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The Scottish Parliament

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The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

September 2000

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish ParliamentHolyrood Report, Fraser Chapter 8 page 97

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

Scottish Parliament Project Organisation Structure 2000

Multi Headed Client, Fraser Report Chapter 12 page

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

The Scottish Parliament

Other Parliamentary buildings

http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/res

STANDARD PROJECT MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUESTOOL Launch Meeting Action Plan/Work Breakdown Schedule STANDARD USEAGE Understand and agree scope and responsibilities Identify activities, durations, milestones, personnel USEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDING Project Manager was not in position at the first meeting This was in place, but not updated, hence useless

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Activity Orientated BudgetAllow cost estimates based on historic data gathered on similar projects.

Not adopted.

Risk Management (budgetary) Project Evaluation and Review Techniques

Identify sources of risk, analyse them and agree a Risks were identified and analysed but no action taken. response Calculate activity slack/float times and rank in order pessimistic, most likely, optimistic This does not appear to have been carried out and certainly not adhered to.

Gantt Chart

Sequencing of operations

Bovis utilised their own methods, which were criticised by team members as being difficult to understand.

Goldratts Critical Chain

To focus on common project issues of unrealistic Trade offs should have been made between design cost or due dates, too many changes, lack of resources design time, but this did not occur. and data, unrealistic budget.

Plan Monitor Control Specific measurement of performance cost and Cycle time to allow these items to be controlled. Data should have been collected and regular reports instigated.

These reports were compiled, but the findings filtered out by the civil service to give an unrealistic performance report.

(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)

TOOL

STANDARD USEAGE Measurement of % budget spent against completion not a good indicator of completion.

USEAGE ON SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT BUILDING Not adopted in this case

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Earned Value Analysis

Project Control

Should regulate results by altering activities accordingly by correcting errors, considering impact on creativity and innovation.

Ineffective as the architect ignored the project managers instructions and requests.

Go/No Go System

Agreed standard must be met before permission is Not adopted instead post-control seems to have been in given to continue with another item of place. work

Change Control

Requested changes should be reviewed, impact on Not followed architect and client simply agreed changes other areas evaluated, communicated and without informing project manager or other team agreed prior to action. members

Project Evaluation

Appraise progress vs goals and objectives to improve performance

Conducted but ignored.

Project Termination

Decide whether to continue with an underConsidered but never seriously evaluated. performing project based on sunk costs or to terminate and cut losses.

Final Report

Measure projects performance, admin, Not yet prepared. organisation structure, project management techniques.

(adapted from Meredith et al, 2004 and Fraser, 2004)

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This is a good site http:// www.scottish.parliament.uk/vli / holyrood/inquiry/sp205-00.htm Lists everything

The Scottish Parliament

http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/pdf_res_notes/rn01-64.pdf

Mr Davidson drew a number of conclusions in his report including the following; it must be noted that in costing terms the Spencely Report indicated a realistic price range expectation of 195 Million to 230Million. This was at a stage when some of the design difficulties were not fully designed through. The conclusion from this is that the motion put to and passed by the Scottish Parliament, known as the Jackson Motion, which was for a fixed cash sum at current prices of 195 Million, was somewhat optimistic and, in light of the complexity of the tender and control process inherited from the previous Scottish Office Administration, nave for such a complicated and indeed unique design.

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http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/committees/historic/audit/reports-00/aur00-06-03.htm

28 SEPTEMBER 2000. At the Audit Committee meeting on Tuesday, 26 September, Muir Russell agreed to provide notes on a number of issues that were touched on during the evidence taking session on the Auditor General for Scotland's Report on the new Scottish Parliament Building. I thought it would be helpful to put in writing the areas on which the Committee is expecting to receive clarification. These are: Details of the person specification and recruitment method adopted for the replacement project manager

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RESPONSE Appointment of Project Manager As DrGibbons and I told the Committee, we were able to minimise the gap following the resignation of the former project manager because the project team was clear about the type of person and experience needed for project manager in the circumstances of this project and a suitably experienced person was available to transfer to this role. He was at that time project manager on the interim Parliament project (the Mound), performing successfully in that role, so he was a known quantity. His appointment to that post followed a decision to establish separate project management for the interim Parliament project, to ensure its successful delivery and to enable the Holyrood project team to concentrate on the main project itself. He was appointed after discussion with a number of project management companies on how best to secure the capability to move the interim Parliament project forward quickly, and was seconded from Project Management International Plc, of which he was and remains an employee, with reimbursement made to the company

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http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03357.pdf

Lord Fraser highlighted in the Holyrood Inquiry that: the 40 million figure could never have been a realistic estimate for anything other than most basic of new Parliament buildings. However, what can be stated clearly is that at the time 40 million was included in the White Paper, there was no clear understanding whether that was a total cost including professional fees or only a construction cost. It was certainly not explained to the Scottish public what the figure

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The Auditor General Report of 2004 made the following conclusions: Spillage The main cause of the 20 months delay to the project since September 2000 was the production of detailed design variations and the late supply of information during the construction process. Cost Increases The main reasons for construction cost increases after 2000 were design development and delay in the construction process. The design development was entirely related to realising the detail of the building and aspects such as the quality of finish and the palette of materials that were used, in accordance with the clients requirements. Project management and control Although it is likely that a high quality building is being delivered, the time and cost objectives have not been met. The same quality could have been achieved for less if the whole design and construction process had been better executed.

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Summary of the Holyrood Inquirys Conclusions and Recommendations The Holyrood Inquiry was published in September 2004 by Lord Fraser. One of the principal conclusions found in the Holyrood Inquiry was that whenever there was a conflict between quality and cost, quality was preferred. Lord Fraser further concluded that since Donald Dewar was determined in building a new parliament for Scotland as soon as possible, the timetable dictated the high risk and fast track procurement route. In regards to the procurement method adopted, there was an inadequate level of evaluation or understanding of the construction management route; subsequently ministers were not informed of all the risks involved.

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The Origins of the 40 million Figure The evidence before the Inquiry is reasonably clear that this figure originally came from Mr Wyllie. On 10 June 1997 he minuted Mrs Doig with his costing of the option of onstructing a new building on a greenfield site. Assuming a building with an area of 15,000m gross (11,250m net a net to gross ratio 25%) including 1,000m for the Chamber, 3,000m for Committees and Ministers and 11,000m for the remainder, he put forward figures in the order of 35-40 million.His minute made it clear that the figures included professional fees, fit out, furniture and VAT although the position in this respect contrasts with his written recognition in which he said that his figures had excluded site works, fit out, professional fees and VAT. In a further