The Trail .. .of the Timberwolves

104th INFANTRY DIVISION

Gamp San Luis Obispo

California

MAJOR GENERAL, TERRY AULEN

The Trail .. ,of the Timberwolves

I—ACTIVATION, TRAINING AND MOVEMENT OVERSEAS, 16 SEPTEMBER1942 TO 7 SEPTEMBER 1944.

The 104th (Timberwolf) Infantry Divisionwas activated at Camp Adair, Oregon, 15September 1942. The sound basic trainingreceived under the able leadership of MajorGeneral Gilbert Cook, who commanded thedivision during its initial training period inOregon, was reflected in the later battleacomplishments of the Timberwolves.

In November 1943, the division moved tothe California-Arizona Maneuver Area, andin March 1944 moved to Camp Carson, Colo-rado for continued combat training. Nightoperation, weapon proficiency, reconnaissance,rapid maneuver, combat exercises, and batt'eteamwork were specially emphasized. "GETSMART and GET TOUGH" was the motto ofour training, and the Timberwolves soonacquired an intensive belief in themselves andin their units. The principles of "FIND 'EM,FIX 'EM, FIGHT 'EM" were firmly inculcated

in all combat units. By August, the divisionwas fully prepared and eager for combat.

The division sailed overseas and landed inCherbourg, France, on 7 September 1944, thefirst American division to go directly fromthe States to France. Its first task was toorganize and operate twelve motor truck com-panies, to transport sorely needed supplies tothe front. In operating truck companies in the"Red Ball Express," the division was creditedwith having transported 40 per cent mor?cargo than any other division so engaged.

H.—CAMPAIGN IN HOLLAND, 15 OCT^OBER TO 8 NOVEMBER 1944.

The 104th Division joined the First Can-adian Army in Belgium on 15 October andwas attached to the I British Corps, in thecritical operation to. free the port of Antwerp,so essential to the continuing invasion ofGermany. . . . . . . ; - . , - • .

From its first baptism in battle on 23October 1944, the division demonstrated itscombat effectiveness by its rapid maneuVeiand bold night operations, and skillful useof artillery and air support. On 2 Novemberthe Timberwolf Division spearheaded the I

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British Corps in forcing a difficult crossingof the Mark River at Standaarbuiten in Hol-land, and during the subsequent drive to theMaas River, which involved an advance oftwenty-three miles over difficult, partiallyflooded ground, against bitter opposition.

The esteem in which the Timberwolves wereheld by our British Allies was indicated bythe following extract from a commendationreceived from Lieutenant General G. G.Simpnds, commanding .the First . CanadianArmy: . . . .

"Once the 'Timberwolves' got their tfeeth 'into the Boche they showed great dash, andBritish and Canadian troops on their'flanksexpressed the greatest admiration for theircourage and enthusiasm. When they againmeet the Boche 'all hell cannot stop theTimberwolves.' "

m.—DRIVE FROM THE SIEGFRD3D LINEEAST OF AACHEN TO THE ROERRIVER IN GERMANY, 16 NOVEMBER

. TO 14: DECEMBER 1944. . ... .'.With its mission in. Holland completed-,, the

division moved on 7-8 Noyembe.r to relieve, the1st U. S. Infantry Division in the Aachen

sector in Germany, while our 414th Infantrywas still engaged in Holland. Thus, withoutbreak, the division continued in close contactwith the enemy.

The division was then assigned to the VlfCorps of the First U. S. Army, in the impend-ing drive to the Roer River. The VII Corpsalso included the 1st and 4th Infantry Divi-sions, 3rd Armored Division and elements ofthe 9th Infantry Division, all veteran andbattle-tried units. The initial assigned missionof the Timberwolf Division was restricted tothe seizure of the vital enemy area of Stol-berg, Eschweiler and Weisweiler. This involvedthe reduction of vastly difficult terrain, in-cluding pill boxes, highly organized defensiveworks and a succession of fortified industrialareas and factories, all stubbornly defended.

The division "jumped off" in this operation,regiments abreast, early on 16 November andafter ten days of continuous day and nightattacks attained all assigned objectives.Lieutenant General J. Lawton Collins, com-manding the VII Corps, stated in a commen-datory message to the division that the greatindustrial area of Stolberg, Eschweiler andWeisweiler was cleared in a much shorter

time than had been expected, and with asurprising minimum of losses.

The division was then given the additionalmission of driving clear through to the RoerRiver. This involved the most bitter fightingyet encountered by the 104th Division. Theattack of the 413th Infantry against Indc-n,of the 414th against Pier and Schophoven andparticularly the night attacks of the 415tnagainst Lucherberg and Merken, all featuredthis operation. Success was attained only byunrelenting pressure and the continuing skill-ful use of night maneuver and stubbornassaults.

The Timberwolf Division led the way inthe drive of the VII Corps to the Roer River.By 14 December, all assigned objectives werecaptured and "buttoned up." In a subsequentmessage, General Collins stated that he re-garded this operation, involving the seizureof Lamersdorf-Inden-Lucherberg-Pier-MerkenSchophoven, as one of the finest pieces ofwork accomplished by any unit of the VIICorps since D-Day. The importance of thisaccomplishment is apparent, since it wasattained just two days before the Germanbreak-through, thirty miles to the south.

IV.—ACTIVE DEFENSE ON ROER RIVER,14 DECEMBER 1944 TO 22 FEBRU-ARY 1945.

The division was then transferred to theXIX Corps of the Ninth U. S. Army, andoccupied a. defensive sector on the Roer River,opposite Duren, from 16 December 1944 until3 February 1945. An aggressive defenseblocked this critical German highway toAachen. Timberwolf patrols completely dom-inated the Roer. During this period 63 Tim-berwolf patrols crossed the Roer under ad-verse weather and terrain conditions andattained valuable information.

V.—THE DRIVE TO COLOGNE, 23 FEB-RUARY TO 7 MARCH 1945.

On 3 February, the 104th Division revertedto the VII Corps, in the First U. S. Army inpreparation for the drive to Cologne, on theRhine River, the last barrier defending theheart of Germany. The Timberwolves weredirected to force crossings at Duren, Birkes-dorf and Huchem-Stammeln, to seize thecommanding terrain five miles east of theRoer, so as to provide a running start for the3rd Armored Division in the breakthrough toCologne, and thereafter to follow the armoredunits in close support.

Under cover of darkness, at 0330 on 23 Feb-ruary, elements of the 413th & 415th Infantry,with skillful engineer assistance and closelysupported by artillery, anti-aircraft, tanks,TD's and 4.2 mortars, forced a crossing of theflooded Roer River, seizing Huchem-Stam-meln, Birkesdorf and North Duren in theirstride. This brilliant night operation wascharacterized by the highest degree of de-termination, combat discipline and team work.By the next night, all infantry regiments anjsupporting units had crossed. Four effectivenight attacks were launched later that samenight by battalions of the 413th, 414:h, and415th Infantry against the sorely pressedenemy. Again the Air Corps in close teamwork blasted gaps in German positions andcommunications. Final objectives were thusattained well ahead of schedule. On the nightof 25-26 February, two battalions of the 413thand 414th Infantry by bold night attacksseized Morzenich and Golzheim, five miles inadvance of the assigned objectives. This as-sured a quick exploitation by the 3rd ArmoredDivision.

The 3rd Armored Division passed throughour advancing infantry on 26 February. TheTimberwolves, following in close support

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reached the Erft Canal, 25 miles northwestof Cologne, on 28 February. In conjunctionwith the 3rd Armored Division, the Timber-wolves then stormed over the Vorgebirge Hillsand seized the southern half of Cologne on7 March 1945. This teamwork established alasting comradeship with the 3rd ArmoredDivision. This conspicuous victory was onlymade possible by the continuing day andnight pressure of unremitting previous com-bat.

VI.—DRIVE TO PADERBORN AND ENCDiClEMENT OF THE RUHR- VAL-UE Y, 22 MARCH. TO 1 APRIL 1945.

The 104th Division moved to the ReniagenBridgehead and crossed the Rhine at Honnef22 March, resuming operations under the VITCorps, with the 3rd Armored Division and the1st Infantry Division. The immediate missionof the VII Corps included a break-through inthe Remagen Bridgehead, followed by an en-circlement of the Rhur Basin on the westflank, then occupied by the enemy in grep.tstrength. This mission of the 104th Division,in conjunction with the 1st Infantry Division,was to break the crust of German defensesjust beyond the Remagen Bridgehead, and

thereafter to follow in close support of the3rd Armored Division. The activity of enemyarmored units and the grouping of hastilyreorganized infantry units indicated enemyintentions for a close defense in our sector.

Initial enemy resistance encircling thebridgehead was overcome in a series of nightattacks by the 413th and 415th Infantry on 23and 24 March, in conjunction with the 1stInfantry Division on our left. The 3rdArmored Division passed through our infantryelements on 25 March, with the Timberwolvesfollowing in close support. The by-pasingtactics employed by the armored units againstenemy centers of resistance necessitated ourinfantry following in close support, in orderto profit by the rapid advance of the armoredunits. The rapid advance of the 413th Infantryon the right created a deep penetration, neces-sitating close coordination with the 415thInfantry on the left, which encountered stifferenemy resistance.

An estimated dozen enemy divisions weretrapped in the huge pocket formed'by theapproaching juncture of the First and NinthArmies near Lippstadt. Commencing on 28March, enemy pressure increased on our ex-posed left flank in the sector of the 415th

Infantry. The 415th Infantry with strong- sup-porting attachments, quickly deployed to de-fend the Medebach area to meet these enemythreats.

Strong enemy counter-attacks, to releasethe trapped divisions in the Ruhr Pocket,continued against the 415th Infantry on ourleft flank from 31 March to 3 April. Finallyon 4-5 April the 415th Infantry, reinforced,in a series of day and night attaclM droveback the enemy spearhead and destroyed theenemy attacking elements in the hard-foughtbattle of Kustelberg. Protection of the leftflank of the VII Corps was taken over by the9th Division and the 415th Infantry continuedits forward advance to the Paderborn area..

VTI.—FINAL DRIVE TO THE MULDERIVER — 7 APRIL TO 21 APRIL,1945.

From the Paderborn area, the drive wasresumed to the east on 1 April, wherein thedivision continued to operate with the VIICorps. This drive included an uninterruptedadvance of 175 miles in fifteen days throughthe heart of Germany. Particularly outstand-ing during the last phase was the captureof Halle by the 414th Infantry after a rapid

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night maneuver and a series of day and nightattacks through that defended area, the cap-ture of Delitzsch by the 413th Infantry andfinally the seizure of Bitterfeld by the 415thInfantry in a series of vigorous day and nightattacks.

The continuing unrelenting pressure of theTimberwolf Division during this last driveresulted in an early contact being establishedwith the Russian 118th Division east ofthe Mulde River on 26 April. This culminatedour combat operations during World War II.

VIII.—READJUSTMENT AND RETURN TOTHE UNITED STATES.

During the weeks following the cessationof hostilities the division was occupied withurgent and extensive duties in the handlingof many thousand released allied prisoners ofwar and displaced civilians. Further dutiesincluded the temporary occupation of numer-ous German towns, in which all Timberwolfpersonnel displayed a highly disciplined at-titude.

Following a quick movement to CampLucky Strike near Le Harve, France, thedivision embarked for the United States ontwo ships, the S. S. Monterey sailing 26 June

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and the S. S. Ericsson on 2 July. Reassemblingat Camp San Luis Obispo, California, thedivision on 15 September observed the thirdanniversary of its activation.

IX.—ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THK 104thDIVISION.

The battle accomplishments of the Timber-wolf Division are a matter of official recordof which you and your friends and relativesmay well be proud. Your combat operationshave been characterized by the tenacity, skill,teamwork and devotion to duty of all combatand service elements and by the efficient func-tioning: of all staff sections. The devotion toduty of the service and administrative sectionsof the division have contributed materially tothe success of the combat units.

In building up the combat efficiency of thedivision through many months of arduoustraining, you have adhered to the fourprimary objectives of our training:DISCIPLINE, which involves alertness, cheer-ful response to orders and directives and urs-selfish teamwork by all concerned; TRAIN-ING, which involves the close application ofthe most painstaking effort to be experts inthe technique of modem battle; PHYSICAL

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FITNESS; and, above all, an intensiveBELIEF IN YOUR UNITS. In this last item,particularly, our division has been most out-standing as we all feel completely assuredthat we are second to none as an Americancombat unit. The same application of theseprinciples will be equally effective toall of you when the division is demobilizedand you return to civilian pursuits.

We should pay tribute to our gallant dead,whose sacrifices made on the battlefield havecontributed so materially to our eventualsuccess.

In closing, I wish to express my personalthanks and gratitude to all of you for yourunfailing loyal support at all times and par-ticularly during- six and a half months ofarduous combat. You have lived up to ourbattle slogan, "NOTHING IN HELL CANSTOP THE TIMBERWOLVES," and . . .NOTHING IN HELL DID STOP THE TIM-BERWOLVES.

TERRY ALLEN"Chief Timberwolf"

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'Nothing in Hell

Con Stop the

Timberwolves"