The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior the Case of Chile

Journal of Communication ISSN 0021-9916

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The Social Media Basis of Youth ProtestBehavior: The Case of ChileSebastian Valenzuela1, Arturo Arriagada2, & Andres Scherman2

1 School of Communications, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Santiago, Chile2 School of Journalism, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile

Protest activity has become a central means for political change in Chile. We examinethe association between social media use and youth protest, as well as mediating andmoderating mechanisms of this relationship, using survey data collected in Chile in 2010.We found that Facebook use was associated significantly with protest activity, even aftertaking into account political grievances, material and psychological resources, values, andnews media use. The link between overall Facebook use and protest activity was explainedby using the social network for news and socializing rather than when it was used forself-expression. Postmaterialist values and political ideologies were not found to moderatethe association between Facebook use and protest.

doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01635.x

Public demonstrations, boycotts, and other forms of protest are normal forms ofachieving political change for citizens in mature democracies (Dalton, Sickle, &Weldon, 2009; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). The same is not true for those who livein countries that experienced the Third Wave of democratization in the 1970sand 1980s. For them, disillusionment with the performance of democratic regimesled to a decline in protest behavior (Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). Spain, Greece,and Portugal, however, have witnessed an increase in protest activity in the pastfew years. Protest activity in Chile increased to the point that the New YorkTimes dubbed 2011 the year of the ‘‘Chilean Winter’’ as previous apathetic groupsbegan demanding wholesale changes in education, the environment, and energypolicy (Barrionuevo, 2011). High school and college students have been the mostvocal—and successful—so far, channeling on the streets and online the public’sdiscontent with the free-market policies that made Chile an economic model forthe region. By the end of 2011, polls put public opinion support for the studentmovement at an astounding 79% (Adimark GfK, 2011).

Political action movements in Third Wave democracies have had three elementsin common: the dominant role of youth; the absence of political parties as the main

Corresponding author: Sebastian Valenzuela; e-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association 299

The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior S. Valenzuela et al.

organizers; and the widespread use of social media as means of political action (Kulish,2011; Zuquete, 2011). It is the latter trend, of course, that is most interesting froma communication perspective. Considering their disengagement from conventionalpolitics, the key role played by youth is also noteworthy.

We examine the role of social media use as it relates to youth protest behavior asmeans of political change. We also map out the processes by which this relationshiptakes place through the analysis of mediating mechanisms. Lastly, we elaborate onthe contingent conditions under which social media can become pivotal for protestbehavior by examining the moderating role of postmaterialist values and ideologies.To do so, we analyze data from a representative survey of Chilean urban youth thatmeasures protest activity, social network site use, and a host of other factors knownto be related to protest.

We focus on Chile because, in contrast with social movements in North Americaand Europe, public protest in Chile has been quite successful at accomplishing legaland policy changes. After briefly describing the Chilean experience, we review theliterature on youth political engagement and social media, paying particular attentionto protest activity and social network sites, and posit specific hypotheses about therelationship between protest behavior and Facebook, the dominant social networksite in Chile.

The Chilean experienceChile has been portrayed as Latin America’s greatest success story ever since Chilereturned to a democracy in 1990, following General Augusto Pinochet’s 17-yeardictatorship. High levels of economic growth, successful social policies, low levelsof corruption, and a prudent management of the political and macroeconomicprocesses have led the country to become a model of steady transition to democraticrule (Mainwaring & Scully, 2008; Valenzuela & Arriagada, 2011). Prosperity hasalso allowed the country to lead the region in terms of technology adoption.Currently, nearly 60% of the population uses the Internet, a proportion that climbsto 86% among those in the 18–24 age group (World Internet Project-Chile, 2010).Nevertheless, disparities in terms of income and other factors remain high in Chile.For instance, in national math tests, the performance of primary school studentsfrom the richest fifth of the population is one-third better than those of the poorestfifth (‘‘Blackboard battle,’’ 2010). Most importantly, following Inglehart’s (1997)value change predictions, the process of economic modernization has also translatedinto making inequality less acceptable in the face of public opinion. In 1990, only16% of Chileans completely agreed with the statement: ‘‘Incomes should be mademore equal.’’ By the year 2000, that proportion grew twice, to 33.5% (World ValuesSurvey, 2000). The Chilean context thus combines successful development with highsocioeconomic inequality—and growing unrest as a result. Younger citizens haveled the social movements against this state of affairs and, in spite of being disengagedfrom electoral politics, have taken their calls for a better quality of education andprotection of the environment both online and offline.

300 Journal of Communication 62 (2012) 299–314 © 2012 International Communication Association

S. Valenzuela et al. The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior

It is in this particular context that Sebastian Pinera defeated the candidate of thecenter-left Concertacion coalition, which ruled for 2 decades, in the 2010 electionsand became president in March of that year. Despite low unemployment rates andhigh economic growth, in his first 2 years as head of state Pinera has confrontedmassive youth-led protests over educational policies and the environment. Whilethese issues have led to street protests in the past, these protests were novel both fortheir success and their use of social media (Planas, 2011).

A case in point was the August 2010 protest against the Barrancones power plantwhich would have closed a marine reserve that holds 80% of the world population ofHumboldt penguins. In the two days following the environmental agency’s approvalof the project, 118 Facebook Groups against Barrancones were created, which togethergarnered more than 25,700 ‘‘Likes’’ and 177,450 ‘‘Fans’’ (García & Torres, 2011). Atthe same time, 3,000-plus citizens—coordinated via Facebook and, to a lesser degree,Twitter—marched to the presidential palace in Santiago, demanding Pinera to fulfillhis campaign promise that no power plants would be built in environmentallysensitive areas. The next day after, Pinera announced that he had overridden theagency’s approval and personally asked the company to relocate the plant.

Barrancones, though telling, was not an isolated manifestation of the new Chileanprotest movement. In January 2011, a series of citizen-led protests in Magallanes,the country’s southernmost region, against a 17% rise in the price of natural gasprices forced the government to sack the Energy ministry, limit the increase to just3%, and give out new subsidies to 17,000 poor families. The public outrage againsthydroelectric dams in Chilean Patagonia, in May 2011, along with the actions filedby environmental groups and legislators, paralyzed the project. And in June 2011,massive student demonstrations in Santiago and other cities led the government tolaunch a full-blown educational reform with more than $4 billion in fresh publicfunds. The government’s decision that same month to start tracking Facebookand Twitter ‘‘to listen to what citizens have to say’’ (Matamoros, 2011)—and theensuing controversy it triggered over people’s right to privacy on the Internet—onlyreinforced the growing role of social media in protest activity in Chile.

Youth, participation, and online mediaYoung people in Chile, as in other parts of the world, typically exhibit low ratesof political participation. Between 1988 and 2009, turnout in the 18–29 age groupdecreased from 35% to less than 9%. Low electoral engagement may reflects changesin the conceptualization and practice of citizenship as the old ‘‘dutiful citizen’’ isreplaced by the new ‘‘self-actualizing’’ citizen (Bennett, 2008; Dalton, 2008). Theformer is oriented toward traditional forms of political participation, such as voting,while the latter opts for civic action through community work, unconventionalpolitical activities, and digitally mediated forms of political expression. While thenormative implication of these changes is contested (Graber, 2004), it is clear thatdigital media now plays a major role among younger citizens (Owen, 2006; Park,Kee, & Valenzuela, 2009; Raynes-Goldie & Walker, 2008).



Scholarly debates regarding the relationship between these tools and the type ofpolitical behavior in which young people engage continue to evolve. Strong contrastsbetween the so-called cyberoptimists and cyberpessimists (Norris, 2000; Xenos &Moy, 2007), have given way to more nuanced perspectives in which the effects ofonline media are seen to be contingent upon the specific ways in which people usedigital platforms and the sociopsychological characteristics of users. In other words,the effects of online technologies on youth engagement are mediated by specificuses (e.g., informational vs. entertainment) and moderated by individuals’ politicalpsychology and background (Bimber, 2001; Shah, Rojas, & Cho, 2009).

Taking into account these considerations, the meta-analysis conducted by Bou-lianne (2009) using U.S. data found no evidence to suggest that using online serviceswas related to political disengagement. On the contrary, exposure to informationalcontent online was positively associated to participation. In the case of Chileanyouth, separate cross-sectional analyses have found a strong link between usingonline platforms, including news sites and social network sites, on political and civicparticipation (Scherman & Arriagada, 2010; Scherman, Arriagada, & Valenzuela,2011). These results are also consistent with studies conducted in other countries(e.g., Bakker & de Vreese, 2011).

Social media use for protestSocial network sites have several affordances for promoting participation, particularlyprotest behavior among youth. They facilitate access to a large number of contacts,thereby enabling social movements to reach critical mass (Marwell & Oliver, 1993).By allowing multiple channels for interpersonal feedback, peer acceptance, andreinforcement of group norms, these sites also promote the construction of personaland group identities that are key antecedents of protest behavior (Dalton et al., 2009).Social network sites function as information hubs that allow users to remain incontact and exchange updates regarding their activities with others that share theirinterests. Those who belong to social movements and political groups can thus buildrelationships with one another, receive mobilizing information that they may notobtain elsewhere, thus expanding their opportunities to engage in political activities(Gil de Zuniga & Valenzuela, 2011; Kobayashi, Ikeda, & Miyata, 2006). Lastly, socialmedia are effective means for social interaction. Finding a basis for conversationand social communication, connecting with family, friends, and society, and gaininginsight into the circumstances of others—all these factors can instill in young peopleinterest in collective issues (Valenzuela, Kim, & Gil de Zuniga, 2011).

Bakardjieva (2009) coined the term ‘‘subactivism’’ to analyze the relationshipbetween individuals’ agency and their everyday political behavior in nontraditionalpolitical contexts. For her,

Subactivism involves a variety of inconspicuous processes such as identityconstruction through subject positioning vis-a-vis social and political discoursesand relations, friend–enemy distinction and identification with collective



formations, discursive re-enactment of debates and clashes with a political frameof reference in the private sphere (everyday political talk), as well as practicalactions and choices regarding matters of daily living that have wider social andpolitical resonance. (Bakardjieva, 2011, p. 4)

Social network sites therefore emerge as resources that may create the kinds ofcollective experiences that are necessary conditions for successful protest movements.Having grown up with digital media, young people may be especially drawn to thesecollective experiences and the new forms of citizenship they entail (Bennett, 2008). Inlight of young Chileans’ lack of interest in traditional politics, as reflected in their lowturnout in elections, examining their use of social media may amplify and organizetheir protest behavior.

These considerations lead us to hypothesize that there is a positive relationshipbetween Facebook use and protest behavior (H1). Frequent Facebook users are morelikely to protest because they engage in activities that are essential for collective action,such as learning information, exchanging and forming opinions about social issues,and constructing a common identity. Thus, it is likely that the link between Facebookuse and political activity is explained by users’ motivations and the particular wayin which the site is used. We therefore hypothesize that the relationship betweenFacebook use and protest behavior is mediated by the extent to which the site is usedfor news consumption, expressing opinions, and socializing with peers (H2).

Postmaterialism and ideology as moderatorsThere is reason to suspect that individuals’ cultural and political values may amplifyor dampen the effects of social media on political activity. Work on modernizationand value change theory, for example, argues that economic development leads to thediffusion of postmaterialist values that promote self-expression and elite-challengingbehavior (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Furthermore, because one’svalues tend to be formed by late adolescence, there are marked generational differencesin individuals’ political goals and behaviors. Thus, having been raised during a longperiod of steady economic growth and relative prosperity—at least by historicalterms—should make Chilean youth more likely to hold postmaterialist values andthereby more likely to protest instead of engaging in traditional electoral behavior.At the same time, the participatory and outspoken nature of social media could makethe use of these sites more consistent with the spirit of emancipation and disrespectfor traditional authority that characterizes postmaterialism.

Links between social network sites and protest behavior may also depend on users’particular political ideology. Those at the left of the ideological spectrum are morelikely to resort to protest as part of their political toolkit (Dalton et al., 2009). Forexample, issues such as public education and the environment are strongly associatedwith the left in Chile. There is some overlap between caring for postmaterialist valuesand the issues that people associate with social democrats and other leftist groups(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Thus, we hypothesize that the relationship between



Facebook use and protest behavior will be stronger for individuals with a leftistideology and with postmaterialist values (H3).

Method

Sample and proceduresData were collected in a survey of individuals aged 18–29 living in Chile’s three largesturban areas: greater Santiago, Valparaíso-Vina del Mar, and Concepcion-Talcahuano.Approximately 43.2% of the total population of the country lives in these three areas.The School of Journalism at Universidad Diego Portales and Feedback, a professionalpolling firm, collaborated in a multistage probability sample stratified by urban area.Within each urban area the sample was allocated proportionally by communes andwithin communes by the number of blocks. For each randomly selected block, fivehouseholds were randomly selected to obtain a list of adult residents aged 18–29. Inthe last stage, one eligible youth from each household selected was randomly drawnfor a face-to-face interview. The final sample of 1,000 represented an 80% completionrate. Interviews were conducted between 27 August and 10 September 2010.

MeasuresProtest behaviorProtests can take a variety of forms, ranging from signing petitions to boycotts,including unofficial strikes and even violent activities. Because illegal protest activitiestend to be quite infrequent in Chile, we focused on activities that represent a transitionbetween conventional and unconventional modes of political behavior, as well asdirect action techniques, all of which are legal. Specifically, protest behavior wasmeasured by asking respondents if they had engaged in the following activities inthe past 12 months: attended public demonstrations (14% of respondents), attendedpolitical forums and debates (11%), signed a petition to authorities (12%), andparticipated in meetings with authorities (8%). Positive responses were summed(range: 0–4) to create a protest index.

Facebook useBoth general and specific Facebook use was assessed. The general assessment involvedfirst asking respondents if they had a registered account on Facebook, and then askingthose that did (85%) how often they used it: (a) every day, more than once a day;(b) every day, once a day; (c) at least three times a week; (d) once a week; (e) two orthree times a month; and (f) once a month or less.

Three specific types of uses were also assessed. First, to measure Facebook as achannel for news, respondents were asked to estimate how many hours on a typicalday they used social network sites for watching, reading or listening to news. Second,Facebook use as a means for self-expression was gauged by asking respondentswhether on a typical day they use the site for contacting friends and acquaintances;chatting; and expressing an opinion on personally relevant issues. These three



items were added to create a single scale of use of Facebook for self-expression(Cronbach’s α = .77). Finally, respondents were asked to report whether they hadused Facebook to plan parties, create event invitations, and confirm assistance withevents. Affirmative answers to these items were summed to create an index coveringFacebook’s use for social life (α = .80). Correlations among the three measures ofspecific Facebook uses were modest, suggesting that they could be treated as relativelyindependent measures. Specifically, Facebook use for news was correlated at .17(p < .001) with Facebook for self-expression and at .23 (p < .001) with Facebookfor social life, while the latter two were correlated at .30 (p < .001).

GrievancesDissatisfaction as a causal agent of protest activity can take many forms. In thisstudy, we considered two types of grievances, economic and political. The formerwas gauged with the following item: ‘‘Has the economic situation of the countryimproved, stayed the same, or worsened?’’ Negative economic evaluations werecoded higher. Political dissatisfaction, in turn, was measured with two variables. Ascale of confidence in public institutions (Cronbach’s α = .63) was computed fromquestions asking how much trust respondents had in political parties, the justicesystem, their district’s representative to Congress, and their local government ormunicipality. Responses were recorded using a 4-point scale, with 1 = nothing and4 = a lot. Government responsiveness was gauged with a single item about howmuch the respondent believes his or her actions influence the decisions made bygovernment officials. More trusting and responsive responses were coded with highervalues.

ValuesThe influence of political and cultural values on protest behavior was operationalizedusing two variables. For ideology, respondents were invited to place themselves ona 10-point scale ranging from left-wing to right-wing. An index of postmaterialistvalues was constructed by asking respondents if they believed that (a) protectingthe environment should be a priority, even if it diminishes economic growth andincreases unemployment; (b) economic growth is fundamental for democracy towork (reversed); and (c) making discrimination against minorities punishable by lawis fundamental for democracy to work. Responses for all three items were dummycoded 0 for no and 1 for yes. Because this variable was computed as an index, ratherthan a scale, internal consistency via Cronbach’s alpha was not computed.

ResourcesIndividuals’ material, psychological, and social resources have been shown to bestrongly associated with protest behavior (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).Members of dominant groups (e.g., male, rich, and college-educated) are morelikely to participate in protests because they have more time and perhaps greatercommunicative and organizational abilities. Having a stronger interest in politicalmatters can also increase the likelihood of being motivated to join protests. From a



social perspective, individuals are more likely to be recruited into political activities,including protest activities, if they are members of groups such as unions, NGOs, andprofessional organizations. Furthermore, organizations can provide an institutionalcontext supportive of political action. These different sets of political resourceswere included in the current study as statistical controls. The respondent’s genderwas dummy coded, with males coded higher. Education was operationalized as thehighest level of formal education completed.1 Political interest was measured as ascale averaging respondent’s level of interest in: (a) Chilean politics and (b) stayinginformed about important political affairs (α = .87). Both items were coded usinga 5-point scale ranging from 1 = not interested to 5 = very interested. Membershipin civic groups was a counter tapping involvement in activities of organizationsrelated to: (a) assisting the poor; (b) protecting the environment; (c) student groups;(d) defending consumers’ rights; (e) preserving public spaces; and (f) defendingreproductive and sexual rights.

News media useTo measure the level of exposure to political information and public affairs, respon-dents estimated how many hours on a typical day they used four different types ofmedia: television news, radio news, print newspapers, and online publications.

Results

Because protest behavior was assessed as a count, the hypotheses were tested withPoisson regression models.2 The variables representing grievances, values, resources,and news media use were entered simultaneously with Facebook variables, so as toisolate the unique relationship between using Facebook and protest behavior, holdingall other variables constant.3 Mediation and moderation analyses, respectively, wereconducted to test the second and third hypotheses. Independent variables werenormalized to a 0 to 1 range before entering them into the Poisson models tofacilitate comparison of the regression coefficients.4

As predicted (H1), there was a positive relationship between Facebook useand protest behavior (Table 1). Holding everything else equal, respondents with aFacebook account engaged in more protest activities than respondents without aFacebook account (b = .47, p < .01), with an average score in the protest indexof .34 versus .21, a 60% difference. For those with a Facebook account, using theonline social network more often was also related to higher levels of protest behavior(b = .47, p < .05). In substantive terms, and holding all other variables constant attheir means, respondents who log in to Facebook several times a day scored .40 inthe measure of protest behavior, while those who did so once a week scored .30, anearly 35% difference.

Consistent with previous research, resources were key predictors of protestbehavior, particularly membership in civic groups. Individuals with higher interest inpolitical affairs as well as those who spent more time reading newspapers and online



Table 1 Poisson Regressions Predicting Protest Behavior

Total Sample Those with a Facebook Account

B (SE) B (SE)

GrievancesNegative economic evaluations 0.16 (0.14) 0.20 (0.15)Confidence in public institutions −0.52∗ (0.24) −0.58∗ (0.25)Government responsiveness 0.25∗ (0.15) 0.19 (0.16)

ValuesRight-wing ideology −0.63∗∗∗ (0.18) −0.54∗∗ (0.18)Postmaterialist values 0.21 (0.21) 0.26 (0.22)

ResourcesMale 0.14 (0.09) 0.11 (0.10)Education 0.17 (0.32) 0.05 (0.33)Political interest 1.10∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.08∗∗∗ (0.16)Membership in civic groups 2.04∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.93∗∗∗ (0.17)

News MediaTV news exposure −0.69∗ (0.37) −0.70∗ (0.40)Radio news exposure −0.02 (0.21) 0.01 (0.22)Newspaper exposure 0.55∗ (0.23) 0.74∗∗ (0.25)Online news exposure 1.00∗∗ (0.32) 0.98∗∗ (0.34)

Social network site useWith a Facebook account 0.47∗∗ (0.17) —Frequency of Facebook use — 0.47∗ (0.21)

Likelihood ratio χ2 447.40∗∗∗ 369.53∗∗∗

Pseudo-R2 (%) 46.3 43.0N 940 810

Note: Cell entries are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.∗p < .10. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.

news were more likely to engage in protest. Among grievance effects, lack of trustin political institutions was the most important driver of protest behavior. Thosewith a left-leaning orientation were far more likely to join protests than those with aright-leaning orientation.

We had also hypothesized (H2) that the positive relationship between Facebookuse and protest was explained by three activities performed on the network:news consumption, expressing opinions, and socializing with peers. To test thesemediating relationships, we estimated a path model in which frequency of Facebookuse was predictive of all three activities on Facebook, while these activities, in turn,were predictive of protest. The results of the estimation are displayed in Figure 1,showing statistically significant paths only (full results are displayed in Table 2).As could be expected, using Facebook more frequently meant engaging in all threeof the Facebook activities considered more frequently as well. Most importantly,using Facebook for news (b = .51, p < .05) and socializing (b = .52, p < .001) was



0.52*** (0.14)

0.51* (0.24)

0.34*** (0.05)

0.22*** (0.03)

0.07** (0.02)

Frequency of Facebook use

Facebook for news

Facebook for self-expression

Facebook for social life

Protest behavior

Figure 1 Path model of Facebook use and protest behavior.

Note. Paths are Poisson regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (see Table 2for further details). Only statistically significant paths are displayed.∗p < .10. ∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.

positively associated with protest levels. Although Facebook for opinion expressionwas not a significant predictor of protest (b = .16, ns) once all other variables weretaken into account, the three Facebook activities included in the model fully mediatedthe direct effects of general Facebook use on protest. This conclusion stems from thesignificant drop in the magnitude of the direct effect of Facebook use on protest (fromb = .47, p < .05 [reported in the last column of Table 1] to b = .23, ns). Thus, in linewith the hypothesis, there was sufficient evidence that mediation was indeed takingplace.

Finally, we examined the association between protest activity and series ofinteractions between Facebook use and political ideologies and postmaterialistvalues, separately for the total sample and among those with a Facebook account.Each of these interactions was anticipated to be significant, indicating a greaterengagement in protest activities among people who were left-leaning and/or heldpostmaterialist values (H3). The coefficients displayed in Table 3 offered no supportfor this hypothesis. The only significant interaction was between ideology andfrequency of Facebook use, but it was in the opposite direction of what had beenpredicted. The relationship between Facebook use and protest behavior was notcontingent upon political and/or cultural values in this study.

Discussion

This article contributes to our understanding of the role of social network sitesin political change in developing democracies. Our analysis of Facebook use andprotest behavior among 18–29 year olds in Chile demonstrated that having aFacebook account and using it frequently were positively and significantly relatedto participation in protests, even after taking into account other known sourcesof this type of political action. Controlling for grievances, values, resources, and



Table 2 Poisson Regressions for Mediation Analysis of Facebook Use on Protest Behavior

Facebookfor News

Facebook forSelf-expression

Facebook forSocial Life

ProtestBehavior

B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)

GrievancesNegative economic

evaluations−0.03 (0.02) −0.01 (0.02) −0.05 (0.04) 0.27 (0.15)

Confidence in publicinstitutions

−0.04 (0.03) 0.11∗∗ (0.04) −0.01 (0.07) −0.60∗ (0.25)

Governmentresponsiveness

−0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) −0.08 (0.09) 0.25 (0.17)

ValuesRight-wing ideology −0.04 (.03) −0.03 (0.03) −0.05 (0.05) −0.49∗∗ (0.18)Postmaterialist values −0.02 (0.03) −0.03 (0.03) 0.03 (0.06) 0.28 (0.22)

ResourcesMale −0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.12∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.06 (0.10)Education −0.01 (0.04) −0.25∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.09 (0.09) 0.07 (0.34)Political interest 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.09∗ (0.04) 1.02∗∗∗ (0.15)Membership in civic

groups0.07∗ (0.03) 0.05 (0.03) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.06) 1.78∗∗∗ (0.17)

News mediaTV news exposure −0.02 (0.05) −0.06 (0.06) −0.08 (0.11) −0.58 (0.40)Radio news exposure 0.18∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.10∗∗ (0.03) 0.06 (0.06) −0.10 (0.23)Newspaper exposure 0.08∗ (0.03) 0.04 (0.04) 0.19∗∗ (0.07) 0.66∗∗ (0.25)Online news exposure 0.21∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.05 (0.06) 0.12 (0.10) 0.84∗ (0.34)

Social network site useFrequency of

Facebook use0.07∗∗ (0.02) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.23 (0.22)

Facebook for news — — — 0.51∗ (0.24)Facebook for

self-expression— — — 0.16 (0.26)

Facebook for social life — — — 0.52∗∗∗ (0.14)

Likelihood ratio χ2 110.77∗∗∗ 102.96∗∗∗ 153.39∗∗∗ 394.24∗∗∗

Pseudo-R2 (%) 12.3 11.4 17.0 47.1N 810 810 810 810


news media use, the strength of this relationship was comparable to the influence ofpolitical distrust and leftist ideology on triggering elite-challenging political behavior.It should be noted, however, that factors such as political interest and membershipin civic groups were more closely related to protest. Facebook use is thus a significanttool for youth activism, but by no means the only or even necessarily the mostimportant one. This is good news in our view because it would be quite troubling



Table 3 Two-Way Interactions Between Facebook Use, Values, and Ideology

Total SampleThose With a

Facebook Account

B (SE) B (SE)

GrievancesNegative economic evaluations 0.15 (0.14) 0.19 (0.15)Confidence in public institutions −0.55∗ (0.24) −0.57∗ (0.25)Government responsiveness 0.25∗ (0.15) 0.19 (0.16)

ValuesRight-wing ideology −2.52∗∗ (0.76) −0.96 (0.66)Postmaterialist values −0.66 (0.77) −0.25 (0.74)

ResourcesMale 0.11 (0.09) 0.11 (0.10)Education 0.21 (0.32) 0.05 (0.33)Political interest 1.10∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.07∗∗∗ (0.16)Membership in civic groups 2.04∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.94∗∗∗ (0.17)

News mediaTV news exposure −0.72∗ (0.37) −0.73∗ (0.40)Radio news exposure 0.02 (0.21) 0.01 (0.22)Newspaper exposure 0.61∗∗ (0.23) 0.73∗∗ (0.25)Online news exposure 0.96∗∗ (0.32) 0.98∗∗ (0.34)

Social network site useWith a Facebook account −0.61 (0.55) —Frequency of Facebook use — −0.08 (0.67)

InteractionsWith a Facebook Account × Values 0.92 (0.79) —With a Facebook Account × Ideology −2.01∗∗ (0.78) —Frequency of Facebook Use × Values — 0.65 (0.93)Frequency of Facebook Use × Ideology — −0.51 (0.79)

Likelihood ratio χ2 454.47∗∗∗ 370.28∗∗∗

Pseudo-R2 47.4 43.2N 940 810


if young adults’ protest behavior was determined by a single technological platformsuch as Facebook.

What people did with Facebook mattered as well. Using Facebook for newsand socializing with peers was associated with increased participation in protests,but using it for self-expression was not. These results are consistent with previouswork showing that the informational and social interactive uses of media can leadto participatory behaviors, while entertainment uses can drive people away fromcollective action (Shah et al., 2009). These findings also indicate that Facebook can



successfully allow youth to interweave the private world of family, friends, andpersonal life with the public sphere of politics, social movements, and protests, in linewith ‘‘subactivist’’ practices (Bakardjieva, 2009). Both as a technology and as a spacewhere people mediate their political interests, Facebook is a resource for creatinga collective agency. Furthermore, by illustrating how Facebook serves multiplefunctions, including surveillance, social integration, and deliberative practice, ourfindings counter simple notions of technological determinism.

Considering Chile’s economic development and the diffusion of postmaterialistvalues among youth, as manifested by students’ demands around quality-of-lifeissues like education and the environment, we expected that the mobilizing potentialof Facebook would be particularly salient for users who share postmaterialist orleftist political values. However, this was not the case, perhaps suggesting thatindividuals need not share a particular cultural or political outlook to benefit fromthe participatory potential of the online network site.

Online tools such as Facebook are not so much creating new forms of protest asamplifying traditional forms of protest, such as street demonstrations. In other words,activism does not confine itself to separate online and offline spheres, but insteadonline interactions can aid offline forms of citizen participation. Governments andpolitical parties, in turn, must take into account what is available on social networksites as they gauge public opinion and knowledge. The positive links betweenFacebook use and protest behavior reported here represent both an opportunityand a challenge. On the one hand, social network sites seem to reduce the costs ofcollective action, enabling citizens to organize themselves more easily and to voicetheir concerns more publicly. On the other, there is the risk of furthering inequality ifthe population of social media users is skewed toward the technologically savvy andthose with high human, social, and economic capital.

Although our study was conducted a year earlier from the massive student-ledprotests that put Chile in the headlines worldwide in 2011, the findings reportedhere provide some clues to understand the surprising impact of the student-ledprotests. Political grievances, leftist orientations, political interest, and participationin civic groups were all found to be strong predictors of protest activity. It is safeto assume that all of these attributes are more likely to characterize college-boundyouth than other segments of Chilean society, and thus it should not come asa surprise that students have led the current movement for economic and socialreform. On the other hand, the unique contribution of social network site use forprotest that was extensively probed with 2010 data suggests that growth in usage ofthese platforms between 2010 and 2011 could be related to an increase in protestbehavior.

Despite the new insights shed by this study, the analysis has several limitations.By employing survey data, we are constrained to self-reports of protest activityand Facebook use, which may yield inaccurate measures due to social desirabilitybias. Although Facebook is the dominant social network site in Chile, our findingsare limited to a single social network application. Additional research is needed to



produce more detailed findings that extend across a range of social media. Althougha number of factors could be controlled statistically, the cross-sectional nature ofour data limits our ability to infer causal relationships. Limitations notwithstandingour study provides an initial foundation for research on the role of social media andprotest behavior in consolidating democracies.

Notes

1 Income was excluded from the analysis because it was found to be highly collinear witheducation (r = .44). When replacing income for education in the multivariate analysis,the results were the same as those reported in the results section.

2 To ensure that Poisson regression was appropriate, negative binomial models wereestimated and contrasted with the Poisson specifications. In all cases, the dispersioncoefficient of the negative binomial models was insignificant.

3 We calculated correlations between all the independent variables used in the regressionsto check for collinearity. Nearly all were relatively uncorrelated (mean r = .07, medianr = .04).

4 Descriptive statistics of all variables and replication data are available from the firstauthor upon request.

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青年抗议行为的社会媒体依据：以智利为例

Sebastián Valenzuela

智利天主教大学

Arturo Arriagada

Andrés Scherman

Diego Portales大学

【摘要：】

抗议活动已成为智利政治变革的一个核心手段。本文通过 2010 年在智利收集的调

查数据，研究社交媒体使用和青年抗议行为之间的关系以及调解和调和这种关系的机

制。本文发现，即使考虑了政治不满、物质和精神资源、价值观和新闻媒体使用等因素

后，Facebook 的使用与抗议活动仍呈显著相关。如果 Facebook 被用于新闻和社交目的

时，二者之间的关联则比被用于自我表达时要强。“后唯物主义价值观”和政治意识形态

都不能调和 Facebook 使用和抗议之间的关联。

L’ancrage dans les médias sociaux des comportements de protestation des jeunes : le cas du Chili

Sebastián Valenzuela, Arturo Arriagada & Andrés Scherman

La protestation est devenue un moyen central de changement politique au Chili. Nous examinons

l’association entre l’utilisation des médias sociaux et la protestation des jeunes, ainsi que les

mécanismes de médiation et de modération de cette association, en utilisant des données

d’enquête recueillies au Chili en 2010. Nous avons découvert que l’utilisation de Facebook était

associée de façon significative aux activités de protestation, même une fois que les doléances

politiques, les ressources matérielles et psychologiques, les valeurs et l’utilisation des médias

d’information sont prises en compte. Le lien entre l’utilisation de Facebook et les activités de

protestation était plus fort quand Facebook était utilisé pour les nouvelles et la socialisation que

quand il l’était pour l’expression individuelle. Les « valeurs postmatérialistes » et l’idéologie

politique n’ont pas modéré l’association entre l’utilisation de Facebook et les protestations.

Mots clés : protestation, jeunesse, Facebook, médias sociaux, participation politique, Chili

Soziale Medien als Basis jugendlichen Protestverhaltens: Der Fall Chile Protestaktivitäten sind in Chile ein wichtiges Mittel, politische Veränderungen herbeizuführen. Wir untersuchen den Zusammenhang zwischen der Nutzung sozialer Medien und Jugendprotesten, sowie die Mediator- und Moderator-Mechanismen für diesen Zusammenhang und nutzen dafür Umfragedaten, die 2010 in Chile erhoben wurden. Wir fanden heraus, dass die Nutzung von Facebook signifikant mit Protestaktivitäten zusammenhing und das dieser Zusammenhang auch dann noch Bestand hatte, wenn politische Nöte, materielle und psychische Ressourcen sowie Werte und Nutzung von Nachrichtenmedien kontrolliert wurden. Die Beziehung zwischen Facebook-Nutzung und Protestaktivität war dann stärker, wenn es für Nachrichten und Sozialbeziehungen Verwendung fand und nicht für die Eigendarstellung genutzt wurde. „Postmaterialistische Werte“ und politische Ideologie moderierten die Beziehung zwischen Facebook-Nutzung und Protest nicht. Schlüsselbegriffe: Protest, Jugendliche, Facebook, soziale Medien, politische Partizipation, Chile

젊은이들의 항의 행태의 소셜미디어 기초: 칠레 사례연구


Catholic University of Chile

Arturo Arriagada and Andrés Scherman

Diego Portales University

요약

항의 행위는 칠레에서의 정치적 변화를 위한 주요한 수단이다. 우리는 2010년 칠레에서

취합된 서베이 데이터를 이용하여, 소셜미디어 사용과 젊은이들의 항의 사이의 연계와

중재 구조에 대하여 연구하였다. 우리는 페이스북 사용이 항의 행위에 중요하게 연계되어

있다는 것을 발견하였는데, 이는 정치적 불만들, 물질적 심리적 소스들, 가치들과 뉴스

미디어 사용들을 고려한 이후에도 마찬가지였다. 페이스북사용과 항의행위사이의

연계는,이 연계가 자기 표현을 위해 사용할때보다 뉴스와 사회화를 사용할때 더욱

강해졌다. 탈 물질적 가치들과 정치적 이론은 페이스북사용과 항의사이의 연계를

중재하는데 있어 발견되지 않았다.

La Base del Comportamiento de Protesta de la Juventud en los Medios Sociales: El Caso

de Chile


Catholic University of Chile

Arturo Arriagada and Andrés Scherman

Diego Portales University

Resumen

La actividad de protesta se ha convertido en central para el cambio político en Chile.

Examinamos la asociación entre el uso de los medios sociales y la protesta de la

juventud, así como también los mecanismos de mediación y moderadores de esta

relación, usando una encuesta de datos colectada en Chile en el 2010. Encontramos que

el uso de Facebook fue asociado significativamente con la actividad de protesta, aún

después de haber tenido en consideración las quejas políticas, los recursos materiales y

sicológicos, los valores y el uso de las noticias de los medios. Esta conexión entre el uso

de Facebook y la actividad de protesta fue más fuerte cuando fue usado para las noticias y

para socializar que para cuando fue usado como auto-expresión. Los “valores pos-

materiales” y la ideología política no fueron encontrados que moderen la asociación entre

el uso de Facebook y la protesta.

The Social Media Basis of Youth Protest Behavior the Case of Chile

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