1

The Science Wars and the Future of the American Academic Profession

Unedited version of article published in:

Daedalus, 1997, 126 (4), 201-20.

It is all too easy to be perplexed about the state of health of academia in

the United States. On the one hand, observers proclaim this "the golden age of

the American university,"1 and it would be hard to disagree based on any sort of

objective measure, such as the competition for admission to selective insitutions,

or the net influx of foreign students. Subjectively, the positive public image of

the American university also seems to be holding.2 At the same time, a steady

stream of jeremiads fills the shelves at bookstores and libraries, lamenting the

catastrophic failure of American higher education to carry out its intended

functions. These portray American colleges and universities as places where

students go to have their minds closed and their spirits killed by tenured radicals

engaged in a giant professorial scam.3 It's difficult to read such books without

feeling we're doing something wrong.

The status of the natural sciences is similarly confusing. Measures based

on student demand are no less positive than in other disciplines. Predictions that

by now we would not be producing enough scientists to replace the increasing

numbers of retirees from academic positions show no signs of coming true.

American scientific research continues to lead the world in most fields, by any

objective or subjective measure. While a good deal of scientific research goes on

outside universities (in contrast to the majority of scholarly work in other

disciplines), surely this leadership is due in very large part to the academic

component.4 Nonetheless, academic scientists sense that all is not well. The

most obvious sign is pressure on research funding. It is telling that the latest

2

federal R&D budget, which barely (if even) keeps up with inflation, is being

celebrated as a "significant achievement" compared to what might have

happened.5 Issues on which scientists may think they have the most authority

slip completely out of their jurisdiction, and become topics of debate in Congress

and the media. What is the proper balance between fundamental and applied

research? How widespread is the problem of scientific fraud, and what

can/should be done about it? What are the consequences of the increasing

proportion of industrial sponsorship of academic research, and of the

burgeoning entrepreneurial behavior of academic scientists — is the potential for

conflict-of-interest significantly dangerous? And many more.

These lurking problems are mostly specific to the natural sciences. Do the

more general problems of the university apply to science as well? The critics

tend to draw fairly heavy lines between science and the rest of the university,

and exclude scientists from the most virulent attacks (aside from the universal

complaint of slighting teaching at the expense of research). But if as scientists we

take any comfort from this partial exculpation, it must be balanced against the

implicit criticism of our roles as members of the academic profession. Science is

portrayed as a completely separate enterprise in academia, with little interaction

or even mutual awareness between it and the other disciplines. The implications

of the departmental structure of American universities, and the conflicting

demands of disciplinary vs. institutional loyalty, have been discussed before;6

but here the consequences are presented in a particularly dire light. As described

by Bloom, "the scientists have had less and less to say to, and to do with, their

colleagues in the social studies and humanities. The university has lost whatever

polis-like character it had and has become like the ship on which the passengers

3

are just accidental fellow travelers soon to disembark and go their separate

ways."7

In this context, recent developments in the relationship between science

and the other disciplines must strike one as supremely ironic. Scholars in the

social sciences and humanities are increasingly looking to the sciences for

subjects to study, and scientists are increasingly becoming aware of this work —

but does this mean that we are finally beginning the work of lowering barriers?

Apparently not: according to the reactions of (some) scientists, we are dealing

with a trend that looks much more like a cross-border invasion than a cross-

boundary collaboration. And this trend has been characterized as a potentially

serious threat, both to science and to the academy. In the balance of this essay, I

will briefly summarize the history and substance of what have come to be known

as the Science Wars, offer a recommendation for a more charitable view of

science studies by scientists, and try to assess their potential for affecting, both

for good and ill, the future of the scientific enterprise and the academic

profession.

A BRIEF CHRONICLE OF THE SCIENCE WARS

Arguably, the person who has had the greatest influence on scholarly

titles in recent years (since the invention of the colon, perhaps?) is George Lucas.

A search of the computerized catalogs of two modest university collections

(Caltech and the Claremont Colleges) yielded well over 50 books, all published

since the appearance of Star Wars in 1977, with the phrase "X Wars" in their titles

— Aspirin Wars, Car Wars, Erotic Wars, Gene Wars, Memory Wars, Mind Wars,

Sperm Wars, Time Wars, and so on — not even counting individual articles.

4

And now we have Science Wars. The phrase (probably derived from

"Culture Wars") has become popularized, primarily by a special issue of the

journal Social Text (more on that shortly); but what are they about, and who are

the forces on each side? Basically these are turf wars. Can those who are not

professional, trained, practicing scientists speak on what science is about and

how it works, or do scientists remain the sole authorities on these issues? In

antebellum times (say before the 60's) scientists were largely unthreatened by

nonscientists studying science. History of science tended to be primarily of a

celebratory nature, while philosophy of science (as viewed by scientists) is, well,

philosophy — it's not about anything real.

But things have changed, and the publication of Thomas Kuhn's The

Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 is often identified as a key factor in that

change. Of course, there is a long tradition of inquiry into the nature of

knowledge. But Kuhn's work, perhaps granted an extra measure of authority by

his credentials as a physicist, served for many to legitimate the notion that

scientific knowledge is not a simple and rational consequence of "the way the

world really is," and led to a number of alternative approaches to the study of

science over the next decades. Perhaps the first systematic one was the "Strong

Programme" initiated at Edinburgh in the early '70s, which constituted a

sociological treatment of scientific knowledge. Such studies of science are

centered on the concept of social constructivism — that scientific facts are

constructed by the activities of scientists, rather than sitting out there in Nature,

waiting to be picked up.

5

Since then an extensive body of science studies, from a variety of

viewpoints — social, cultural, linguistic, feminist, etc. — has burgeoned. These

vary widely in many aspects — commitment to realism or relativism, respect for

or hostility towards the scientific enterprise, etc. — and it would be both

misleading and unfair to try to capture them all in a simple description. They do

all call into question the traditional view of what science is about and how it

works, though, and it would not be at all surprising for them to provoke at least

some sense of disturbance among scientists. Nonetheless, for a long time (until

around 1990) there was little evidence that scientists paid much attention to these

movements. If we represent the Science Wars as a Lucasian film trilogy, the

appropriate title for the first reel would be The Mouse that Roared.8

Scientists did begin taking notice in the early '90s, and for this second

phase we can use Lucas' title: The Empire Strikes Back is a very apt description of

the responses that started showing up in print. The first significant attacks,

focusing on the social constructivist school, were incorporated in books

published in 1992 by physicist Steven Weinberg and biologist Lewis Wolpert.9 In

1994 the battle lines were drawn for all to see. An account of a heated debate

between Wolpert and sociologist of science Harry Collins at a meeting of the

British Association for the Advancement of Science appeared in the (London)

Times Higher Education Supplement, while an anti-constructivist meeting of the

National Academy of Scholars was featured in US papers such as the Boston

Globe. But the main event so far — the grand declaration of war — was the book

Higher Superstition by biologist Paul Gross and mathematician Norman Levitt,10

which examined a number of areas of study, and concluded that they constitute a

general movement that is hostile to science, arrogant in its assumption of

competence, and aimed at overthrowing scientific authority. As a sequel, the

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authors organized a meeting of the New York Academy of Sciences in 1995,

entitled "The Flight from Science and Reason."11

The targets of these attacks began regrouping, and put forth an organized

defense of their positions in the afore-mentioned special issue of Social Text,

which appeared in 1996.12 However, the defenders unknowingly harbored a fifth

columnist! An article by physicist Alan Sokal, entitled "Transgressing the

Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,"13

was accepted for this special issue. Simultaneously with its publication, Sokal

revealed that his article was a parody, deliberately crammed with as much

nonsense as possible and submitted to test whether the hoax would be detected.14

Inevitably, it was this aspect of the issue — what has come to be known as The

Sokal Affair — that got all the attention. Letters and Op-Ed pieces, both praising

and condemnatory, filled the New York Times for weeks, and continue to echo in

a wide range of scholarly and popular media, most visibly in a recent issue of

Newsweek.15

A FEW NOTES FROM A WAR CORRESPONDENT

I first became interested in science studies about 5 years ago. The

suggestion that high barriers between science and the other academic disciplines

are detrimental to the health of the university seemed right to me, and I was also

dissatisfied with the demarcations between my own professional pursuits —

then strictly scientific — and my extracurricular interests. Some of my initial

reading forays into social studies of science proved quite intriguing, but also

disappointing, because the authors exhibited little apparent interest in attracting

scientists to their work, and often indulged in rhetoric that couldn't help but

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provoke some scientists to antagonism, even if unintentionally. I expressed some

of these thoughts in an article, which was published in Social Studies of Science,

along with a set of responses.16 By and large the latter were quite positive,

recognizing the need for developing dialogs between the two camps.

I was dismayed, therefore, by the outbreak of war signaled by the

appearance of the Gross and Levitt book, and its call for scientists to change their

attitude towards science studies from benign neglect to active combat. While

perhaps few have yet rallied to that banner, some in prominent positions have

done so. For example, in a guest editorial in Chemical & Engineering News (the

weekly organ received by all members of the American Chemical Society), Allen

Bard, editor of the prestigious Journal of the American Chemical Society, opined:

"Scientists should also confront the sociologists and philosophers at their

institutions who are attacking the foundations of science. Presumably, tenure

decisions and promotions at universities are based on scholarship, and academic

scientists must take an interest in the academic decisions in other departments on

campus. This is not a question of academic freedom, but rather one of

competency."17 I did say that I hoped to see more interactions between different

disciplines, but that's not quite the sort of thing I meant!

Is this really about an attack on the foundations of science? And can

scientists simply dismiss such work as incompetent? Obviously I can't address

the full range of topics; Higher Superstition alone criticizes 4 major groups (so

defined on the basis of getting an entire chapter to themselves) — social

constructivism, postmodern literary and cultural criticism, feminist criticism, and

radical environmentalism — along with several smaller movements, and other

writers have still longer hit lists. But I would like to comment briefly on one

8

aspect — social constructivism — and to argue for a much more positive

interpretation of what (some of) these science studies are trying to do.

The bare idea that scientific knowledge is socially constructed may be

fleshed out in a number of ways, ranging from the mild position that social

factors affect scientific practice — even Gross and Levitt find that perfectly

acceptable18 — to the extreme view that the laws of nature themselves are socially

determined, caricatured by Sokal's invitation that those who so believe try

transgressing those laws from his 23rd floor apartment. A philosopher (not a

social constructivist) has offered a more moderate statement:

The deep point of the sociological critique is that the social forces that operate in this

modification of practice — the rules for consensus shaping, the conversations with peers,

the training process and broader socialization within a larger community — may be

sufficiently powerful that the effects of nature are negligible.19

which has been given much more vivid voice, as for example the oft-quoted (but

incorrectly; see below): "The natural world in no way constrains what is believed

to be." Most scientists would, I believe, reject this version, as indeed do many in

the science studies world as well. Philosopher Susan Haack, for example: "Bad

sociology of science is thus purely sociological, whereas good sociology of

science, acknowledging the relevance of evidential considerations, is not."20

Noting the possibility of "bad good sociology of knowledge" — sociology done

poorly though taking the right approach — she charitably (and symmetrically)

recognizes the possibility of "good bad sociology" — that studies based on a

purely sociological perspective could nonetheless yield valuable results. But she

9

insists that any such accomplishment would be mostly by chance (like the blind

squirrel that occasionally finds an acorn?).

I propose a different perspective, that starts from the correct version of the

above quote: "The appropriate attitude for conducting this kind of enquiry is to

assume that 'the natural world in no way constrains what is believed to be'."21

That's quite different: it represents the "social is all" view as a methodological

starting point, not an ideology or a conclusion. In this sense, what Haack calls

bad sociology is not denying the relevance of Nature, but simply bracketing it

out of consideration, in order to focus on the social. And certainly such a

research strategy should not seem foreign to any scientist, as Haack herself

points out: "What is distinctive about inquiry in the sciences is, rather: systematic

commitment to criticism and testing, and to isolating one variable at a time...." (my

italics).22 Granting that there is a social dimension to the scientific endeavor —

without necessarily specifying its magnitude — and that it is worthy of scholarly

examination, then a social constructivist approach can be viewed as just one

possible experimental design strategy, and one that may not be so unreasonable

according to traditional scientific standards.

Certainly a constructivist approach is not the only strategy, and I have

argued for its shortcomings in my earlier article.16 Furthermore, it must be

acknowledged that many (most?) of those engaged in science studies would

refuse to concede either the non-uniqueness or the incompleteness of their

approaches; also that they are prone to making flamboyant rhetorical claims that

offend those who are committed to any sort of realist position. So it is not

surprising that this particular battleground is one of the main sites where the

Science Wars are fought. But perhaps a small shift of perspective can allow us to

10

fit it within our traditional understanding of scholarly — even experimental —

work, and to recognize the possibility of obtaining useful insights even though

we may not like the starting premise.

I believe a number of projects in cultural and literary criticism of science

(usually attacked under the blanket term of postmodernism, which may make up

in convenience some of what it lacks in definition) may be similarly

reconstituted, although a detailed discussion would be out of place here. We all

find ourselves living in a world that is completely permeated by science and its

products; and it seems to me perfectly understandable that many of those who

are not practicing scientists nonetheless feel the urge to bring their own

professional expertise to bear in the attempt to make sense of this scientific

world.

Now, nothing in this section should be taken to deny that some science

studies are incompetently done, or are motivated by a clearly hostile stance, or

exhibit tones that might be reasonably characterized as arrogant. Bad work

(whether "bad good" or "bad bad" by Haack's criteria) is always with us.23 It also

must be admitted that rigorous criteria for deciding whether a piece of work is

good or bad are hard to come by. For this reason, Sokal's "prank," which has

been lauded by some and condemned by others, seems to me quite appropriate.

We need some kind of assay, and Sokal has provided an experimental one (note

the title of his Lingua Franca article). Complaints about betrayal of trust and the

like are beside the point; we would like assurance that the system is capable of

distinguishing between sound work and garbage, and the results of this

particular experiment were less than encouraging.

11

Nevertheless, I hope that scientists would recognize that much of the

work that has been characterized as attacking the foundations of science may

actually be part of the same project, viewed on the largest scale, that they

themselves are engaged in. Compare Herschbach's mountain-climbing

metaphor for science:

[I]t is vital to have some scientists willing to explore unorthodox paths, perhaps straying

far from the route favored by consensus. By going off in what is deemed the wrong way,

such a maverick may discern the right path. Hence in science, it is not even desirable,

much less necessary or possible, to be right at each step.24

THE (PRESENT AND) FUTURE OF THE SCIENCE WARS

We need a title for the third reel of the Science Wars epic — what shall it

be? From the point of view of science, Much Ado About Nothing may well be the

most appropriate. There is little or no evidence that the "assault" on science and

reason has had any measurable effect on science itself, dire proclamations like

the following (from a philosopher, not a scientist) notwithstanding:

In Feyerabend's view, science is a religion, for it rests on certain dogmas which cannot be

rationally justified....Because most scientists can't justify their methodology, Feyerabend's

claims have gone largely unanswered. As a result, Feyerabend's position has become

prominent in both academia and the public at large. This has arguably led not only to

the rise of pseudoscience and religious fundamentalism, but also to a shrinking pool of

scientific jobs and research funds.25

12

There may well be a shrinking pool of scientific jobs and research funds,

but is it because the public at large (or Congress at small) has taken

Feyerabendism to heart? I think not. The countersuggestion that scientists

blame science studies for their plight rather than confronting the true culprits —

the end of the Cold War and consequent reductions in defense-related research,

and the deficit-induced pressure on budgets for science26 — is also off the mark.

Science is undergoing change because it is entering a no-growth regime, simply

because it can't grow anymore. Price was one of the first to note that the

scientific endeavor has been growing exponentially and continuously for several

centuries. Using the number of scientific journals as a quantitative measure, he

found fairly smooth exponential growth, with a doubling period of about 15

years, applies over the entire period of 1750-1950. Clearly such growth couldn't

continue indefinitely — without making everyone in the world a scientist, it can't

continue much at all past the present — and this enforced demographic

transition is more than enough to account for the strains on the scientific

community.27

(If I might digress for a moment, the growth of academia shows very

similar behavior. Figure 1 plots number of faculty in US academic institutions

from 1880-1980.28 The exponential growth is, again, remarkably smooth,

persisting through all the changes in emphasis and historical events during that

century. If these data are representative, they do not reflect common wisdom,

such as: "It is obvious...that the intrusion of the federal government into higher

education since the end of World War II...[made] for an expansion of the

professoriate to a size almost inconceivable when the United States dropped its

atom bombs over Japan."29 There is no corresponding deviation in the graph.

Furthermore, the growth rate — a doubling period of about 16 years — is almost

13

identical to that determined for science by Price! Is there some innate

institutional growth rate operating here? In any case, clearly academia has

reached or is about to reach an impenetrable ceiling just as science has, and

doubtless some of the current upheaval should be ascribed to that same cause.)

So if science isn't really threatened, why is there so much agitation? Sokal

has proposed that these are primarily civil wars within the other disciplines:

Finally, within academia and the left, this affair tapped into a pre-existing pool of

consternation and resentment among non-postmodernist academics in the humanities

and social sciences (of which I, as a scientist, was largely unaware). It's this latter factor

14

that has kept the affair going — in the form of innumerable forums, colloquia and

debates — in academia.30

I think that's probably pretty accurate. At the "Flight from Science and Reason"

conference, the majority of participants were non-scientists, as Gross points out,31

and some of the most virulent attacks came from that group (see below). My

own (mostly anecdotal) experience is also consistent with this interpretation.

Very few practicing scientists have yet become aware that anything is happening

at all. If I mention to a colleague that I'm writing on the "Science Wars," the

inevitable response is "what's that?"; and when I gave a talk on the topic to a

group of inorganic chemists last summer (when the Sokal affair was still going

strong in the newspapers), exactly one hand went up (in an audience of nearly

100) when I asked who had read or even just heard of the Gross & Levitt book.

(A "science wars briefing" in a recent issue of Nature32 may help to raise scientific

awareness.)

Furthermore, I've seen no documentation for the claim that anti-science

attitudes have diffused into the general public. A 1995 NSF-funded poll showed

not only that the popular attitude towards science is strongly positive but, more

importantly, that the level of support has remained essentially constant since the

surveys began in 1979.33 If the "postmodern attacks" on science were having any

significant impact outside academia, surely one would expect some downward

trend during this period.

What about the impact within academia itself, then? Beyond the sound

and fury, is anything tangible happening? This is the question of greatest

relevance to our concern about the academic profession. I have little data, but

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there are a couple of intriguing cases, most notably in the form of two non-

hirings at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Studies.

About six years ago an offer of a position to prominent science studier

Bruno Latour was in the works, but scientists at the institute objected. Particle

physicist Frank Wilczek commented:

Roughly speaking, this school [of science studies] takes the techniques anthropologists

have used to study preliterate cultures — going in without preconceptions and observing

— and applies [these methods] to science. That is clearly inappropriate in the study of

modern science. You can't make sense of the endeavor without reference to what it is

about. It is a human endeavor and scientists have all the human motivations, but

ultimately the test is a confrontation with reality.34

As I've commented earlier, it is not at all clear to me that observing without

preconceptions is an inappropriate method. Even if one agrees (as I do) with the

last phrase of Wilczek's quote, the key word there is "ultimately." Nonetheless,

the offer was withdrawn. At the time, the event did not attract much general

attention. Now history has repeated itself, with the overturning of an

appointment to historian of science Norton Wise; and this time the controversy

has spilled over into the academic world at large, as a new battle in the Science

Wars.35

How might the evolution of the Science Wars play out in academia? I can

imagine two distinct (but by no means mutually exclusive) scenarios.

Continuing with our movie title schema, I'll call the first of these the I'm Gonna

Git You Sucka! scenario. Recall the suggestion, cited earlier, that scientists should

16

monitor tenure decisions in other departments. That has been amplified and

expanded, as in the following two quotes (both from philosophers) at the NYAS

meeting:

Walk a few steps away from the faculties of science, engineering, medicine, or law,

towards the faculty of arts. Here you will meet another world, one where falsities and

lies are tolerated, nay manufactured and taught, in industrial quantities....This fraud has

got to be stopped, in the name of intellectual honesty....Let them do that anywhere else

they please, but not in schools; for these are supposed to be places of learning. We

should expel the charlatans from the university....36

The sole remedy at our disposal is to quarantine the antiscience brigades and inoculate

the rest of the population against them. This requires that those who know something

about science — I mean scientists — will have to devote some of their energy to

systematic confrontation with the enemies of science....37

A disturbing aspect of these diatribes, beyond the apocalyptic tone, is the

implication that a number of movements, each comprised of many scholars with

widely ranging goals and methods, can nonetheless be linked together as the

"antiscience brigades." This is a strategy of "unite and conquer" that avoids the

need to treat an individual case on its own merits, when guilt by association can

be imposed instead. In the Wise case several commentators (including Wise

himself) suggested that this was the main factor in his rejection, as he is not

generally considered to be as controversial and "far out" within the field of

science studies as Latour.

17

A quote from Gross and Levitt, if stated less stridently than the above,

offers an even more threatening proposition:

The humanities, as traditionally understood, are indispensable to our civilization and to

the prospects of living a fulfilling life within it. The indispensability of professional

academic humanists, on the other hand, is a less certain proposition....If, taking a fanciful

hypothesis, the humanities department at MIT (a bastion, by the way, of left-wing

rectitude) were to walk out in a huff, the scientific faculty could...patch together a

humanities curriculum, to be taught by the scientists themselves....[that] would be, we

imagine, no worse than operative....The notion that scientists and engineers will always

accept as axiomatic the competence and indispensability for higher education of

humanists and social scientists is altogether too smug.38

There are many possible comments, such as what should we make of Gross and

Levitt's accusation of arrogance on the part of humanists and social scientists in

light of the last quote;39 but let the obvious one suffice: if these polemics are

translated from the realm of rhetoric to that of action, the potential for destroying

the quality of life in the academic profession seems virtually limitless.

But there is, I would like to believe, an upside potential as well. If it is

true that the rigid and near-universal separation between science and other

disciplines has been and is undesirable, is it possible that the Science Wars could

be converted, from a wedge to separate them further, into a bridge (forgive the

overused metaphor) to rejoin them? This might be the Terms of Endearment

scenario. Collaboration, or at least more mutual awareness, between scientists

and those engaged in science studies may provide a mechanism whereby each

side can get a better idea of what their opposite numbers are up to.

18

I do not want to pretend that this is going to be easy to achieve. To start

off, as has often been observed, the practice of science readily consumes all the

time that is granted to it. It is quite understandable that the majority of academic

scientists, especially young ones struggling for tenure, would feel that devoting

any fraction of that time to matters outside their mainstream research — even if

they were interested in doing so — could not be justified.40 And of course the

structure of academia only reinforces that conclusion: it rarely offers much in the

way of rewards for such interdisciplinary pursuits, or even for critical

examination of one's own discipline.

At the same time, a scientist making exploratory moves in the direction of

science studies can encounter indications that the welcome mat may not be out.

These include some of the examples of rhetorical excess alluded to earlier, which

can make it difficult to focus on possible joint agendas, as well as what seem to

be explicit rejections of the desirability of cross-boundary interactions, such as:

[T]he social epistemologist should engage in what ethnomethodologists call "participant

observation" of scientific practices. In other words, she should learn to ply her trade in

the presence of those whose company she is most likely to loathe.41

[T]he opinions of scientists about science studies are not of much importance....The vision

we develop of science does not have to resemble what scientists think about science, any

more than the understanding a physician has about the inner workings of my body must

resemble what I feel of it.42

19

But we should not make too much out of rhetoric — especially out of

individual soundbites. People say different things at different times and places,

as chemist Dudley Herschbach noted at the NYAS meeting,43 and many of those

engaged in science studies, including the last two quoted above, have elsewhere

expressed interest in reconciliation. Indeed, there are examples of productive

interactions between scientists and science studiers, even though hostilities get

all the press. So perhaps the barriers are not insurmountable.44

What is to be gained by striving to surmount them? First and foremost, as

already indicated, is to begin reversing the fragmentation of the university. If we

agree that sharp disciplinary separation is not beneficial to the health of the

academic profession, such moves are essential. Beyond that, I believe there are

potential advantages for science studies and science alike. I discussed these in

my earlier paper16 and will not repeat them here in detail; generally I argued that

science studies would benefit from collaborations with practicing scientists,

while the latter might well find that some of the ideas introduced and elaborated

by science studies give them new and stimulating insights into the way they do

their work. The intersection of science and public policy is an obvious locus for

productive interactions as well.

One topic of particular relevance to the academic profession is science

education. Science studies can claim to have debunked the idealized model of

science that Kitcher has termed Legend,45 but I expect that any practicing

scientist has already learned that lesson from his experience. (That may in part

explain why some scientists are little impressed by science studies.) The teaching

of science, on the other hand, is usually thoroughly imbued with Legend, from

beginning surveys for non-science majors all the way up through graduate

20

courses. This was brought home to me a few years ago, reading the student

evaluations of an advanced course I taught on catalysis. For such a course,

which covers primarily recent and still ongoing work, I like to present a good

deal of the material in case-study mode. That is, I might describe some of the

first experiments on a given topic, explain how they led to a certain conclusion,

then show how later work changed the interpretation, and so on. A number of

students didn't care for this at all. "It's too confusing," one evaluation read, "why

can't you just give us the facts?" I found this response rather surprising,

especially from graduate students who would shortly be going out into the real

world and engaging in that sort of process themselves. On reconsideration,

perhaps it isn't so surprising, if the majority of their education has led them to

view science as the unproblematic generation of facts — a view which isn't

significantly changed until they enter into the actual practice of science.

Herschbach has experienced this as well:

Many students [in introductory science courses] have told me about a disheartening

syndrome: the questions and problems seem to have only one right answer, to be found

by some canonical procedure. The student who does not quickly grasp the "right" way,

or finds it uncongenial, is soon likely to become alienated from science....Nothing could

be further from what actual frontier science is like.46

I would make a similar argument concerning the science we teach to those

who are not going to become scientists: is it desirable that they be taught

according to a model that we don't take seriously? As noted earlier, many

scientific critics are worried about the negative impact of science studies on the

public image of science.47 If the more extreme versions of

relativism/constructivism were to be accepted as common wisdom, that

21

certainly would be disastrous; but I see little or no evidence that there is any

significant danger of that happening. On the other hand, an overly idealized

public understanding of how science works is also dangerous: when science

(inevitably) fails to live up to the ideal, there will always be the possibility of

disenchantment and backlash. Two of my Caltech colleagues have argued

convincingly that such misunderstanding is a major factor in much of the recent

agitation over scientific "misconduct."48 Perhaps, in teaching science, the

addition of a dose of science studies might be beneficial.49

To close, I would support the above-cited call for scientists to pay some

attention to their colleagues outside of science — but not as a confrontation of

enemies. No doubt there are some enemies out there; but if, as argued here, they

pose little real threat to science, the time and energy required would be much

more profitably expended in a positive engagement — to the possible benefit of

science and science studies, as well as the highly probable benefit of the

academic profession — than in escalating the Science Wars to the next level of

bellicosity.

ENDNOTES 1. See Thomas Bender, "Politics, Intellect, and the American University, 1945-

1995," Daedalus 126 (Winter 1997): 1-38; and references cited therein. 2.. See Kenneth Prewitt, "America's Research Universities under Public Scrutiny,"

in Jonathan R. Cole, Elinor G. Barber, and Stephen R. Graubard, Eds., The

Research University in a Time of Discontent (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1994), 203-217.

22

3. Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: Simon and Schuster,

1987; Page Smith, Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America (New York:

Viking, 1990); Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics has Corrupted Our

Higher Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1990); Charles J. Sykes, ProfScam:

Professors and the Demise of Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: Regnery

Gateway, 1988). 4. In a recent assessment of scientific research output, based on citation analysis,

the US, UK and Canada came out with unexpectedly high ratings compared to

France and Germany, both countries with strong science traditions and

reputations. The author suggested this might be due to the preponderance of

research in universities in the former group vs. dedicated research institutes in

the latter: the university may be a better environment to foster high-quality

research. (Robert M. May, "The Scientific Wealth of Nations," Science 275 (1997):

793-796.) Alternatively, of course, it may just be that citation analysis doesn't

really tell us very much about quality. 5. Andrew Lawlor, "Smoother Road for R&D Spending?" Science 275 (1997): 916-

919. 6. See Walter P. Metzger, "The Academic Profession in the United States," Tony

Becher, "The Disciplinary Shaping of the Profession," and Kenneth P. Ruscio,

"Many Sectors, Many Professions," all in Burton R. Clark, Ed., The Academic

Profession: National, Disciplinary, and Institutional Settings (Berkeley, CA:

University of California Press, 1987). Of interest in this regard is a recent survey

reporting that 77% of US academics considered affiliation with their academic

discipline to be very important, while only 36% felt the same about institutional

affiliation: Ernest L. Boyer, Philip G. Altbach, and Mary Jean Whitelaw, The

23

Academic Profession: An International Perspective (Princeton, NJ: The Carnegie

Foundation, 1994), 80. 7. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, 350. 8. Recalling the 1959 movie in which a the leaders of a small, impoverished

nation devise a plan to declare war on the US and lose, thus ensuring future

prosperity; but unfortunately they schedule their invasion for a holiday, and it

goes completely unnoticed. 9. Steven Weinberg, Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Fundamental Laws

of Nature (New York: Pantheon, 1992); Lewis Wolpert, The Unnatural Nature of

Science: Why Science Does Not Make (Common) Sense (London: Faber & Faber,

1992). 10. Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt, Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its

Quarrels with Science (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 11. The proceedings were subsequently published: Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt,

and Martin W. Lewis, Eds., The Flight from Science and Reason (New York: New

York Academy of Sciences, 1996). 12. Social Text 14 (Spring/Summer 1996), reprinted with the addition of a number

of articles (and the deletion of one — Sokal's) as Andrew Ross, Ed., Science Wars

(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 13. The text of this article, as well as a number of commentaries and many links to

related work, may be found at the following Website:

http://weber.u.washington.edu/~jwalsh/sokal/ 14. Alan D. Sokal, "A Physicist Experiments with Cultural Studies," Lingua Franca

(May/June 1996): 62-64. 15. Sharon Begley, "The Science Wars," Newsweek (April 21, 1997): 54-57.

24

16. Jay A. Labinger, "Science as Culture: A View from the Petri Dish," Social

Studies of Science 25 (1995): 285-306; and following articles. 17. Allen J. Bard, "The Antiscience Cancer," Chemical & Engineering News (April

22, 1996): 5. 18. Gross and Levitt, Higher Superstition, 43-44. 19. Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity

Without Illusions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 162. 20. Susan Haack, "Towards a Sober Sociology of Science," in Gross et al., The Flight

from Science and Reason, 259-265. 21. H. M. Collins, "‘Son of Seven Sexes: The Social Destruction of a Physical

Phenomenon," Social Studies of Science, 11 (1981): 33-62. 22. Haack, "Towards a Sober Sociology of Science," 261. 23. There is a rule to this effect, known as Sturgeon's Law. When challenged that

90% of science fiction is crap, SF author Theodore Sturgeon freely agreed, but

countered that 90% of anything is crap. I cite this not in support of the magnitude

he proposed, but simply as a reminder that judging a whole by a few of its more

egregious parts can be highly misleading. 24. Dudley R. Herschbach, "Imaginary Gardens with Real Toads," in Gross et al.,

The Flight from Science and Reason, 11-30. 25. Theodore Schick, from a paper given at a conference titled "Science in the Age

of (Mis)Information" sponsored by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation

of Claims of the Paranormal, as reported in the New York Times, July 7, 1996. 26. See, for example, Dorothy Nelkin, "The Science Wars: Response to a Marriage

Failed," in Ross, Science Wars, 114-122. 27. Derek da Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science...and Beyond (New York:

Columbia University Press, 1963). See also David L. Goodstein, "Scientific Elites

25

and Scientific Illiterates," Engineering & Science, 56 (Spring 1993): 23-31; John

Ziman, Prometheus Bound: Science in a Dynamic Steady State (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1994); Rodney W. Nichols, "Federal Science Policy

and Universities: Consequences of Success," in Cole et al., The Research University

in a Time of Discontent, 271-298. 28. Data from Metzger, "The Academic Profession in the United States," 124. 29. Stephen R. Graubard, "The Research University: Notes toward a New

History," in Cole et al., The Research University in a Time of Discontent, 361. 30. Alan D. Sokal, posted on an e-mail discussion list, Dec. 12, 1996. A similar

view is suggested in John R. Searle, "Rationality and Realism, What Is at Stake?"

in Cole et al., The Research University in a Time of Discontent, 55-83. 31. Paul R. Gross, Letter to the Editor, Chronicle of Higher Education (October 20,

1995): B3. 32. Nature 387 (May 22, 1997): 331-335. 33. Andrew Lawlor, "Support for Science Stays Strong," Science 272 (May 31,

1996): 1256. 34. David Berreby, "...that damned elusive Bruno Latour," Lingua Franca

(September/October 1994): 24 35. Liz McMillen, "The Science Wars Flare at the Institute for Advanced Study,"

Chronicle of Higher Education (may 16, 1997), A13. 36. Mario Bunge, "In Praise of Intolerance to Charlatanism in Academia," in Gross

et al., The Flight from Science and Reason, 96-115. 37. Barry R. Gross, "Flights of Fancy: Science, Reason, and Common Sense," in

Gross et al., The Flight from Science and Reason, 79-86. 38. Gross and Levitt, Higher Superstition, 242-243.

26

39. One might counter with a diploma form suggested by a scientist in 1955: "The

Johns Hopkins University certifies that John Wentworth Doe does not know

anything but Biochemistry. Please pay no attention to any pronouncement he

may make on any other subject, particularly when he joins with others of his

kind to save the world from something or other. However, he worked hard for

this degree and is potentially a most valuable citizen. Please treat him kindly."

(Cited in John C. Burnham, How Superstition Won and Science Lost (New

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 251.) Presumably the truth lies

somewhere in between? 40. On the other hand, it might be noted — admittedly rather cynically — that as

scientists find it increasingly difficult to obtain full funding for that mainstream

research, the possibility of engaging in some (relatively inexpensive) part-time

work at the borders of science may start to look more attractive. 41. Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric and the End of Knowledge (Madison, WI:

University of Wisconsin Press, 1993), 311. 42. Bruno Latour, Letter to the Editor, The Sciences (March/April 1995): 6-7 43. Herschbach, "Imaginary Gardens with Real Toads," 15. 44. A reviewer wondered whether the increasing numbers of women and

minorities who become practicing scientists might make a difference, since their

viewpoints play prominent roles in critiques of science. Again there is little hard

data, but my impression is that the (lack of) awareness of science studies is

essentially the same among these groups as for scientists in general. 45. Kitcher, The Advancement of Science, 3-10. 46. Herschbach, "Imaginary Gardens with Real Toads," 17. 47. Concern for the public image of science does not necessarily imply respect for

those who try to do something about it, as Gould pointed out in his eulogy for

27

the late Carl Sagan: Stephen Jay Gould, "Bright Star Among Billions," Science 275

(1997): 599. 48. James Woodward and David Goodstein, "Conduct, Misconduct and the

Structure of Science," American Scientist 84 (September-October 1996): 479-490. 49. A similar argument was offered in a recent editorial in Nature: "Science Wars

and the Need for Respect and Rigour," Nature 385 (1997): 373. See also Henry H.

Bauer, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method (Urbana, IL:

University of Illinois Press, 1992).