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STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEF

No. 5

The UN Department of HumanitarianAffairs in Angola:

A Model for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance?

by

Toby Lanzer

Refugee Studies ProgrammeUniversity of Oxford

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 1996

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Indexing terms

Emergency reliefDiplomacyGovernmentUnitaInternal securityAngola

ISSN 1400-3120ISBN 91-7106-385-4Printed in Swedenby Reprocentralen HSC, Uppsala 1996

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PREFACE

“Studies on Emergencies and Disaster Relief” is aseries of research reports on topics of relevance toeverybody working with relief and developmentassistance in unstable situations. Most of thestudies so far have been conducted by theRefugees Studies Programme at Queen ElisabethHouse, University of Oxford. Sida, in close co-operation with the Nordic Africa Institute, ispublishing these reports in order to throw morelight on the complex relations of today’s conflictsand emergencies.

A considerable share of Swedish assistance ischannelled to meet the immediate needs from allsorts of emergencies. In recent years the contribu-tions for disaster relief and humanitarian assis-tance in conflicts caused by war has increasedconsiderably and amounts today to approxima-tely three quarters of the total disaster reliefbudget.

In the present two issues of special concern toSida are covered; the emergency situation inAngola after the return to civil war in 1992 and therole of the UN Department of HumanitarianAffairs in dealing with the coordination of disasterrelief. These are two subjects which up till todayhave been very little covered.

This report describes the activities of theUnited Nations Department of HumanitarianAffairs (DHA) in Angola from April 1993 to April1995. It starts with the creation of DHA Angola in1993 and continues to describe how relations wereestablished with the Government and UNITA. Itcovers the different ways in which main conceptsand roles and responsibilities could be discussedand agreed to. It presents the day-to-day activitiesincluding the crucial information exchange. Itshows how DHA organised the preparation andlaunching of inter-agency appeals. It describeshow DHA promoted and monitored the safety ofhumanitarian agency personnel and how capacitybuilding was made one of the important strategiesof DHA.

It is our hope that this report will contribute tothe ongoing discussion on disaster relief and thedifferent mechanisms such as the coordination ofdifferent actors during the actual conflict phase.

Carin NorbergDirectorDepartment for Cooperation with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance,

Sida, and member of the Programme and Research Council of the

Nordic Africa Institute

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report describes the activities of the UnitedNations Department of Humanitarian Affairs(DHA) in Angola from April 1993 to April 1995. Itdoes not aim to evaluate the activities undertakenor compare them to DHA’s work in othercountries, such as Iraq or Mozambique.

I worked for the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP) in Angola when DHA estab-lished its Humanitarian Assistance CoordinationUnit (UCAH) there in April 1993. UNDP secondedme to UCAH, where I served as NGO & donorliaison officer during 1993, as the representative inHuambo during 1994, and as the interim managerof the emergency relief office from January to June1995. I then left Angola after three years in thecountry and it has taken me some months to stepback from the experience to write this report,which represents my own views and not those ofthe United Nations or DHA.

Much of the information in this paper is fromUN documents, such as reports of the UN Secre-tary-General to the Security Council. Much of it,too, is based on my own experience garnered fromholding various positions within UCAH.

My thanks are due to Manuel Aranda da Silva,the former director of DHA in Angola and nowwith the department in New York, for hiscomments on the outline of this report. Commentson the outline also came from staff at UCAH, inparticular Peter Simkin, Carlos Veloso, and YvonMadore. Finally, I am most grateful to threepeople who laboured through drafts of the reportand made helpful suggestions: Sarah Longford atDHA Geneva, Barbara Harrell-Bond at theUniversity of Oxford’s Refugee StudiesProgramme, and Harry Rutter in London. I amresponsible for the contents of this report and anymistakes are, of course, mine, not theirs.

Finally, I dedicate this report to a former col-league and friend in Huambo, Alfredo “Alfa”Afonso, who served the UN and me as a loyalradio operator under some of the most difficultcircumstances.

Toby LanzerRefugee Studies Programme

University of Oxford, December 1995

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ANGOLA

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CONTENTS

Preface and Acknowledgements 3Map of Angola 4Abbreviations 7

I. Executive Summary 8

II. Background 10Independence, Civil War, Peace, Elections, and War 10

III. The Establishment of DHA Angola 13Calls for Coordination and the Arrival of DHA 13UCAH’s Link to the SRSG, UNAVEM, and UN Agencies 13UCAH’s Terms of Reference: Coordination not Operation 14Initial Organisation: Human Resources, Office Space, and Equipment 15Administration and Finance 15Administrative and Management Capacity 16

IV. Humanitarian Diplomacy & Advocacy 17Establishing Contact with the GoA in Luanda and with UNITA in Huambo 17Negotiating Aid with the GoA and UNITA 17Developing Principles for Humanitarian Programmes 181993 and 1994 Linkage 18Working with UNITA within a Sanctions Regime 19

V. Humanitarian Policy & Strategies 20The Sanctity of Aid 20Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development 20Consolidating the Strengths of UN Agencies and NGOs 20The Emergency Relief Plan 21

VI. Main Features of Coordination 23Information Exchange 23Maintaining Relations with the GoA and UNITA 23Coordinating with UN Agencies 24Establishing and Maintaining Relations with Donors 24Working with NGOs 24Assessing Needs 25Field Advisers 25Coordination in Times of Peace 26

VII. Special Coordination Mechanisms to Enhance Operations 28The ASDI-UCAH Mechanism 28The Seeds and Tools Working Group 28Provincial Meetings 29The Humanitarian Coordination Group 29

VIII. Preparing & Launching Appeals 301993 Appeal Preparation and Launch 30Revised Appeal: February 1994 30Revised Appeal: September 1994 31

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1995 Appeal 31A Model Launch 32

IX. Security Issues 33Procedures for Airlifts & Convoys 33Cross-line Operations: Kuito 33Freedom of Movement Crises 35Security Coordination when Aid Workers are Under Threat 36Security Recommendations for Luanda and Angola 37Evacuation of Foreigners 37Monitoring the Road Situation 38

X. Capacity Building 39The Angolan Government 39Institute of Mine Action 39Institute of Demobilisation and Reintegration 40Capacity Building for UNITA 40Angolan NGOs 40Preparing for Transition from UCAH to UNDP 41

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADRA Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e AmbienteASDI Autoridade Sueca para o Desenvolvimento InternacionalAUM ASDI–UCAH MechanismCMAO Central Mine Action OfficeDRO Demobilisation and Reintegration OfficeECHO European Community Humanitarian OfficeECU (UN) Emergency Coordination UnitFAA Forças Angolanas ArmadasFALD Field Administration Logistics DivisionFNLA Frente Nacional de Libertação de AngolaGoA Government of AngolaHCG Humanitarian Coordination GroupHF High FrequencyICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIDP Internally Displaced PersonIO International OrganisationIOV Inter-office VoucherMINARS Ministerio de Assistência e Reinserção SocialMPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de AngolaMSF Medecins sans FrontièresMTs Metric TonnesNGO Non-governmental OrganisationNKw Novos Kwanzas (Angolan currency during the period under review)SCAM Sociedade Cristã de Ajuda MutuaSCF–UK Save the Children Fund-United KingdomSRPA (UN) Special Relief Programme for AngolaSRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-GeneralUCAH Unidade de Coordenação para Assistência HumanitáriaUHF Ultra-high FrequencyUNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification MissionUNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and DevelopmentUNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian AffairsUNDP United Nations Development ProgrammeUNFAO United Nations Food and Agriculture OrganisationUNFPA United Nations Population FundUNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for RefugeesUNICEF United Nations Children’s FundUNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de AngolaVORGAN Voz do Galo NegroWFP World Food ProgrammeWHO World Health Organisation

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Angola returned to civil war in October 1992,after only eighteen months of peace. The countrymight have thought that it knew how to cope intimes of war, yet the conflict that struck shortlyafter Angola’s first presidential andparliamentary elections was more violent thananything the population had experiencedpreviously. Within just a few months after theoutbreak of war, some two million Angolanswere in need of emergency relief. This numberalmost doubled over the course of 1993 and1994.1 Heavy fighting took place in virtually allof the eighteen provincial capitals, many of whichremained under siege until peace was once againestablished on 20 November 1994. The wartouched all Angolans directly or indirectly: Theeconomy collapsed; commercial ties broke down;social services stopped; agriculture ceased;families separated.

The humanitarian response to the sufferinginduced by the crisis was slow when it broke atthe end of 1992. Most aid agencies, indeed nearlyall Angolans, were caught by surprise by therenewal of fighting. Few had personnel withemergency experience and fewer still had theappropriate programme inputs to deal with theconsequences of conflict. What the humanitarianresponse really lacked, however, was an organis-ation to provide leadership, and support imple-menting agencies to develop a framework withwhich to mount coordinated programmes toaddress the civil war’s misery. In March 1993,DHA was called on to provide such a role. Thisreport explains how DHA took on the task anddeveloped different aspects of coordination fromApril 1993 to April 1995.

The ‘Establishment of DHA Angola’ showshow the calls of different actors, such as UNagencies or NGOs, led to DHA’s creating acoordination unit in the country. Perhaps para-mount to the whole experience was that almostevery organisation involved in humanitarianassistance wanted coordination, albeit ‘light andnot bureaucratic’. DHA’s relationship with diffe-rent UN structures was clearly defined and termsof reference were compatible with the

1 For details of numbers of affected populations referto DHA’s consolidated inter-agency appeals of 1993and 1994.

expectations of what was needed: a small groupof professionals who spent all of their time onfacilitating coordination. The reasoning behindUCAH was that it be a support structure to theSRSG, whom the Security Council had endowedwith the mandate to coordinate humanitarianassistance. In reality, the SRSG relied on UCAH tocoordinate. Neither Dame Margaret Joan Ansteenor Maître Alioune Blondin Beye, both of whomwere SRSGs at separate times during UCAH’sfirst two years, became operationally involved inthe coordination of humanitarian assistance. Theydid, however, advocate humanitarian issues andprovide high-level diplomacy to support thecause. Further, when in Luanda, they heldmeetings with UN agencies, donors and NGOs.This section also highlights UCAH’s internalorganisation and administration. UCAH couldnot have been established or survived the first sixmonths without material and personnel inputsfrom UNAVEM and UNDP. Too little materialsupport was available from DHA Geneva andNew York.

‘Humanitarian Diplomacy & Advocacy’ ex-plains how UCAH established contact with theGoA and UNITA to address humanitarian issues,and how the unit developed the notion of advo-cacy. UCAH’s ‘open door’ policy promoted dia-logue between the unit, UN agencies, and donors,and NGOs so that, together, they could agree tocertain principles and issues. UCAH then dis-cussed these with both sides to the conflict.

‘Humanitarian Policy and Strategies’ demon-strates some of the ways in which UCAH pro-vided an environment in which main conceptsand roles and responsibilities could be discussedand agreed to. Separating humanitarian affairs asmuch as possible from political and militaryissues, and placing the ‘emergency’ within adevelopment context were overriding concerns.Defining which UN agency would be responsiblefor particular activities and bringing together UNagencies and NGOs to work in a collaborativespirit is highlighted. Further, an ambience whichpromoted dialogue, analysis, and planning led toagencies being able to take sound, yet flexible,decisions throughout the period under review(April 1993–April 1995).

The ‘Main Features of Coordination’ presentsUCAH’s day-to-day activities, of which promot-

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ing information exchange was crucial to thesuccess of the humanitarian programme. Dailycontact with the two parties to the conflict waspart of UCAH’s standard work, as was develop-ing close working relations with and helping tobuild constructive links between donors, UNagencies, and NGOs. As UCAH spent all of itstime on coordination, i.e. it did not implementprojects, it was seen as the most appropriateorgan to lead inter-agency needs assessments.These took place frequently and strove to includemembers of the GoA or UNITA, donors, UNagencies, and NGOs. One weakness of theassessments was the lack of a common format toconduct them, although this was resolved in early1995 by the Humanitarian Coordination Group(HCG), created in early 1995 in light of Angola’speace agreement. In preparation for peace, UCAHhired personnel to plan for an expansion ofhumanitarian activities to include mine actionand demobilisation and reintegration. In addition,there were some ‘Special CoordinationMechanisms to Enhance Operations’, such as afund for Angolan and expatriate NGOs donatedby the Swedish International DevelopmentAuthority and managed by UCAH.

Humanitarian assistance depended on the pro-vision of financial and material resources. In‘Preparing and Launching Appeals’, the reportshows how DHA organised the preparation andlaunching of inter-agency appeals. These in-formed donors about the humanitarian crisis, theplanned response to it, and the resources thatwould be necessary to carry out activities. Donorsand NGOs became increasingly involved in theappeal process, which called for resources forboth UN agencies and NGOs.

Working in a conflict often brought the safetyof personnel and operations to the fore. ‘SecurityIssues’ demonstrates how UCAH promoted andmonitored the safety of humanitarian agency per-sonnel. The unit facilitated the establishment ofsecurity procedures for air and road operations.UCAH worked together with various agencies,UN and non-governmental, to ensure that pro-grammes proceeded in the safest way possible.When staff were in danger, concerted action wastaken to evacuate them. Operations in Huambo,Kuito, and Malange posed special challenges foraid workers and for UCAH’s staff involved insecurity issues.

‘Capacity Building’ is discussed in this report’sfinal section, although it became one of UCAH’smost important strategies during 1994. It wasclear to the unit’s staff that the humanitarian

crisis afflicting Angola was not a finite event thata group of expatriates could resolve. The solutionlay with Angolans and much of UCAH’s task wasto support them with their work. UCAH’sdirector worked closely with the AngolanGovernment to encourage it to assume ever-increasing emergency management capacity. Thisprocess was enhanced within the framework ofthe Humanitarian Coordination Group, whichincorporated members of UNITA. Long-termissues, such as mine action and demobilisationand reintegration initially were to be managed byUCAH, which worked with the GoA and UNITAto establish Angolan institutes to tackle bothissues. In addition, support to Angolan NGOs sothat they might be fully incorporated intoemergency relief programmes was a standardpart of UCAH’s NGO liaison task.

Finally, one often hears that an organisation isonly as good as its leader. If this is true, UCAHmust have been rather good for its directorembodied many qualities that are important tocoordination: political savvy, diplomacy, leader-ship, and teamwork. In addition, he understoodthe context in which Angola’s crisis was occur-ring, had experience in the coordination ofhumanitarian emergencies, and spoke the rele-vant languages. UCAH was much more than justone person, however. Its corps staff had most ofthe following qualifications or characteristics, allof which are important: a background in deve-lopment issues; previous work experience ingovernment ministries, UN agencies, or NGOs;familiarity with Angola or a similar setting in thesame region, such as Mozambique; spoken andwritten fluency in the relevant languages (Englishand Portuguese); a keen interest in andunderstanding of the UN and the Department ofHumanitarian Affairs; team spirit; hard work anda commitment to excellence; and a participatoryor ‘open door’ attitude toward all actors involvedin humanitarian assistance.

As is shown in the body of this report, thesupport of UN agencies, donors, and NGOscombined with the qualifications and character-istics of UCAH’s staff created an environment inwhich coordination could flourish. While everyhumanitarian emergency is unique and needs tobe addressed in a particular way, many of thecoordination activities that UCAH carried outmight serve as a model for future humanitarianemergencies.

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II. BACKGROUND

Independence, Civil War, Peace, Elections,and WarAngola has been at war almost constantly since1961, when the armed liberation struggle againstthe Portuguese colonial regime started. Thatstruggle ended in January 1975, when the leadersof the three nationalist movements (FrenteNacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA, Movi-mento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA,and União Nacional para a Independência Totalde Angola—UNITA) and Portugal signed theAlvor Agreement establishing a coalition govern-ment and setting 11 November 1975 as inde-pendence day. The coalition collapsed inFebruary of that year, however, and the countrywent to war: The FNLA and Zairean troopsattacked Luanda from the north; The SouthAfrican Defence Force invaded the south andpushed on toward the capital; and, Cuban troopsarrived to defend the MPLA, whose leaderAgostinho Neto was sworn in as the firstpresident of the People’s Republic of Angola on11 November.

During the rest of the 1970s and much of the1980s, civil war between the MPLA and UNITA(complicated by cold war interests and theregional power’s meddling) raged in Angola’scountryside, especially in the central andsouthern provinces. The former-USSR and Cubabacked the MPLA. The United States of Americabacked UNITA, which also got support fromSouth Africa, itself interested in attackingmembers of the South West Africa People’sOrganisation in Angola. By the late 1980s, warhad devastated most of the country’sinfrastructure and caused tremendous suffering.The UN addressed this in October 1990 bylaunching the Special Relief Programme forAngola (SRPA), coordinated by the UnitedNations Development Programme’s EmergencyCoordination Unit (ECU).

Portugal, the USA and the former USSR (thetroika countries) brokered a peace agreement,known as the Bicesse Accords and signed on 31May 1991. The troika invited the United Nationsto observe and verify the peace agreement. Theaccords called for troop demobilisation and thecreation of one Angolan army, political reconcili-ation and the extension of government to all of

Angola’s provinces, based on the outcome ofAngola’s first multi-party elections.

SRPA expanded its operation throughout theBicesse period and facilitated humanitarian assis-tance programmes in central and southernAngola. As peace was consolidated, humanitarianagencies turned their attention increasingly torehabilitation and development activities. Devel-opment staff replaced emergency staff and UNDPdecided to end the SRPA and close the ECU at theend of 1992.

Parliamentary and presidential elections tookplace on 28–29 September 1992. Internationalobservers monitored them and the Special Repre-sentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) deemedthem, ‘generally free and fair’. The parliamentaryelection showed an overwhelming victory for theMPLA. In the presidential election, the MPLA’sJose Eduardo dos Santos did not quite managethe necessary ‘fifty percent plus 1 vote’ to avoid arun-off, but UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi trailed himbadly.

UNITA argued that the elections were riggedand refused to accept the results. During the firstweek of October, UNITA withdrew its generalsand cadres from the recently established ForçasArmadas Angolanas (FAA). UNITA’s army beganintimidating MPLA representatives in ruralmunicipalities causing them to leave, therebytaking de facto control of almost three quarters ofAngola’s municipalities by the end of October.This left the government in control of the coastalstrip and all but one of the provincial capitals, asshown on the map below. (Shaded areas andcircles indicate areas under government control inlate October 1992).

The MPLA could do little to stop UNITA fromoccupying rural municipalities: Most formerMPLA soldiers had abandoned their arms and leftthe army during 1991 and 1992. The FAA wasweak and badly equipped. Only one group, anelite corps of troops referred to as ninjas, couldhelp the government defend its interests in keyareas such as the provincial capitals. Beforereverting to force, however, the MPLA turned tothe internationally community for help.

The SRSG worked relentlessly to get the peaceprocess back on track, but her efforts were ham-pered by several factors. First, UN headquartersdid not know what to do. The Security Council

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mission, UNAVEM II, was supposed to close itssixty-five team sites and leave Angola by 31October 1992. In light of the post-electoral crisis,however, many people argued that the unarmedUN police and military observers should stay inthe countryside to monitor the political and mili-tary situation. Even if the observers were power-less to act, they could report on the situation as itevolved. Others at headquarters felt that theobservers neither had the mandate nor the equip-ment to stay in Angola during a conflict. Further,it would be better to withdraw most teams andmaintain a small observer presence to support theSRSG with a ‘UN good offices’ strategy to get theGoA and UNITA back to the peace process.2

Second, there was a split in the troika: Portugaland the Russian Federation recognised the MPLAas a legitimate government; but the United Statesdid not. Third, South Africa, the most powerfulnation in the region, failed to recognise the MPLAas a legitimate government. This sent a signal tothe MPLA that South Africa might yet return toits historic role and support UNITA. In sum, theMPLA or Angolan Government, as it could legit-imately call itself, could not rely on the interna-tional community’s support.

By the end of October the government haddecided to take decisive action to ensure its sur-vival. From 31 October to 2 November 1992,conflict erupted between the MPLA and UNITAin the capital, Luanda. This resulted in UNITA’selimination from the city and the death of keyfigures in the party, such as the vice-presidentand secretary-general.3 Shortly thereafter, battlesensued in the most important provincial capitalswhere the government fought to maintain controlby expelling UNITA. In most cases, this policywas successful. UNITA was forced out offourteen provincial capitals, but by lateNovember 1992 the party controlled four: Caxito,M’Banza Congo, N’Dalatando, and Uige.

2 This view eventually took hold. UNAVEM teamswere called to Luanda and asked to prepare to leaveAngola. Indeed, fifty-nine out of the sixty-five teamsites closed by 25 January 1993 leaving the UN in fivesites along the coast and one in the interior town ofLubango.3 It is not in the scope of this paper to discuss the battlein Luanda. Suffice it to say that it was the turning pointin the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords. UNITA’sprovocation toward the population of Luanda duringOctober and the violent response to it, both bygovernment forces and the population at large, led tothe party’s political extermination as well as theincarceration or death of many personal allies andrelatives of Jonas Savimbi.

During November and December 1992, theUnited Nations scrambled to salvage the BicesseAccords but the battles between the governmentand UNITA became more serious and the hopesfor peace more remote. As the new year came,any doubts that Angola had returned to war weredispelled when battles started in two additionalprovincial capitals, Huambo and Kuito. UNITAgained control of Huambo, Angola’s second city,on 6 March 1993. (The battle for Kuito dragged onuntil mid-September).4

The nature of the civil war that erupted inAngola differed from previous wars in the coun-try. Whereas the wars of the 1960s, 1970s, and1980s mostly took place in rural areas, this con-flict concentrated in the main cities. In almost allcases, if the government managed to expelUNITA from a provincial capital, governmentcontrol extended no further than the city limits.UNITA usually controlled all surrounding areas,thus creating a siege situation affecting hundredsof thousands of Angolans.

The return to war surprised almost allobservers and participants in Angola. The politi-cians dealing with the peace process were con-vinced that if the election went smoothly, theresults would bind the political parties to peace.

However, some members of the UNDP’sEmergency Coordination Unit, who travelledextensively throughout Angola during the secondhalf of 1992, were less convinced about thecountry’s bright future. They warned that troopdemobilisation was not proceeding as plannedand that war could break out again. The reportsof the ECU field coordinators, however, conflictedwith the main activities of the UNDP: support tothe electoral process and development. Theagency’s attention had turned away from its ECUand its experienced staff, whose existence inAngola was no longer thought to be necessary.

Renewed fighting in Angola called forUNDP’s leadership to address the situation. Littlewas forthcoming. The agency neither sought thenecessary resources to keep core staff or hire newemployees for the ECU, nor fomented a spirit ofcollaboration amongst the UN agencies to addressthe crisis. UNDP’s sole contribution to keeping

4 UNITA spent considerable time and effort trying toconvince the international community that the civil warwas ethnic, i.e. that the GoA was trying to eliminateUNITA because most of its support came from theOvimbundu people. Few members of the internationalcommunity took such claims seriously, feeling insteadthat the war erupted because of one side’s politicalgrievance against the other’s. Political ambitions, ratherthan ethnic tensions, were behind the war.

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the ECU alive were two programme officers withno previous emergency experience. Other UNagencies and many non-governmental organisa-tions (NGOs) also found it difficult to respond tothe new circumstance of war. Many organisationshad personnel for development programmes,which had been planned since early 1991. Few ofthese employees had emergency experience andfewer still wanted to work in a conflict situation.Many organisations lost their materials duringOctober as warehouses were looted during erup-tions of violence. The UN World Food Pro-gramme (WFP) was the first UN agency tounderstand that Angola was back at war andquickly mobilised the resources to deal with thesituation. WFP led efforts to reach civilians inneed and provide them with basic assistance fromNovember 1992 to March 1993.

By March 1993, prospects for a speedy returnto peace were slim. The humanitarian crisis wasexpanding yet the UN agency and NGO responseto the situation was weak. There was no structurein the country capable of promoting collaborationamong the different agencies, thereby harnessingtheir work and facilitating a coordinatedapproach to the emergency. The Angolan Gov-ernment no longer had access to most of the terri-tory and asked the UN for help to confront themounting humanitarian crisis.

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III. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DHA ANGOLA

Calls For Coordination and the Arrivalof DHAAs demonstrated above, there was a clear needfor coordination by March 1993. All actorsinvolved in humanitarian assistance in Angolaunderstood this. The main factors that led toDHA establishing a coordination unit in Angolawere:

– The Angolan Government approached theSRSG and requested the UN to coordinatehumanitarian assistance throughout the coun-try. The SRSG, a former UNDP resident repre-sentative, acknowledged that UNDP was un-prepared to handle such a task in Angola andsought other solutions.

– The SRSG advised the Secretary-General ofmassive human suffering and asked forsupport to address the issue while continuingpolitical initiatives to get the government andUNITA to return to peace.

– The Security Council became increasingly con-cerned about the consequences of renewedfighting and the need for coordination ofhumanitarian assistance. On 12 March 1993, theSecurity Council issued resolution 811,operative paragraph 10 of which ‘encouragedthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General to coordinate humanitarian assistance,with the resources at her disposal’.

– Donor delegations from the United States andSweden visited Angola in January and March1993 and called for action. While the US dele-gation felt that the existing UNDP structurecould be strengthened, the Swedes initiatedinformal contacts with the former Under-Secre-tary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, JanEliasson, and encouraged him to act.

– NGOs, in particular CARE International,Medecins sans Frontières-Belgique, and Save theChildren Fund (UK), called on the UN agenciesto address humanitarian issues withcoordinated policies and programmes.

– UNICEF and WFP, two of the most activeagencies in Angola at the time, called for DHAto establish an office in Angola to coordinatehumanitarian assistance, although both agen-cies cited concerns that coordination not lead toadditional bureaucracy.

DHA sent a mission to Angola in March 1993 toanalyse the situation and look at humanitariancoordination. The mission concluded that UN

agencies needed support as quickly as possible toharness their efforts. While the SRSG was wellqualified to deal with humanitarian coordination,she did not have time to do so on a day-to-daybasis because of her responsibilities trying to getthe two warring sides to negotiate peace. TheSRSG would need a support unit to coordinatehumanitarian assistance. UNDP was neither will-ing nor capable of providing such a unit. DHA,therefore, assumed the task. Its links to the UnitedNations structures in the country would need tobe clearly defined.

UCAH’s Links to the SRSG, UNAVEM,and UN AgenciesThe highest ranking UN official in Angola in 1993was the SRSG, who had the rank of under-secretary-general.5 While there are many under-secretaries-general and several SRSG’s world-wide, only the Secretary-General himself holds ahigher position in the organisation. As such,SRSGs can have a lot of influence over other UNstructures in a country even though the activitiesof an SRSG may differ entirely from those of theUN humanitarian agencies.

The Secretary-General assigned a specialrepresentative to Angola to head the UN AngolaVerification Mission II (UNAVEM II). UNAVEMII was established to verify the implementation ofthe Bicesse Accords. Its mission was political andwas carried out by civilian staff and military andpolice observers. UNAVEM II was widely seen,albeit incorrectly, as the cause of the failure of theBicesse Accords. Both the government andUNITA accused UNAVEM of being partial to theother side, and UNITA often called for with-drawal of the SRSG. By February 1993, hostilitytowards UNAVEM became more commonplace.Demonstrations took place outside the UNbuilding in Luanda with people hurling insults atthe UN for having ‘led the country back to war’,and rocks were thrown at UNAVEM vehiclesentering the capital from the mission’s compoundoutside Luanda.

5 Dame Margaret Joan Anstee served as SRSG until 30June 1993, after which Maître Alioune Blondin Beyetook over. He continued in the position throughout1994 and 1995.

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The UN agencies had been in Angola beforeUNAVEM’s establishment and were to continuein the country when the UN mission left. Theirtask was to support Angolans working on emer-gency, rehabilitation, and development issues. Tobe able to carry out their work, the agenciesneeded to be welcome and useful. When calls forcoordination of humanitarian assistance camefrom a number of actors and the UN SecurityCouncil endorsed the SRSG to lead the effort, UNagencies were anxious: They supported the SRSGbut raised concerns that they might be broughtinto the UN’s political activities, which were thebrunt of much criticism at the time. Conse-quently, they distanced themselves fromUNAVEM II explaining that they had nothing todo with the political process or military events.As far as the agencies were concerned, they werein Angola to carry out only their respective man-dates.

When DHA established itself in Angola inApril 1993, it found itself in an awkward position:called on to establish a unit to support the SRSGbut having to distance itself from the UN’spolitical activities because Angolans, the govern-ment, and UNITA, perceived them as a failure.Further, DHA was to coordinate the UN’shumanitarian agencies who were wary of closeinvolvement with the SRSG and UNAVEM II.DHA handled this in several ways.

First, it agreed that its representative inAngola report to the SRSG: this flowed fromDHA’s role of providing support to the SRSGwith her mandate of coordinating humanitarianassistance.6 However, DHA insisted that itsdirector in Angola also report to the UnderSecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs atheadquarters in New York. Second, there was tobe no operational link between DHA Angola andUNAVEM II. While the two branches of the UNshared information, their tasks were different.Third, DHA invited the main UN agency inAngola, WFP, to second a staff member to DHAto become the director of the new coordinationunit. (DHA and WFP selected a well-qualified

6 The role really became one of the SRSG relying onDHA’s unit, UCAH, to handle co-ordination while theSRSG worked to resolve Angola’s political problems.Upon UCAH’s establishment, the SRSG was in Abidjantrying to negotiate a peace agreement with the GoAand UNITA. In late 1993 and during virtually all of1994, the new SRSG worked in Lusaka, Zambia, wherehe brokered Angola’s current peace agreement. WhileUCAH’s director spoke to the SRSG daily to brief himon the humanitarian situation, the latter rarely gotoperationally involved, preferring instead to use high-level diplomacy to advocate humanitarian issues.

emergency manager, who headed the WFP in theSudan at the time and had previously been agovernment minister in Mozambique. He arrivedin Angola to establish and direct theHumanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit,known by its Portuguese acronym UCAH, on 17April 1993). Fourth, DHA asked UN agencies tosecond staff members to the new unit, therebygiving the agencies the chance to ensure thatUCAH’s staff would understand the agencies andwork to add value to their programmes.

UCAH’s role as a coordination structurevis-à-vis the UNDP was defined in the followingway: UCAH would coordinate all activitiesrelated to the ongoing emergency and UNDPwould continue to coordinate development activ-ities. (There were very few in Angola in 1993 and1994). While some staff members at UNDPpushed the idea that UCAH be a support unit forUNDP, this idea was quickly rejected. The defini-tion of UCAH’s position with regard to UNDPculminated in a communiqué addressed to theUNDP Resident Representative in Angola by theUnder-Secretary-General for HumanitarianAffairs and the former UNDP Administrator,William Draper III, who instructed the UNDPResident Representative to hand-over all emer-gency coordination to UCAH’s newly appointeddirector. While this instruction could have beentampered with by arguing over what should orshould not be considered ‘emergency coordina-tion’ the UNDP Resident Representative agreedthat he should not coordinate the emergency andcollaborated with UCAH staff.

UCAH’s Terms of Reference: Coordination notOperationThe most important concept on which the unitwas based was that it would not implement pro-grammes, but would facilitate coordination of allactors providing emergency assistance. Describedas a unit to support the SRSG, its terms of refer-ence included to:

– coordinate with all parties involved in theemergency activities and humanitarian pro-grammes of the United Nations agencies, bilat-eral donors, and NGOs;

– facilitate speedy delivery of emergency com-modities and increase programme efficiency byeliminating duplication of effort;

– gather, evaluate, and disseminate to all con-cerned parties information relevant to thehumanitarian assistance programme, providingregular updates of unmet and additional needsof the affected population;

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– propose policy recommendations relating tothe implementation of the humanitarianassistance in cooperation with the UNoperational and specialised agenciesconcerned, giving special attention to allaspects of the reintegration of returnees,refugees, displaced persons, and vulnerablegroups;

– monitor emergency needs arising from theunforeseen displacement of populations; and

– prepare documentation for donor meetings,appeals for support, and other consultations asrequired.

Initial Organisation: Human Resources, OfficeSpace, and EquipmentOne of the main problems facing UCAH upon itsestablishment were human and financialresources. The only staff member specifically sentto Angola to work in UCAH was the director.Human resources came from UNAVEM II, fromwhich the SRSG offered four staff on a short-termbasis. UNDP seconded one expatriate staffmember to the unit and agreed that UCAHabsorb all of the Angolan staff administrativelyassigned to the ECU.

During the unit’s first three months, donorswho had committed funds to the former ECU,made them available to UCAH thereby allowingthe unit to hire one additional expatriate. Further,in July 1993, UNICEF seconded an expatriate staffmember to UCAH; hence, three months after itsestablishment, UCAH had four expatriates: thedirector, a monitoring and evaluation officer, apolicy adviser, and an NGO/donor liaison offi-cer.7 About a dozen locally hired staff memberssupported the unit with crucial secretarial, trans-lating, and transport services. (Most of them hadprevious experience in the ECU and institutedimportant office procedures, such as a centralregistry and filing system). The staff on loan fromUNAVEM either returned there or left Angola.

Concerning UCAH’s location, the UN systemused two main buildings in the capital, Luanda.The first was the site of the UN agencies and wasknown as the UN building. The second stood justoutside the city limits and housed UNAVEM. The

7 The tasks of the information and public relationsofficer were assumed by the policy adviser and theNGO/donor liaison officer. This arrangement lasteduntil December 1993, when DHA hired a staff memberto assume information and donor liaison. This wassupplemented in late 1994, when UCAH hired twoadditional staff: one reporting officer and one donorliaison officer.

issue arose of whether UCAH should be locatedin UNAVEM II’s compound outside the city or inthe UN building. Both UNAVEM and UN agencystaff argued that the unit should be located intheir respective buildings; even though UCAHwas to have no link to UNAVEM and the UNbuilding had little available space. Donors andNGOs supported the view that UCAH should belocated inside the city, not in a compound outsideit. A convenient solution was found. UCAH useda former UNAVEM office in the heart of Luanda,placing the unit physically (and symbolically)between the UN agency building and the SRSG’smain office in the UNAVEM II compound, andwithin easy reach of GoA offices, donors, andIOs/NGOs.

Concerning office and logistics equipment,UCAH relied almost entirely on UNAVEM andUNDP during its first six months.8 The SRSGarranged for UNAVEM to provide DHA withoffice furniture and material, computers andprinters, phones and fax machines, and cars.UNDP lent UCAH vehicles and walkie-talkies.Without such support, it would have been impos-sible for DHA’s office in Angola to function.9

Administration and FinanceThe administration of UCAH’s personnel andequipment was problematic during the unit’s firsttwo years. After some discussions on the differentways in which to establish UCAH’s administra-tive and financial links, it was decided that DHAGeneva would manage UCAH and transferfinancial resources to the unit via UNDP Luandausing the UN’s system of inter-office vouchers(IOV). This system proved to be too slow giventhe urgency of the situation in Angola. If UCAHwanted to buy something locally, it could do soonly after asking DHA Geneva to ask UNDP toissue a check to UCAH, with which the unit couldacquire the item. This sometimes took weeks, andUCAH itself had little control over the process.

UNDP’s office in Luanda also handled thehiring of UCAH’s Angolan personnel, thusmaking many of the unit’s employees depend on

8 Two staff members used their personal computersand one NGO lent UCAH a portable printer on severaloccasions for negotiation missions to Huambo.9 Throughout 1994, whenever UCAH placed a fieldadviser in a province, such as Benguela, Huambo, orMalange, the unit was rarely able to send the officers tothe field with the equipment they needed to performtheir jobs. Each of the field advisers had to rely on hisor her personal equipment or that of UN agencies andNGOs, such as a car, a computer, a printer, or aphotocopier.

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the efficiency of the UNDP office. Similarly, DHAdid not hire UCAH’s expatriate personnel.UNCTAD handled this in Geneva, thereby takingaway DHA’s control of the process. However,UNCTAD performed quite well: It hired staff andgot them to the field in one month, fast by UNstandards.

During 1995, UCAH’s role in light of the peaceagreement expanded tremendously. UCAHplanned to hire and administer over 100 addi-tional staff members to handle the coordination ofthe mine action and the demobilisation andreintegration programmes. Arrangements withUNCTAD and UNDP were not working wellenough to cope with this challenge, so UCAHdecided to split the task in two. Some staff werehired under existing procedures and others werehired by the UN mission, UNAVEM III, on behalfof UCAH. This arrangement made UCAH depen-dent on UNAVEM III, which in turn relied on theField Administration and Logistics Division(FALD) in New York. In sum, UCAH’s adminis-trative ‘web’ included DHA and FALD in NewYork, DHA and UNCTAD in Geneva, andUNAVEM and UNDP in Luanda. These relationswere often time-consuming and complicated,thereby putting tremendous strain on the staffworking for UCAH. This decreased their effec-tiveness in dealing with the task at hand: complexemergency coordination.

Administrative and Management CapacityDespite working closely with DHA Geneva andUNDP, UCAH itself compounded the administra-tive and finance issue by not hiring a professionalto keep track of the unit’s administration andfinance. Rather, the unit relied on the experienceof one of its most senior employees and on thehard work of three Angolan support staff. Thisarrangement was unfair on the employees con-cerned and insufficient for the unit’s needs: Thesenior employee assigned the task of supervisingfinance and administration was often detractedfrom what he was actually hired to do, and thesupport staff never had a full-time manager. InJanuary 1995, UCAH hired a staff member tobecome the unit’s administrator, but the staffmember had no previous experience in theUnited Nations and spoke neither English norPortuguese, the two most important languagesfor the post in question.

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IV. HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY & ADVOCACY

Establishing Contact with the GoA in Luandaand with UNITA in HuamboThe Angolan Government (GoA) welcomed theestablishment of a United Nations coordinationunit in April 1993. At the time, the governmenthad lost control of almost eighty percent of thecountry to UNITA, and recognised that it was inno position to coordinate emergency relief activi-ties on behalf of the Angolan people. The UCAHdirector adopted a policy of frequent consultationwith the GoA’s focal point for humanitarian assis-tance, the Ministerio de Assistência e ReinserçãoSocial. (The ministry is known as MINARS and isreferred to in English as the Ministry of SocialAffairs). These consultations provided a forumfor government-UN discussion on humanitarianaffairs and enhanced information exchange on thehumanitarian situation between the two bodies.An atmosphere of trust was established quickly,perhaps because the UCAH director had been agovernment minister in Mozambique when thatcountry experienced similar political and militarycircumstances to those facing Angola in 1993.

Some doubts existed in the UN as to whetheror not UNITA would accept the UCAH directorgiven his previous links with the Mozambicangovernment, which could have been construed asmaking him pro-MPLA, but UNITA never ques-tioned this publicly or in any UN circles. Contactwith UNITA was more difficult to establishbecause the party had no office in Luanda sinceits expulsion from the city in November 1992.UNITA’s leadership was in Angola’s second city,Huambo, where the party established its head-quarters after winning a fierce battle that ragedfrom January to March 1993. Huambo, however,was inaccessible by road from Luanda anddespite constant UN, NGO, and ICRC requests togain access to the city by air either the GoA orUNITA refused the requests during March, April,and May. In June 1993, however, the ICRCmanaged to send a four-person team to assess thesituation in the city and speak to a UNITAdelegation. Shortly thereafter, three NGOstravelled to Huambo and in mid-June, the UCAHdirector led the first UN mission to Huambo withthe purpose of establishing dialogue onhumanitarian affairs with UNITA.

This mission was vital to the United Nationshumanitarian effort for two reasons. First, there

was little chance of a cease-fire or return to peacein the near future. In April 1993 just before UCAHwas established, the SRSG had brought the GoAand UNITA together for the third time that yearto mediate a cease-fire and to re-establish thepeace process. This third meeting was held inAbidjan and lasted some six weeks, after whichthe talks broke down. Before the GoA returned toLuanda and UNITA went to Huambo, UCAHasked the SRSG to present both sides with anemergency relief plan which would allowhumanitarian agencies to provide aid to needycivilians. (See section V below). UCAH nowneeded to get to Huambo to discuss humanitarianaffairs and the emergency relief plan withUNITA. Second, the scale of the emergency wasalready large but likely to get far bigger in thenear future. The war in Angola in early and mid-1993 was decidedly different from previous warsin the country in that it was urban. Cities housinghundreds of thousands of Angolans were the sitesof devastating battles, or were besieged cuttingcommercial ties and leaving residents unable togo to their fields to cultivate. Consequently, thenumber of Angolans suffering from inhumaneconditions was far greater than at any previoustime in the country’s history.

Negotiating Aid with the GoA and UNITADuring the civil war, UCAH dealt with the GoAand UNITA separately, explaining to both sidesthat the unit was not a mediator to bring the twosides together. UCAH aimed to discuss humani-tarian issues with both sides in order to facilitatethe speedy and effective delivery of aid tocivilians in need, wherever they might be.Humanitarian issues were on the agenda ofneither the GoA nor UNITA in mid-1993. Politicaland military issues occupied the time of both.However, the establishment of UCAH made bothsides to the conflict more aware that their violentactions bore heavily on the population, whichwas suffering as it had never done so before.

To highlight the Angolans’ plight, UCAHassembled the available information and calcu-lated that 1,000 Angolans were dying daily as adirect consequence of the war. This figure, whichwas initially accepted with some scepticism butupon explanation gained widespread credibility,

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was perhaps the most critical factor in puttinghumanitarian issues on the agenda of policymakers. Suddenly, humanitarian concerns wereraised on the two main nation-wide radio net-works, Radio Nacional de Angola and Voz do GaloNegro (Vorgan), and in the pro-government daily,Jornal de Angola, and UNITA’s monthlypublication, Terra Angolana.

Developing Principles for HumanitarianProgrammesOnce the GoA and UNITA understood UCAH’srole and were conscious of the scope of Angola’shumanitarian disaster, UCAH concentrated ondiscussing conditions of work with both sides.This discussion was particularly necessary withUNITA as the party controlled the majority ofAngolan territory. After consulting UN agenciesand NGOs to establish common concerns on theconditions of work, UCAH explained to the GoAand UNITA that aid agencies had certain expecta-tions that would have to be agreed to before anyoperations could succeed. These expectationsincluded:

– the neutrality of humanitarian assistance,which would be made available to those inneed and should not serve military purposes;

– guarantees on the safety and security ofhumanitarian personnel and property;

– needs assessments as a basis for humanitarianprogrammes;

– freedom of movement of humanitarian person-nel and their goods; and

– freedom for humanitarian personnel to com-municate with Angolans.

UCAH negotiated humanitarian issues on behalfof the humanitarian cause and spoke about con-cerns and expectations of aid agencies on thewhole. UCAH never mentioned any particularaid agency by name unless a UN agency or NGOasked the unit to do so on a precise issue, i.e.UCAH did not speak on behalf of an agency,rather for a collective cause. This approachbecame increasingly appropriate throughout 1993as working relations between UN agencies andNGOs tightened. Two organisations, Medecinssans Frontières-France and the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, asked UCAH tomention to the GoA and UNITA that MSF and theICRC were independent of UCAH. The two

organisations maintained separate, individualcontacts with the GoA and UNITA.10

The main issue concerning humanitarianorganisations following the renewal of fightingwas access to civilians. Aid workers had littleinformation from the provincial capitals, wherefighting had been fierce. UN agency and NGOstaff assumed that civilians were in need of assis-tance; but it was impossible to know how manypeople were suffering and what their needs werewithout going to each province to assess the sit-uation. To tackle the issue, UCAH and the UNagencies presented the GoA and UNITA with aplan of action, known as the Emergency ReliefPlan, in late May. The plan was approved shortlythereafter, although it faltered almostimmediately because of an issue which wouldarise frequently until the end of the war inNovember 1994: linkage. (See section V below).

1993 and 1994 LinkageHumanitarian negotiations with the GoA werereasonably straightforward. The governmentcommitted itself to the concept that aid should beprovided to any Angolans who were suffering.UNITA’s leadership explained that it wanted allAngolans to receive aid. That is, one side agreedto the concept that all Angolans in need shouldreceive assistance while the other side wanted allAngolans to be provided aid.

In mid-1993, the humanitarian situation infour provincial capitals was of particular concern.In two, Huambo and Kuito, major battles hadaffected hundreds of thousands of people anddevastated the infrastructure. While Huambo hadwitnessed a fierce battle, known as the ‘fifty-fivedays’, it was not under siege. Government troopsfled to the coast upon losing control of the city.UNITA occupied Huambo and all of the sur-rounding countryside. Residents could accessareas outside the city and therefore had somemeans with which to survive. No aid organisa-tions had visited Kuito since late 1992, but dailyreports via high frequency (HF) radio fromAngolan staff in the city indicated that the situa-tion there was disastrous. Two other provincialcapitals, Malange and Menongue, were besiegedby UNITA. In both cities, the population had noaccess to the fields around the towns and wasslowly starving.

10 Nevertheless, the UCAH director and head ofICRC’s delegation met weekly to share information ontheir own respective negotiations with both sides.

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To start humanitarian operations in these fourand other areas of Angola, the UN sought theagreement of the GoA and UNITA. Both sidesagreed, in principle, although UNITA cited secu-rity problems affecting Kuito, Malange, andMenongue and did not think that humanitarianoperations could take place safely in the cities.After much discussion between the UN andUNITA, the party agreed that humanitarian pro-grammes start in Kuito but stressed that Huambomust receive aid, too. In other words, UNITA setthe precedent in mid-1993 of linking aid for onecity’s population to that of another city’s, basedon the premise that if Angolans in a governmentarea received aid, then Angolans in a UNITA areahad to be provided assistance, too.

Once UNITA had set the precedent of linkage,the GoA adopted the strategy as well; although itused a different argument. For example, the GoAexplained that fierce fighting had taken place inKuito for months. GoA, UN, and NGO reportsfrom the city highlighted the terrible sufferingthere. If the citizens of Kuito, who were clearlymore in need of humanitarian assistance than anyother Angolans, could not get it, then noAngolans should.

Linking one city to another and paralysing aidoperations based on whether or not one city gotassistance had disastrous effects on the sufferingpopulations caught in any of the ‘linked’ areas.UCAH confronted this situation throughoutmuch of 1993 by stressing to both sides thatpeople in need had the right to receive assistance.UCAH explained that requiring similar amountsof aid to go to government and UNITA zones wasa political argument. The distribution of aid, theunit explained, would be justified onhumanitarian grounds, not political considera-tions.

Such discussions were complex and requiredconcerted action. Given UCAH’s position as asupport structure to the SRSG, the unit oftentapped on his discussing humanitarian issueswith the GoA and UNITA. At times, the SRSGcalled on the Secretary-General himself tointervene when humanitarian negotiationsreached a stalemate. In addition, UCAH’s closelinks to donors and NGOs permitted other actorsto approach the sides in the conflict with the samemessage. In sum, much pressure was exerted onboth sides to cooperate with the humanitarianprogramme.

Working with UNITA within a SanctionsRegimeDuring 1993, several countries and the SecurityCouncil called on UNITA to stop fighting andreturn to the peace process. UNITA was heldaccountable for re-starting the conflict and creat-ing the humanitarian disaster which had assumedcatastrophic proportions. On 15 September 1993,the Security Council issued Resolution 864. CitingChapter VII of the UN Charter the Councildecided that all States should prevent the sale orsupply of weapons, ammunition and militaryequipment as well as petroleum products to anyterritory in Angola not controlled by the Gov-ernment of Angola.

The Security Council sanctions did not limitthe ability of UNITA’s war machine to function.In terms of arms acquisitions or having enoughpetroleum products to run its army, sanctions didnot make UNITA suffer.11 However, SecurityCouncil sanctions did have a political andpsychological effect on the party. Sanctionsconfirmed the international community’s viewthat UNITA was to blame for the breakdown ofthe Bicesse Accords and the renewed fighting,with its consequences for the Angolanpopulation. Sanctions diminished UNITA’spolitical clout amongst its followers andconfirmed, in the minds of its enemies, that theinternational community blamed UNITA forAngola’s predicament. Psychologically, this boreheavily on the UNITA leadership, whichcomplained that sanctions had been imposed on aparty, as opposed to a government, and that thiswas unfair.

UCAH never raised the matter of sanctionswith UNITA. The party brought up the issues fre-quently, complaining that the party had beensingled out and blamed for a problem which itdid not cause. At such times, UCAHrepresentatives (principally the director andduring 1994 the Huambo field adviser) listened toUNITA and explained that the UN had differentdepartments each of which had specific roles:DHA or UCAH’s was to facilitate humanitarianassistance. After several such incidents, UNITAno longer raised the its concerns over sanctionswith UCAH; perhaps the party understood thatsuch discussion was better held with the SRSG orUNAVEM.

11 Human Rights Watch, Angola: Arms Trade andViolations of the Laws of War since the 1992 Elections, p.47–58.

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V. HUMANITARIAN POLICY & STRATEGIES

The Sanctity of Aid1 2

The point put across most strongly by UCAHthroughout its first two years was that humanitar-ian issues should be considered on their ownmerit. While it was necessary to place thehumanitarian situation within a wider, and hence,political context one should not createhumanitarian policy or carry out humanitarianprogrammes based on political or militaryconsiderations or influences. UN agencies,donors, NGOs, and the ICRC welcomed andendorsed this approach; although someorganisations questioned UCAH’s capacity tostay apolitical given that it was part of DHA, adepartment of the UN Secretariat.

UCAH’s insistence on maintaining humanitar-ian issues separate from political and militaryconsiderations and influences enabled it to main-tain its credibility with the GoA and UNITA, and,of course, with humanitarian agencies. It alsoprovided the humanitarian assistance programmewith a safeguard: if the political process worsenedor the military situation deteriorated, UCAH’saccess to decision makers would be assured as itspurpose was to further the humanitarian cause ina non-partisan, apolitical framework.

Relief, Rehabilitation, and DevelopmentA second pillar for the establishment of humani-tarian policy was the principle that emergencyrelief activities be addressed context of Angola’seventual rehabilitation and development. UCAHdid not subscribe to a linear continuum theory,which stressed the end of the ‘emergency’ and thebeginning of ‘rehabilitation’, which would thenmove into ‘development’. (Many of Angola’sprovinces had the three different activities occur-ring simultaneously). The key, as far as UCAHwas concerned, was that emergency activitieswere an essential, not necessarily the essential,component in a much wider scope of humanitar- 12 UNICEF seconded a senior staff member to UCAH,which employed him as a policy adviser. His morethan twenty years development experience working forNGOs in Canada and Southern Africa provided UCAHwith an invaluable ‘think-tank’ capacity, therebysupporting the unit’s director to analyse humanitarianaffairs and propose appropriate policies and strategies.This role greatly enhanced UCAH’s credibility vis-à-visthe donors, UN agencies, and IOs/NGOs.

ian action, which included simultaneous emer-gency, rehabilitation, and development activities.

Consolidating the Strengths of UN Agenciesand NGOsIn Angola, the challenge of implementinghumanitarian programmes when resources werevery scarce called for agencies to consolidate theirprogrammes and avoid duplication of effort.Upon its establishment, UCAH met UN agenciesand NGOs working in Angola to discusshumanitarian assistance. The first step was toascertain the type of activities in which respectiveorganisations were or planned to be involved.This led to thorough discussion on the roles andresponsibilities that different types oforganisations could assume. UN agencies andNGOs quickly agreed that the UN agencies’logistic and technical capabilities should becombined with the expertise of the field-basedpersonnel of Angolan and expatriate NGOs. TheUN agencies could be responsible for ‘macro’issues, such as logistics or security, while theNGOs tackled ‘micro’ issues, such as thedistribution of food in cities and towns.13

Amongst UN agencies, agreement was reachedon the following distribution of responsibilities:

– logistics would be undertaken by WFP, whichwould transport UN and NGO equipment,property, personnel, and programme inputs byair or road to the provinces;

– food Aid would be cleared through Angola’sthree main ports, stored in warehouses, anddelivered to primary distribution points, i.e.provincial capitals, by WFP;

– nation-wide HF and Telex-over-Radio Com-munications would be managed by UNDP withsupport from UCAH;

– security for humanitarian staff and propertywould be monitored by UCAH;

– non-food Sector Provincial Offices would beestablished by UNICEF; and

– resource Mobilization was the responsibility ofeach agency involved in the relief effort;

13 This discussion was supported by a group of keyNGOs, brought together by the International MedicalCorps and SCF-UK, which wrote a paper “NGO EmopStrategy” and shared it with UCAH.

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although UCAH promoted it by organising thepreparation and launching of four consolidatedinter-agency appeals from April 1993 to Febru-ary 1995. (See section VIII below).

Defining roles and responsibilities by sector,rather than by social group, enabled UN agenciesto know precisely where their responsibilities layand helped build a sense of collaboration, ratherthan competition, between the different UN agen-cies.

In addition to nation-wide UN agency-NGOcollaboration, the four MSF sections and the ICRClaunched their own respective humanitarianprogrammes throughout Angola. While theseactivities were not part of the integrated UNagency-NGO strategy, UCAH promoted informa-tion exchange between all actors to avoid dupli-cation of effort.

The Emergency Relief PlanFrom November 1992 to April 1993, the UNagencies’ approach to humanitarian operationswas ad hoc. The UN did not have a policy forhumanitarian operations. There was no seriousdiscussion between the UN agencies on whichway to approach the GoA and UNITA. WFP hada several cargo aeroplanes in Luanda and hadflown cargo to some destinations under govern-ment control but this was not donesystematically. UNHCR had bought some hoursfrom a commercial cargo company and flew tothe northern provinces of Uige and Zaire, bothunder UNITA control, and to two easternprovinces under government control. Yet, therewas little or no institutional discussion on anoverall UN agency response to the crisis.

Upon UCAH’s establishment, the UN agenciesfound a place in which joint policies and strate-gies could be discussed. The first operational planwhich the agencies elaborated was known as theEmergency Plan for Humanitarian Assistance,later modified and referred to as the EmergencyRelief Plan. Initially, it highlighted reaching fourareas by road and ten by air. Each road or aircorridor would be used on one, two, or three des-ignated days per week. On such days, ‘Bothparties agreed not to take any military advantagesfrom humanitarian operations...road and air cor-ridors will be utilised during the agreed days ofthe week only for relief assistance under the UNumbrella’.

The Emergency Relief Plan was handed toboth sides to the conflict on 26 May 1993, at theend of the Abidjan peace talks. The GoA andUNITA accepted the plan during the first week of

June, although UNITA suggested the inclusion ofseveral additional corridors and cited difficultiesin reaching some of the destinations because oflogistic and security constraints. Among the citiesthat could not be reached were Kuito, Malange,and Menongue, three of the four cities harbouringthe worst humanitarian situations.

The government agreed that the plan begin on21 June but stressed that access to Kuito would benecessary to ensure success. UCAH went toHuambo for further negotiations on the same dayto discuss access to Kuito and possible air drop-ping operations to Malange and Menongue, butUNITA reiterated that access was impossiblebecause of damaged landing strips.Consequently, the government cancelled theplan’s continuation explaining that, thoseAngolans most in need, the people of Kuito,should get aid as soon as any other Angolans.

The Emergency Relief Plan started again on 15July 1993, after UCAH had held a series of meet-ings with UNITA and gained the party’s accep-tance of aid flights to Malange and Menongue.However, two events, which put an end to theplan, occurred on the same day. First, the UN hadgained the agreement of both sides to fly to Kuitoby helicopter. The flight had to take place viaHuambo for logistics reasons. Upon arrival inHuambo, however, UNITA called a meeting withthe UN team and announced that the missionshould not proceed to Kuito because of intensefighting in the city. (UCAH later received inde-pendent confirmation that this was the case).Second, a UN agency flight to the capital of Zaireprovince, M’Banza Congo, was shot as itapproached the runway. (UNITA later acceptedresponsibility for the incident). Based on thesecond event, which put into question thesecurity of aid workers and their property, theUN stopped the Emergency Relief Plan.

The response to the plan demonstrated thatfour cities, Huambo, Kuito, Malange, andMenongue, were particularly sensitive to the GoAand UNITA, and that their influence on the plan’ssuccess or failure was enormous. In light of this,UCAH (in consultation with the SRSG, UN agen-cies, and IOs/NGOs) decided to divide the plan’sdestinations into two groups: non-active con flictand active-conflict. Negotiations on access toareas included in the plan were henceforth split intwo in the hope that access would be available tonon-active conflict zones while discussions con-tinued on active conflict zones. However, justafter UCAH proposed the amended plan to bothsides, the GoA launched a six-week air attack on

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the city of Huambo. One effect of this was thatUCAH’s communication links with UNITA werecut. The SRSG managed to arrange a meetingbetween UCAH and UNITA in Kinshasa, Zaire,on 23 August 1993, and on 3 September 1993 theparty accepted flights to proceed to ‘non-activeconflict’ zones.

In light of the delays caused in implementingthe Emergency Relief Plan, UCAH discussed dif-ferent ways in which to get aid to those in need inareas that it deemed safe. At the same time,Caritas Internationalis managed to gain the con-sent of both sides to fly its own reliefcommodities to some cities around the country inwhich no fighting was taking place.14 Further,two NGOs hired a commercial cargo company tofly aid to a handful of provincial capitals.Consequently, UCAH encouraged collaborationbetween UN agencies and Caritas, and betweenUN agencies and the concerned NGOs to arrangefor UNICEF and WFP relief commodities to reachkey, non-conflict cities. This approach lastedthroughout August and part of September 1993and was indicative of the growing collaborationbetween UN agencies and NGOs.

14 Caritas had its own HF radio network throughoutAngola and could provide aid via the Catholic church.

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VI. MAIN FEATURES OF COORDINATION

Information ExchangeFacilitating information exchange between allactors involved in emergency relief activities inAngola and providing a global view ofhumanitarian issues was one of UCAH’s mostimportant functions. During 1993, the unitworked to establish itself as a focal point whereinformation could be gathered, synthesised, anddisseminated. The lack of an information officerduring 1993, however, hindered the unit’s abilityto develop many of the ideas that it had toproduce and disseminate useful information.With the arrival of a full-time information officerin December 1993, UCAH increased itsproduction of written information, much of whichwas disseminated to the GoA, UNITA, donors,UN agencies, IOs and NGOs.

– Information Bulletins, written weekly to informreaders of the main events related tohumanitarian assistance and of humanitarianprogrammes being implemented in differentparts of the country;

– briefing notes on key cities and provinces avail-able to the all humanitarian actors and thepress;

– field trip reports prepared by UCAH staffmembers whenever they travelled outsideLuanda. These reports were often distributedto key donors, UN agencies, and NGOsworking in the area of concern;

– situation reports sometimes prepared byUCAH’s field advisers and disseminated todonors and humanitarian organisations work-ing in the province under review;

– needs assessment reports of assessments led andorganised by UCAH written and disseminatedto donors, participants, UN agencies, andNGOs concerned;

– provincial files including public informationproduced by humanitarian organisations keptat UCAH for public consumption; and

– special reports on sectoral issues such as agri-culture or nutrition written to highlight specialprogrammes and outstanding needs.

UCAH produced few in-depth analyses ofhumanitarian issues in Angola. While this wasalways a concern of the unit, the lack of resources

prevented it from carrying out this role.15 How-ever, considerable verbal analysis of the availableinformation took place at meetings which the unitpromoted.

Finally, UCAH concentrated on disseminatinginformation about the humanitarian crisis inAngola to the national and international media.Such dissemination often highlighted the positiveimpact of the humanitarian programmes under-way. While Angola’s crisis was often referred toas the ‘forgotten war’ UCAH’s relations with thepress, especially during 1994, captured the mediainterest that existed and promoted the work ofUN agencies and NGOs alike.

Maintaining Relations with the GoAand UNITAConcerning actual contacts with the two sides, itwas agreed that each agency, whether UN orNGO, was responsible for discussing the opera-tional details of its particular programme with theGoA and UNITA, or only with the government ifthe programme was in a government-controlledarea. UCAH and the UN agencies most involvedin the emergency (UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP)maintained close contact with the Ministry ofSocial Affairs in Luanda, which was easily acces-sible for consultation. UCAH’s frequent contactswith the ministry concentrated on the globalaspects of humanitarian operations while the UNagencies sometimes went to the ministry individ-ually to explain more programme-specific details.

As illustrated above, communication withUNITA was complicated during 1993 and 1994 bythe party’s location far from the capital. UCAHheld negotiations with UNITA in Huambo onseveral occasions during June and July 1993.UNICEF and WFP often joined UCAH to promotea consolidated UN agency position. This processwas interrupted during August and September1993 because it was impossible to get to the city,but contact was re-established in Huambo inOctober and consolidated in November andDecember. In January 1994, UCAH placed a full-

15 A notable exception was the unit’s demobilisationand reintegration office, which hired anthropologistsand sociologists familiar with Angola to carry outseveral thorough studies, such as the socio-economicexpectations of demobilised soldiers.

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time representative in Huambo to facilitatecommunication with the party. This processcontinued uninterrupted, except for six weeks inmid-1994, until UNITA lost control of the city ofHuambo in November of that year.

Coordinating with UN AgenciesSeven UN agencies (UNDP, UNFAO, UNFPA,UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO) worked inAngola when UCAH was established. Mostagency representatives cited the need for acoordination unit to help the UN agenciesestablish common policies and better integratetheir programmes. UN agency heads expressedthe concern that UCAH not create an additionallayer of bureaucracy, with which agencies wouldhave to work. One agency head was quite wary ofthe establishment of a coordination unit andasked that it not tell agencies what to do butenhance their programmes.16

Throughout its first two years, UCAH pro-vided UN agencies with a regular forum in whichto discuss issues related to policy andprogramme. For example, within a few weeks ofUCAH’s establishment, UN agencies had reachedagreement on a major division of roles andresponsibilities (see section V above). UCAHpromoted daily, informal consultations betweenUN agency heads and held formal meetings eachweek. Discussions included everything fromquotidian operational issues to how to approachdonors to raise programme resources.

Establishing and Maintaining Relations withDonorsUCAH invited donors to a meeting during theunit’s first week. When asked about coordinationof humanitarian assistance and whether or notdonors had their own coordination mechanism todiscuss humanitarian issues, two of the maindonors answered ‘ad hoc’ and ‘You're it’. Donorsexpressed their hope that UCAH facilitatecoordination amongst all actors.

The UCAH director, supported by the donorliaison officer, started a number of activities tofoment strong relations between the donor com-munity and UN agencies and IOs/NGOs. Theseincluded:

– weekly meetings held at UCAH where the unitbriefed donors on overall humanitarian issuesand UN agencies explained their ongoing pro-

16 The representative actually said in a meeting thatthe unit should consist only of the director and onesecretary!

grammes. (UCAH proposed that IOs andNGOs be allowed to attend these meetings. Theproposal was accepted for the ICRC but not forNGOs). UCAH wrote notes for the file of thesemeetings and sent them to donors thefollowing day;

– individual consultations and briefings with donorsto address specific issues or providehumanitarian briefings;

– donor participation in assessments, organised byUCAH;

– field trips to the provinces, to show and explainthe humanitarian situation to donors or delega-tions from outside Angola;

– specific resource mobilisation to ask donors foragency programme support.

Humanitarian assistance programmes receivedstrong financial and in-kind support from thedonors throughout 1993 and 1994. Moreover,UCAH’s attention to building strong relationswith donors by organising the actions citedabove, encouraged donors to interact moreamongst themselves. For example, four of the keydonors (ECHO, Sweden, UK, and USA) metmonthly to share information on which UNagency and NGO programmes they planned tosupport.

Working with NGOsThroughout much of 1991 and 1992, relationsbetween UN agencies and NGOs were awkward.NGOs felt that some UN agencies, especiallyUNDP, behaved in a paternal and generallyhaughty manner towards them. For example,SRPA appeal preparations did not include discus-sions with NGOs despite the document beinglittered with activities that the NGOs were toundertake for UN agencies. There were, of course,exceptions but the overall relationship betweenUN agencies and NGOs was not good.

UCAH’s establishment in April 1993 providedan opportunity to enhance UN agency-NGO rela-tions. UCAH seized the opportunity in several,straightforward ways. First, UCAH explained itsrole to the NGO community and told NGO rep-resentatives that the unit had no authority over orinstitutional link to any NGOs. Second, UCAHinvited NGOs to establish open and frank dia-logue with the unit so that policy or operationalissues could be addressed. Third, UCAH toldNGOs that it wanted strong relations betweenUN agencies and NGOs and that ways in whichto pursue this should be discussed. Fourth,UCAH assured NGOs that the unit would not

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make assumptions about NGO plans orprogrammes without first consulting them. Fifth,UCAH promised to support NGOs, asappropriate, if they had issues to resolve with UNagencies. Sixth, UCAH offered to back NGO fundraising efforts in general terms by including themin the appeal process (see section VIII below).

Throughout UCAH’s first two years, the unitinvited NGOs to participate in almost all facets ofits work thereby building a spirit of collaborationand trust between the UN and NGOs. NGOsthemselves, of course, contributed to the processenormously. First, while NGOs lacked a strongcoordination body of their own, they showed aninterest and willingness in building constructiveworking relations with UCAH and UN agencies,such as WFP.17 Second, the representatives ofimportant Angolan and expatriate NGOs such asADRA, Oikos, SCAM, SCF-UK, and World VisionInternational, worked to encourage all non-governmental humanitarian organisations toparticipate in the framework which was estab-lished.

Some examples UCAH’s actions vis-à-visNGOs are given below:

– letter of affiliation: A letter of understandingbetween the United Nations in Angola and anyNGO which chose to sign the letter. It helped tofoster a spirit of collaboration and clarifiedwhat NGOs could expect from the UN, e.g.flight support, communications frequenciesand identity cards;

– strategy sessions to discuss relevant programmeissues;

– information sharing sessions to provide UNagencies and NGOs a forum in which informa-tion could be shared and announcements andplans could be made;

– communications and flight support provided toaffiliated NGOs, who could use UN HF andUHF radio frequencies, and get free air trans-port for humanitarian personnel to and fromthe provinces; and

– security meetings and support: During 1993 and1994, the absence of UNAVEM II observers inalmost all of Angola’s interior led to UNagencies and NGOs seeking UCAH’s supportto monitor the security situation as it related tohumanitarian operations, to keep UN agenciesand NGOs informed of the situation, and to

17 Two NGO co-ordination bodies existed at the timebut neither were particularly effective. The Forum dasONGs Angolanas, known as FONGA, included AngolanNGOs and the Confederação de ONGs em Angola,known as CONGA, included Angolan and expatriateNGOs.

organise evacuations, when necessary. (Seesection IX below).

– pigeon holes at UCAH for all NGOs working inAngola so that they could receive informationfrom the unit and send information to eachother in a cost-effective way.

Assessing NeedsMuch discussion took place among UN agenciesin Angola to decide who should lead andorganise needs assessments. It was agreed thatthe task should go to UCAH because the processwas considered a coordination function, whichshould be led by an agency that did notimplement projects.

UCAH called on the GoA and UNITA to alertthe unit of areas where a population’s needs wereacute. When an area was identified, UCAH or-ganised a team to visit the area. Assessmentteams aimed to include government or UNITAofficials, donors, UN agencies, and Angolan andinternational NGOs. During the war, it wasimpossible for GoA or UNITA members orvirtually any Angolans to move from agovernment zone to a UNITA area, or vice-versa.This changed after the peace agreement, knownas the Lusaka Protocol, was signed on 20November 1994. Shortly thereafter, GoA andUNITA members and Angolans working forhumanitarian organisations crossed former front-lines to help evaluate needs.

Assessments were followed by meetings toorganise quick inter-agency responses to theneeds that were identified. After consultationwith the participants, UCAH wrote needsassessment reports according to its own formatand distributed them to the GoA, UNITA, donors,UN agencies, and NGOs. However, individualUN agency assessment reports sometimes ‘told adifferent story’ which led to conflictingprogramme recommendations. This might havebeen averted if agencies had used the sameformat during needs assessments. Standardformats also would have allowed agencies toallocate scarce resources more efficiently,according to priority needs. In March 1995, theHumanitarian Coordination Group starteddeveloping a format that could be used byagencies during assessments and it was expectedthat this would help to resolve the issue.

Field AdvisersSince its establishment, UCAH stressed the needto have representatives or field coordinators at

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the provincial level. However, this idea worriedUN agencies, who were concerned that UCAHwould become operational. Donors and NGOsagreed with UCAH and by late 1993, when accesshad been gained to most of the country and reliefactivities were expanding, UN agencies agreedthat UCAH have a presence in the field on a tem-porary basis.

The first area to have an UCAH field adviserwas Huambo. UCAH needed daily contact withUNITA as humanitarian operations could nottake place nation-wide without it. Flying fromLuanda to Huambo each time discussions on aparticular issue were necessary was not alwayspossible. In addition, the humanitarian pro-gramme in Huambo was expanding. UCAH wascalled on to facilitate the coordination of the effortand to monitor the security situation.

In addition to the Huambo field adviser, dur-ing 1994 UCAH placed field advisers in Benguela,Kwando Kubango, and Malange. Further, oneofficer in Luanda was dispatched to the field, asnecessary. The standard functions of fieldadvisers were to:

– represent the UCAH director at the provinciallevel;

– work closely with the GoA or UNITA, UNagencies, and IOs/NGOs to facilitate coordi-nated relief activities;

– facilitate information exchange by gathering,synthesising, and disseminating briefing notesand reports on the humanitarian situation;

– monitor the humanitarian situation and bringto light programme gaps and areas of unmetneeds;

– lead and organise assessment missions;

– monitor the security situation and takemeasures as appropriate;

– ensure that UHF, HF, and telex-over-radioworks were available to UN agencies andNGOs in the field; and

– organise field visits for donors and journalists.

The field adviser system was useful and worked,although UCAH’s efforts to place the staff in thefield quickly were hampered by two issues. First,donors were slow to deposit funds in the appro-priate accounts. Second, it was difficult for UCAHto find qualified candidates, who spokePortuguese.

Coordination in Times of PeaceIn February 1994, it looked increasingly likely thatthe peace talks under way in the Zambian capital,

Lusaka, would soon bear fruit. UCAHhighlighted the need for the UN agencies andNGOs to be fully prepared to confront humani-tarian needs. UCAH sought donor support andhired staff so that the unit and agencies in thecountry would be ready to address the changingreality when the war ended. Upon peace, therewould be three programme areas, supported byUCAH’s policy section:

– Emergency relief, resettlement, and rehabilita-tion: This section would concentrate onUCAH’s role of coordinating the relief opera-tion bearing in mind three issues. First, emer-gency relief activities were likely to expandafter a peace agreement because of increasedaccess to towns and villages across the country.Second, internally displaced people andrefugees were likely to return to their place oforigin, and this programme would need carefulcoordination and synchronisation between thevarious actors. Third, as the peace process con-solidated, emergency activities would diminishand rehabilitation work would most likelyexpand;

– Mine action, i.e. mine awareness, survey, clear-ing, and training: Angola, similar toAfghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique,was burdened with millions of mines through-out the country resulting in one of the highest‘amputee per capita’ rates in the world. A con-certed effort to address this issue would be nec-essary in post-war Angola. UCAH opened aCentral Mine Action Office (UCAH-CMAO) toplan and coordinate the thee-pronged strategyof mine awareness, survey, and clearance,which included training for Angolans toassume these tasks. United Nations experienceoutside Angola emphasised the use of localstaff for mine clearing. This staff would benefitfrom training and special equipment. Theresulting transfer of knowledge from spe-cialised UN agencies and NGOs to citizens ofthe country in question would help to form thenucleus of a national mine capacity. Given thelong time that would be needed to resolve themine problem in Angola, UCAH proposed thata national institute for mine action be estab-lished to coordinate mine action throughoutthe country. (See section X below);

– Demobilisation and socio-economic reintegra-tion of former combatants: The success of thepeace agreement in Angola would hinge on thedemobilisation and social reintegration offormer combatants. To tackle this task, UNDPcollaborated with UCAH by hiring a consultantto review and analyse the Angolan demobilisa-tion experience under the auspices of theBicesse Accords. In May 1994, UCAH hired

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four consultants with demobilisation and rein-tegration experience in El Salvador andMozambique. These consultants formed theembryo of what was later to become UCAH’sDemobilisation and Reintegration Office(UCAH-DRO).

During the second half of 1994, UCAH-DROsought extensive consultations with the GoA andUNITA, and carried out a series of studies, suchas the social and economic expectations of demo-bilising soldiers. Several planning sessions wereheld with UNAVEM, UN agencies, and NGOs, toprepare appropriate programme options. Similarto the mine action programme, UCAH-DROstressed the need to create an independentAngolan institute for demobilisation and reinte-gration, which would take on overall management of the programme. (See section X below).

Given the way in which the Angolan conflicthad erupted in late 1992, the GoA and UNITAwere very suspicious of each other. This compli-cated UCAH-DRO’s task, and often led to delaysin gaining access to one side or the other and inobtaining information necessary to elaborate theprogramme. The situation became particularlyfrustrating in early-1995, when the GoA andUNITA began to renegotiate the way in whichtroop demobilisation was to be conducted. Thesenegotiations culminated in both sides agreeing toa concept termed ‘Global Incorporation’, whichdiffered from the method originally envisaged.This change in tactic led to the necessary revisionof the plans as they stood in March 1995. How-ever, the establishment of UCAH-DRO almostone year earlier had allowed the UN to collectand analyse a wealth of information, as well asdiscuss it with all necessary partners, and thiscould only strengthen the chances for a successfulprogramme.

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VII. SPECIAL COORDINATION MECHANISMSTO ENHANCE OPERATIONS

The ASDI–UCAH MechanismDuring 1993, the Swedish International Devel-opment Authority (known in Angola by its Por-tuguese acronym, ASDI) wanted to fund NGOemergency relief activities. However, ASDI didnot have the staff to receive, evaluate, and rec-ommend NGO proposals for support. Further,ASDI was constrained by its bilateral agreementwith the GoA which stipulated that the agencycould support only Angolan or Swedish NGOs.After discussion with the GoA, which agreed toASDI’s proposal to fund NGOs that were notAngolan or Swedish, the agency approachedUCAH so that together they could back NGOsworking to alleviate human suffering. ASDI andUCAH created an arrangement known as theASDI-UCAH Mechanism (AUM). It functioned inthe following way:

– NGOs wrote emergency project proposals,following a simple format that was discussedand agreed to, for health, logistics, nutrition,and water and sanitation (and, later, supportfor street children) projects;

– during the first two weeks of each month,NGOs sent proposals to UCAH which analysedthem with support from a UN technical reviewcommittee comprising members from UNDP,UNICEF, WFP, and WHO;

– UCAH and the UN technical review committeerecommended to ASDI which proposals shouldreceive financial support;

– ASDI approved UCAH’s recommendationsand arranged for project funds to betransferred directly from Stockholm torespective NGO headquarters;

– UCAH assumed responsibility for monitoringNGO project implementation, and ASDIremained responsible for tracking projectfinances; and

– NGOs sent quarterly reports and financialreports to UCAH, which reviewed them andforwarded them to ASDI.

From October 1993 to April 1995, UCAH received140 NGO proposals. These were reviewed byUCAH and the UN technical review team, andtogether they recommended 52 or 37% for full orpartial funding. During the AUM’s second phase,which allowed direct funding to Angolan NGOs,

38% of the fund recipients where Angolan NGOs.Over US$ 6 million was disbursed through thisfund and proposals were reviewed and approved orrejected in seven days.

Project distribution by sector was widealthough the health and nutrition sectors weremost often represented. The majority of the pro-jects were implemented in besieged cities, wherethere were virtually no basic services. Acollaborative spirit existed between the donor(ASDI), the mechanism’s manager (UCAH), theUN technical review team and non-governmentalorganisations. Project proposals and reports werekept simple yet comprehensive to enable NGOsto concentrate their efforts on project implemen-tation while UCAH and ASDI monitoredprogramme activities. In sum, the AUM was apowerful tool that enhanced UCAH’s rolebecause it gave the unit the means with which toencourage NGOs to work in the areas with themost critical needs.

The Seeds and Tools Working GroupAnother mechanism which greatly enhancedcoordination of the humanitarian programme inAngola was UCAH’s seeds and tools workinggroup. This group was based in Luanda and com-prised members of the GoA, donors, UNagencies, and IOs/NGOs.18 Each month,members met to analyse the needs for Angola’stwo planting seasons and agree on roles andresponsibilities of the various actors. (Angola hastwo planting seasons, one main season known asthe lavras and one secondary season known as thenacas). Meetings provided the opportunity forinterested parties to communicate with eachother, and come to decisions on the allocation ofavailable resources. This included:

– The GoA’s Ministry of Agriculture beingclosely involved with UN agency and IO/NGOactivities throughout the country even the min-istry was not represented nation-wide;

– Donors working together to inform each otherof the seeds and tools resources to be madeavailable; and

18 Starting in January 1995, UNITA also participatedin Luanda.

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– UN agencies and IOs/NGOs sharing informa-tion on their assessment of needs for seeds andtools by province.

The seeds and tools working group demonstratedUCAH’s concern that the provision of emergencyrelief items, especially food aid, not become anend in itself, and that Angolans be supported intheir desire to maintain their own agricultureproduction, wherever possible.

Provincial MeetingsDuring UCAH’s first two years, the unit organised and led meetings that addresses issues inspecific provinces. (Ideally, these meetings wouldhave taken place in the provinces themselves, butoften this was not possible because of UCAH’slack of staff). UN agencies and IOs/NGOs wereinvited to participate in these meetings, whichwere held to allow humanitarian organisations toassess, plan, monitor, and evaluate future andongoing programmes. UCAH thus provided ope-rational agencies a forum in which programmeissues could be discussed. (Donors sometimesattended these meetings, too). At times, UCAHused these fora to discuss security issues, inclu-ding the need for evacuations, but the thrust ofthe initiate was to address humanitarian pro-grammes. At different times during 1993, 1994,and 1995 working groups existed for Bie, Bengo,Huambo, Kwando Kubango, Kwanza Norte,Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Malange, Menongue,and Moxico. (See map below.)

The Humanitarian Coordination GroupThe Lusaka Protocol, signed on 20 November1994, established an organ known as the JointCommission to oversee the implementation of thepeace agreement. The Joint Commission com-prised members of the UN, GoA, and UNITA.Portugal, the Russian Federation, USA, and theICRC sat on the commission as observers. Ini-tially, it was thought that the Joint Commissionshould establish a sub-committee to deal withhumanitarian issues. However, humanitarianagencies and some donors cited the continuingneed to separate humanitarian issues from thepolitical process; hence, an organ known as theHumanitarian Coordination Group (HCG), wascreated in January 1995.

The Humanitarian Coordination Group was amechanism through which the UN, GoA, andUNITA could discuss humanitarian affairs at the

central level in Luanda.19 Members of the GoAand UNITA were especially active in addressingtwo issues: First, needs assessments to areaswhich had not received any aid during 1993 and1994; and, second, resolving problems in the field.For example, when there was friction between theFAA and NGOs in Matala, Huila province, UN,government, and UNITA members worked tosettle the situation. Both of these activitiesinvolved government personnel travelling toareas under UNITA control and vice-versa,thereby contributing enormously to confidencebuilding measures necessary to ensure thesuccess of the peace agreement. Further, thegroup was replicated in some provinces, such asMoxico, to allow decisions taken at the central,policy level to be disseminated to key provinces.(The HCG is discussed in more detail in section Xbelow).

19 UCAH decided that its parallel relations onhumanitarian affairs with the GoA and UNITA shouldcease. There was no longer a war to justify contactingthe GoA in Luanda and UNITA’s leadership inHuambo. (UNITA had actually left the city of Huambobut was based in the north of the province, inBailundo). Instead, overall humanitarian assistance co-ordination should include all actors and take place inthe capital, Luanda.

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VIII. PREPARING & LAUNCHING APPEALS

1993 Appeal Preparation and LaunchIn April 1993, the humanitarian situation inAngola was dire and deteriorating quickly. It hadnot reached the catastrophic proportions onceexperienced in the southern Sudan or Somalia butit was widely felt that if concerted emergencyrelief activities did not reach most areas of thecountry within a few months, hundreds of thou-sands of citizens would die. To address this issue,humanitarian organisations would need signifi-cant resources.

Angola was not a household name in 1993. Itwas often referred to as, ‘The Forgotten War’.International attention was much more fixed onevents in the former-Yugoslavia and Somalia. Tochange this, UCAH decided to prepare a consoli-dated inter-agency appeal. Besides enumeratingoverall humanitarian needs and the proposed UNagency response, the appeal process would callattention to the humanitarian situation in Angola.

DHA Geneva and UN agencies with offices inAngola sent staff members to Luanda to supportagency colleagues there prepare the appeal docu-ment. The process lasted two weeks. Despite alack of basic information, such as the data onpopulation movements, agencies coped and pre-sented the humanitarian situation based on theavailable information.

Initially, NGOs were frustrated by the UNagencies’ appeal process. NGOs felt that it did notinclude them. UCAH explained that it was not bepossible to bring NGOs fully on board in the 1993appeal process because there were no establishedrelations between the unit and NGOs. However,UCAH did hold several meetings with NGOsduring the appeal’s preparation to inform them ofprogress and obtain their views on their ownparticular relief strategy. Further, UCAHprepared a full chapter as an annex in the appealto explain UN-NGO relations, call on donors tosupport NGO projects, show NGO activities byprovince and sector, and list NGO project pro-posals. While UCAH’s first appeal preparationsdid not include NGOs as much as both groupsmight have wished, collaboration was greaterthan at any time previously in Angola.

The 1993 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola was launched in Genevaon 3 June by the SRSG, UCAH director, and UNagency representatives. The document called for

US$ 226 million in multi-sectoral aid to be used toassist almost 2 million beneficiaries, 345,000 ofwhom were internally displaced persons(IDPs).20 Initial donor commitments totalledsome US$ 70 million with Sweden and the UnitedStates showing the largest support for theprocess. By January 1994, confirmed pledges hadreached nearly half of the overall target—US$ 103million.

Revised Appeal: February 1994By January 1994, humanitarian operations weretaking place throughout Angola. UCAH hadbrokered access to several new areas of the coun-try, in which UN agencies and NGOs were work-ing together to complement each other’sstrengths. The ICRC, too, began a large pro-gramme in some areas, particularly in Huamboprovince. All of these efforts, enabled agencies togarner a far more accurate picture of the humani-tarian situation, which now showed a staggering3.3 million people in need of food or non-foodassistance. Almost 1 million of these people weredisplaced, who had left their places of origin insearch of security. Consequently, UCAH and theUN agencies decided to update the appeal tomake the call for financial and material resourcesbetter reflect the situation in the country.

The revised appeal of February 1994 illus-trated improved UN agency-NGO collaborationby including a chapter on non-governmentalorganisations and allowing NGOs to includeproject summary sheets to explain their respectiveprojects. For the first time in the history of DHAconsolidated appeals, NGOs were makingspecific project requests in the same document asUN agencies. While some UN agencies felt thatallowing NGOs to advertise and ask for specificsupport in a UN document would lessen UNagency chances for receiving donor backing,UCAH felt that showing overall needs and theplanned UN agency and NGO response wouldgenerate stronger donor support. The inclusion ofNGO projects in the appeal promoted comple-mentary action and further illustrated the shared

20 This figure and remaining figures referring toappeal amounts include the value of food aid.

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UN agency-NGO strategy for humanitarian inter-vention.

The revised appeal also introduced theconcept of forward planning for mine action anddemobilisation and reintegration. While warcontinued throughout much of the country therewere signs from Lusaka, where the SRSG wasnegotiating a peace settlement with the GoA andUNITA, that an agreement could be signed in thenear future.

In sum, the February 1994 revised appealcalled for donor contributions to the tune of US$179 million for six months.

Revised Appeal: September 1994DHA issued a second revision of the consolidatedinter-agency appeal in September 1994 for tworeasons. First, to report on the progress and con-straints of the humanitarian operation sinceFebruary 1994; and, second, to extend theappeal’s coverage to December 1994 therebybringing total resource requirements to almostUS$ 188 million with a funding shortfall of justover US$ 61 million.

While 1994 had started full of hope with manyobservers expecting the UN to broker a peaceagreement by the middle of the year, the oppositehappened. In May 1994, the war intensified andreached heights of violence never before seen inthe country. In June, all UN-WFP cargo andflights were grounded for nearly three weeksbecause of the lack of security clearance. As ofSeptember 1994, almost 3.7 million Angolans orone third of the population was in need of someform of emergency assistance to stay alive. Inessence, the stop-go pattern of the relief operationsince May wiped out the gains in the humanitar-ian situation which UN agencies and NGOsachieved between October 1993 and April 1994.

The increased fighting throughout Angoladuring the previous months, made donors waryof providing resources for a country that lookedlike it was not moving towards peace. Whiledonors had responded relatively well to theconsolidated appeal process by providing 67.5percent of the funds requested between 1February and 31 August 1994, they wanted to seesome positive results in the political processbefore committing themselves to further support.

1995 AppealThe signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20November 1994 after thirteen months of negotia-tions in the Zambian capital brought Angola its

best chance to move away from emergency reliefactivities and on to long-term rehabilitation and

development. To prepare for this, UCAH devel-oped a plan of action for the preparation of aconsolidated inter-agency appeal. The 1995appeal was, without question, the culmination ofUCAH’s policy of involving all actors in humani-tarian assistance in Angola to tap on their respec-tive strengths.

To reflect the new political situation, humani-tarian organisations, in consultation with theGoA, agreed that a three-pronged humanitarianprogramme should be planned: humanitarianassistance including relief, resettlement, and repa-triation; mine action; and, demobilisation andreintegration. As with the previous three appeals,the 1995 document was prepared by sector. UNagencies and NGOs were called on to select a leadUN agency and NGO for each sector: food pro-duction and basic rural capacity; food aid; nutri-tion and household food security; water and sani-tation; health; shelter, relief, and survival; educa-tion and assistance to children in difficult circum-stances; and, logistics. Each sector’s UN agencyand NGO representative then organised planningsessions with other humanitarian organisationsinvolved in the respective sector to write thechapter corresponding to that sector. Forexample, UN agencies chose UNICEF and NGOsselected Save the Children Fund-UK to representthem in the education sector. UNICEF and SCF-UK were then responsible for organisingmeetings with the Ministry of Education, UNagencies and NGOs involved in the educationsector so that, together, they could prepare thesection explaining the current situation and theway in which to address the issue during 1995.This process was repeated for the sections onmine action, and demobilisation andreintegration, which UCAH-CMAO and UCAH-DRO led on behalf of the UN.

The 1995 appeal included the most extensivechapter on non-governmental organisations todate. Angolan and expatriate NGOs chose Acçãopara o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente(ADRA–Angolana) and Save the ChildrenFund–UK to represent them, respectively. Theywere responsible for coordinating the productionof the chapter titled, ‘Non-GovernmentalOrganisations’. NGOs decided to include thefollowing sections in their chapter: strategy;emergency to rehabilitation; reinforcing nationalcapacities; networking and programme extension;financing; list of NGOs and ICRC operating in

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Angola; matrix showing NGO activities by sectorand province; list of proposed/ongoing projectsfor 1995 and financial resources needed.21

Throughout the chapter NGOs stated their viewthat complementary UN-NGO humanitarianoperations, based on the model developed during1993 and 1994, should continue throughout 1995with enhanced UN coordination and quick-disbursement funding mechanisms such as theASDI-UCAH Mechanism.

Capacity building for the government andnational NGOs was the recurring theme through-out the appeal process and was reflected as suchin the document. UN agencies and expatriateNGOs committed themselves to expanding theirprogrammes to include enhanced capacity build-ing for national institutions and Angolan NGOs.The mine action chapter explained in detail thestrategy to help the Angolan Government create anational institute for mine action by the end of1995. Likewise, the demobilisation and reintegra-tion chapter highlighted the need for UCAH-DROto support the establishment of an Angolan insti-tute for demobilisation and reintegration. Finally,concerning coordination, UCAH announced itshope to withdraw from Angola by mid-1996, andexplained that in order to hand over coordinationto the government’s Ministry of Social Affairs(MINARS) by then, the unit would work closelywith MINARS to enable it to carry out the tasksuccessfully.

The 1995 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola called for donor con-tributions totalling some US$ 213 million, splitamongst the three programmes: US$ 145 millionfor humanitarian assistance (relief, resettlement,and repatriation); US$ 12 million for the mineaction programme; and, US$ 56 million fordemobilisation and reintegration.

A Model LaunchDHA launched the 1995 appeal on 23 February1995. The event was termed a ‘Donors’ Consul-tation’, which briefed those present on the overallsituation in Angola, then allowed the UCAHdirector to place the humanitarian situationwithin that context and outline the planned UNagency and NGO response to overall humanitar-ian needs. Thereafter, GoA and UNITA represen-tatives had the opportunity to speak, and this was 21 NGOs chose not to include project summary sheets,which briefly explain an individual agency’s specificproject and its cost, in the appeal. NGOs explained that,as far as they were concerned, the appeal shouldhighlight programmes, not individual projects.

followed by member state delegates whoannounced their respective country’scontribution. The consultation started at 10:00 amand finished just after 4:00 pm and included theschedule outlined below:

– Statement by the SRSG on the overall political,military, and humanitarian situation in Angola.

– Presentation of the 1995 United Nations Con-solidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola by theUCAH director. This presentation incorporateddetails of the humanitarian assistance activitiesof all UN agencies and other humanitarianagencies active in Angola, and included astraightforward set of overhead slides toimprint the main themes of the document, aswell as the key financial and food resourcesbeing requested on the minds of those present.

– Statement by the prime minister of Angola.

– Statement by the UNITA representative to theUnited Nations in Geneva.

– Statements by the representatives of the obser-ver countries (Portugal, the Russian Federation,and the United States of America).

– Statements by representatives of UN memberstates.

– Statements by representatives of non-govern-mental organisations.

– Closing statement by the SRSG.

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IX. SECURITY ISSUES

Procedures for Airlifts & ConvoysWhen UCAH was established, the World FoodProgramme flew relief commodities andpersonnel to accessible government towns inAngola. The agency had no contact with UNITAtherefore it could not fly to any of the areas thatthe party occupied. UNHCR was the only UNagency flying to UNITA zones. On occasion, theagency chartered a commercial cargo company tofly on its behalf to M’Banza Congo or Uige, in thenorth of Angola. Both of these agencies took strictsecurity measures. During the third week ofApril, however, UNITA shot down a WFPaeroplane outside Luena, and six weeks later on15 July 1993 UNITA attacked a second WFPaeroplane, as it came in to land in M’BanzaCongo.

These two incidents led UCAH to conduct anumber of policy meetings on securityprocedures for humanitarian operations.22

UCAH drafted the procedures, which includedrecommendations made by the GoA and UNITA.UCAH and UN agencies discussed theprocedures and agreed to them. They acted asguidelines for what was to become one of theUN’s largest relief operations by air: at theprogramme’s peak, the WFP carried out some 200cargo and personnel flights per week to almostthirty destinations. During 1994, the WFPdelivered over 110,000 MTs of food and non-foodrelief by air.

Regarding road convoys, which accounted forabout half of aid deliveries in Angola, UCAH andWFP worked out safety procedures. However,based on an incident on 27 August 1993 duringwhich three Angolan truck drivers died whilecarrying out work for WFP in Benguela province,the SRSG called on UN agencies to enhance secu-rity procedures by combining the existingapproach with UNAVEM’s procedures. While thegoal was to strengthen ongoing securitymeasures, the use of UNAVEM did not achievethis. First, the mission’s field presence wasrestricted so it rarely had primary information onthe security situation; second, involving

22 UCAH benefited from one of its senior staffmember’s expertise in security matters and operationalexperience in Angola to allow it to take a leadershiprole on security.

UNAVEM in security clearances made theprocedures unnecessarily bureaucratic.

The participatory elaboration of and strictadherence to security guidelines for the airlift androad convoys contributed to the lack of seriousinjuries or deaths sustained by aid workersduring the aid operation in 1993 and 1994.

Cross-line Operations: KuitoA fierce battle took place for the city of Kuitofrom January to September 1993. When it ended,the city was divided with the GoA controllingabout forty percent of it and the airport, andUNITA controlling sixty percent of the city andall of the surrounding countryside. A UN staffmember was in the city during all of the siege andkept almost daily radio contact with the ECUuntil April 1993 and UCAH thereafter. Hisreports and others from the city indicated terriblehuman loss and a humanitarian situation farworse than elsewhere in the country. Asexplained above, UCAH spent considerable timetrying to gain access to the city and when, on 15October 1993, a UN assessment team finallylanded in Kuito it confirmed that a largeoperation would have to be mountedimmediately.

Kuito was an operational challenge for UNagencies and NGOs. UCAH negotiated thefollowing procedures with both sides.

– One WFP cargo aeroplane landed at Kuito air-port. WFP workers unloaded the aeroplane’scargo into two trucks.

– The two trucks left the airport, directly outsideof which there was an ‘humanitarian com-mittee’ comprising GoA and UNITA memberswho verified that both trucks held only human-itarian cargo.

– UNITA controlled the road from the airport tothe city and placed one checkpoint along thestretch. Both trucks stopped at the checkpointand continued only after being waved on bythe respective UNITA controllers.

– At the end of the road leading from the airportto the town centre, one truck continued straightahead and travelled into the UNITA part of thecity, while the other truck turned right andstopped at a second UNITA check-point, whereit was cleared to leave the zone under theparty’s control. After crossing a roundabout,

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the truck stopped at a GoA checkpoint andentered the part of Kuito under governmentcontrol.

– Once in its respective part of the city, eachtruck proceeded to a warehouse where WFPstaff unloaded it.

– NGOs working with WFP picked up the foodor non-food items in one of the two ware-houses and implemented projects on either theGoA side of Kuito or in an UNITA area nearby.

– Expatriate UN agency and NGO staff couldwork in both parts of the town but they had tocross from one zone into the other at specialcheck-points.

– UN agency and NGO offices and houses wereon the GoA side of Kuito.

– The arrival and departure of cargo and per-sonnel aeroplanes took place after authorisa-tion was received from Luanda and Huambo,and the commanders on the ground wereaware of schedules.

The political, military, and humanitarian situationin Kuito was tense, and the slightest incidentcould flare into a skirmish. The GoA had man-aged to hold on to the city despite all odds to thecontrary, and could continue to do so only if itreceived supplies from Luanda. The government,therefore, commissioned aeroplanes to fly overthe city and drop pallets of equipment for gov-ernment troops in that hope that the pallets fell inthe GoA zone. Sometimes they did; at other timesthey did not. When they fell into UNITA’s zoneor areas controlled by neither the GoA or UNITA,troops fought over the spoils. This becameextremely dangerous, at times.

From October 1993 to July 1994, aid workerswere evacuated from Kuito on four occasions.One evacuation took place by road. Aid workerscrossed from the government zone to the UNITAzone, after which the party escorted them west tothe city of Huambo. Once in Huambo, the work-ers were flown to Luanda. Usually, however, itwas impossible for aid workers to cross from thegovernment to the UNITA zone, hence they werestuck until the skirmish ended.

The worst of such incidents started on 26 May1994 when staff from UN agencies, NGOs, andthe ICRC were in the city. The workers were ableto gather in two bunkers which the ICRC andMSF had prepared. During more than one week,the staff members stayed in the bunkers maintain-ing HF contact with their respective agency andUCAH, which was planning their evacuation.

UCAH was in a strong position to organiseevacuations. First, the unit’s direct link to the

SRSG enabled it to benefit from his high-levelcontacts with both sides to the conflict. Second,the unit had instant access to the GoA in Luandaand to UNITA in Huambo and constantly keptboth sides informed of the situation on theground and how it affected aid workers stuck indangerous circumstances. Third, UCAH’s work-ing relations with UN agencies and NGOs weregood. For example, UCAH could always count onWFP’s collaboration to provide the logistics forevacuations.

As soon as the 26 May crisis broke, UCAHnegotiated with the GoA in Luanda and withUNITA in Huambo to gain authorisation to carryout an evacuation. After considerable discussion,both sides granted permission for 4 June. Giventhe tense military situation on the ground, UCAHset up a structure whereby a high-level govern-ment official could be contacted in Luanda asevents unfolded. Likewise, UNITA’shumanitarian affairs coordinator was with theUCAH field adviser in Huambo monitoringevents so that if problems occurred, messagescould be sent by the GoA and UNITA to theirrespective people on the ground in Kuito.

On 4 June, two small passenger aeroplanesflew to the city. While one aeroplane landed, theother circled overhead. WFP’s country directortravelled on the aeroplane that landed and main-tained constant contact with UCAH in Luandaand Huambo via HF radio.

After the first aeroplane landed, the humani-tarian staff stuck in the city began to move fromthe GoA part into the UNITA zone, and on to theairport. The staff got stuck at the last UNITAcheck-point. Someone had not instructed thesoldiers at the check-point to let the staff leave thecity, and without clear orders the soldiers wouldnot do so. The agency staff in Kuito contacted theWFP country director via walkie-talkie. He inturn relayed a message via HF radio to UCAHLuanda. This message was picked up by UCAHHuambo which immediately discussed the issuewith the UNITA humanitarian affairs coordina-tor. He contacted UNITA’s military who sent amessage to Kuito. Within a few minutes the prob-lem was solved and the staff proceeded to the air-port and left the city.

In sum, UCAH brokered a ‘window’ with bothsides to the conflict so that aid workers who werein danger and could no longer work in the areacould be evacuated. UCAH organised and man-aged such evacuations, with the full operationalsupport of WFP logistics, almost one dozen timesduring 1993 and 1994 and gained a reputation for

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being willing and able to support operationalagencies with their primary concern: security fortheir staff and equipment.Freedom of Movement CrisesOne of the basic principles on which humanitar-ian agencies counted to carry out their pro-grammes was freedom of movement for its per-sonnel and property. (See section IV above).Without it, agencies could not work. This wasexplained to both sides to the conflict on severaloccasions. Despite this, three incidents duringwhich the principle was violated occurred.

On 17 October 1993, the aid operation to Kuitowas just getting under way. UNITA hadapproved three cargo flights to the city that dayon the understanding that one cargo flight wouldgo to Huambo in accordance with the flight planthat WFP had organised. WFP and NGO stafftravelled to Kuito on the first cargo flight andwere to return to Luanda on the third. After thesecond flight had landed in Kuito, however, andno flight had gone to Huambo, UNITAannounced that the third WFP flight could notland in Kuito; hence the aid workers were stuck.At the time, the military situation in the city wasextremely tense and fighting could have brokenout at any moment. If aid workers could not go toand leave the city at will, it would be too danger-ous to carry out programmes there. The UCAHdirector flew to Kuito on the third flight andnegotiated with UNITA from the aeroplane, buthe was unable to gain the party’s authorisation toland. Consequently, UCAH travelled to Huambothe following day, with the support of UNICEFand WFP, to negotiate access for a passengeraeroplane to go to Kuito to pick-up the aidworkers.

The city of Malange was under siege through-out 1993 and 1994 and probably harboured theworst malnutrition in Angola. For example, inOctober 1993 up to 250 children were starving perday in the city. WFP organised an airlift to thecity delivering some 1,000 MTs of food and non-food aid each week for UN agency and NGOprojects. On average, ten WFP cargo flights flewto Malange per day. On several occasions, partic-ularly on 2–3 March and 16–19 May 1994, cargoand passenger flights landing or already on theground in Malange were hit by mortar shells.These incidents led to extensive negotiationsbetween UCAH and UNITA, which at one stageclaimed responsibility for the incidents by blam-ing ‘bad communications’; although the partylater retracted the statement and denied anyinvolvement. While UCAH’s discussions on

Malange were generally successful and usuallyled to the resumption of programmes, aidworkers frequently got stuck in the city whilesuch negotiations took place.23 At one stage,UCAH’s field adviser in Malange, who had goneto the city on a Saturday and was due back inLuanda the following Monday, got stuck in thecity for thirty-eight days.

The GoA stopped all UN and ICRC cargoflights to Huambo and Uige effective 22 May 1994explaining that if the UN could not fly to Malangesafely, it could not do so to Huambo and Uige.Personnel flights could continue, therebyallowing UN agency, NGO, and ICRC personnelthe freedom to go to and leave both cities. UCAHworked hard to convince the GoA that it shouldallow humanitarian flights to continue toHuambo and Uige, particularly to Huambowhere hundreds of thousands of Angolansneeded aid to survive. However, thesenegotiations were unsuccessful. UNITA re-sponded to the government’s move by refusing toauthorise any cargo or personnel flights nation-wide, effective 13 June. Further, UNITA stoppedUN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC from leavingthe city of Huambo by road claiming that theGoA was bombing different parts of Huamboprovince and that it was not safe. Informationindicated, however, that the least safe place in theprovince was the city of Huambo itself, againstwhich the GoA’s air force was waging an aircampaign. Arrangements were made to fly theUCAH director to Huambo so that he and theUCAH field adviser could negotiate withUNITA’s leadership. Upon arrival, however,UNITA refused to speak to the director andinsisted that he leave the city immediately. Inaddition, they obliged those who wished to leavethe city to stay. As of that moment, the UnitedNations considered all UN and NGO humanita-rian staff in Huambo to be there without freedomof movement. The SRSG and troika ambassadorsprotested vehemently and called on UNITA toallow humanitarian staff to move as necessary tocarry out their work. This the party did, and UNagencies and NGOs left the city of Huambo on 17June 1994 in protest over UNITA’s actions.24

23 On several occasions, the SRSG spoke to the GoAand UNITA at the highest level about the targeting ofWFP aeroplanes in Malange. This most likely helped toresolve problems.24 The ICRC and MSF did not participate in theprotest and stayed in Huambo. The country director ofCARE International also stayed in Huambo, althoughall other CARE staff left.

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Security Coordination when Aid Workers areUnder ThreatHuambo was Angola’s second largest city andstood strategically in the centre of the country. Itwas occupied by UNITA in March 1993, after afifty-five days of heavy fighting. Humanitarianneeds in Huambo were acute because of the fight-ing and UN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRCplaced considerable emphasis on gaining accessto the city and the province and starting pro-grammes there. Aid agencies’ efforts were ham-pered by political and military considerations,however, and emergency relief activities onlyexpanded in October 1993.

UCAH placed a representative in Huambo inFebruary 1994. In addition to its main function ofoverall coordination of humanitarian assistance,UCAH collected and shared information relatedto security in order to support aid workers’ safetywhen necessary. UCAH initiated and led manymeetings in Luanda and Huambo related to secu-rity. For example, one priority was to make theAngolan Government in Luanda and UNITA inHuambo sensitive to humanitarian organisations’concerns and to keep both parties informed aboutsecurity incidents affecting UN agencies andNGOs. The meetings that UCAH led enabled UNagencies, NGOs, and the ICRC to discuss andanalyse security issues. It also allowed securityinformation related to humanitarian affairs to becentralised and passed on to the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General, whomaintained separate contacts with the AngolanGovernment and UNITA. In Huambo, UCAHtook the following steps on behalf of UN agenciesand NGOs to improve security conditions there:

– wrote a security plan and shared it for com-ments with UN agencies, NGOs, and the ICRC.The security plan was updated every twomonths and handed to UNITA;

– organised the provision and maintenance ofcommunications equipment, including arepeater for ultra-high frequency (UHF), HFradio with telex-over-radio capacity, and asatellite telephone for emergency use;25

25 UCAH and UNDP were slow to placecommunications equipment in Huambo: The HF basestation was installed in March 1994; telex over radioarrived the following month; the satellite telephonewas delivered in July 1994; and the UHF repeater,necessary to enable aid workers to communicate from

– built a large bunker for all UN agency andNGO staff, and encouraged NGOs to buildsmaller bunkers at their residences and offices;and

– monitored security events and shared securityinformation with UN agencies, NGOs, and theICRC on a regular basis.

In late October 1994, the Angolan Government’sarmy began an advance on the city of Huambofrom the west and the south. UCAH Huambocalled on agencies observe the recommendationsin the security plan, and coordinated meetingseach morning and evening to review thesituation. UCAH Luanda, in consultation with theSRSG, took measures to evacuate humanitarianstaff. This included sending a UN Boeing 727from Luanda to the city. The mission failedbecause UNITA did not think it safe for theaeroplane to land in Huambo.

During the first days of November, the gov-ernment’s advance towards the city continued.UNITA prepared to defend the city and encour-aged the population to leave. This caused somepanic and security events, such as theft and loot-ing, increased. Most residents expected a battlesimilar to the ‘fifty-five days’ which rocked thecity from January to March 1993.

UCAH coordinated UN agency-NGO meet-ings in Luanda and Huambo to analyse the situa-tion. This led the UN agency and NGO represen-tatives in Huambo to adopt phase III of the‘Huambo Security Plan’, which indicated movingto a UN building or a previously agreed to alter-native. A consensus was reached amongst UNagencies and NGOs to accept ICRC’s invitation tomove to the ICRC Huambo complex in BombAlta., about 3 km east of the city centre. Thecompound was not in the line of fire and wasslightly outside the city. Organisations agreedthat the aid workers would be safer together andby Saturday 5 November 1994 all expatriate aidworkers (31 ICRC and 23 UN agency and NGO)were at Bomb Alta.

Three people were managing events at BombAlta: The ICRC officer-in-charge, the ICRCGeneva security adviser, and the UCAH fieldadviser. (The ICRC head of delegation was away).This group of three handled organisation, secu-rity, and diplomacy respectively. Theymaintained contact with UNITA and the FAA(once the latter had taken control of the city), and

one end of the city to the other, arrived in September.At times, UCAH had to rely on the bettercommunications equipment of organisations, such asConcern and the ICRC, to carry out its work.

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gathered as much information as possible onevents as they unfolded. All of this informationwas passed on to UCAH Luanda, whichforwarded it to the SRSG in Lusaka so that he,too, could maintain contact with the AngolanGovernment and UNITA on the issue.

In Luanda, UCAH became the operationscentre for UN agencies and NGOs, and liaisedwith the UNAVEM security office and the ICRCdelegation constantly. (UNAVEM did not haveany personnel in Huambo). Staff worked aroundthe clock to maintain an operations room withmaps and the HF communications room. In addi-tion, UCAH held briefings for embassies, whichhad nationals in Huambo.

The FAA was coordinating its advance andoccupation of Huambo from Catumbela,Benguela province, hence UCAH asked two of itsfield advisers and the WFP country director to gothere to strengthen UN contacts with the AngolanGovernment and its army. The three UN staffmembers were joined by the ICRC-Huambo headof delegation, who had been outside Angolawhen events started, and, together, they workedwith UCAH and the ICRC in Luanda andHuambo to support the safety and evacuation ofthe UN agency-NGO-ICRC aid workers.

Two days after the FAA had occupied the city ofHuambo, the UN and the ICRC decided on a jointevacuation of the fifty-four aid workers. The WFPcountry director accompanied an ICRCDC-3 aeroplane to Huambo, where the UCAHfield adviser made arrangements for all aidworkers to move to the airport with the FAAguaranteeing safe passage. Once at Huambo air-port, the field adviser met the FAA’s local com-mander and established communications with theWFP country director aboard the DC-3 so that theaeroplane could land safely. Having landed, theaid workers entered the aircraft and departed forCatumbela airport. Upon arrival, UN and ICRCaeroplanes flew the aid workers to Luanda whereall arrived in the evening of Friday 11 November1994.

Several lessons were learned from the eventsin Huambo:

– UCAH’s coordination of the integrated UN-NGO-ICRC effort enabled centralised informa-tion sharing and analysis;

– UCAH promptly shared all information withthe SRSG, who was in Lusaka, so that he coulddiscuss issues with Angolan Government andUNITA representatives there;

– UCAH took advantage of all available meansand capacities in Luanda, Huambo, andBenguela;

– communications equipment (including HFradios, telex-over-radio, and satellite tele-phones) allowed all actors in Luanda, Huambo,and Benguela to maintain contact around theclock;

– the team of UCAH field advisers and the WFPcountry director in Benguela, where the FAAhad its operation’s headquarters, enabled theUN to maintain around-the-clock relationswith the FAA’s decision makers;

– humanitarian staff Huambo worked as a team;and

– the UN-NGO-ICRC press black-out until theaid workers were successfully evacuatedallowed decision makers to concentrate onsecurity issues and minimised pressspeculation about events.

Security Recommendations for Luandaand AngolaDuring 1993 and 1994, government police andsecurity forces controlled ordinary crime quitewell in areas under GoA control. Luanda was arelatively safe city during most of 1993 and 1994.Shortly after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol,however, expatriates and later Angolans becamethe targets of organised crime. Most cases wereviolent and involved groups of armed men hold-ing up expatriates outside restaurants to stealtheir vehicles or of following them home andentering residences to steal all of their belongings.Physical violence against expatriates andAngolans became more prevalent as 1995 pro-gressed.

This situation led to UCAH writing and dis-seminating an extensive document on securitymeasures to be taken in Luanda and theprovinces to reduce the risk of becoming a victimof crime. The paper also included a section oncorrect radio use, medical evacuations, andadditional security measures for staff members inthe provinces.

Evacuation of ForeignersThe city of Kuito was long known to be one ofAngola’s gems: a colonial town surrounded byrolling hills in the country’s highlands. Many Por-tuguese families moved to Kuito during the colo-nial period and decided to stay when Angolabecame independent.

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In January 1993, the battle for Kuito beganbetween the GoA and UNITA. UNITA wasshunted out of the city initially, but laid siege to itand started to edge its way back in. UNITA hadgreat difficulty re-entering the town and takingcontrol of it, despite the party having won overeighty percent of the vote there in the September1992 elections. The battle of Kuito continuedmercilessly until UNITA declared a unilateralcease-fire effective 20 September 1993. The gov-ernment troops in Kuito reciprocated and fightingstopped for the first time in nine months.

The Portuguese Embassy in Luanda was par-ticularly concerned about its citizens in Kuito. Itwas unclear if the lull in the fighting would lastso the embassy pushed for a quick evacuation ofany foreigners who wished to leave. In suchcases, the International Committee of the RedCross is usually called on to organise evacuations.Indeed, three months earlier in Huambo, theICRC had negotiated and managed the exodus ofhundreds of Portuguese from that city. On 30September, UNITA issued a communiquéexplaining that, in its view, ‘Conditions werefulfilled for the evacuation of foreigners...in[Kuito]’, and that, ‘the modalities of theevacuation will be coordinated with the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General’.

In early-October, UNITA informed the SRSGthat a mission to Kuito was possible. On 15October UCAH led the first needs assessmentmission to Kuito since the siege had started, and alarge aid programme started the following day.The SRSG and UCAH took advantage of the posi-tive momentum to push for the foreigners’ evacu-ation. The GoA and UNITA gave their permissionfor the process to take place on 22 October 1993.On that day, UCAH and WFP organised theevacuation from Kuito to Luanda of 121 citizens:94 Portuguese, 18 Cape Verdeans, 6 São Tomeans,and 3 Brazilians. Transport was provided fromthe city centre to the airport in an open truck. Atthe airport, the evacuees boarded a cargoaeroplane, which flew them to São Tomé, wherethe respective embassies assumed custody oftheir citizens.

Monitoring the Road SituationThroughout the war in Angola, UCAH tried tonegotiate access from the coast to the major townsin the interior along one of the two major roadcorridors: Luanda–N’Dalatando–Malange andBenguela/Lobito-Huambo-Kuito. Unfortunately,these negotiations did not succeed during thewar, probably because both sides were concerned

that the use of such road corridors would lead toa military advantage for the other side. If themain road corridors had been open humanitarianorganisations would have gained access toseveral communities along the corridors andsaved millions of dollars that were spent on theairlift. Shortly after the Lusaka Protocol wassigned, UCAH once again approached the GoAand UNITA and encouraged them to open theroads. Indeed, freedom of movement for peopleand goods was part of the peace agreement.

In theory, the UNAVEM was the bestequipped organisation to assess and monitor theroad situation in Angola after the Lusaka Protocolwas signed. UNAVEM had over fifty team sitesdotted around the nation by April 1995. Itsobservers were active, whenever possible, drivingaround their team site areas to assess the condi-tion of the roads and bridges. Many of theUNAVEM observers had specific qualifications todo this and wrote useful situation reports. How-ever, the road information from the team siteswas not consolidated at UNAVEM headquarters.

In light of this, UCAH started a small database of information on roads and bridges inAngola. The unit asked UN agencies and IOs/NGOs to provide any relevant information thatthey and a staff member in UCAH-CMAOcollated it. UCAH also kept a map, which wasupdated daily, showing which roads were open,suspected of being open, and closed. This infor-mation was shared with UNAVEM whenever itcame in, and with UN agencies and NGOs atMonday briefings and by way of the InformationBulletin. Monitoring the road situation in Angolain this way allowed UCAH to organise humani-tarian missions along part or all of the two mostimportant corridors, and to make recommenda-tions on the logistics of current and future huma-nitarian assistance.

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X. CAPACITY BUILDING

The Angolan GovernmentWhile UCAH did not have any specific capacitybuilding projects for the government, the unit’sstaff spent considerable time and effort workingwith members of the government at the centraland provincial levels to include them in allaspects of disaster response coordination:assessment, planning, monitoring, informationexchange, and resource. As mentioned above, theGoA controlled only about twenty percent of thecountry when UCAH was established and thegovernment asked the UN to coordinatehumanitarian activities on its behalf. UCAH didnot take this position at face value, however, andactively encouraged the government (principallythe Ministry of Social Affairs, MINARS) to get asinvolved as possible in the coordination andimplementation of emergency relief activities.

MINARS promoted government activitiesthroughout the emergency. Although the over-whelming percentage of the government’s budgetwas spent on defence during 1993 and 1994, theGoA did make the following contributions tohumanitarian assistance: In 1993, the GoA con-tributed US$ 10 million on relief items, of whichUS$ 6 million went toward food aid, US$ 3.6million on the non-food items, and US$ 400,000on seeds and tools. In addition, the GoA spentNkw 6 billion on dried fish and salt at local mar-kets to complement the diets of IDPs. Finally, theGoA exempted humanitarian organisations frompaying airport fees for their aircraft and sold fuelat subsidised prices.26

The signing of the Lusaka Protocol on 20November 1994 demanded a change in the co-ordination mechanism which had existed duringthe previous eighteen months. While war raged,UCAH maintained separate, parallel discussionswith the government in Luanda and UNITA inHuambo. In times of peace, however, UCAH feltthat all coordination should take place in Luanda.Consequently, the Humanitarian CoordinationGroup (HCG) was established. This group, whichwas headed by the Minister for Social Affairs andthe UCAH director, included members fromAngolan governmental ministries, UNITA, andUNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP. Observer status wasgranted to some donors (European Union,

26 1994 United Nations Revised Consolidated Inter-AgencyAppeal for Angola, February 1994, p. 29.

Portugal, Russian Federation, and USA), NGOs(one Angolan and one international) and theICRC. (See section VIII above). The humanitariancoordination group had the following objectives:

– improve general understanding of the humani-tarian crisis in Angola by promoting needsassessments and sectoral evaluation missions;

– monitor access to civilians in need and makerecommendations to the Joint Commission, asnecessary;

– gather and analyse information to makerecommendations concerning food security;

– track financial contributions to the 1995 Con-solidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola andencourage donors to support NGO pro-grammes;27

– facilitate information exchange with donorsand NGOs about humanitarian needs and thefinancial and human resource capacity torespond; and

– keep the Joint Commission informed about thehumanitarian situation in the country.

The Humanitarian Coordination Group includeda small secretariat, which was responsible fororganising meetings, preparing briefing notes,and monitoring the implementation of decisionsthat were taken by the group. UCAH putconsiderable effort into the HCG, assigning oneinternational staff member to work with it almostfull-time in the hope that it would provide aforum in which Angolan leaders could increasetheir capacity to take on the task of humanitariancoordination. Further, as part of a preparednesscapacity building exercise, UCAH felt that theHCG should be able to manage and coordinateany future emergencies that might affect Angola.The diagram below shows the HCG’s links tovarious entities involved in humanitarian affairsin Angola.

Institute of Mine ActionMine action (an overall term to cover mineawareness, survey, clearance, and training) was,as noted earlier, particularly important in Angola,a country that might have more mines thanpeople and the record holder for ‘amputees percapita’. The issue had to be dealt with compre-hensively to rehabilitate the country after war and

27 DHA Geneva and UCAH tracked the response toprevious appeals during 1993 and 1994 and workedclosely with the HCG on this task.

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provide a base for long-term development. Whilemany believed mine action to be a military issue,which was normally handled by military orpeace-keeping components of governments or theUnited Nations, the organisations involved inhumanitarian assistance in Angola believed thatthe issue was a long-term problem that affectedcivilians; hence a humanitarian agency shouldcoordinate the process.

Initial coordination of mine action washandled by UCAH, which created the CentralMine Action Office (UCAH-CMAO). The officeworked closely with the government to ensurethe eventual hand-over of coordination from theUN to the GoA, which was preparing tocoordinate and manage the issue by creating anational institute for mine action.

Institute of Demobilisation and ReintegrationAccording to UCAH, the successful demobilisa-tion and reintegration of soldiers hinged on actu-ally ‘converting’ former combatants into civilians.This, in the view of the unit, could be accom-plished best by allowing civilians to handle theprocess. As mentioned above (see section VI)much work took place during 1994 to prepare fordemobilisation and reintegration, based on pastexperience of Angola and other countries in theworld. Such experiences showed that the estab-lishment of an Angolan institute should takeplace but that it should include members from theGoA and UNITA. Hence, work undertaken byUCAH’s Demobilisation and Reintegration Office(UCAH-DRO) during 1994 and 1995 highlightedthe need to capacitate the GoA and UNITA toassume such a responsibility.

Capacity Building for UNITADuring the war of 1993 and 1994, the UnitedNations considered UNITA an illegal occupant ofmuch of Angola. UNITA was not a political equalto the Government of Angola, which was electedin a democratic process deemed ‘generally freeand fair’. UCAH did not approach UNITA withthe same capacity building ideas that wereoffered to the government, for examplemanagement and coordination. However, UCAHpromoted the incorporation of some of the party’smembers into aspects of the humanitarianprogramme, such as the assessment and design ofagriculture and health projects throughoutHuambo province. When the Lusaka Protocolwas signed and the Humanitarian CoordinationGroup was created, UNITA was invited toparticipate in overall capacity building efforts.

Angolan NGOsThe nature of emergency relief, which was highprofile and expensive, discriminated againstAngolan NGOs. UCAH’s policy was to create anenvironment in which Angolan and internationalNGOs were as equal as possible. The Letter ofAffiliation, an agreement on cooperation betweenNGOs and the UN in Angola, provided a goodbasis for this. As part of the agreement NGOsreceived UN endorsed identity cards and accessto free transport to project sites on UN personnelaircraft. Further, the unit decided that the work-ing language with NGOs was in the Angolannational language, Portuguese. Almost all corre-spondence and information sent to NGOs andUCAH’s NGO meetings were held in Portuguese.

UCAH encouraged Angolan NGOs to partici-pate in humanitarian assessments and pro-grammes. The unit provided support to nationalNGOs writing programme proposals and helpedthem establish contacts with UN agencies, such asUNICEF and WFP. UCAH addressed theresource problem encountered by Angolan NGOsin the scope of the ASDI-UCAH Mechanism. TheSwedish Government, which allocated money tothis fund, initially preferred that UCAH not rec-ommend Angolan NGO projects for financingunless an expatriate NGO could oversee the pro-ject’s implementation. At first, UCAH handledthis by insisting that expatriate NGO projectswith capacity building components for AngolanNGOs be given priority funding. Four monthslater, UCAH succeeded in convincing the donorto change its position so that funds could betransferred directly from the SwedishGovernment to Angolan NGOs.

Preparing for Transition from UCAH to UNDPUCAH promoted the policy that relief activitiesbe placed in a development context. The signingof the Lusaka Protocol signalled the impending‘end’ of the emergency and hence UCAH’s exitfrom Angola. Within the UN system, the UnitedNations Development Programme was respon-sible for supporting the government’s efforts todevelop the country. The agency developed astrategy to support the GoA design a programmefor the national rehabilitation of Angola, andUCAH worked very closely with UNDP to ensurecomplementary UCAH/UNDP activities leadingto a smooth transition from the UN’s humani-tarian structure to that of the AngolanGovernment.28

28 The UCAH director assumed the positions ofUNDP resident representative and UN resident co-ordinator in September 1994 and continued all threeroles until he left Angola in June 1995.

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STUDIES ON EMERGENCIES AND DISASTER RELIEFis a series published jointly by Sida and the Nordiska Afrikainstitutet in closecooperation with the Refugee Studies Programme, Queen Elizabeth House,University of Oxford.

1. K. B. Wilson, Internally Displaced, Refugees and Returnees from and in Mozambique. 61pp. Uppsala1994.

2. Jonathan Baker, Refugee and Labour Movements in Sub-Saharan Africa. A review.Roger Zetter, Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees. A state of the artreview. 106 pp. Uppsala 1995.

3. Sidney Waldron and Naima A. Hasci, Somali Refugees in the Horn of Africa. State of theart literature review. 87 pp. Uppsala 1995.

4. Eftihia Voutira and Shaun A. Whishaw Brown, Conflict Resolution. A Review of Some

Non-Governmental Practices. ‘A Cautionary Tale’. 50 pp. Uppsala 1995.5. Toby Lanzer, The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola: A Model for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance? 40 pp. Uppsala 1996.

Published by In cooperation with

Nordiska Afrikainstitutet(The Nordic Africa Institute)P O Box 1703 Swedish International DevelopmentS-751 47 Uppsala, Sweden Cooperation Agency

ISSN 1400-3120

ISBN 91-7106-385-4

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