what happened; andthat while it is likely that there is fratricide, we will know for sure after the report is

finalized, which will reach me when it gets done. (p. 31, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. I said that it was important that the leadership know. Andbetween the chairman and me I mean, its clear that the leadership up above us is theSecretary and the President . (p. 223, HOC 8-01-07)

General Abizaid concluded, The incident took place on the 22nd. The chain of command,through me, was notifi ed of Corporal Tillmans death. There was a P 4 sent on the 29th.The first 15 6 report [CPT Scott] was completed on the 4th of May [actually Final Report

was dated April 29 th ], and it was deemed not sufficient by General McChrystal [actuallyCOL Nixon], and another 15 6 officer [LTC Kauzlarich] was appointed on the 8th of May.And on May 25th, that report reached my headquarters, and on May 28th, I approved thatreport. Those are the dates as I know them. But it is clear that all along fratricidewas called as early as the April 29th, [actually 23 rd ] and that on May 28th, we conclusivelystated it was fratricide

General ABIZAID. Here is what I do know, to make sure that we are all talking aboutthe same dates. The incident took place on the 22nd. The chain of command, through me,was notified of Corporal Tillmans death. There was a P 4 sent on the 29th. The first 15 6 report was completed on the 4th of May, and it was deemed not sufficient by GeneralMcChrystal, and another 15 6 officer was appointed on the 8th of May. And on May25th, that report reached my headquarters, and on May 28th, I approved that report.Those are the dates as I know them. (p. 226, HOC 8-01-07)


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General ABIZAID. Congressman, on the 28th I approved the report that came fromGeneral McChrystals command as being definite proof of friendly fire. The May 28th.

(p. 214, HOC 8-01-07)

But it is clear that all along fratr icide was called as early as April 29th, and that on May28th, we conclusively stated it was fratricide, a report that I rendered to the chairman andto the Secretary. In terms of fratricide investigations, by the way, thats not a slowinvestigation. Thats a fast investigation. In looking back, of how we go aboutinvestigating these things after theyve happened, it may seem slow; but in my experiencewith a lot of fratricides , it went probably faster than most. (p. 221, HOC 8-01-07)

Fratricide called as early as Apr il 29 th? But, McChrystal said he learned of friendly-fireon April 23 rd . Then why did he wait six days until he sent his timely P4 message on April

29th

so nobody would be surprised ?

McChrystal said he wanted some level of truth before sending his P4. But just two daysafter Pats death, on April 24 th , the investigating officer CPT Scott passed confirmation of fratricide up the chain of command.

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: I also sent a [P4] message informing my chain of commandthat we believed it was fratricide, and we did that when we were told there were going tobe fairly high- profile memorial services. when I sent the message, the intent entirelywas to inform everyb ody up my chain of command so that nobody would be surprised.

(p.18, SASC 6-02-09 )

LTC BAILEY: Sir, within three or four hours of being out here on the ground by theincident, I went back and I told [COL Nixon] that I was certain that we had killed him. In fact, I think just about everybody around knew that. And certainly, by the next daywhen we did the investigations, I confirmed it. So, after [CPT Scott] did his first five[15-6 investigation ] interviews, he came back to me and said, Sir, Im certain. Imsure. And then I called [COL Nixon]. I think it was the 24 th.

(Jones 15-6, Section Z, p 52-53 )

[See LTC Baileys testimony from the Jones 15-6 report (section Z, p.53), view MaryTillmans copy with names hand-written above redactions]

Just above COL Nixon in the chain of command was Gen. McChrystal, followed by Gen.Abizaid, Gen. Meyers, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Within just two days of
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Tillmans death, confirmation of Tillmans fratricide moved up the chain of command. But, the Abizaid claims it took him five weeks to confirm fratricide.

[Chain of command chart ]

The operational chain of command for CPL Tillmans unit was: (DoD IG, p.12)

1. Headquarters, Operations Team [LTC Bailey, MAJ Hodne?]2. Headquarters, 75 th Ranger Regiment [COL Nixon]3. Headquarters, Joint Task Force [GEN McChrystal]4. CENTCOM [GEN Abizaid]

GEN MeyersSec of Defense Rumsfeld

President Bush

. . .

Representative Clay said, on April 30, 2004, the Army announced that CorporalTillman has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star. It was rushed through so itwould be ready in time for the memorial service for Corporal Tillman on May 3, 2004Clay noted, the Silver Star citation was false. the Def ense Department InspectorGeneral [Gimble] concluded that the Silver Star citation and supporting documents hadmaterially inaccurate statements and erroneously implied that Corporal Tillman died byenemy fire.

Mr. CLAY. on April 30, 2004, the Army Special Operations Command announcedthat Corporal Tillman has been posthumously awarded the Silver Star. It was rushedthrough so it would be ready in time for the memorial service for Corporal Tillman onMay 3, 2004, which was widely covered by the press. (p. 191, HOC 8-01-07)

Mr. CLAY. the Silver Star citation was false. And here is what it says: Corporal

Tillman put himself in the line of devastating enemy fire as he maneuvered his fire teamto a covered position from which they could effectively employ their weapons at knownenemy positions. In his March 26, 2007, report, the Defense Department Inspector General concluded that the Silver Star citation and supporting documents had materiallyinaccurate statements and erroneously implied that Corpora l Tillman died by enemy fire.

(p. 192, HOC 8-01-07)
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Representative Issa asked, Can anybody on this panel give me an answer, how thathappened, that the specialist, on-the-ground eyewitne ss right beside Corporal Tillman, wrote an accurate description of what happened indicating friendly fire; and yetdownstream we follow that time line, we in the Congress and the American people got adifferent story?

Mr. ISSA. Specialist ONeal wrote a witness statement in the immediateaftermath of Corporal Tillmans death that made it quite clear that this was a case of friendly fire. But then something happened. Someone rewrote that statement we hadSpecialist ONeal in, and we showed him the statement and we asked, Did you write this

part? No, I didnt. Did you write this part? No, I didnt. So there was a drastic revision between what the eyewitness wrote and what eventually went to the press Cananybody on this panel give me an answer, how that happened, that the specialist, on-the-

ground eyewitness right beside Corporal Tillman, wrote an accurate description of what happened indicating friendly fire; and yet downstream we follow that time line, wein the Congress and the American pe ople got a different story? (p. 216, HOC 8-01-07)

Rumsfeld and the generals all testified that they werent involved with the Silver Staraward process. General Myers replied, My response is essentially like SecretaryRumsfelds. The chairmans office, the Joint Staff is not involved in these awards. This isan Army responsibility. General Abizaid said, Sir, in General McChrystals personalforward he said the potential that he might have been killed by friendly fire in no way

detracts from his witnessed heroism I believe that the Army has looked at the awardon several different occasions. They have upheld it on every occasion. General Brownagreed with Abizaid , I have talked to General McChrystal several times and the actions of Corporal Tillman, based on the discussion I had with General McChrystal, certainly wouldwarrant a Silver Star.

General MYERS. My response is essentially like Secr etary Rumsfelds. The chairmansoffice, the Joint Staff is not involved in these awards. This is an Army responsibility. Andlike the Secretary, I understand that the wording is being looked at and I alsounderstand and I cant tell you where I heard thi s it may have been in the prep thatGeneral McChrystal thought the actions were heroic whether or not they came fromenemy fire or friendly fire. That was his determination. (p. 193, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. Sir, in General McChrystals personal forward he said the potentialthat he might have been killed by friendly fire in no way detracts from his witnessedheroism or the recommended personal decoration for valor in the face of the enemy. I


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believe that the Army has looked at the award on several different occasions. They haveupheld it on every occasion. Whether or not the wording was correct or not in the initialstage, I do believe that the Corporal Tillman deserved the award that he received.

(p. 193, HOC 8-01-07)

General BROWN. Sir, I believe that I agree with General Abizaid. I have talked to GeneralMcChrystal several times and the actions of Corporal Tillman, based on the discussion I had withGeneral McChrystal, certainly would warrant a Silver S tar. (p. 193, HOC 8-01-07)

Chairman Waxman also noted, At our last hearing, Specialist ONeal told ussomething else. After he submitted his statement, someone else rewrote it. This unnamedperson made significant changes that transformed ONeals account into an enemy attack.We still dont know who did that and why he did it.

Chairman WAXMAN. At our last hearing, Specialist ONeal told us something else.After he submitted his statement, someone else rewrote it. This unnamed person madesignificant changes that transformed ONeals account into an enemy attack. We stilldont know who did that and why he did it. (p. 2+, HOC 8-01-07)

During the Committees last hearing, Representative Braley asked DoD Inspector GeneralGimble who would have been the most likely person to have mad e alterations to thestatement originally prepared by Specialist ONeal? Gimble replied, we could not

determine that. I could speculate, but I just prefer not to. It is somewhere in the approvalchain that it got edited

Mr. BRALEY: Did you ever determine in the course of your investigation who, out of people who had contact with that statement, would have been the most likely person tohave made alterations to the statement originally prepared by Specialist ONeal?

(p.98, HOC 4-24-07 )

Mr. GIMBLE: Actually, no, we could not determine that. I could speculate, but I justprefer not to. It is somewhere in the approval chain that it got edited.

(p.98, HOC 4-24-07 )

But, there were only three people in that approval chain who could have m ade thealterations to the Silver Star recommendation to remove all references to friendly fire:LTC Kauzerlich, Col Nixon, and Gen. McChrystal.

[DoD IG Report: Appendix E: Silver Star Award Process Flowchart showing only three officers
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in that approval chain: LTC Kauzerlich, Col Nixon, and Gen McChrystal ]

And, Gen. McChrystal personally led the Silver Star recommendation process on theground in Afghanistan. He worked with the Ranger Regimental commanders Col Nixonand LTC Kauzerlich. Gen. McChrystal didnt just sign off on a piece o f paper that landedon his desk.

GEN MCCHRYSTAL: In the case of Corporal Tillman, a Silver Star wasrecommended. I sat down with the people [Ranger Regiment officers] whorecommended it [Silver Star]. and we went over a whiteboard, and we looked at thegeometry of the battlefield, and I queried the people to satisfy myself that, in fact, that hisactions warranted that, even though there was a potential that the actual circumstances of death had been friendly fire. (p. 18, SASC 6-02-09 )

Rumsfeld and the generals didnt know anything about who altered the witness statements.Then why didnt the Committee interview MG McChrystal, COL Nixon, or LTCKauzlerich who were in the approval chain? Its especially puzzling the Committeenever questioned McChrystal. McChrystal would have been the logical person to questionabout both the P4 memo and the Silver Star.

. . .

Chairman Waxman attempted to conclude the hearing by summing up when each witness

learned about the friendly fire issue leading to an series of corrections. Finally, Waxmanconcluded with Well, you all knew or didnt know within that timeframe. But it appearsthat all of you had some indication before the ceremony [memorial service] where theworld was being told that Corporal Tillman was killed in the line of duty.

Chairman WAXMAN. OK. Well, let me conclude the hearing by indicating the factsthat General Myers and General Brown knew about the friendly fire issue at the end of April. General Abizaid learned on May 6th. Secretary Rumsfeld learned on May 20th.All of these are the senior leaders that knew before the public and the family

Mr. RUMSFELD. Could I correct that?

Chairman WAXMAN. Yes.

Mr. RUMSFELD. I want to make sure this is precisely accurate. I do not believe Itestified that I learned on May 20th, and if that impression has been left, I dont want thatleft. My testimony is that I do not recall; that is the letter I gave to the IG. I was told that
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a person was in a meeting after May 20 th when I was informed. But that is I just simplydo not know when I first learned of the possibility of fratricide.

Chairman WAXMAN. I appreciate that correction.

General ABIZAID. And, sir, if I may, I also wanted to make sure that the 6th is alogical day. It is not the day; the day is somewhere between 10 and 20 days after theevent. Its the best that my staff and I could come to a conclusion on at this point.

Chairman WAXMAN. You were all very busy. There is no question about it.

General BROWN. Sir, one other thing, if I could interrupt also to correct. Yourstatement was that I knew about the friendly fire, I knew that there was an investigationongoing, the potential for friendly fire.

General MYERS. That goes for me, too.

General ABIZAID. And for me, as well. (p. 223, HOC 8-01-07)

Chairman WAXMAN. Well, you all knew or didnt know within that timeframe. But itappears that all of you had some indication before the ceremony where the world wasbeing told that Corporal Tillman was killed in the line of duty. He was getting the SilverStar. It was a memorial service where this information, this misinformation, was given

out.

Chairman Waxman closed the hearing by saying, And you have all admitted that thesystem failed. So I just think that the public should have known, the family should haveknown earlier who was responsible. But none of you feel that you personally areresponsible, but the system itself didnt work. We are obviously trying to find out whatwent on and who had responsibility, who dropped the ball. The system didnt work.Errors were made. Thats too passive. Somebody should be responsible

And you have all admitted that the system failed. So I just think that the public shouldhave known, the family should have known earlier who was responsible. But none of you feel that you personally are responsible, but the system itself didnt work.

Ironically enough, the President could have called you all in and said, Why didnt Iknow about this when there was a P 4 memo? But somehow or another it seemed like


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the President avoided embarrassment as well. So maybe somebody did know at the WhiteHouse that this was likely to be friendly fire, on more thorough investigation.

You have been here a long time. I appreciate your taking the time to be with us. We areobviously trying to find out what went on and who had responsibility, who dropped theball. The system didnt work. Errors were made. Thats too passive. Somebody shouldbe responsible, and were trying to figure that out. (p. 224, HOC 8-01-07)

. . .

During his opening statement, Chairman Waxman noted, General Kensinger refused toappear today. His attorney informed the committee that General Kensinger would nottestify voluntarily, The committee did issue a subpoena to General Kensinger earlier this

week, but U.S. Marshals have been unable to locate or serve him

three officers received this P 4 report: Lieutenant General Kensinger, GeneralAbizaid and General Brown. General Kensinger refused to appear today. His attorneyinformed the committee that General Kensinger would not testify voluntarily, and, if issued a subpoena, would seek to evade service. The committee did issue a subpoena toGeneral Kensinger earlier this week, but U.S. Marshals have been unable to locate orserve him (p. 2+, HOC 8-01-07)

BARBARA STARR: While we heard from Rumsfeld today, we did not hear fromPhilip Kensinger, the retired three star general who led Army Special Forces at the timeof Pat Tillman's death. Just yesterday, he was censored for "a failure of leadership" --that's a quote -- and was found "guilty of deception. Committee Chairman HenryWaxman says Kensinger was invited to testify, refused to appear. He was subpoenaed,but could not be lo cated. (CNN Situation Room, 8-01-07 )

CNN reporter Barbara Starr said, There is another man who will not be in the room.That is Lieutenant General Stan McChrystal. General McChrystal was also invited by

the Committee to testify at the hearing. However, McChrystal never appeared. Unlikewith General Kensinger, Chairman Waxman never explained McChrystals absence.

(screen print 7-20-07 listing McChrystal as invited to testify )

BARBARA STARR: "There is another man who will not be in the room. That isLieutenant General Stan McChrystal. It should be very clear to everyone, GeneralMcChrystal is the head of covert special forces. The so-called dark or black forces. The
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ones who stay undercover ... Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covertspecial forces, he is not appearing in public. And so he will not be questioned further bythe committee in an open hearing. (CNN, 8-01-07 )

Note: I could not locate the original transcript for this quote at the CNN website [quote is fromStan McChrystal: The New U.S. Commander in Afghanistan (Time, 5-12-09 )].

Barbara Starr explained, Because of his extraordinarily sensitive position with covertspecial forces, he is not appearing in public. And so he will not be questioned further by thecommittee in an open hearing. Perhaps Im reading things into that quote, but it suresounds as though the Committee had already questioned McChrystal in a secret closedhearing! (In May 2008, the Senate Armed Services committee held just such a secrethearing for McChrystals promotion to Director of the Joint Staff).

Did the Committee hold a secret closed hearing with General McChrystal? Why didntMcChrystal appear at the August 1 st hearing? Did he refuse to testify? Or did ChairmanWaxman decide to drop McChrystal from the witness list? ( Was Waxmans excuse that,the previous day, Secretary Geren had exonerated McChrystal of all wrong -doing andthat McChrystal supposedly tried to alert his chain of command [with his P4 memo] thatTillman may have been killed by friendly fire?)

Chairman Waxman concluded his hearing by saying, We are obviously trying to find outwhat went on and who had responsibility Errors were made. Thats too passive.

Somebody should be responsible Then why didnt Chairman Waxman have GeneralMcChrystal testify at his hearing? McChrystal directed the writing of the fraudulentSilver Star recommendation and wrote the misleading P4 memo, both issues that werecentral to the Committees investiga tion.

Later, in 2008, Kensinger testified in a closed hearing with the Committee. But Gen.McChrystal never testified before the Committee. Its puzzling the Committe e neverquestioned McChrystal. Did Chairman Waxman drop McChrystal from the witness list toshield him from public scrutiny of his central role in the Tillman cover-up? Perhaps it hadsomething to do with the fact the McChrystal was the only general who had not yet retired?

Was the Committees investigation just yet another smokescreen thrown in the face of the Tillman family?

. . .

Although General McChrystal did not appear at the hearing, his fellow generals were fullof praise for him during , echoing the remarks that Secretary of the Army Geren and
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General Cody made during the Wallace briefing the previous day. General Myers said,When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated an investigation, that was thatwas good for me. I knew his integrity. We will learn the truth. General Abizaidsaid, General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely fashion. and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing. He sent a timely messagein a timely fashion through the most secure channels . The witnesses before the OversightComm ittee couldnt recall when they learned of Tillmans fratricide, but they were allcertain McChrystal did the right thing.

General MYERS. When I learned that General McChrystal had initiated aninvestigation, that was that was good for me. I know he had worked for me before. Iknew his integrity. I said, this is good, and they are going to do an investigation. We willlearn the truth. (p. 33, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. Again, no excuses can be offered, but I can tell you a couple of facts. General McChrystal reported the incident in a forthright and in a timely fashion.That the information flowed poorly through the chain of command to include me is aproblem of the chain of command, both administrative and operational. It should havebeen handled better and it wasnt. From that, a lot of other bad things may have flowed.

(p. 218, HOC 8-01-07)

General ABIZAID. There is an interesting thing about the P 4 that says, Deliverduring normal duty hours ; and so again General McChrystal did exactly the right thing .He sent a timely message in a timely fashion through the most secure channels. And,

again, it went to Tampa. I was forwarded. It didnt get to me in a timely fashion,forward. Thats a problem that was strictly in my command. (p. 223, HOC 8-01-07)

Note: I dont understand how McChrystal sent a timely message in a timely fashion throughthe most secure channels McChrystal knew of potential fratricide on the 23 rd (and confirmedfratricide on the 24 th) yet supposedly waited 6 days until he sent his P4 to warm of friendly fire?How can that delay be considered timely or forthright?

During the Committees hearing, Rumsfeld and the generals echoed Secretary Geren andGeneral Cody s scapegoating of General Kensinger for failing to do his duty in theadministrative chain of command (as opposed to the operational chain of commandwhich included McChrystal and Abizaid). General Abizaid said, The administrativechain of command in this case, handles things like notification of families, awa rds,logistics, etc. Secretary Rumsfeld said, Abizaid, who was the combatant commander in


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that case, he was fighting a war. He was busy. He was traveling all over the world. Andthere is an attraction to moving the responsibility for such an investigation over to theadministrative chain, General Brown said, Awards goes through service channels,as everyone else here has mentioned here, It is an administrative command, goesthrough the administrative chain, which is U.S. Army, not Special Operat ions Command.

. General ABIZAID. Sir, I think it is very important to understand that the way the war-fighting system is designed is to keep the operational commanders hands free withforward-looking battlefield activities and operational decisions. The administrative chainof command in this case, handles things like notification of families, awards, logistics,etc. And I think it would not be beneficial to try to saddle the combatant commander withall the administrative functions, because it would cause his staff to become too big, toounwieldy, and would frequently cause that person to take their eye off of the immediate

actions going on in the battlefield. (p. 206, HOC 8-01-07)

Mr. RUMSFELD. the command responsibility is separated from the organizedtrain-and-equip responsibility. However, in the middle at various places, there areindividuals who have a hat, if you will, in both of those. Should it be done in theadministrative chain or the command chain? Obviously, the problems usually happen inthe command chain, so there is a tendency to be biased toward that. On the other hand,you take a man like John Abizaid, who was the combatant commander in that case, hewas fighting a war. He was busy. He was traveling all over the world. And there is anattraction to moving the responsibility for such an investigation over to the administrative

chain, because those individuals are not engaged in the actual chain of command andwrestling with those problems. (p. 205, HOC 8-01-07)

General BROWN. Awards goes through service channels, as everyone else here hasmentioned here, and do not go through Special Operations Command, Tampa, FL. It is anadministrative command, goes through the administrative chain, which is U.S. Army, notSpecial Operations Command. (p. 193, HOC 8-01-07)

Note: Gen. Kensinger was scapegoated by the Army for his failure to notify the Tillman familyof friendly-fire and to initiate the safety investigation. But, if you look at the DoD IG reportsAppendices C & D, youll see that both the notification and investigative responsibilities laywith the operational chain of command. That is, with Gen. Abizaid and Gen. McChrystal.

Congressman Tierney asked General Meyer, Did anybody at your staff talk to anybody atthe White House? General Myers replied, I cant tell you that. There are some things, by


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the way, that circulate in public affairs channels that could be like that. But I wasnt awareof that. General Myers made several references to some things that circulate in publicaffairs channels. Yet the Committee didnt probe into th e Public Affairs channels. Nordid the DoD IG Gimble, who said during the April hearing, That is kind of the Public

Affairs chain of command , and that wasnt really a part of what we were looking at.

General MYERS. Yes, and I told in working with my former public affairs adviser , Isaid, you know, we need to keep this in mind in case we go before the press. We have

just got to calibrate ourselves. With this investigation ongoing, we want to be careful howwe portray the situation. (p. 33, HOC 8-01-07)

General MYERS. Well, first of all, I did not know that Corporal Tillman had beenkilled by friendly fi re. I didnt say that. What I said was that I was informed that it ispossibly friendly fire, and that there is an investigation ongoing. In terms of notifying thefamily, that is in Army channels, and we have just talked about the regret there is for thefact that was not done properly. If it had been done properly, my assumption would bethey would have known before the memorial service. So I did not know it was friendlyfire until the investigation. Like Secretary Rumsfeld, when you are in a senior position,you have to be very careful what you say about it. And that is why I talked to the publicaffairs officer . (p. 37, HOC 8-01-07)

. . .

Mr. TIERNEY. General Myers, at that time you were the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff. You were the principal military adviser to the President and the NationalSecurity Council, the Secretary of Defense. Did you advise the President or anyone at theWhite House that there was a fratricide investigation?

General MYERS. Bear in mind again I had not seen the P 4. All I knew was that therewas potential for fratricide, there was an investigation ongoing. I do not recall and amfully certain I didnt talk to anyone at the White House about that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Did anybody at your staff talk to anybody at the White House?

General MYERS. I cant tell you that. There are some things, by the way, that circulatein public affairs channels that could be like that. But I wasnt aware of that.

Mr. TIERNEY. Who on your staff would have been in that loop, the public affairsloop?


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General MYERS. My public affairs officer was then Captain Frank Thorpe, and I doremember talking to him about the potential of fratricide and saying we have to becautious here; if we make any comments, we have to bear that in mind.

Mr. TIERNEY. And who would that persons contact at the White House be?

General MYERS. I dont know. Routinely he would never talk to the White House.They would talk to the services public affairs officers. He would also talk to the Office of Secretary of Defenses public affairs folks . But I cant imagine him ever talking to the White House, unless it was on a conference call where he was included.

(p. 181, HOC 8-01-07). . .

Chairman WAXMAN. Do you know if there was a response to the e-mail sent from the

White House?Mr. GIMBLE. I am not aware of any. That is kind of the Public Affairs chain of command , and that wasnt really a part of what we were looking at.

(p.103, HOC 4-24-07)

Note: Clearly there was a lot going on in the Public Affairs channels concerning Tillman sdeath. Unfortunately, the Committee was stone-walled when they asked for documents. Or, forthat matter, what was flowing through the channels of the Adjutant General (lawyers) chain of command. Its preposterous that the Army is arguing that all these guys, who were advising the

commanders, failed to properly read and understand the regulations!

"The [Untold] Tillman Story" Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing (7/06/10)

Documents

Transcript of "The [Untold] Tillman Story" Appendix D2 -- August 1, 2007 Congressional Hearing (7/06/10)