The Sankhya Karika

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SCUOLA ORIENT

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‘THE

SANKHYA

KARIKA,

MEMORIAL VERSES ON

THE

SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

BY

ISWARA

KRISHNA;

TRANSLATEDFROMTHESANSCRIT

BY

HENRY

THOMAS

COLEBROOKE,ESQ.

ALSO

THE BHASHYA OR COMMENTARY OF

GAURAPADA;

TRANSLATED, AND ILLUSTRATED BY AN ORIGINAL COMMENT,

BY

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON,

M.A.

F.R.S.

MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY, AND OF

THE

ASIATIC socIETIEs 0F PARIS

AND CALCUTTA, S z c .

&c.;

AND EODEN

PROFESSOR

OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF oxFoED.

OXFORD,

PRINTED

FOR

THE

ORIENTAL TRANSLATION FUND OF

GREAT BRITAIN

AND

IRELAND,

BY

S- COLLINGWOOD,

PRINTERTOTHEUNIVERSITY.

PUBLISHED AND SOLD BY A . J - VALPY, A . M., LONDON.

1837.


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TO

SIR

GRAVES

CHAMNEY

HAUGHTON, M.A.

F.R.S.

AS

TO ONE

WHOWAS THE FRIEND AND ADMIRER

OF THE LATE

HENRY THOMAS COLEBROOKE;

WHO

IS QUALIFIED,

BY

HIS

CONVERSANCY

WITH

THE

SANSCRIT

LANGUAGE.

AND METAPHYSICAL INQUIRIES,

TOAPPRECIATE THE CORRECTNESS WITH WHICH

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF

THE HINDUS

IS REPRESENTED IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES;

AN D

WHO

HAS FOR MANY

YEARS

BEEN

UNITED

WITH THEIRAUTHOR

IN STUDIES, SENTIMENTS, AND FRIENDSHIP;

THE

PRESENTWORKIS INSCRIBED,

AS A PUBLIC TESTIMONY OF

ESTEEM

AND REGARD,

BY

HORACE

HAYMAN WILSON.


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PREFACE.

ONEof the works e a r l i e s t announced

for publication b y the Oriental

Translation

Fund Committee wa s the Sa'nkhya K a ' r z ' k a ' , a text b o o k

of that system of Hindu philosophy to which the

term

Szinkhya i s

applied, and which had been translated

from

Sanscrit into English

by that emi n en t

Sanscrit

scholar the l a t e Henry Thomas Colebrooke.

The

accession of the lingering

i l l n e s s which

finally

terminated

in

hi s

decease

prevented

M r. Colebrooke from conducting hi s work through

the p r e s s , and f ro m a dd in g to the translation those explanations and

i l l u s t r a t i o n s

which the

text

required,

and wh ich h e

was most compe

tent to supply. Upon my return to England from India, therefore,

in the beginning o f 1833, I

f o un d that

no

progress

had

been

made

in

the publication, and that t he T ra nsl at io n o f

the text

a l on e

was in

the possession of the Committee.

Being

desirous

of

redeeming

the

pledge

which

they

had

publicly

given,

and of accomplishing

the purpose which they

had anno unce d ,

the Committee

thought i t desirable that

the

Translation,

in

i t s then

existing form, should b e printed

; and

conceived t h a t , as i t s extent was

insuflicient

to

constitute a separate work, i t would be

advisable to

print

i t in

the

Transactions

of the

Royal Asiatic Society. With t h i s

view

the manuscript was

placed in

my hands, that I sh ou ld re nd e r such

assistance a s I

might

be able

to

afford in the correction of the p r e s s .

Conceiving

that the appearance of t he Tra nsl a ti o n i n the pages

of

the

Transactions

would

be

equally incompatible

with

the views of

the Translator and the original intention of

the Committee, I

ven

tured

to

recommend

that their

purpose

should

be

adhered t o , and

b


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v i PREFACE.

that t he Tra nsl a ti on should be printed, as at first designed, as a

separate

work;

offering

at

the same time

to supply

such annotations

as

the text m igh t se em t o require, to be rendered sufficiently

i n t e l l i

gible

and

e x p l i c i t .

The

Committee

approved

of

the

suggestion,

and

M r.

Colebrooke’s

concurrence

wa s readily

obtained.

In the meantime, in the interval that had elapsed since the work

was announced, other translations of the

Sa'nkhya

K a i r i k a ' had a p

peared. The Sanscrit t e x t , and a version of i t in Latin by Professor

Lassen, had been printed at Bonn“; and

the

text

in

Roman ch a

r a c t e r s , with

a

French

translation,

had been

published

at

Paris by

M o n s . Pauthierf.

Many

of

the verses

of the translation had

been

also embodied i n M r. Colebrooke’s general

view

of the Sankhya phi-

losophy; and i t appeared to me expedient, therefore, to make some

such addition to

the

work as should give i t at l e a s t more novelty

than i t was otherwise likely to p o s s e s s . I t seemed also

to

be a

favourable occasion fo r offering to Sanscrit

students

a n e xe mp li fica

tion of the mode

in

which philosophical works are illustrated b y

native

commentators;

and I

accordingly

procured the

consent

of the

Translation Committee to

p r i n t , not

only

the

text and translation

of

the

Szinkhya

K a ' r i k a ' , but the

text and

a translation of

the

o l d e s t ,

and perhaps the b e s t , commentary upon

the

K a ' r i k a ' , the

Bha'shya

of

GAURAPADA. In

order

likewise to fulfil

the

object of attempting to

render the doctrines of

both

text

and comment

as

clear and

e x p l i c i t

as i t

was

in

my power

to

represent them, I further added to the

translation of the Bha'shya a

comment

of my

own,

deriving my

el u

cidations

however, to

a very

great extent,

from the works of native

s c h o l i a s t s ,

and

giving the

original passages at

the foot of the

page.

The scholia which have been

used for t h i s

purpose

are

the

* Gymnosophista: s i v e I n d i c i i e

Philosophiaa

documenta. Vol. I .

Iswara

Crishnae

San'

khya-Caricam

t e n e n s . Bo nn aa a d

Rhenum,

1882.

T E s s a i s s ur l a Philosophie des

Hindous, t r a d u i t s

de l ’ A n g l a i s ,

e t

augmentés de t e x t e s

S a n s k r i t s , &c.; p ar G. P a u t h i e r . P a r i s , 1833.


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PREFACE. v i i

Sa'nkhya Tatwa Kaumudz' of VAcHEsrATI

MISRA,

a n d

the

Sa'nkhya

C h a n d r z ' k a ' of NARAYANA TiRTHA. The Sa'nkhya Kaumua'z' of RAMA

KRISHNA ha s been also consulted,

but

i t i s almost word for

word

the

same

as

the

S .

Chandrika',

and

i s

therefore

in

most

instances

super

fluous. I have occasionally referred

to

the

Sa'nkhya

S a ' r a , a separate

tract o n the doctrines of t h i s school by VIJNANA BHIKSHU; but a n

o ther

work by

the same scholiast, the

Sa'nkhya

Pravachana Bha'shya,

a commentary

on

the S z i t r a s or aphorisms of KAI’ILA, the first teacher

of the Sankhya, according

t o t r a d i t i o n ,

has

been

of

particular

s e r v i c e ,

and w i l l

b e

f o u n d often

c i t ' e d .

Copies of these

different

commenta

r i e s ,

as well as

of

the

text,

exist in the

library of the

East India

Company,

and the

Sa'nkhya

Pravachana Bhzishya

was printed at

Serampore

in

1821.

I have,

however,

f ol lowed a

manuscript

copy,

a s I d id not obtain a copy of

the

printed work until my translation

was finished.

There was l i t t l e ne e d of the labour of c o l l a t i o n , a f t e r the very

accurate

text

of

Professor

Lassen.

I

have

n ot

failed,

however, to

compare

the reading of the different c o p i e s ,

and

have noticed a

few

of

the

variations: n o n e

of

them

are of

a n y

great importance.

Where

collation

was

most

wanted, i t was

unfortunately

not practicable,

there

being b ut

a single

copy

of the

Bha'shya

of

GAURAPADA in

my

possession. The manuscript

was luckily

tolerably

c o r r e c t ,

b ut i t

was doubtful i n

some

p l a c e s , and clearly faulty i n

others;

and I may

not have always succeeded i n rightly correcting, or i n accurately

interpreting i t . With regard to typographical errors i n t he p rese nt

edition of text and comment, I trust they w i l l not be fou n d very

inexcusable, especially when i t i s known that

the

work was f o r the

greater

part necessarily carried on a t a distance from me,

during

my

absence

in

London,

and that i t i s the first publication in

Sanscrit

printed

at

the Press of the

University of

Oxford.

Not

having made

the

Sénkhya philosophy a

subject

of study i n

India, I have executed my task without the advantage o f p revi o us


15/277

v i i i PREFACE.

preparation. Thesubject indeed

i s

b u t l i t t l e cultivated b y the Pan

d i t s , and during the whole of my intercourse with learned natives

I met with but on e Brahman who professed to be a cq u ai n te d wi t h

the

writings

of

t h i s

school.

Opportunity

was

wanting

to

benefit

b y

his instructions, and I cannot therefore venture

to

claim exemption

from those l i a b i l i t i e s t o error

to

which the unassisted study of Sa n

s c r i t

l iterature i n Europe i s

exposed, especially when

directed

to

topics s u f f i c i e n t l y obscure a n d

difiicult in themselves,

and

rendered

s t i l l

more so b y the

sententious and

e l l i p t i c a l

s t y l e in

which they

are treated. . I t i s the fashion with some of the

most

distinguished

Sanscrit scholars on the co nti nen t

to

speak

slightingly

of native

scholiasts

and

Pandits, but t h i s i s the consequence of measuring

their

merits

by

a

wrong

s c a l e ,

and

censuring

them

f o r

venial

inac

curacies which often proceed

from

too entire a familiarity with their

subject. In

a l l

studies

which

native scholars professedly

pursue, they

have the advantage of traditional tuition, of a

course

of

instruction,

coming d o wn , t hro u gh successive generations, from the founder of a

syst em, o r the author

of

a b ook, to the individual who explains the

one or illustrates the other, and from whose interpretation

we

may

therefore reasonably expect

t o

learn

what i t

was originally meant to

teach.

There are a l s o in a l l

philosophical works, e s p e c i a l l y , brief

hints

and conventional allusions, which without such

aid i t i s n o t

possible

to decipher, and f o r the

proper

understanding of

which

a

native explanation i s

indispensable.

Without therefore in the l e a s t

degree undervaluing European industry and a b i l i t y , I cannot consent

to

hold in l e s s esteem the attainments of my former

masters

and

friends, the

Sanscrit l ea rn i ng o f learned

Brahmans.

The translations

to

which I

have

above referred are highly

credit

able to

the t r a n s l a t o r s .

That

of Professor

Lassen i n particular i s

of

great

merit

and

accuracy,

a n d i s

illustrated

by

annotations,

i n

which

he has successfully cleared

up

many of

the

obscurities of the original

t e x t . I have

taken the plan of

h i s notes as in

some degree the


16/277

PREFACE. ix

model of

my comment; and although I d o not

always

concur i n h i s

interpretations

or

explanations, I have fou n d them always entitled

to attention and respect. In on e

or

two instances,

and

especially in

regard to the first stanza, where I have most widely

differed

from

him, I have sought rather t o vindicate the accuracy of

Mr. Cole

brooke,

than

to impugn

that

of

Professor

Lassen.

Variety

of inter

pretation in

such a case

as that of a d i f f i c u l t Work,

o n

a n abstruse

subject, i s no more than may be expected from different interpreters;

and occasional misapprehension implies n o want of either

compe

tency or care.

In t he co urse of my attempts to elucidate the t e x t , I have in a

few instances pointed out what seemed to me to o f f e r remarkable

coincidences

with the

doctrines of

c l a s s i c a l philosophers.

That a n

intimate connection

e x i s t s between the

metaphysical systems of the

Hindus

and

those

of the Greeks

i s generally

admitted, although

i t s

extent

h as n ot yet

been

fully made o u t . We are

scarcely

yet

indeed

in

possession of

the means

of instituting

a n

accurate comparison,

as

the

text books of the Hindus

have

not been

printed

or

translated,

and

general

d i s s e r t a t i o n s , however comprehensive or profound, are

insuf

ficient

f o r

the purpose. The present

publication w i l l go some

way,

perhaps,

t owards su p p lyi n g

the deficiency,

and

may

a f f o r d ,

a s

f a r

as

i t

extends,

authentic materials f o r

the use of

those

better qualified

c l a s s i c a l scholars

who may

be curious

to ascertain in

what

degree the

speculations of Plato and Aristotle correspond with those of Kapila

a n d Ga u ta ma , or

how

f a r the teachers of on e school may h ave b een

indebted

to

tho se o f another. That

the

Hindus derived

a n y

of their

philosophical

ideas

from

the

Greeks seems

very

improbable; and i f

there i s

a n y

borrowing in

the

c a s e , the l a t t e r were most probably

indebted to

the

former. I t has been objected to t h i s conjecture,

that

the

t o t a l

want

of

chronology

i n

Hindu

writings

renders

i t

i m

possible

to

pronounce

upon

their date, and that

i t i s

probable that

many works

regarded a s ancient are

really very modern,

a s

they may

0


17/277

x

PREFACE.

have been

composed

long

a f t e r the

a e r a of

Christianity;

the

notions

which they

inculcate

being

in

f a c t

acquired

from the Greeks of

Alexandria, through

the

intercourse between India and Egypt. That

t h i s

intercourse

may

have

e xe rci se d a

mut ual

influence

upon

some

parts of

the

philosophy of both countries in the first ages of Chris

tianity—that resemblances, respectively interchanged, may be d e

tected in

the

notions of the new Platonists or Platonic Christians

and

of the

more

modern Védantis, or in the

e c l e c t i c

pantheism 0f

the Pauraniks—is not

impossible;

but the

Greek

philosophy of that

period

ca n scarcely

have su gge st ed t he

severer

abstractions of the

Sankhya,

and we

must go

back to a remoter age

f o r

the origin

of

the

dogmas

of

KAPILA. In truth, the more

remote

the

period,

the closer

the a f f i n i t y that seems

to

prevail; and

as

f a r

as

we are acquainted

with the tenets o f the

Ionic and

Italic schools,

i t i s with

them that

Hindu philosophy,

unalloyed

with pantheism,

seems to

claim ki n

d r e d ,

rather than

with

the

mysticism of Plato,

or the subtleties

of

A r i s t o t l e . The

metempsychosis

i t s e l f i s a n important feature i n t h i s

similitude: f o r t h i s belief i s not to be looked upon a s a mere popular

superstition;

i t i s

the main principle of a l l Hindu metaphysics;

i t

i s

the

foundation

of a l l Hindu philosophy. The great object of their

philosophical

research

in

every

system,

Brahmanical

or

Buddhist,

i s

the

discovery

of the means of p utti ng a stop

t o

further

transmigra

tion; t he d isco n ti n ua nce of

corporeal

being;

the

liberation of

soul

from body. That such was the l ea di ng principle of

the

philosophy

of Pythagoras we

learn from

ancient

testimony,

and

i t

essentially

influences the speculations of Plato.

Concurrence in

t h i s principle

involves

agreement

i n

a l l the most important

deductions

from i t , and

e s t a b l i s h e s , i f not

a mutual interchange, at

l e a s t

a

common o r i g i n ,

for much of the oldest

philosophy

of the

Greeks

and the Hindus.

This

i s

a

s u b j e c t ,

however,

to

which

I

ca n

here

but

thus

briefly

allude, and to which I would rather invite the a tt en ti on o f some of

the emi n en t scholars of whom the

University

of

Oxford has

reason


18/277

PREFACE. xi

to

b e proud,

than impair

i t s interest by my own l e s s competent

attempts at i t s elucidation.

The

whole

scope

and

leading

tenets of the Sankhya philosophy

ha ve b een

most

accurately

described by

the

l a t e

M r.

Colebrooke,

in

the

Transactions

of the Royal Asiatic Society, from various original

authorities, i ncl u d i ng that now published, the Ka'riku', or ra ther

K a ' r i k a ' s , of the Sankhya system; the term d esignating a collection

of

memorial

v e r s e s , of apothegmatical stanzas, i n which the chief

tenets of t he scho ol are textually and dogmatically s t a t e d . The

Sankhya philosophy

i s

so

termed, as

M r.

Colebrooke has

mentioned,

because

i t

observes precision of reckoning in the

enumeration

of

i t s

p r i n c i p l e s ,

Sa'nkhya

being understood

to signify

‘ numeral,’ agreeably

t o the usual acceptation of Sankkyri, ‘number ; ’ “and hence i t s

analogy

to

the Pythagorean philosophy has

been

presumed.” The

term i s also explained, however, as Mr. Colebrooke

proceeds

to

men

t i o n , to

denote

the result of deliberation

or

judgment, such

being

on e se nse o f the word Sankhyci, from which Sainkhya

i s

derived.

Agreeably to the

purport

of the word K a ' r z ' k a ' ,

‘

a t ech nica l o r

memorial v e r s e , ’ the following work consists of a s e r i e s of stanzas

systematically arranged, though n ot a lwa ys obviously connected; and

asserting

p r i n c i p l e s ,

rather

than

discussing

arguments.

The

tract

opens with a n explanation of the object of t h i s and of a l l philosophy,

ascertainment of the means by

which

the pain of corporeal existence

may be

finally and absolutely remedied, and the

soul

freed for ever

f ro m b od y:

t h i s

i s declared

alone

to be philosophy,

or the knowledge

of the real

nature

of a l l that i s ,

agreeably to

the

Sa'nkhya

enumera

tion of things. These things,

in

number twenty-five,

are

briefly

indicated

with reference

to

their

r e l a t i v e

character,

as

producing or

produced; and the work then

pauses to

explain the

means

b y wh ich

they

may

be

known,

or

perception,

inference,

and

authority.

Re

verting

then to such of the

twenty-five

things or principles as are

imperceptible, e s p e c i a l l y

t o

the fi r s t material c a u s e , a n d

t o

s o u l ,


19/277

x i i

PREFACE.

logical proofs of their

actual

existence

are adduced,

and the points

in which

they agree

or d i f f e r

with other

things, and

with

each

other,

are described. We

have then

a n explanation

of the

three

essential

qualities

of

things;

purity

or

goodness;

imperfection,

foulness,

or

passion;

and

i n di fference, stu p i di ty, or darkness.

The

existence

of

a general, imperceptible,

unseparated,

universal

cause, the

substance

of which

a l l i s

made, the

eternal

matter of the

Greek

cosmogonies,

i s

then a rgu ed ; and, as a consequence

of

i t s existence, that

a l s o

of

a

s p i r i t u a l

n at ure, o r s o u l ,

i s

asserted.

The properties

of sou l a re then

detailed. We

have

next the twenty-five Tatwas, ‘categories or

prin

c i p l e s , ’ of the Sankhya philosophy severally

described.

These a l l

resolve

themselves, as

may be

inferred

from what has

preceded, into

but two,

matter

and s p i r i t ,

nature

and

soul;

the rest

are a l l the

progeny or products of nature,

evolved

spontaneously through the

necessity of

nature’s providing

f o r the

two

purposes of s o u l , fruition

and l i b e r a t i o n . These products a r e , intelligence; egotism or indivi

duality;

eleven senses,

ten

external

and one internal, or mind; five

rudimental elements, or

elements

of elements; and

five

gross or per

ceptible elements, ether,

a i r ,

water, fire

or

l i g h t , and earth. The

descripti on of these different categories, of their mode and objects of

acting,

of

their

modifications,

and

of

their

e f f e c t s ,

occupies a

con

siderable number of K a ' r i k a ' s . We have then a general account of

bo

dily

condition of two

kinds,

subtile and

gross;

the l a t t e r perishing at

death,

the former accompanying

and

investing soul through

a l l

the

migrations

t o

which

the

various conditions of the intellectual f a c u l t y ,

or virtue and

v i c e ,

subject

i t . Those

conditions

are

then

detailed at

length, and in a l l their modifications, constituting what i s

called

intellectual creation,

or

l i f e ,

consequent

upon

conduct,

originating

with

the

intellect.

But, to give

effect

to these modifications,

form,

a s

well

a s

l i f e ,

i s

said to

be

necessary;

and

hence

results

personal

or

bodily creation

of

various descriptions. Bodily existence, however,

i s

described

a s confinement and

pain,

from which

soul

i s anxious

to


20/277

PREFACE. x i i i

b e e xe mp te d . Nature i s said to labour also fo r s o u l ’ s l i b e r a t i o n , and

to supply the means, in the display which

i t

makes of i t s products,

until

s o u l ,

fully

possessed of their r e a l

character and

tendency, i s

represented

as casting away

a l l

notions-of

individuality

and

s e l f ,

and

i s

n o

more condemned to bodily incarceration. The work c l o s e s

with

stating

that

these truths were taught

originally

by KAPILA

to

Asum, and by him

to PANCHASIKHA,

from

whom

i t

descended,

through repeated

generations

of d i s c i p l e s ,

to

IswAEA KRISHNA,

the

author of

the

Kdrika's. The d a te o f this writer

i s n ot known,

but

Mr. Colebrooke considers

GAURAPADA,

the scholiast on the K a ' r z ' k a ' ,

to

be

the

same a s the

preceptor

of the

celebrated

teacher SANKARA

ACHARYA,

whom

there

i s

reason

to

place

i n

the eighth

century.

How

l o n g anterior to

this

the Ka'rikds existed in their present

form,

we have no means of knowing,

b ut

they we re a vo we d ly subsequent

to other standard compositions of the school, and evidently repre

sent doctrines of high antiquity, doctrines exhibiting profound r e

flection and subtle reasoning; although, l i k e a l l the e f f o r t s of human

i n t e l l e c t

to penetrate unai d e d

the mysteries

of

existence, wholly

unavailing, and too

often ending, a s Cicero complains, i n

d o u b t

and

impiety: “Cogimur

dissensione

sapientum Dominum nostrum

ignorare.”

Some excuse i s perhaps necessary f o r

having

delayed to publish

the present work

so long a f t e r

the Committee of

the

Oriental

Trans

lation

Fund

had

sanctioned i t s

publication.

The work, a s i t i s now

offere d to the public, was ready for press

in the

co urse o f the year

following that

in

which i t was undertaken. Being

desirous,

however,

of printing i t

at

Oxford, where the University had l i b e r a l l y resolved

to provide i t s Press with two new f ou nts o f

Devanagari l e t t e r s ,

I was

u n d e r

the necessity of a wa it in g t he

completion

of the

t y p e s . As

soon

as

one

fount

wa s

supplied,

the

text

was

printed.

I t

was my

wish to have

employed

the other and smaller fount f o r

the

citations

which accompany my Comment; but that fount being not yet c a s t ,

( 1


21/277

xiv PREFACE.

I h av e t ho u gh t i t preferable to

incur

n o

further delay.

I t i s

scarcely

doing justice to

types

of the s i z e here employed to place

them

in

juxtaposition with characters

so much

smaller

as

t ho se o f the English

alphabet;

b ut

looking

a t

them

b y

themselves,

i n

the

pages

of

the

t e x t , I think they w i l l be

fou n d

to wear a more genuinely Oriental

aspect than a n y that have yet been fabricated in Europe.

OXFORD,

J u l y 1 ,

1 8 3 7 .

sANxHYA KARIKA


22/277

SANKHYA

KARIKA.

I .

THEinquiry

i s into the

means

of

precluding the three s o r t s of

pain;

f o r

pain

i s embarrassment: nor i s

the

inquiry superfluous

because

o bvio us means

of alleviation

e x i s t ,

for

absolute

and

fin a l

r e l i e f i s not thereby accomplished.

BHASHYA.

Salutation

to that KAPILA

by whom the Sankhya

philosophy was com

passionately imparted,

to

serve as

a

boat f o r the purpose of crossing the

ocean of ignorance in which the world

was

immersed.

I will

declare compendiously the doctrine, fo r

the

benefit o f s tu d e n ts;

a

short e a sy w ork,

resting on

authority,

and

establishing certain

r e s u l t s .

Three s o r t s o f pain. -The explanation of this Arya

stanza

i s as

follows:

The d ivine

KAPILA,

the son o f

BRAHMAindeed: as i t i s said, “ SANAKA,

SANANDANA, and SANATANA

the

third; AsuRI, KAPILA, BORHU, and PAN

CHASIKHA: these seven sons of Brahma were termed

great

sages.” To -

gether with

KAPILA

were born Virtue, Knowledge, Dispassion, and

Power:

for he

b e i ng born, and observing the world

p l u nge d in

profou n d

darkness

by

the

succeeding

series

of worldly revolutions, was filled with

compassion; and to

his kinsman, the

Brahman

Asulu,

he

communicated

a

knowledge o f th e TWENTY-FIVE

PRINCIPLES;

from which knowledge

the

destruction of pain proceeds. As i t i s

said;

“ He

who

knows the twenty

“ five principles, whatever order

of

l i f e he may

have

entered, and whether

“

he

wear

braided

hair,

a

top-knot

only,

or

be

shaven,

he

i s

liberated

“

(from

existence): of

this

there i s no doubt.”

The

inquiry

i s

in consequence of the embarrassment of the

three

s o r t s

‘

B


23/277

2

of

pain. In

this place

the three sorts

o f p ai n

a r e ,

1 . (édhyétmika) natural

and

inseparable;

2 .

(éd h i bh a ut ika ) n a tura l

and extrinsic; and 3 . (MM

d a i v z ' k a )

non-natural or superhuman. The

first

i s of two kinds, corporeal

and

mental:

corporeal

i s

flux,

fever,

or

the

like,

arising

from

d i so rd e r o f

t he wi nd , b i l e , or

phlegm:

mental i s privation of what i s

liked,

approxi

matio n of what i s disliked. Extrinsic

b u t natural

pain i s fourfold, ac

cording

to the

aggregation of elementary

matter

whence i t originates ;

that

i s , i t

i s

produced

by any created beings,

whether viviparous, oviparous,

generated by heat and moisture, or springing from

the

s o i l ; or in short,

by men, beasts, tame or wild birds, reptiles,

gnats,

musqu i toes,

l i c e ,

bugs,

fish,

alligators, sharks,

trees,

stones, &c. The third

kind

of pain

may

be called superhuman, daivika meaning either

divine

or atmospheric:

i n

the

latter

case

i t

means

pain

which

proceeds

from

col d, heat,

wind,

rain, thunderbolts,

and

the like.

Where

then,

or

into

what, i s

inquiry,

in

consequence of

the

embar

rassment

of the

three

kinds of

pain, to

be made?

Into th e means o f

precluding them. This i s the inquiry. Nor i s the inquiry superjfluous.

That i s ;

i f

this

inquiry be (regarded

a s ) superfluous, the

means of

pre

cluding the

three

s o r t s

of

pain

b e i ng

obvious (seen);

as f o r example;

the internal means of alleviating

the

two

inseparable

kinds of pain are

obvious, through the application of medical science, as by pungent, b i t t e r ,

and astringent decoctions, or through the removal o f th ose o bj ects t ha t

are

disliked, and

accession

of

those

tha t a re

liked;

so

the

obvious

ob

struction of pain from natural causes i s protection and the like; and

these

means being obvious, any (farther)

inquiry

i s superfluous: i f you

think

in

this

manner, i t i s n o t

so ; for

absolute, certain,

final,

permanent,

obstruction (of pain)

i s

not ( t o

be

effected) by obvious means. Therefore

inquiry i s

to

be made by

the

wise elsewhere, or into

means

of prevention

which

are

absolute

and final.

COMMENT.

The

first

verse

of the

Kériké

proposes

the

subject

of

the

work,

and

not o nly

of

t h a t , b u t

of

the

system

to

which

i t belongs, and

of

every

philosophical system studied

by

the Hin d us; the common en d of

which


24/277

3

i s , ascertainment of

the

means by

which

perpetual e xem p ti on

from the

metempsychosis,

or

from

the

necessity

of repeated

b i r t h s ,

may

be at

tained: for l i f e i s

uniformly

regarded by

the Hindus

as

a

condition of

pain and

suffering, as a

state

of

bondage

and

evil; escape

from which

finally and f o r ever i s

a

consummation devoutly to be

wished.

The liberation thus proposed as the object

of

rational existence cannot

be a tt ai ne d a s long as

man

i s subject to the

ordinary

infirmities

of his

nature,

and t he a cci d en ts of hi s condition:

and

the primary

object

of

philosophical inquiry

therefore i s ,

the means by which the imperfections

flesh i s heir to may be obviated or removed.

As

preparatory

then

to

their

right determination, i t

is

first shewn i n the text what means are not

conducive to this end;

such, namely, as obvious but

temporary expe

dients,

whether

physical

or

moral.

Of this introductory stanza Professor Lassen, in the first ‘number of

hi s

Gymnosophistu,

containing

the translation

of

the

K éri ké , h as given

a

version differing in some

respects from

Mr. Colebrooke’s.

He t hu s re n

ders

i t :

“

E

tergeminorum dolorum impetu oritur desiderium cogno

scendaa rationis, qua i i depellantur. Quod cognoscendi desiderium licet

in visibilibus

rebus

infructuose versetur, non

est (infructuosum)

propter

absentiam absoluti, et omni

aevo

superstitis remedii.”

In the first

member

of t h i s sentence, the translation of abhigha'ta by

‘ impetus’ i s irreconcilable with the context. The sense required by the

doctrine

laid

down

i s

‘ i m p ed i m e n t, em ba rr ass me n t,

the

p re ve nt io n o f

liberation by worldly cares and s u fi ' e r i n g s . ’ So the same word abhz'gha'taka

i s immed iately used to mean ‘ preventing, removing,’ ‘ depellens.’ Pro

fessor Lassen’s text, i t i s true, rea ds apagha'taka, but this i s n o t the reading

followed by Mr.

Colebrooke, nor

that

of

the citation

of the text given

in

the

S.

Bhésllya

or S.

Kaumudi;

i t i s that of the S. Tatwa Kaumudi

and

S. Chandrika',

and

although in i t s e l f unobjectionable, ye t i s not a neces

sary

n or

preferable variation. At

any rate

there

can be

no question that

the word abhigha'ta may

be used

in the sen se

of ‘ depellere,’ and

that

sense

therefore

equally

attaches

to

i t

in

the

prior

member

of the

hemi

s t i c h . So

in

the

Bha'shya of

GAURAPADA we

have ridhibhautikasya raksha'

dina

abhigha'tah; ‘ The

prevention of

extrinsic pain

i s

by

protection

and


25/277

4

the l i k e . ’ It

would

not be possible

here

to render abhigha'ta

by ‘impetus.’

By

VAcm-zsmTr the term

abhigha'ta

i s

defined

‘the

confinement

of

the

sentient

faculty

(explained to mean

here

‘ l i f e ’ ) , through the impediment

o pposed

by threefold

distress

abi d ing

in s p i r i t * . ’

NARAYANA

interprets i t

more

concisely asahya sambandha T , ‘intolerable r e s t r a i n t . ’

‘

Embarrass

ment’ therefore sufficiently well expresses the purport of these d efi ni

t i o n s , or

the obstructions offered by

worldly

sufferings to

the

s p i r i t anx io us

to

be

f r e e .

This variation, however, i s of no great

consequence:

the more

im

portant difference i s in the second portion

of

t he st a nz a; and as Professor

Lassen has

deviated

advisedly

from

Mr.

Colebrooke,

i t i s necessary t o

examine the passage

more in d e t a i l . The f ol l owi ng are hi s reasons f o r

the

version

he

has

made:

“ Ha ac posterioris versus ( d rz ' s h fé e t c . ) interpretatio, s i c u t i scholiastarum

suffragiis probatur, a grammatica postulatur. Quod ideo moneo, ne l e v i

ter rationem,

a

Colebrookio, V. summo,

i n hoc versu

enarrando

initam

deseruisse

censear.

Is

enim: ‘ nor i s

the

inquiry superfluous,

because

obvious means of

alleviation exist:

f o r absolute

and

final r e l i e f i s not

thereby accomplished.’

Sed vereor,

ne

vi r summus

constructionem par

t i c u l s e chét

sententiam claudentis et a negatione

exceptaa male

intellex

e r i t .

De qua re d ix i

ad Hitop. protein.

d . 28. Ex interpret.

Colebrook.

construendum esset: drishfé

s c .

s a t i ( i . e . yadyapi

drishfam

vidya t é ) s a '

( j g ' j m i s a ' )

a p a ' r t h a '

n a

e'ka'nt—abha'mit

I .

Sed

ut

omittam,

particulse

chét

nullum omnino relinqui locum i n sententi a, n a inopportuno versus

loco

collocatum e s s e , non potes q u i n concedas. Male omnino se habet tota

s e n t e n t i a e t c l a u d i c a t . E q ui d e m c o n s t r u o : d r i s h f e '

s a '

( j g ' j n a ' s a ' ) a p a ' r t h a '

(bhavati)

c h e ' t ( t a t h a ' p i ) m

a p a ' r t h a ' bhavati)

e ' k a ' n t a — a b h a ' v a ' t l l . Prorsus

similiter dicitur n a ' b h a ' v a ' t

i n f r .

v . 8 . Ablativum igitur eka'ntyatyantoh

? i

.z

a a a a

F

. m5‘

‘mmTWHsitrfirhwfqséfiawmfilm)

mam—ml

"sfimfislsrrsnsmviflufimfi

(ms-Fa)

= 1 (W131 Hafir)mar-mi


26/277

5

a b h a ' v z i t , non

ad d r z ' s h t ' é

refero cum

Colebrookio, se d

ad

negationem,

quae

cum supplementis suis

apodosin

c o n s t i t u i t . Nam quaa post chénna se

q u u n t ur

verba,

ad

apodosin

pertinere

semper

observavi.

Quam

gram

matica postulate videtur, patitur prseterea l o c i tenor enarrationem, imo

melior

evadit

sententia.

Ad

drishlé enim r e l a t i s i s t i s

verbis,

id

tantum

d i c i t u r , rerum visibilium cognitione non attingi posse philosophies finem,

liberationem absolutam e t perpetuam a doloribus; mea posita enarra

tione non id tantum docetur, sed a d d i t u r

etiam

hoc: finem istum posse

a t t i n g i , l i c e t a l i o cognitionis

genere.

Tres omnino positiones altero he

mistichii versu co nti n en t ur: philosophies ( i d

enim

valet g i g n a ' s a ' , i . e .

cognitionis desiderium) finem esse emancipationem a doloribus certam

et omne tempus transgredientem; d e i n d e ad eum non perveniri

ea vi a

quae primum

i n i t u r ,

q ui a obvia

quasi

s i t ,

i .

e .

remediorum

a

s e n s i b i l i

bus rebus

petitorum

op e; d en iq ue

ea remed ia

cognoscendi

desiderium

posse expleri. Sed a l i t e ' r

atque

Colebrookius

hasce sententias

in ter se

conjungit n oster, et p er co nd i ti on em e f f e r t , quod i l l e per n ega ti on em

enuntiat.”

In this view of the meaning of the verse, there i s a refinement that

does n ot belong to i t , and which i s not Indian: arguments are often

e l l i p t i c a l l y and obscurely stated in Sanscrit d i a l e c t i c s , bu t on e position

at

a

time

i s

usually sufficient

for even Brahmanical subtlety. The only

position

here advanced i s , that the cure of worldly e v i l i s not to be effected

by such remedies as are o f o bvi o us and ordinary application, as they can

only

afford

temporary r e l i e f .

Death

i t s e l f i s

no exemption

from calamity,

i f i t

involves the obligation

of b ei ng b orn again.

The version proposed by Professor Lassen rests upon hi s notion of the

grammatical force o f the e xp re ssi on che'nna or c h e ' t , ‘ i f , ’ na, ‘ no t : ’ the

former he

would refer

to the prior member of the sentence, the l a t t e r to

the subsequent expressions.

But

this

division of

the

compound i s not

that

which

i s

most usual

in argumentative writings.

The

phrase i s an

e l l i p t i c a l n ega ti on of a preceding assertion, c h e ' t referring to what has

been

s a i d ,

implying,

‘ i f

you

assert

or b el ieve

this ; ’ and

n a

meeting

i t

with a

negatur,

‘it is not so : ’ then follows the reason or

argument

of

the denial. Thus in the Mukta'vali: ‘

But

why

sho ul d n ot

Darkness

be

c


27/277

6

called

a tenth

thing,

f o r

i t

i s

apprehended

by

perception?

If t h i s be s a i d ,

i t i s

not

so ( i l l

c h e ' n - n a )

; for i t i s

the

consequence o f th e

non-existence

of

absolute

l i g h t , and i t would be i l l o g i c a l to enumerate i t

amongst

things*.’

So

in the Nya'ya Su'tra V r z ' t t i : ‘ If by

a

disturbance in the assembly

there

be no subsequent speech,

and

through the

want

of

a reply

there be

defeat;

i f

t h i s be urged, i t i s not so

( i t z '

c h e ' n - n a ) , because there has

been

no

opportunity

for

an answer

T . ’

Again in the

Sa'nkhya

Pravachana

Bha'shya.

S(1tra:-‘ If i t

be

sa id t ha t Prakriti i s

the

cause

of

bondage, i t

i s not s o , from i t s dependent s t a t e l . ’ Comment : — - ‘ But bondage may be

occasioned by Prakriti. If

t h i s be asserted,

i t i s not s o .

Why? Because

in

the

relation

of

b on d age, Prakriti i s dependent upon conjunction, as

w i l l

be explained

in the

following

precept

l l . ’

Also in the Veda'nta Sa'ra

Vivriti:

‘If

in

consequence

of

such

texts

of the

Védas

as “let

sacrifice

be

performed as long as l i f e

endures”

their performance i s

indispensable,

and constant and occasional

r i t e s must be celebi'ated by those engaged in

the

attainment of

true knowledge; and i f , o n the

other ha n d, the attain

ment

of

true knowledge

i s

distinct from

the observance of ceremonies;

then

a d ou b l e

d u ty

i s

incumbent on those wishing to

eschew

the world.

If

this be asserted, i t

i s

not so ( i t z ' c h e ' n - n a ) , from the

compatibility of

severalty

with union,

as

in

the

case

of a r t i c l e s of

khayar or

other wood§:’

that i s ,

where

t he re a re several

obligations, that which i s

most

essential

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28/277

7

may b e

selected

from the r e s t . In the same

work

we have a n

analogous

form

used

affirmatively; a s ,

‘

But

how

by the efficacy of knowledge, after

the

dissipation

of ignorance,

in

regard

to

the

object

(of

philosophy),

ca n

the true nature of the essentially happy (being) be attained? for as he i s

eternally

existent,

knowledge i s not

necessary

to establish

hi s

existence.

If

this

be asserted, i t i s true ( i t i c h e ' t ;

satyam).

Brahme, o n e essentially

with felicity, i s admitted to

be

eternal, but i n a

state

of ignorance

he is

not obtained; like a piece of gold which i s forgotten (a nd so ugh t f o r ) ,

whilst i t i s hanging round the neck‘.’ Here i t would be impossible to

refer

satyam

to the

succeeding

member

of

the sentence,

as the apodosis

b e i ng separated from i t , not only by the sense, b u t by the particle a p i .

Passages of this description might be indefinitely multiplied, b u t these

are

s u f f i c i e n t to

shew

that

the construction

in

the sense

a d o pted

by

Mr.

Colebrooke i s

common

and correct.

Accordingly hi s version i s

uniformly

supported scholiastarum sufl‘ra

giis. Thus

in

the

S . Bh a' sh ya , a s we have

seen, the passage

i s

e xp l a i n e d,

d r i s h f e '

s a ' a p a ' r t h a '

c h e ' t e'vam

manyase' n a

e ' k a ' n t a ,

&c.; ‘

If by reason of

there

b e i ng obvious remedies, you think i n dee d the inquiry superfluous,

no i t i s not s o ) , from their not b e i ng absolute

and

permanent.’

So

in the

S. Tatwa Kaumudi, after stating the objection at length, the commentator

adds,

n i r a ' k a r o t i , n a i t i ; ‘ (the author)

refutes

i t (by

saying),

no , not so : ’

kutah, ‘why

? ’

e'ka'ntatyantatoh a b l u z ' v a ' t 1 ' .

The

S. Cb a n drika' i s to

the

same e f f e c t , or

s t i l l

more

explicit: ‘ There b e i ng obvious means,

the

inquiry i s superfluous,

the conclusion being otherwise

attained:

i f

( t h i s

b e . urged) such i s the meaning (of the t e x t ) , (the

author)

contradicts i t ;

no, i t i s not so I . This commentator g iv in g t he very reading, d r i s h t ' e ' s a t i ,

which Professor

Lassen

argues Mr. Colebrooke’s version

would errone

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29/277

8

ously require. The remaining scholiast, RAMA KRISHNA, adopts the com

ment o f t he Chandrika' word f o r word, and consequently the commentators

are

unanimous

in

support

of

the

translation

of

Mr.

Colebrooke.

With

respect

to the

passages referred

t o by Professor Lassen as esta

blishing the connex io n

of

the

negative

with the l a t t e r member

of

the

sentence,

instead

o f i t s being

absolute,

i t will be

seen

at once

that they

are

not

at a l l

analogous

to the passage in our t e x t . They

are

declaratory,

not argumentative; and the

terms

following

the n egative particle are

the

pa rts or circumstances of the

negative,

not the

reasons

on which i t i s

grounded. Thus in the Hitopadesa: ‘

What

w i l l not be, will not b e;

i f

i t

will be,

i t

will n ot be otherwise * . ’ So

in

v. 8 . of the Ka'rika' : ‘ The

non

apprehension of

nature

i s

from i t s

subtlety, not from

i t s

nonentity

T . ’ In

neither

of

these

i s

there

any

reference

to

a

foregone

position

which must

be admitted or denied, nor i s t he n ega ti ve followed

by

the reasons

f o r

denial, as i s the

case

in our text.

These considerations are more than

sufficient

to vindicate,

what

i t was

scarcely perhaps necessary

to

have

asserted,

M r.

Colebrooke’s

accuracy;

and they

are now also somewhat superfluous, as

I

have been

given to

understand that Professor Lassen acknowledges the correctness of hi s

interpretation. The commentary

of

GAURAPADA

distinctly

shews that

nothing more

i s intended

by

the t e x t , than the unprofitableness

of

recourse

to

visible

or

world ly e x ped ie nts

for

the

r e l i e f

or

removal

of

worldly

pain.

In subjoining

therefore the gloss of VACHESPATI MISRA, with

a

translation,

i t i s intended rather to illustrate the d oct ri ne s o f t he text, and the mode

of their d evel opmen t by native scholiasts, than further to vindicate the

correctness of the translation.

‘ IBut verily the object o f t he science may not need inquiry, 1 . i f there

b e no pain in the world; 2 . i f there be no desire to avoid i t ; 3 . i f there

be no means of extirpating i t . The

impossibility

of extirpating i t i s

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30/277

9

twofold; either

from

the

eternity

of p ai n, or

from ignorance

of

the means

of alleviation : o r , though i t be possible to extirpate pain, ye t that know

ledge

which

philosophy

treats

of

may

not

be

the

means

of

i t s

removal;

o r aga in,

there

may

be some other and

more

ready

means.

In the

t e x t ,

however, i t

is

not said that

pain

does not exist, nor

that there is no

wish

to avoid i t . From the embarrassment of the three kinds of palm—A

triad

of

pain,

three

kin ds: they

are the

a'dhya'tmika,

‘ natural

; ’ a'dhibhau

t i k a , ‘extrinsic ; ’ and a'dhidaivika, ‘superhuman.’ The

first

i s of 'two

kinds, bodily and mental: bodily i s caused by disorder of the humours,

wind, bile,

and phlegm; mental i s

occasioned

by

desire, wra t h , co ve t o u s

ness, fear, envy, grief, and want of discrimination. These various kinds

of pain are called inseparable, from their admitting of internal remedies.

The

pain

that requires

external

remedies

i s also twofold, a ' d h i b a u t z ' k a and

a'dhidaivika. The first has fo r i t s cause, man, b e asts, d eer, birds, reptiles,

and inanimate t hi ngs; t he second arises from the e v i l infl uence of the

planets, or

possession

by impure

s p i r i t s (Yakshas, Ra'kshasas,

Vina'yakas,

&c.).

These kinds of pain, depending upon the vicissitudes

arising

from the

quality

of foulness, are to be experienced by every indivi

dual,

and

cannot be

prevented.

Through the obstruction occasioned

by the

three

kinds of p ai n a bi di ng in s p i r i t , arises

embarrassment,

or

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10

confinement of

the sentient

faculty. The capability of

knowing

the

impediment

occasioned

by such pain,

i s

considered the cause

of

the

desire

to

avoid

i t ;

for

though

p a i n

may

not

be

prevente d, yet

i t

i s

p os

sible t o overcome i t , as will be subsequently explained. Pain then b e i ng

generated, inquiry i s to be

made

into the means

of i t s

removal.

Tad

apagha'take': tad refers here to t he t hre e kinds of pain, tad having the

relation dependent upon i t s b e i ng used as a subordinate ( r e l a t i v e ) term.

The means ( h e t u ) of removing—These

are

t o be derived

from

philosophy,

not from any other source: this i s the position (of the t e x t ) .

To

t h i s a

d o u b t i s

objected;

As there

are

obvious means,

the inquiry

i s superfluous;

4 ' f s o — - . The

sense i s

this:

Be i t admitted that th ere a re th re e kinds o f ‘

pain; that the rational b e i ng wishes to escape from them; that

escape

i s

practicable;

and

that

means

attainable

t h ro u gh p h il o so p hy

are

a d eq uate

to their extirpation; s t i l l any investigation by those who look into the

subject i s

need less;

for there

do

exist o b v i o u s (visible) means o f extirpa

t i o n ,

which

are easily

attainable,

whilst

the knowledge

of

philosophical

principles

i s

d i f f i c u l t

of

attainment, and to

be

a cq ui re d o nl y

by long

study,

and

traditional tuition through many generations. Therefore,

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32/277

11

according to the p op u l ar

saying,

“Why

should a

man who may

find

honey in

the

arkka flower, go for i t to the mountain?” so what wise

man

w i l l

give

himself

unnecessary

trouble,

when

he

has

attained

the

object

of

hi s

wishes. Hundreds of remedies for bodily affections are indicated by

eminent

physicians.

The p le asu re s o f sense,

women,

wine, luxuries,

unguents, dress, ornaments, are the easy means of obviating mental

d i s t r e s s . So in regard to extrinsic pain, easy means of obviating i t exist

in the s k i l l acquired by acquaintance with moral and p o l i t i c a l

science,

and by residing in safe and

healthy

places, and the like; whilst the

employment of gems

and

charms readily counteracts the e v i l s in d uced

by superhuman agency. This i s the objection. (The author) refutes

i t ; i t i s not s o . Why?

From

these means

not

being absolute or

final.

Eka'nta

means

the

certainty

of

the

cessation

of

pain;

atyanta,

the

non

recurrence of pain that has ceased. (In obvious means of r e l i e f there

i s )

the non-existence of both these properties; the affix t a s z ' , which may be

substituted

f o r a l l inflexions, being here p u t f o r the sixth case

dual

;—as

i t i s said; “From not observing the (invariable) cessation of

pain

of

vario us ki n d s, in consequence

of

the

employment of

ceremonies,

drugs,

women, moral

and political studies,

charms,

and

the

like,

their want of

certain operation ( i s predicated); so i s their temporary influence, from

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33/277

12

observing the recurrence‘of pain

that

had been ’suppressed. Although

available, therefore, the obvious means o f p utti ng a stop to p a i n are

neither

absolute nor final, and consequently this inquiry (into other

means) i s not superfluous. This i s the purport (of the t e x t ) . ’

The

Sa'nkhya Chandrih'a' and S. Kaumudi

are both

to

the same e f f e c t ,

and i t

i s

unnecessary to

c i t e them. The

original Sutras

of

KAPILA,

as collected

in the S. Pravachana, and

commented

on

by

VIJGNYANA

BnIKsnu,

confirm

the

view taken

by

the scholiasts.

S(1tra:—‘

The final

cessation

of

the three kinds

of

pain

i s

the fin a l

object of soul*.‘

Comment :—‘ The fin a l cessation

of these

three kin ds

of pain, the

t o t a l cessation

of universal

pain,

whether

gross

o r su bt le

(present

or

to

come),

i s

the

final,

supreme

object

of

soul

1 - . ’

Sfrtra :—‘ The accomplishment of that cessation i s not from obvious

means, from the

evident

recurrence (of pain) after suppression 1 . ’

Comment :—‘ The

accomplishment of

the

final

cessation

of pain i s not

( t o be effected) by

worldly means,

as

wealth,

and

the like.

Whence i s

this?

Because

that

pain

of which

the cessation

i s procured by

wealth

and the

like

i s seen to occur again, when that wealth and the r e s t are

exhausted

l l . ’

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34/277

13

I I .

THE

revealed mode

i s

like

the

temporal

one,

ineffectual,

for

i t

i s

impure; and

i t i s defective

in

some

r e s p e c t s ,

as

well

a s

excessive

i n

others. A

method

different

from

both

i s preferable,

consisting in a

discriminative

knowle dg e

of perceptible principles, and of the imper

ceptible

one, and of the thinking s o u l .

BHASHYA.

Although the

inquiry i s

to

be directed

to

other

than to

obvious remedies,

ye t

i t

i s

n ot to

be directed

to such as

a re d eri va bl e from revelation,

as

means of removing t he t hre e kinds of pain. Anusravati, ‘ what man su c

cessively hears ; ’ a'nusravika, ‘th a t which i s

thence

produced, revealed

mode

; ’ that i s ,

established

by the Védas: as i t i s said; “ We drank the

juice

of

the acid

asclepias;

we became

immortal;

we attained

effulgence;

we

know divine things. What

harm

can

a

foe inflict

on

us? How ca n

decay

affect an immortal 1 ”

(This

text

of the

Véda

refers

t o ) a

discussion

amongst Indra

and

other gods, as to how they became immortal. In

explanation i t was s a i d , “We were d ri nke rs o f soma juice, and thence

became immorta

, ” that

i s ,

gods:

f urt he r, “Weascended to , or a t t a i n e d ,

efiulgence,

or

heaven;

we knew

divine,

celestial,

things.

Hence then,

assuredly,

what

can

an enemy

do

to

us? What decay can affect an im

mortal?”

dhurtti meaning

‘

decay’ or

‘injury : ’ ‘What can

i t do

to an

immortal being?’

It

i s

also said

in

the

Védas,

that

final recompense i s obtained

by

animal sacrifice:

“ He

who offers the

aswame'dha conquers a l l worlds,

overcomes

d eath,

and ex piates

a l l sin,

even the murder

o f

a

Brahman.”

As, therefore,

final

and

absolute consequence

i s

prescribed

in

the

Védas,

inquiry (elsewhere) should be superfluous; b u t this i s not the case.

The t e x t s a y s , t h e r e v e a l e d mode i s l i h e t h e t e m p o r a l o n e — d r i s h t ' a v a t ;

‘ l i k e , same as the temporal,’ d r i s h f e ' n a t u l y a . What i s that revealed

mode,

and

whence i s

i t

(ineffectual)? It i s impure,

defective i n some

E


35/277

14

r e s p e c t s ,

and

excessive in

o t h e r s .

It

i s

impure

from (enjoining) animal

sacrifices; as, “according to the ritual of the aswame'dha,

si x

hundred

horses, minus three,

are

offered at

midday.”

For

though that

i s virtue

which

i s

enjoined

by

the

Védas

and

laws,

y e t ,

from

i t s

miscellaneous

character, i t may be affected by impurity.

It

i s also said ;

“Many

thou

sands of Indras and other

gods

have passed away in successive

ages,

overcome

by

time; f o r time i s hard to overcome.”

Hence

therefore, as

even

Indra

and

the go ds perish,

t he re ve al ed mode involves

defective

cessation

of pain.

Excess

i s also on e of

i t s properties, and

pain

i s

pro

duced by

observing the

superior

advantages

of others.

Here,

therefore,

by excess,

a t i s ' a y a , i s understood

the u n e q u a l

distribution of temporal

rewards, as the

consequence of

sacrifice;

the

object of the

ritual of

the

Védas b e i ng in

fact

in

a l l cases temporal good. Therefore

t he re ve al ed

mode

i s like the temporal one. What then i s

the

preferable

mode?

If

this

be asked, i t i s replied, One dilfirent from both. Amode different from

both the

temporal

and revealed i s preferable, b e i ng

free

from

impurity,

e xce ss, o r

deficiency.

How i s

this?

I t i s e x plaine d ( i n the text: It

consists in a

discriminative knowle dge,

&c.

Here, by perceptible princi

ples,

a re intended

Mahat

and the r e s t , or Intellect,

Egotism, the

five

subtile rudiments, the

eleven

organs (of perception

and action),

and the

five gross

elements. The imperceptible

one

i s Pradlia'na

(the

chief or

great one). The thinhing s o u l , Purusha

(the

incorporeal). These twenty

five

principles

are

intended

by

the

(three)

terms

vyakta, avyakta,

and

jna.

In discriminative

knowledge o f t he se

consists the preferable mode;

and he who

knows

them knows the twenty-five

principles

(he has perfect

knowledge).

The difference between the perceptible, and imperceptible, and think

ing principles, i s n e xt explained.

COMMENT.

Having taught that worldly means of overcoming worldly

evil are

ineffectual, i t i s next a sse rt ed t ha t d evotio nal remedies, such as the rites

enjoined by the Védas, are e q ua l ly u n ava i li n g; and knowledge of the


36/277

15

t hre e p art s or

divisions o f e xi st en ce ma te ri al

and s p i r i t u a l ,

i s

the only

mode

by which

exemption

from

the infirmities

of

corporeal

being can be

attained.

The

Védas

are

i n e f l i c i e n t ,

from

their

i n h um a n i ty

in

prescribing the

shed d ing of blood: the

rewards

which

they propose

are

also b u t

tempo

rary,

as

the gods themselves are

finite beings,

perishing in

each

periodical

revolution. The immortality spoken of in the Védas i s merely a long

duration,

or until a dissolution of the existent forms o f thin gs * . The

Védas

also

cause, instead of curing, pain, as the blessings t h ey p ro m is e

to on e man

over

another are sources

of

envy and

misery

to those who d o

not possess them. Such i s t he se nse

given by

GAURAPADA to atisaya, and

the S. Tatwa Kaumudi understands i t

also

to imply the u ne qu al a pp or

tionment of

rewards

by the Védas themselves: ‘The jyotishtoma and

other

r i t e s

secure

simply

heaven; the v a f j a p e ' y a and others co nf er th e

'sovereignty of heaven: this i s b e i ng p osse sse d o f t he property o f e x ce ss

(inequality) T . ’

In like manner, the original aphorism

of

KAPILA

affirms

of these

two

modes,

the

temporal and re ve a le d , t h at

there

‘is no difference

between

themi,’ and

that ‘ escape from

pain i s

not

the consequence of the l a t t e r

l l , ’

because ‘ recurrence i s nevertheless

the

result of

that

immunity which i s

attainable by acts

(o f

devotion) § , ’ as

‘ t h e consequences

o f acts

are

n ot

eternal

“3 Here however a

dilemma

occurs, for the Véda also says, ‘

There

i s

no

return

(regeneration)

of

o n e

who

has

attained

the

sphere

of Brahma

by acts (of

devotion)

T T . ’

This

i s explained away by

a

Sfitra of Ka pi la ,

which declares that

the Véda limits

the n o n -regenerati o n of on e who

has

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16

attained

t he re gi on of Brahma to him who, when there, acquires

discri

minative wisdom * ‘ .

This

discriminative wisdom i s

th e a ccu ra te

discrimination of

those

principles

into

which

a l l

that

exists

i s

distributed by

the

Sa'nkhya

philo

sophy.

Vyakta,

‘that which i s

perceived, sensible,

discrete ; ’

Avyakta,

‘ that which i s

unperceived,

indiscrete ; ’ and

Jna,

‘ that which knows, or

discriminates

: ’ the first i s matter in i t s perceptible modifications; the

second i s crude, unmodified matter; and the

third

i s soul. The object o f

the

S. Ka'rika' i s

to define

and

e x p l a i n

t he se t hre e things,

the

correct

knowledge o f which i s of itself release from worldly bondage, and ex

emption from exposure to human

i l l s ,

by the final separation of soul

from

body.

I I I .

NATURE, the root (of a ll ) , i s n o production. Seven principles, the

Great or intellectual one, &c., are pro d uctio ns and p rod uctive. Si x

teen

are

productions (unproductive). Soul

i s

neither a production

nor productive. I

BHASHYA.

Z l l z f l a

(the

r o o t )

prakriti (nature) i s pradha'na

( c h i e f ) ,

from i t s being the

root

of

the

seven

principles

which

are

productions

and

productive;

such

nature i s

the r o o t .

No production.—It i s not produced from another:

on

that

account nature

(prakriti)

i s

no

product of any other

thing.

Seven

pr inciples.- M ahat and

the

rest;

from i t s being

the

great (mahat) element;

this i s Intellect (Buddhi). I n t e l l e c t and the rest.-The

seven

principles

are, l . Intellect; 2 .

Egotism; 3-7.

The

five

subtile rudiments.

These

seven

are productions

and

productive: in t h i s manner:

Intellect

i s produced

from

the

chief on e (nature). That again

produces

Egotism, whence i t i s

productive (prakriti). Egotism, as derived from I n t e l l e c t , i s a prod uc

*rrau'rwfifiwmqfirrgfim


38/277

17

tion; but as i t gives origin

to the

five subtile rudiments, i t i s productive.

The subtile ru dimen t of sound i s derived from Egotism,

and

i s

therefore

a

production;

b u t

as causing

the

production of

ether,

i t i s productive.

The subtile

rud iment

of t ou ch , a s

generated

from Egotism, i s a prod uc

tion; as

giving origin

to a i r , i t i s productive. The subtile

rud iment

of

smell

i s

derived

from Egotism,

and

i s therefore

a

production;

i t gives

origin to

earth,

and

i s t he re f ore p ro d u ct i ve . The subtile rudiment of

form i s

a

production from Egotism; as

generating

l i g h t , i t

i s

productive.

The subti le rudiment

of

flavour, as derived from Egotism, is a production;

i t i s p ro du ct ive , a s giving origin to water. In this manner the Great

principle

and

the rest are productions

and

productive. Sixteen are pro

d uctio ns; that

i s ,

the

five organs

of perception, the five organs of action,

with

mind,

making

the

eleventh,

and

the

five

elements:

these

form

a

class of sixteen which are productions, the term vika'ra b e i ng the same as

v i h r i t i . Soul i s neither a

production nor

productive.

These

(principles)

- being thus

classed,

i t i s next to be considered by what and how many

kin ds of proof, and

by

what proof severally

applied,

the demonstration of

these three (classes o f ) principles, the perceptible, the imperceptible, and

the thinking s o u l ,

can

be

effected.

For in this wo rl d a

probable

thing

i s

established

by

p ro of, i n the same mode as (a quantity of ) grain by a

prastha (a certain measure), and the l i k e , or sandal and o th er t hi n gs by

weight.

On this

account what

proof

i s ,

i s nex t

to be d efin e d.

COMMENT.

In t h i s sta nza the

three principal categories

of the

Sankhya system

are

briefly

d efi ned,

chiefly with

regard

to

their relative

characters.

Existent things, according to o n e classification, are

said to

be fourfold:

l . prahriti; 2 . v i / r r i t i ; 3 . p r a h r i t i - v i i h r i t i ; and anubhaya r i ' i p a , neither pra

I m ' t i nor v i h r i t i . Prabriti, according to i t s ordinary

use,

and i t s etymo

logical sense, mcans that

which i s primary,

that

which

precedes what

i s

made; from

pm, pm’, and bri,

‘ to make.’ This, however, i s

further

dis

tinguished

in

the

text

into

the

rmila

prahriti; the

p r a / t r i t i

which

i s

the

root

and substance

of

a l l things except s o u l , matter or nature; and

secondary,

special,

or relative

prahriti,

or every

production

that in i t s

F


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18

turn

becomes

primary

t o some other

derived from i t . By prahriti

may

therefore be

understood

the

matter

of which every substance primarily or

secondarily i s composed, and from which i t proceeds, the primary, o r , a s

Mr. Colebrooke

renders

i t , ‘

productive’

principle of

some s eco n d a ry s ub

stance

or

production.

This

subsequent

product i s termed v i h r z ' t i ,

from the

same r o o t , h r i , ‘ to make,’with v i , implying

‘ v a r i a t i o n , ’

prefixed. V z ' h r i t i does

not mean a product, or thing brought primarily into existence, b ut merely

a

mo d ificatio n of

a

state of

being,

a new d evel opmen t or

form

of some

thing previously extant.

We

might

therefore

consider i t

a s b est

rendered

by the term ‘ development,’

b u t there

i s no objection to

the

equivalent in

the t e x t , or ‘ product.’ In this way, then, the different substa nces o f

the

universe are respectively nature, or matter, and form. Crude or radical

matter

i s

without

form.

Intellect

i s i t s

first

form,

and

Intellect

i s

the

matter o f Egotism. Egotism i s a form o f Intellect, and the matter of

which the senses and the ru d i me n ta l e l em en t s are formed: th e se nses

are

forms

o f

Egotism.

The gross elements a re forms of

the

rudimental _

elements. We are not to ex ten d the materiality of the grosser

elements

to the forms of

visible things,

for visible things are compounds, not simple

d evelo pments

of a

simple base. Soul comes

under

the

fourth

class; i t i s

neither

ma tter n or

form, production nor productive.

More particular

d e fin i ti o ns o f each category

subsequently

occur.

IV.

PERCEPTION, inference,

and

right

affirmation, are admitted to

be

threefold proof; for they ( a r e by a l l acknowledged, an d) comprise

every mode of

demonstration.

I t i s from proof that belief of that

which i s to b e proven r e s u l t s .

BHASHYA.

Perception

,'-as,

the

ear,

the

skin,

the

eye, the

to ngue,

the nose, are the

five organs of sense; and their five o bj ect s a re respectively, sou n d, f e e l ,


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19

form,

flavour, and odour: the ear a p p re h en d s so u n d ; the skin,

feel;

the

eye,

form;

the to ngue, taste; the nose, smell.

This

proof i s

called, (that

which

i s )

seen (or perception).

That

object which i s not

ascertainable

either

by

i t s b e i ng present,

or by inference,

i s to

be apprehended from

right

aflirmation; such a s , INDRA, the king of the gods;

the

northern

Kurus;

the

nymphs

of

heaven; and

the

like. That

which

i s

n ot ascer

tainable by

perception or

inference,

i s derived from

apt

( o r s u f f i c i e n t )

authority. It i s also said; “ They c a l l scripture,

right

affirmation; r i g h t ,

as free from e r r o r . Let not o n e

exempt

from fault affirm a falsehood

without a de q u a te reason. He who in his appointed o f f i c e i s

free

from

partiality or enmity, and i s ever respecte d by persons of the same cha

r a c t e r ,

such

a

man

i s

to

be regarded as apt (fit or worthy).”

In these

three

are

comprised

a l l

kinds

of

proof.

JAIMINI

describes

six

sorts

of

proof. Which of those

then

are n ot p ro of s? They a r e , presumption

( a r t h a ' p a t t i ) , proportion (sambhava),

privation ( a b h a ' v a ) , comprehension

( p r a t i b h a ' ) , oral communication ( a i t i h y a ) ,

and

comparison (upama'na).

Thus: “Presumption” i s twofold, ‘ seen’

and

‘heard.’ ‘ Seen’ i s where in

on e case t he e x ist ence of s p i r i t i s admitted, and i t i s presumed that i t

exists in'another. ‘ Heard ; ’ DEVADATTA does not eat by day, and yet

grows f a t : i t i s presumed then that he eats by night. “ Proportion ; ” By

the t erm o ne prastha, four huravas are equally designated. “ Privation” i s

fourfold; prior,

mutual,

constant,

and

total. ‘

Prior ; ’

as, DEVADATTA

in

child ho o d,

youth,

&c.

‘Mutual

; ’

as,

Water j ar in

cloth. ‘ Constant

; ’

as,

The horns of an ass; the son

of

a barren woman; the flowers of the

sky. ‘

Total’ privat ion,

or

destruction;

as when cloth i s b urnt, o r as from

contemplating

withered grain, want

of

rain

i s

ascertained. In this manner

privation

i s manifold.

“

Comprehension ; ”

a s , The part of the country

that

l i e s

between the Vindhya

mou n ta i ns

on the north and Sahya moun

t a i n s on the south, extending

to

the

sea,

is

pleasant;

By this sentence

i t

i s intended to express that

t here are many

agreeable circumstances

com

prehended in that co un try, t he name of the

s i t e

indicating i t s several

products.

“Oral

communication

; ”

a s ,

When

peopl

The Sankhya Karika

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