NWC 2061G

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

A Primer for: The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), Guidance for

Employment of the Force (GEF), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP), the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and

Global Force Management (GFM)

by

Professor Michael McGauvran

15 July 2017

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Table of Contents

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) . . . . . . . . . . 3

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Theater and Functional Campaign Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Security Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Global Force Management (GFM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

1

The purpose of this primer is to provide an unclassified overview of the Joint Strategic

Planning System (JSPS), the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), the Joint

Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Regional and Functional Campaign Plans, the

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) System, and Global Force Management

(GFM).

The Joint Strategic Planning System

The JSPS provides the structure for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to interact

with National, Congressional, and DoD processes; it encompasses how the Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out statutory responsibilities assigned in Titles 6, 10, 22,

and 50 of the United States Code. The Chairman’s primary roles within the JSPS, listed

in figure 1, are to Direct, Execute, Assess, and Advise. This primer will focus on the

Direct and Execute roles of the Chairman.

Figure 1: The Chairman’s Statutory Roles and Responsibilities

The Chairman assists the President and SecDef in providing unified strategic direction to

the Armed Forces by linking the President’s and SecDef’s national strategic objectives to

the military strategy, plans, and resources needed to achieve them. The Chairman’s

strategic guidance is issued in the National Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Strategic

Capabilities Plan, the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, and Joint Training

Guidance.

For execution, the Chairman assists the President and SecDef by translating their

direction into coordinated military missions, tasks, and activities. These missions, tasks,

and activities include Global Force Management, producing the SecDef’s Orders Book,

2

validating Joint requirements via the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and

conducting strategic analysis. Figure 2 illustrates how the Chairman’s statutory

requirements and associated processes align with SecDef and National Security Council

(NSC) processes.

Figure 2: JSPS in Relation to OSD and the NSC

Please keep in mind that the JSPS is a four-year cycle beginning with the President’s

inauguration. By law, the President must produce a National Security Strategy within

150 days of inauguration. This ‘new’ document drives the publication of major OSD and

JSPS strategy documents (to include the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), NMS,

Unified Campaign Plan (UCP), GEF, and JSCP) in the President’s second year in office.1

These strategic-direction documents are then reevaluated and, if required, updated in year

four. The assessment and advice documents are generated annually (see CJCSI 3100.01C

for a notional four year schedule of these processes). Moreover, while the National

Security Strategy (NSS) and the NMS are two major national strategies, strategic

guidance may also be found in several other documents in the ever-expanding library of

national guidance documents. These include the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,

the National Strategy to Combat WMD, and 14 other similar documents.

The JSPS is how the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff carries out statutory

responsibilities assigned in Titles 6, 10, 22, and 50 of the United States Code. Once the

documents required for Strategic Direction are available, the Chairman and the Joint Staff

1 Although these processes/steps (Figure 2) are linearly depicted, they are often developed

concurrently. Additionally, though OSD, the Joint Staff, or the NSC are depicted as the approval authority,

most of the documents are developed with formal (or informal) collaboration with the Service Chiefs,

CCDR’s, DoD agencies and the Joint Staff.

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then produce documents which guide joint force employment and management. The first

document, developed by the OSD staff and approved by the SecDef, is the Guidance for

the Employment of the Force, or GEF.

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)

Background

In previous years, OSD strategic guidance to combatant commanders and their staffs

were contained in five separate documents. As these documents were released

independently and at different times, one could characterize the coherency of the

collective strategic guidance as sub-optimal. Recognizing the inefficiencies, these five

separate guidance documents, listed below, were consolidated and integrated in 2008 into

a single, comprehensive strategic directive known as the Guidance for Employment of the

Force.

Security Cooperation- Tasks combatant commanders with developing theater

Campaign plans to illustrate how all steady-state activities in their respective

AORs contribute to strategic end states. Provides focus areas and tools for

combatant commanders (CCDRs) to integrate into their peacetime military

engagement activities on a regional basis, thereby gaining efficiency through the

coordination of engagement activities, theater end states, and objectives.

Contingency Planning- Directs and guides the development of contingency plans,

which will be branches to the campaign plan.

Global Posture- Provides DoD-wide global defense posture realignment guidance,

to include DoD’s broad strategic themes for posture changes and overarching

posture planning guidance, which inform the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(JSCP) theater posture planning guidance. It establishes the requirement for

combatant commanders to submit theater posture plans annually.

Global Force Management- Enables global sourcing regardless of the command

or Service to which the force is assigned. Provides a decision framework for

making assignment and allocation recommendations to the SecDef and

apportionment recommendations to the CJCS. The Force Allocation Decision

Matrix provides the framework for prioritizing CCDR force sourcing

requirements with finite forces. Allows for the SecDef to make proactive, risk

informed force management allocation decisions.

Nuclear Weapons Planning- Self-explanatory.

.

Melding multiple sources of strategic planning guidance into one document minimized

the possibility of conflicting guidance. It also resulted in a more expansive document

directing Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to develop theater (or functional) strategies to

meet GEF objectives and, in turn, create and execute a Campaign Plan (CP) to obtain

these objectives. The overarching CP would integrate steady-state events, for example,

ongoing operations and security cooperation activities and contingency plans (developed

through contingency planning) were to be linked to the CP as branches and would be

executed should the CP fail to achieve desired results (e.g., maintain the peace).

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The 2015 GEF

The 2015 GEF is greatly changed from previous editions. First, the timeframe has shrunk

from a previous 10-year to a two to five year horizon. In short, the GEF is now ‘less

strategic’; it has gone from an ‘aspirational’ strategy-central document with strategic end-

states to a more achievable threat-based document listing specific, resource constrained

campaign objectives. Secondly, it introduces a planning construct designed to address

threats as larger ‘problem sets’ rather than piecemeal through individual contingency

plans. This approach recognizes that many threats (e.g., non-state actors, WMD) or

missions (Cyber, Global Deployment Operations, etc.) cross UCP-directed boundaries

and emphasizes the need for CCDR’s to plan collaboratively. Finally, the 2015 GEF,

recognizing increasing resource constraints, introduced new readiness and availability

priorities to improve DoD’s ability to balance force allocation between regional

engagement and surge response to a major contingency.

While the GEF’s time horizon has

shortened, the CCDR’s campaign plan

remains the central mechanism for

integrating DoD steady-state activities.

Campaign plans should focus on defusing

strategic problems before they become

crises and resolve crises before a large

scale contingency response is needed (see

Figure 3). At the same time, CP’s should

also set the conditions for success should

contingency operations be required. The

focus on CCDR collaboration and prevention reflects OSD’s expectation that continued

resource limitations will ‘require different methods to attain near-term objectives with

fewer resources’ (this subject is discussed in more depth later in the Global Force

Management section). Finally, the 2015 GEF’s shorter time horizon drove a

corresponding reduction in the number of chapters. From the previous ten chapters, the

GEF now contains six chapters; Contingency Planning Guidance and NUWEP are

located in separate annexes:

Chap 1. Introduction: Self-explanatory.

Chap 2. Global Priorities and Assumptions: Discusses global security priorities based

on near-term threats, lists the top priority planning (problem sets) requirements (and three

lesser priorities), and provides 2-5 year strategic-level assumptions. Again, Contingency

Planning Guidance (CPG), once folded into the GEF, is now located in a separate annex.

Chap 3. Resource Planning Guidance: Provides direction and planning factors for the

resources available to support CCDR steady-state theater campaign objectives and

respond to emerging threats given a two to five year horizon (resources include forces,

security cooperation, contingency and operations and maintenance funding). This

chapter further states that DoD must have a “global view” of the Joint Force to include

Figure 3: Campaign Planning

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current forces and commitment, availability and readiness. To accomplish this, the GEF

requires development and implementation of a centralized, automated system for Joint

Force reporting to replace the Global Status of Resources and Training System

(GSORTS). This system will assist decision makers in force allocation decisions to

better balance the need / ability to surge against the need for global engagement.

This chapter also provides CCDR’s a “minimum” or baseline force—and requires

CCDR’s to identify—and justify—the forces and capabilities required to support then in

steady-state activities. One assumes this is to assist CCDR’s in resource allocation given

the reduction of DoD resources and the need to shift forces from region to region based

on emerging threats. Finally, many plans that didn’t require a Time Phased Force

Deployment Data (TPFDD) now require a “force closure estimate.”

Chap 4. General Campaign Planning Guidance: Provides broad planning guidance for

the development of CCDR (both theater and functional) campaign plans. Given the

lesser time horizon, campaign objectives are prioritized and are designed to be militarily

achievable with in a five-year period. CCDR’s responsible for CP’s will establish

Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) that directly—and measurably—contributes to

the achievement of each GEF campaign objective.

Chap 5. Implementation Guidance: Levies the requirement for campaign plans to be

assessed annually (bi-annually once the plan is approved). Discusses the plan approval

process (In-Progress Reviews (IPR’s) (see CJCSI’s 3110.01 and 3141.01), and

coordination instructions for plan coordination with allies and partners. Requires that

Level 1, 2 and 3 contingency plans be reviewed annually or as directed, and given the

new focus on collaborative planning and problem sets, plans dealing with the same threat

will normally be reviewed together to better understand the force and risk dynamics.

This chapter also requires each CCMD to use APEX for planning and produce an annual

assessment of how well the CCDR’s campaign plan is meeting the GEF directed

objectives. To support this assessment requirement, a list of questions to be answered is

provided. Finally, guidance is provided on CCMD interaction for planning with other

departments / agencies: informal action officer contact can be made with other

departments / agencies, but SecDef approval is needed before formalizing plans.

Chap 6. Steady-State Planning Guidance: This final chapter, subdivided by regional

and functional Combatant Command, provides strategic context, U.S. goals and DoD

priorities for each combatant command. It lists strategic-level (broad) campaign

objectives, assumptions, and regional posture planning guidance.

Despite the shorter time-frame and the threat-centric vice strategy centric approach, the

GEF’s focus remains on the steady-state campaign plan as the central mechanism to

achieve assigned campaign objectives. The GEF, together with the NSS, NMS (and

Dense Planning Guidance, if issued) are then used by the Joint Staff and Chairman to

provide CCDR’s more specific guidance and tasking via the JSCP.

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The 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

Integrating separate OSD-level guidance

documents into the GEF reduced the

possibility of conflicting strategic guidance.

To minimize guidance conflicts between the

SecDef’s GEF and the Chairman’s JSCP,

these documents were envisioned to be

developed concurrently; the OSD staff and

the Joint Staff would work on the documents

in tandem. That said, the JSCP is driven by

the requirements within the GEF (see

Figure 4). The JSCP (CJCSI 3110.01J) also

leverages the GEF; rather than restate

portions of the GEF, it refers readers to the

GEF for campaign objectives and other

guidance. The JSCP, with the GEF, provides

guidance to the CCDRs, the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the Services, and specific DoD agencies

to accomplish tasks and missions based on

current military capabilities.

The 2015 JSCP reflects the changes in the 2015 GEF vis-à-vis resource informed

planning, near-term campaign plan prioritized objectives, and integrated problem set

planning. The GEF’s transformation from a

strategic 10-year to a two to five year look reduced

the need for JSCP specificity somewhat. For

example, the previous GEF listed the required

contingency plans and the JSCP assigned the plans

to specific CCMDs. Today, the GEF assigns

CCMD leads for the listed mission and problem

sets in the CPG Annex, eliminating the need for

the JSCP to do so (though the JSCP, mirroring the

GEF, also moved CPG guidance to a separate,

TOP SECRET supplement). As a result, the 2015

JSCP, like the GEF, is shorter than previous

versions and is now organized into six enclosures

(see Figure 5).

Despite being shorter, the JSCP still provides

additional, more specific planning guidance to the

CCMDs. In broad terms, the GEF can be

considered “what” needs to be done; the JSCP is more

“how” the GEF requirements should be met. Sometimes the additional JSCP guidance is

little more that coordination instructions, e.g., what office and when to contact members

Figure 4: National Strategic Direction

Figure 5: JSCP Enclosures

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Figure 6: Joint Phasing Construct

of the Joint Staff to schedule GEF required IPRs, provide required assessments of CP’s

and so forth. Other guidance is definitional and / or provides additional direction; for

example, the 2015 JSCP added an appendix and chapter to clarify OSD policy on security

cooperation and integrated planning respectively. Directive guidance is seen in the

JSCP’s guidance to CCDR’s on meeting the GEF’s requirement to develop an

overarching strategy and Campaign Plan. The 2015 JSCP provides additional guidance

on what a CCMD strategy is and what it does—and suggests how to develop a strategy to

meet the GEF tasking. Finally, the JSCP provides additional, more focused direction on

the campaign plan the CCDR needs to meet to obtain the GEF directed campaign

objectives (Enclosure D provides each CCMD campaign plan intent, followed by more

specific requirements). The GEF, for example, has a half-page of prioritized campaign

objectives for one CCMD; the JSCP’s more specific directives span two pages.

The JSCP is the Chairman’s document. It is informed by the NSS, the NMS (and other

strategic documents) and nests with the GEF to provide CCDR’s additional, more

specific guidance and direction to meet SecDef requirements.

Theater and Functional Campaign Plans

Perhaps the greatest

change created by the

2008 GEF / JSCP

guidance is the

requirement for CCDRs

to develop campaign

plans to support their

theater (or functional)

strategies. The intent of

the campaign plan is to

“operationalize” CCDRs’

strategies and to

transition planning from a

“contingency–centric”

focus to a “strategy-

centric” design—with an

eye towards identifying

all steady-state force and

resource requirements.

While CCDRs have been given latitude in how the campaign plan might be constructed,

they are expected to include:

A comprehensive integration of steady-state activities (security cooperation and

other shaping activities) with the Phase 0 of combatant command contingency plans.

“Phase 0” refers to “shaping” in joint doctrine (see Figure 6).

o Theater posture plans are annexes to the theater campaign plans.

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o Contingency plans become “branches” to the campaign plan—with associated

‘triggers’ to review these plan should execution appear likely.

Identification of supporting “force providers,” that is, Services, CCMDs, and select

defense agencies and field activities which will develop campaign support plans.

Another critical element of this new “strategy-centric” paradigm is a forcing mechanism

to synchronize functional campaign plans with theater campaign plans. As the title

implies, functional campaign plans impact multiple theaters; therefore, supporting

CCDR’s must develop subordinate plans in support of the lead or supported CCDR’s

functional campaign plan. These subordinate plans are then embedded in the CCDR’s

own theater campaign plan (see Figure 7). The 2015 GEF / JSCP, as touched on earlier,

expand this ‘collaborative / integrated’ planning to the regional CCDRs with the use of

problem sets. This broader review of challenges acknowledges that more than one

regional or functional CCMD’s resources can be brought to bear against a problem to

meet the SecDef’s strategic objectives. Again, an emphasis on the need for a ‘global

perspective”.

Since the CCDR’s theater campaign plan “operationalizes” the commander’s theater

strategy, one should expect to find a theater campaign plan containing the common

characteristics seen in Figure 7. First and foremost, the campaign plan should flow from

the commander’s strategy (see Figure 8). This expectation could be problematic,

however. A CCDR may choose to publish an unclassified strategy—after all, a CCMD

has a broad audience. Communicating a

strategy to regional partners and

adversaries (much like an unclassified

NSS and NMS) has its own intended

outcomes. This ‘messaging’ strategy

could deprive the planners of the clarity

found in unvarnished concerns and

expectations that would be more closely

held—sharpness that would likely prove

useful to campaign planners. As such, the

commander’s classified theater

Figure 7: Generic Campaign Plan Construct

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campaign plan will likely require a bit of “reverse engineering” to ensure the CCDR’s

objectives are free of ambiguity.

While each combatant command’s campaign plan may approach the task differently, a

GEF directed campaign plan will ultimately address the commander’s Area of

Responsibility (AOR) in an interconnected manner (problem sets and integrated

planning) and seek to avoid a myopic focus on one or two stove-piped contingency plans

developed during contingency planning. While directed contingency plans must be

linked to the campaign plan, they are branch plans in the event of campaign plan

‘failures’. In addition, the theater campaign plan must include and support the CCDR’s

Theater Posture Plan. The Theater Posture Plan uses three interdependent posture

elements to define the need, plan for, and assess U.S. overseas military presence.

The nature of host-nation relationships, including associated legal arrangements.

The footprint of facilities, personnel, force structure, and equipment.

The steady-state and surge activities of U.S. military forces.

One aspect of the theater campaign plan which should support greater cohesion is the

requirement to closely integrate security cooperation objectives into the theater campaign

plan. In theory, the very nature of many security cooperation activities, which often span

multiple objectives and outcomes, will assist in the campaign plan’s goal of a cohesive

framework.

Security Cooperation (SC)

Security cooperation activities, which are integrated into the CCDR’s campaign plan, are

grouped into ten focus areas.

Human Capacity/Human Capital Development – Facilitate activities which

enhance and/or develop Partner nation’s military members and civilian security

officials’ capacity to sustain their defense sector over time.

Operational Capacity and Capability Building – Build usable, relevant, and

enduring Partner capabilities while achieving U.S. and Partner objectives.

Institutional Capacity – Strengthen Partner nation’s security sector long-term

institutional capacity and capability through Security Force Assistance (SFA).

Support to Institutional Capacity/ Civil-Sector Capacity Building – Strengthen

Partner nation’s non-security civil sector capacity and capability to deliver services

to its own population through stable and effective civil sector institutions.

Combined Operations Capacity, Interoperability, and Standardization –

Develop operational and technical capabilities, doctrine, and tactics, techniques and

procedures with Partner nations to enable effective combined operations or improve

a collective defense capability.

Operational Access and Global Freedom of Action – Gain unfettered access to

and freedom of action in all operational domains. Support global defense posture

realignment and larger U.S. political and commercial freedom of action and access

needs.

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Intelligence and Information Sharing – Gain and/or share specific kinds of

intelligence or information and develop shared assessments of common threats.

Assurance and Regional Confidence Building – Assure Allies and Partners,

enhance regional stability and security, reduce the potential for inter- or intra-state

conflict and international consensus building, and/or expand community of like-

minded states dedicated to more peaceful and secure international order.

International Armaments and Space Cooperation – Encourage armaments and

space activity cooperation activities with allies, Partner nations and alliances (e.g.,

NATO to increase efficiencies, leverage expertise, and enhance relationships.

International Suasion and Collaboration – Build cooperative political-military

relationships with key security influencers and offset counterproductive influence in

key regions and international organizations

The CCDR’s campaign plan integrates and synchronizes current activities and future

shaping operations with contingency plans and provides Service components and

operational-level commander’s strategic objectives and goals. The Maritime Security

Cooperation Policy: an Integrated Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard Approach (2013)

prescribes a planning framework for the Navy-Marine Corps-Coast Guard headquarters,

regional components, force providers, and SC enabling providers to achieve an integrated

maritime approach to SC to support the CCDR’s campaign plan. Navy Component

Commanders (NCCs) balance their naval service policy/strategy with the theater

campaign plans (TCP) of CCDRs and provide guidance to the fleet in the form of

Maritime Security Cooperation Plans (MSCPs). MSCPs provide resourcing guidance

and maritime capabilities to the tactical maritime commanders for further planning and

execution that support achievement of the CCDR’s theater objectives. Maritime staffs

utilize higher headquarters guidance and country-specific information normally resident

in appendices to the TCP and can leverage two key publications, the NWP 5-01, Navy

Planning, and the NTTP

3.07-15 (2010), Navy

Component Commander

Support to Theater

Security Cooperation, to

develop the MSCP.

As can be seen in

Figure 10, a close

nesting of a component’s

security cooperation

activities/actions will

support the combat

commander’s theater

campaign plan and its Figure 10: Nesting of Security Cooperation Activities

with CCDR’s Strategy

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associated Intermediate Military Objectives (IMO) and/or strategic objectives. When

planning security cooperation activities, staffs must be able to identify the ultimate

objective of a given activity and be able to assess the results of said activity.

Assessment

A critical requirement in the planning construct—and the requirement is often repeated in

the 2015 GEF— is the need for regular assessments to provide annual, or as directed,

feedback to the SecDef on:

Change in the strategic environment

To what extent did CP implementation shape the environment

Implications of executing strategic outcomes

Program execution and output

Critical points of the assessment process include:

The CJCS is responsible for building an annual comprehensive assessment and

for providing an independent analysis

The assessment focuses on more than security cooperation

That all CCDR’s are responsible for establishing baselines, IMO’s, and metrics

that support achievement of their respective campaign objectives.

That CCDR’s and other defense agencies / departments that administer global

security cooperation initiatives must provide assessments of program execution

and output (to include the execution of campaign support plans).

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

Adaptive Planning

GEF directed (or CCDR directed) contingency plans are developed using the Joint

Planning Process (JPP). Contingency plans typically address a possible future crisis and

are therefore often conceptual in nature. Uncertainty of when the plan will be executed

requires planners to make assumptions across the DIME, e.g., who will be the political /

military leaders and what are their objectives? Who are the allies, both friendly and

enemy? What are the enemy (and friendly) force composition and locations? Many

assumptions are made so detailed planning may continue. A large number of assumptions,

however, can result in a less than executable plan if many of the planning assumptions

prove incorrect. Contrast this with crisis planning for emergent or unforeseen events

where there is less ambiguity and fewer assumptions, yet also less time to understand the

complexities of the operational environment or explore alternative course of action.

Leveraging time is one advantage of contingency planning. With the potential conflict on

a distant horizon, CCMD planning staffs have the time to investigate multiple courses of

action. They also have time to shape the environment through the campaign plan to

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either avoid the crisis or shape the environment to better support the contingency plan

should it be executed (example: War Plan Orange and the development of U.S.

amphibious doctrine to support the plan’s island-hopping strategy). But time can also be

a weakness; many large-scale contingencies in the past, e.g., DESSERT STORM, were

contingency planned yet when the crisis came, conditions were not as expected.

Assumptions were often invalid and a multi-month, around-the-clock effort to produce a

new plan began.

The Adaptive Planning initiative was designed to ‘close the gap’ between the Joint

Operation Planning and Execution System’s2 (JOPES) former “deliberate” and “crisis

action” planning processes—to avoid the oft-seen, time-intensive need to re-plan

contingency plans (APEX, as well as the 2017 JP 5.0, have removed the terms

“deliberate” and “crisis action” planning. Since they both use the Joint Planning Process,

they fall under the umbrella term “contingency planning”). The intent of AP is to

produce relevant contingency plans more quickly, and then update them annually (or as

needed) to ensure the assumptions upon which the plan was based remained valid. If the

assumptions changed, the plan would be updated. This, in theory, would keep these plans

current and therefore more executable.

Tightening the time line could make these plans more relevant, but CCMD planning

staffs, especially the J-5, were already overwhelmed with the tasked number of plans and

the planning detail required (annexes, TPFDD, etc.). Adding a requirement to develop

contingency plans in one year (it usually took two to three years) and then review these

plans at annually was not possible without major change. Since adding manpower was

not an option, OSD leadership chose to 1) review and reduce the number of contingency

plans required; 2) prioritized the

remaining plans, and then; 3) reduced

the ‘fidelity’ requirement of the

lesser priority plans (see Figure 11).

For example, if a potential crisis was

a high risk to U.S. security AND

likely to occur, this would be

identified as a high priority plan and

require more detail—in this case a

Level 4 plan.

Reducing both the number and level of plans decreased the overall work load for

planning staffs, but level three and four plans still required a lot of time and effort to

develop—especially those plans requiring a TPFDD. OSD personnel assisted planning

coordination by developing collaborative tools allowing planners to meet virtually with

members of their joint planning group and to review and update plans in secure, shared

folders. These tools reduced travel time and increased productivity. OSD personnel also

understood that TPFDD development was a lengthy process, and again leveraged

2 JOPES is an integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support military

operation monitoring, planning (deliberate and crisis action), and execution activities. JOPES is

transitioning to APEX.

Figure 11: Plan Levels

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technology to automate TPFDD development, reducing an often six-month effort to 30

days or less. These efforts, when combined, made the goal of one-year plan development

more achievable.3

Another challenge contingency planning timelines faced was strategic guidance. As

discussed earlier, there were multiple—and sometime conflicting—sources of OSD-level

guidance. The result was that many CCMD

plans, when reviewed by the SecDef or

designated representative, did not meet

expectations and had to be revised;

thousands of man-hours were wasted.

Guidance consolidation—the GEF and

JSCP—helped mitigate many of these

misunderstandings. To minimize any other

guidance challenges in the future (and

understanding that GEF and JSCP guidance

could be overcome by events), the Initial

Progress Review (IPR) concept was

instituted (see Figure 12). CCDR’s tasked

with contingency plans would meet

regularly with OSD to discuss the tasked

plan before the plan was submitted for

approval, thus minimizing the possibility

the plan would be rejected.

Yet another challenge to ‘executable’ contingency plans was a lack of interagency (IA)

cooperation. The reason for this varies, but it often comes down to priorities.

Contingency plans might get executed, whereas IA personnel have jobs and crises to deal

with today. Couple IA indifference with the past requirement to get JS approval to

discuss plans with IA personnel and it was not unusual to find plans tasking the IA

without IA coordination; execution became problematic.

To improve interagency cooperation the Promote Cooperation (PC) program was

instituted. PC is the forum where CCDRs coordinate their plans with other agencies. An

OSD and JS approved program, PC generates collaborative development of DoD plans

with civilian agencies and non-DoD entities up front to encourage buy-in and support.

PC events provide CCDRs with a means of directly engaging USG Departments and

Agencies to better inform plan development and identify intergovernmental policy issues

to advance plan development. In many cases, DoD personnel go to these agencies to

discuss what each can bring to the table to meet mission objectives.

3 TPFDDs have a short ‘shelf life’ as units are constantly rotated. To assist planners in keeping

the TPFDD current (or aware of force readiness / availability changes), OSD requested the development of

an automated “common operating picture” for joint forces that provides decision makers (and planners)

timely information on force readiness, location and availability; this requirement is repeated in the 2015

GEF.

Figure 12: Initial Progress Reviews

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Figure 13: APEX integrates several processes that influence

planning.

Taken together, these multiple improvements to JOPES made it possible to realize the

goals of the AP initiative. The AP initiative has since developed into a broader,

overarching construct known as the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

system.4 JOPES is gradually transitioning to APEX; APEX has now has replaced the

Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) as the DoD planning and

execution system.5 APEX is now a system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and

reporting structures supported by JOPES communications and information technology.

JOPES enables the Joint Planning and Execution Community to monitor, plan, and

execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and

demobilization activities associated with joint operations. Even this technology segment

of JOPES is transitioning to APEX; it will be referred to as APEX System Technology.

APEX, again, is the joint capability to create, revise, and execute situational relevant

plans rapidly—and to a high level of quality. APEX seeks to leverage:

Near-continuous collaboration

Frequent senior-subordinate consultation

Parallel multi-level and multi-functional planning

Expeditious plan reviews

Web-based data networking

Integrated or interoperable tools

APEX’s comprehensive end-to-end approach includes the streamlining of strategic

guidance (GEF / JSCP) as the “up front” piece to planning as well as the “backend”

plan assessment piece.

Additionally, APEX

integrates various

systems, processes and

tools such as Global

Force Management, the

Defense Readiness and

Reporting System,

Logistics,

Transportation, and

Intelligence to inform

CCDR “Living Plans”

(see Figure 13).

4 This introduction to APEX was taken from Robert M. Klein’s, “Adaptive Planning: Not Your

Great Grandfather’s Schlieffen Plan,” Joint Force Quarterly (2 Qtr, 2007): 84-6; and the “Adaptive

Planning Roadmap II” (March 2008). 5 JOPES is now defined as an APEX system technology. The JOPES volumes (CJCSM 3122

series of publications) are being replaced by the APEX family of publications (CJCSM 3130 series). Many

of the changes are significant (as discussed in this primer), but many are also cosmetic, e.g., message

formats were not changed.

15

Assumptions used in developing the APEX process include:

Planning never stops until a plan / OPORD is rescinded and/or the operation is

terminated.

Execution requires the comparable categories of information as planning, but with

greater detail, refined fidelity and speed.

To achieve the essential unity of action in execution, early and continuous

dialogue between DoD planners and those from other Depts. and Agencies is

essential to successful planning and execution.

The speed of planning during execution for continuing and potential operations is

critical.

Operations and intelligence officers, logisticians and planners are closely

integrated.

Information Technology (IT) will assist in collection of disparate data to form

actionable information.

Where applicable, automated “flags” will assist in:

o Plan update and maintenance to form “living plans” (this requires force

visibility).

o Confirmation and/or replacement of planning assumptions with current

intelligence and operational Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops

and support available—Time available, Civil Considerations (METT-TC)

factors.

In conclusion, JOPES transition to APEX’s end-to-end approach is designed to make

contingency plans relevant and executable. In many ways the promise of APEX is still

that—a promise. The computer tools have yet to materialize and since 2008, the trend in

GEF’s is to require an increasing number of priority (and level) of plans. IPR’s are now

prioritized and delegated; review for lesser level plans are now done at lower levels than

the SecDef, and CCDR’s are advised not to stop planning and wait for IPR’s that seem

increasingly difficult to schedule. With these changes, plans are rarely approved within

the one year goal and there appears to be little demand for CCDR’s to meet this goal.

Finally, the once consolidated GEF is less consolidated in 2015, and the OSD and Joint

Staff developed the recent GEF and JSCP serially vice in parallel. The campaign plan

focus remains, however—as well as the need for relevant ‘living’ plans.

Global Force Management (GFM)

As noted in the previous section, resource-informed planning and decision-making

requires timely visibility on U.S. force readiness, location and availability. Such

information is a key requirement for ensuring high-level contingency plans remain

relevant and executable which, in turn, reduces strategic—and operational—risk. Put

simply, contingency plans relying on rapid force flow into a region will utilize a TPFDD

to assist in the smooth and efficient flow of forces into a region. The TPFDD, however,

will be less useful if the scheduled forces are neither ready or near the expected point of

embarkation (e.g., deployed). The APEX goal of making contingency plans relevant and

executable requires a realistic understanding of what forces will be available—and when.

16

To meet this need, Global Force Management6 (GFM) was born; its main elements are

found in Figure 14.

The Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), at the center of

Figure 14, is a critical source document for force planning and execution. As mentioned

earlier, the SecDef is required to balance global demand for steady-state and current

operations against the needs of the services (e.g., training and testing), while also

maintaining a surge capability against contingencies. This SecDef-approved document

integrates establishes guidance for assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces in

support of GFM framework. The definition of each category follows:

Assignment – Service Secretaries assign forces to CCDRs (COCOM authority) per

SecDef direction to meet UCP directed responsibilities; these forces are available for

employment unless allocated to another CCDR. The GEF requires, and GFM clarifies

the ‘floor’, or the # of forces available forward to a CCDR for that should not be re-

allocated. More detail on this concept will be provided in the 2016 GFMIG.

Unassigned forces - Forces not assigned to a CCDR IAW Title 10 USC, section 162

and instead retained under Service control in order to carry out function of the

6 GFM is a Department of Defense process to align force apportionment, assignment, and

allocation methodologies to support joint force availability requirements, enable comprehensive insight into

global availability of U.S. military forces, and provide senior decision makers a vehicle to quickly and

accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed allocation, assignment, and apportionment changes.

Figure 14: GFM Elements

17

Secretary of a Military Department IAW Title 10, USC, sections 3013(b), 5013(b),

and 8013(b).

Service retained forces - AC and RC operational forces under the administrative

control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, and not assigned to a

CCDR.

Allocation – Forces transferred from the assigned CCDR by the SecDef (and approved

by the President). Command relationship is specified (normally OPCON) and forces are

available for employment during specified dates. Allocation is done: 1) in the annual

GFM cycle; 2) Bi-weekly for emergent force requests (SecDef Orders Book) or 3) a

special process for emergent, urgent requests that can’t wait for the bi-weekly cycle

(Special SecDef Order Book). Allocation tables are updated in the GFM Allocation Plan

(GFMAP)7 located on the JS J3 GFM website.

Apportionment – Quantities of forces “reasonably expected to be available” globally for

planning purposes. This information can be found in the GFMIG or the JS J8 website.

As seen in Figure 15,

assignment, allocation, and

apportionment are interrelated.

Figure 15 shows the entire

DoD force pool (every

military unit, Soldier, Sailor,

Airman, and Marine) within

the “Service Institutional

Forces” (recruiters, instructors,

Service Title 10 type forces—

man, train, and equip) and

“Operational Forces” boxes.

This force pool is further

divided by “assigned” (Forces

For) to a CCDR, “unassigned”

forces, and “Service

Retained” forces.

In the past, planners were rarely limited in the scope and type of forces available for

contingency planning. The unspoken assumption was that the plan would be the only

contingency plan executed and receive the appropriate. The concept behind Figure 15’s

framework acknowledges today’s resource constrained environment and attempts to limit

the forces contingency planners use in developing their plan (the blue box: apportioned

forces). This limiting, in theory, makes these contingency plans more feasible/executable

as the forces listed in the plan would more likely be available. Limited availability of

forces, however, especially specialized forces, may require planners to require/assume

7 The GFMAP is a global DEPORD. It is a message with five annexes.

Figure 15: DoD Forces

18

availability of forces outside this box. Such use is allowed, though it raises the risk of

mission failure if the force(s) required prove not to be available if the plan is executed.

The GFMIG also references “Preferred Forces’; or specific forces identified (and

assumed available) by planners to continue employment, sustainment, transportation

planning (TPFDD / transportation feasibility) and to assess risk. These forces are

planning assumptions only, they are not considered "sourced" units; there are no

guarantees that these specific units/forces will be available. CCMD service / functional

components are encouraged to work with Joint Force Providers (JFP) and their

components to make the best possible assumptions with respect to identifying preferred

forces for planning.

The OSD goal of developing an automated sourcing tool to assist both planning and

execution sourcing is

evidenced in the Preferred

Force Generation tool (see

Figure 16). When the tool

becomes reality it will, in

theory, provide an

automated capability to

rapidly identify candidate

forces. This will enable

planners to make more

informed assumptions

when identifying the

preferred forces required

by their operational design.

More informed

assumptions during

planning offers the opportunity to improve plan feasibility, enabling a quicker transition

to execution. Additionally, the tool can assist planners by allowing faster and more

accurate updates to

TPFDDs (and risk) should

execution of contingency

plans prove likely.

The overall GFM process

can be seen in Figure 17.

In short, strategic guidance

sets the requirement, GFM

prioritizes forces to meet

said requirements and

assesses risk, and, in the

end, forces are assigned

and allocated. In a way,

the overall process has

Figure 16: Preferred Force Generation

19

similarities to the contingency and crisis planning in APEX—the red arrow can be seen

as a deliberate force assignment/allocation process taking place over a year; the

‘Emergent’ allocation process provides the flexibility to react to any unforeseen crises for

which rapid action is required.

One item in Figure 17 not yet discussed is the Global Force Management Board (GFMB).

This role of this board is oversight; the board is chaired by the Joint Director of the Joint

Staff (DJS) and is comprised of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, Services,

CCMDs, and DoD Agencies. The GFMB assesses and prioritizes CCDR requests for

annual capabilities, provides a prioritized list of CCDR requests to the Joint Force

Coordinator (JFC) and Joint Force Providers (JFP) to use in identifying joint

solutions for military capabilities among the Services, and frames any contentious issues

for decision by the SecDef.

As a final note, it is important to note what is NOT included in GFM yet can assist the

DoD mission across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO). These include Contract

Support (CCDRs can contract via their Service Components rather than request

additional forces), other government agencies, and Coalition & NGOs.

The Force Allocation Process

Force allocation, or acquiring the additional forces the commander needs to accomplish

an assigned task, is often not well understood by military staffs. The next section

discusses this process in more detail. Using the numbering in Figure 18 as a guide, the

force allocation process is as follows:

1, 2. Combatant

commanders

submit a Request

for Force or

capability (RFF/C)

to support annual

or emerging

operational

requirements to the

SecDef via the

Joint Staff.

3 & 4. The Joint

Staff validates the

request and assigns

the request to a

JFC and /or JFP to

determine a recommended sourcing solution.

5 & 6. The JFC/JFP develop sourcing recommendations in coordination with the

Services via their assigned ‘global-look’ Service Components. The recommendations

will include any associated risks and other information considered germane to the

Figure 18: Force Allocation Process

20

sourcing recommendation. The recommendation must conform to existing OSD

policy; any deviations must be accompanied with a detailed explanation for SecDef

approval.8

7. The Joint Staff receives the JFC/JFP sourcing recommendations and the JS J3

briefs recommendations via the SDOB.9 Combatant commanders and Service chiefs

may communicate to the CJCS their assessment of risk or other issues associated with

the JFC/JFP’s recommended global sourcing solution. The Joint Staff coordinates w/

OSD, agencies, Services, or combatant commands with issues or equity to either

articulate or adjudicate (if possible) issues that would result in a non-concurrence or

reclama.10 The Joint Staff will, as required, convene an off-cycle GFMB, or

Operations Deputies Tank or JCS Tank to address and attempt resolution of

contentious issues.

8. The CJCS recommends solution to SECDEF with the non-concurrence, if not

adjudicated in the GFMB, to the SecDef for approval.

9. Upon SecDef approval, the JS publishes SECDEF approval in GFMAP. The

GFMAP is a consolidated order that allows all SecDef allocation decisions be

complied into one order. Supporting and Supported CCDRs publish Deployment

Orders (DEPORDs) implementing the orders in the GFMAP.

8 Each Service maintains Service Red Lines and Service Polices that govern how forces will

deploy. The SecDef may order the Services to exceed these polices. 9 J35 (N), the Global Force Management Division, validates CCMD requirements and manages

the SecDef Orders Book (SDOB) process. 10 This action does not relieve the JFC/JFP of the requirement to coordinate its recommended

sourcing solution with combatant commands and Services. Instead, it provides a means as required for

combatant commanders and Service chiefs to provide an additional assessment if they feel one is required.