The social control of technology: D Collingridge Frances Pinter, London (1980) 200 pp, £12.75
1
in cattle feed was only one. The vital contaminant was not something of whose presence anyone was aware. Furthermore, the methods of instru- mental analysis were not readily acces- sible even if the object of the search had been known. The various studies by experts and new complaints coming in from farmers lacked major organizational co- hesion. When the Michigan Department of Agriculture ultimately intervened it was to serve quarantine notices on the farmers. From then on there proceeded a tangled series of scientific arguments, legal confrontations, interactions with politicians and uncertainties about the standing of the local university in the community. With case material of this kind it is important to try and draw out what is of general application. This appears to lie in the illumination of two problem Our technological future D Collingridge The social control of technology Frances Pinter, London (1980) 200 pp, £12.75 One cannot avoid believing that some- where, deep down, the author has spe- cial feelings about an ill-defined force which he calls 'technology'. The kinds of arguments which he deploys can clearly be directed against other targets such as tobacco, slavery, opium, adulter- ated bread (to name some issues of the early 19th century) or skateboards, hyp- ermarkets, containerization, and mone- tarist politics. According to him 'our tech- nical competence vastly exceeds our understanding of the social effects which follow from its exercise'. As everyone of reasonable age and maturity knows this is not a new complaint. During the 1930s there was a call for a 'morator- ium on scientific research' for a areas. The first deals with distributing systems in whiv.h noxious products can be introduced by ignorance, stupidity, or evil intent, and which can generate diagnostic puzzles because of lack of information. The second concerns the development of adequate response pro- cedures. The general approach today attempts to lower the likelihood of occurence of disasters by legal and pro- cedural means. But we do not appear to have an organized concern about unexpected possibilities. Although there are regional disaster plans and the hke has anyone given thought to diag- nosing the less obvious? These are matters which should be reflected upon by those who take decisions on the design of communities. Do we have a sufficiently sensitive monitoring system? TP similar reason. The principal claim advanced is 'a new way of dealing with the dilemma of control' the dilemma being that, if a technology can be knowrgto have un- wanted social effects only when these effects are actually felt, how can one retain the ability to exercise control over it. To arrive at this we need to understand and counter the 'notorious resistance to control which technologies achieve as they become mature'. In presenting his case Coiling- ridge provides a number of reviews of events which deal with energy, nuclear and ballistic weapons, and lead in motor fuel. What emerges from these reviews is that there is no standard pattern of events -- which would, in any sober consideratio~ be highly unlikely. He characterizes the causes briefly as: inflexibility, competition, 'hedging decision', lead time difficulty, scale of operation and dogmatism. It might also be noted that some of the activities rev- iewed are continuing whereas others are limited as projects. The theoretical tool chosen is a technique of 'decision making under ignorance' which is declared to be diff- erent from the now well-accepted dec- ision making under uncertainty. This he does not appear to qualify in any way with respect to criteria such as 'least regret' etc. Some qualification emerges incidentally in what seems to be the least pessimistic part of the book. This deals with the use of scenario analysis in the 1976 Marshall Report on UK Energy R and D. This scenario analysis develops a set of six hypothetical states of the world up to 2025 AD. These are roughly the equivalent of potential failure modes in the operation of a com- plex manufacturing system. What is sought is a portfolio of R and D which has great robustness, with the least likelihood of failure over the period of interest. No- thing particularly new comes out of Marshall's use of scenario analysis but it provides a rhetoric for informed pub- lic discussion. Within some such potential- states-of-the-world structure we might be better placed to make decisions, although, as decisions go, they are most likely to be made on political or power grounds. But given a public exposure of the arguments and, more importantly, the availability of the indications from a suitable monitoring system, it should be possible for interested people to take part in debate on whether to change direction. Perhaps the debate is about democracy, or more democracy, and about the kind of machinery which is needed to make that democracy fun- ctional. Technological issues have been chosen, possibly because of their 'non- transparent' character, but equally well educational or economic issues might be involved and, from some viewpoints at least, have a larger significance. TP vol 2 no 3july 1981 191
Transcript of The social control of technology: D Collingridge Frances Pinter, London (1980) 200 pp, £12.75
in cattle feed was only one. The vital contaminant was not something of whose presence anyone was aware. Furthermore, the methods of instru- mental analysis were not readily acces- sible even if the object of the search had been known.
The various studies by experts and new complaints coming in from farmers lacked major organizational co- hesion. When the Michigan Department of Agriculture ultimately intervened it was to serve quarantine notices on the farmers. From then on there proceeded a tangled series of scientific arguments, legal confrontations, interactions with politicians and uncertainties about the standing of the local university in the community.
With case material of this kind it is important to try and draw out what is of general application. This appears to lie in the illumination of two problem
Our technological future
D Collingridge The social control of technology Frances Pinter, London (1980) 200 pp, £12.75
One cannot avoid believing that some- where, deep down, the author has spe- cial feelings about an ill-defined force which he calls ' technology'. The kinds of arguments which he deploys can clearly be directed against other targets such as tobacco, slavery, opium, adulter- ated bread (to name some issues of the early 19th century) or skateboards, hyp- ermarkets, containerization, and mone- tarist politics.
According to him 'our tech- nical competence vastly exceeds our understanding of the social effects which follow from its exercise'. As everyone of reasonable age and maturity knows this is not a new complaint. During the 1930s there was a call for a 'morator- ium on scientific research' for a
areas. The first deals with distributing systems in whiv.h noxious products can be introduced by ignorance, stupidity, or evil intent, and which can generate diagnostic puzzles because of lack of information. The second concerns the development of adequate response pro- cedures.
The general approach today attempts to lower the likelihood of occurence of disasters by legal and pro- cedural means. But we do not appear to have an organized concern about unexpected possibilities. Although there are regional disaster plans and the hke has anyone given thought to diag- nosing the less obvious? These are matters which should be reflected upon by those who take decisions on the design of communities. Do we have a sufficiently sensitive monitoring system?
T P
similar reason. The principal claim advanced
is 'a new way of dealing with the dilemma of control' the dilemma being that, if a technology can be knowrgto have un- wanted social effects only when these effects are actually felt, how can one retain the ability to exercise control over it. To arrive at this we need to understand and counter the 'notorious resistance to control which technologies achieve as they become mature'.
In presenting his case Coiling- ridge provides a number of reviews of events which deal with energy, nuclear and ballistic weapons, and lead in motor fuel. What emerges from these reviews is that there is no standard pattern of events -- which would, in any sober consideratio~ be highly unlikely. He characterizes the causes briefly as: inflexibility, competition, 'hedging decision', lead time difficulty, scale of
operation and dogmatism. It might also be noted that some of the activities rev- iewed are continuing whereas others are limited as projects.
The theoretical tool chosen is a technique of 'decision making under ignorance' which is declared to be diff- erent from the now well-accepted dec- ision making under uncertainty. This he does not appear to qualify in any way with respect to criteria such as 'least regret' etc.
Some qualification emerges incidentally in what seems to be the least pessimistic part of the book. This deals with the use of scenario analysis in the 1976 Marshall Report on UK Energy R and D. This scenario analysis develops a set of six hypothetical states of the world up to 2025 AD. These are roughly the equivalent of potential failure modes in the operation of a com- plex manufacturing system. What is sought is a portfolio of R and D which has great robustness, with the least likelihood of failure over the period of interest. No- thing particularly new comes out of Marshall's use of scenario analysis but it provides a rhetoric for informed pub- lic discussion.
Within some such potential- states-of-the-world structure we might be better placed to make decisions, although, as decisions go, they are most likely to be made on political or power grounds. But given a public exposure of the arguments and, more importantly, the availability of the indications from a suitable monitoring system, it should be possible for interested people to take part in debate on whether to change direction.
Perhaps the debate is about democracy, or more democracy, and about the kind of machinery which is needed to make that democracy fun- ctional. Technological issues have been chosen, possibly because of their 'non- transparent' character, but equally well educational or economic issues might be involved and, from some viewpoints at least, have a larger significance.
TP
vol 2 no 3ju ly 1981 191
