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Transcript of The Scottish Parliament Starts on next page. The Scottish Parliament.

  • The Scottish ParliamentStarts on next page

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish ParliamentSeptember 2000

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish ParliamentHolyrood Report, Fraser Chapter 8 page 97

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish ParliamentScottish Parliament Project Organisation Structure 2000Multi Headed Client, Fraser Report Chapter 12 page 194

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish Parliament

  • The Scottish ParliamentOther Parliamentary buildings

    http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefings-03/sb03-52.pdf

    Building / Location

    Description

    Cost

    Welsh Assembly - Cardiff

    Small, straight-forward design

    40.997 million (in budget)

    Australian Federal Parliament - Canberra

    Large, complex design

    440 million

    (in budget)

    Reichstag - Berlin

    Large, traditional design

    190 million

    (in budget)

    Portcullis House - Westminster

    Large, traditional design

    235 million

    (over budget)

    European Parliament building - Strasbourg

    Large, complex design

    230 million

    (over budget)

  • (adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)STANDARD PROJECT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES The Scottish Parliament

    TOOLSTANDARD USEAGEUSEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDINGLaunch MeetingUnderstand and agree scope and responsibilitiesProject Manager was not in position at the first meetingAction Plan/Work Breakdown ScheduleIdentify activities, durations, milestones, personnelThis was in place, but not updated, hence uselessActivity Orientated BudgetAllow cost estimates based on historic data gathered on similar projects.Not adopted.Risk Management (budgetary)Identify sources of risk, analyse them and agree a responseRisks were identified and analysed but no action taken.Project Evaluation and Review TechniquesCalculate activity slack/float times and rank in order pessimistic, most likely, optimisticThis does not appear to have been carried out and certainly not adhered to.Gantt ChartSequencing of operationsBovis utilised their own methods, which were criticised by team members as being difficult to understand.Goldratts Critical ChainTo focus on common project issues of unrealistic due dates, too many changes, lack of resources and data, unrealistic budget.Trade offs should have been made between design cost or design time, but this did not occur.Plan Monitor Control CycleSpecific measurement of performance cost and time to allow these items to be controlled. Data should have been collected and regular reports instigated.These reports were compiled, but the findings filtered out by the civil service to give an unrealistic performance report.

  • (adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)The Scottish Parliament

    Earned Value AnalysisMeasurement of % budget spent against completion not a good indicator of completion.Not adopted in this caseProject ControlShould regulate results by altering activities accordingly by correcting errors, considering impact on creativity and innovation. Ineffective as the architect ignored the project managers instructions and requests.Go/No Go SystemAgreed standard must be met before permission is given to continue with another item of work Not adopted instead post-control seems to have been in place.Change ControlRequested changes should be reviewed, impact on other areas evaluated, communicated and agreed prior to action.Not followed architect and client simply agreed changes without informing project manager or other team membersProject EvaluationAppraise progress vs goals and objectives to improve performanceConducted but ignored.Project TerminationDecide whether to continue with an under-performing project based on sunk costs or to terminate and cut losses.Considered but never seriously evaluated.Final ReportMeasure projects performance, admin, organisation structure, project management techniques.Not yet prepared.

    TOOLSTANDARD USEAGEUSEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDING

  • The Scottish Parliamenthttp://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn01-64.pdf

    Mr Davidson drew a number of conclusions in his report including the following;

    it must be noted that in costing terms the Spencely Report indicated a realistic price range expectation of 195 Million to 230Million. This was at a stage when some of the designdifficulties were not fully designed through. The conclusion from this is that the motion put to and passed by the Scottish Parliament, known as the Jackson Motion, which was for afixed cash sum at current prices of 195 Million, was somewhat optimistic and, in light of the complexity of the tender and control process inherited from the previous Scottish OfficeAdministration, nave for such a complicated and indeed unique design.

  • The Scottish Parliamenthttp://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/audit/reports-00/aur00-06-03.htm#ana01

    28 SEPTEMBER 2000.At the Audit Committee meeting on Tuesday, 26 September, Muir Russell agreed to provide notes on a number of issues that were touched on during the evidence taking session on the Auditor General for Scotland's Report on the new Scottish Parliament Building.I thought it would be helpful to put in writing the areas on which the Committee is expecting to receive clarification. These are: Details of the person specification and recruitment method adopted for the replacement project manager

  • The Scottish ParliamentRESPONSE

    Appointment of Project ManagerAs DrGibbons and I told the Committee, we were able to minimise the gap following the resignation of the former project manager because the project team was clear about the type of person and experience needed for project manager in the circumstances of this project and a suitably experienced person was available to transfer to this role. He was at that time project manager on the interim Parliament project (the Mound), performing successfully in that role, so he was a known quantity. His appointment to that post followed a decision to establish separate project management for the interim Parliament project, to ensure its successful delivery and to enable the Holyrood project team to concentrate on the main project itself. He was appointed after discussion with a number of project management companies on how best to secure the capability to move the interim Parliament project forward quickly, and was seconded from Project Management International Plc, of which he was and remains an employee, with reimbursement made to the company

  • The Scottish Parliamenthttp://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03357.pdfLord Fraser highlighted in the Holyrood Inquiry that:the 40 million figure could never have been a realistic estimate for anything other than most basic of new Parliament buildings. However, what can be stated clearly is that at the time 40 million was included in the White Paper, there was no clear understanding whether that was a total cost including professional fees or only a construction cost. It was certainly not explained to the Scottish public what the figure

  • The Scottish ParliamentThe Auditor General Report of 2004 made the following conclusions:SpillageThe main cause of the 20 months delay to the project since September 2000 was theproduction of detailed design variations and the late supply of information during theconstruction process.Cost IncreasesThe main reasons for construction cost increases after 2000 were design developmentand delay in the construction process. The design development was entirely related torealising the detail of the building and aspects such as the quality of finish and thepalette of materials that were used, in accordance with the clients requirements.Project management and controlAlthough it is likely that a high quality building is being delivered, the time and costobjectives have not been met. The same quality could have been achieved for less ifthe whole design and construction process had been better executed.

  • The Scottish ParliamentSummary of the Holyrood Inquirys Conclusions andRecommendationsThe Holyrood Inquiry was published in September 2004 by Lord Fraser.One of the principal conclusions found in the Holyrood Inquiry was that whenever there was a conflict between quality and cost, quality was preferred.Lord Fraser further concluded that since Donald Dewar was determined in building a new parliament for Scotland as soon as possible, the timetable dictated the high risk and fast track procurement route.In regards to the procurement method adopted, there was an inadequate level of evaluation or understanding of the construction management route; subsequently ministers were not informed of all the risks involved.

  • The Scottish ParliamentThe Origins of the 40 million Figure

    The evidence before the Inquiry is reasonably clear that this figure originally came from Mr Wyllie. On 10 June 1997 he minuted Mrs Doig with his costing of the option of onstructinga new building on a greenfield site. Assuming a building with an area of 15,000m gross (11,250m net a net to gross ratio 25%) including 1,000m for the Chamber, 3,000m for Committees and Ministers and 11,000m for the remainder, he put forward figures in the order of 35-40 million.His minute made i