Mike Pasenelli Capital Area Chapter PIAA Football Officials 9 August 2010.
The role of social capital in national football team …...2016/11/11 · The role of social...
Transcript of The role of social capital in national football team …...2016/11/11 · The role of social...
The role of social capital in national football team
performance
8th ESEA, September 2, 2016
Inna Zaytseva
NRU HSE, Moscow
Problem
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Talent and effort
Cooperation
What is the role of cooperation in translating players’ talent
to a team performance?
Hypothesis
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Social capital, defined as the ability to act
collectively for a common goal (Putnam,
1993), and measured at the national level, positively influences the national football team performance
Explicit incentives of immediate financial gain are weak for
national team players
Players have pro-social motivation in
addition to the implicit incentive of
career concerns
SC complements individual skills as
factor of team success
About cultural factors in football
Latin American culture Hoffmann et al., 2002
• Positive effect of Latin culture
Football traditions Hoffmann et al., 2002; Houston, Wilson, 2002; Macmillan, Smith, 2007; Leeds, Leeds, 2009
Three different measures: • the duration of the development of football
in the country • hosting the FIFA World cup • colonial past
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Factors of success in football
Cultural heterogeneity in clubs Maderer et al., 2014
• Negative effect of cultural diversity • No support for the hypothesis “The more collectivist a
team is, the more successful it is” (average national individualism/collectivism scores of Hofstede (2001))
Other factors of success of national football teams Houston, Wilson, 2002; Macmillan, Smith, 2007; Berlinschi at all. 2013; Leeds, Leeds, 2009 • Income, population, climate, oil production, the
power of national championship, migration of national team players, political regime
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Pay-performance relationship and financial
motivation
Pay -> Performance Torgler, Schmidt, 2007; Della Torre et al., 2014 • the absolute value of lagged salary has positive effect
with diminishing return on individual performance
Franck, Nüesch, 2011 • wage expenditures increase sporting success at the
team level, however including the pay dispersion eliminates this effect
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Pay-performance relationship and financial
motivation
Performance -> Pay Deutscher, Buschemann, 2016 • average performance explains the difference in
players’ market values
• consistency of payer’s performance negatively impacts the market value
Wicker et al., 2013 • effort, measured as distance covered and intensive
runs, has no effect
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Pay-performance relationship and financial
motivation
Causality Nüesch, 2009 • both pay and performance of players are driven
mostly by the talent
Frick, 2006 • poor teams use bonus payments, while rich teams pay
a high fixed salary
Hall, Symanski and Zimbalist, 2002 • the more restrictions on players spending is imposed
the weaker is the influence of wage bill on the team performance
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Do players have a vested interest in a national team win? To what extent does the FIFA WC team performance determine future market value? • MV before and after the World Cup 2014 • National football team performance at the
World Cup 2014 (number of points) • 50 biggest changes in market value • Corr=0.004, t-stat=0.025
Coupe, 2007 • No link between cumulative bonuses to players and
the performance of the team on the World Cup 2006
Players’ motivation
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Theoretical model Dewatripont, Jewitt, Tirole (1999). The economics of career concerns
Team output:
𝑦 = (𝜆𝜃𝑖 + 𝜇𝑎𝑖 + 𝑎𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝜃𝑖) + 𝜀
• 𝜆, 𝜇 > 0
• 𝜃~𝑁 𝜃 , 𝜎𝜃2 , i.i.d.
• 𝜀~𝑁 0, 𝜎𝜀2
The expected reward or the career concern of players is 𝐸 𝜃𝑖 𝑦, 𝑎
∗
Player’s problem: max𝑎𝑖≥0𝛼𝐸𝑦 + 𝐸𝑦𝐸𝜃 𝜃𝑖 𝑦, 𝑎 − 𝑐 𝑎𝑖
F.O.C.: 𝛼 𝜇 + 𝜃 +(𝜇+𝜃 )(𝜆+𝑎𝑖)𝜎𝜃
2
𝜎𝜃2 (𝑎𝑖+𝜆)
2𝑛𝑗=1 +𝜎𝜀
2 = 𝑐′(𝑎𝑖)
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Explicit incentives of immediate financial gain are weak for national team players
Theoretical model
Assumption: 𝜆 >𝜎𝜀
𝜎𝜃 𝑛
Proposition 1 𝑎∗ increases in 𝜃 (expected talent), 𝛼 (social capital) and decreases in n (collective signaling problem).
Proposition 2 𝐸𝑦 increases in 𝜃 (expected talent) and 𝛼 (social capital).
Proposition 3
For sufficiently large n and 𝑐 𝑎 = 𝑎2 one has 𝜕2
𝜕𝛼𝜕𝜃𝑦 > 0.
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Why do we use national SC?
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National culture
determines the players’
behavior to a large extent
Rare meetings of the team
(3-6 days 5-6 times a year)
High club heterogeneity
HH Index Spain 0.13 HH Index Italy 0.07
HH Index Russia 0.16 HH Index India 0.15
Teams are comprised of mostly home
country nationals
Data
142 observations for 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014 ESS waves
Dependent variable: Performance of national football teams: the FIFA World Ranking
Social capital measures: • Trust: “Most people can be trusted or that you can't
be too careful in dealing with people?” • Help: “Most of the time people helpful or people
mostly look out for themselves?” • Care: “Important to help people and care for others
well-being” • Fair: “Most people try to take advantage of you, or
try to be fair”
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Data
Controls: • TMV: cumulative market value (inverse
relation)(transfermarkt.de) • Clim: deviation of average annual temperature
from 14C • Inc: GDP PPP • Pop: population size
Method: Negative Binomial Regression
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Summary Statistics
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
fifarank 36.859 30.664 1 155
tmv 92.843 96.272 1.54 562.981
clim 47.177 43.013 0 213.16
inc 520.477 708.381 9.551 3049.71
pop 21.590 30.226 0.291 143.3
trust 41.895 17.739 12.5 78.4
help 37.722 15.322 13.6 66.4
care 89.478 5.934 69.1 98.5
fair 50.556 17.877 17.8 83
Results1
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fifarank 1 2
tmv_inv 2.518 2.3628 (1.0634)** (1.0631)**
lninc -0.2221 -0.2726 (0.0838)*** (0.0796)***
pop -0.0132 -0.0103 (0.0041)*** (0.0037)***
clim 0.0086 0.0072 (0.0019)*** (0.0017)***
trust -0.0122 (0.0047)***
help -0.0091 (0.0048)*
_cons lnalpha 4.9046 5.0317 (0.3990)*** (0.4027)***
_cons -1.0279 -1.0079 (0.1327)*** (0.1325)***
Results1
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fifarank 3 4
tmv_inv 2.4623 2.5976 (1.1022)** (1.0626)**
lninc -0.3215 -0.2211 (0.0754)*** (0.0864)**
pop -0.0069 -0.0119 (0.0031)** (0.0039)***
clim 0.0052 0.0078 (0.0014)*** (0.0018)***
care -0.01 (-0.0096)
fair -0.0101 (0.0044)**
_cons lnalpha 5.8661 4.9064 (0.9428)*** (0.3979)***
_cons -0.9894 -1.021 (0.1321)*** (0.1329)***
Results3
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fifarank 1 2
tmv_inv 1.7637 1.92 (0.8109)** (0.8462)**
lninc -0.1345 -0.1585 (0.0710)* (0.0690)**
pop -0.0039 -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0034
clim 0.0015 0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0017
trust 0.0078 (0.0047)*
tmvtrust -0.0001 (0.0000)***
help 0.0106 (0.0049)**
tmvhelp -0.0002 (0.0000)***
Results4
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fifarank 3 4
tmv_inv 1.7719 1.9979 (0.8353)** (0.8868)**
lninc -0.157 -0.187 (0.0655)** (0.0758)**
pop -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0039
clim 0.0016 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0019
care -0.0022 -0.0082
tmvcare -0.0001 (0.0000)***
fair 0.0078 -0.0048
tmvfair -0.0001 (0.0000)***
Conclusion
Team performance in football is determined not only by talent of players, but also by their ability to work cooperatively for common goal (SC)
SC works through the pro-social motivation to contribute to team’s success even if such success is little material value for an athlete
National level social capital, measured as perception of values and behavior in a society, can be used as a proxy for national football team social capital
Social capital complements individual skills and talent
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8th ESEA, September 2, 2016
Data
Dependent variable: Performance of national football teams: the FIFA World Ranking
• Four-year period • Was the match won or drawn? (M) • How important was the match? (I) • How strong was the opposing team in
terms of ranking position? (T) • How strong was the confederation to
which they belong? (C) • P = M x I x T x C
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