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The Significance of Plato's "Cratylus"Author(s): Georgios AnagnostopoulosSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Dec., 1973), pp. 318-345Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20126422.
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
2/29
THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF
PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
JLn
the
introduction
to
his translation
of
the
Cratylus
H. N.
Fowler
explains
the
nature
and
assesses
the
significance
of
the
dia
logue
in
the
following
words
:
The
Cratylus
cannot
be
said
to
be
of
great
importance
in
the
develop
ment
of
the Platonic
system,
as
it treats
of
a
special subject
somewhat
apart
from
general
philosophic
theory;
its interest lies rather in its
technical
perfection
and
in
the
fact that
it
is
the
earliest
extant
attempt
to
discuss the
origin
of
language.
Linguistic
science
was
in
Plato's
day
little
more
than
a
priori
speculation,
not
a
real science
based
upon
wide
knowledge
of
facts;
but
this
dialogue
exhibits such
speculation
conducted
with
great
brilliancy
and
remarkable
common
sense.1
Fowler's
view
that the
Cratylus
is
concerned
with
the
origin
of lan
guage
and
that
it
is
not
of
great
philosophical
significance
is
shared
by
many
other
schoars
among
whom
we
may
include
A. E.
Taylor,
Paul Shorey, W. Lutoslawski, U. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, and Paul
Friedl?nder.2
It is
undoubtedly
true
that the
Cratylus
deals
with
a
problem?what
Fowler
calls "a
special
subject"?which
is
not
dis
cussed
in
any
other
of
Plato's
dialogues.
And
it
is
perhaps
this
fact
1
Plato,
"The Loeb
Classical
Library,"
Vol. VI
(Cambridge:
Harvard
University
Press,
1953),
p.
4.
2
Cf. A. E.
Taylor,
Plato: The
Man and his
Work
(New
York:
Meridian
Books, 1956), p. 78;
Paul
Shorey,
What
Plato Said
(Chicago: University
of
Chicago
Press, 1933),
p.
259;
W.
Lutoslawski,
The
Origin
and
Growth
of
Plato1
s
Logic
(London:
Longmans,
1897),
p.
228;
U. Wilamowitz-Moelen
dorff,
Platon
(Berlin,
1959),
pp.
220-29;
G. S.
Kirk,
"The
Problem
of
Cratylus,"
American Journal
of Philology,
LXXII,
1951,
p.
226;
Paul
Fried
l?nder,
Plato,
An
Introduction
(New
York:
Harper
and
Row,
1964),
p.
32,
writes
:
"The
Cratylus
is
much
more
like
a
medley
of
merry
pranks
than
a
scientific treatise
in
linguistics;" also,
Max
Leky,
Plato als
Sprachphilosoph
(Paderhorn,
1919).
For
other
views about
the
scope
of
the
Cratylus,
cf.
Proclus,
In
Platonis
Cratylum
Comment;
K.
Lorenz
and
J.
Mittelstrass,
"On
Rational
Philosophy
of
Language
:
The
Programme
in
Plato's
Cratylus
Re
considered,"
Mind,
LXXVI;
R. H.
Weingartner,
"Making
Sense
of the
Cratylus,11
Phronesis, XV, I, 1970; Norman Kretzmann, "Plato on the
Correctness
of
Names,"
American
Philosophical
Quarterly,
8,
April,
1971;
and the
works,
which
I
think
contain
some
of
the
most
perceptive
discussion
of
the
dialogue,
by
George Grote,
Plato,
II
and Richard
Robinson,
"The
Theory
of
Names
in
Plato's
Cratylus,17
"A
Criticism
of Plato's
Cratylus,11
in
his
Essays
in
Greek
Philosophy
(Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,
1969).
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
PLATO'S CRATYLUS
319
coupled
with the
claim
that the
"special
subject"
with
which the
dialogue deals is the origin of language that has led many scholars to
the conclusion
that
the
Cratylus
is
of
no
philosophical significance.
Although
it is
not
altogether
clear
how this conclusion follows
from
the
premises,
logical
validity
will
not
be
our
concern
here.
Instead,
I
will
argue
here
that
neither
the
premise
that the
dialogue
is
con
cerned
with
the
origin
of
language,
nor
the
conclusion that it
is of
no
philosophical
significance,
is
true
in
the
case
of the
Cratylus.
In
section
I
of
what
follows,
I
will
briefly
discuss the
reasons
for
taking the Cratylus to be concerned with the origin of language and
explain
what the
question
is
which
concerns
Plato
in
the
Cratylus,
viz.,
what is
the
correctness
of names?
I
will
then
state
the
two
answers
to
this
question
he
considers,
i.e.,
conventional and natural
correctness
;
finally,
I will
explain
the
criticisms that Plato advances
against
the
two
answers
and,
in
particular,
the
sense
in
which he
"believed"
the
theory
of the
natural
correctness of
names.
In
sec
tion
II,
I
will
turn
to
the
question
of
the
significance
of
the
dialogue.
By
this
I
mean
to
try
to
answer
the
following
two
questions
:
1)
Why
does
Plato
raise
the
question
of
the
correctness of
names
in
the
first
place?
i.e.,
What
philosophical
problem
is
he
trying
to
solve
by
seeking
a
theory
about the
correctness
of
names? and
2)
How
would
each
of
the
two
theories about
the
correctness
of
names
examined
in
the
Cratylus
solve
Plato's
problem?
We shall then
see
that
the
importance
of
the
dialogue
for
us
is
not
so
much that
it
is
the
first
attempt
at
providing
an
empirical linguistic
theory,
nor
that
it is
the earliest
extant
attempt
to
discuss the
origin
of
language;
but
rather that it is
perhaps
the earliest
attempt
to solve a
perennial
philosophical
problem
about the
relation
between
the
nature
and
structure
of
language
and
the nature and structure of
the
world
in
order
to
use our
knowledge
of
the
nature and structure
of
the former
to
arrive
at
knowledge
of
the
nature and structure of
the latter.
I
Is
the
Cratylus
concerned
with
the
origin
of
language?
This
question
is
difficult
to
answer,
partly
because
it is
not
altogether
clear
what
we are
supposed
to
understand
by
"the
origin
of
language,"
and
partly
because it is
not
obvious what kind of
evidence
would
show
that
the
Cratylus
is,
or
is
not,
concerned with
the
origin
of
language.
Depending
on
what
we
understand
by
"the
origin
of
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320
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
language"
we
might
find
some
remarks
in
the
dialogue
that
seem
to
say something about the "origin" of language, but, I will argue here,
to
take
these remarks
as
evidence
that
the
dialogue
is
about
(or
is
concerned
with)
the
origin
of
language
is
a
mistake.
We
cannot
however
here
deal
with all
the
possible
ways
of under
standing
"the
origin
of
language."3
Let
us
focus
on
the
most
im
portant
ones or on
those
for
which
we can
find
some
relevant
remarks
in
the
dialogue.
For
our
purposes
then
we
might
say
that
when ask
ing
about
the
origin
of
language
one
might
be
asking
for
an
empirical
theory (or account)
of
:
(a) the conditions that give rise to language ;
(b)
the
function of
language;
or
(c)
the
"history"
of
language:
that
is,
its
original
form
and how
it
developed
into
its
present
form,
or
the
way?e.g.,
by
an
act
in contrast
to
a
natural
development?
language
came
into
being,
or
the
beings
that
created
language.
Though
(a)
seems
intuitively
to
be what
one
concerned with
the
origin
of
language
should
be
seeking,
hardly
any
philosophers
have
tried
to
find
the conditions
that
give
rise
to
language.
Plato
in
the
Cratylus
is
not
searching
for
the conditions
that
give
rise
to
language
:
this is
not
what
Socrates
and his
interlocutors
discuss,
and
he
produces
no
empirical
(or
any
other
kind
of)
theory
as a
potential
answer
to
such
a
question.
Now
there is
a
sense
in
which
what
satisfies
(a)
might
be
an
account
describing
the
need(s)
which
give
rise
to lan
guage,
and
this
is
often the
way
philosophers
have
interpreted
(a).
Interpreting
(a)
this
way
brings
out
clearly why
philosophers
have
almost
always
taken it
to
be
connected
with
(b)
:
they
take the need
that
gives
rise
to
X
to
be the function that
X
has,
performs,
or
fulfills.
Thus Locke
speaks
of our need to communicate our ideas as
giving
rise
to
language,
where
communicating
our
ideas is the
function
of
language
;
and
Russell
thought
at
some
point
that
our
need
for
com
manding
others is what
gives
rise
to
language,
commanding
others
being
the function of
language
at
least
in
the
early stage
of its
develop
ment.4
One
might
question
the
sense
or
explanatory
power
of
such
accounts,
but
this is
not
our
concern
here. Our
concern
is
with
3
For
a
useful
discussion
of
the
problem
of
the
origin
of
language
see
J.
Diamond,
History
and
Origin of
Language
(New
York:
Philosophical
Society,
1959).
4
Cf.
Locke,
An
Essay Concerning
Human
Understanding;
Book
III,
ch.
2;
and
B.
Russell,
An
Inquiry
into
Meaning
and
Truth
(Baltimore:
Penguin
Brooks, 1965),
ch.
1.
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
PLATO'S CRATYLUS
321
settling
the
question
whether Plato
in
the
Cratylus
was
searching
for, or gives, such an account of the origin of language. It is true
that
at
one
point
(423A-C)
Plato
discusses
some
possible
ways,
or
means,
we
might
employ
if
we
wished
or
needed
to
represent
(?rj\ovv)
the
nature
of
things,
e.g.,
by
means
of
gestures,
signs.
One
such
way
is with
language
or
names.
It
is
clear,
however,
that
what
he is
searching
for
is
not
the need that
gives
rise
to
language
(names),
but
the
necessary
and
sufficient conditions that
a
phonetic
unit,
and
specifically
a
simple
one,
must
fulfill
in
order
to
do
what it is
supposed
to
do:
to
represent
or
reveal
(?rjXovv)
the
nature
of
things. That
this is
what
Plato
is
searching
for
is
clear
from the
statement of
the
problem
by
Socrates
at
422E
:
Well,
then,
how
can
the earliest
names,
which
are
not
as
yet
based
upon
any
others,
make clear
to
us
the nature of
things,
so
far
as
that
is
possible,
which
they
must
do
if
they
are
to
be
names
at
all ?
And it
is also clear from
the conclusion of this
part
of
the
discussion,
a
conclusion
concerning
the
necessary
and
sufficient
conditions for
naming,
and
not
concerning
the
need that
gives
rise
to
language
(names)
:
A
name,
then,
it
appears,
is
a
vocal imitation
of
that
which
is
imitated,
and he
who
imitates
with
his
voice
names
that
which he imitates
(423B).
Let
us now
consider
the
second
possible
interpretation
of
"the
origin
of
language,"
that
is,
our
interpretation (b).
Is
giving
the
function
of
something
giving
an
account
of
its
origin?
Intuitively
this
seems
not to
be
so
in
many
cases.5
But
let
us
assume
that it
is so since philosophers have always been concerned with the function
of
language.
Is
the
Cratylus
then
a
search
for,
or
concerned
with,
the function
of
language?
It is
true
that
at
one
point
(388B)
Plato
(or
Socrates)
raises
a
question
about the function
of
language (names)
and
offers
a
ready
answer
to
it.
But it
is clear
from
the
argument
5
E.g.,
an
account
of
the
function
of
the
heart need
not be
an
account
of
its
origin.
More
importantly
some
philosophers
have
claimed
that
giving the function of something is giving an essential attribute of
it,
whereas
the
origin
of
something
is
an
empirical
account.
This
is
certainly
the
view
of
both
Plato
and
Aristotle
who
gave
a
metaphysical interpretation
to
the
problem
of
essence
;
for
a
recent
more
linguistic
or
conceptual
interpretation
of
this,
cf.
Philippa
Foot,
"Goodness
and
Choice," Proceedings
of
the Aristo
telian
Society,
Supl.
Vol.
XXXV
(1961),
where
it is
claimed
that the
function
of
some
things
is
part
of
the
meaning
of
their
names.
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322
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
that the
reason
this
question
is
raised is that
an
answer
to
it
can
also
be used for answering the main question of the dialogue: i.e., the
question
of
the
correctness
of
names.
This is
clear
again
from
the
conclusion
the
argument
reaches
at
389C-390,
i.e.,
the conclusion
that
certain
conditions
(Plato
terms
them
"natural
correctness")
are
necessary
in
order
that
a
phonetic
unit
perform
the function of
naming.
We
might
say
then that
an
account
of the
function of
names
is needed
for
solving
some
other
problems,
and
Plato
does
offer
a
brief
account
which is indeed difficult
to
understand.
But this is
not what the participants
in
the dialogue
are
primarily concerned
with
:
Socrates
and his
interlocutors
do
not
discuss,
debate,
or
examine
the
question
of the function
of
language
and
they
do
not
consider
alternative
theories
of
the function
of
language.
The
quest
for
the
origin
of
language
in
sense
(c),
the
"history"
of
language,
sometimes
takes the
form of
a
question
about its
original
form and its
development
into
its
present
form from
the
original
one
:
Russell,
for
example,
considers the
possibility
that
language
in
its
original
form consisted
of
imperatives,
from
which its
present
diver
sity
of forms
developed.
There
seem
to
be
two
sets of
remarks
that
might
lead
someone
to
suppose
that
the
Cratylus
is
concerned
with
the
origin
of
language
in
the above
sense.
The first
consists
of
Socrates'
remarks
in
the
later
part
of the
dialogue
about
the
changes
language
has
undergone,
mostly
for
the
worst
from
an
earlier
more
perfect
state.
These remarks have
not,
and
I
think
correctly,
been
taken
seriously
by
many;
but
even
if
they
are
taken
seriously
they
hardly
provide
any
evidence
that
the
aim
of
the
dialogue
is
to
give
an account of the
origin
of
language by
discovering
its
original
state and
showing
how
its
present
form
emerged
from
that
original
state.
The
other
set of remarks that
might
lead
one
to
suppose
that
Plato is
concerned
with the
origin
of
language
as
the
original
form
of
language
and
its
subsequent
development
consists
in
Socrates'
dis
cussion
of
simple
names
:
the
particles
(elements)
out
of
which
the
rest of
the
names are
made.
Plato himself calls
these
simple
names
"first"
or
"earliest"
(xpc?ra)
names
in contrast
to
the
complex
ones
which he calls "latest" (Cerrara) (422C, D). This, however, should
not
mislead
us.
For
although
Plato
talks about
the "first"
(simple)
names
out
of
which
language might
be
constructed,
he thinks
of
"first"
names
here
in
the
logical
sense
and
not
in
the
temporal
sense?
although
they
might
be
temporally
first
also.
This
point
is
clear
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
323
from
the
passage
where he embarks
upon
the discussion
of
simple
names, where he calls these basic particles of language not "first,"
or
"earliest"
names,
but
the
"elements"
(aroLxela)
and
goes
on
to
make clear
what he understands
by
"element."
But
let
us
bear
in
mind
that
if
a
person
asks
about
the
words
by
means
of
which
names are
formed,
and
again
about
those
by
means
of
which
those
words
were
formed,
and
keeps
on
doing
this
indefinitely,
he
who
answers
his
questions
will
at
last
give
up
;
will
he
not?.
.
.
Now at
what
point
will
he be
right
in
giving
up
and
stopping?
Will
it not
be when he
reaches the
names
which
are
the
elements
(aroixela)
of
the
other
names
and
words? For
these,
if
they
are
the
elements,
can
no
longer rightly appear to be composed of other names. For
instance,
we
said
just
now
that
?Ya#??>
was
composed
of
ayaarap
and
?obv,
and
perhaps
we
might
say
that
?obv
was
composed
of
other
words,
and those
still others
;
but if
we ever
get
hold
of
a
word
which
is
no
longer
composed
of
other
words,
we
should be
right
in
saying
that
we
had
at
last
reached
an
element
(orrouxelov),
and
that
we
must
no
longer
refer
to
other
words
for
its
derivation
(421E-422B).
It
is clear
from
the
above that Plato's
concern
here is with
the
ques
tion of
analysis
or
definition
of
names
by
analysis,
which
is
a
logical
question
and
procedure,
and
not
with
the
development
of
language
from an earlier and simpler state.
There
are
two
other
ways
of
understanding
(c),
the
origin
of
language
as
its
"history" (which
have been
more
influential
in
the
traditional
interpretations
of
the
Cratylus
and
for
which
the textual
evidence
for
taking
the
dialogue
to
be
about the
origin
of
language
seems
to
be
stronger
than
anything
we
have
discussed
so
far).
The
first
is
to
take
(c)
to
be
a
quest
for
the
way(s)
language
came
into
being.
Thus
Plato
talks about
"conventions"
(^vv?rjxrj)
and
"agree
ments" (ofjidkoyia) by
which
names are
given
and
contrasts this view
to
another that claims
that
names
have
some
particular
relationship,
described
as a
"natural
correctness,"
to
what
they
name.
And
many
have
taken this
as
evidence
that
the
dialogue
is
about
the
origin
of
language
since it tries
to
determine whether
names
are
posited,
or
come
into
being,
by
an
act of
convention
and
agreement.6
This,
how
ever,
is
a
total
misunderstanding
of
what
Plato is
doing
here. In
the
first
place
the distinction between
names
by
convention
and
agree
ment
on
the
one
hand and
natural
names
on
the
other is
not
a
distinc
6
Cf.
R.
Robinson,
"The
Theory
of
Names
in
Plato's
Cratylus,11
op.
cit.,
pp.
110-16
for
an
excellent
discussion
and
criticism
of
the
views
of
Proclus,
Leky,
Steinthal,
A. E.
Taylor
and
others
who,
claim
that
Plato's
problem
is
to
find
whether
language (names)
has
been
posited
or
is
natural.
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324
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
tion
between
names
that
are
posited by
an
act
(convention
or
agree
ment) and names that are not posited. For clearly the theory which
Plato
contrasts to
conventionalism does
not
claim that
names are
not
posited
in
some
way
or
other.
Plato often talks
about the
name
maker
or
lawgiver
that makes
or
gives
the
naturally
correct
names.
Moreover,
actual
acts
of
agreement
or
convention
are
not
even
nec
essary
for
what Plato calls
"names
by
convention
or
agreement."
When he
comes
to
explain
at
435A-B what
convention and
agreement
amount
to,
he
clearly
states that
custom
or
habit would
do
as
well
for his
purposes?and
no
one
would
want to
call
these
acts. This
is
not,
of
course,
surprising
at
all.
For,
in
the second
place, questions
about convention
or
agreement
and
natural relation
in
names are
not
questions
about the
way
names come
into
existence,
but
questions
about
the
way
names are
correct
(see below),
although
an
answer
to
this
question
might imply
an
answer
to
the
question
about
the
way
names
came
about. We
can
say
then
that
when Plato
is
trying
to
determine
whether
names are
conventional
or
natural
his
concern
is
not
so
much
a concern
with
the
"history"
of
names,
as
with the
necessary
and sufficient
conditions for
naming?and
determining
the
latter
is
not
an
empirical question.
The last
way
of
understanding (c)
is
as a
question
about
the
beings
that
created
language.
And
this
way
of
understanding
it
has
undoubtedly
been
the
most
influential
in
advancing
the
claim
that
the
Cratylus
is about the
origin
of
language.
Here
one
would
cite
as
support
of his
claim
Plato's remarks about the
"namemaker,"
"lawgiver,"
"the
ancient
wise
men
who
made
names."
As
Richard
Robinson says, these remarks, presenting a picture of a man (or men)
who created
language,
have led
some
scholars
to
claim "that
Plato
is
trying
to
write
a
history
here,
trying
to
describe what
happened
when
men
began
to
talk."7
Robinson
seems
to
me
to
be
right
when
he
argues
that
the
figure
of
the "namemaker"
has
been
misconstrued
as an
actual
historical
figure.
Yet he
goes
to
the other
extreme him
self when he
claims that the namemaker
or
lawgiver
is
a
myth
for
Plato.
Something
which is
not
history
need
not
be
myth
:
it
might
be something of much greater importance than either history
or
myth
in
relation
to
certain
philosophical
questions.
Robinson
seems
to
see
this
himself when he writes
that
"he
[the
namemaker
or
lawgiver]
7
Ibid.,
pp.
105-06.
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
325
is
someone
who
ought
to
exist
if
names
are
to
be
correct,
rather than
someone who has existed."8 But if Plato argued that the lawgiver,
or
namegiver,
ought
to
exist
if
names
are
to
be
(naturally)
correct,
it
is
not
simply
a
myth
for him?it
is
a
consequence
of
some
other
views
or
claims.
It
seems,
as
it
will
be
explained later,
that
the
figure
of
a
lawgiver,
or
namemaker,
is
an
important
element
in
one
view
of what Plato
calls
"the
correctness
of
names"?as
important
as
social
contracts
or
non-deceiving gods
are
for
some
other
philo
sophical positions.
In
any
case
Plato's
remarks
about namemakers
and
lawgivers
are
not
to
be taken
as
evidence
that
the aim of
the
dialogue
is
to
find what
beings
created
language,
since Plato's
remarks
are
not meant to
be about
any
such historical
beings.
What
then
is the
question
of the
Cratylus?
The
question
of
the
dialogue
is
about the
correctness
(?p?brns)
of
names.
It
is
stated
at
the
opening
of
the
dialogue
:
this
is
what
Hermogenes
and
Cratylus
are
discussing,
and
they
then
invite
Socrates
to
take
part
in
their
dispute. Indeed,
almost the
whole
of
the
dialogue
is
an
attempt
to
find
an
answer
to
the
above
question
or
to
examine
some answers
to
it
and their
consequences.9
But what is
this
question?
A
name
for
Plato is
a
certain
sound, phonetic
unit
or
segment
;
it
is,
as
Plato
calls it
(383B),
a
part
of
our
voice
(?x?piov
(p
vijs)
that
is
used
to
name
something.
The
question
of
the
dialogue
is then this:
What
is
the
relation
(the
necessary
and
sufficient
conditions)
between
a
phonetic
unit
P
and
a
"thing"
(entity)
T
in
order that P
be the
name
of
T?
Or,
as
Plato
sometimes
puts
it
:
What is
the relation
between P
and
T
such that
P
means
what it
names
(T)
?
It
is in
response
to
this
ques
8
Ibid.
9
It
might
be useful
at
this
point
to
give
a
brief
outline
of
the structure
of
the
dialogue.
The Bound with
Hermogenes:
A.
Statement
of
the
various
claims of
conventionalism and natural correctness
(383-385B)
;
B.
Criticism
of
one
form
of
conventionalism
:
naming
by
fiat
(385-386E)
;
C.
Criticism
of
the
main
thesis
of
conventionalism and
development
of
an
argument
in
terms
of
the
function
of
names
in
support
of
natural
correctness
(386E-391)
;
D.
Etymological
accounts of
many
names
and
an
account of
what
the
rela
tion of
natural
correctness
is
(391-428).
The
Bound with
Cratylus:
E.
A
consequence
of the
theory
of natural correctness: true-false and correct
incorrect
names
(428-434C)
;
F.
An
argument
against
the
claim
that
natural
correctness
is
a
necessary
condition
for
naming
(434C-435D);
G.
The
problem
of
acquiring
knowledge
of
things:
whether
it
can
and
should
be
acquired through
the
names
of
things
or
the
things
themselves
(435D-439C)
;
H.
The
nature
of
the
objects
of
knowledge:
can
they
be
in
flux?
(439C
end).
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
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326
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
tion that
the
two
theories about
the
correctness
of
names are
given
in
the Cratylus: conventionalism (propounded by Hermogenes) and
natural correctness
(propounded
by
Cratylus).
The
two
theories
in
brief
are
as
follows.10
Hermogenes
claims
that
convention
or
agreement
to
use
P to
name
T
is
a
sufficient
condi
tion
for P
to
be
the
name
of
T;
that
is,
no
particular
relationship
between the
phonetic
unit
P
and
thing
T
is
necessary
in
order
that
P
be the
name
of
T:
convention
to
use
P for
naming
T
is
sufficient.
Cratylus,
on
the other
hand,
claims
that
a
certain relation
between
P
and
T
is
necessary,
as
well
as
sufficient,
in
order
that P
be
the
name
of
T. P must
reveal
(?rj\ovp)
the nature of
T in
order
to
be
its
name.
And
P
reveals
the nature of
T
if
and
only
if
the
elements
of
P
correspond
to
and
imitate
(ixiix?cr&ai)
phonetically
the
nature of
T.
The
analysis
of P into
its
elements
stops
at
the smallest
phonetic
units,
the
letters,
which
are
taken
to
be
the elemental
names.
These
elemental
names
reveal the
nature
of
what
they
name
by
being pho
netic imitations
(?ja/jLelcraai)
of
the
nature
(ova?a)
of
what
they
name
(423E). Thus Socrates and Hermogenes agree that the sound p
imitates
motion
and
that it
"appeared
to
be
a
fine instrument
expres
sive
of
motion
to
the
namegiver
who
wished
to
imitate
rapidity,
and
he
often
applies
it
to
motion"
(425D).
Similarly,
it
is claimed
that
the
sounds
r
and
?
imitate
binding
and rest
;
that
the
sounds
a
and
77
imitate
greatness
;
that
o
imitates
roundness,
etc.
There
is
no
doubt
that
this notion
of
phonetic
imitation
is
obscure.
Plato
and
Socrates
seem
to
be
aware
of this. But
they
also
seem
to
be clear
about
its
importance
for the
theory
of natural correctness. Thus at 425D
Socrates
says,
"It
will,
I
imagine,
seem
ridiculous
that
things
are
made manifest
(xar??rjXa)
through
imitation
in
letters
and
syllables
;
nevertheless
it
cannot
be otherwise." He
goes
on
to
argue
that the
relation
of the
elemental
names
to
what
they
name
is
the foundation
of the
theory
and unless
it is
explained
what
the relation
is,
no com
plete
account
of
the
correctness
of
names
would have been
given.
101
give
here
only
the most
important
claims
of
each
theory.
Plato
presents
each
theory
as
consisting
of
three
different,
though related,
claims.
I
have
discussed
these
in
detail
in
my
paper,
"Plato's
Cratylus:
The
Two
Theories
of
the
Correctness
of
Names,"
The Beview
of
Metaphysics,
June
1972,
pp.
691-736
(hereafter
referred
to
as
"Two
Theories
of
Correctness").
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
327
Moreover,
if the
elemental
names were
found
not
to
be
naturally
correct, the theory of natural correctness would lose its significance.
What then
is
the
picture
of
language
that
emerges
from
Plato's
discussion of
naturally
correct
names? At
424C Socrates
attempts
to
give
an
account of
a
language
consisting
of
naturally
correct
names.
He
says
:
When
we
have
properly
examined
all
these
points,
we
must know
how
to
apply
each letter with
reference
to
its
fitness
(?/xot?r^ra),
whether
one
letter
is
to
be
applied
to
one
thing
or
many
are
to
be
combined
;
just
as
painters,
when
they
wish
to
produce
an
imitation,
sometimes
use only red, sometimes some other color, and sometimes mix many
colors,
as
when
they
are
making
a
picture
of
a
man
or
something
of
that
sort,
employing
each
color,
I
suppose,
as
they
think
the
par
ticular
picture
demands
it. In
just
this
way, we,
too,
shall
apply
letters
to
things
using
#
one
letter
for
one
thing,
when that
seems
to
be
required,
or
many
letters
together,
forming
syllables,
as
they
are
called,
and
in turn
combining
syllables,
and
by
their
combination
forming
nouns
and
verbs.
And
from
nouns
and
verbs
again
we
shall
finally
construct
something
great
and
fair
and
complete.
We
might
view the above
as
a
vision
of
an
ideal
language.
In
such
a language its constituents and structure would correspond to the
constituents
and
structure of
the world. This
one-to-one
correspon
dence between
language
and
the world would
even
be
pushed
down
to
the smallest
phonetic
unit
of
language,
the
letter.
Here then
one
would
have
a
language
which is
completely isomorphic
with
the
world,
its
nature
and
structure
reflecting
the
nature and
structure of
the
world.
Language
would
be,
as
Socrates
says
in
so
many
places,
an
imitation
(?i^rnia)
or
picture
(e?x?p,
?^o?co/xa)
of
the world.
In
such
a
language each
term would
wear
its semantic
import
on
its
sleeve.
The
elemental constituents would be
phonetic
imitations
of
what
they
name
and
the
semantic
import
of
the
complex
ones
would
be
determined
by
that
of their
components.
If
the
main
question
of
the
dialogue
and
the two
answers
to
it
that Plato
considers
are
what
we
described
above,
we
might
want
to
ask
:
What
is
the result
of
the discussions
in
the
dialogue
regarding
this
question
and
the
two
theories considered?
We
must
answer
this question before we attempt to examine the problem of the sig
nificance
of
the
dialogue. Although
there
are
minor
differences
of
scholarly
opinion
as
to
what the
result
of the
discussion
about
the
two
theories
are,
most scholars
concur
that Plato
refutes
the natural
correctness
theory
and
sides
with
a
modified
version
of
Hermogenes'
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328
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
conventionalism.11
For
our
purposes
it will
be
enough
to
consider
Richard Robinson's position, since it is the most forceful statement
of,
and
also
gives
some
evidence
in
support
of,
the
claim
that Plato
refutes
the
theory
of natural
correctness and
accepts
the
convention
theory
of
names.
Robinson
argues
that
Plato
did
not
believe
the
nature-theory
of
names
which
Socrates
develops
in
the
dialogue,
because
we
find
that
the
arguments
he
advances
in
support
of
the
theory
are
weak
or
bad,
whereas
those
against
it
are
unchallengeable
ones
:
The above evidence suggests that Plato believed that there is no
natural
Tightness
of
names.
The
Cratylus
itself
suggests
the
same
after
we
have
critically
examined
and
weighed
the
arguments
which
his
"Socrates"
there
produces.
...
I
conclude that
the
appearance
of
Plato's
distributing
himself
equally
on
both
sides
of
the
question
is
deceptive.
In
favour
of
the
nature-theory
he
produces
only
argu
ments
that
are
weak
or
bad;
against
it
he
produces unchallengeable
arguments;
and
he
probably
felt
this
himself.12
It
is
not
altogether
clear
what it
means
to
believe
in
a
theory
of the
type
under
discussion
here
and
what
kind
of
arguments
can
be
ad
vanced
against
such
a
theory.
So
let
us
first
see
how
the
theory
can
be
criticized
and
then
consider
the
arguments
that
supposedly
are
brought
against
it
in
the
dialogue
and
what
they
show.
We
will
then
be
in
a
position
to
make
some
sense
of,
or
even
determine,
whether
Plato
believed
the
theory.
Now
if
one
were
to
claim that
X
is
a
necessary
and
sufficient
condition
for
Y, provide
some
arguments
to
support
his
claim,
and
spell
out
what
X
is?and
this is
what
Plato does
in
advancing
the
nature-theory?the
way
to criticize such a
theory
would be to show
that
the
arguments
advanced
to
support
the
claim
are
inconclusive,
weak,
or
bad
;
or
to
show,
by
providing counter-examples,
that
X
is
neither
a
sufficient
nor
a
necessary
condition. We will
first
consider
Robinson's
claims
about
the
supposed
arguments
Plato advances
in
support
of the
theory,
which Robinson
finds
"weak
or
bad."
The
11K. Lorenz and J.
Mittelstrass,
op.
cit.
;
R. H.
Weingartner,
op.
cit.
;
Paul
Friedl?nder,
op.
cit.;
A.
E.
Taylor,
op.
cit.;
U.
Wilamowitz-Moellen
dorff,
op.
cit.
An
exception
is Norman
Kretzmann,
op.
cit.
12
R.
Robinson,
"A
Criticism
of Plato's
Cratylus,11
op.
cit.,
pp.
121,
125;
Robinson
goes
even to
the
point
of
writing
that "His
[Plato's] writing
of the
Cratylus
may
have
been
a
sort
of
a
purgation
of
the
nature-theory
from
his
mind,"
ibid.
p.
122.
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THE
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OF PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
329
arguments
for the
theory
are,
according
to
Robinson,13
the
argument
from 385 to 386D (i.e., part B of our outline, cf. fn. 9 above) and
the
argument
from
386E
to
390E
(i.e.,
part
C of
our
outline).
It
is
not
surprising
that Robinson
finds
B
a
bad and
a
vague
argument
for
the
theory
of
natural
correctness
since the
argument
is
not
at
all
an
argument
for
the
theory.
B
is,
as
Robinson is
aware,
two
arguments
:
from
385-385D Socrates
attacks
one
of
Hermogenes'
claims
on
behalf
of
conventionalism,
that
one
can
name
by
fiat,
by
showing
that
this
claim
is
inconsistent
with
the
position
that truth
and
falsity
are
applicable to
names
;and from 385D-386C he continues his attack
on
Hermogenes'
claim
by
considering
the
consequences
of
giving
up
the
position
that
truth
and
falsity
are
applicable
to
names
and
showing,
to
Socrates'
satisfaction,
that this last
move
leads into
the
doctrines
of
Protagoras
and
Euthydemus,
doctrines
which
Hermogenes
is
not
eager
to
embrace.14
These
arguments
then
are
not
bad
or
weak
arguments
for the
theory
of natural
correctness, they
are
not
argu
ments
for
it
at all
;
they
are
criticisms
of
one
form of
conventionalism.
C however is
an
argument in support of the theory of natural
correctness.
There
Plato
argues
that
a name
is
a
kind
of
instrument
with
a
certain
function;
that
in
order
to
perform
this function the
material
(sounds)
of
names
must
bear
a
certain
relationship
to
the
things
named;
and
that
names
must
be made
according
to
certain
principles,
by
the
man
who
has the
skill,
in
order
that this
relation
ship
be
realized.
Now
what is the
problem
with
this
argument?
Robinson
writes,
This
argument
is not so much an argument as a free
development
of
the
nature-theory
on
the
assumption
that
a
name
is
a
tool
like
a
shuttle.
It
contains
no
undeniable
observations
like
those
which
attack
the
nature-theory
at
the
end
of
the
dialogue.
It
all rests
on
the
easily
deniable
assumption
that
a
name
is
a
tool
like
a
shuttle.
.
.
,15
There
is
no
doubt
that
there
are
problems
with
Plato's
argument,
although
Robinson's
account
and
criticism
seem
to
be unfair
to
13
Ibid.,
pp.
123-25.
141
have
explained
what
naming
by
fiat is
and how
it is
related
to
conventionalism
in
"Two
Theories
of
Correctness"
and
have
examined
in
detail
the
arguments
given
against
it
in
a
forthcoming
paper
on
"False
names
in
the
Cratylus."
15
R.
Robinson,
"A Criticism
of
Plato's
Cratylus,11
op.
cit.,
pp.
124-25.
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330
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
Plato.16
But it is
questionable
that
we can
draw
any
conclusions
about Plato's beliefs concerning the nature-theory even if Robinson
were
correct
in
claiming
that
the
argument
is
really
"a
free
develop
ment"
of
the
theory
itself and "it
all
rests
on
the
easily
deniable
assumption
that
a
name
is
a
tool
like
a
shuttle."
For,
suppose
that
Plato's discussion rests
on
the
assumption
that
names
have
a
function and
are
instruments
(tools),
like
shuttles
or
other
instruments
;
what
can
we
conclude
from
this
about Plato's
"beliefs"
concerning
the
theory
of natural correctness
of
names?
The fact
is
that
the
assumption
that
some
things
have
a
definite,
often
a
single, function,
and
that
certain conditions
are
necessary
and
sufficient
for
performing
these
functions,
is such
a
pervasive
assumption?if
it
can
be called
so?in
Greek
thought
that
one
is
justified
in
drawing
a
conclusion
opposite
to
Robinson's
concerning
Plato's
beliefs.
Plato
uses
the model
of
function
constantly
and
where
one
would
hardly expect
it.
Aristotle, using
the
same
model,
commits
the
fallacy
of
composition
in
arguing
from
the fact
that
eyes,
ears,
etc.
have
a
function
to
the
conclusion
that
man
has
a
function
;
and he
sees no
difficulty
in
answering
negatively
the
ques
tion:
"Are
we
then
to
suppose
that,
while
the
carpenter
and
the
shoemaker
have definite
function
or
business
belonging
to
them,
man
as
such
has
none,
and
is
not
designed
by
nature
to
fulfill
any
func
tion?"17
If
this then
is
their
way
(model)
of
thinking,
although
perhaps
a
wrong
one,
we
should conclude
that Plato
took the
argu
ment
under discussion
very
seriously.
But
what
are
the
arguments
that Plato
brings against
the
theory
of natural correctness and what do they show? Robinson writes:
The
considerations
which
"Socrates"
finally
brings
forward
against
the
theory
(434-39)
are
upon
reflection
undeniable
truths.
The
pas
sage
is
as
adamantine
an
argument
as
you
can
find
anywhere
in
Plato.
(i)
It
certainly
is custom
that
enables
us
to
understand
each other
when
we
do
;
and
the
power
of
custom is
wholly independent
of
whether
the
name
we
use
resembles
its
nominate
or
not;
and
(ii)
however
much
names
might
resemble
things,
it
certainly
must
be
possible
to
learn
about
things
otherwise
than
from
their
names;
and
it
must
be
better
to do
so.
I
feel
sure
that
every
reasonable
man
who
reflects
on
these
matters to
the
extent
of
writing
or
studying
the
Cratylus
becomes convinced of them.18
le
?f "Two Theories
of
Correctness,"
section
III.
17
Nicomachean
Ethics,
1097b29-1098a.
18
R.
Robinson,
"A
Criticism
of
Plato's
Cratylus,11
op.
cit.,
pp.
121-22.
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
PLATO'S CRATYLUS
331
To
consider
(ii)
first
:
the
argument
from 435E-439B
is
presented
against Cratylus' claim that the only way of learning and teaching
about
things
is
through
their
names.
Socrates
in
this
argument
denies that
learning
and
teaching
about
things
is
possible
only
through
names.
And this
is
not
an
argument
against
the
theory
of
natural
correctness,
but
against
a
different
claim.
Robinson's
(i),
part
F
of
our
outline,
however,
is
an
argument
against
the
theory.
Plato here
gives
a
counter-example
by
presenting
a
name
(axXnp?rris)
where
the relation
between
the
name
and what it
names,
though
a
necessary
condition
according
to
the
theory
of
natural
correctness,
does
not
obtain,
and
yet
the
name
is
a name.
This
then is
a
counter
example
to
the claim
of the
theory
that the relation
of
natural
correct
ness
is
a
necessary
condition
for
naming.
There
is
nowhere
an
argu
ment
that
the
relation
is not
a
sufficient
condition. The
passage
then
is
an
"adamantine
argument" only against
one
claim
of
the
theory.
It
does
not
prove
that
custom
(or
convention)
is
a
necessary
condition
for
naming,
as
Robinson
seems
to
imply.19
Rather it
simply
states
that
in
the
case
of
axXrjpOTrjs
and
many,
or
even
most,
other
cases
it
is
custom
(or
convention)
that enables
us
to
understand
each
other,
i.e.,
that
custom
(or
convention)
is
a
sufficient
condition.
What
we can
conclude
then
is
that
Plato
thinks that
both
the
natural
correctness relation and
custom
(or convention)
are
sufficient
conditions
for
naming.
But
what does
this
mean
for
Plato,
who
sees
names as
a
kind
of
instrument
with
a
certain function?
In
the
Republic
he defines
the function
F
of
X
as
that which
X
alone
can
do
or can
do
better
than
any
other
thing.20
In
the
first
case
X
would
be the necessary condition for
(performing) F,
whereas in the second
it need
not
be;
X
simply
does
F
better
(or
best).
A
natural
name
19
In
fact,
there
is
no
argument
at
all
to
prove
that
convention
is
a
necessary
condition.
I
have discussed this
in
detail in "Two
Theories
of
Correctness,"
but
briefly
Plato's
discussion
at
this
point
could
be taken
as
showing: (a)
natural
correctness is
not
a
necessary
condition;
(b)
natural
correctness is
not
a
sufficient
condition
;
(c)
convention is
a
sufficient
condi
tion;
(d)
convention
is
a
necessary
condition.
Plato
really gives
a
counter
example
to show (a) and none to show (b) ;he gives no argument to
support
(d);
and
although
he thinks he has
shown
(c),
there
is
really
no
argument
to
show
that
it is
convention,
and
not
something
else,
that
accounts
for
the
counter-example
he
gives.
20
Cf.
Bepublic 352E;
I
have
argued
in
"Two
Theories
of
Correctness,"
section
III,
that
Plato
uses
"function"
in
the
Cratylus
in
the
sense
he
uses
it
in
the
Bepublic.
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332
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
then,
even
if not
a
necessary
condition
for
performing
the
function
names perform, might be what performs this function better than
anything
else.
Indeed,
after
Socrates
advances the
argument
that
the relation
of natural correctness
is
not
a
necessary
condition,
Plato
not
only
gives
no
argument
to
show
that
some
other kind
of
names
is
better
than
natural
names,
but
even
goes
on
to
say
that
natural
names
would
be
preferable?they
would
be better
instruments
:
I
myself
prefer
the
theory
that
names
are,
so
far
as
possible,
like
the
things
named.
.
. .
Probably
language
would
be,
wTithin the bounds
of
possibility,
most
excellent
when
all its
terms,
or
as
many
as
pos
sible,
were based on
likeness,
that is to
say,
were
appropriate,
and
most
deficient
under
opposite
conditions
(435C-D).
We
may
conclude
then
that
no
fatal
arguments
are
advanced
against
the
theory
of natural
correctness.
Robinson is
in
error
when
he claims
that Plato advances conclusive
arguments
against
the
theory
and that
we can
conclude
from
this that
he did
not
believe
the
theory.
Our
account
has
shown, contrary
to
Wilamowitz
and
in
agreement
with
Grote,21
that
at
the
end
of
the discussion of
the
two theories in the Cratylus Plato (and Socrates) still thinks that
natural
names are
preferable
to
names
by
custom
(or
convention).
The
account of
Grote
that Robinson criticizes
and
rejects
is
the
cor
rect account of Plato's
position regarding
the
two
theories
:
George
Grote,
however,
who
was
a
perceptive
and
judicious
interpreter
of
Plato,
thought
that
Plato at
the
end
of
his
Cratylus
was
still
believing
that
names
having
natural
rectitude
were
possible
and
desirable,
though
not
actual.22
Our question is then to find why Plato thought that natural names,
or a
naturally
correct
language,
were
preferable
and
why
he raised
the
question
of the
correctness of
names
at
all.
II
When
the
criticism
of the
theory
of natural correctness
is
con
cluded
at
435D
and Socrates
expresses
his
preference
for
a
language
consisting
of
natural
names,
he
says
to
Cratylus:
"But
now answer
the next question. What is the function of names, and what good
21
U.
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,
op.
cit.,
p.
223;
George
Grote,
op.
cit.,
p.
543.
22
R.
Robinson,
"A
Criticism
of
Plato's
Cratylus,11
op.
cit.,
p.
125.
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THE
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
PLATO'S
CRATYLUS
333
do
they
accomplish?"
The discussion then
moves
to
a
new
topic
and proceeds as follows :
CRA.
I
think, Socrates,
their
function
is
to
instruct,
and this is
the
simple
truth,
that he
who
knows
the
names
knows
also
the
things
named.
SOC.
I
suppose,
Cratylus,
you
mean
that
when
anyone
knows
the
nature
of
the
name?and
its nature is that of
the
thing?
he
will
know
the
thing
also,
since
it
is
like
the
name,
and
the science
of
all
things
which
are
like
each other
is
one
and
the
same.
It
is,
I
fancy,
on
this
ground
that
you say
whoever
knows
names
will knowr
things
also. CRA.
You
are
perfectly
right.
The
above,
I
think,
can
be taken
as a
clue
to
seeing
the
significance
of
the
dialogue,
that
is,
to
seeing
what
philosophical problem
Plato
thought
might
be
resolved
by
finding
what
the
correctness of
names
is.23
I
want
to
provide
some
evidence
for
the
suggestion
that the
search
for
the
correctness
of
names
is related
to
Plato's search
for
a
method
(or way)
of
inquiring
after and
discovering
the
nature of
things.
These
problems
seem
to
have concerned Plato
from
the
earlier
dialogues
through
some
of
the
late
ones.
In
this
sense
then
the
Cratylus
does
not
merely
treat
"of
a
special subject
somewhat
apart
from
general philosophic
theory,"
as Fowler and others
claim;
but is
intimately
connected
with
the
epistemological
and
metaphysical
problems
Plato raises
and discusses
in
other
dialogues.
The
reasons
for
raising
the
question
of
the
correctness
of
names
are,
briefly,
these
:
The
main
concern
of
Socrates
and
Plato,
as
pre
sented
in most
of
the earlier
dialogues,
is
to
give
definitions
or
accounts
of the nature
of various
things.
Certain
assumptions
which
underlie
the
Socratic
conception
of
definition and the
procedure
of
obtaining
23
Professor
D. J.
Allan
has
suggested
that
in
the
Cratylus
Plato
is
concerned
with
refuting
a
view which
Cratylus
(and
perhaps
some
other
Heracliteans)
seems
to
have
held,
that
the
aim
of
human
wisdom
is to
learn
the
(naturally
correct, true)
names,
"The
Problem
of
Cratylus,"
American
Journal
of Philology,
LXXV, 1954,
pp.
283-84.
Although
some
elements
of
Plato's
thought
could
perhaps
be
found
in
some
current
views?and
this
is
quite
true with
some
dialogues?it
wrould
be
too
strong
a
claim
if
one were
to
say
that
the
only
point
of
the
Cratylus
is to
criticize such
current
views.
For,
(a)
The
theory
of
natural
correctness
is
developed
in
the
dialogue
by
Socrates (and not by
Cratylus)
; (b) Although Plato
puts
in the mouth of
Cratylus
that
the
only
way
to
acquire knowledge
is
by
investigating
names,
it is
Socrates
who
analyzes
and
gives
substance
to
this
view
;
and
(c)
Plato
does
not in
the
end
refute
the
view
that
knowledge
of
things
can
be
arrived
at from
knowledge
of
(the
laws
of)
names,
though
he does
raise
some
prob
lems
about the
availability
of
a
naturally
correct
language
and
our
knowing
that
it is
a
naturally
correct
one
(see below).
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8/11/2019 The Significance of Plato's Cratylus - G. Anagnostopoulos
18/29
334
GEORGIOS
ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
definitions
give
rise
to
certain
problems
about the
method
of
inquiring
after
and
discovering
the
nature
of
things.
In
the
Cratylus
Plato
explores
the
possibility
of
using
the
name
(phonetic
unit)
of
a
thing
in
order
to
inquire
after
and
discover the
nature
of that
thing.
But
in
order
to
do
that,
one
would have
to
know
the
relation
between
a
name
and
what
it
names
;
that
is,
one
would
have
to
know
what
the
necessary
and sufficient
conditons
are
for
a
phonetic
unit
to
be
a
name.
And this is
the
question
of
the correctness
of
names
that
Plato raises
in
the
Cratylus.
Now
of
the
two
theories he
considers
as
possible
accounts
of the
correctness
of
names,
one
would
not
solve
his
problem regarding
the method of
inquiry
and
discovery,
but the
other
would.
If conventionalism
were
the
true account
of
the
cor
rectness
of
names,
then
the
name
could
not
be used
to
inquire
after
and
discover the
nature
of that
which
it
names.
But
if
the natural
correctness
theory
Avere
the
true
account
of
the
relation
between
names
and
things,
then he
would have solved
his
problem
about
inquiry
and
discovery.
Plato
sees,
however,
that
natural
correct
ness
need
not
be
the
way
names are
correct,
and also that
there
are
other problems with using the name as a means of discovering the
nature of
what
it
names.
Nonetheless,
it
is
instructive
for
us
to
see
how the
two
theories
of
the
correctness of
names
would,
or
would
not,
have
solved his
problem
about
inquiry
and
discovery,
and
why
in
the
end
neither
could be
used
for
inquiring
after and
discovering
the
nature
of
things.
What then
was
the
context
in
which
Plato's
problem
about
in
quiry
and
discovery
arose,
and
how would
an
account
of
the
correct
ness
of
names