The State

Origin, Transformation, and Collapse

I. Defining the StateA. Definition based on politics: community

or institution with a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force over people in its territory

B. Definition based on language: The totality of a country’s governmental institutions and officials, together with the laws & procedures that structure their activities

C. Key feature: Sovereignty (sole legal authority over people and territory)

II. Theories of the StateA. Formalism (a.k.a. the “Old” Institutionalism) –

Constitutions and laws determine resource allocation and political outcomes

1. Look at successful states to copy design features (success attributed to formal laws). Freedom preserved by Bill of Rights, etc.

2. Problems:a. Same constitutions = different outcomes (Swiss, Filipinos,

Liberians all modeled US Constitution)b. People sometimes obey states but other times overthrow

themc. Difficult to predict which mechanisms will be effective

because no theory about why some work while others fail

B. Functionalism: The state serves functions for society1. Assumptions:

a. Every society must perform certain functions in order to survive (reproduction, education, defense, etc.)

b. Both formal and informal rules needed to preserve social stability

c. Existing customs and laws serve certain universal functions. Which ones?

2. State failure explained as “disequilibrium” – some parts failed to fulfill functions

3. Problems: a. Theory is tautological –What predictions can we make?b. Treats status quo as “normal” state of affairs – but some

institutions seem to have negative effects (ag agencies decreasing ag production…)

C. Social Forces: The state is an object of struggle1. Assumption: Political outcomes are the

result of interest groups fighting over the control of resources

2. Method: Examine group strength and position, then calculate “sum of forces” to arrive at result

3. Problems:a. Similar group alignments produce different

outcomes in different statesb. Some groups appear to have influence out of

proportion to objective power (resources)c. States intervene to alter group power

D. Rational Choice: The state is composed of rational individuals1. Focuses on individuals. 2. Rationality =

a. Connected preferences: People know what they want (although they might not know what’s really good for them)

b. Transitory preferences: People are consistent about what they want

3. Method: Given preferences, how can individuals get what they want? Private enterprise, collective action, or politics?

4. Problem: “Rules of the game” differ in different countries incentives to behave differently

E. The “New” Institutionalism: Institutions as “Rules of the Game”1. Assumes social forces or rational choice: Actors

pursuing interests do construct or alter states, often to solve collective action problems or security dilemmas

2. Argues that state institutions in turn structure group/individual decision-making by changing incentives (indeed, this was their purpose)

3. Implication: Different group relations produce different institutions (Example: Presidentialism inappropriate for competition between ethnically-based parties)

4. Problem: Still no theory of preferences. Why do people have different desires?

III. Evolution of the StateA. State formation:

1. Early polities: Socially-stratified groups in which people specialize, with some specializing in administration or governance.

2. Large polities become empires through conquest and relaxing criteria for inclusion (beyond the family or tribe)

3. States become territorial: Clovis is “King of the Franks” in late 5th Century but Capetians are “Kings of France” in 6th Century. Laws of people (wherever they might be) replaced by laws of territories.

4. Loyalty still personal: To the person, not the position.5. “Capstone governments” – States are composed of different

groups ruled by their own customs and only occasionally interacting with government. “Early states ran wide but not deep.”

B. Transition to the Supremacy of States1. Centralization: Technology, economic

growth, trade, better defense enable rulers to centralize authority and “deepen” ties to the state through taxation and policing

2. Rule of Law: Formal law is enforced, contracts become written, etc.

3. Sovereignty: Clash between sources of authority (Church and state) produces huge wars and leads to development of sovereignty norm (only the state has control over its people and territory)

Note: From here on, everything is disputed…

C. Colonialism and Institution-Building1. European states ignored sovereignty of

non-Europeans, imposed new institutions2. Institutions selected for benefit of colonial

powers or colonistsa. Densely populated areas (tropics): Native

labor exploited through slavery and feudalismb. Sparsely populated areas: Institutions set up

to encourage further colonization by Europeans (representation, autonomy)

3. The Institution-Based Reversal: Colonial Development and Population

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D. The Constitutional State1. Why would rulers limit their own power?

a. Increased trade enriches merchant class able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot)

b. Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property rights): only Crown enriched

Voyages Per Year: Mediterranean (Pink) vs. Atlantic (Blue) Trade

D. The Constitutional State1. Why would rulers limit their own power?

a. Increased trade enriches merchant class able to finance rebellion (stick) or Crown (carrot)

b. Absolutism restrains trade (no secure property rights): only Crown enriched

2. Result: Bifurcation of Europe into constitutional (England, Netherlands) and absolutist (Spain, Portugal) regimes

3. Expansion of franchise: Threat of revolution when industrialization empowers poor (unskilled labor)

E. Post-Colonial States1. Most “born” with institutions designed for

benefit of others2. Pre-independence institutions enriched

some local elites and impoverished others (divide and rule -- or mobilization of revolutionary armies)

3. Existing elites use economic power to preserve political power (institutions designed to perpetuate rule)

IV. Future of the State: Threats to Legitimacy and PowerA. A New World Order? Undermining the

legitimacy of state sovereignty1. International Relations: Sovereign states

sometimes have to bargain with other sovereign states to solve common problems

2. Problem: Treaties should be unenforceable3. Solution: Create “self-enforcing” agreements like

multilateral treaties that sanction violators4. Alternative solution: Create common decision-

making entity (UN, EU, IMF, etc.)5. Either solution constrains the state, eroding

sovereignty in practice (#3) or law (#4)

B. State failure: Sovereignty without authority

1. Routes to state failurea. Catastrophe: Something overwhelms state’s

ability to provide even minimal protection or enforce law.

b. Sovereignty without institutionalization: State is created which lacks de-personalized institutions or capacity to extract taxes and monopolize force (de-colonization in Congo)

c. Poverty trap: State is so poor than virtually no surplus exists to support political institutions (like catastrophe, but long-standing)

2. Civil War: Sovereignty under siege

a. Causes of civil war: Weak states and opportunism

i. Weak States• Recent civil war (security dilemma)• Low GDP!• Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy)

Anocracy and State Failure

2. Civil War: Sovereignty under seige

a. Causes of civil war: Weak states and opportunism

i. Weak States• Recent civil war (Security Dilemma)• Low GDP!• Anocracy (weak semi-autocracy)

ii. Opportunism Lootable resources: drugs, diamonds, even oil! Diasporas from Previous Conflicts: Money,

Supplies, Agenda-Setting Rough terrain: Mountainous areas Threatened Dominance: Single ethnic group

45%-90% of population

b. Non-causes of civil war Inequality: No statistical evidence of

relationship Personal poverty

Easier to recruit – but for both sides! Rich regions with key commodities

frequently rebel Ethnic diversity

Low and High levels are “safe” – middle is danger zone in non-democracies

Relationship: Diversity and Freedom

C. Predicting State Failure

1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failurea. Capacity to absorb catastrophe:

essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

b. Predicting catastrophei. Civil war – Recent civil war is best predictor,

followed by Low GDP, then other factorsii. Disease – Compare disease prevalence with

health care resources

TB Incidence per 100,000

Per-Capita Health Spending

1. Predicting the catastrophic route to failurea. Capacity to absorb catastrophe:

essentially determined by wealth and efficient governance (GDP, Corruption)

b. Predicting catastrophei. Civil war – Recent civil war is best predictor,

followed by Low GDP, then other factorsii. Disease – Compare disease prevalence with

health care resourcesiii. Natural disasters – Analysis by the UN

2. Predicting the de-institutionalization route to state failurea. Recent decolonization/independence --

“New” states at risk

b. State “birth” type and institutional strengthi. Hypothesis: States born in revolution,

secession, or nonviolent struggle for independence should be stronger than those granted independence without struggle (examples: Congo, Uzbekistan)

ii. IV = Better birth experience (requiring organization and solution of collective action problems)

iii. Tests using both GDP and Rotberg’s (2004) index of state failure as DVs reveal…

iv. The puzzle of state birth Good births increase later GDP and

decrease odds of state failure but… Relationship disappears when war participation

is also included as a (control) IV. Why? Theory: War produces state strength.

Interstate war increases later growth! Civil war decreases later growth

Another finding: States with imposed borders different from pre-colonization ones have lower growth, higher rates of failure

c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to measurei. One indicator = unconstrained

executives (very similar to autocracy measures). Test Results:

Estimated risk of genocide – it goes up when unconstrained executives have a powerful Army

Index of Military Personnel

c. Personalized regimes: Difficult to measurei. One indicator = unconstrained executives

(very similar to autocracy measures). Test Results: unconstrained executive + large military = danger

ii. Alternative experiment: Compare personalist post-Soviet regimes to institutionalized or previously-independent regimes. DV = violent deaths…

iii. Everyone agrees Turkmenistan is personalized. Why?

Welcome to Turkmenistan

A statue of our glorious leader, President-for-Life Turkmenbashi (meaning Great Leader of All Turkmen).

This is one of a half-dozen statues of him we made out of gold. (Really, it was the least we could do.)

You’ll be hearing a lot about Turkmenbashi here… This one revolves so he

may always face the sun!

He’s everywhere!

Turkmenbashi the Spiritual Guide Ruhnama is the combination autobiography,

historical fiction, and spiritual guidebook written by Turkmenbashi himself

Must be prominently displayed in bookstores and government offices

Required to be displayed next to and equal to the Islamic Qur'an in mosques

Main component of education from primary school to university. Ability to exactly recite passages from it is required for state employment – and even a driver’s license

Ruhnama was sent into space in 2006

Every night this enormous mechanical Ruhnama opens and passages are recited with video

More interesting construction projects In Niyazov's home village of Kipchak, a

complex has been built to the memory of his mother, including a mosque (est. at US$100 million) conceived as a symbol of the rebirth of the Turkmen people. The walls of this edifice display precepts from the Ruhnama along with Qur'an suras.

August 2004: Turkmenbashi orders an ice palace to be built – in the desert. This “wonder of the world” ends up being an ice skating rink.

But wait, there’s more… Recent decrees:

Turkmenbashi ordered the closure of all rural libraries because “village Turkmen do not read”

Ban on opera and ballet – they are “unnecessary” Young people may not get gold tooth caps/teeth,

but rather should chew on bones Closure of all hospitals outside Ashgabat, saying

that sick people could just come to the capital Ordering that physicians swear an oath to him

instead of the Hippocratic Oath All recorded music is banned The city of Krasnovodsk is now the city of…

Turkmenbashi

In case you’re not convinced… In 1991 he introduced a new Turkmen

alphabet, which all are required to use He renamed the days of the week Then he renamed the months of the year:

January is now “Turkmenbashi” February is now “Flag” – (Flag Day is

celebrated on Turkmenbashi’s birthday) April is “Gurbansoltan Eje”, the name of

Turkmenbashi’s mother September is “Ruhnama” And so forth…

Is Turkmenistan headed for failure?

Turkmenistan’s Path Exports natural gas and cotton

1990s: Depression (Russia cut off trans-shipment of gas)

2000s: Recovery as non-Russia pipelines began operation

Government follows free trade policy, received MFN status from Europe and WTO

January 2006: Government eliminates pensions to one third of elderly, cuts pensions of remaining two-thirds – and then orders elderly to repay the pensions received in the past two years back to the State. Reports indicate that this may be killing old people, whose $10 - $90 pensions were their sole sources of support

3. The Poverty Trapa. Official data: Concentration in Africa

b. Satellite estimates (areas with lots of people but few lights are assumed to be poor)

c. Combined National Poverty Estimates

D. What do we know about state failure?1. Multiple paths to state failure exist – no

single cause of collapse2. History matters – Method of

independence and original institutions help determine later institutions

3. Economics matters – Common element in most routes to state failure is poverty

4. Greatest risk is sub-Saharan Africa: recently de-colonized, poor, vulnerable to disasters, patterns of civil conflict, lootable resources, etc.

IV. Historical Case Study: The Great Lakes Crisis

A. Congo/Zaire: Anatomy of a weak state1. Pre-colonization: Strong Luba Kingdom in Katanga

area; other areas attached to other kingdoms or occupied by smaller tribes

2. Colonialism: a. 1885: Belgium “awarded” the territory

i. King Leopold builds railways and rubber plantations using slave labor: 5-15 million dead (about half of population dies)

ii. Force Publique established to maintain control over laborers

b. 1908: Belgian Parliament takes over colonyi. Hospitals, schools, etc built – improvement. But…ii. No native administration developed. No local rule

allowed.

3. Decolonization

a. Lack of preparationi. 1958: Kongo ethnic groups form ABAKO, occupy areasii. 1959: Belgium bans ABAKO, promises independence.iii. May 1960: Elections Anti-Belgian party defeats pro-

Belgian party and regional parties. Coalition government formed by Lumumba, Kasa-Vubu, and allies such as Mobutu.

b. Independence declared on June 30, 1960 – Congolese Parliament has only existed for a month!

4. Mutiny, Civil War, and FragmentationYellow = gov’tRed = rival gov’tGreen = Katanga

secessionists, aided by Belgium

Blue = Kasai Mining Statesecessionists

4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentationa. Mutiny and Secession (July 5, 1960)

i. Force Publique recruits mutiny against Belgian officersii. Belgium sends troops to suppress mutiny, even though

government has not requested aidiii. Belgium assists Katangan secessionistsiv. Luba tribes then revolt against Katanga (secession within

secession!)b. Political Maneuvers

i. Col. Mobutu gains control of foreign aid as Chief of Staff, distributes it to units loyal to himself.

ii. UN peacekeepers deployed, but not empowered to fight. Lumumba asks Soviets for aid, uses Soviet airlift to suppress Kasai secessionists

iii. Coup: CIA then assists Lumumba rivals Mobutu and Kasa-Vubu, who assemble anti-Lumumba coalition in Parliament and dismiss him from office.

Only 67 days have passed since independence!

4. Mutiny, Civil War, and Fragmentationc. New rebellions rise as old ones fail

i. Lumumba arrested by Kasa-Vubu but his V-P sets up a Lumumbist government in the Northeast (red area on map)

ii. Jan 1961: At Belgian urging, Mobutu executes Lumumba

iii. Feb 1961: UN Security Council authorizes use of force (only time between Korea and Persian Gulf War)

iv. 1961-1962: UN forces attack Katanga. Secretary General of the UN killed when plane crashes in Congo (cause undetermined)

Mutiny, Civil War, and FragmentationYellow = gov’tRed = rival gov’tGreen = Katanga

secessionists, aided by Belgium

Blue = Kasai Mining Statesecessionists

d. 1964-1965: The fourth round of rebellionsi. 1964: New revolts in eastern provinces

by “Simbas” (Swahili for “lion”)ii. Simbas seize European hostages

military rescue operation succeedsiii. Simbas defeated by government of Kasa-

Vubuiv. 1965: CIA assists Mobutu in coup against

Kasa-Vubu. Mobutu bans all other political parties and establishes personal dictatorship with title of "Father of the Nation."

5. Mobutu and Mobutism a. From Congo to Zaire

i. 1967: Mobutu creates new, obligatory national party (MPR). State becomes extension of party: “The MPR must be considered as a Church and its Founder as its Messiah.”

ii. Constitution gives President power to dismiss governors and judges, issue decrees

iii. 1971-2: Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire, citizens ordered to take African names

iv. 1973: Salongo -- “obligatory civic work” introduced (like colonial labor requirement)

Mobutu’s own “Africanization”Joseph Desire Mobutu becomes…Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku

Ngbendu waza BangaUsual translation: “The all-

conquering warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to conquest leaving fire in his wake."

5. Mobutu and Mobutism a. From Congo to Zaire

i. 1967: Mobutu creates new, obligatory national party (MPR). State becomes extension of party: “The MPR must be considered as a Church and its Founder as its Messiah.”

ii. Constitution gives President power to dismiss governors and judges, issue decrees

iii. 1971-2: Africanization -- Congo renamed Zaire, citizens ordered to take African names

iv. 1973: Salongo -- “obligatory civic work” introduced (like colonial labor requirement)

“For weeks at a time, Zaire's official press was forbidden to mention the name of any other Zairian than the president himself.” -- NYT

b. Zaire’s troubles: State weaknessi. Mobutu and political allies funnel billions of dollars

into Swiss and other offshore accountsii. Early 1970s: World Bank refuses to fund grandiose

development program. US agrees to lend the money. Huge public debt accumulates.

iii. 1973: “Zairianization” -- expropriation of foreign-owned businesses for the benefit of political allies. Massive business failures follow.

iv. 1977, 1978: Invasions by Katangan exiles. French and Moroccans defeat invasion with US transport.

v. 1980s: Zaire used by US/allies as staging ground for rebels in neighboring countries

vi. 1991: Paratrooper mutiny over unpaid wages

B. Regional Background: A History of Slaughter

Zaire

1. Historical Overview: Hutu vs. Tutsi in the Great Lakes Region

1950s-1970s: Hutu vs. Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi: Tutsi refugees to Uganda, Congo/Zaire

1980s: Civil war in Uganda – Tutsi exiles aid Ugandan rebels victory

Early 1990s: Tutsi exile army invades Rwanda with help from Uganda

1993: Arusha Accords – Agreement to share power between Hutu and Tutsi

1993: Massacres in Burundi – Hutu rebellion begins

1988: Tutsis Kill 20,000 Hutus1972: Tutsis Kill 100,000 Hutu Elites

1993: 50,000 Civilians Killed

1963: Invasion: 10,000 Tutsis Killed1959: Hutu Revolt Displaces Tutsis

1980-1988: Civil War: Tutsi Exiles Aid Rebels

1994: Genocide: Civil War Resumes1990-1993: Exile Invasion Civil War Cease-Fire

2. Genocide in Rwanda, 1994

1994: Genocide in Rwanda

April 1994:- Assassination of Rwanda and Burundi

presidents (probably by Hutu extremists)- Hutu extremists kill moderate Hutus in

Rwanda, seize power, and systematically exterminate 80% of Tutsis (about 800,000 people)

- Tutsi rebels immediately restart civil war, take control of country

- Hutu militants, 2 million Hutu civilians flee to camps in Zaire

3. Flight of the Interahamwe

4. Security Issues: Rwanda looks to Zairea. Interahamwe threaten Rwandan Tutsis:

Control camp resourcesb. Zaire’s Tutsis (Banyamulenge) fear the

Interahamwec. Burundi Hutu rebels ally with

Interahamwe

C. From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo1. Mobutu decides to preserve power by

using Interahamwe against enemies classifies Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsis) as “refugees” and revokes citizenship

2. September 1996: South Kivu province orders all Banyamulenge / Tutsi to leave or be sent to “camps”

3. Rwanda sees opportunity: defend Tutsi in Zaire AND eliminate Interahamwe

4. October 1996: Anti-Mobutu ADFL revolt sponsored by Rwanda, led by Kabila (fought Mobutu in the 1960s!)

1990-2005: Civil War

1996: Zaire Rebellion / RPF Invasion

4. 1996-1997: The Zaire War

a. Rebels attack Hutu camps, force refugees back to Rwanda. Zaire army melts away.

b. All of Mobutu’s regional enemies aid the ADFL.

c. May 1997: ADFL seizes power – factional infighting begins

d. ADFL renames Zaire the DRC

D. “Africa’s World War”1. Origins of the DRC War

a. 1997: Kabila wins power struggle within ADFLb. Early 1998: Kabila seeks independence from

sponsors (Rwanda, Uganda)c. Kabila expels Rwandan forces / Banyamulenge

Rebellion in Kivu (again)2. The Maelstrom: The war goes regional

a. Pro-rebel intervention: Uganda, Rwanda, and later Burundi (pro-Tutsi)

b. Pro-government intervention: Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Sudan, Chad, Hutu rebels in Burundi, Interahamwe

c. Other involvement: Both sides in neighboring Congo Republic war, Ethiopia and Eritrea (Sudan Ethiopia Eritrea)

“Africa’s World War”

3. Fragmentation

a. Military Stalemateb. Rwanda-Uganda

conflictc. Rebel

organizations fragment

d. About 2-4 million die, mostly civilians

E. An uncertain peace1. War formally ended by negotiation in 2003 after

Kabila assassinated (son takes power)2. Death toll still 1000/day in 2004 – many small

militias carry out massacres, but majority dies of starvation and disease due to ongoing anarchy

3. July 2006: Elections finally held by transitional government. Kabila fails to win majority his forces then attack the forces of his competitor in the upcoming runoff

4. Will October’s runoff bring peace and stability to the Congo?