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THE SENSUS PLENIOR IN THE LAST TEN YEARS

It is now exactly ten years since we published in CBQ1 a summary of

the literature on the theory of a sensus plenior (henceforth S P ) . In the

subsequent years there has been a continued discussion of that subject, some

of it provoked by our doctoral dissertation.2 Having deliberately avoided

taking part in this discussion3 in the hope that a few years of exegetical

experience would give perspective, with some hesitation we take the

occasion of this jubilee to return to the fray (and unfortunately her-

meneutics still has the appearance of a fray).

As we review the literature of the past ten years,4 we shall discuss

modifications in our own views that have resulted from these contributions.

To proceed chronologically and to summarize each author's opinion (as we

did in 1953) would result in much repetition and seems less useful since

the appearance of NT A. We shall rather proceed topically bringing in the

authors under the various important aspects of the problem. To make this

study profitable we shall have to presume a knowledge of the bibliography

and the state of the question at the time of our dissertation (end of

1954).ΰ In particular, we shall not bother to reaffirm the careful qualifica

tions6 made there concerning the recognition of the SP. Fortunately, the

misconception that the theory of a SP is an attempt to circumvent scientific

exegesis or to let piety run riot is gradually disappearing.

1 "The History and Development of the Theory of a Sensus Plenior/' 15 (1953) 141-162.

2 The Sensus Plenior of Sacred Scripture (Baltimore: St. Mary's, 1955; reprinted 1960). In the bibliography we shall list only a few reviews, chiefly those whose observations are of value for this article. However, a British review in Theology 58 (1955) 356 should not pass unnoticed: "The author's judgment is sound and his style clear and, for an American, restrained . . ." (italics ours).

3 With a minor lapse : the debate about Lagrange's supra-literal sense. 4 For convenience a bibliography of this period, completing the one in the Diss.,

shall be appended to this article. It tries to be reasonably complete for the SP, but only touches on allied fields like typology, history of exegesis, Protestant hermeneutics. All footnote references with just the author's name are to works in this bibliography.

5 To help readers interested in only one or the other aspects we shall occasionally mention the pages of the Diss, where a full discussion can be found. The Diss, is still available in the 1960 reprint.

β Η. Η. Rowley, in his review, Book List of SOTS (1956) 36: ". . . the author's restraint in finding the sensus plenior, as shown in his criteria for recognizing where it may legitimately be found, contrasts with the tendency in some quarters to revive allegory and typology, whereby anything may mean anything."

262

T H E Sensus Plenior 263

The Nature of the "Literal" Sense

As is well known,7 St. Thomas divided the senses of Scripture into literal and spiritual: the literal being conveyed by the words (litterae or verba) of Scripture, and the spiritual by the "things" (res) of Scripture.8 The question of the consciousness of the human author does not enter into this concept of the literal sense : whatever God intended by the words is literal. Recently both Fernández and Benoit9 have defended this definition of the literal sense.

In many ways it would be a better use of the term "literal." From some discussions of the literal sense we might get the impression that, first, one knows what the human author meant and that, therefore, one knows what a text means. Actually, the process of exegesis is the reverse : one discovers first what the text says, and then one attempts to draw from this the outlook and meaning of the author. Many times we can obtain some sense from the words without ever being certain what the human author meant, e.g., Is 7,14. The above definition of the literal sense gives the text the primacy.10 In addition, its use of "literal" is more logical.

Be this as it may, the definition of literal sense as the meaning intended by the human author is so entrenched that we cannot believe that it will be displaced. Notice, for example, how Pius XII used the term in Divino afflante Spiritu : n "To discern and define that sense of the biblical words which is called literal . . . so that the mind of the author may be made clear."

Sensus Plenior and the Consciousness of the Author

In his division of the senses of Scripture Benoit12 has insisted that the human author had no consciousness of the SP. On the other hand, in a

7 Diss., 2-4 ; also our second division, 123. 8 See Quodlib. VII, q.6, a.14: "Uno modo secundum quod res significantur per

verba et in hoc consistit sensus lateralis; alio modo secundum quod res sunt figurae aliarum rerum et in hoc consistit sensus spiritualis." Zarb, 258-261, claims that St. Thomas occasionally used a more specific term, sensus litteralis historicus vel principalis, to indicate the meaning intended by the author and immediately expressed by the words.

» Fernández, 184-5; Benoit, "Plenitude," 164. In Prophecy, 147-50, he divides the senses of Scripture thus : (cf. our first division, Diss., 123) Primary Sense : what the human author intended. Secondary Sense : what God intended unbeknown to the human author.

(a) SP : in the words of Scripture (b) Typical : in the "things" of Scripture 10 Fernández, 191, stresses this in his definition of biblical sense: "Sentido bíblico

es el concepto expresado inmediatamente por las palabras del texto bíblico." The father of the term "sensus plenior," Fernández died Nov. 3, 1961 at the age of 90.

H EB, #550. i 2 Sup., n.9. In "Plénitude," 172, Benoit admits that there exists at times a certain

264 T H E CATHOLIC BIBLICAL QUARTERLY [Vol. 25

series of articles John O'Rourke has insisted that the human author must, at least, have had a vague awareness of the SP. Otherwise, he claims, the SP involves a concept formally different from that of the literal sense, and the result is an impossible ambiguity on the part of God.13

It seems that two questions are involved : first, is some vague consciousness of the SP necessary on the part of the human author ; second, if not, is this consciousness necessarily to be excluded ?

(A) In dealing with the first question we would side with Benoit rather than with O'Rourke.14 More clearly than in 1955, we now tend to see the demand for consciousness on the part of the human author as a pseudo-problem. How could one ever measure this vague consciousness? To what extent is a man aware of the implication of his words? In an imprecise Semitic language which employs many symbols, what constitutes a different formal concept? A theoretic answer may be possible for these questions, but we doubt the feasibility of applying such an answer in practical exegesis. It is worth noting that in the field of literature modern criticism seems to be moving away from an emphasis on what the author intended to an emphasis on what his words actually convey.

In 1955, in answer to Bierberg, we admitted15 that at times the SP involves what by the strict rules of logic might be termed a new formal concept. Does this mean that the SP is not a homogeneous development of the literal sense? Fr. O'Rourke16 says that if there is a new formal concept, then the SP is different from the literal sense. Yes, it is different, i.e., partly different. If there were no difference, there would be no plenior. Jesus Christ is the Son of God in a different way from that in which the

obscure, implicit knowledge. "Elle pourra être comme la préparation ultime du sens plénier, mais elle n'est pas le sens plénier."

13 "Marginal Notes," 65. 14 Benoit, "Plénitude," 172, n.l, judges O'Rourke's effort a bit severely as an

example of the impasse to which an ignorance of the distinction between the consciousness of the author and his text will lead. We do believe, however, that the tendency recently is to insist less on consciousness, e.g. Michl, 8; Levie, 250; Grelot, 204; Schildenberger, 142. Fernández, 198, says it is difficult to discern whether the human author knew the SP vaguely or not at all.

15 Diss., 128. Ie "Notes," 319. On 324 Fr. O'Rourke suggests that if the SP is not foreseen at all

by the human author, it seems to be a species of the illative consequent sense (which we both agree is not a real sense of Scripture). There is quite a difference, however. God foresaw the illative consequent sense, but that sense is derived by non-biblical means (syllogistic reasoning with a non-revealed minor proposition). God foresaw the SP, but that sense is attained only in dependence on biblical revelation. In the one case God guarantees that the sense is part of His biblical salvific plan; in the other case, He does not.

1963] T H E Sensus Plenior 265

king of Judah was the son of God (Ps 2) . Yet, there is a certain homogeneity between the two sonships; and Jesus' kingship is the end product of the same Davidic line of kingship to which Ps 2 referred literally. We do not believe that the SP can be rejected on the basis of different formal concepts.

Does this mean that there is an ambiguity on God's part? A double entendre? A return to the old view of a multiple literal sense?17 "Ambiguous" is a pejorative term; double entendre is worse. Perhaps it is not even meaningful to discuss the question since modern linguistics believes that verbal communication, being linguistic symbolism, is by its very nature ambiguous.18 There is no more ambiguity in our concept of the SP than there is in a pedagogy where the teacher communicates to the children intelligible truths, but truths whose full content he knows they will not understand until later. What is so unfitting (or "impossible") in God's inspiring an author to speak of the royal coronation as the begetting of a son of God, all the while knowing that one future day men will see the reference to His only-begotten Son ?

Fr. O'Rourke19 suggests this criterion : were we to ask the human author now whether or not he meant what we see in his inspired writing, he would have to be able to assure us, with his increased understanding, that he did mean it. With proper emphasis on the words we have italicized, this is not a bad criterion, although we are sure that the human author would often be quite surprised how what he had said had come out. We doubt that the fact that the fulfillment was a formally different concept20 would stop him from saying he "meant" it once he had an increased understanding of God's plan. The ordinary notion of "meaning" is a much vaguer and wider idea than a laboratory distinction like "formally different concept" might allow.

The view that consciousness of the SP is not necessary seems to raise difficulties from the aspect of inspiration. Some of the Spanish authors, like Ause jo and Ibañez Arana,21 insist that if the human author was not conscious of the SP, it cannot be a true sense of Scripture for this would

17 This is just a bogy. The ancient concept of multiple literal sense, i.e., that one passage can be applied to entirely unrelated realities (Diss., 129), is rejected by all. To stress the word "multiple," divorcing it from this specific significance, and to say that holders of the SP are holding a multiple literal sense (O'Rourke, "Theology," 306) only confuses the issue.

ι» Musurillo, "Symbolism," 68. i» "Theology," 305. 2 0 Always, however, presupposing the limitations imposed by our criteria for the

SP (Diss. 145-6). 2i Also Giblin, "As Written," 331-5.


violate the rules of instrumentality. The basic argument seems to go like this : the human author is an instrument ; we know the philosophical rules of instrumentality ;22 therefore, we know the limitations of God's use of the author. This procedure seems to us invalid r23 the human author is a unique instrument, an instrument only by analogy. In fact, when a prophet [or author] is fully conscious of what God intends, Benoit24 maintains, he is not properly an instrument in the strict Thomistic sense of the word. If this be true, unconsciousness of the full divine intention can scarcely be contradictory to instrumentality.

In any case, any absolute a priori decision of what God can or cannot do on the basis of the laws of instrumentality is, we suggest, impossible.25

As Kevin Smyth26 reminds us, the Church's explanation of inspiration "works from the elements of inspiration to describe instrumentality. It does not start from instrument to reach the notion of inspiration." To adopt John O'Rourke's words:27 "Where we are concerned with the unique

2 2 Even this presupposition must be modified, for there are several philosophies of instrumentality. Giblin, ibid., 332, n.ll, states that our theory of instrumentality (Diss., 132) seems to be Bannezian. He corrects it by quoting the Thomistic notion. At one time we would have been interested enough in the strictest scholastic approach to inspiration to debate the question. We might notice, however, that Thomas himself allowed much wider leeway to scriptural senses unknown to the human author than does Fr. Giblin's Thomistic theory of instrumentality. De Pot, q.4, a.l : "Si aliqua ab expositoribus sacrae Scripturae litterae aptentur, quae auctor non intelligit, non est dubium quin Spiritus Sanctus intellexerit, qui est principalis auctor divinae Scripturae." Fr. Giblin insists strongly upon analogy as the key to hermeneutics ; a proper emphasis on the analogous character of the instrumentality of the human author is, in our opinion, the key to the whole question of what is permitted by instrumentality.

2 3 The fact that we make no attempt here to defend the SP along the lines of the classic instrumental approach to inspiration does not mean that such an answer cannot be formulated. See references in Diss., 132-3; Krumholz, Temiño Saiz, Sebastián, Franquesa, and Fernández, 195-8.

2 4 Prophecy, 79-81. John of St. Thomas classifies the prophet [or human author] as a secondary principal cause.

2 5 Giblin, "As Written," 335, n.15, wonders if we are not suggesting that God uses the instrument of the human author miraculously in relation to the SP. He uses the comparison of a pen being used to cut diamonds as the type of miracle that might parallel the instrumentality of a human author inspired to write a verse of whose SP he remains ignorant. Since in this example the pen is not accomplishing its primary purpose of writing, we find the example highly inappropriate. If there must be an example to illustrate what is unparalleled, the use of a pen to write with invisible ink might be better. The pen is being used to write, its natural instrumental function, just as the author is being used in his natural function of conscious composer (of the literal sense). But something is being written which has meaning beyond what appears on the surface.

2e p. 16. π "Theology," 306.


situation of Scripture, involving two authors—God and the inspired writer —we cannot expect to solve all problems by an analysis of purely human authorship."

The mention of authorship leads us into another objection: would not unconsciousness of the SP mean that the human author is no longer functioning as an author ? This would be true only if the human author was writing something the primary meaning of which he had no understanding. But, as Benoit28 insists, we who hold the SP are not thinking of a prophet, for instance, as simply tape-recording a divine message which he passes on without understanding. The prophet does understand the message ; the vitality of his grasp and presentation is what helps to make it acceptable ; but his view is limited by circumstances of time and place. Often, then, there is a plus-value that only the future will reveal. This plus-value is not only in God's spirit ; it has now been objectively made part of the words of the prophet where it can be perceived by other minds in the future. In the case of the SP, the prophet or the hagiographer is using his mind and will fully in the composition of his message or work (just as any author does). If God uses what he has written to convey meaning beyond that which he has understood, how does this make him less an author ?

(B) Thus far we have agreed with Benoit: consciousness of the SP on the part of the human author is not necessary. But Benoit29 goes further by excluding, in principle, even marginal consciousness. If the author had even a vague intuition or suspicion that his words had deeper meaning than he fully understood, for Benoit this deeper meaning belongs in the realm of the "primary" sense (i.e., literal sense, in the normal terminology). By Benoit's definition the SP must be totally unknown to the human author. Here we cannot agree for we believe that a precision is being introduced that is impossible to control.30 To insist that the human author cannot have had any awareness of the SP is to reintroduce by the back door the whole problem of consciousness and its importance for the SP.

In 195531 we defined the SP of a text as a deeper meaning "intended by God, but not clearly intended by the human author." Our definition neither insisted on consciousness nor ruled it out. It was formulated not simply out of a desire to avoid taking sides, but out of an appreciation of

2» "Plénitude," 170-1. He also discusses here the objection against the SP that the effect must be common to the principal cause and to the instrumental cause.

» "Plénitude," 187. 3 0 As Dreyfus, 114-5, remarks, if it is relatively easy to say what the author

realized, it is much more delicate to say what he did not realize, especially when the object of his message is something new which defies adequate expression in the words at his disposal.

31 Diss., 92.

\


the complicated nature of the question of human consciousness and of the consciousness of the biblical author, in particular. At that time we mentioned several ways32 that had been proposed to explain a possible borderline consciousness of the SP on the part of the human author. We admit now that such explanations as the theoria3* of the Antiochenes are totally out of the question. But we believe more firmly than ever that there are many factors that make it virtually impossible to characterize exactly the human author's mental relationship to that richer meaning which his words would be seen to possess at a future time.34

For instance, Coppens35 mentions two factors to be considered in this problem. The first is the mentality of the Semitic peoples and of the Hebrews in particular: "La pensée hébraïque est une pensée ouverte et dynamique, orientée vers un surplus de sens, que souvent elle devine sans pouvoir l'exprimer adequatemene'36 The second is a faith or hope in the future, a hope that could not be adequately expressed intellectually but which was real none the less. The latter factor seems particularly important in the question of the SP of prophetical passages. For instance, who would care to define exactly the limits of consciousness in the hyperbolic language of Isaiah's Emmanuel passages ? We can determine, to some extent at least, the general meaning of these passages for the eighth century ; but who can tell how far Isaiah's hope outdistanced his time? To include under the literal sense (Benoir/s primary sense) all the vague possibilities that might have been on the periphery of his consciousness and to characterize as SP only that which he could not have foreseen in any way seems utterly impractical. It introduces the immeasurable into our concept of the literal sense and unduly complicates the primary task of exegesis.

Let us, then, keep the term "literal sense" for that meaning which by the rules of historico-critical exegesis we can determine as the author's message for his time. Let us apply the term SP to that meaning of his

8 2 Ibid. 107-13: Origene mystical experience; theoria; Gribomont's psychological explanation. The latter is the only one that we would now consider seriously as contributing toward a solution of the problem.

3 3 Murphy, 303, in his review of our Diss, rejected theoria as an explanation. 3* See Diss., 106. 35 P. 10. We would not necessarily commit ourselves, however, to Coppens' view

that the hagiographer was normally somewhat conscious of the SP. se See already Diss., 125; Murnion, 128-31. O'Rourke, "Theology," 304-5, intro

duces a factor akin to this, namely, Semitic totality-thinking and the notion of corporate personality. Certainly such factors would have to be discussed in estimating the authors consciousness of a possible SP in the suffering servant and son of man themes. Charlier, "Methode," 15, stresses the problem of symbols, a problem which fascinates modern psychology. How does one measure the prophet's consciousness of the possible applications of his symbols ?


text which by the normal rules of exegesis would not have been within his clear awareness or intention but which by other criteria we can determine as having been intended by God.37 We agree with Benoit that the key to the theory of a SP is that the sacred book is distinct from the internal thought of the writer and capable of an increment in meaning which transcends his conscious intent. But, for this very reason, we insist that a vague consciousness of this richer meaning may or may not have been present, and that such vague consciousness has no integral place in the definition of the SP, either as necessary or as inadmissible.

The Divisions of the Sensus Plenior

In our dissertation (97-104) we discussed various categories of the SP, categories which constituted a modification of Coppens' division. Perhaps there is a certain unreality about such divisions, but the problems that were at the basis of our attempt are still with us.

(A) For instance, what is the relation of the SP to the typical sense? Coppens had originally spoken of a typisme verbal ;38 we found the idea obscure and now Benoit39 rejects it. In principle all proponents of the SP agree that the SP and the typical sense are two different senses because the SP deals on the plane of the abstract values of language and the typical sense with concrete realities of person, thing, and event.40 ( Some also distinguish the two senses on the basis of the consciousness of the human author.41) But one

37 For the criteria see Diss., 145-8. 38 Diss., 99, n.36. In his latest article Coppens still refers to it obliquely : "On aime

même parler aujourd'hui d'un typologie qui serait avant tout verbale." 3» "Plénitude," 178-9. 4 0 Fernández, 191, draws a very sharp distinction between the two senses, over

simplifying the question. Benoit, "Plénitude," 177-9, does a more balanced job of making the distinction clear. However, as Bourke has pointed out, Benoit, 178, goes too far in saying that the correspondence between type and antitype is one of opposition, while in the SP the correspondence is one of completion and essential communion. (Perhaps Coppens, 8, is aiming in the same direction as Benoit when he speaks of a certain transposition of sense in typology.) We wonder with Bourke if there is always a qualitative difference between the correspondence involved in the typical sense and that involved in the SP. David is a type of Jesus; "You are my son; this day I have begotten you," which in a literal sense may refer to one of the early Davidic kings, refers by way of SP to Jesus Christ. What is the qualitative difference between these two correspondences?

41 We object not only to the assumption that consciousness is required for the SP but also to the assumption that there never was any consciousness of the typical sense. In dealing with the typology of the Exodus events, for instance, we are concerned with consciousness of the biblical authors who lived seven hundred or more years after the events described, the heirs of a developed theology about these types. Were not these authors conscious to some degree that a figure like Moses was a pattern


difficulty is that the concrete reality which serves as type is capable of a biblical typical sense only when it is written about in words.42 And sometimes in the very passage that deals with a biblical type we find words that also bear a SP. This SP which exists in close proximity to the typical sense we called the "Typical Sensus Plenior"43 Benoit44 also recognizes its existence in what he calls : cas de sens typique avec sens plénier. Thus we have this category of the SP even though a better nomenclature than ours should be found for it.

(B) What about the classification we called the "General Sensus Plenior" ? We meant that homogeneous enrichment in meaning that is seen to exist when we take a text or a biblical term and place it in the context of the whole Bible. Even before 1955 there was a tendency to accept this sense under another name (Courtade's historical sense?). This same phenomenon persists. Benoit speaks of cas de sens plénier sans sens typique, e.g., OT notions like sin and justice when considered in the light of the NT. Spicq,45 while not favorable to the term SP, allows that biblical theology

for future times, e.g., the theme of the prophet-like-Moses ; the examples of how the Elijah cycle patterns the picture of Elijah on Moses? The vital threads that run through and unite God's revelation are woven into typology as well as into the SP, and the question of consciousness in both cases is complicated. See Murnion, 140; Hill, 8.

4 2 Diss., 15. This view strikes Ausejo, 101, as exceeding strange, but it is only common sense. Hundreds of years before the Pentateuch was written God may have intended that manna serve as a type of the Eucharist, but until that writing there was no typical sense of Scripture involving the manna. Of necessity the symbolism in Scripture is literary and linguistic—see Musurillo, "Symbolism," 75. Perhaps Fr. Ausejo would be happy with Fernández* (188-90) distinction between the sentido real-típico (the ordination of type to antitype, not rigorously biblical) and the sentido literal-tipico (involving the biblical description). But Fernández insists': "El sentido está en las palabras que expresan el objeto; no en el objeto expresado por las palabras."

4 3 O'Rourke, "Notes," 320, discusses the sensus plenior typicus, citing our earlier discussion. But he seems to be talking simply about the typical sense. In our mind the typical sense and the typical SP are quite different. On the inspiration of the typical sense O'Rourke, 321, remarks: "Thus one sees that a commentator who, in his consideration of biblical inspiration, places the accent on the human author would not call the typical sense inspired, and that he who places the emphasis on the divine movement would insist that the typical sense is inspired." We wonder if more of an emphasis on inspired books would help us here.

4 4 "Plénitude," 180-2. He gives the examples of the sacrifice of Isaac which is a type accompanied by Gn 22, 2, "Take your son, your only son whom you love . . ." which is applicable to Christ in a SP.

46 In BThom VIII1 he agreed with Courtade in rejecting the SP on the grounds of a violation of instrumentality and of the problem raised by a lack of consciousness. In VIII3 he accepted it in the way proposed by Coppens but still objected to the


brings a light to each isolated text by confronting it with parallel texts. It is not a question, he claims, of adding meaning to the individual text, but of gaining the illumination to grasp better the nuances and compass. The more exact understanding of the whole reality adequately expressed by the words is the proper object of biblical theology,46 and so Spicq prefers to speak of a theological sense. For many authors47 such biblical theology is really a recognition of the (General) SP.

Can this classification also cover what Charles Homer Giblin48 calls "theological meaning"? Theological meaning is the root intelligibility which Scripture itself discloses when considered in the light of faith.49

It is not a "reflex plus-value," but a meaning drawn from a group of texts or authors because of their thematic presentation.50 Much will depend here on how Giblin defines plus-value. When one takes from different stages in the biblical account a group of texts that deal with the same theme, one can often see more meaning in them than the author of any one of them saw. This more (plus-value?) is not added from outside; it is a recognition of meaning already present in the words. If this is what Giblin means, then we are not as far apart as might be supposed from his denial of the SP.

The Range of the Sensus Plenior

Benoit51 insists that the SP exists only on the level of the correspondence between the OT and the NT. There is no real SP of an OT text reread at another stage of the OT. There is no real SP of a NT text reread by the later Church. He admits, of course, that there is a development of insight throughout the O T ; but in face of the decisive step involved in the coming of Christ, he thinks it better not to overextend (gaspiller) the SP by applying it to anything except the OT-NT relationship.

Such confinement seems too artificial. Certainly the act of revelation that was the Incarnation was the greatest light ever focused by God on His plan of salvation; and, therefore, NT insights will be most helpful in pointing out the SP of OT Scripture. But, as Benoit admits, the Exile

term. He thought that the comparative plenior seemed to refer to a more profound exegesis than to a more profound sense of the text. Spicq prefers sens plein or sens thêologique.

4« See Spicq, "Nouvelles réflexions," 216-19. 4* E.g., Hessler ; Peinador, "La integración" ; Michl ; Levie. 4* Giblin rejects the SP, but recently ("Structural," 27, n.35) he feels he is in

substantial agreement with Spicq's view; and as we have pointed out, Spicq now accepts the SP. We shall discuss Giblin's theory more fully below.

« "As Written," 336. 60 "Structural," 27, n.35. « "Plénitude," 184-5.


and Return were a great step in religious development too ;52 and there is no real danger of overextending the SP in recognizing, for instance, that at times the postexilic books brought out a SP of earlier Scripture. Michl mentions Georg Ziehner's treatment of the exegesis of the OT in the Book of Wisdom. Does it not seem artificial to refuse to classify as SP Wisdom's fuller exegesis (even though it may satisfy the criteria for the SP) simply because Wis is not part of the NT F53 As Michl54 insists, Wis is extremely close in its exegetical principles to the NT writers ; and the same might be said for Qumrân.55

Our objections to ending the possibilities of recognizing the SP with the close of the NT period would be even stronger. In his review of our dissertation Benoit denies that the Church's deeper understanding of revelation in later centuries can uncover the SP of a NT text. As an example, he maintains that the Church's insight into the universal motherhood of Mary from Jn 19,26 or into Extreme Unction from Jas 5,15 is simply a better penetration of the literal sense by the consequent explicative sense.56 One could debate this suggestion for most of the standard examples of consequent explicative sense are far simpler to uncover than Benoit's two examples. The explicative sense is a mere exercise of elementary logic—can one arrive at Mary's universal motherhood by pure logic ? What about more complicated examples, e.g., the sacrament of Penance and the exegesis of Mt 18,18? In our opinion, there are many examples of the Church's understanding of NT texts which would be better classified as SP rather than as explicative literal sense.57

In short, it seems that Benoit's argument for confining the SP to the

5 2 Murnion, 125fi\, does a good job in showing that the SP within the Bible is intimately associated with progressive revelation.

5 3 The Muratorian Fragment, line 69, lists it among the NT books. 54 P9 # 55 Fitzmyer, 332, points out that some Qumrân exegesis of the OT could just as

easily involve the SP as NT exegesis; there is the same exegetical method and devices. When Fitzmyer says, however, that we would be forced to deny that Qumrân exegesis uncovers a SP because Qumrân literature is not inspired, he is perhaps handicapped by Benoit's theory that SP may be uncovered only by the NT. Qumrân by its relation to Judaism is part of a stream of divine revelation, and so the Qumrân exegetes could come to recognize a SP of the OT.

ß e See Diss., 25-6. A meaning of Scripture derived by an explicative method (i.e., an ample explanation of the text by applying the general rules of logic) is preferably to be removed from the realm of the consequent sense altogether. Most examples are no more than the literal sense.

57 Levie, 252, and 264-72, defines the plenary sense in terms of the Church's deeper understanding of Scripture after NT times; he speaks of the OT-NT relationship in terms of typology.


OT-NT relationship has much of the ex convenientia about it. We see

nothing intrinsic to the definition of the SP that would require such limita

tion. The OT-NT relationship is the most fertile field for the recognition of

the SP, but not the exclusive field.

With reference to this same problem of the range within which one may

find a SP, a suggestion originally made by Coppens58 has come in for

more discussion, namely, that the way in which the words of Christ are

narrated in the Gospel brings out the SP of the words of the Master as

originally spoken. This suggestion involves a distinction such as that made

by Stanley59 between the Sits im Leben Christi and the Sitz im Evangelium.

The same problem can be raised in relation to the oral tradition of the OT

and its subsequent commission to writing, often accompanied by a deeper

insight into its meaning.00 Are these really examples of the SP of

Scripture? Certainly the deeper insight and the more profound meaning

that are uncovered are very similar to the insight and meaning involved

in the SP. e i Yet, to be exact, one cannot speak of a sense of Scripture

before there is a written text. The bystanders' original understanding of

the words of Christ as they were spoken is not a sense of Scripture. The

meaning that the Evangelist understands years later and is inspired by

5 8 Diss., 144-5. This is the only part of our Diss, that interested R.P.C. Hanson in the review mentioned in n.2 above.

δ» "Balaam's Ass, or a Problem in New Testament Hermeneutics," CBQ 20 (1958) 50-6. Stanley speaks simply of a Sit2 im Leben; but this can be confusing since the form critics use the phrase to refer to the situation of the primitive Church and not to the life of Christ.

e° Stuhlmueller brings this out in his article, and we agree with his general thesis of the importance of oral tradition and of subsequent redactions of the text. For instance, his treatment (316-7) of the Emmanuel section of Is 9 is perfectly plausible. Yet he seems to think that this general thesis greatly affects the problem of the SP; for in his last pages (318, 325) he maintains that a study of the history of editions should make us careful of too hasty a resort to the SP theory. But there are two fundamental problems which S. has not touched upon and which have the key to the SP question: (a) When the later editor, inspired and even with new revelation, redacts a text so that a meaning now stands forth clearly that did not stand forth before, is he adding meaning to what God intended in that text, or is he simply bringing to the fore what God had intended all along but which had not been clear to the original human author? Revelation, by the root meaning of the word, need not mean adding from the outside ; it can mean unveiling what was already there, (b) There are many examples of SP where there is no evidence for redaction of the original text, e.g., in some of the NT use of the OT.

6 1 Levie, 267: "The plenary sense of the supreme word of revelation is not absolutely identical with the plenary sense of the inspired writing as such. Agreed. But this transcendent and unique case [the plenary sense of Christ's words] is fundamentally the essential principle underlying all other examples of the plenary sense, and gives the reason for and throws its light on them all." Italics ours.


God to convey to his audience is the literal sense of the Gospel (even where, thanks to the working of the Spirit, the Evangelist's understanding is much deeper than the original understanding). The same principle would apply to OT oral tradition and its later commission to writing and incorporation into Scripture. Such distinctions are a bit pedantic, but they are a necessary corollary of the theory of inspiration as classically formulated.62

Criteria for the Sensus Plenior

Benoit63 insists on the same two criteria that we proposed in our dissertation : homogeneity with the literal sense ; evidence based on revelation (or development in revelation, we would add) that God intended a SP in a biblical text.64 Now these criteria must be used to identify the SP amidst the more-than-literal exegesis found in the NT, the Fathers, the Liturgy, and Church Documents. No serious author should ever suggest that all or even a good part of this more-than-literal exegesis involves the SP.65 Some more-than-literal exegesis is typology ; some of it is pedagogical or a fortiori application of principle ; some of it is fanciful accommodation ; some of it is based on a failure to comprehend the literal sense. We must

62 In Prophecy, 127, Benoit is moving toward a wider definition of biblical inspiration that would make writing only one part of the picture; likewise J. L. McKenzie, "The Social Character of Inspiration," CBQ 24 (1962) 115-124. Naturally, if primacy in inspiration is put on the spoken word, then our formulations of the senses of Scripture would have to be changed radically.

es "Plénitude," 189-92. 6 4 Our insistence on fairly stringent criteria (apparent to Rowley, n.6 above)

makes Fr. McKenzie^ remarks ("Hermeneutics," 202) a bit hard to understand. How does the theory of the SP seem to "involve the danger of removing all control from the investigation of the genuine meaning of the Bible"? Why is it so hard to distinguish the principle behind the SP from the allegorism of Origen (who, as far as we know, rarely investigated homogeneity, and relied more on his own creative imagination more than on revelation concerning a particular text) ? Why does the SP introduce a charismatic element into exegesis? It takes investigation, not charisma, to trace homogeneity; it takes rational proof to establish that revelation (or development in the understanding of revelation) has pointed out the deeper meaning of a text. If Fr. McKenzie means that the detection of a SP lies beyond the rules of purely critical exegesis, he is right. Faith is involved, but this should not lead to the dangers Fr. McKenzie sees. A look at the list of some of the leading exegetes who hold the SP should be a proof that his fears are unfounded.

65 Again Fr. McKenzie, ibid., perhaps overestimates our enthusiasm when he says that we present the SP as something which will recapitulate the solution of the problems raised by all this exegesis in a single view. Diss., 150: "The sensus plenior appears to solve many problems—it does not solve them all. It is in no way an exegetical 'cure-all.' "


use the greatest care in classifying such exegesis, and some of it almost defies classification.

Thus, at least in principle, we are in agreement with Schmid's careful analysis of Pauline exegesis where he proves that often Paul was not guided by the literal sense of the OT and that therefore the theory of a SP is not universally applicable to Pauline exegesis. Likewise, O'Rourke's study of the eleven fulfillment texts in Mt shows that sometimes Matthew is dealing with a fulfillment of the literal sense (SP) , sometimes with a typical sense, sometimes with accommodation.

In treating liturgical exegesis even greater care is required. Barrosse lists some general factors or attitudes66 that lie behind all the more-than-literal exegesis found in the OT, NT, the Fathers, and the Liturgy.67 How, in particular, are we to classify liturgical exegesis ? Barrosse68 states : "It seems hard to admit that so very much of the liturgy's use of the Bible should be mere accommodation of the text to a meaning that the passage of itself does not have, especially since the Church's official attitude toward accommodation is very restrained." There is typology, he says, but less than in the Fathers. Specifically, throughout all this more-than-literal exegesis, Barrosse is troubled by the cases where interpretation finds a "new" meaning in an old text. For instance, he suggests69 that if a NT author recognizes the hitherto unsuspected messianic character of an OT text, we should not speak of this meaning as being in the text from the start, but of the text as now acquiring the new meaning. This is, perhaps, the most commonly proposed objection to the SP today, and we shall consider it in the next section.

For the moment let us simply point out that Barrosse's difficulty in classifying such "new" meanings can only be solved, as far as the SP is involved, by invocation of the criterion of homogeneity. It is never simply a question of saying: here is an OT text, and here we have it reused of

6 6 These are: (a) Reinterpretation and rethinking of past institutions and history to link them closer to God's plan of salvation, (b) The homogeneous continuity of God's interventions in history so that they form part of a unified plan : this leads one to see the earlier stages as preparations for or as foreshadowings (types) of later stages, (c) The absolute character of God's word so that it does not remain something of the past but has meaning for the present. This leads to constant reinterpreta-tions (sometimes redactions) in order to find new and broader meanings in earlier writings. Does "new" for Barrosse necessarily mean added from the outside, or could it cover insight into meaning already there ?

6 7 The continuity of these factors is, in our opinion, one more reason for not confining the SP to the OT-NT plane as Benoit does.

«8 P.19. es P.20.


Christ in the NT or the Liturgy; therefore we have a SP. What is the organic connection between the two ? How can we see that God wanted one to prepare the way for the other? In Is 7,14, for example, if the OT does refer to a Davidic king to be born, then we have an organic link in the Davidic birth of Christ at Bethlehem. Among the links that join Is 7,14 and Mt 1,23 there are the line of David, a continued and vital expectation of the Davidic messiah, and the LXX rendering of the verse. The Targums, Qumrân, and the pseudepigrapha also are chains helping us to connect OT concepts and passages concerning the Suffering Servant and the Son of Man to their NT fulfillment. Without such links we cannot make a real claim for the presence of a SP, and the more-than-literal exegesis should be otherwise classified.70

The Sensus Plenior9 Analogy, and Fuller Understanding

We now come to the work of Fr. Charles Homer Giblin. His remarks on the senses of Scripture are quite thought-provoking; but we should caution our reader that, perhaps because of our own limitations, his thought is quite difficult to understand71 and we are not certain that we can faithfully represent his views.

?° Benoit, "Plenitude," 192 insists that the SP is something frequent. This is certainly true for what we call the General SP ; the Typical and Prophetical SP would not be too frequent in our opinion.

71 Benoit, ibid., 193, n.l, also seems to find difficulty ; he speaks of Giblin's "étranges affirmations." We feel obliged to clarify an observation Fr. Giblin has made. In "As Written," 338-40 he takes great pains to correct the translation we gave of Prov. Deus in CBQ 17 (1955) 455. We used the same translation in our Diss., 136; there we indicated that it is not our translation but the standard English trans, found in Rome and the Study of Scripture; and it is not incorrect. The Latin of the encyclical (EB, 108) speaks of ". . . ampliore quadam et reconditiore sententia, quam exprimere littera et hermeneuticae leges indicare videantur . . ." RSS translates it: " . . . a fullness and a hidden depth of meaning which the letter hardly expresses and which the laws of interpretation hardly warrant." (All italics ours) Now Giblin says quite correctly that the quam means "than" not "which." But RSS is not mistranslating the quam; it is simply giving a freer translation, for the "which . . . hardly" has the same meaning as the "than." Giblin wants to translate : "a fuller meaning than the letter expresses." The RSS translation, "a fullness of meaning which the letter hardly expresses," is saying the same thing.

Giblin seems to think that he has here an argument against any reference to what subsequently came to be called the SP, for this is more than the letter while the SP is (for many) a subdivision of the literal sense. We believe that the confusion is caused by two different definitions of the literal sense. If the literal sense is the meaning which the ordinary laws of hermeneutics (mentioned in this same passage) indicate as having been intended by the human author, then the SP is more than the letter says. If the literal sense is taken in the wider connotation of St. Thomas-Fernández-Benoit, then the SP is literal. The amplior of the encyclical disturbs Fr.


First, what does Fr. Giblin mean by the SP which he rejects? He says72

that it seems to be "the meaningful use to which the text may be put"; but this is not properly a sense of the text, even though God may have meant the Scripture to be used meaningfully. We agree entirely that such use of Scripture is not a sense of Scripture; it is accommodation (or "application," as he calls it) and is found in many varieties. Our real objection to Giblin's remarks is that such "application" is not a SP and that, as far as we know, no author who holds the SP has ever defined it in a way that would support Giblin's description. For instance, God foresaw that Paul (1 Cor 9,9) would use Dt 25,4 to justify the salary of the Christian preacher—certainly a meaningful use. Yet there is no evidence whatsoever that such an application is a homogeneous development of the literal meaning of the OT text; and so it is not a SP. Fr. Giblin is perfectly free to reject the theory of the SP ; but, without meaning to be harsh, we believe that it is only compounding confusion to formulate a personal description of the SP which equates it with an accommodation that no one wishes to defend as a real sense of Scripture.

One of Giblin's main objections73 to the SP is that the theory implies a univocal use of "Scriptural sense," i.e., suggests that the SP is different from the literal sense only in degree. For him the real solution to the hermeneutical problem lies in an analogical use of "sense" or "meaning." He speaks of one analogate as the "theological meaning" (see notes 48-50 above) and the other analogate as the literal sense. These two senses are really distinct (not in degree but in kind), but both are senses of Scripture. We think that he means that in a given text we may encounter two factors: what the author intended (literal sense) and what a later stage in God's plan74 came to understand (theological meaning). If we use the term "sense" to cover both the intention and the understanding, we are using it analogically.75

There are some difficulties. Giblin rejects the SP because the human author was not aware of it. What knowledge does he posit for the OT

Giblin because the "theological meaning" which he is trying to defend is not different in degree but in kind; he assures us the amplior is only a question of literary style.

72 "Structural," 26, n.35. ™ "As Written," 336. 74 Fr. Giblin speaks of theological meaning as existing within the biblical frame

work, and thus perhaps closing with the NT. In all of this we are very uncertain we have caught the nuances of his ideas.

75 Benoit, "Plénitude," 193, n.l, says that apparently for Giblin the theological meaning does not seem to come through the words of the text. We are not so sure that this is his meaning; the theological meaning comes from an understanding of God's whole plan, but does it not come from the text understood thus?


writer in relation to the "theological meaning"?—analogous knowledge.76

Frankly, this seems to bring in through the back door what has been thrown out the front.

He stresses that the "theological meaning" is something beyond the literal sense, not something more, but something different in kind, "a toto caelo generic difference."77 Yet, in fact, when Giblin speaks more concretely of theological meaning as an insight gained from seeing a text in the light of God's plan of salvation, he does not seem to be dealing with something so completely different from the literal sense, but something only partly different. The SP is partly different from the literal sense too.78 Giblin says that the theologian does not ask a deeper question than the exegetical critic; he asks a different question. Not "What did the human author say?" but "What did God intend to work out?" We would rather phrase it this way: the literal sense answers the question of what this text meant according to its author's intention as that author was inspired to compose it in his particular stage in the history of God's plan of salvation.79 The SP answers the question of what the text means in the whole context of God's plan, a meaning which God, who knew the whole plan from the start, intended from the moment He inspired the composition of the text.

Fr. Giblin's comments lead us into a discussion of what is the principal objection against the theory of the SP today; did God intend this meaning from the moment He inspired the composition of the text? Or does the text acquire a new meaning for a later generation whom God

76 "As Written/' 344. The theory that the word "sense" is used analogously is intelligible, but we do not understand what is meant by analogous knowledge.

77 Ibid., 346. 78 Fr. Giblin, ibid., 349, emphasizes that fulfillment brought something new and

unexpected, a substantial change. In principle we are not opposed. In our Diss., 128-9, we insisted : "When we say that the fuller sense is a development of the literal sense, we are not referring to the terminology of Aristotelian logic." With Coppens (12) we admit an element of newness in the SP; what we refuse to admit is that the literal sense and the SP can refer to historically unrelated ideas. If there is newness and difference, there must also be linear development. The theory of a SP partly the same and partly different should fit in with Fr. Giblin's emphasis on the analogous.

70 The realization throughout Hebrew history that the present stage has preparatory value for the future is an extremely important aspect of the literal sense. On the one hand Fr. Giblin (ibid., 331) tells us that the work of the exegete is not divorced from that of the critic; on the other hand (329) he speaks of a theological aspect of Heilsgeschichte and of a non-theological or strictly literary aspect. If he means that the latter is the object of exegesis, then we believe his concept of exegesis is too narrow. The literal sense concerns a partial theological aspect of Heilsgeschichte; the SP concerns a more complete theological aspect.


has enlightened through revelation ? Frs. McKenzie, Barrosse, and perhaps Vawter80 seem to opt for the latter; McKenzie maintains that we are dealing with a fuller understanding rather than a fuller sense.81 These authors stress that their suggestion would allow God to respect the limitations of the human author in the original inspiration of the text.

We shall not debate this question exhaustively for no one of these scholars has sufficiently developed in writing his own theory of this "fuller understanding" to enable us to appreciate all the advantages of this viewpoint. Presumably the "fuller understanding'' comes from an appreciation of God's plan of revelation: it is not an understanding of what the text says (or else we would be back to a SP) but of how this text may now be seen to fit into the plan of salvation.82 Taking the text in its limited original literal sense, we see how, as such, it was a step in God's plan.

If this presentation of the theory of a "fuller understanding" is correct, we see several difficulties which such a theory will have to encounter. The NT authors in their exegesis of the OT seem to believe they are dealing with a fuller meaning already present in the text, i.e., that the way they understand the text is what God had already said in the OT.83 There is no verbal indication that they are simply seeing the place of the text in the plan of salvation ; rather they seem to speak of the text as referring to their present salvine situation. Now, of course, the approach of the NT authors is rather unsophisticated;84 and we should probably not attempt a conclusive solution of this technical modern problem in hermeneutics on the basis of their phraseology. But, on the other hand, they are our only

80 Vawter's thought is hard to classify. On 295 he rejects the SP and says that he agrees with Charlier's view in Christian Approach. But what Charlier describes as the "spiritual sense" sounds to us like the SP, e.g., (262) : "It will be seen that the spiritual sense is not really distinct from the literal sense, but is already objectively present as one aspect of it . . . it is simply the full realization of the literal sense, even though the writer may not have understood it, even implicitly." In "Méthode," 24-5, Charlier seems to have confirmed our view, for he says that instead of speaking of the literal and spiritual sense it would be more exact to speak of the initial sense and the sens plénier. We are not certain where this leaves Fr. Vawter.

81 Letter to TD, 126. Sutclifïe argues strongly against this view. 82 McKenzie, ibid., speaks of an enrichment which comes from the organic devel

opment of the unified process of salvation. 83 Fitzmyer, 303-5, makes an interesting point: the fulfillment formulae, frequent

in the NT (and found in the OT too—3 Kgs 2, 27), are not found at Qumrân or in the Mishnah.

84 Paul, for instance, in his a fortiori application of Dt 25,4 (1 Cor 9,9), says that God is not speaking for the sake of the oxen but "for our sake." He seems to treat even accommodation as being what the text said.


witnesses to what really happened ; for they are the men who received the inspiration and revelation to interpret the OT in the light of Christ. The burden of proof lies on any hermeneutical theory that runs contrary to the NT authors' understanding of what they were doing.

Another problem that we foresee in this theory of "fuller understanding" is that it seems to create a certain dichotomy in God's action. God must be thought to have foreseen how a particular OT text would be interpreted more deeply against the background of the whole plan of salvation, to have willed that through this deeper interpretation the text play a significant role in helping people to understand that plan, and yet to have withheld any intention of deeper meaning when He inspired that text, out of respect for the limitations of the human author. For instance, would not the theory of "fuller understanding" imply a process something like this : God foresaw that Jesus would be born of a virgin. God moved Isaiah to utter an oracle about a maiden's giving birth to a wonderful child (of the House of David?) who would be a sign of God's presence with His people.85 He knew that centuries after this event the LXX translators would render "maiden" as "virgin" ; He knew that He would inspire Matthew to apply this text to the Davidic birth of Jesus (literally God with us) of the virgin Mary. Yet, when He inspired Isaiah's oracle, He did not intend in the text any reference to Jesus' birth. To us this seems a rather odd and unnecessary dichotomy. The theory of a SP, as we propose it, allows God to respect the limitations of the human author (in respect to the literal sense) and yet to incorporate the text from within into His plan of salvation much more tightly than does the theory of a "fuller understanding."86

And finally we have the problem of a long theological tradition that there was in some way or other a prophetic preparation in the OT for what happened in the NT, and in the NT for what happened in the Church. This preparation was accomplished primarily, we agree, by God's ordination of salvation history.87 Yet can we do full justice to the ancient concept

85 As an hypothesis we assume the view of many modern Catholic authors that the literal sense refers to an event in Isaiah's time. By a SP we refer the text to Jesus. That the text in some sense refers to the virgin birth at Bethlehem, see EBS, #74.

86 For an excellent treatment of the development of God's plan, allowing for the SP, see Levie, 247-9.

87 Let us emphasize, lest we render consolation to those who look with jaundiced eye on all modern Catholic exegesis, that it would be a real misunderstanding of the views of the opponents of the SP to say that they deny prophecy. All that we suggest is that they do not do enough justice to one aspect of prophecy; for they remove from the text itself any real reference to the fulfillment and place the whole burden of prophecy on external ordination. At least, this is our understanding of their view.


of prophecy by completely removing all notion of foretelling? Once again we suggest that the theory of a SP does more justice than does the theory of a "fuller understanding" to some of the elements of prophecy spoken of by the Fathers, theologians, and documents of the Church.

But we assure such scholars as Frs. McKenzie and Vawter that to some extent our differences are theoretical, and not really exegetical. Those who hold the SP would approach the OT with the same tools as those who oppose it; and their literal exegesis (allowing for individual differences) would be of the same quality and orientation. Likewise, our discovery of a SP (without any novel charism which Fr. McKenzie seems to think would be necessary) would involve a theological outlook on the whole plan of salvation, an outlook achieved also by those who propose the theory of "fuller understanding/' Our difference concerns the role of the text in that plan, not the method of literal exegesis nor the value of biblical theology.

Conclusion

The bibliography that follows shows that the theory of a SP has been far from a dead question in these past ten years. It is encouraging to see how many names can be added to our list of 195588 as supporters of the theory: M. Bourke,89 Charlier, de la Potterie, Feuillet,90 Gelin,91 Giblet, Hessler, Huesman,92 Kerrigan, Krumholtz, Levie, Michl, Roland Murphy, Nicolau, O'Rourke, Peinador, Siegman,93 Spicq ( ?),94 to name a few. Some non-Catholics have shown interest.95

Such adherence does not mean that there is no need of further investigation. R. Murphy has remarked: "The primary task that remains to be done is the working out of the SP in actual exegesis.,, This is quite true for if, as we insist, all NT, Patristic, or Liturgical exegesis cannot be classified as SP or as typical sense, then we should get busy classifying such exegesis.

88 Diss., 96. Note that there are names of German scholars in both lists. Fr. McKenzie, "Problems," 202, who regrets that the majority of Catholic scholars seem to be leaning toward the SP theory, seemed somewhat consoled by the report that no German Catholic exegete was interested in the SP.

sa For Gn 3,15 in the Conf. Bulletin of the Archdiocese of NY 32 (1955) 15-28. »o For the mariological ref. of Ap 12, RSR 49 (1961) 349-50. si Sacra Pagina (Gembloux: 1959), I, 304. 92 For Is 7,14 in Isaia (Paulist Pamphlet Series, 1961) I, 11. 93 For Dn 2, CBQ 18 (1956) 379. 94 See n.45 above. 95 Grant, 111-12; also Markus, 80 (though he does not use the term SP) : The

"spiritual sense" of the OT is the meaning which the NT writers find in it when looking back on it in the light of the revelation given in Jesus. That the basic problem is found in Protestant research, see Herbert Hahn, The Old Testament in Modern Research (Phila. : Muhlenberg, 1954) 231.


Especially with regard to the NT, we should distinguish what is typology, what is SP, and what is some form of accommodation. There remains also the problem of the relation of our hermeneutical theory to the newer theories of inspiration.96 We suspect that in the next ten years, as the whole question of inspiration is discussed and clarified, we shall hear more of the problem of the SP.

RAYMOND E. BROWN, S.S.

St. Mary's Seminary Baltimore 10, Md.

96 McKenzie, who is sympathetic with Benoit's broader theory of inspiration (Letter, 126), rejects the SP which Benoit holds. What would K. Rahner think oí the SP in view of his own theory of inspiration? We spoke with him about it for an hour in Rome recently, and one problem that bothered him was the connotation of "sense." Yet see Rahner's remarks in "The Development of Dogma," Theological Investigations (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961) I, p. 62. Rahner and Vorgrimler, Kleines Theologisches Wörterbuch (Freiburg: Herder, 1961), 328, lists the SP as a legitimate Schriftsinn.

O

BIBLIOGRAPHY (see n. 4 above)

Ausejo, Serafín de, O.F.M. Cap., "El 'sensus plenior' de la Sagrada Escritura," EstBib 15 (1956) 95-104 (a review of our Diss.).

Barrosse, Thomas, C.S.C., "The Senses of Scripture and the Liturgical Pericopes," CBQ 21 (1959) 1-23.

Bea, Augustine, S.J., "La Bula Tneffabilis Deus' y la Hermenéutica bíblica," RstaB 82 (1956) 181-6; 83 (1957) 1-6. Latin original in Alma Socia Christi 3 (1955) 1-17.

Benoit, Pierre, O.P., Review of our Diss, in RB 63 (1956) 285-7. Reprinted in Exégèse et Théologie (Paris: Cerf, 1961) I, 19-21.

"La plénitude de sens des livres saints," RB 67 (1960) 161-96. Condensed in TD 9 (1961) 3-8.

Prophecy and Inspiration (Ν.Y. : Desclée, 1961), esp. 147-54. Bläser, Peter, M.S.C., "St. Paul's Use of the Old Testament," TD 2 (1954) 49-52.

Original in TQ 133 (1952) 152-69. Bourke, Myles M., Letter to the Editor re Benoit's article, TD 9 (1961) 66. Brown, Raymond E., S.S., "Communications to the Editor" (re Lagrange's supra-

literal sense) CBQ 17 (1955) 451-5; 18 (1956) 49-53 (with J.P. Weisengoff). Bruce, F.F., Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), Charlier, Célestin, O.S.B., The Christian Approach to the Bible (Westminster:

Newman, 1958) esp. 255-64. Original of this section in MaisDieu 12 (1947) 14-52. "Méthode historique et lecture spirituelle des Écritures," Β VC 18 (1957)

7-26. Coppens, J., "Le problème du sens plénier," ETL 34 (1958) 1-20. de la Potterie, L, S.J., "The Meaning of the Word of God," LumenV 10 (1955) 15-30. Dreyfus, F., O.P., Review of our Diss., BThom 10, n.189, pp. 114-15. Dupont, Jacques, O.S.B., "The Use of the Old Testament in the Acts," TD 3 (1955)

61-4. Original in ETL 29 (1953) 289-327.

1963] THE Sensus Plenior 283

Eichrodt, W., "Ist die typologische Exegese sachgemässe Exegese?" VTSupp 4 (1957) 161-80.

Ellis, E.E., PauYs Use of the Old Testament (Edinburgh: 1957). Encisco, J. "Observaciones acerca del sentido pleno," EstBib 13 (1954) 325-31. Fernández, Andrés, S.J., "Apostillas relativas a los sentidos bíblicos," Bib 37 (1956)

184-98 (a review of our Diss.). Fitzmyer, Joseph Α., S.J., "The Use of Explicit Old Testament Quotations in

Qumran Literature and in the New Testament," NTS 7 (1960-61) 297-333 (esp. 332-3).

Franquesa, Pedro, C.M.F., "Inspiración, causalidad instrumental y sentido pleno," Semana Biblica Española XIV (Madrid: 1954) 187-207.

Giblin, Charles Homer, S J., " As It Is Written . . .'—A Basic Problem in Noematics and Its Relevance to Biblical Theology," CBQ 20 (1958) 327-53; 477-98.

"Structural and Theological Considerations on Luke 15," CBQ 24 (1962) 15-31 (esp. 26-7).

Girbau, Basilio, O.S.B., "Sobre el uso de la Biblia en la liturgia," Liturgica 1 (Schuster volume; Montserrat, 1956) 45-65.

Grant, Robert M., The Letter and the Spirit (N.Y.: Macmillan, 1957). Grelot, P. "L'interprétation catholique des livres saints," Introduction à la Bible, éd.

A. Robert and A. Feuillet (2 ed.; Paris: Desclée, 1959) I, 169-212 (esp. 202-12). Guillet, Jacques, S.J., "Deux aspects du sens spirituel de l'Écriture," Problemi Scelti

di Teologia Contemporanea (Rome : Greg., 1954) 299-305. Hessler, Β., "Zur Frage nach dem 'Vollsinn' der Heiligen Schrift," WissWeis 21

(1958) 134-41. Hill, Edmund, O.P., "Saving the Fathers," Blackfriars 39 (1958) 2-15. Hunt, Ignatius, O.S.B., "Rome and the Literal Sense of Sacred Scripture," AmBenRev

9 (1958) 79-103. Ibañez Arana, Andrés, "El concepto de inspiración y el porvenir del 'sensus plenior/ "

Lumen 2 (1953) 193-219. Condensed in TD 4 (1956) 59-64. Kerrigan, Alexander, O.F.M., "The 'sensus plenior' of Joel, III, 1-5 in Act., II, 14*

36," Sacra Pagina (Gembloux: 1959) II, 295-313. Krumholtz, Robert H., "Instrumentality and the 'Sensus Plenior/" CBQ 20 (1958)

200-205. Lampe, G.W.H. and Woollcombe, K.J., Essays on Typology (Studies in Biblical

Theology, #22, 1957). See our review CBQ 19 (1957) 533-5. Levie, Jean, S.J., The Bible, Word of God in Words of Men (N.Y.: Kenedy, 1961)

esp. 247-72. Mailhiot, M.-D., "La pensée de saint Thomas sur le sens spirituel," RevThom 59

(1959) 6X3-63. Markus, RA., "Presuppositions of the Typological Approach to Scripture," The

Communication of the Gospel in New Testament Times (London: SPCK, 1961) 75-85.

McKenzie, John L., S.J., The Two-Edged Sword (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1956) esp. 295-308.

"Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis," JBL 77 (1958) 197-204.

Letter to the Editor re Benoit's article, TD 9 (1961) 66 and 126. Michl, Johann, "Dogmatischer Schriftbeweis und Exegese," BZ 2 (1958) 1-14.


Miller, Athanasius, O.S.B., "Sui diversi sensi della Sacra Scrittura," Problemi Scelti di Teologia Contemporanea (Rome : Greg., 1954) 233-49.

Muñoz Iglesias, Salvador, Review of del Paramo's El Problema del Sentido Literal Pleno, EstBib 14 (1955) 125-6.

Murnion, Philip J., tfSensus Plenior and the Progress of Revelation," Dunwoodie Review 2 (1962) 117-42.

Murphy, Roland, O.Carm, Review of our Diss, in CBQ 17 (1955) 502-5. Musurillo, Herbert, S.J., "Shadow and Reality: Thoughts on the Pattern of Ty

pology," TS 22 (1961) 455-60. A review of the Eng. tr. of Daniélou's Sacramentum Futuri.

"Symbolism and Kerygmatic Theology," Thought 36 (1961) 59-80. Nicolau, M., "Sentido 'plenior' de la Sagrada Escritura," EstEcl 34 (1960) 349-59. O'Flynn, John, "The Senses of Scripture," IrTQ 22 (1955) 57-66.

Review of our Diss., ibid., 275-6. Oñate, J.Α., "El llamado sentido típico ¿es estrictamente sentido bíblico viejo-testa

mentario?" EstBib 13 (1954) 185-97 and Problemi Scelti di Teologia Contemporanea (Rome: Greg., 1954) 307-17.

O'Rourke, John J. (following articles listed in order of actual composition) "Theology and the Sensus Plenior," AER 143 (1960) 301-6. "Marginal Notes on the Sensus Plenior" CBQ 21 (1959) 64-71. "Notes on the Sensus Plenior," AER 145 (1961) 319-25. "The Fulfillment Texts in Matthew," CBQ 24 (1962) 394-403.

Páramo, Severiano del, S.J., "El 'Misterio' Paulino y el sentido literal pleno," Semana Biblica Españolad (Madrid: 1955) 247-66.

Reply to Muñoz Iglesias' review (see above) EstBib 14 (1955) 309-14. Peinador, Máximo, C.M.F., "Justificación del sentido 'plenior' dentro de las necesi

dades a que responde," Semana Biblica Española XIV (Madrid: 1954) 421-38. "La integración de la exegesis en la teología," Sacra Pagina (Gembloux:

1959) I, 158-79. Puzo, Felix, S.J., "El doble sentido literal del P. Juan Azor," Problemi Scelti di

Teologia Contemporanea (Rome : Greg., 1954) 275-9. Schmid, Josef, "Die alttestamentlichen Zitate bei Paulus und die Theorie vom sensus

plenior," BZ 3 (1959) 161-73. Sebastián, Fernando, C.M.F., "Interpretación teològica de la inspiración," Semana

Biblica Española XIV (Madrid: 1954) 179-86. Smyth, Kevin, "The Inspired Writer as God's Instrument," TD 8 (1960) 15-19.

Original in Scr 6 (1954) 67-75. Spicq, C, O.P., BullThom V i l l i (covering 1947-53) #227-8, pp. 216-17; VIII3

#1386-90, pp. 789-99. "Nouvelles réflexions sur la théologie biblique," RSPT 42 (1958) 209-19

(esp. 216-19). Schildenberger, Johannes, "Altes Testament," Fragen der Theologie Heute (Zurich:

Benziger, 1957) 123-48. Stuhlmueller, Carroll, C.P., "The Influence of Oral Tradition upon Exegesis and

the Senses of Scripture," CBQ 20 (1958) 299-326. Sutcliffe, E., S.J., "The Plenary Sense, Original or Superimposed?" HeyJourn 1

(1960) 68-70. Temiño Saiz, Α., "En torno al problema del 'sensus plenior/" EstBib 14 (1955)

5-47.

1963] THE Sensus Plenior 285

Tuya, Manuel de, O.P., "Anotaciones a un artículo sobre el sensus plenior," CiTom 81 (1954) 627-44. An answer to Ibañez Arana.

Vawter, Bruce, CM., The Conscience of Israel (Ν.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1961) esp. 289-95.

von Rad, Gerhard, "Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament," Interpr 15 (1961) 174-92.

Zarb, S.M., O.P., "De Ubertate Sensus Litteralis in Sacra Scriptura secundum Doctrinam Sancti Thomae Aquinatis," Problemi Scelti di Teologia Contemporanea (Rome: Greg., 1954) 251-73.

Zerafa, P., "The Limits of Biblical Inerrancy," Ang 39 (1962) 92-119.

^ s

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