The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army

8/6/2019 The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army

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The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of BalochistanLiberation Army

By Tariq Saeedi in Ashgabat, Sergi Pyatakov in Moscow, Ali

Nasimzadeh in Zahidan, Qasim Jan in Kandahar and SM Kasi in

Quetta·

Deception and treachery. Live and let die. The ultimate zero sumgame. Repetition of bloody history:

Call it what you may, something is happening in the Pakistaniprovince of Balochistan that defies comprehension on any

conventional scale.

Because of his intimate connections with Indiaand Russia, it was no surprise that BalachMarri was picked as the new head of therevived BLA. He was later killed in anencounter with Pakistani forces in 2007.

Four correspondents and dozens of associates who collectively logged more than 5000 kilometers dur ing the seven weeks spent in pursuit of a single question ± What is happening in Balochistan? ±

have only been able to uncover small par ts of the entire picture.

However , if the par ts have any propor tional resemblance to the whole, itis a fr ightening and mind-boggling picture. Ever y stor y must star tsomewhere. This stor y should conveniently have star ted on the night of 7 Januar y 2005 when gas installations at Sui were rocketed and much of Pakistan came to almost gr inding halt for about a week. Or , we shouldhave taken the night of 2 Januar y 2005 as the star ting point when anunfor tunate female doctor was repor tedly gang-r aped in Sui. However ,the appropr iate point to peg this stor y is Januar y 2002 and we shall

retur n to it in a minute.

[ Dr. Shazia Khalid was raped on January 2nd, 2005 allegedly by an army man while performing her duty as a medical officer for Pakistan Petroleum Limited in Sui,Balochistan. Her rapist was never caught and the then President Musharraf's government forced her to leave Pakistan and left her



stranded in the United Kingdom, where she got asylum].

Actually, the elements for the star t of insurgency in Balochistan hadbeen put in place already and the planners were waiting for a convenientcatalyst to set things in motion. The gang-r ape of 2 Jan, around which

this sticky situation has been built, was just the missing ingredient the planners needed.

Two for mer KGB off icers explained that the whole phenomenon has been assembled on skilful manipulation of cir cumstances. We shall keep retur ning to their comments throughout this repor t.

As Pakistan and India continue to mend fences, as Ir an, Pakistan andIndia tr y to pool effor ts to put a shared gas pipeline, as Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tur kmenistan join hands to lay a natur al gas pipeline of great economic and str ategic impor tance, as the United States continues to laud the role of Pakistan as a frontline nation in war against terror ism,as Chinese contr actors forge ahead with construction wor k in Gwadar por t and on tr ans-Balochistan highway, as the Pakistan gover nmentmakes effor ts to br ing Balochistan under the rule of law and eliminate safe havens for terror ists and drug barons, as the whole region tr ies to develop new long-ter m models to cur b terror ism and br ing prosper ity to f ar flung areas, there is a deadly game going on in the barren and hostile hills of Balochistan. Liens are muddy; there are no clear -cut sectors to distinguish fr iends from foes.

Right in the beginning we would like to clar if y that when we say Indians,we mean some Indians and not the Indian gover nment because we don¶thave any way of ascer taining whether the activities of some Indiannationals in Pakistan represent the off icial policy of their gover nment or is it merely the adventur ism of some individuals or organizations. Whenwe say Ir anians or Afghans, we mean just that: Some Ir anians or Afghans. We don¶t even know whether the Ir anian and Afghan players inBalochistan are tr ying to ser ve the interests of their countr ies or whether their loyalties lie elsewhere.

T he KGB headquarters in Moscow.KGB is an abbreviation for theRussian: [ Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security]. It was the premier internal security ,intelligence, and secret police organization of the former super



power the Soviet Union [ from 1954 until 1991].

IT ALL STARTED FIRST IN KREMLIN

As they told us, dur ing the Russo- Afghan war , the Soviet Union was

surpr ised by the ability and resour cefulness of Pakistan to gener ate aquick and effective resistance movement in Afghanistan. To punishPakistan and to answer back in the same currency, Kremlin decided to create some organizations that would specialize in sabotage activities inPakistan.

One such organization was BL A (Balochistan Liber ation Ar my), the br ainchild of KGB that was built around the core of BSO (BalochStudents Organization). BSO was a group of assor ted lef t-wing students in Quetta and some other cities of Balochistan. Misha and Sasha can be considered among the ar chitects of the or iginal BL A.

The BL A they created remained active dur ing the Russo- Afghan war andthen it disappeared from the surf ace, mostly because its main sour ce of funding ± the Soviet Union ± disappeared from the scene. In the wake of 9-11, when the United States came rushing to Afghanistan with little prepar ation and less insight, the need was felt immediately to create sour ces of infor mation and action that should be independent of the Gover nment of Pakistan.

As Bush peered into the soul of Putin and found him a good guy,

Rumsfeld also did his own peer ing into the soul of his Russiancounterpar t and found him a good game. The result was extensive andgenerous consultation by Russian veter ans who knew more about Afghanistan and Balochistan than the Amer icans could hope to f ind.

Kremlin & pentagon join hands to reactivate the BL A

It was presumably agreed that as long as their interests did not clashwith each other directly, the United States (or at least Pentagon) andKremlin would cooper ate with each other in Balochistan. That br ings us

to Januar y 2002. ³ Actually, most of the elements were in place, thoughdor mant, and it was not diff icult for anyone with suff icient resour ces to reactivate the whole thing,´ said Misha about the present-day BL A that is blamed for most of the sabotage activities in Balochistan.

In Januar y 2002, the f irst batch of µinstructors¶ crossed over from Afghanistan into Pakistan to set-up the f irst tr aining camp. That was the



y Balochis¶ r ight of independence,y The Concept of Greater Balochistan,y Sabotage as a tool for political struggle,y Tyr anny of Punjab and plight of oppressed nations, andy Media-fr iendly methods of mass protest.

³Manuals, guidelines and even lecture plans were available in the Kometit [KGB] ar chives. Except for media inter action, they vir tuallyfollowed the old plans,´ told Sasha.

As was logical, the small ar ms and sabotage tr aining soon entered the syllabus. First shipment of ar ms and ammunition was received from Afghanistan but as the number of camps grew, new supply routes were opened from India.

NEW S PPLY R TES ARE PENED FR M INDIA

Kishangar h is a small Indian town, barely f ive kilometers from Pakistanibor der where the provinces of Punjab and Sindh meet. There is a supplydepot and a tr aining center there that maintains contacts with militanttr aining camps in Pakistan, including Balochistan.

There is also a logistics suppor t depot near Shahgar h, about 90kilometers from Kishangar h, that ser ves as launching pad for the Indiansupplies and exper ts.

These were unimpor tant stations in the past but they have gainedincreasing impor tance since Januar y 2002 when Balochistan became the hub of a new wave of foreign activity.

The method of tr ansfer from India to Balochistan is simple. Ar ms andequipment such as Kalashnikov, heavy machine guns, small AA guns,RPGs, mor tars, land mines, ammunition and communication equipmentare tr ansferred from Kishangar h and Shahgar h to Pakistani side oncamel backs and then they are shif ted to goods trucks, with some legitimate cargo on top and the whole load is covered by tarpaulin

sheets. Ar ms and equipment are, as a rule, boxed in CK or SK for m.

The trucks have to tr avel only 140 or 180 kilometers to reach Sui and alittle more to reach Kohlu, a distance that can be covered in a few hours only. This is most convenient route because tr ansferr ing anything from Afghanistan to these areas demands much stur dy vehicles that mustcover longer distance over diff icult terr ain.



The small ar ms and light equipment are mostly of Russian or iginbecause they are easily available, cheap, and diff icult to tr ace back to any single sour ce.

This route is also handy for sabotaging the Pakistani gas pipelines

because the two main ar ter ies of Sui pipe ± Sui-Kashmore-Uch-Multanand Sui-Sukkur ± are passing, at some points, less than 45 kilometers from the Indian bor der. Whoever planned these camps and thesubsequent insurgency, had to obtain initial help in recruitmentand infrastructure from Indian RAW.

[ Right: Agents from India¶s foreignintelligence agency have been working in theFederally Administered T ribal Area¶s (FAT A)as well as in Balochistan province of

Pakistan. RAW officials in the guise of diplomats and embassy officials based at different consulates in Afghanistan are activein attempts to destabilise the region].

RAW J MPS IN

³When we f irst star ted the BL A thing, it was logical to ask for R AW assistance because theyhave sever al thousands of ground contacts inPakistan, many of them in Balochistan,´ said

Sasha.

³ Anyone wanting to set shop in Pakistan needs to lean on R AW,´ addedMisha. The number of camps increased with time and now there is a big tr iangle of instability in Balochistan that has some 45 to 55 tr aining camps, with each camp accommodating from 00 to 550 militants.

A massive amount of cash is flowing into these camps. Americandefence contractors ± a generic term applicable to Pentagonoperatives in civvies, CIA foot soldiers, instigators in double-

disguise, fortune hunters, rehired ex-soldiers and free lancers ± arereportedly playing a big part in shifting loads of money fromAfghanistan to Balochistan. The Americans are invariablyaccompanied by their Afghan guides and interpreters.

Pay structure of militants is f airly def ined by now. The or dinar y recruits and basic insurgents get around US $200 per month, a small for tune for anyone who never has a hope of landing any decent gover nment job in



their home towns. The section leaders get upwar d of US $ 00 and there are special bonuses for executing a task successfully.

Although no exact amount of rewar d could be ascer tained for specif ictasks, one can assume that it must be substantial because some BLA

activists have lately built new houses in Dalbandin, Naushki, Kohlu,Sibi, Khuzdar and Dera Bugti. Also, quite a few young Balochactivists have recently acquired new, flashy S Vs.

Oddly enough, there is also an unusual indicator for measur ing the newfound wealth of some Baloch activists. In the marr iage ceremonies the dancing troupes of eunuchs and cross-dressers are r aking in muchheavier shower of currency notes than before.

Based on the geographic spread of training camps, one can saythat there is a triangle of extreme instability in Balochistan. Thistriangle can be drawn on the map by taking Barkhan, Bibi Nani(Sibi) and Kashmore as three cardinal points.

T he Coastal Connections: InBalochistan the beauty, themagnificence and conspiracies move side by side. T he landscape of the province is diverse and multifaceted. As such it offers

scores of safe havens for insurgents, places that areinaccessible to outsiders.

There is another, larger,triangle that affords a kind of cushion for the first triangle. It isformed by Naushki, Wana (in NWFP) and Kashmore. Actually,landscape of Balochistan is such that it offers scores of safehavens, inaccessible to outsiders.

Star ting from the coastline, there are Makr an Coastal Range, SiahanRange, Ras Koh, Sultan Koh and Chagai Hills that are cutting the land ineast-west direction. In the nor th-south direction, we f ind SulemanRange, Kithar a Range, Palma Range and Centr al Ravi Range to complete the task of for ming deep and inaccessible pockets. Few directroutes are possible between the coastline and upper Balochistan. Onlytwo roads connect Balochistan with the rest of the countr y.



Apar t from the tr iangles of instability that we have mentioned there is anar c ± a wide, slowly cur ving corr idor ± of extensive activity. It is diff icult to make out as to who is doing what in that corr idor.

IN DALBANDIN & NA S KI, PRESENCE F F REIGN AGENTS IS

A MATTER F R TINE

Here is how to dr aw this ar c-corr idor on the map: Mar k the little Afghantowns of Shah Ismail and Ziar at Sultan Avais Qar ni on the map. Thenmar k the towns of Jalq and Kuhak in Ir an. ow, dr aw a slowly ar ching cur ve to connect Shah Ismail with Kuhak and another cur ve to connectZiar at Sultan Avais Qar ni with Jalq. The corr idor for med by these two cur ves is the scene of a lot of diverse activities and we have been able to gather only some superf icial knowledge about it. The towns of

albandin and aushki where foreign presence has become a matter of

routine are located within this corr idor. ifferent entities are making different uses of this corr idor. espite

employing some local help, we could f ind ver y little about the kind of activity that is bubbling in this corr idor.

We found that the Indian consulate in Zahidan, Ir an, has hired a house off Khayaban anishgah, near Hotel Amin in Zahidan. This house is used for accommodating some people who cross over from Afghanistanto Pakistan and from Pakistan to Ir an through the ar ched corr idor we have descr ibed. But who are those people and what are they doing, we

could not f ind.

We also found that although Pasdar an (Revolutionar y Guar ds), the trusted for ce directly under the control of Khamnei, are monitor ing Zahidan-Taf tan road, there is no regular check post of Pasdar an on the road between Khash and Jalq, making it easy for all kinds of elements to cross here and there easily.

We also found that the bor der between Afghanistan and Ir an is mostlyunder the control of Pasdar an who come down har d on any illegal

bor der movement and that is why the ar ched corr idor passing throughPakistan is the f avor ite route for any individuals and groups including Amer ican µdefence contr actors¶ and their Afghan collabor ators who mayhave the need to go across or near the bor der of Ir an. ot surpr isingly,par t of this corr idor is used by Ir anians themselves when they feel the need to stir some excitement in Pakistan.



Ir anians also use the regular road of Zahidan-Quetta when they can f indsomeone with legal documents as was the case with an Ir anian who has business interests both in Pakistan and Ir an and who came to Quetta just before the star t of 7 Jan trouble. He has not been hear d of since then.

There is a coastal connection that also provides free access for elements in ubai and Oman to connect with militants in Balochistan. This is a loosely def ined route but there are three main landing points inBalochistan: Easter n lip of Gwater Bay that lies in the Ir anian terr itor y butaffor ds easy crossover to Pakistan through unguar ded land bor der ; 2. Open space between Bomr a and Khor Kalmat; and . Easter nmostshoulder of Gwadar East Bay.

Some Indians, a cur ious mix of businessmen and cr ime maf ia, came in

f ishing boats from either ubai or Oman and landed on the Gwater Bayin the Ir anian terr itor y before the star t of 7 Jan eruptions. From there they tr aveled to Khuzdar and then Quetta where they met with some Baloch militants. It is rumored in those areas that the Indians came withheavy amounts of cash but there was no way of ver if ying it. They were escor ted both ways by some Sar awani Balochs who run their ownf ishing vessels.

Simultaneously, there were repor ts from our Washington correspondentthat some µsour ces¶ in Pentagon had been tr ying to µleak¶ the stor y to the media that Amer icans and Isr aelis were carr ying joint reccee oper ations inside Ir an and for that purpose they were using Pakistani soil as launching point. The lead was f inally picked and disseminated bySeymour Hersh of The New Yorker.

However , from our own obser vations in the area we could not conf ir mthis repor t although there is a possibility that the cur ving corr idor that we have identif ied may have been used by the Amer icans and Isr aelis to tr avel from Afghanistan into Pakistan and then into Ir an and back for this purpose although this is mere speculation, based on the movement of foreigners in this area, and we can neither conf ir m nor deny the

substance of this repor t.

Also, there was some buzz, as repor ted by our correspondent in ewelhi, that some high cir cles were questioning the wisdom of two-f aced

policy of engaging Islamabad in peace dialogue while at the same time suppor ting insurgent activity in Balochistan. It was also not clear as to why Ir an would be interested in stirr ing trouble in Balochistan when itwas f aced by an imminent war from the Amer ican side and it needed all



the allies it could muster on its side and one of those allies couldpossibly be Pakistan.

It was also diff icult to reconcile Ir anian involvement in Balochistan withthe f act that Ir an-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, that is a crucial pro ject for

Ir an, was in the f inal stages of negotiation and there seemed no logical point in sending mixed signals by creating diff iculties in Balochistan.

MIS A & SAS A [PSE D NYMS] T E F RMER KGB AGENTSNCE ACTIVE IN BAL C ISTAN SPEAK

These were some of the questions that we took to Misha and Sasha andhere is the explanation they gave. Their answers came in bits andpieces but we have reconstructed their replies in the for m of one coherent inter view:

Question:W hat was the purpose of Russian invasion of Afghanistan?

Misha: The Soviet Union was not in love with Afghanistan itself and bynow ever yone must have understood it. We, or at least our leaders,wanted a convenient corr idor to the war m waters of the Indian Ocean ²the idea was to f irst establish full control in Kabul and from there to r aise the double-bogey of Pakhtunistan and Greater Balochistan and tr y to detach at least a par t of Balochistan from Pakistan and to either merge itas a new province of Afghanistan or to create a new countr y that shouldbe under the f ir m control of Moscow. That would have solved most of the

problems f acing Kremlin.

Question:W hen you helped create BLA back in the 1980¶s, what objectives did you have in mind?

Sasha and Misha: It was simply an instrument to create problems inPakistan. There were no ideological reasons ± it was merely a pr agmaticsolution for a str ategic problem.

Question:W ho could have revived BLA after so many years of

inactivity? Misha:Most likely, Pentagon. With good lot of suppor t from Kremlin. You should keep in mind that reviving such an organization is a tr icky taskand it needs active suppor t from a number of players. Pentagon andKremlin would not be able to do much without some help from R AW thathas hundreds of active contacts all over Balochistan. Russia could have helped negotiate the involvement of Balach Marr i in the pro ject.



Sasha: R AW must have jumped at the chance because last July the µdiscretionar y gr ants¶ budget [a euphemism for espionage fund] was increased by 700% in the Indian consulates in Kandahar , Jalalabad andZahidan.

Misha: Yes, discretionar y gr ants are not subject to centr al audit and the station chief can do what he wants with it.

Sasha: Balach possibly came to head the revived BL A through Russianf acilitation but you cannot say the same for Sar dar Ataullah Mengal. He retur ned from his self imposed exile in London and established his headquar ters in Kohlu. Was it a mere coincidence? I don¶t think so. In all probability, he is the Amer ican man to keep a check on Balach because Amer icans can never fully trust Russians.

Question: F rom your comments it appears that Balach and Mengal areheading the resurrected BLA and the BLA has been revived by the

Americans and Russians to create trouble in Balochistan but could yougive us any coherent reasons for going to such great lengths for disturbing Pakistan that is supposed to be a frontline ally of the United States on its war against terrorism?

EXCEPT F R BAL C ISTAN, REST F PAKISTAN IS SELESSF R T E AMERICANS, SAY T E F RMER KGB AGENTS

Misha and Sasha: [Misha laughed so har d that tears came to his eyes

while Sasha merely kept smiling in an absentminded way] ± Frontline ally? Are you kidding? Amer icans are using Pakistan and Pakistanis would soon f ind it out if they have not already. Amer icans don¶t need thatkind of allies and they have made it abundantly clear for anyone who can read their policy goals correctly. Let them deal with Ir an and you would see. If there can be any desir able Amer ican ally in that region,that is Ir an ± Ir an under a different regime, and they are wor king to thatend. Except for Balochistan, the rest of Pakistan is useless for them.

Question: It is still not clear from your answer as to what do the

Pentagon and Kremlin hope to achieve by stirring trouble inBalochistan?

Sasha: Amer icans have two long-ter m policy objectives in that region:First, create a safe and reliable route to take all the energy resour ces of Centr al Asia to the continental United States, and second, to containChina.



Misha: Balochistan offers the shor test distance between the Indianocean and the Centr al Asia, that is to say, shor test distance outside of the Gulf. The moment the conditions are r ipe, Amer icans would like to take all the oil and gas of Centr al Asia to Gwadar or Pasni and fromthere to the United States.

Question:If the Americans are interested in creating safe channelfor shipping energy resources through Balochistan, why wouldthey encourage trouble there?

Misha:That is for now. By inciting trouble, they would effectivelydiscour age Tr ans- Afghan Pipeline or any other pro ject that is intendedfor sending Centr al Asian resour ces to South Asia. They are notinterested in strengthening the South Asian economies by allowing themto obtain sensibly pr iced oil and gas. They would be more interested in

taking all they can to their own countr y and let ever yone else star ve if that is the choice.

Sasha: The Amer icans would also like to discour age China fromenter ing into more development pro jects in Balochistan than it alreadyhas. By developing the por t and roads in Balochistan, China is ultimatelyhelping itself by creating a convenient conduit for commer ce that wouldconnect China concurrently with Centr al Asia, South Asia, and all-weather Balochistan por ts. The space is limited ± where China gains, Amer ica loses, and where Amer ica gains, China loses.

The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of BalochistanLiberation Army ± IV

Ex cept for Balochistan, rest of Pakistan is useless for Americans,assert the two former agents of the KGB.

Question: OK. This sounds plausible. But what interest couldRussia have in helping Pentagon inthis trouble-Balochistan project?

Sasha: Russia has its own policy goals and as f ar as the present phase of creating trouble in Balochistan is concer ned, Amer ican and Russian goals are not in conflict with each other. Russiawants to maintain its monopoly over all the energy resour ces of Centr al Asia. Atpresent, the Centr al Asian countr ies are



dependent entirely on Russia for expor t of their gas pro ject succeeds, itwould open the floodgates of exodus. Centr al Asian countr ies wouldunderstandably rush to the mar ket that pays 100% in cash and pays better pr ice than Russia. It is therefore ver y clear that by keeping Balochistan red hot, Russia can hope to discour age Tr ans- Afghan

pipeline or any other similar pro jects. Russian economy in its presentfor m is based on the monopoly of Gazprom and if Gazprom goes under ,so will the Russian economy at some stage.

Question:So f ar , there is some in sense what you have said but howwould explain Indian involvement in the Balochistan revolt?

Sasha: India has its own per ceived or real objectives. For instance, Indiawould go to great lengths to prevent Pakistan from developing a directtr ade and tr anspor tation route with Centr al Asia because it would

under mine the or th-South corr idor that goes through Ir an. Also, while the acute shor tage of energy may have compelled India to extend limited

cooper ation to Pakistan, the prefer able pro ject from Indian point of viewstill remains the Ir an-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.

Misha:Moreover , you cannot ignore the f act that India is prepar ing to use Afghanistan as its main ar ter y system to connect with Centr al Asiaand it would not allow Pakistan to share this sphere if it can.

Question:What about Iran? Why should Iran be a party to it?

Misha: Ir an has incurred great expenses to develop Chah Bahar , the por t that is supposed to be the Ir anian answer to Pakistani por ts of Gwadar and Pasni. Ir an has also done lot of wor k to create excellentroad link between Her at and Chah Bahar. All this would go to waste if Pakistani route comes on line because it is shor ter and offers quickcommuting possibilities between Centr al Asia and Indian Ocean.

Sasha: At the same time you need to allow cer tain margin of unreliabilitywhen dealing with Ir an. You cannot be sure whether they mean whatthey are saying and you cannot be sure whether they would keep their

promises. They do what suits them best and to hell with anycommitments. I am sorr y but that is how I judge Ir an.

Question: W hile both of you have given some explanation of American,Russian, Iranian and Indian involvement in Balochistan, what is the roleof Afghanistan?



Sasha:There are many influential cir cles in Afghanistan that are deadlyopposed to Pakistan for one reason or the other. While Afghanistan as acountr y may not be har bor ing any ill will against Pakistan, it is diff icult to rule out the possibility that some power cir cles would not be inclined to damage Pakistan wherever they can. It is clear from the recent

developments that as India, Ir an and Afghanistan have made greatstr ides to for m some kind of economic, tr ade and tr anspor tation alliance,all effor ts have been made to exclude Pakistan from any such deal.

Question: W hile BLA is being used by a number of power players for their own objectives, does it have any potential, even as a byproduct, toserve the cause of Baloch people?

Misha and Sasha: BL A is not the only f ish in the pond. There is BalochIttehad and there is PO AM and there is lots of small fr y out there. But

none of them can be expected to do any good to the Balochi people because the command this time is mostly in the hands of Baloch Sar dars and they have no past recor d of br inging any benef it to their own people. If anything, they are known to sell their own people down the r iver.

[Misha thumbed through a dog-eared f ile and read]

Sar dar Mehrulla Marr i sold all miner al and petroleum r ights of Khatanregion to the Br itish gover nment in 1885 for a paltr y sum of Rs. 200 per month. There was no time limit to this agreement ± it was, as they say, inperpetuity.

In 1861, Jam of Bela allowed the Br itish gover nment to put a telegr aphline through his terr itor y, thus helping substantially the Br itishgover nment in consolidating its control over large areas of Balochistan. He received less than Rs. 900 per month for this disser vice to his ownpeople and took the responsibility to safeguar d the telegr aph line. In188 , the Khan of Kalat sold the Quetta distr ict and adjoining terr itor ies to the Br itish gover nment. This was an outr ight sale. The agreement thatwas signed in asht, included the provision that the heirs andsuccessors of Khan of Kalat would also be bound by the same

agreement. He received annual gr ant of Rs. 25000 for selling the mostattr active par t of Balochistan to the Br itish gover nment.

In the same year , the Br itish gover nment paid Rs. 5500 to the BugtiSar dar for his cooper ation although it was not specif ied as to what kindof cooper ation he extended to the Br itish gover nment.



While the Baloch Sar dars were enthusiastically selling Balochistan to the Br itish gover nment, there was no suppor t to the idea of Pakistanwhereas the or dinar y Balochs gave full approval for Pakistan. Anypositive development in Balochistan would go against the interests of Sar dars and only a fool would expect them to do anything for the good of

their people. Bear in mind that Marr i and Mengal Sar dars f irst stood up against the Pakistan gover nment when the law was passed to abolishSar dar i system in Balochistan to free the or dinar y Balochs from the clutches of their tr ibal leaders.

Question: The way the things are progressing in Balochistan, what could be the l ikely outcome?

Misha: If no strong action is taken for another few months, the resultcould be bifur cation of Pakistan.

Question: Is that the only likely outcome?

Misha: o. In f act, that is the f ar thest possible scenar io but that couldeventually happen if Pakistan f ails to assess, analyze and address the situation quickly. For example, I have yet to see any Pakistani effor t to contact the or dinar y Balochs. They are still tr ying to woo the same Sar dars who are living on the blackmail money since the creation of Pakistan.

Sasha: I am surpr ised at the way Pakistan goes about tackling this

problem. ur ing my few years in Afghanistan when I was engaged withBalochistan, I found that while Baloch Sar dars would sell their loyalties and anything else at the drop of a hat, or dinar y Balochs are stupidlypatr iotic. They are har d to buy and har der to manipulate. If I were aPakistan gover nment functionar y, I would gather enough or dinar y,educated Balochs to counter the Sar dar influence and deflate this whole insurgency balloon.

Question: Both of you were, let¶s say, among the developers of theoriginal BLA. Do you find any differences between the original and the

present BLA?

Misha and Sasha: Plenty. Or iginal BL A was mostly led by the young people and Baloch Sar dars had ver y little to do with it but the presentBL A is concentr ated in the hands of Sar dars.

The present movement in Balochistan, led by BL A, PO AM and BalochIttehad is a mismatched concoction of ancient and moder n.



They are tr ying to run a moder n media campaign but there are crucial gaps in that effor t. Ours were different times and we could do withoutmedia suppor t. They have created a list of Pakistani jour nalists who are supposed to be sympathetic to any move against the gover nment andthey are feeding them daily a mixture of truth and lies, a pr actice that

has been perfected by the Pentagon.

They managed to br ing some Baloch women in er a Bugti but the results would be little if they cannot repeat the perfor mance in most other areas of Balochistan.

They have built their campaign around a single incident ± the Sui gang-r ape ± and if the Gover nment is smar t enough, it would hang the real culpr its and ask the victim of the r ape to announce publicly that she was satisf ied with the justice meted out to the cr iminals and that would take

all the wind out of the sails of the BL A

campaign. A

real har d campaignneeds to be built around much broader and har d to solve issues.

Question: H ypothetically speaking, if the Pakistan government asked your advice, what would you suggest?

Sasha:The options are few. They should abolish Sar dar i systemimmediately and cr ack down powerfully on the pr ivate ar mies. As f ar as Iknow, the constitution of Pakistan does not allow Sar dar i system andpr ivate ar mies and there would be no legal questions if those laws are implemented with the full help of state power.

Misha:They should involve broadest possible r ange of or dinar y Balochs in the dialogue. The can f ind enough educated youth in Marr i andMengal tr ibes to match the influence of tr ibal leaders. They should also allow the fr agments of Bugti tr ibe to retur n to their ancestr al lands andthat would be enough to calm down the ageing and eccentr ic Bugti who pretends to be the leader of that tr ibe.

Sasha: Pakistan government should hasten the developmentprocess in the province because it would open job opportunities

and that would allow the escape hatch to ordinary Balochs todistance themselves from their leaders.

Misha: They should try to cut down the sources and channels of supply of arms and cash to insurgents.

Concluded.



Source: Originally published inhttp://satribune.com/archives/200503/P1_bla.htmCross published at therearenosunglasses.wordpress.com/

The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army

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Transcript of The Stunning Investigative Story on the Birth of Balochistan Liberation Army