The Sri Lanka Dilemma: Can an Agreement Be Reached?

8/14/2019 The Sri Lanka Dilemma: Can an Agreement Be Reached?

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The situation in Sri Lanka, between the Tamil minority and the

Sinhalese majority, has been degrading steadily over the last few decades.

Sri Lanka has now come to the point where it is divided, with a defacto Tamil

state in the north (Stokke 1022). The friction between the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sinhalese majority has derailed Sri Lankas

development both economically and socially. With flaws in the development

of civil liberties, electoral law, and human rights, Sri Lanka has been stuck in

a period of social stagnation for decades. The only way for Sri Lanka to keep

progressing as it once was, is to find a peaceful solution to the separatist

desires of the Tamil minority. The following discussion will detail how the

country of Sri Lanka came into this current situation and what is to be done

to solve the problems that both sides have to overcome.

The conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese can be traced back

to colonial times when the Sinhalese believed, according to the International

Crisis Group, that outsiders had the upper hand (4). This feeling the

Sinhalese had towards outsiders led to the ethnocentrism we see today in

the holding back of Tamil development. With a majority of 70 percent of the

population (4) at the time of independence, it was not very difficult for the

Sinhalese to begin a series of efforts to get ahead of the minorities. One of

the early steps to promoting the Sinhalese identity was the creation of the

Sinhala Only Legislation (5) where Sinhala was established as the only

language for government business (5). This legislation, in part, led to the


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process of ethnic outbidding in which attempts by government coalitions

to come to an agreement with the Tamil Federal Party were undermined by

those in opposition (5). This was the end for minority rights in Sri Lanka.

The 1972 and 1978 constitutions promoted Sinhala

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Buddhist hegemony, further centralised the state and failed to provide

adequate protection for minority rights (6). As conflict between the two

sides arose because of the Sinhalese centered legislation, a desire for peace

became important to both the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Under Kumaratunga,

the government tried to defeat the LTTE in battle while restructuring the

state to accommodate Tamil grievances (9). This point in Sri Lankas history

was the closest they had come to federalism (9), but ultimately the bill was

finally defeated in August of 2000 because of party politics (9). With the

failure of finding a solution for the Tamils, there was continued conflict

between the two sides, which led to the Sinhalese governments growing

popularity within the armys lower ranks and junior officers (12). This

growing popularity eventually leads to a military that sides with the

Sinhalese and is against the Tamils. This Sinhalese favouring military fights

the LTTE controlled areas in the north and northeast regions of Sri Lanka,

which are under defacto control by the LTTE (Stokke 1022).

The Tamil region has been declared a defacto state by scholars such as

Kristian Stokke, who points out the defacto Tamil government includes

revenue collection, police and judiciary as well as public services and


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economic development initiatives (1022). Public services such as schools,

hospitals, courts, and police and other law enforcement personnel (Oberst

5) are important indicators of defacto status in the Tamil regions. The LTTE

also has a military of about 15,000 troops (2), which further proves the

defacto status of the Tamil controlled regions of Sri Lanka. While the Tamil

regions might have defacto control over their territory, that in no way means

they are democratically running their regions. The LTTE have no problem

engaging

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in political killings if members of rival Tamil parties, suspected Karuna

sympathizers and government informants, and journalists and human rights

workers (3). The northern regions of Sri Lanka are argued to be autocratic in

governance under the LTTE leadership. Instances of the refusal to allow free

elections (3) are common and coincide with the policies of not permitting

free expression and repressing the publics ability to criticize the government

(3). The LTTE will also force civilians to attend pro-LTTE rallies (3). This form

of rule is different from what the Sinhalese use to rule the rest of the country.

With these instances of forced rallies and no free elections, as laid out by

Oberst, the defacto LTTE state in the northeast can be categorised as an

autocratic regime, ruling over a coerced population of Tamils.

An electoral democracy is present in the legitimate Sinhalese ruled

portion of Sri Lanka. This portion of Sri Lanka is labelled an electoral

democracy based on certain aspects that do not allow for the necessary


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freedoms in a liberal democracy; situations such as irregularities, violence,

and intimidation (3) occur in the Sinhalese national elections. There has also

been growing concern over corruption of officials and the lack of government

processes that can be used to hold the corrupt public officials accountable to

the public for their misdeeds (3). Sri Lanka was ranked 78 out of 159

countries surveyed in the 2005 Transparency International Corruption

Perceptions Index (3-4) as a result of the lack of accountability of

government actors. By not having the aspect of accountability in

government, it would not be fair to call Sri Lanka a liberal democracy, and

therefore it must be labelled an electoral democracy. As well as corruption

within the elected officials, there has been perceived politicization of the

judiciary

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(5) where legal decisions have been altered to consistently defend the

government in legal actions relating to political disputes (5). This would in

effect alter the outcomes of any legal decisions regarding Tamil autonomy in

Sri Lanka. If a peace settlement were to be reached between the parties,

there would no longer be any need for the corrupt judiciary and it would be

able to regain its former independence (International Crisis Group 28). With

repairs to the current political regime in Sri Lanka, it may be possible for

peace talks to progress even further as a positive feedback loop could be

created through the increased trust the Tamils would gain in the fair and

independent judiciary. This judiciary repair bring a long-term structural (28)


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reform will take time, effort and patience from both sides, but in the end will

surely benefit both the Tamils and the Sinhalese as legal matters regarding

issues such as human rights can now be settled in proper courts of law.

The goals of the Tamil population are to obtain the separate and

legitimate control over their regions of Sri Lanka, this would be a disaster for

the rest of the country, as the sitting government would not allow The Tamils

to separate from Sri Lanka and civil war would be a likely result. The goals for

a separate state could fall under a form of holding together federalism if it

were to be accepted by the Sinhalese majority, it could also be read as two

distinct states instead of federalism however (25). In keeping with the idea of

change, it is important to outline what the proper expectations of the Tamil

population should be; first, the Tigers must be pressed to say

unambiguously they would accept autonomy within a united Sri Lanka, not

insist on a separate state. The demand for a separate state allows Sinhalese

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hardliners to argue that devolution would be merely a step towards

separation (25). The next logical step for the Tamils to aim for would be

political autonomy in the areas it currently controls in its defacto state; this

would be a form of federalism if it were to come into effect. Control however

should not be given in the way of the judiciary, as this would grant more

autonomy than the Sinhalese would tolerate. Autonomy should only be

granted in the areas of revenue collection, police . . . as well as public

services and economic development initiatives (Stokke 1022)


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Consensus. International Crisis Group Asia 141 (2007)

Oberst, Robert C. Country Report Sri Lanka. 2006. Countries at the

Crossroads 2006: A

Survey of Democratic Governance. Freedom House. 8 Nov. 2008

Stokke, Kristian. Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions

and Forms of

Governance in LTTE Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka. Third World

Quarterly 27.6

(2006): 1021-1040

The Sri Lanka Dilemma: Can an Agreement Be Reached?

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