The Jounnl of Modnn Africøn Studizs,37, r (¡999), pp. 137-169Printed in the United Kingdom @ rggg Cambridge University Press

The role of non-violent action inthe downfall of apartheid

Stephen Zunes*

A B S T R A C T

Against enormous odds, non-violent action proved to be a major factorin the downfall of apartheid in South Africa, and the establishment of ademocratic black majority government, despite predictions that the transitioncould come only through a violent revolutionary cataclysm. This was largelythe result of conditions working against a successful armed overthrow of thesystem, combined with the ability of the anti-apartheid opposition to takeadvantage of the system's economic dependence on a cooperative black labourforce. This article traces the history ofnonviolent resistance to apartheid, itsinitial failures, and the return in the r98os to a largely non-violent strategywhich, together with international sanctions, forced the government tonegotiate a peaceful transfer to majority rule.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Against enormous odds, non-violent action proved to be a major factorin the downfall of apartheid and the establishment of a democraticblack majority government. This came despite the fact that movementsworking for fundamental change in South Africa faced unprecedentedobstacles. Never had such a powerful and highly industrialised statebeen overthrown from within. Opponents of apartheid faced a complexweb of regulations which produced a rigid stratification system whichseverely limited dissent by the oppressed majority. Apartheid SouthAfrica defied most traditional political analyses, due to its uniquesocial, rpolitical, economic and strategic position. It practised one ofhistoryls most elaborate systems of internal colonialism, with a whiteminority composed of less than one-fifth of the population in absolutecontrol. The ruling party was led by racialists who also possessed anunusual level of political sophistication. They controlled some of theworld's richest mineral deposits, including one-third of the earth'sknown gold reserves. A modern military machine stood ready in anarea which lacked any other large conventional force. Its internal

* Department of Politics, Universiry of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA g4r 17, USA.

I 3 B S T E P H E N Z U N E S

security system was elaborate and repressive. As a modern industri-alised state in an undeveloped region, South Africa's rulers created adegree of economic hegemony, despite almost universal non-rec-ognition of their legitimacy. It was a pariah ofinternational diplomacy,yet economically, and to a lesser extent strategically, was wellintegrated into the Western system.

It was this paradoxical situation, of being both extraordinarilypowerful and highly vulnerable, that gave non-violent resistance itspower. Despite great mineral wealth and an increasing industrialcapacity, South Africa's white minority regime found itself dependenton its black majority, its southern African neighbours, and theindustrialised West, to maintain its repressive political system and itshigh level of modernisation. Indeed, the resistance movement in SouthAfrica has been referred to as'probably the largest grassroots eruptionof diverse non-violent strategies in a single struggle in human history'(Wink ry87:$. This non-violent movement, which consisted in bothinternal resistance and solidarity work outside the country, was largelysuccessful in its strategy, which avoided challenging the South Africanstate where it was strong, and concentrated its attacks on where it wasweak. This article will examine how unarmed methods of resistancefaced these challenges, as well as comparing the history of both violentand non-violent strategies in South Africa.

Non-violent action can be defined as a conflict behaviour consistingof unconventional acts implemented for purposive change withoutintentional damage to persons or property. Non-violent action includesstrikes, boycotts, sit-ins, occupations, demonstrations, refusal to paytaxes, creation of alternative and parallel institutions, and other formsof civil disobedience.l

The basic political assuption implicit in non-violent action is thatgovernments are ultimately dependent on the fearful obedience andcompliance of the people. The power of the apartheid regime wasfundamentally vulnerable, in that it depended upon the submission ofthe Bo per cent non-white majority to reinforce its power sources.Punishment of those who disobey a given command does not in itselfsatisfy the objective, should others still refuse to given in. Thus,according to Gene Sharp (tg73tzB), even the South African regime,despite all ofits repressive machinery, was still a government based upona form of 'consent'. Other theorists of non-violent action, such asSouad Dajani (tgg4, Ioo-I), argue that such an individualistic andvoluntaristic conceptualisation of power cannot apply in situations likeapartheid South Africa, since social power is deeply rooted in social

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D I 3 9

relationships and patterns of social behaviour that are institutionalisedover time and pervasive throughout society. Yet she also noted that,should the opposition be effectively educated, empowered andmobilised, non-violence could work in South Africa, as indeed provedto be the case.

Virtually no campaign for national liberation has consistedexclusively in violent or non-violent tactics. Indeed, rioting, sabotage,murder of suspected collaborators and other violent tactics were verymuch part of the anti-apartheid resistance movement. Yet, as will beargued below, these were not as important as the ongoing andpotentially greater non-cooperation with the apartheid regime and theeconomic system that sustained it. While the armed struggle neverreached a level which threatened the survival of the regime, the threatof such an armed uprising may have played a role in forcing it tocompromise. Yet, as will also be demonstrated below, the regimeclearly had the means to forestall a successful uprising for many yearsto come, whereas the largely non-violent resistance was already causingenormous disruption to the existing order.

T H E P R O B L E M S O F A R M E D S T R U G G L E

From its inception in r9rz, the African National Congress (ANC) wasthe primary organisational vehicle through which black South Africanspursued their rights. After using largely legal tactics during its first fortyyears, the militant youth wing ascended to the leadership in the earlyIgsos, with an orientation towards non-violent direct action. The rivalPan Africanist Congress (PAC), founded in 1959, also pursued thisstrategy until both organisations were banned in the wake of theSharpeville massacre of 196o. Subsequently, they advocated variousforms of armed resistance until the ANC agreed to a cease-fire duringthe final stages of talks with the government in r99r. The PAC hadlargely disintegrated by this point, as a result of governmentsuppression, internal factionalisation and lack of internal and externalsupport. The armed struggle was largely limited to an occasionalbombing and intercepted border crossing, which gradually increased inthe late rg8os to a rate of three or four attacks every month.

Evidence suggests that the armed struggle may have actuallyharmed the anti-apartheid movement: the bombing campaign by theANC's armed wing, Umkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), in theearly I96os seriously weakened simultaneous non-violent campaigns,

r 4 o S T E P H E N Z U N E S

since the government was able to link them in the eyes of the public andjustify their repression. Not only were most of those involved in thebombing campaign captured, but the turn to violence was used tojustify the rounding up of many other suspected dissidents as well.Although the ANC explicitly directed their campaign towardsproperty, a number of their trained attackers used their explosives onthe homes of pro-government blacks, killing several people, includingchildren. This not only invited further government repression, butresulted in a loss of support by some Africans as well. Given thetendency for those in authority to treat opposition movements byreference to their most violent components, the armed struggle in itsearly stages probably did more harm than good to the movementagainst apartheid.

However, given the level of repression against non-violent activistswithin the country, and the successes of outgunned armed liberationmovements elsewhere, there was the widespread belief for most of therg6os and rgTos that the armed struggle would play a major role in thedownfall of apartheid. The problem was that those who dreamed ofliberating their country through force of arms faced enormous obstacles.

White South Africa possessed by far the most powerful militarymachine on the continent. By the early lgBos, it had a rigorouslytrained operational force of r8o,ooo men and, with a reserve forceconstantly replenished through universal white male conscription, itcould mobilise nearly half a million troops within a few hours (Leonardrg8r: r3). In addition, a cadet programme of military training forsecondary students would grow to 3oo,ooo within the next few years(ibid.), and every white man and woman was required from adolescenceto learn marksmanship. The number of guns per capita for the whitepopulation was among the highest in the world, while apart from thero,ooo blacks in special military units and some police, no blacks wereallowed to carry firearms under any circumstances.z The estimatedcombined forces of all black African states and liberation movementssouth of the equator came to less than half that of South Africa. Interms of military equipment, South Africa had an even greateradvantage. The South African air force possessed over 875 aircraft,including over Soo combat aircraft and more than eoo helicopters; thearmy owned over 260 tanks, r,3oo armoured cars, over r ro armouredpersonnel carriers, and a large number of selÊpropelled medium andheavy artillery guns (Leonard r 98 r : zo). The material of the liberationmovements and black African states was limited to small, outdatedWestern arms and a limited supply of modest-grade Soviet hardware.

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D r 4 r

Only Angola had major military equipment within its borders, and thiswas largely in the hands of Cuban forces defending the governmentfrom US and South African-backed UNITA rebels.

There was little promise of an organised force of African nationsIaunching a successful invasion of South Africa. The Organisation ofAfrican Unity lacked any coordinated military organisation, leadershipor general staff, training techniques or doctrine. Zaire, Ethiopia andNigeria, the sub-Saharan states with the largest standing armies,required their armed forces for internal control. Nor could Cuba, orother states allied with the black South African cause, be expected toredirect substantial numbers of their troops away from their ownnational defence needs. Opposition by the United States and otherWestern states would have prevented any kind of United Nations orother multinational force from being deployed.

Until November $77, when the mandatory United Nationsembargo went into effect, South Africa was the recipient of highlysophisticated weaponry from Israel, France and other countries. Theembargo did not significantly alter the strategic balance, since a largeamount of outside arms were getting into the country anyway, and,more importantly, South Africa had by that time become almost self-sufficient militarily. The government was manufacturing its own tanks,mine-clearing vehicles, missiles and even napalm and nerve gas.3 Noguerrilla movement could hope to combat such a powerful armed forceon its own territory effectively, especially when South Africa'spreparedness for such an attack was considered. South African forceswere being trained by the highly effective Israeli counter-insurgencyunits (Southern African Committee ry78: r4). In addition, aninvestigation at that time noted how (Adam rgTr: rz5-6):

Five special 'anti-terrorist' training camps have been strategically establishedfor training in camouflage and disguise, the establishment of bases, tracking,field shooting, convoy and ambush drill. The Defense Minister told Parliamentthat the men were kept informed of counter-measures against the latestterrorist tactics throughout the world. The Air Force has been reorganized forgreater mobility and is being integrated with the anti-guerrilla combat forces.An underground air defense radar station has been constructed at Devon inthe eastern Transvaal as the nerve center ofthe northern area's early warningsystem. Information is fed into computers from radar heads above ground andfrom various remote satellite stations. Three thousand miles of South Africa'snorthern borders are reported being patrolled night and day...An under-ground radio communications center is flocated] at Westlake near CapeTown. Its computer produces on demand a map of the shipping in anyselected portion of the ocean.

r42 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

In addition, South Africa had (Friedland r9B3):

augmented its internal production of armaments, established new militarybases in the northeastern Transvaal, created a special anti-terrorist police unitand counter-insurgency division within the army, and initiated plans toremove Africans from the border areas and transfer them to villages undermilitary supervision.

The border with Mozambique, the only frontier with sufficientvegetation for cover, had been cleared for a depth of at least one mile,was heavily mined, and was under constant patrol with the assistanceof bright floodlights (Gann & Duignan rgTB: 53).

Another important factor was the consolidation of the security andintelligence forces under the centralised command of the South Africanpresident. This was but one part of the increasing militarisation ofSouth African society, in preparation for what many saw as aninevitable armed conflict with black guerrilla movements. There waslittle question that they would be ready to meet any military challengein the foreseeable future. The most frightening obstacle to a militaryvictory by armed liberation forces was South Africa's nuclearcapability, demonstrated by the apparent nuclear test in Septemberr979.

Proponents of armed struggle in South Africa pointed to Angola,Mozambique and Ztmbabwe as examples of how an outgunnedguerrilla movement need not win the war to achieve liberation: that awar of attrition would be enough to result in the capitulation of thewhite minority regime. Indeed, the victorious armed struggle in theformer Portuguese colonies was the major inspiration for many blackSouth Africans to look favourably on the prospects of a successfularmed revolutionary struggle in their own country.

However, several key differences were often overlooked. The whitepopulace in those territories was less than 5 per cent of the population,and in each case under a quarter million people. South African whites,by contrast, totalled z'B million, over 15 per cent of the population.There was strong pressure from the colonial power for a settlement withthe black majority in their colonies, once they realised that they couldnot win an unpopular colonial war, which made further resistance bythe white minority impossible. White South Africans did not have toyield to the priorities of a 'mother country'.

White South African troops would have been fighting, not for theprotection of colonial interests, but for their own livelihood, reducingthe chances of the class divisions and low morale which plagued thePortuguese and others fighting colonial wars. In addition, many

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T T O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D r 4 3

Portuguese and white Rhodesians willingly moved to South Africa orreturned to their European homelands after liberation. White SouthAfricans, however, had lived in their land for many generations - mostAfrikaners traced their ancestry back at least two and a half centuries- and would have nowhere to go. In the face of a violent liberationmovement, they would probably have fought to the bitter end. It islikely that the full military might of the South African state would havebeen unleashed against whole communities, with enormous destructivepotential. Many whites on the far right began stockpiling arms for whatthey saw as an inevitable race war, which they had an almost messianiccommitment to resist to the last Afrikaner.

A-lso, unlike these former colonies, South Africa was a modern,industrialised state. It was the major industrial power of the continent,if not the southern hemisphere. It was the only country in Africa withmajor iron and steel industries, advanced engineering facilities andpetrochemical plants. The industrial infrastructure, through its thenquasi-governmental administration, was intrinsically linked to themilitary establishment.

The black townships outside South African cities were designed sothat they could be easily cordoned off and subjected to air strikes,making it easy for the military to suppress any armed uprising. Whilesome ANC leaders began to advocate a 'people's war' of massivearmed resistance within the townships in the mid-rg8os, such ascenario was never realistic. Unlike Algiers, or other locations ofsuccessful urban guerrilla warfare, there was no rrraze of alleys in whichguerrillas could lose those in pursuit. The black townships were built asgrids, with wide thoroughfares, making it difficult for a guerrilla to findshelter. In addition, the record of urban guerrilla warfare in thepreceding years, as in lJruguay,BraziI and Argentina, did not offer avery hopeful precedent.

The Bantustans - the small, non-contiguous, remote rural areas setaside by the apartheid system for the black majority - presentedbasically the same situation on a larger scale. Because of theirgeographical fragmentation and tight rule by hand-picked elites, theycould hardly be ideal bases for guerrilla warfare. There were strongpressures, both internally and externally, on the leadership of thehomelands to work with the South African military, and several werecooperating quite closely (Karis rg8g-+). In addition, less than +2 percent of the population was male, the majority of these being under r5or over 65, limiting the number of potential recruits (Johnsonrg77: goo). Meanwhile, the 4 million blacks in white rural areas,

1 4 + S T E P H E N Z U N E S

labouring primarily as farm hands, were so utterly dependent on theirwhite overlords and geographically separated, that there was littlereason to think that they would shift dramatically away from theirtraditional conservatism and non-involvement in popular resistancemovements, so as to be able to contribute to an armed revolution.

Another problem was that the terrain in South Africa was totallyunsuitable for guerrilla warfare. The South African countryside consistsmostly of open areas of desert and savanna, especially in thestrategically important Transvaal, and there were virtually nosanctuaries, such as mountains and jungles, in which to retreat orestablish bases of operation. In addition, unlike other countries thatexperienced successful guerrilla warfare, South Africa was a highlyurbanised society, with modern communications and transportfacilities, so there would be little opportunity to avoid detection andattack.

Guerrilla raids from neighbouring independent states would alsohave been problematic, since they would have been susceptible tooffensive military actions by South African forces. South Africa madefrequent attacks in Angola against SWAPO bases and refugee campsduring their occupation of Namibia, as well as numerous minorincursions. There were three major attacks deep inside Mozambiqueduring the Ig8os, attacking alleged ANC homes and offices. Therewere also raids during this period into Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana.It was unlikely that a newly independent Namibia would take the riskof provoking conflict with its giant neighbour, on which it was stilldependent. Even the tiny Rhodesian army had been capable of makingdevastating raids against its neighbours, and the prospects made theseblack states, already in desperate economic shape from previous warsand dependent on South Africa economically, extremely wary aboutharbouring guerrillas. South Africa was financing anti-governmentguerrillas in Mozambique and Angola, and there was increasing SouthAfrican military activity along the borders. Mozambique was forced tosign a peace treaty with South Africa in rg84, as were Swaziland andLesotho, which severely limited ANC activities. According to RobertM. Price (r99r : g4-5):

through the use of military and economic power, Pretoria sought to create a'neutral' cordon of African states to its north. Under a regime of SouthAfrican regional hegemony southern African states would be expectedto...prevent their territory from being used in any manner by the ANC[among others].

No armed guerrilla struggle has ever succeeded without sanctuaries

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T T O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D r 4 5

for rest from combat, the provision of food, rearmament and militarytraining. No sanctuaries existed at this time within easy strikingdistance of South Africa, and there was little likelihood that any wouldbecome available. Even were a neighbouring country willing to takethe enormous risks necessary to provide sanctuary, there was still theproblem ofpenetrating the heavily guarded border regions, a barrierthat the ANC was never fully able to overcome, even before theintroduction of highly sophisticated monitoring devices.

Despite increasing numbers of South African blacks leaving thecountry for military training with the ANC in the late r97os, thenumbers of potential guerrillas was still very small, especially whenconsidering the strength of the South African military and the size ofthe ANC's objectives. Estimates of ANC military personnel in the earlyrg8os were never higher than r4,ooo (Karis rg83-84). The ANCrefused to make a public estimate, presumably because of itsembarrassment at the paucity of men under arms. Even taking intoaccount the high ratio of military personnel over insurgents needed tosuppress a guerrilla movement, the ANC could hardly have beenconsidered a formidable military threat for many years to come.

Despite twenty-five years of armed resistance, and large amounts ofmilitary aid and training from the Soviet Bloc, the ANC was able toshow 'little serious military capabiity' (Uhlig r986: r7o), and,militarily speaking was referred to as 'one of the world's least successful"liberation movements"' (Lelyveld r9B3).

Random terror, as attempted in the þoqo campaign of the earlyrg6os, or even on a larger and better-coordinated scale, would not havebeen helpful. Terrorism has traditionally united the opposition, oftenmaking them more entrenched, while dividing the aggrieved popu-lation - in effect, the opposite of non-violent action. The traditionaljustification for terrorism, that it would allow the state to reveal its trulyrepressive nature, certainly did not apply to apartheid South Africa:not only was the repressive nature of the state obvious to any blackSouth African, but their largely non-violent resistance brought out therepressive apparatus without providing the needed rationalisation ofcurbing terrorism.

It was under these circumstances that the ANC and other resistanceorganisations in the early r g8os began to seriously question whetherarmed struggle would be successful. The Soviet lJnion, the chiefmilitary backer of the ANC, which had long since joined Westerncountries in doubting the military capability of the ANC armed wing,supported a negotiated settlement, and saw continued armed struggle

r46 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

as counter-productive (Price lggr:g). Many South Africans alsoquestioned whether they were willing to subject their country to themass murder, ecocide and rampant devastation that occurred inVietnam. Unlike the Vietnamese, the South African revolutionarieswould not have had a terrain favourable for guerrilla warfare, oravailable sanctuaries; nor would their opponent have been inunfamiliar territory, far from supply lines, be proxies for a corruptregime with little popular support or have a large anti-war movementwith which to contend.

A violent strategy would have led inevitably to spiralling escalation,with the state having the strategic edge at every turn in the foreseeablefuture. Even had the blacks eventually won, it would have probablyhave left millions dead and a ravaged country. Many skilled whitesneeded to maintain specialised positions during the interim periodbefore a sufficient number of blacks (denied advancement underapartheid) could take these positions, would be killed or driven intoexile. Armed resistance in South Africa would probably have attractedmany of the least disciplined elements from African society underapartheid, thus blurring the distinction between revolutionary actionand hooliganism. This would have resulted in a widespread amoraleffect on an entire younger generation of South Africans needed torebuild their country, a problem which has proved to be difficultenough, even with the relatively limited revolutionary violence that didoccur.

There has been a tendency for non-violent movements to maintaina more democratic and inclusive character than armed movements(Sharp rg8o), a factor that many black South Africans undoubtedlyconsidered after years of living under a most undemocratic andexclusivist system. In addition, since a violent struggle would havetended to be directed more against people than a non-violent struggle,which tends to aim at institutional and systemic targets, there wouldhave been a greater chance of the revolutionary struggle taking on amore destructive racialist orientation. In addition, as Liddell Hart(r967: zo4) observes:

The habit of violence takes deeper root in irregular warfare than it does inregular warf;are. In the latter it is counteracted by the habit ofobedience toconstituted authority, whereas the former makes a virtue of denying authorityand violating rules. It becomes very difficult to rebuild a country and a stablestate on such an undermined foundation.

By contrast (ibid.):

While the practice of non-violent resistance is not entirely devoid of such after-

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D r 4 7

effects, they are less damaging, materially and morally. The practice mayfoster a continuing habit of evasion, but it does not sow the seeds of civil warnor breed terrorists.

In addressing the question of what kind of strategy a South Africanmovement for majority rule should consider to maximise its chances ofsuccess, Sharp (rg8o: 163) outlined three major criteria:

(I ) How to achieve the maximum strength and involvement in the struggleby the non-whites, mainly the Africans.

(z) How to split some of the whites from support for the AfrikanerNationalists and white domination, and move them towards action in supportof the non-whites.

(3) How to bring the maximum international pressures to bear on theSouth African government towards change compatible with the selÊdetermination of the South African people as a whole and their futuredevelopment.

Non-violent action proved to be the most effective means of achievingthose criteria.

While maintaining their commitment to pursue armed struggle,both on principle as well as a strategy of disrupting normal operationsof the repressive state, the South African opposition reached a clearconsensus by the early rg8os that liberation had to be pursued throughlargely non-violent methods. Despite the romantic rhetoric of in-ternational solidarity groups in the US and elsewhere of a victoriousANC army marching to Pretoria,a the ANC never saw armed struggleas the sole or even primary means for bringing down the apartheidregime (Price r gg r : g). Strategic analyst Thomas Karis, writing in r 986(tg4), noted that 'despite a commitment to "armed struggle", theANC has considered sabotage and guerrilla attacks to be only a minorstrand in a multifaceted strategy consisting mainly of politicallyinspired demonstrations, strikes and defiance'. By the rg8os, the ANCsaw strikes and boycotts as 'a main element in the organization'sstrategy for liberation' (Uhlig 1986: 169), emphasising that thearmed struggle was only 'one strand' in the fabric or resistancestrategies which included civil disobedience (ibid.: r7o). The ANCeven acknowledged that most of its acts of sabotage and small-scaleguerrilla attacks were no more than 'armed propaganda' (KarisI986: r Iz). Indeed, during the anti-Republic Day campaign of r9Br,when hundreds of thousands of people took part in protest rallies allaround the country, and a successful general strike demonstrated thelevel at which the opposition could mount a successful mobilisation, theANC launched about half a dozen attacks against strategic targets

I48 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

across the country 'as a well-coordinated demonstration of support fora popular campaign of mass resistance' (Frederickse rgBT: 39).

It had become apparent by this point that the armed struggle was ameans of providing moral support for the unarmed resistance, ratherthan what many had anticipated as an unarmed resistance being usedprimarily to support the armed struggle. According to journalistJulieFrederikse (ibid.: r7B).

While the African National Congress is known for its anti-government guerillaattacks, its leaders also seem wary about any over-emphasis on military ratherthan political activity. The ANC President's first public statement of r984exhorted all South Africans to 'create conditions in which the country willbecome increasingly ungovernable'.

In effect, the ANC recognised that the non-cooperation of the peoplewas critical, and that it was the ungovernability of the country by theapartheid regime, and not its physical overthrow, which would endapartheid. Thus, while never formally renouncing armed struggle untilthe peace process was well under way, there was a growing recognitionthrough the Ig8os by the ANC that the largely non-violent forms ofresistance would be the decisive means of overcoming apartheid. Anti-apartheid leader Desmond Tutu, the Anglican archbishop, who openlydeclared on several occasions that he was not a pacifist and was opento sanctioning armed resistance if necessary, publicly called upon theANC to suspend the armed struggle in I9BB (Smuts & Westcottr 9 9 r : I 3 5 ) .

The shift to a largely non-violent strategy, which was concomitantwith the decentralisation and democratisation of the resistancemovements, was not the result of an ethical transformation, but wasborn out of necessity. American theologian Walter Wink, writing inrgBT (Bo-r) , observed:

Since armed resistance is largely futile, people have taken recourse in non-violent means. Non-violence has even become the preferred method of peoplewho have never contemplated absolute pacifrsm. Because anti-Apartheidleaders are arrested almost as soon as they emerge, resistance groups haveinvented non-hierarchical and democratic organizational forms. Means andends coalesce as people create for themselves social instruments for change thatalready embody the better life they seek ahead.

N O N - V I O L E N T R E S I S T A N C E I N S O U T H A F R I C A N H I S T O R Y

The apartheid system went well beyond segregated public amenities toinclude the system of grand apartheid, maintained through a policy ofinflux control, which kept surplus labour and undesirables in the

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D \ 4 9

barren Bantustans many miles from the white cities and industrialareas. Squatter settlement by migrants in South Africa, deemed'illegal' by the white minority government, was not just the commonThird World phenomenon of rural poor desperately seeking work inthe cities, but an act of civil disobedience against the one of thefundamental pillars of apartheid. When such settlements werethreatened by government bulldozers in the rg8os, multiracial groupswould often lie down in front of them, courting arrest (Wink r9B7: 93).This resistance against efforts at government repression became both asymbolic and structural defiance against the system. The UrbanInstitute of South Africa estimated in r gBB that there were as many as

7 million illegal squatters in urban arcas (ibid.: rz5), more than thegovernment could reasonably hope to control.

In Cape Town, District Six, a coloured neighbourhood where 3o,ooopeople whose families had lived there for generations were evicted in1966 to shantytowns in a distant area, became a no-go zone forprospective white tenants and landowners in the decades that followeddue to local opposition (ibid. r9B7: gz). Campaigns against evictionsof Indian families from the whiteJohannesburg suburb of Pageview inI979, and of rural blacks from the Ventersdorp area in rgB3-4, becamenational campaigns of resistance (ibid.: rr5-rl). I" 1987, migrantmineworkers began bringing their wives into single-sex compounds indefiance of mine management and government regulations (ibid.: 94).

In addition, the non-violent resistance by workers and commuters inthe Ciskei bantustan in 1983, centred on a bus fare increase and poorworking conditions in factories, which was met by brutal repression bya joint effort of the homeland regime, the South African governmentand big business, marked a turning point in delegitimising the wholegrand apartheid scheme, by demonstrating to white South Africansthat the homelands policy was based on fear and force, not on a benignmutually beneficial programme of ' separate development' (Frederickser 9 B 7 : r r r - r z ) .

The centrality of the townships became apparent to both the SouthAfrican government and the ANC following the Soweto uprisings. Thewhites had to acknowledge that a black urban population was apermanent fixture in South African society and its economy. The whitepaper which accompanied the Riekert Commission Report emphasisedthat 'black labour represents by far the largest proportion of the totallabour force...in the so-called "White area"'. Furthermore, itprojected a far greater increase in the black population than for thewhites (RSA rg79). This acknowledged the vulnerability of the

r50 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

government and the entire South African economy to strikes and other

forms of non-violent disruption by the black majority. According to

P r i c e ( r g 9 r : r o r ) :

The black worker, whose increasing militancy since the Durban strikes of rg73threatened to undermine South Africa as a haven for multinational investors,and who during the Soweto uprising showed a growing willingness to supportradical youth with political strikes, was a township resident. Townshipsrepresented both a source of skilled workers, and an enormous untappeddomestic market for South Africa's manufactured goods. And the townships,easily accessible to journalists, offered the international media vivid materialto reveal the reality of black deprivation in South Africa.

Non-violent resistance against white minority rule has a long history

in South Africa, going back as far Mohandas Gandhi's non-violent

campaigns in Natal at the turn of the century. A half century later, the

l95os Defiance Campaign, despite its demise, demonstrated the

potential of non-violent action based in the townships in resisting

apartheid (Benson r966: r5g).

Of the ro,ooo volunteers called for, more than 85oo had gone voluntarily tojail despite the intimidating effect of police action, of dismissal by employers,and the propaganda of the bulk of the press and the radio; some teachers whohad done little before had thrown up their jobs to defy; the United Nationshad been inspired to discuss apartheid and the press of the world had takenthe nonwhite challenge to oppression more seriously than ever before.

As Benson (ibid.: t5t) observed:

October was the peak of the Campaign. For the frrst time in the history ofmodern South Africa, the Africans' militant achievement had kept theinitiative hard-won through discipline and selÊsacrifice. Only one thing couldrob them of such initiative: violence.

Violence did indeed break out, and the Campaign was crippled (Sharp

r 9 7 3 : 5 9 9 ) .

At the peak of the civil disobedience movement, after it had been in motionfor about six months, a series of African riots broke out between October lBand November g. Six whites were killed and thirty-three Africans. The whitedead included a nun who had been missionary doctor of the Africans: herbody was spoliated. This contributed to the sensationalism and to feelings thatrepression was'justified'. The precise causes of the riots are not clear. Theresistance leaders demanded an enquiry, which the government refused.There was no evidence that the resistance movement was responsible, andthere were suggestions that agents proaocateurs may have been involved. In anycase, the effects of the riots'were to damp down the spirit of resistance'.

Zulu Chief and anti-apartheid leader Albert Luthuli (196z: rz7-B)

added:

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D r 5 r

The Defiance Campaign was far too orderly and successful for theGovernment's liking, and it was growing. ... The challenge of nonviolence wasmore than they could meet. It robbed them of the initiative. On the otherhand, violence by Africans would restore this initiative to them - they thenwould be able to bring out the guns and the other techniques of intimidationand present themselves as restorers of order.

It can not be denied that this is exactly what happened, and at the momentmost convenient for the Government. The infiltration of agents þrouocateurs inboth Port Elizabeth and Kimberly is well attested. They kept well clear of thevolunteers and the Congress....They did their work among irresponsibleyoungsters. ...

It was all the government needed. The riots and the Defiance Campaignwere immediately identified with each other in the white South Africanimagination. The initiative was with the Government.

It is well known that the Government used its recovered initiative harshlyand to the full. ... The activities of rioters provided the pretext for crushingnonviolent demonstrators.

The number of those committing the civil disobedience droppedfrom 2354 in October to only z8o in November (Kuper rg58: r43).The resistance campaign, for all practical purposes, was at an end.There were a number of factors leading to this, including the arrests ofcertain leaders, harsh new penalties against civil disobedience, and theimpending general elections, but (ibid.: r45):

clearþ the riots played a decisive role. Quite apart from their effect on theresisters, the riots provided the opportunity for the Government to take overthe initiative and to assume far-reaching powers with some measure ofjustification.

It appears that the campaign's successes were limited not because itwas non-violent, but in large part because of the limited violence thatdid occur. The government refused demands by the resisters that a

Judicial Commission of Inquiry be appointed to investigate the causesof the riots, strengthening the belief that the violence was indeedgovernment inspired. The use of øgents þroaocateurs throughout thehistory of the resistance movement demonstrated that the whiteminority government strongly preferred the black resistance movementnot to use non-violence. The government felt threatened by the use ofmassive, disciplined non-violent resistance, as demonstrated by itsharsh counteractions during the Defiance Campaign and other timeswhen similarly challenged.

A major factor in the revitalisation of the South African resistancewas the Black Consciousness movement, which was launched in theearly l97os, stressing self-reliance and non-violent resistance. Though

Í52 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

inspired in part by Frantz Fanon's ideas of empowerment andconscientisation, the Black Consciousness Movement stressed thatblack pride need not come only through violence. Sam Nolutshungu(rg8z: rBg-+) observed:

Although Fanon's writings were widely read and his ideas of alienation incolonial society had much influence on many of the theorists of blackconsciousness, there is little evidence that his ideas on violence were muchdiscussed, and none that they were widely shared. It is nowhere seen as beingin itself a mentally liberating process; rather its instrumental role properlycomes only when consciousness has been achieved by other means.

Similarly, Gail Gerhart (rg78: z85-6), writing about the internalresistance movement of the I97os, adds:

The aim of Black Consciousness as an ideology was not to trigger aspontaneous Fanonesque eruption of the masses into violent action, but ratherto rebuild and recondition the mind of the oppressed in such a way thateventually they would be ready forcefully to demand what was rightfullytheirs.

The late Black Consciousness Movement leader Steve Biko and otherinternal resistance leaders stressed the need for non-violence, at least atthe early stage of the struggle, and criticised the PAC's 'reckless rushto confrontation when circumstance did not favor a black victory'(Gerhart r97B: zB5); they similarly criticised armed ANC raids aspremature and counterproductive to their work within the country.5

Some activists saw the public espousal of non-violence as a tacticalrecognition of the need to postpone government repression of the anti-apartheid group's public activities, to be followed by a'second phase'after conscientisation, that of armed struggle. Preliminary clandestinecommittees were set up by black consciousness leaders to explore thatpossibility, but these were set aside as advances in the internal andlargely non-violent resistance became apparent. There was somepressure from militants both in the leadership and at the grassrootsabout moving to active armed resistance, but the tactical advantages ofnon-violent resistance, regardless ofthe sincerity ofits initial advocates,had meanwhile won widespread support.

By the rg8os, the ANC and the more traditional nationalistleadership within the country had accepted many aspects of theparticipatory orientation from the Black Consciousness Movement,and, through their mutual support of the United Democratic Frontand trade union federations, maintained a degree of resilience andunity in the face of the worst repression in South Africa's history. It wasduring this period that they committed themselves to non-violent

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D I 5 3

resistance. A mass democratic movement was formed, which includedthe informal alliance of the ANC, COSATU, UDF and UDF affiliates,calling for non-racial democracy under the leadership of the ANC. Theformation of the UDF in r9B3 was significant, in that it was a loosecoalition of nearly 7oo organisations, including civil associations, tradeunions, student groups, youth groups, churches, women's organisations,religious groups and sports clubs, committed to a 'united, democraticSouth Africa based on the will of the people' and 'an end to economicand other forms of exploitation' (Karis 1986: rzB). They were able tohelp coordinate non-violent resistance campaigns, such as boycotts,strike support and other issues from local arenas to national support.

The rise of labour militancy was perhaps the most important trendtowards successful utilisation of non-violent action. The r973 strikes inthe Durban area demonstrated the vulnerability of crucial sectors ofthe South African economy to militant actions by black workers. Thestrike wave spread throughout Natal and beyond; between Januaryand March rg73, approximately r5o firms were struck. Increasingtrade union militancy on economic demands, demonstrating (as in theDurban strikes) that they could win, paved the way towardsempowering the population to a degree that massive political strikescould succeed. Black working-class support for the I976 student-ledSoweto uprising could be attributed in part to the increasinglyprecarious position of black workers in the country (Price rggl: 53).

Lodge (1983: 327) observed in r9B3 the significance of the wave ofstrikes in the preceding years:

Their scale, spontaneous character and degree of success made these strikesunique in South Africa's labor history. They had several distinctive features.The strikers refused to elect a leadership, thus immunizing themselves from theeffects of victimization and cooption. They avoided all formally constitutedrepresentative bodies (there were in any case very few ofthese). They reliedprincipally on the sharp demonstrative shock of a short withdrawal of laborto gain concessions from employers rather than entering negotiations orprotracted confrontations. The workers stayed in the vicinity of their factorieswhich may have afforded them some protection against police reprisals. Theconscious aim of the strikers in almost all cases was to gain better wages.

In addition, according toJohnson (t977: rB7):

The [1973] strike wave...had more than just economic effects. If anything,indeed, the short-term and partial satisfaction of economic demands merelylifted the threshold of workers' resentment to focus on their wider condition oflife.

Thee was a steady increase in strike activities following 197r, despite

r 5 4 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

occasional downturns in individual years. In rg7g, the governmentallowed Africans to join unions and permitted recognition of both blackand multiracial unions. There were still major restrictions on politicalactivities, penalties for illegal strikes were toughened, and governmentcontrols were increased. Yet, unions were able to force businesses toenter into negotiations, membership soared, and they began organisingin key sectors of the economy. Over r,ooo black workers were on strikeevery day by r98z, a number which grew in subsequent years(Frederickse ry87: zz). A halÊhour general strike in which loo,oooworkers put down their tools in r98z, in protest at the torture anddeath of a white trade union activist at the hands of governmentsecurity agents, marked the first such action in over two decades(ibid.: 166). The strikes tended to increase in duration, and while thevast majority were on immediate economic issues, a trend emerged bythe rg8os towards work stoppages in solidarity with labour struggleselsewhere. The unification of 5oo,ooo workers in r9B5 into one unionfederation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU),and its commitment to address concerns beyond the standard bread-and-butter issues, marked a turning point in the struggle. Unlike thesmall isolated black unions that had existed previously, this strongtrade union movement helped bring apartheid to its knees.

Another significant development was the increasing communitysupport for striking workers, first made apparent during the rgTg-Bostrike wave in the Western Cape. The use of consumer boycotts forcedmajor concessions by employers during that period. While boycotts inSouth Africa go back as far as the successful 1959 ANC-led potatoboycott in solidarity with farmworkers in the eastern Transvaal(Frederickse rgBT: 186), the boycotts of the rg8os were subsequentlyinstigated with increasing frequency. The boycott of red meat resultingfrom a rg8o strike by meat workers in the Western Cape, the rg8rboycott of Rowntree chocolates during the stike there, and the boycottof National Co-operative Dairies in protest at the dismissal of blackworkers in r9B7 at Clover Dairies in Durban, demonstrated the powerof community solidarity (ibid.: z7; Smuts & Westcott rggr: rro-r r).Thus strikes by vulnerable independent trade unions, whose workerswere mostly unskilled, often migrants, and constantly threatened withunemployment, demonstrated their power through strike support andboycotts from the community. More significantly, these evolved into'long-term, mass-based structures for change in both the workplaceand the community' (Frederickse rgBTl-27). A particularly goodexample of this phenomenon was the Sarmcol strike in Natal in 1985,

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T T O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P Á , R T H E T D I 5 5

where, following the firing of striking rubber factory workers, the entireregion mobilised on their behalf to raise funds, protest, engage in aone-day stayaway and boycott white businesses (Smuts & Westcottr g g r : r z 8 - g ) .

It is noteworthy that the October lg85 ban of media coverage of'unrest' specifically included strikes and boycotts. Yet such labouraction escalated still further: in rg87, over 2o,ooo railway workersstruck for over two months, and g4o,ooo mineworkers struck theChamber of Mines for three weeks (Smuts & Westcott IggI: rzB). Inlg8g alone, over 3 million person-days were lost from labour disputesin South Africa (ibid.: rzg).

The nationwide two-day general strike in r984, the largest of its kindin South African history up to that point, terrified the government, andmany observers see it, along with the government crackdown whichfollowed, as the starting point of the flnal wave of unrest which broughtthe regime to the negotiating table (Frederickse I9BT: IBo):

As many as Soo,ooo people refused to go to work and 4oo,ooo studentsboycotted classes. The strike was more than 8o per cent effective amongworkers from the besieged Vaal townships, and in the east Rand, where heavyindustry and organised labour is concentrated. The SASOL (oil-from-coal)and ISCOR (iron and steel) para-statals ground to a halt, despite threats tofire workers who joined the strike. The transport system designed to carryworkers to the Transvaal's industrial centre was abandoned....

The trade union's foray into the political arena, bolstered by thecommunities and students, was a stunning success: the stay-away strike hadbeen the most successful in South Afüca's history. The combined force of themuscle of organised labour and the back-up of the UDF's affiliatedorganisations had dealt the government a body blow that sent the politicians,the policy and the army reeling.

To try to halt these challenges, the government imposed a state ofemergency in rgB5 to curve the dissent. Since violent acts were alreadyillegal, the state of emergency was aimed primarily at curbing theunarmed resistance. According to Wink (1987: 7g),

'In an eloquenttribute to the power of nonviolence the government had decided, ineffect, to treat nonviolence as the equivalent of violence.' Initially, therestrictions were so comprehensive and the penalties so severe, that thishampered the non-violent resistance efforts. For example, merelystating an opposition to military conscription, participating in a non-violent demonstration, criticising the government or any governmentofficial or advocating a boycott, could land one in prison for up to tenyears (ibid.:79-Bo). Yet the state of emergency did not halt the non-violent movement. Charges of high treason against UDF leaders were

r56 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

dropped in December (Karis 1986: rz8). Indeed, 'The imposition ofthe July r9B5 state of emergency was not only a disastrouslyunsuccessful effort to control the mass uprising, it also galvanizedEuropean and American elites into pushing for economic sanctions'(Price rggr: z5o). The UDF and the unions had demonstrated thepower of non-violent resistance. Karis (rg83:4o5), writing in 1983,correctly concluded that 'black leaders will continue to calculate thatmass pressures, including strikes and boycotts, will be rnore efficaciousthan violence'.

A three-day general strike inJune rgBB included more than 3 millionworkers and pupils, paralysing industry. More than I millionparticipated in a similar stayaway in May 1987, and an August IgBggeneral strike proved to be the largest in the series, essentially shuttingdown commerce in Pretoria,Johannesburg, Durban and East London,and severely crippling industry in the Western Cape (Smuts &Westcott rggr: r25-7).

The rent boycott, based on objections to the poor living conditionsand higher utility rates for black than for white homes, began in theVaal triangle in August 1984, and spread to 50 townships over the nexttwo years. By September 1986, an estimated 6o per cent of the blackpopulation was not paying rent. By rgB9, the official governments ofSoweto and other townships were forced to negotiate (Smuts &Westcott r99r: z6). School boycotts were widespread in the seventeenyears prior to majority rule, forcing some needed reforms, though thecosts of denying much of a generation of blacks their education mayhave outweighed what was gained (ibid.:3o).

In addition to demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, occupations andother activities, there was an impressive development of alternativeinstitutions, effectively creating a situation of dual power in SouthAfrica, where institutions affecting the daily lives of black SouthAfricans came increasingly to be managed by black South Africansthemselves. Civic organisations based in the townships (Frederickser 9 8 6 : e 7 ) :

discovered the value of long-term projects in mobilizing community support,such as health and education centres, creches and pre-schools, advice offices,culture clubs, and perhaps most importantly, news media. Newspapers,newsletters and pamphlets [became] a valuable means of consolidatingorgar:jzation, educating the community, and ensuring two-way communi-cation.

Cooperatives, community clinics, legal resource centres and similaroffices offered places for people to go when existing institutions were

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T T O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E T D r 5 7

clearly inadequate. For example, a group known as OASSA (theOrganisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa), foundedin the Transvaal in 1983, later spreading to Cape Town, Durban andPietermaritzburg, offered medical and psychological help to thosereleased from detention and others victimised by state repression(Frederickse r986: rB). The South African government recognised thepower of these young community organisations, or 'civics'. President P.W. Botha, in justifying a law restricting international financialassistance to community based organisations, stated (Price rggr: 236) :'I say it's subversive to create alternative organisations in South Africafor the education of people, for local government, for proper economicdevelopment.' The Kasigo Trust, the country's largest anti-apartheidfoundation and a major backer of such alternative institutions, whenordered by the government to disclose all its funding sources, simplyrefused, on the grounds that it would be used by the government forintelligence-gathering purposes (Smuts & Westcott r99r: 36-7). Thetrust was supported by the European Community and hundreds ofother foreign and domestic funding sources.

These alternative institutions prospered because official institutionswere no longer recognised as legitimate. Only 6 per cent of the voterscast their ballots in council elections for black townships in the later97os after their establishment, well below previous advisory bodies inthe I96os (Price rggr: r3z). By the mid-rg8os, scores of officiallysanctioned local governments in the Black townships collapsed due tomassive non-cooperation, and the mayors and town councils, in mostof these cases, either resigned or were simply ignored. Pro-ANC/UDFalternative governments were established in face of virtual militaryoccupation.

One of the most striking examples of this was in the AlexandraTownship near Johannesburg, which had a population well overIoorooo. The alternative government started at the level of the 'yatd',

where three to five houses, each containing four to five families, shareda courtyard. About six of these yard committees, representing up totwenty-five families, made up a block committee, which then sentrepresentatives to street committees. All of the street committeesformed the Alexandra Action Committee, which became the township'sde facto government. With the assistance of a white lawyer, they drewup a local constitution based on participatory democracy and formedtheir own'people's courts', which dealt with matters such as pettytheft, family violence and inter-family disputes.G When the ActionCommittee successfully led a rent strike, the official government cut off

I 5 B S T E P H E N Z U N E S

water supplies and the cleaning of the communal pit toilets. The ActionCommittee then simply formed their own committees which took upthese and other jobs themselves (National Public Radio rg87). Therent strikes constituted an overt rejection of the authority of thetownship councils, making them a major target of state repression(Pr ice r99r : 257) .

Not all street and area committees were as democratic and well-functioning as those in Alexandra. Some were composed primarily ofselÊappointed vigilantes who engaged in undemocratic, violent andarbitrary forms of control. Yet, in most cases, they did constitute amodel of democratic selÊgovernance, where none had ever existedpreviously, and became a powerful tool of non-violent resistance to theofficial government.

Meanwhile, the first general elections based upon the newconstitution of r984, which created a tricameral legislature grantingthe coloured and Indian populations their own parliament alongside(though clearly unequal to) the white parliament, but ignoring theblack African majority altogether, resulted in an Bo per cent boycott bythose communities; those who did run were so reviled by theirrespective constituencies that they were essentially unable to campaign(Frederickse ry87: r47). Dr Van ZyI Slabberr, leader of the officialopposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) in the white parliament,resigned from parliament in protest at the disenfranchisement of themajority of South Africans. The result was rhat the façade oflegitimacyof the new constitutión was a non-starter.

It was also in the early rg8os that the churches became increasinglyoutspoken, not just in speaking out against apartheid as a sin, but inorganising protests in open defiance of apartheid and engaging in non-violent resistance. Anglican Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who won therg84 Nobel Peace Prize for his anti-apartheid activism, led the SouthAfrican Council of Churches (SACC), representing twenty-two of thenation's leading denominations in ongoing resistance. Having largelyfailed to support the Defiance Campaign for the rgsos, the churchleadership was frequently in the forefront of non-violent actioncampaigns in the rg8os. The SACC adopted a resolurion inJuly r9B7which openly questioned the legitimacy of the white minoritygovernment, and called on member churches to question their moralobligation to obey apartheid laws. The SACC openly supported therent boycott, tax resistance, conscientious objection to military serviceand registering births outside the official race-based system (Smuts &Westcott rggr: 35-6). In addition, individual churches became

N O N - V T O L E N T A C T T O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D I 5 9

sanctuaries for squatters whose homes had been deomolished and forthose sought by the authorities (ibid.: tzo-r), as well as becomingcentres for meetings and offices for anti-apartheid groups.

By the mid to late rg8os, defiance had reached a point where thegovernment had cle arly lost control. At political funerals and elsewhere,the green, black and gold flag of the ANC was unfurled widely despitethe ban on such displays (Smuts & Westcott rggl:55). Schools andother public facilities were renamed by young men with paint brushesafter jailed and exiled heroes of the resistance (ibid.: gr). Governmentofficials were met by school children who refused to entertain them asa show of opposition (ibid.: r23). Universities were faced with sit-ins insupport of black students (ibid.: n$. Clergy began to marry mixed-raced couples in defiance of the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act(ibid.: 67),which was finally abolished in I985. Church pre-schools andeven some state elementary schools began admitting non-white studentsin violation of segregation laws (ibid.:67; Wink rgBT:62). Whiteliberals started boycotting stores which refused to serve all races(Wink r9B7: Bz) .

In February r989, 3oo anti-apartheid activists jailed without chargewent on a hunger strike which resulted in the release of hundreds ofdetainees, and led to substantial limitations on the practice of detentionwithout trial (Smuts & Westcott rggr: 64). Two years earlieÍ, a +o-day public fast by a Buddhist nun from Britain resulted in the releaseof z5o children from detention (ibid.:66).

The growth in non-violent resistance culminated in the new DefianceCampaign of rg8g, with wave upon wave of illegal multiracial peacemarches. These started in Cape Town in September, and spread to

Johannesburg, Durban, East London, Grahamstown, Oudsthoorn,Kimberley, King William's Town, Bothshabelo and Uitenhage,collectively encompassing hundreds of thousands of demonstrators,and effectively neutralising the state of emergency (ibid. ryy:66).By November, the government allowed an ANC rally of 7o,ooo totake place in a soccer stadium, to welcome seven released politicalprisoners (ibid. : r r r).

There were four major goals of the l g8g campaign : ( l ) open defianceof the state of emergency to render it ineffective; (z) challenging pettyapartheid laws; (3) supporting the rights of black workers by defyinganti-labour legislation; and (4) demonstrating the illegitimacy of thetricameral legislative system. The campaign was largely successfu-I,both in making those laws unenforceable, and in rebuilding oppositionorganisations which had been seriously damaged by the 1986 state of

1 6 0 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

emergency. The alliance between the UDF and COSATU was

strengthened and members of the white establishment, ranging from

the mayor of Cape Town and business leaders, to leaders of the

opposition Democratic Party, joined in the movement (Smuts &

Westcot t rggr : 45-6) .Actions of this kind, far more than the sporadic armed attacks by the

ANC, forced the South African government to recognise that its days

were numbered. Price (rggr:45-6) predicted that:

the precondition for negotiations leading to fundamental political change inSouth Africa is an extended period of economic decline and political unrest.Over time a situation of economic, physical and psychological deterioration islikely to impact on strategically important constituencies. Support for thepolitical status quo will consequently erode among elements considered vitalby the ruling elite, including segments of its security forces. The government'scapacity to control will deteriorate as the costs ofsecurity escalates beyond thefinancial capabilities of a deteriorating economy and its self confidence willcollapse as the resources and policy options to turn the situation around aeperceived as exhausted. This process of decline and disaffection will lead to agradual shift, over time, toward a position where negotiations for some formof fundamental political change, such as majority rule, is deemed acceptable.

According to anti-apartheid activist Dene Smuts (Smuts & Westcott

r 9 9 r : 9 ) :The two historic strands of struggle, violent and nonviolent, were operatingsimultaneously at the time of the Defiance Campaign of 1989. Whennonviolent action coexists with a declared policy of armed struggle, it cannotapproach Gandhian refinement and control. But, with violence on the groundand with the ambiguous goals of negotiation or takeover, nonviolent action inSouth Africa in the late r98os - the hunger strikes that ended the mass use ofthe system of detetion without trial, the beach protests that showed up theinjustice ofsegregation and outrageousness ofpolice action - operated on thesame premises Martin Luther King described in his Letter from a Birminghan

Joil... fthat] 'direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such tension

that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced toconfront this issue'.

Rather than ungovernability of the townships by the white authorities

creating liberated zones which would become a beachhead for an

armed assault against white South Africa, as many predicted, it was

their ungovernability in itself, combined with effective alternative

institutions, that helped force the government to recognise the need for

negotiations.Meanwhile, the largely unarmed resistance and the repressive

countermeasures against the movement prompted the non-violent

resistance in the industrialised countries to force sanctions. The existing

N o N - v l o L E N T A c r l o N : D o w N F A L L o F A p A R T H E , I D r 6 l

cultural, academic and sports boycotts were broadened to includeeconomic sanctions which made a real impact. The British Com-monwealth enacted restricted measures in 1986; the US, Japan,Canada and several European countries enacted a series of sanctionsthat same year, while international bankers refused to roll over newloans. Several major corporations disinvested and, while their shareswere often just bought up by South African firms, it restricted theamount of capital available to promote economic growth. This,combined with the strikes and other forms of economic resistance by theblack majority and the increasing costs of internal security from boththe armed and the far more significant unarmed resistance, led SouthAfrica into the economic crisis which forced manv of the country's elitesto advocate change.

R E A S O N S F O R T H E S U C C E S S O F T H E N O N - V I O L E N T E M P H A S I S

The non-violent struggle in South Africa ultimately proved successfulwhen sufficient numbers were empowered, mobilised and willing totake the personal risks to challenge the existing order. One complicatingfactor in the South African struggle had been the use of 'bannings', aform of house arrest, and suspended sentences with limits on politicalactivity, against leaders in the resistance movement. In most cases, theleaders abided by these restrictions rather than face years ofimprisonment; most of those who did not fled into exile. The politicalconsequence of this submission was quite negative. Sharp (lg8o: r7t)noted that:

One of the objective results of the leaders'choice of accepting these limitations,instead of refusing to comply and going to prison, has been to set an exampleharmful to future resistance. The ordinary opponent of apartheid is not likelyto risk a greater punishment than the leaders are seen to be suffering. Yetwillingness to undergo imprisonment and other suffering is a primaryrequirement of change.

The increased willingness to defy banning orders in the late rg8os, asevidenced by Winnie Mandela and others, encouraged greater numbersto openly defy the authorities, and created a climate of resistance in theface of government repression. In August rg89, the UDF and otherrestricted organisations, along with scores of restricted activities, openly'unbanned' themselves in a public march in Cape Town (Smuts &Westcott I99r: 49). As one activist at the time describedit (ibid.:45):

A remarkable aspect of the lgSg campaign was that many of the organisationsand people taking part 'unbanned' themselves in order to do so. And not only

1 6 Z S T E P H E N Z U N E S

did the rg89 campaign, unlike that of rg5z, take place against the backgroundof a state of emergency - it effectively ended it.

An editorial in the Weekþ Argus during that year noted (ibid.:97):

the intimidatory powers of the state have waned; the veneration of the law hasdiminished with the erosion of the rule of law. Inevitably that meekacquiescence of yesteryear has evaporated and SA is now witnessing an open,deliberate and organised campaign of defiance.

Though it is easy to think of apartheid South African society in termsof radical polarisation, a model that would tend to support armedstruggle as a means of change, the high degree of interdependence,albeit on unfair terms imposed by the ruling white minority, allowedgreater latitude for manipulation through non-violent means than ispossible in classically polarised societies.

About half of the country's Africans lived in areas allocated to SouthAfrica's whites, including all the ports, major cities, industry, minesand optimal agricultural land, as did virtually all of the Coloureds andAsians. The white minority existed from day to day with a high levelof dependence on the black majority, not just for their high standard ofliving, but for their very survival. Non-violent action constituted amore direct challenge to the system of apartheid than did violence.

The black South Africans' overwhelming numerical majority madethe use of non-violent action particularly effective when they started tomobilise in large numbers in the mid-lg8os. Non-violent action, despiteits requirements of discipline and bravery in the face of repression,allowed participation by a far greater percentage of the population thanwould a guerrilla army, thus optimising the black majority. Sustainednon-violent action created a great deal of unity and militancy amongpreviously non-committed Africans, as was witnessed in earlier non-violent campaigns. The late Zulu chief and ANC leader Albert Luthuli(196z: 64) noted how the 1953 Defiance Campaign 'had succeeded increating among a very large number of Africans the spirit of militantdefiance. The Campaign itself came to an untimely end, but it left anew climate, and it embraced people far beyond our range of vision'.ANC membership jumped from approximately 7,ooo at the start of thecampaign to over roo,ooo towards the end. Another ANC leader,Walter Sisulu, observed that another non-violent campaign, thesuccessful rg57 Alexandra township bus boycott, 'raised the politicalconsciousness of the people and has brought about a great solidarityand unity among them' (Sharp: ry72:7gS).7

By contrast, violence often alienates support within the grievancegroup. This has been apparent in South African history, where the

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D I 6 3

essentially conservative and religious Africans tended to respondnegatively or not at all to revolutionary violence. Heribert Adam(rg7r: r16) reported that Operation Maltebulte, an ANC bombingcampaign in the early rg6os, 'which aimed at frightening whites intomaking concessions, instead resulted in a strengthening of the repressivemachinery and general discouragement of African militancy closer togeneral resignative despair that determination to actively resist whitedomination'.

The shift to a largely non-violent orientation lured white popularopinion away from those seeking continued white domination. Non-violent action threw the regime off-balance politically. A related factorwas that the largely non-violent struggle of the r g8os made theprospects of living under black majority rule less frightening. Thoughthe prospects of giving up their privileges was not particularlywelcomed by most whites, the use of non-violence by the black majorityagainst their white oppressors was seen as indicative of a tolerantattitude not likely to result in the previously anticipated reprisals uponseizing power. The use of armed struggle as the primary means ofresistance, even if white civilian casualties were kept at a minimum,would have led many whites to fear for the worst.

One consequence of the divisions created within the whitecommunity was the End Conscription Campaign, which began in ther97os with white youth opposing South Africa's occupation of Namibiaand invasion of Angola, but grew dramatically in the mid-rg8os, whenthe regular armed forces moved into the black townships. As many asIrooo new open resisters surfaced in IgBg alone, and thousands moreevaded the draft in less public ways. Through the rg8os, an average of

4,ooo men failed to report every year for military service (FrederikselgBT: Bz). Resistance included voluntary exile, going underground orvoluntarily submitting oneself to arrest and imprisonment for refusal tobe drafted into the army. While some were religious pacifists, mostresisted on political grounds.

The phenomenon of clearly non-violent demonstrators beingsubjected to cruelty and brutality, creating strong dissent within thewhite minority, had also occurred in earlier non-violent campaigns. Inthe rg57 Alexandra township boycott (Sharp 1973:669-7o):

Despite official threats, many European automobile drivers gave rides to thewalking African boycotters. On the route the Africans had been systematicallyintimidated and persecuted by the police. Also, after Sharpeville, unprovokeciattacks - including whippings - by police against Africans in the Capetownarea during an African strike led to so many European bystanders phoning to

T 6 4 S T E P H E N Z U N E S

report the attacks to Capetown newspapers that the switchboards werejammed; the President of the Cape Chamber of Commerce of Industries, C.F. Regnier, personally pleaded with the Chief of Police, Cot. I. P. S.Terblanche, to stop the assaults.

The shooting deaths of non-violent Coloured students on strike inCape Town in May rg8o produced an outpouring of sympathy for thestrikers. Even the second largest white political party, the ProgressiveFederal Party, complained about the excessive force by the police. Bycontrast, the PFP strongly supported the January rgBI raid intoMozambique and other incursions by the South African armed forcesagainst alleged armed guerrilla units.

Previously unsympathetic whites actively supported the non-violentdefence of a number of squatter settlements, such as the Crossroadscommunity near Cape Town, threatened with destruction by theauthorities. Such episodes created a climate of divisiveness within theruling order which was then exploited by the black resistance.IJnfortunately, the slight escalation in armed attacks by the ANC in theearly rg8os inhibited this shift.JournalistJulie Frederikse (r987: t74)observed:

When the ANC's attacks were largely confined to the sabotage of townshiprailway lines and raids on black police stations, most whites had been able todismiss the guerrillas as a few poorly-trained radicals 'hurting their ownpeople'. But when nineteen whites and blacks were killed by a bomb in thestreets of Pretoria in r983, many white South Africans then readily acceptedthe government's argument that the ANC was committed to naked terrorism,aimed at civilians... The fact that the blast was aimed at the Defence ForceHeadquarters and half those killed were military personnel was obscured bythe media fixation on 'the car bomb outrage'.

By contrast, disciplined non-violence created morale problems withinthe police and military, rendering them less effective (Sharp 1973:

s8s-6).In an effort to crush a strike by Africans which began on March ez, 196o (thed,ay after the shooting at Sharpeville), police invaded the Nyanga locationnear Capetown on April 4; for four days they unleashed a reign of terrorincluding extensive whippings of men, use of batons and some shootings andkillings. (This was after extensive unprovoked police brutality against Africanselsewhere, which had produced important white protests against the police.)Norman Phillips of the Toronto ,Sfør reports the inhibiting effects ofnonretaliation even in this situation: 'For sheer sadism, the closest comparisonto what happened at Nyanga was when the Gestapo sealed off the Warsawghetto and began to annihilate it. Had Nyanga fought back, it, too, wouldhave been wiped out; but the Africans employed nonaggressive tactics thatpuzzled the police.'

N o N - v I o L E N T A c r r o N : D o w N F A L L o F A e A R T H E I D t 6 5

Armed revolution, in the eyes of the white minority, would haveconfirmed their worst stereotypes of the Africans as 'violent savages',would have reinforced the laager mentality, and encouraged whites toresist bitterly and engage in extraordinarily brutal repression. On theother hand, non-violent action not only challenged the popular imageof the 'black terrorist', but also that of the 'subservient house boy',creating significant attitudinal changes among whites, similar to thosewhich occurred in the American South in the lg6os. Non-violent actionallowed far greater potential for creating cleavages among theprivileged white minority, such as how to respond to the resistance,how long to resist the inevitable changes demanded by the revo-lutionaries, and at what cost.

The importance of maintaining a non-violent discipline was not loston leaders of the anti-apartheid movement. Bishop Tutu, in reaction toblack attacks against suspected collaborators in rgB5, deplored thiskind of violence and threatened to leave the country if such tactics werenot ended, insisting that 'You cannot use methods to gain the goal ofliberation that our enemy will use against us' (Smuts & Westcottr 99 l : 68) . When Winnie Mandela, the once-revered wife of imprisonedANC leader Nelson Mandela, and a prominent anti-apartheid activistin her own right, was found to be sanctioning violent activities, shefound herself ostracised by the mass democratic movement (ibid.:96).

The advantages of non-violence in winning allies went far beyondthe potentially enlightened sectors of South Africa's white minority, inthat they also extended to the world community. World opinion was ofcrucial importance. Despite verbal condemnation of its racial policies,the Western industrialised world gave South Africa consistent supportover the years in the form of trade, industrial development,technological assistance, infusion of capital and arms. South Africawould not have become the economic and military power it waswithout the massive aid it received from the West over forty years ofapartheid rule.

Prior to the imposition of sanctions in the mid-rg8os, there was over

$ r 3 billion worth of annual trade between South Africa and the West,which combined with $3o billion in foreign investment, supplied thecountry with the vast majority of such basic commodities astransportation equipment, electrical equipment and machinery, nu-clear technology, telecommunications facilities and services, computertechnology, chemicals and related products, paper and manufactures,and other goods essential to the maintenance of South Africa as amodern industrialised state. In addition, the West supported the South

1 6 6 s T E P H E N Z U N E S

African regime through outstanding bank loans and credits totalling$6'5 billion, much of which went to government entities with norestrictions.

When the United Nations Security Council threatened sanctions andother punitive measures against South Africa, the United States, GreatBritain and France, due to their important economic and politicalinterests, cast vetoes. By the mid to late rg8os, however, thanks tomassive non-violent protests in those countries and others by anti-apartheid activists, most industrialised nations imposed sanctions onthe apartheid regime. Labour unions, church groups, students andleftist organisations made business as usual with the apartheidgovernment impossible. This upsurge in solidarity work came as aresult of the largely non-violent resistance in South Africa during therg8os, and the government repression which resulted. fn contrast, hadthe primary mode of resistance been armed struggle, it is unlikely thatthe same level of sympathy and the resulting mass mobilisation wouldhave been enough to make the sanctions movement so successful.

While some attribute the rioting, such as the Soweto uprising of 1976and subsequent outbursts of violent township protests in the rg8os, asa key factor in the end of apartheid, these were probably not decisive.Even as the riots and the repression escalated following the declarationof a state of emergency in 1985, heavy government censorshipsuccessfully limited media coverage, and interest in the situationwaned. Unlike the concomitant non-violent campaigns, the rioterswere in large part suppressed. Like the youth rebellions in advancedcapitalist countries in the r96os and early lg7os, young militantscertainly had a disruptive effect, may have inspired some reforms, andfurther exposed the repressive machinery of the state; but they did nothave the power in themselves to force major structural change. Onlywhen the youthful rebels were able to effectively build an alliance withthe black working class was real change possible. The Soweto uprisingsof 1976 illustrate this in both ways. Some Zulu migrant workers wereused to brutally suppress the student strikes and other actions inAugust. However, after careful organising among the workers bystriking students, they became largely supportive in the general strikethe following month, which led to the most dramatic crisis for thegovernment during that turbulent period. In short, the rioting Sowetoyouths only began to seriously challenge the white authorities whenthey stopped rioting, built alliances with workers in the townships, andorganised a non-violent movement.

A resurgence of the student boycotts and protests sprang up among

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D T 6 7

coloured students in early rg8o in the Western Cape. By keeping theirprotest primarily non-violent, and linking their educational demandsto national political grievances, this led to the two-day general strike in

June, when 7o per cent of the workers stayed at home. Police repressionwas severe - over sixty people were kiled in the following week - but itresulted in unprecedented support for the resistance among people of

all races (Frederickse I9BT:r8-r9). When tens of thousands of blackstudents walked out of the classroom in early 1984, they were met byrepression similar to that in the Soweto uprising. Yet not only was theviolence more controlled, they were able to involve workers and theircommunities in their support, and draw up specific demands for

educational improvements (ibid.: r68).The wave of violent unrest in the mid-Ig8os was largely insulated

from the white minority community; there was actually less publicityin the white South African media on the unrest than there was in othercountries. Often the targets of the rioters were public facilities forAfricans, which created rifts within the black populations at a timewhen unity was of crucial importance. Far more significant, in termsboth of building a popular resistance movement and of challenging the

state, were the boycotts, strikes, creation of alternative institutions and

other forms of largely non-violent resistance. A I9BI study by theAmerican Friends Service Committee (Ig8z: lrz) concluded:

The South African government presents a classic example of bureaucracy,musclebound with arms and ideologically ill-equipped to meet the challengeof massive, nonviolent noncooperation. The government has alreadydemonsrrated an inability to use its bludgeoning techniques to foreclose strikesinvolving even a relatively small geographic area and a relatively smallnumber of workers. What would happen if the black workers, servants, andfarm labourers withdrew cooperation on a massive scale in a well-organizednonviolent campaign !

Is it possible that at a certain point, as lZarnbian president Kenneth]Kaunda puts it, the oppressor will realize that'he is powerless, in the lastresort, to prevent the inevitable because he is trying to fight not an army butan idea, and short of exterminating a whole population he cannot bomb orblast it out of their minds?'The truth of the idea-the releasing of thirtymillion people to be human - is better served by nonviolent actions which donot deny the basic humanity of the oppressor.

This is exactly what happened in South Africa. And while the

struggle was more protracted, more complex and not as exclusivelynon-violent as some similar struggles during this era, it was one of themost significant. It demonstrated that even where so many had givenup on non-violence, key elements of the resistance movement would

1 6 8 S T E P H E N z U N E s

recognise its power, and utilise unarmed resistance in the successfulliberation of their people.

N O T E S

¡. In one sense, to characterise any form of resistance in South Africa as 'nonviolent' is amisnomer, since the South African government often responded with very violent repression toany form ofchallenge to its authority. There is little question, however, that there would be farfewer casualties in a nonviolent revolution than from a violent one.

e. By the mid-rgBos, the number of armed blacks working for the South African governmenthad grown dramatically, both through uniformed forces as well as through vigilantes affiliatedwith the Inkhatha Freedom Party.

3. The embargo did make it impossible for the South African air force to replace its lost jets,thus raising long-term questions regarding its command of the air, and the armed forces ofZimbabwe and some other African states v/ere improving somewhat. However, while suchchanges could, in the ìong term, have limited Soth Africa's regional military hegemony, it wouldnot pose a challenge to the apartheid regime itself.

4. Part of the scepticism towards those downplaying the armed struggle came from the fact thatmany of those who argued against the successful outcome of armed resistance were Westernanalysts who pushed an equally unrealistic scenario that reform would come through theliberalising influence of foreign investment and economic development. There was also a problemof romanticising armed struggle within certain leftist circles outside South Africa. For example,this author was purged from an anti-apartheid group at Oberlin CoIIege in rg78 because I refusedto endorse the princþle that military victory by the ANC and PAC was the means of liberation.Simiìarly strident attitudes towards armed struggle often plagued white radicals in North Americaand Europe, who supported the anti-apartheid struggle but were unfamiliar with the actualsituation on the ground.

5. Lekele chastised those who talked of armed struggle and ignored the crucial diferencesbetween the successful liberation struggles in neighbouring countries and the situation in SouthAfrica. At the same time, while he felt armed struggle might be necessary at a later stage, heemphasised that this could only be so in conjunction with massive nonviolent resistance: the'difference between armed struggle in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa [is] the developmentof the mass strike and massive political action growing into armed insurrection.' (Marx Ig8o: I5).

6. These peoples' courts are not be confused with the vigilante actions which periodicallyresulted in the lynching of suspected collaborators which took place in other black townships.These peoples' courts were highly regarded, not only because they were more trusted than thecorrupt local magistrates, but because they were often able to actually return stolen propertyrather than simply punishing the suspect.

A rg87 attack by police on an Alexandra peoples' court left eight people dead. A South Africancourt decision soon thereafter, however, limited the ability ofgovernment authorities to suppressthese popular administrative committees.

7. It is noteworthy that the Alexandra boycott was not organised primarily by the ANC, butby a number of local groups, and the boycotters rejected efforts by the ANC to force acompromise.

R E F E R E N C E S

Adam, H. tg7t. Moderni/ng Raci¿l Domination: tlu Dlnamhs oJSouth AJrican Politics.Berkeley:University of California Press.

Benson, M. r 966. South Afica: the Struggle for a Birth-right. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Dajani, S. tgg4. ETes Without a Countr2: Searching for a Palestini.an Strateglt Jor Liberation.

Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Frederikse, J. rg97. South Africa: A Diferent Kind of War. Boston : Beacon Press.Gann, L.H. & P.Duignan. ry78. South Afrha: War, Renlution, or Pea¡e. Stanford: Hoover

Institution.Gerhart, G. 1978. Bla¡k Powcr in South Africa: TIu Eaolution of an ldcologt. Berkeley: University of

California Press.

Johnson, R. W. 1977. WilI South AJrica Surviae? New York: Oford University Press.

N O N - V I O L E N T A C T I O N : D O W N F A L L O F A P A R T H E I D I 6 9

Klri¡, T. 1983-4.'Revolution in the Making: Black Poütics in South /linca,, Foreign,lfairs.Winter.

Kans, T. 1986. 'Black politics: the road to revolution', in Mark A. Uhlig, ed., Apartheíd in Crisis.New York: Vantage Books.

$uper, L. 1958. Passioe Reistarce in South Africa. New Haven: Yale Univenity press.Lelyveld,J. 1983. 'Black challenge to Pretoria', N¿w fork Times, rz October, AB.

l99llld, R. rg8 r. 'Mobilizing for total war', Southern Africa, January/February.Liddell Hart, B. H. 1967. 'Lessons from resistance movements - Guerrilla and nonviolent'. in

Adam Roberts, ed., The Strateg of Ciailian Defente. London: Faber.Lo¡l€e, T. ry83 Black Politics in South Africa Sùue rg45. New York: Longman.Luthuli, A. r96e. Let My Peoþle Go: an Autobiograpþt New York: McGraw Hill.Marx, A. r98o. 'Black consciousness groups meet', Southtnz Afica, Sept./Oct.: 15.National Public Radio. 'All things considered', 3June 1987.Nolutshungu, S. rg8a. Changing South Africa: Politi¡at Considerations. Manchester: Manchester

Univenity Press.Pig",

\._M. tggr. The Aþartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Afica, rg1¡-rggþ.New York: Oxford Univesiw Press.

Repr¡blcofsouthAfrica (RSh). 1979. Reportof theCommissionof Inquir¡innLegislationAfectingtheUtilisation d Manþower; Reikert Commission R¿þort. Pretoria: Govemment printer.

!!utp, C. rg73 [r97r]. Politics of Nonoiolent Action. Bosron: Porrer Sargent.

lharp, G. ry$o. Social Pow¿r and Political Freedom. Boston: Porter Sargènt.Smuts, D. & S. Westcott (eds.) rg9r. The Purple Sh¿ll Goaen: a South A.frican A to ( oJ Nonaiolent

Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Soutlrern African Committee. 1978. 'News brieß', Soutlum Africø,}farc}'.Uhtig, M. A. 1986. 'The African National Congress', in Uhlig, ed., Apartheid in C¿s¿i. New york:

Vantage Books.wink, I. w' :g87. violn¡e and Noruioleøe in south Africa: Jens' Third wa2. plttladerphia: New

Society Publishers.