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The Washington Quarterly

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The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Bad and Worse Options

Daniel Byman & Sloane Speakman

To cite this article: Daniel Byman & Sloane Speakman (2016) The Syrian RefugeeCrisis: Bad and Worse Options, The Washington Quarterly, 39:2, 45-60, DOI:10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204352

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204352

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Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

The Syrian Refugee Crisis:Bad and Worse Options

The Syrian civil war has spawned a host of evils. Perhaps 400,000

Syrians have died in the carnage, and regional powers like Iran and Saudi

Arabia treat it as a proxy war. Terrorist groups like the Islamic State seem to

delight in creating new horrors for those who fall into their clutches, and use

Syria as a base to expand in the Middle East, attack Europe, and inspire terrorists

around the world. Syria’s problems, however, are also the world’s problems, and no

problem is more immediate than the country’s refugees.

Syria is the world’s largest producer of refugees—people who cross a state border

due to conflict or persecution. Of the world’s 15 million refugees, the Syrian civil

war has produced over 6 million of them, and has displaced roughly 7 million more

within Syria. Indeed, over half the country’s pre-war population of 21.5 million is

displaced, either externally or internally. Most of the refugees are living near

Syria’s borders. Turkey hosts more than two million, Lebanon over one million,

and Jordan over 600,000. Things are so bad that 250,000 Syrians have even

fled to Iraq. The regional refugee crisis has become a global one, as Syrians seek

refuge in Europe. Germany opened its doors, accepting almost 500,000 Syrian refu-

gees in 2015; other European states, however, have closed their gates or otherwise

tried to limit the number of Syrians they take.1

The refugee crisis has reached epic proportions, and neighboring states feel

trapped. Refoulement, forcefully expelling refugees to their home countries while

Daniel Byman is a professor at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a

senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. His latest book is

Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know(Oxford, 2015). Follow him on Twitter @dbyman. Sloane Speakman is a Syria analyst and

Deputy Foreign Policy Editor of the Lawfare blog. She recently returned from a year working

with Syrian refugees in Jordan as a Fulbright Scholar and Boren Fellow. Follow her on

Twitter @sloanesp.

Copyright © 2016 The Elliott School of International Affairs

The Washington Quarterly • 39:2 pp. 45–60

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204352

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 45

the conflict or other dangers persist, is forbidden under the 1951 UNRefugee Con-

vention and 1967 Protocol. Not all countries are signatories to the convention and

protocol, but the norm is well accepted. So once refugees are admitted, states feel

they could never escape the responsibility of caring for them.

Nor are the refugee flows likely to abate. The Syria conflict is entering its sixth

year and has seen ferocious levels of violence. The Assad regime is the leading

culprit, using indiscriminate attacks on civilians and sectarian atrocities as part

of its efforts to intimidate its enemies and rally its supporters. Waves of refugees

and displaced are also a means for the Assad regime to put pressure on neighboring

states and opposition areas in the country, overwhelming their ability to provide

for the civilians under their protection.2 The Russian bombing campaign, which

has repeatedly targeted civilians and civilian infrastructure on a massive scale,

led even more to flee the country.3 The Islamic State has sent religious minorities

and many Sunni Muslims fleeing its barbaric version of law and order, too. For

instance, a UN Commission cited “fear of rape” as a driver for many refugees.4

More broadly, the devastation of the civil war and the absence of any hope in

Syria have left most Syrians doubtful that any future remains for their country.

The United States and its allies seem overwhelmed by the crisis. Their

responses are often uncoordinated, sending mixed signals to regional states and

to Syrians themselves. For instance, the Obama administration initially promised

to punish the Assad regime for its chemical attacks on civilians, yet pulled the plug

on a 2013 airstrike at the last minute. Then a year later, it was bombing the Islamic

State, one of the regime’s enemies. At times the United States and its allies have

backed different factions among the fractious Syrian opposition. Politics at home

often overwhelms sober policy discussions, with the specter of terrorism hanging

over many debates.

This essay seeks to break through this paralysis, offering five options for hand-

ling the refugee crisis. The options run the gamut from turning our collective backs

on the refugees to a massive resettlement program. The United States and Europe

could also increase support for regional states, create safe zones within Syria, or

even step up intervention in Syria itself to diminish the flows. All these options

are flawed, but our hope is that by laying out the advantages and disadvantages

of each, we can move the debate forward and enable a better discussion of the

benefits and risks of any course of action.

The Dynamics of Paralysis

U.S. policy toward Syrian refugees has exhibited a mix of confusion, fear, and

politics—and many long-term dangers are growing as a result. Beyond the

humanitarian concerns, the refugee crisis may lead to instability in host countries,

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

46 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

foster terrorism if the refugees are not integrated, and worsen the civil war at home

by providing fighters with rear bases.

The United States historically has accepted many refugees—Cuba and

Vietnam stand out in the ColdWar period, when the United States took hundreds

of thousands fleeing these brutal communist regimes—but this generosity has not

held up in the Syrian case. In 2014 and 2015, the United States took in almost

70,000 refugees each year. Of that number, more than 32,000 were from Iraq,

32,000 from Burma, and 17,000 from Somalia.5 In

contrast, the United States has taken fewer than

2,000 Syrians in the five years since the conflict

began in 2011.6 In moral and humanitarian terms,

at least, the United States is falling short. U.S. allies

in Europe, such as Germany, have accepted more,

but thousands of refugees are still dying as they

attempt to cross the Mediterranean in ramshackle

boats or otherwise risk their lives to gain security

and a future for themselves and their families.7 And

even Europe is trying to tighten its borders. In April 2016, the European Union

and Turkey began enforcing a deal that would try to stop refugees from crossing

the Aegean Sea by immediately returning new arrivals to Turkey.

So far, the main U.S. effort is financial. As of February 2016, the United States

has offered around $5 billion dollars to assist Syrians, as well as several hundred

million more to bolster Jordan and Lebanon.8 Over a billion of this is specifically

for the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR).

What explains the limited U.S. effort? Domestic politics. Initial U.S. public

attitudes toward the Syrian refugees were favorable. However, the 2015 attacks

in Paris and San Bernadino vaulted terrorism to a top public concern: after the

attacks, 52 percent of Americans opposed taking in refugees, a figure that was par-

ticularly high among Republicans (84 percent).9 Many Republican governors in

the United States declared their opposition to allowing Syrian refugees to enter

their states, a policy of dubious constitutionality but considerable political

benefit.10 The commander of U.S. forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove,

warned that among refugees, the Islamic State “is spreading like a cancer, taking

advantage of paths of least resistance, threatening European nations and our

own with terrorist attacks.”11

U.S. allies are experiencing even more disarray domestically. A virulent anti-

immigrant and anti-Muslim political strain is spreading in Europe. Right-wing

and even fascist parties are gaining more influence, and countries like Austria,

Hungary, and Slovakia are shutting their doors to refugees. Neighbors may have

completely different approaches: Sweden takes in many refugees, while Norway

is far more conservative. The common borders of the European Union are

The U.S. has fallenmorally short,taking in fewer than2,000 Syrians in fiveyears.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 47

under strain, as governments try to prevent refugees from coming their way, which

is almost impossible in a Europe where people can pass freely from country to

country. Greece, the closest access point to Europe for many refugees, is under

the most strain. Despite repeated calls for all EU countries to share the responsi-

bility in resettling refugees and providing financial support to mitigate the crisis,

no common policy has jelled.

If refugees roil politics in Europe, it might mean a government loses the next

election. The destabilization risk in the Middle East is far worse. Refugees have

a history of bringing conflict with them: they wage cross-border wars from

refugee camps, serve as recruiting pools for militant groups, upset delicate ethnic

and sectarian balances in host states, and otherwise act as carriers for regional radi-

calization.12 The Islamic State reportedly used someone entering Turkey as a

refugee to carry out an attack there.13

The problem is a long-term one and will fester. Just look at Israel and Palestine:

almost 70 years after the Israeli war of independence, the Middle East is still shaped

by the Palestinian refugee crisis. A standard approach to refugees is to treat them as a

short-term humanitarian problem, while waiting for the conflict in their homeland

to resolve itself or die out. This approach was usually misguided: the average refugee

crisis saw refugees only returning after almost twenty years.14 This misconception

prevailed at the start of the Syria crisis, when Syrian refugees often were welcomed

with open arms, in part because regional regimes assumed the Syrian government

was on the verge of falling. Although nego-

tiations to resolve the Syrian conflict continue,

few are optimistic. Even if the talks go better

than anticipated, the country is in ruins and

no one expects refugees to return home

anytime soon. It is best to conceptualize the

Syrian crisis as one of forcedmigration and reset-

tlement, rather than a temporary humanitarian

emergency.

Option One: Open Arms

The first option to address this problem would be for the United States to increase

its resettlement commitments. Since 2011, the United States has accepted less

than 2,000 Syrians. In September 2015, President Obama announced that the

United States would increase this number to 10,000 over the next year.15

Canada, with its population of 36 million, accepted more than 25,000 Syrian refu-

gees within a matter of months.16 If the United States were to match this commit-

ment proportionately, this would mean accepting roughly 230,000 refugees. While

The crisis is anongoing, long-termproblem, not just atemporary humani-tarian emergency.

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

48 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

that number is unrealistic, 10,000 is significantly less than the commitments of

other, much smaller states.

Settling Syrians could have myriad benefits in the United States, such as pro-

viding a demographic lift and vibrancy in certain places. The scholar David Laitin

and housing expert Marc Jahr point out that Hmong refugees have revitalized parts

of Minneapolis, Minnesota; Bosnians have done so in Utica, New York; and

Somalis in Lewiston, Maine—to say nothing of the stunning contributions to

the United States made by Vietnamese, Cubans, and other groups of refugees.

Laitin and Jahr call for settling tens of thousands of Syrians in Detroit, where

they would revitalize a decaying city and fit in well with the broader Arab-Amer-

ican community in Michigan.17

Settling significant numbers of refugees anywhere in the United States would

require streamlining the current processes and bureaucratic hurdles within the

U.S. agencies that process resettlement. Currently, the average processing time

for resettlement is 18–24 months.18 Refugees undergo thirteen different reviews

and screenings, including multiple in-person interviews with U.S. and inter-

national agencies, medical screenings, and intensive biographic and biometric

security checks by the Department of State, Department of Homeland Security,

and law enforcement and intelligence agencies—and this does not include the

additional screenings to which Syrian refugees are subjected.19 The resettlement

process would need revamping in order to be meaningful. Although this step

would be difficult—as “streamlining” anything in the U.S. government usually

is—it is certainly possible if the United States made resettlement a priority.

Accepting a greater number of Syrian refugees offers a host of further benefits. It

would not only be a signal of goodwill to displaced Syrians who largely feel ignored

by the international community, but would also counter the extremist narrative of

the U.S. “war against Muslims.” Additionally, studies have shown that although

there is a short-term financial cost in accepting immigrants and refugees, there

are significant long-term economic benefits including increased wages and econ-

omic growth.20 Accepting refugees also aligns with the United States’ identity

as a haven for those fleeing persecution and our country’s long history of enjoying

the benefits that diversity brings.

Admitting a greater number of refugees would also fulfill a moral obligation. The

widespread suffering of displaced Syrians has been well documented. The UNHCR

reports that 38 percent of Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon are living

in substandard shelters, and only one-third of Syrian children are in school.21

UNHCR High Commissioner Filippo Grandi recently told donors in London, “A

tragedy of this scale demands solidarity beyond funding. Put simply, we need

more countries to share the load by taking a greater share of refugees from what

has become the biggest displacement crisis of a generation.”22 In a conflict with

little prospect of ending soon, resettlement offers a potential solution for those

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 49

who have been able to escape. The United States has a long and storied history of

accepting refugees from brutal, even ongoing, conflicts from South Sudan to

Vietnam. Moreover, the United States’ leader-

ship in resettlement would encourage other

states to do the same and signal our seriousness

in resolving the crisis to both our regional and

European partners dealing with its fallout.

At the same time, there are several costs

associated with accepting refugees, especially

those from an active conflict in which the

United States is involved. Even refugee advo-

cates refer to resettlement as a shared

“burden.”23 First, the decision to admit more Syrians would be politically unpopular.

After the November 2015 Paris attacks, 53 percent of Americans were in favor of

ending refugee resettlement altogether.24 As a result, any problems refugees create,

such as crime, will come under a magnifying glass—to say nothing about potential

refugee involvement in terrorism.

Second, there is a security risk involved in accepting large numbers of refugees,

including the possibility of terrorists entering the United States amid the wave of

admitted refugees. Though the risk is small and not as immediate as the one facing

European nations, it is not zero, and could be exacerbated by an expedited reset-

tlement process.

Third, there are economic costs in taking in refugees, especially in the short

term. Though there is no easy way to determine the per refugee cost—much

depends on the degree of screening and level of support—it runs into the thou-

sands per refugee.25 This cost is not prohibitive—accepting 100,000 refugees at

this price would still cost less than many alternatives—but it would increase the

short-term economic burden, which would also include increased job competition

and social service provision.

Lastly, accepting a large number of refugees would not, on its own, offer a sol-

ution to the crisis. Of the millions of Syrian refugees, there is no number the

United States could realistically accept that would be anything other than a

small dent. To have any real impact, the United States would still need to take

other steps, including ensuring that regional and European partners also commit

to accepting their share.

Option Two: Help from Afar

Instead of the United States taking in more refugees, another option is to bolster

regional partners’ and European states’ abilities to deal with the crisis by providing

U.S. leadership inresettlement wouldencourage otherstates to do thesame.

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

50 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

increased, targeted aid. Of the roughly 6 million Syrian refugees, 4.8 million live in

neighboring states, primarily Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. After five years of con-

flict, nearly 25 percent of Lebanon’s population and one in ten residents in Jordan

are now Syrian. These regional hosts are also part of the Syrian civil war: Jordan

has flown missions in Syria against the Islamic State and allows the United States

to base its ground-based missiles in the country as well as train opposition forces

there; Turkey has actively engaged Kurdish militias both in its eastern territories

and over the border, even as the United States supports various Kurdish forces

in Syria; and Lebanese Hezbollah is openly fighting in support of the Assad

regime. In Europe, more than 1.5 million migrants reached the European Union

in 2015—one-third of them from Syria.26 As of December 2015, the number of

Syrian asylum applications in the EU reached nearly 900,000.27

To be sure, Syrian refugees have received significant aid: more than any other

refugee situation in history. At a fundraising conference in London on February 4,

2016, European nations raised more than $5.8 billion for 2016 and pledged an

additional $5.4 billion through 2020. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

remarked that “Never has the UN raised so much in a single day for a single

cause.”28 Robust aid programs allow for burden-sharing across budgets and services,

which diffuses the view of refugees as “burdens” in the first place.

Still, having met only 62 percent of its funding requirements,29 the UNHCR

has admitted that it is “financially broke.”30 The UNHCR has argued that

funds still need to be “urgently dispersed” and “matched by other forms of inter-

national solidarity,” including better access to education and economic opportu-

nity for refugees in neighboring countries.31

Aiding the crisis from afar, via increased financial or material assistance, would

allow the United States to participate in alleviating the massive suffering without

directly accepting any risk or role itself. Money can help in so many ways, from

immediate relief—providing medical aid, sanitation, and shelter—to longer-

term issues like boosting education and building infrastructure.

This approach could also include bolstering host communities bearing the

largest share of the burden. In Jordan, an already-high unemployment rate has

reached record numbers after refugee arrivals, and under-staffed schools operate

on a shift system.32 In Lebanon, most refugees live outside of camps, competing

with Lebanese citizens for jobs and driving up rent prices in many areas.

Turkey’s delicate ethnic balance has been challenged as the Syrian refugee popu-

lation becomes less homogenous and the protracted state of the conflict becomes

increasingly sectarian. The security risks associated with the Syrian refugee crisis

can be seen in a string of Islamic State attacks in Turkey, most recently in a

March 2016 suicide bombing that killed four tourists in Istanbul’s main shopping

district.33

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 51

In addition to the considerable cost, massive influxes of financial assistance for

the refugee crisis could exacerbate host community tensions in places like Jordan

and Lebanon, whose own populations face considerable economic and social chal-

lenges. In February 2016, King Abdullah of Jordan said that the crisis has “gotten

to a boiling point… Sooner or later, I think the dam is going to burst.”34 In

Turkey, where the government says it has spent $6.5 billion from its own

budget, citizens have expressed anger that taxpayer money is being spent on refu-

gees.35 Over 60 percent of those surveyed in Turkey in October 2014 saw Syrian

refugees as linked to increased criminality.36 Ultimately, the United States would

need to include host communities in order to manage these tensions, further

driving up the cost.

Option Three: Safe Zones

To avoid placing the burden on U.S. allies—and to avoid the risks of doing

nothing—several leaders have called for establishing a sanctuary inside Syria to

protect those fleeing the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Senator John

McCain (R-Arizona) and Democratic front-runner Hillary Clinton have both

embraced this idea. Government leaders in Turkey have also advocated for it,

and Jordan has helped establish a de facto safe zone in southern Syria along its

border.37 Safe zones occupy a ‘Goldilocks space’ in the minds of their proponents,

helping refugees and otherwise stepping up pressure against Assad and the Islamic

State, but not requiring the resources and commitment that a direct intervention

would demand. One model is Operation Northern Watch, which in the 1990s

relied on U.S. air power to keep part of northern Iraq free from Saddam’s clutches,

allowing the Kurds there to enjoy de facto autonomy.

What, precisely, a haven entails is unclear. Some see it as a neutral area in Syria

where civilians would be protected; for others, it is a sanctuary where opposition

forces would organize and train, safe from Syrian regime as well as Russian air and

ground attacks. Nor is it clear who would protect the safe zone: some call for U.S.

airpower, while others call for a U.S. or allied ground component.

Like many solutions that promise high reward and low cost, both may be illu-

sory. Unless they are well-protected, the civilians in the zone would offer a target

for both Assad and the Islamic State, particularly if the zones are used for military

operations. Civilians under the thumb of Assad or the Islamic State would find it

difficult to travel to such sanctuaries, and those traveling to the zones would be

vulnerable to attack. UN agencies, which have worked closely with Assad to

deliver aid in parts of Syria,38 would face pressure to do little in the zones or

risk having their operations elsewhere in Syria jeopardized. Neighboring states,

meanwhile, would have a legitimate excuse for taking fewer refugees, arguing

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

52 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

that they no longer face a threat of conflict or persecution because of the zone’s

theoretical protection. Indeed, they might push for refoulement on the same

grounds.

To secure the zones, their borders must be protected and the populations

policed—both are manpower intensive. The zone must be protected against

threats as diverse as the Russian air force, the conventional forces of the Assad

regime, and Islamic State infiltrators that might launch attacks or suicide bomb-

ings against moderate leaders in the zone. Secretary of State John Kerry’s estimate

that 15,000–30,000 troops are needed to establish a zone39 is probably on the low

side, particularly if more than one zone is established or if they are established in

militarily vulnerable areas, such as near Aleppo. Diplomatically, the zones would

be difficult to establish as well. Both China and Russia oppose such zones as a vio-

lation of Syria’s sovereignty, and without their support, hopes for UN approval dis-

appear—and European states might balk at what they perceive as the lack of

legitimacy and legality of establishing a zone without the blessing of the UN.

The international track record on safe zones is

often disappointing, if not downright bleak. When

NATO created six safe zones in the Balkans in

1993, two of them fell to Serbian forces, leading to

the horrific 1995 massacre in one of the havens, Sreb-

renica, in which roughly 8,000 Bosnian men and boys

were rounded up and slaughtered. Such horrors

prompted the United States to intervene to end the

war.40

The risks for intervening forces increase if the zone

is protecting a staging area for anti-Assad and anti-Islamic State forces, as they

would have to secure the area against formidable enemies. If the zone is humani-

tarian only, the challenge shifts. Assad and the Islamic State might—but only

might—see it as less of an immediate threat. However, intervening forces would

have to stop those in the zone from organizing, training, and otherwise becoming

part of the conflict, which proffers a massive policing challenge.

Because the zones put U.S. and allied credibility on the line, they are a potential

source of unwanted escalation. If Russia or the Islamic State challenged the zone,

the United States would have to push back hard, and both are likely to test U.S.

resolve given uncertainties over what the zones entail and the overall U.S.

commitment.

In addition, the zones are a short-term fix. Operation Northern Watch, that

rare success, strained U.S. air force capabilities,41 and it required far fewer resources

than a zone in Syria would. In addition, the zones risk becoming de facto borders

over time, hardening divisions in Syria and making negotiations to end the war

The internationaltrack record on safezones is often dis-appointing, if notdownright bleak.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 53

less likely to succeed in the future. So a serious conflict resolution approach would

have to complement the zones, and no such approach is in the offing.

Not surprisingly, senior aid organization officials—who in the past in places like

Rwanda and Somalia championed such efforts—are skeptical. In these places,

efforts to carve out humanitarian enclaves failed on the ground, as local warlords

and factions saw them as potential threats. As one official noted about these zones,

“We’ve been there. We’ve seen it doesn’t work.”42

Option Four: Fix the Problem at its Source

If safe zones are so flawed, and if we want to ease the burden on neighboring states

and the world in general, a bolder option is to end the flow of refugees by ending

the conflict itself. Indeed, all the other options discussed in this article are at best

Band-Aids by comparison. In addition to allowing the refugees to eventually go

home, resolving the conflict would end the world’s bloodiest civil war and

resolve a tremendous source of regional instability.

Notionally, there are two ways to end a conflict: through negotiations or

through military victory. Secretary Kerry and other Western leaders have for

years tried to resolve the conflict through negotiations. However, many of the

key players—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, among others—have fundamentally

different interests, and split over issues such as whether the Assad regime must go

and how much power to give opposition groups. The Syrian opposition itself is

highly divided, and no single entity speaks even for the more moderate elements

at the negotiating table, let alone more disparate groups like the Syrian Kurds or

jihadists. The United States and theWest in general appropriately want to exclude

the Islamic State and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra from the negotiations,

but they are a huge part of the violence—so even successful negotiations without

them would not end the fighting. Until the military balance changes, diplomacy is

not likely to work.

Military victory is more appealing in theory, but only as long as the right

Syrians are victorious. For now, this seems unlikely. Since the Russian military

intervention began in fall 2015, the Assad regime and its allies have regained

the upper hand, and some of their strongest opponents are jihadist groups like

the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and other radical groups like Ahrar al-Sham.

More moderate opposition elements remain a serious force—which is, in part,

why they remain a top target of Russia and the Assad regime—but they are

dwindling. The United States could, in theory, support the Assad regime, but

that is a dubious moral choice; the regime’s ties to Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah

indicate that it would not be a strategic partner even if the United States could

ignore the sea of blood the regime has created. And should Assad win, in the

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

54 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

short term more Syrians would likely flee the country, fearing his harsh brand of

victor’s justice.

U.S. efforts to train Syrians have gone nowhere. Part of the problem is that the

United States wants its Syrian allies to focus on the primary U.S. enemy,

the Islamic State, while the Syrian groups are focused first and foremost on the

Assad regime. Indeed, pushing back the Islamic

State in Syria would do little to solve the overall

refugee problem, as the vast majority of the flows are

caused by the brutal tactics of the Assad regime. In

general, U.S. military training and equipping efforts

have seen few successful cases, with some only train-

ing a dozen or so fighters at the cost of hundreds of

millions of dollars. Others trained by the U.S. military

even turned their weapons over to the al-Qaeda affili-

ate, Jabhat al-Nusra.43 At most, approximately 60

Syrians have been trained at the cost of $500 million, with General Lloyd

Austin admitting to the Senate Armed Services Committee that only “four or

five” remain fighting the Islamic State.44

In our view, both efforts to train the opposition and to negotiate an end to the

conflict should continue—but we shouldn’t hold our breath while they are hap-

pening. Neither is likely to succeed in the near term, and the United States and

its allies will still need a refugee policy until they do. Such hedging becomes par-

ticularly necessary, since failure remains a distinct possibility.

Option Five: Shut the Gates

Of course, to eliminate all risk of terrorism from Syrian refugees, one option would

be to close Syria’s borders completely. Closing the borders would end the flow of

refugees pouring into neighboring states and would allow the international com-

munity to focus on those who have already made it out. Although bolstering

border security measures would incur a cost, it is a significantly cheaper option

than any of the previously mentioned, resource-heavy alternatives. Moreover,

containing the problem would allow the United States and international commu-

nity to manage the crisis—to prevent its spread and focus on securing already-

destabilized neighbors and stemming its flow across the Mediterranean.

This option would not only carry a significant moral cost—including the inevi-

table, large-scale suffering that would likely result—it would also come at a con-

siderable strategic cost. Not only could this anger Muslim communities in the

United States and Europe, it could also create greater terrorism risks. Many

foreign fighters who have traveled to Syria were motivated by the large-scale

The vast majorityof refugee flows arecaused by the Assadregime, not theIslamic State.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 55

suffering of the Syrian people and fellow Muslims.45 Sealing the borders, leaving

thousands to face assaults from both the regime and Islamic State with no

option for escape, would further feed the jihadist narrative that the West does

not care about the lives of suffering Muslims around the world.

Lastly, enforcement would not be as easy as it may seem. Though sealing

Jordan’s border with Syria may be possible—given its highly-trained and U.S.-

funded border security apparatus—Turkey’s 510-mile, heavily active border

would be nearly impossible to secure entirely. Additionally, U.S.-supported

groups and equipment, mostly aimed at bolstering the Syrian Democratic Forces

in northern Syria, rely on routes running through key towns along the Syrian–

Turkish border. Lastly, the United States has limited ability to function along

Lebanon’s and Iraq’s borders with Syria, possibly forcing those fleeing to make

the dangerous trip toward these areas.

The above options, of course, are not

mutually exclusive. Canada, for example, is

increasing its resettlement commitments and

is involved militarily in Syria. Yet even in com-

bination, the above options make clear there

are no silver bullets: each option at best fixes

only part of the problem, demands enormous

costs, or both. Some even violate the first law

of intervention: do not make the situation

worse.

Making the Best of a Bad Lot

As the above discussion makes clear, the policy options for dealing with the

refugee crisis range from bad to worse. A few allow the situation to deteriorate

further, while many of the most effective options are costly and probably politically

prohibitive. It is always tempting to look for middle ground options, but sometimes

they represent the worst of all worlds.

Regardless of which path the United States and the international community

choose, we should treat the crisis as a long-term, perhaps permanent one. These

refugees will not return in the near term, and perhaps not ever. With this in

mind, helping them needs to go beyond humanitarian relief. Refugees need

jobs, the right to move within their hosts’ borders in search of those jobs, and

their children need education. We cannot risk a lost generation of Syrians.

At the very least, we must help their hosts, particularly those in the region.

They have legitimate concerns about radicalization among Syrians and among

their own population, and because the crisis is a long-term one, these problems

The above options,ranging from bad toworse, make clearthere are no silverbullets.

Daniel Byman and Sloane Speakman

56 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

are more likely to grow if not addressed. These countries bear most of the burden,

and Jordan and Lebanon in particular have few resources to spare.

Moreover, integrating refugees is vital. If they remain an isolated people, separ-

ate and apart, with few opportunities for jobs and little hope for the future—

especially when linked to an ongoing, brutal war—then, a generation from

now, the problem will be even harder to resolve. Islamic State recruiters, or

their successors, will have a field day.

In the end, doing nothing is the worst option, from both a moral and strategic

perspective. It is a moral failing if wealthy European countries, Canada, the United

States, and others do not aid those fleeing the worst war of our generation. But it is

also a strategic failure, risking more conflict and instability in a region and world

that have seen too much of both.

Notes

1. Michael Martinez, “Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don’t,”

CNN, September 10, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-

refugees-countries/.

2. Kelly Greenhill, “Demographic Bombing,” Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2015, https://

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-12-17/demographic-bombing.

3. “Russian bombing ‘fuels refugee crisis’ US official says as airstrike kills 39,” The Guardian,January 9, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/09/imprecise-russian-bombing-

syria-fuelling-refugee-crisis-us-official; Siobhan O’Grady and Reid Standish, “Growing Air

War in Syria Sparks New Refugee Crisis,” Foreign Policy, November 16, 2015, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/16/growing-air-war-in-syria-sparks-new-refugee-crisis/; and “State-

ment to the UN Security Council on Syria,” UNOCHA, October 27, 2015. https://docs.

unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Stephen%20OBrien_Statement%20to%

20Security%20Council%20on%20Syria_27%20Oct%202015%20CAD.pdf.

4. UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of

Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” paragraph 91, 2013, http://www.ohchr.org/

Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-23-58_en.pdf.

5. Jie Zong and Jeanne Batalova, “Refugees and Asylees in the United States,” Migration

Policy Institute, October 28, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-

asylees-united-states#Refugee Countries of Origin.

6. Martinez, “Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don’t.”

7. “Over 3770 Migrants Have Died Trying to Cross the Mediterranean to Europe in 2015,”

IOM, December 31, 2015, https://www.iom.int/news/over-3770-migrants-have-died-

trying-cross-mediterranean-europe-2015.

8. Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Stephen Castle, “Syria Aid Pledges From Rich Countries Reach

#10 Billion,” New York Times, February 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/

world/europe/john-kerry-calls-on-russia-to-honor-syria-airstrike-resolution.html?_r=0.

9. Elizabeth McElvein, “What do Americans really thing about Syrian refugees?” Markaz

Blog, Brookings Institution, March 4, 2016, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/

posts/2016/03/04-syrian-refugees-us-public-opinion-mcelvein.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 57

10. Gregory Korte, “Governors have little power to block refugees,” USA Today, November

16, 2015. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/11/16/governors-have-little-

power-block-refugees/75888766/.

11. Lisa Ferdinando, “Breedlove: European Security Situation ‘Serious, ‘Complicated,’”

Defense Media Activity, U.S. Department of Defense, March 1, 2016, http://www.

defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/683569/breedlove-european-security-situation-

serious-complicated.

12. See, among others, Kelly M. Greenhill, Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement,Coercion, and Foreign Policy (Cornell University Press, 2011); Seung-Whan Choi and

Idean Salehyan. "No good deed goes unpunished: refugees, humanitarian aid, and terror-

ism," Conflict Management and Peace Science 30, no.1 (2013): 53-75; and Daniel Byman

and Kenneth Michael Pollack, Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an IraqiCivil War (Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

13. Dion Nissenbaum, Ayla Albayrak, and Raja Abdulrahim, “Istanbul Suicide Bombser

Entered Turkey as Syrian Refugee, Officials Say,” Wall Street Journal, January 13, 2016,

http://www.wsj.com/articles/istanbul-suicide-bomber-entered-country-as-syrian-refugee-

officials-say-1452685264.

14. “UN Special Envoy Angelina Jolie Pitt calls for action of World Refugee Day,” Press

Release, UNHCR, June 20, 2015, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=

search&docid=558595e96&query=average%20stay%20in%20refugee%20camp.

15. Gardiner Harris, David E. Sanger, and David M. Herszenhorn, “Obama increase number of

Syrian refugees for U.S. resettlement to 10,000,” New York Times, September 10, 2015,

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/world/middleeast/obama-directs-administration-to-

accept-10000-syrian-refugees.html?_r=0.

16. “#WelcomeRefugees: Canada’s plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees,” Goverment of

Canada, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/welcome/index.asp?wbdisable=true

17. David Laitin and Marc Jahr, “Let the Syrians Settle in Detroit,” New York Times, March

14, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/opinion/let-syrians-settle-detroit.html?

action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-

c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region.

18. “US Refugee Admissions Program: Application and Case Assessment,” U.S. Department

of State, http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/.

19. “Refugee Process and Security Screening,” U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services, https://

www.uscis.gov/refugeescreening.

20. Ana Swanson, “The big myth about refugees,” The Washington Post, September 10, 2015,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/09/10/the-big-myth-about-

refugees/.

21. “Access to Education for Syrian Refugee Children and Youth in Jordanian Host Commu-

nities: Joint Education Needs Assessment,” UNICEF Education Sector Working Group,

March 2015, http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/REACH_JENA_HC_

March2015_.pdf; and Beth Ferris and Kemal Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos: Syria’sHumanitarian Crisis and the Failure to Protect (Brookings, 2016), p. 62.

22. “Syria conflict at 5 years: The biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time demands a

huge surge in solidarity,” Press release, UNHCR, March 15, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/

56e6e3249.html.

23. Swanson, “The big myth about refugees.”

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58 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016

24. Bloomberg Politics National Poll, November 2015, archives at: http://www.scribd.com/

doc/290824881/Bloomberg-Politics-national-poll-Nov-23-2015.

25. Amber Phillips, “Here’s how much the U.S. spends on refugees,” The Washington Post,November 30, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/11/30/

heres-how-much-the-united-states-spends-on-refugees/.

26. Fabrice Blanche, “The worse of Syrian refugee crisis is coming for Europe,” Business Insider,February 16, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-worst-of-the-syrian-refugee-crisis-

is-coming-for-europe-2016-2.

27. “Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications,” Syria Refugee Response, UNHCR, Updated

January 2016, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php.

28. “Donors pledge more than US$6billion for Syrians,” UNHCR, February 4, 2016, http://

www.unhcr.org/56b3902c6.html.

29. “Needs and Funding Requirements,” UNHCR Global Appeal 2016–2017, available at

http://www.unhcr.org/564da0e20.html.

30. Hariet Grant, “UN agencies ‘broke and failing’ in face of ever-growing refugee crisis,” TheGuardian, September 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/06/refugee-

crisis-un-agencies-broke-failing.

31. “Donors pledge more than US$6billion for Syrians,” UNHCR.

32. “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile,”

International Labor Organization, April 2014, http://www.ilo.org/beirut/publications/

WCMS_240134/lang–en/index.htm.

33. “Turkey blames Islamic State for Istanbul bombing,”BBC,March 20, 2016. http://www.bbc.

com/news/world-europe-35856201?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_

campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report.

34. David Shenker and Andrew J. Tabler, “A Safe Zone in Southern Syria,”Washington Insti-

tute, March 8, 2016, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/a-safe-zone-

in-southern-syria.

35. Ferris and Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos , p. 4136. Ibid., p. 4037. Schenker and Tabler, “A Safe zone in Southern Syria”; see also Kristina Wong, “McCain

backs Clinton’s call for a no-fly zone in Syria,” The Hill, October 20, 2015, http://thehill.

com/policy/defense/257406-mccain-backs-clintons-call-for-a-no-fly-zone-in-syria, and

Johnny Hogg, “Saddled with 2 million Syrian refugees, Turkey shows signs of strain,”

Reuters, September 16, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-migrants-

turkey-analys-idUSKCN0RF1PX20150915.

38. Annie Sparrow, “Aiding Disaster: How the United Nations’ OCHA Helped Assad and

Aided Disaster,” Foreign Affairs, February 1, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/

articles/syria/2016-02-01/aiding-disaster.

39. Justin Fishel, “Up to 30,000 Troops for Syria Safe Zones Kerry Says,”ABCNews, February

24, 2016, http://abcnews.go.com/International/30000-troops-needed-syria-safe-zone-

kerry/story?id=37173697.

40. Ivo Daalder, “Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,” Foreign Service

Journal, Brookings Institution, December 1998, http://www.brookings.edu/research/

articles/1998/12/balkans-daalder.

41. James Kitfield, “Highs and Lows of Northern Watch,” Air Force Magazine, August 2002,

pp. 50-55, http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2002/August%

202002/0802northern.pdf.

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THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016 59

42. Ferris and Kirisci, The Consequences of Chaos , p. 104.43. “Udall, Manchin, Murphy, Lee Call for an End to the Failed Syria Train and Equip

Program,” Office of Senator Tom Udall, October 2, 2015, http://www.tomudall.senate.

gov/?p=press_release&id=2117.

44. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Only 4-5 American-trained Syrians fighting against the Islamic

State,” The Washington Post, September 16, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/

news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/16/only-4-to-5-american-trained-syrians-fighting-against-

the-islamic-state/.

45. Dan Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid, Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism

from Western Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria,” Brookings Institution, Policy Paper No.

34, November 2014, p. 12, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/

11/western-foreign-fighters-in-syria-and-iraq-byman-shapiro/be-afraid–web.pdf ; see also,

Richard Barrett, “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” The Soufan Group, June 2014, p. 18,

http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf.

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60 THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ SUMMER 2016