The Role of Keynesians in Wartime Policy and …...The Role of Keynesians in Wartime Policy and...

The Role of Keynesians in WartimePolicy and Postwar Planning,

1940-1946By BYRD L. JONES*

Liberal Keynesian economists by 1940shared a diagnosis and remedy for theAmerican economy: full employment wasa prerequisite for resolving most of the na-tion's critical social issues; and, despitedifficulties, full employment could be at-tained through government spending.That analysis underlay the Keynesians'positions in several major debates duringthe next six years.

I. A Full Employment Defense Program

Early in 1940, Secretary of CommerceHarry Hopkins showed Franklin Roosevelta brief outline of fiscal policies for defenseas seen by economists on his staff. Thefirst step was "prompt expansion to thelevel of full employment" by means offederal deficits. Then, "once full employ-ment is attained, the task of fiscal policyis twofold: (1) to maintain full employ-ment; (2) to secure as rapidly as possiblethat orientation of production which ourdefense demands."1 Leon Henderson,Richard V. Gilbert, and other liberalKeynesian advisers were proceeding withthe 1930's agenda of recovery. Theyviewed expenditures for national defense,together with exports of military goods, as

* Associate professor of education, University ofMassachusetts at Amherst. I would like to thank thefollowing people for their help in the research andwriting of this paper: Edward M. Bernstein, LauchlinCurrie, Emile Despres, Theodore Geiger, RichardGoode, G. Griffith Johnson, Roger Noll; with specialthanks to Walter S. Salant and Alan Sweezy.

1 See "National Defense and Fiscal Policy." An at-tached note by Hopkins dates it about Jan. 1, 1940, andcalls it "a good paper."

primarily a prudent expansionary pro-gram.

At about the same time, Secretary ofAgriculture Henry A. Wallace reportedthat his economic advisers feared "thateven if war lasts through 1942 industrialactivity may average only between 10 to15 percent more . . . than in the absenceof war—a difference hardly sufficient tomean the kind of recovery we are strivingfor."2 A rapid achievement of prosperityrequired truly massive deficits, which wereunlikely unless the United States fought aworld war.

Roosevelt asked his administrative as-sistant Lauchlin Currie to handle unof-ficially any planning to meet economicproblems caused by a cutback of defenseprograms. Currie saw a postdefense slumpas "but one special case of the overallproblem of securing and maintaining fullemployment." That conclusion followedfrom "a line of investigation I initiated atthe Reserve Board and which is today be-ing carried on by the brilliant group ofyoung economists in Harry Hopkins' of-fice."3

According to Currie's analysis, defenseexpenditures and war exports, "by provid-ing an offset to saving, are a temporaryaid." But a long-run solution, not depen-dent on chronic deficits, required a liberalprogram of progressive taxes, increases insocial security benefits, more public works

2 See F. D. Roosevelt to Lauchlin B. Currie, OfficialFile 396.

3 See Currie to Roosevelt, Official File 264.

125

Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

126 AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

projects and encouragement for invest-ment (especially in home building). Roose-velt should defend that program on itsimmediate appeal to voters rather than toeconomists. Nevertheless, Currie argued,Keynesian fiscal policies were "in com-plete harmony with the often stated socialand economic objectives of the NewDeal."4 Full employment would allowboth more butter and more guns, therebygiving the New Deal its social revolutionwithout destroying capitalists' incentivesto invest.

Hence, New Deal economists estimatedthe potential output at full employment—first as a target for recovery programs andlater for feasible military production.While syndicated newspaper columnistswere accusing government economists of athreefold exaggeration of unemployment,Walter Salant and a group of economistsworking under Gilbert showed that afigure of twelve million workers eitherwithout jobs or on federal relief was con-sistent with the national income data andthe best estimates of the labor force. Al-lowing for a rise in the labor force, Salantprojected that reasonably full employ-ment required an expansion of three mil-lion jobs a year for four years, or a 6 per-cent growth rate based on 1939 levels.The expansion of real gross national prod-uct required to accomplish that goal by1944 would be about 40 percent and wouldprobably require deficits as large as $10to $15 billion per year.5

II. Defense and Inflation

Liberal economists had seldom antici-pated an immediate need for a large expan-sion of war production. With the Nazi in-vasion of the Lowlands on May 10, how-ever, they generally came to advocate all-out preparation for defense. But they be-lieved overall unused capacity was ample

4 Ibid.5 See Walter S. Salant.

for defense preparations. Accordingly,many liberal economists differed at thattime with the advice which John MaynardKeynes had offered in his pamphlet onHow to Pay for the War. To combat infla-tion in Britain, he had urged higher taxesand compulsory saving, especially for mid-dle and lower income levels. And he wouldlater advise his American disciples to raisetaxes before inflation had gained the firstround.

American Keynesians read about com-pulsory saving, understood Keynes's ar-guments, but still counseled delay. Thesubstantial rise in military orders duringthe summer of 1940, which threatened topush the federal deficit from $5 to $10billion, seemed less worrisome than thepersistent stagnation. In June, GerhardColm in the Bureau of the Budget urgedthat "most of the additional expendituresshould be financed by borrowing; thattaxation of the upper income brackets andexcessive profits should follow, with dueattention to facilitating investments inplants and equipment at this period."6

At an important financial conference inSeptember 1940, Gilbert eloquently arguedfor postponing higher taxes and controlson civilian production and consumption"until such time as we have reasonablyfull utilization of our resources." Thatwould mean a rise in the Federal ReserveBoard index of industrial production from115 in fiscal 1940 to an estimated 170 in1943 or 1944. He described a policy offinancing defense through increased taxa-tion in 1940 as "taking two steps forwardand then one step back."7

At the same conference, Leon Hender-son, then on the National Defense Ad-visory Commission (NDAC), urged en-larging plant capacity for war goods in

6 See Gerhard Colm to Richard V. Gilbert.7 Conference held in Washington on Sept. 17, 1940,

reported in "Exploring the Financing of National De-fense and Its Economic Consequences."


KEYNESIAN REVOLUTION 127

order "to avoid the restriction of civilianuse." The Chairman of the Securities andExchange Commission, Jerome Frank,had previously advocated the Keynes loan-savings plan, but decided it could waituntil defense orders reached as high as $40to $50 billion. Alvin Hansen, noting thatKeynes's proposal had won support "fromeconomists of different schools of think-ing," recommended legislation "when thecountry gets on toward full employment."8

As the issues of military expendituresand their relation to prices and outputwere raised, the new defense agenciesgathered their own staffs of economists.The largest group drifted out of the Com-merce Department about the time JesseJones replaced Hopkins. Don Humphreyhad been lent to Henderson's Price Di-vision in the NDAC in July, followed laterby Gilbert, Salant, V. Lewis Bassie, VictorPerlo, Griffith Johnson, Roderick Riley,and others. Eventually they formed thekey macroeconomic advisory group in theOffice of Price Administration (OPA).

By December 1940, Currie could reportto the President on a consensus of "someof the ablest economists in the Govern-ment" working on the potential expansionof national output. Their work indicated"that reasonably full utilization of ourlabor forces in 1943 would yield us a na-tional income, with no advance in prices,of between $105 and $110 billion, or from$35 billion to $40 billion higher than ourincome for 1940."9

Thus, as Roosevelt developed the Lend-Lease program and rallied Allied hopeswith his promise that America would bean Arsenal of Democracy, he had con-vincing support from his economic ad-visers that his optimistic expectations werefeasible. By emphasizing the unused po-tential of an economy producing at less

8 Ibid., pp. 46, 52-53.9 See Currie to Roosevelt, President's Personal File

1820.

than 80 percent of capacity, they couldurge all-out preparation for defense whilemaintaining New Deal programs. At theadvice of economists on the National Re-sources Planning Board (NRPB) andothers, Roosevelt reaffirmed the liberalaims of government to provide equal op-portunities, jobs, social security, and "theenjoyment of the fruits of scientific prog-ress in a wider and constantly rising stan-dard of living."10

Keynesian economists worked to calmpublic fears of an inflation such as had oc-curred during World War I. Hansenpointed to agricultural surpluses, persis-tent high unemployment, and a substan-tially progressive tax structure. He con-cluded that "the fear of inflation is exag-gerated, and danger exists that the im-portant weapon of specific price increaseswhere these may help eliminate bottle-necks is not sufficiently used." John Ken-neth Galbraith added that he favoredpriorities, rationing, and price controls"well in advance of a reduction of aggre-gate spending." A considerable infla-tionary pull would be necessary to achievefull employment—a key factor in whatGalbraith later called "the disequilibriumsystem" (1947).11

In a meeting with Keynes in the summerof 1941, New Deal economists defendedtheir continued advocacy of pushing ef-fective demand in excess of existing levelsof output. While conceding that specula-tive price rises had just started in theUnited States, Keynes argued for govern-ment action to limit any potential in-flationary gap "by heavy taxation, a highpressure savings campaign, or rationingon a wide scale." He wondered if hisAmerican disciples had forgotten "that

10 See Roosevelt, 1969, p. 671.11 See Alvin Hansen in "Defense Financing and In-

flation Potentialities," p. 6. Also see pp. 78-93 and 107—12 for responses by James W. Angell. J. K. Galbraith,Albert G. Hart, Carl Shoup, John M. Clark, and Han-sen's rejoinder. See Galbraith to Hansen.



when the supply of consumable goods isincreased, the incomes of those producingthem are likewise increased and the gapwould be reduced only insofar as savingand taxes increase."12

Prodded by Keynes's sharp questioningabout "an extraordinarily low marginalpropensity to consume," Salant sum-marized the thinking of the Gilbert groupin OPA. He made it clear that they hadtaken into account the induced effects ofexpanding defense expenditures on de-mand—both the multiplier effects on con-sumption and the acceleration effects oninvestment expenditure. Their estimatefor a marginal ratio of consumption to in-come of 50 percent was supported byevidence of the high marginal yield of thetax structure and a predicted reaction toshortages of civilian goods. Using similaranalytic approaches, Keynes and hisAmerican disciples differed on forecastingempirical relationships, and perhaps onthe goals of policy. Keynes wanted wargoods for Britain while the Americans werestill worried about persistent unemploy-ment.13

John M. Clark supported Keynes'sview, which was also the classical pre-scription, that higher taxes were neces-sary to limit the inflationary threat.Skeptical of the high estimate of potentialcapacity, Clark urged concurrent use offiscal and credit controls, rationing, priori-ties, and direct controls to limit price in-creases due to bottlenecks and excess de-mand for consumer goods. While he ap-preciated the "tremendous power" of theKeynesian analysis, he feared it was "alsoexposed to the dangers of too undiscrim-inating application . . . of which I thinkthe Gilbert-Humphrey attitude is one il-

12 Don Humphrey and Salant to Gilbert about adinner meeting with Keynes, June 11, 1941, in Salant'spossession.

13 Keynes to Salant on July 9, 1941, in Salant'spossession.

lustration."14 Despite their criticism, how-ever, both Keynes and Clark recognizedthe quality of economics being done inWashington.

The memoranda written by Keynesianswere specific, pragmatic, and analytic incontrast not only with noneconomists butalso non-Keynesians. Their efforts to ap-praise magnitudes were inventive and ledto a better understanding of various con-cepts of the inflationary gap as well asthe variety of possible estimates of multi-pliers. They had direct and personal accessto policy makers, including the President.Within the Washington bureaucracy Key-nesians influenced the financing of defenseand the timing of price controls. And theyshifted public attention to the expan-sionary rather than inflationary effects oflarge deficits.

III. Feasibility and Reconversion

The declaration of war ended debate onthe desirability of a greatly expandedproductive capacity; but in the spring of1942, New Deal economists faced a dif-ferent test of their influence on policy.Could they keep military orders withinfeasible productive capacity so that priori-ties would have meaning and inflationmight be limited by a pragmatic systemof direct controls, rationing, higher taxesand voluntary savings bond campaigns?Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Rooseveltraised specific targets of 60,000 aircraft,45,000 tanks, and 8 million tons of mer-chant shipping for 1942. Larger goals wereset for the following year, despite con-siderable public skepticism about their at-tainability. Nevertheless, Roosevelt hadkept his demands within the limits earlierestimated by Stacy May and RobertNathan.15

14 Clark to Keynes, July 24, 1941, copy in J. M. ClarkPapers, Special Collections, Columbia UniversityLibraries.

15 See John E. Brigante, p. 31.



Taking a cue from the President's op-timism, military leaders quickly expandedtheir orders for related equipment andconstruction in excess of productive ca-pacity. After a debate, Nathan and DonaldNelson of the War Production Board(WPB) apparently won an agreementfrom the military services to reduce ordersfrom $62 to $45 billion. But the generalswanted more, Congress appropriatedfunds, and the President raised his targets.Furthermore, Nathan, by then appointedto a special Planning Committee, re-treated a bit because he realized that somebasic priorities and critical shortages,rather than general feasibility, would de-termine production for several crucialitems.

The feasibility debate continued to fes-ter during 1942. Simon Kuznets had car-ried out a major analysis—the first partof which was based on the national in-come approach. He also considered capac-ity from the perspective of critical raw ma-terials, industrial plant and equipment,and labor requirements. On any basismilitary orders were too large. Hopkins,relying on advice from Isador Lubin,agreed that orders for 1943 would exceedcapacity by 25 percent. At last, RobertPatterson, Assistant Secretary for War,ordered military requirements scaled backfrom $95 to $80 billion and certain con-tracts extended.16

By the time arms production reached apeak annual rate of $74 billion in Novem-ber 1943, the WPB began considering theproblems of reconversion to civilian out-put. Liberal economic advisers anticipatedwidespread unemployment when militaryorders declined, despite persistent laborshortages in some areas. They thereforesought an early rebuilding of civilian out-put and nondefense employment. ByJune 1944, Nelson distributed a series of

16 See Jack W. Peltason, pp. 223-24.

Planning Division reports which sought"to evaluate the magnitude of cuts in warproduction after victory in Europe . . .and to delineate the possibilities of utiliz-ing the resources released in expandingproduction of goods and services forcivilian use."17

The Battle of the Bulge in December1944, with its threat of renewed Germanattacks and Nelson's tenuous status in theWPB, resulted in a de facto acceptance ofthe military position—there must be noofficial encouragement of civilian pro-duction before the collapse of effectiveGerman resistance. At that time, accord-ing to a WPB memo, cutbacks of 40 per-cent "will release enough materials, facili-ties and manpower for unrestricted civilianproduction."18 Keynesian economists hadlost the fight for a planned reconversionbecause they could not find effective sup-port among liberal government leaders.

IV. Fiscal Planning and theEmployment Act of 1946

Discussion of postwar fiscal planninghad started in 1940 with the Keynesianprogram for full employment. The war-time expansion of output demonstratedthe effectiveness of public deficits as ameans to full employment, and Keynesiansgained confidence that they could deviseeffective fiscal policies to maintain war-time gains. They fretted most about apostwar slump, although they also pre-dicted a postwar rise of prices since pent-up demands for consumption and newcapital equipment would appear beforethe economy had reconverted to peace-time output. Typically, Paul Samuelsonpredicted "a boom and a depression at thesame time."19

Working for the Employment Stabiliza-

17 See Donald Nelson to Robert Patterson.18 See Joseph Kovner.19 See Samuelson to Blaisdell and Samuelson, Full

Employment After the War.



tion Division of the NRPB, Samuelsonattacked any complacency based on opti-mistic reports from the Committee onEconomic Development, Brookings In-stitution, the National Association ofManufacturers, the Chamber of Com-merce, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.Samuelson exclaimed, "It is nothing lessthan pitiful to hear speakers, who ad-mittedly reckon the backlog of deferreddemand at $5 billion for the first sixmonths after the war, claim in the samebreath that this will take the place of a $35billion deficit and reemploy eight millionservicemen, to say nothing of another tenmillion government workers as well!"Thus he urged plans for federal spendingof at least $7 1/2 billion and probably $25billion annually.20

As the war drew to a close, New Dealeconomists had two immediate goals. Theysupported a continuation of price controlsuntil civilian capacity could satisfy de-mands without temporary price rises.They had developed liberal spending pro-grams. That effort formed the bulk of thelast three reports of the NRPB and in-cluded a comprehensive social welfare pro-gram as well as proposals for air and waterpollution abatement, a national grid pat-tern for electric systems, public trans-portation for cities, and so on. Having"thawed out the hard crust of unemploy-ment," as Samuelson noted, America hadan outstanding opportunity to plan forabundance.21

Further, New Deal economists hadreached agreement on at least three broadareas. First, as Hansen noted, the govern-ment must "play a balancing role, check-ing any temporary tendency toward an ex-cessive boom, and, on the other hand, beprepared to go forward with large federalexpenditures on public improvement proj-

20 Ibid.21 Ibid.

ects to compensate for any strong tend-ency toward deflation and depression."Second, the Keynesian analysis providedpowerful tools for statistical analysis andforecasts of national income. Third, mostliberal Keynesians believed, as AlanSweezy concluded, that "if we take thesteps necessary to insure adequate demand—I admit this is a big if—I am confidentthat production will respond without agreat deal of government regulation orcontrol."22

In order to make Keynesianism meanmore than a rough guideline for federalfiscal policies to counteract inflationary ordeflationary forces, liberal economists hadto disseminate the understanding of na-tional income data and the sophisticationin using the various estimates of multi-pliers and gaps which had developed inWashington during the war. Abba Ler-ner's Functional Finance and the FederalDebt, Seymour Harris' testimony, advice,and writings, and Lorie Tarshis' firstKeynesian textbook for undergraduateshelped to spread the word. But at leastthrough 1946, Keynesian economics wasspread mainly through a handful of grad-uate seminars.

Outside of universities and Washingtonagencies, variations on Keynesian policydid gain some publicity and support as acure for unemployment. A Pabst BrewingCompany contest attracted 35,000 entriesin the spring of 1944 proposing remediesfor postwar unemployment. In his prize-winning essay, Herbert Stein recognized"the effectiveness of controlled govern-ment spending as an instrument of eco-nomic stabilization," but he preferredtax policies for that purpose. LeonKeyserling, who won second prize, ad-vocated compensatory expenditures, asdid Everett Hagen, Albert G. Hart, John

22 See Hansen, 1943, p. 18, and Alan Sweezy, p. 26.For a review of forecasts see Everett E. Hagen, pp.45-59.



H. G. Pierson, Grover W. Ensley, andMordecai Ezekiel in their entries.23

The National Planning Association(NPA) also pushed for public acceptanceof Keynesian fiscal policies. Its meetingsand publications helped to elicit andpublicize the views of government econo-mists in the years before the creation of theCouncil of Economic Advisers and theJoint Economic Committee. A significantpamphlet on fiscal policies for full employ-ment incorporated advice from ThomasBlaisdell, Louis H. Bean, A. F. Hinrichs,Jacob Mosak, Arthur Smithies, Colm,Ensley, Ezekiel, Hart, Henderson, Lubin,May, Nathan, and others. Overall, theNPA emphasized a program for raisingthe share of consumption out of nationalincome as a means to maintain full em-ployment.24

Meanwhile the Committee for EconomicDevelopment (CED) helped to explainand promote Keynesian ideas to business-men. During the war Beardsley Ruml andRalph Flanders, with assistance fromvarious economists, publicized a version ofKeynesian fiscal policies more acceptableto business interests. As Ruml urged in1943, "We should set out tax rates at afigure that will enable us to balance thebudget when we have a high level of em-ployment and production."25 Stressing theautomatic stabilization effect of incometaxes, the CED seldom supported morethan a first level of Keynesian policies.

At least in part as a result of the spreadof Keynesian ideas, three out of fourAmericans favored a central governmentalagency to plan for reconversion, demobili-zation, and full employment. AlthoughCongress killed off the NRPB in 1943, thepublic demand for full employment couldnot be denied. In his State of the Union

23 See The Winning Plans in the Pabst Postwar Em-ployment Awards, p. 5.

24 See National Budgets for Full Employment.25 See Herbert Stein, p. 185.

address in 1945, Roosevelt asked thatplanning and government agencies as-sure sixty million jobs, which would giveevery American the right "to a useful andremunerative job." Henry A. Wallacepicked up that theme and elaborated on theimportance of a prosperous United Statesfor better international relations.26

In Congress, Senators Murray, Wagner,Thomas, and O'Mahoney cosponsored theFull Employment bill in January 1945.Many New Deal economists worked ondrafts or testified in behalf of the bill.Earlier versions included mandatory fore-casts based on a National Production andEmployment Budget. Bertram Gross,Edward Pritchard, and Keyserling re-drafted the bill to eliminate some objec-tionable features without destroying thepossibility of fiscal planning for full em-ployment. But when it was finally passedin the House of Representatives, mostKeynesian features had disappeared alongwith the adjective "full" in its title. Gen-erally, liberal economists regarded the Actas disappointing.

Yet their disappointment was also ameasure of their ambitions—for sometwenty to fifty economists had created arevolution in American policy. Sharingnew developments, ideas, and influence,they laid the basis for national fiscal plan-ning. They convinced a growing numberof their professional colleagues of thelegitimacy of their analysis. They had es-tablished themselves as influential ad-visers to Roosevelt, Wallace, Ickes, Hop-kins, Nelson, Henderson, Chester Bowles,Harold Smith, and various Senators andCongressmen. They had incorporated fiscalplanning into the bureaucracy and madeit responsible to the President.

In general, Keynesians gained influencebecause the analytic tools devised by

26 See Stephen Bailey, pp. 3-98, and Jerome S.Bruner, pp. 170-87.



Keynes, Hansen, Currie, Gilbert and ascore of others helped them correctly fore-cast the direction and magnitude ofchanges in national income. Also, ofcourse, Keynesian economists in Wash-ington tended to be more liberal or sup-portive of New Deal measures to expanddemand than their colleagues. Perhapstheir commitment to liberal programs un-derlay their fearful expectation of a post-war slump. Because they wanted moredone, they underestimated how deeply theNew Deal had changed the relationship ofgovernment to the economy. Once EmileDespres gently reproved Hansen for dis-missing the spending activities of the1930's as "exclusively a salvaging pro-cess."27

An assessment of the long-run impact ofKeynesians is difficult. In a sense, ofcourse, the New Deal economists had wontheir battles; and the government haslooked much more as they envisioned itthan the way their opponents saw it. Butwhile a high level of employment and agrowing economy have been generally at-tained, they have not resolved the nation'scritical social issues. The economists' de-feat in the dispute over reconversion hasforeshadowed the long years of the ColdWar when military expenditures wouldtake precedence over social welfare pro-grams. After 1946 the defense programhas come, not to represent, but to conflictwith the liberal Keynesian hopes forabundance, security, and progress.

REFERENCESS. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, New York

1950.J. E. Brigante, "The Feasibility Dispute: De-

termination of War Production Objectivesfor 1942 and 1943," Committee on PublicAdministration Cases, Washington, D.C.1950.

27 Emile Despres to Hansen, July 26, 1944, inSalant's possession.

J. S. Bruner, Mandate from the People, NewYork 1944.

G. Colm to Richard V. Gilbert, June 10, 1940,Box 119, Hopkins Papers, Franklin D.Roosevelt Library (FDRL).

L. B. Currie to Roosevelt, "Memorandum onFull Employment," Mar. 18, 1940, OfficialFile 264, FDRL.

to Roosevelt, "Expansion Possibilitiesof Our System," Dec. 2, 1940, President'sPersonal File 1820, FDRL.

J. K. Galbraith to Hansen, "Fiscal Policy andControl of Inflation," Feb. 13, 1941,OPACS, Natl. Archives.

, "The Disequilibrium System," Amer.Econ. Rev., June 1947, 37, 287-302.

E. E. Hagen, "Postwar Output in the UnitedStates at Full Employment," Rev. Econ.Statist., 1945, 27.

A. Hansen, "Defense Financing and InflationPotentialities," Rev. Econ. Statist., Feb.1941, 23.

, "The Postwar Economy," PostwarEconomic Problems, Seymour Harris ed.,New York 1943.

J. M. Keynes, How to Pay for the War, NewYork 1940, 17-19.

J. Kovner to Dr. Joseph D. Keenan and Mr.C. S. Golden, Oct., 1944, War ProductionBoard Records, Natl. Archives.

D. Nelson to Robert Patterson, June 10, 1944,War Production Board Records, Natl. Ar-chives.

J. W. Peltason, "The Reconversion Contro-versy," Public Administration and PolicyDevelopment, Harold Stein, ed., New York1952.

F. D. Roosevelt to Currie, Jan. 29, 1940, Of-ficial File 396, FDRL, for an attached copyof Henry A. Wallace to Roosevelt, datedJan. 26, 1940.

, The Public Papers and Addresses ofFranklin D. Roosevelt, 9, comp. by SamuelRosenman, New York 1969.

W. S. Salant, assisted by G. Shaskan, Jr., "TheMagnitude of the Recovery Problem," May13, 1940, in Salant's possession; also in filesof Defense Economics Section of the Officeof Price Administration and Civilian Supply,Natl. Archives.

P. Samuelson to Thomas Blaisdell, Mar. 12,



1943, Natl. Resources Planning Board, Natl.Archives.

-, "Full Employment after the War,"Postwar Economic Problems, Seymour Har-ris, ed., New York 1943.

H. Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America,Chicago 1969.

A. Sweezy, "The Government's Responsibilityfor Full Employment," Amer. Econ. Rev.supp. 1949, 33.

"Exploring the Financing of National Defenseand Its Economic Consequences," Sav. BankJ., 21, Oct. 1940, 6-19, 26-58, and Nov.1940, 45, 13.

National Budgets for Full Employment, Natl.Planning Assoc., Washington, D.C. 1945.

"National Defense and Fiscal Policy," Box119, Hopkins Papers, FDRL.

The Winning Plans in the Pabst Postwar Em-ployment Awards, Milwaukee 1944.


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