The role of governance and incentives DRAFT · Version: 0.9 (final draft) Date: 31.3.2012 Status:...

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WEATHER Weather Extremes: Assessment of Impacts on Transport Systems and Hazards for European Regions Deliverable 5 The role of governance and incentives DRAFT Status: Public Version: 0.9 (final draft) Date: 30.3.2012 Authors: Christian Trinks (KIT), Anestis Papanikolaou, Evangelos Mitsakis (CERTH-HIT), Claus Doll, Stefan Klug, Luis A. Tercero Espinoza (Fraunhofer ISI) DISCLAIMER This document is in draft version waiting for formal approval by the European Commission. Citations and references to the document shall contain the status information "unapproved draft". Study funded under the 7 th framework program of the European Commission

Transcript of The role of governance and incentives DRAFT · Version: 0.9 (final draft) Date: 31.3.2012 Status:...

Page 1: The role of governance and incentives DRAFT · Version: 0.9 (final draft) Date: 31.3.2012 Status: Public Quality review: SMASH-CIRED Accepted: The WEATHER project: Full title: WEATHER

WEATHER Weather Extremes: Assessment of Impacts on Transport

Systems and Hazards for European Regions

Deliverable 5

The role of governance and incentives

DRAFT

Status: Public

Version: 0.9 (final draft)

Date: 30.3.2012

Authors: Christian Trinks (KIT), Anestis Papanikolaou, Evangelos Mitsakis (CERTH-HIT), Claus Doll, Stefan Klug, Luis A. Tercero Espinoza (Fraunhofer ISI)

DISCLAIMER

This document is in draft version waiting for formal approval by the European Commission. Citations and references to the document shall contain the status

information "unapproved draft".

Study funded under the 7th framework program of the European Commission

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Document details This document should be cited as:

Trinks, C., Papanikolaou, A., Doll, C., Klug, S., Tercero Espinoza, L.A., Mitsakis, E. (2012): “The role of governance and incentives” Deliverable D5 within the research project WEATHER (Weather Extremes: Impacts on Transport Systems and Hazards for European Regions) funded under the 7th framework program of the European Commission. Project co-ordinator: Fraunhofer-ISI. FINAL DRAFT VERSION

Document title: Deliverable 5: “The role of governance and incentives“

Lead Authors: Trinks, C. (KIT-IIP), Doll, C.,, Klug, S. and Tercero Espinoza, L. A. (Fraunhofer ISI) Papanikolaou, A., Mitsakis, E. (CERTH-HIT)

Version: 0.9 (final draft)

Date: 31.3.2012

Status: Public

Quality review: SMASH-CIRED

Accepted:

The WEATHER project:

Full title: WEATHER – Weather Extremes: Impacts on Transport Systems and Hazards for European Regions.

Duration: November 1st 2009 to April 30th 2012

Funding: Call 2008-TPT-1, 7th framework program of the European Commission, Directorate General for Research and Technical Development

Contract: Grant Agreement no. 233 783

Consortium: Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Karlsruhe – project co-ordinator Fraunhofer Institute for Transportation and Infrastructure Systems (IVI), Dresden , Centre for Research and Technology Hellas (CERTH), Helenic Institute for Transport (HIT), Thessaloniki Société de Mathématiques Appliquées et de Sciences Humaines - International research Center on Environment and Development (SMASH-CIRED), Paris Karlsruhe Institute for Technology (KIT), Institute for Industrial Production (IIP), Karlsruhe Institute of Studies for the Integration of Systems (ISIS), Rome HERRY Consult GmbH, Vienna Agenzia Regionale Prevenzione e Ambiente dell'Emilia Romagna (ARPA-ER), Servizio Idro-Meteo-Clima (SIMC), Bologna NEA Transport Research and Training, Zoetermeer

Internet: www.weather-project.eu

Contact: Dr. Claus Doll Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI), Breslauer Str. 48, 76139 Karlsruhe, Germany, T: +49 721 6809-354, E: [email protected]

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... xi 

1  Setting the scene ................................................................................................... 1 

1.1  Introduction to the WEATHER project ................................................... 1 

1.2  Project objectives and work plan ........................................................... 1 

1.3  Position of WP5 in the framework of the WEATHER project ................. 2 

1.4  Objective of Deliverable 5 ...................................................................... 2 

1.5  Structure of Deliverable 5 ...................................................................... 3 

PART A: ACTOR ANALYSIS......................................................................................... 5 

2  Introduction to the actor analysis ........................................................................ 5 

2.1  Objective of the chapter ......................................................................... 5 

2.2  Methodological approach ...................................................................... 5 

3  Theoretical background ........................................................................................ 7 

3.1  Understanding Actor Analysis and its position in the Policy Making Process ..................................................................................... 7 

3.2  Who is an ‘actor’? .................................................................................. 9 

3.3  Actor analysis: Concepts and methodologies ........................................ 9 

3.4  Stakeholder management as a special case of Actor analysis ........... 13 

4  Actor analysis of the transport sector in relation to adaptation measures .............................................................................................................. 16 

4.1  Exploring the usefulness of actor analysis in regard to EU transport adaptation policy initiatives ................................................... 16 

4.2  Actors involved in the adaptation policy making process per transport sector .................................................................................... 17 

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4.3  Actor analysis for the transport adaptation policymaking process on European level ................................................................................ 19 

5  Conclusions on the Actor Analysis .................................................................... 31 

5.1  Actor analysis and policymaking ......................................................... 31 

5.2  Actor analysis and transport adaptation .............................................. 31 

PART B: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSPORT ADAPTATION ..................... 34 

6  Policy systems dealing with transport adaptation ........................................... 34 

6.1  Rationale, effects and challenges ........................................................ 34 

6.1.1  Rationale ............................................................................................. 35 

6.1.2  Policy-targeted effects ......................................................................... 40 

6.1.3  Challenges ........................................................................................... 46 

6.2  Adaptation policy frameworks .............................................................. 48 

6.3  Risk and risk-based policy ................................................................... 57 

6.3.1  Defining risk ......................................................................................... 57 

6.3.2  Managing climate change risk in road transportation .......................... 59 

6.3.3  An adaptation policy process in transport ............................................ 65 

7  Types of adaptation ............................................................................................. 70 

8  Regulation and governance vs. incentives ....................................................... 79 

8.1  Defining regulatory policy systems ...................................................... 79 

8.2  Costs of regulatory policy systems ...................................................... 84 

8.3  Defining incentive-based policy systems ............................................. 87 

9  Current policy systems and possible applications in transport adaptation ............................................................................................................. 92 

9.1  Policy systems dealing with energy efficiency ..................................... 92 

9.2  Possible applications in transport adaptation ...................................... 99 

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10  Conclusions on Policy Instruments ................................................................. 101 

10.1  Policy systems dealing with transport adaptation .............................. 101 

10.2  Types of adaptation ........................................................................... 101 

10.3  Regulation and governance vs. incentives ........................................ 102 

10.4  Current policy systems and possible applications in transport adaptation .......................................................................................... 103 

PART C: INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION ............................. 104 

11  Innovation Potentials ......................................................................................... 104 

11.1  Adaptation and mitigation policies ..................................................... 104 

11.2  Instruments, policies and the system of innovations ......................... 106 

11.3  Innovations in sustainable transportation markets worldwide ........... 109 

11.4  Conclusions ....................................................................................... 112 

12  Competitiveness of European transport supply industries ........................... 114 

12.1  Methodology for comparing innovation potentials across countries ............................................................................................ 114 

12.1.1  Concept and objectives ..................................................................... 114 

12.1.2  Input data ........................................................................................... 115 

12.1.3  Patent search strategy ....................................................................... 115 

12.1.1  Dimensions ........................................................................................ 116 

12.2  Results for Innovation Indices for Adaptation Technologies .............. 120 

12.2.1  Patent applications by region ............................................................ 120 

12.2.2  Patent applications by adaptation sector ........................................... 121 

12.3  Patent densities ................................................................................. 123 

12.3.1  Dynamics of patent applications ........................................................ 125 

13  Conclusions on Innovation Policies ................................................................ 128 

13.1  Learning from mitigation strategies ................................................... 128 

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13.2  Indicators and international Benchmarking ....................................... 128 

13.3  Policy implications ............................................................................. 129 

PART D: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ 130 

14  Main conclusions and recommendations ........................................................ 130 

14.1  Transport planning and general protection ........................................ 130 

14.2  Infrastructure investments and technology ........................................ 131 

14.3  Vehicle and information technology ................................................... 132 

14.4  Transport service operation ............................................................... 133 

14.5  Final remarks ..................................................................................... 133 

15  Study goals and achievements ......................................................................... 135 

16  References .......................................................................................................... 137 

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List of tables Table 1:  Possible contributions of actor analysis to policy analysis

activities ............................................................................................ 8 

Table 2:  Overview of methods for actor analysis .......................................... 12 

Table 3:  Objectives of the several agents in an intermodal transportation system ..................................................................... 27 

Table 4:  Actors and their involvement in the policy areas ............................ 29 

Table 5:  Rationale for public intervention for adaptation .............................. 35 

Table 6:  National Definitions of Critical Infrastructure .................................. 39 

Table 7:  Main Policy issues in the local level ............................................... 45 

Table 8:  Policy frameworks and responsibilities for adaptation governance in ten OECD countries ................................................ 47 

Table 9:  Assessment steps of risk-based approaches to adaptation policy .............................................................................................. 49 

Table 10:  Economic framework for climate change adaptation policies ......... 56 

Table 11:  Definitions of risk and hazard ......................................................... 57 

Table 12:  Risk analysis and management frameworks in road transportation ................................................................................. 59 

Table 13:  Steps of RIMAROCC process ........................................................ 60 

Table 14:  Scale, orientation and objectives of the RIMAROCC method ........ 62 

Table 15:  Primary criteria to assess vulnerabilities ........................................ 64 

Table 16:  Difficulties for developing adaptation strategies ............................. 72 

Table 17:  Concepts of adaptation................................................................... 76 

Table 18:  Criteria for evaluating climate change adaptation strategies in light of uncertainty concerns ........................................................... 78 

Table 19:  Advantages and disadvantages of regulatory institutions .............. 82 

Table 20:  Frequently used policy instruments ................................................ 92 

Table 21:  Classification of the enlisted 20 energy efficiency policy instruments ..................................................................................... 94 

Table 22:  Number and frequency of high, medium and low impacts per policy instrument type ..................................................................... 97 

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Table 23:  Number of high, medium and low impacts per combination of policy instrument types ................................................................... 97 

Table 24:  Measures implemented through information / education / training, infrastructure and social planning / organisation .............. 98 

Table 25:  Possible applications of policy instruments in transport adaptation ....................................................................................... 99 

Table 26:  High-Leven IPC chapters considered in the patent search strategy ......................................................................................... 117 

Table 27:  Adaptation patent density indicators for selected world regions ... 124 

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List of figures Figure 1:  Conceptual framework for the multi-actor context of policy

making (Source: Hermans, 2005) ................................................... 11 

Figure 2:  Representation of power/interest grid (Source Bourne) ................. 15 

Figure 3:  Network of actors for operational management and ICT solutions ......................................................................................... 24 

Figure 4:  Network of actors for planning, construction, design and maintenance of transport infrastructure .......................................... 25 

Figure 5:  Power / interest grid of transport adaptation actors ........................ 30 

Figure 6:  Disasters due to natural hazards in EEA member countries, 1980–2009 (Source: EEA, 2010, p 27)........................................... 38 

Figure 7:  Change in Average Costs due to Weather Extremes by 2010-2050 (Source: Fraunhofer ISI) ........................................................ 42 

Figure 8:  Outline of the Adaptation Policy Framework process (Source: UNDP, 2004, p 11) ......................................................................... 49 

Figure 9:  A framework to support good decision-making in the face of climate change risk (Source: Willows and Connell, 2003, p 7) ....... 52 

Figure 10:  Highways Agency adaptation framework (Source: Highways Agency, 2011, p 17) ....................................................................... 65 

Figure 11:  A Process Model of the Efficacy of Policy Instruments (Bressers and Klok, 1988, p 27) ..................................................... 69 

Figure 12:  Risk level and climate change adaptation (Source: Hallegatte et al., 2011, p 33) ........................................................................... 71 

Figure 13:  Design life of road infrastructure assets (Source: Highways Agency, 2011, p 22) ....................................................................... 72 

Figure 14:  Enforcement and sanctions pyramids (Source: UN, 2001, p 13) .................................................................................................. 81 

Figure 15:  Types of costs of regulation to businesses (Source: SCM Network, 2005, p 6) ........................................................................ 85 

Figure 16:  Administrative costs and burdens (Source: Better Regulation Executive, 2005, p 16) .................................................................... 86 

Figure 17:  Pure incentive and hybrid instrument (Source: Bressers and Klok, 1988, p 35-36) ....................................................................... 90 

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Figure 18:  Range of market-based instruments (Source: Stavins, 2001; Whitten et al., 2004, p 9; Coggan and Whitten, 2005, p 5) ............. 91 

Figure 19:  Frequency of current instruments applied to foster the energy efficiency in transport (Source: MURE II database, www.mure2.com)............................................................................ 96 

Figure 20:  Categorising promising eco-innovations in climate mitigation by mechanism and target of innovation ........................................ 106 

Figure 21:  Heuristic scheme of an innovation system. Example: renewable energies ...................................................................... 108 

Figure 22:  Survey based profile of general innovation conditions for sustainability innovations .............................................................. 111 

Figure 23:  Shares of the BRICS+G countries in world exports and international patents in the field of mobility................................... 112 

Figure 24:  Share of patent counts. All sectors 1990-2010 by country ........... 119 

Figure 25:  Share of patent counts. All sectors 1990-2010 by world regions .......................................................................................... 121 

Figure 26:  Sector shares of patent applications by world regions 1990 - 2010 ............................................................................................. 122 

Figure 27:  Absolute patent counts by sector 1990-2010 ............................... 123 

Figure 28:  Patent densities by damage costs road and rail 2010 by climate region ............................................................................... 125 

Figure 29:  Relative patent development indicators 1990 to 2010 by world region ........................................................................................... 126 

Figure 30:  Relative patent development 1990 to 2010 by world region excluding China ............................................................................ 127 

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List of abbreviations

AL Alpine Area

APF Adaptation Policy Framework

BI British Islands

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CA Canada

CBA Cost-Benefit Analysis

CDM Clean Development Mechanism

CH Switzerland

CI Critical Infrastructure

CN China

COM European Commission

CSM Common safety method

DECC Department of Energy and Climate Change

DSM Demand-Side Management

EA Eastern Europe

EC Commission of the European Communities

EEA European Environment Agency

EFA Energy Futures Australia

EPO European Patent Office

ESCO Energy Service Company

ETM Emergency Transport Management

ETS Emission Trading Scheme

EU European Union

FR France

IATA International Air Transport Association

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

IEA International Energy Agency

IP Iberian Peninsula

IPC International Patent Classification

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

IR Independent Regulator

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ISO International Organization for Standardization

JI Joint Implementation

JP Japan

KPA Key Performance Areas

MBI Market-based Instrument

MD Mediterranean area

ME Mid Europe

MURE Mesures d’Utilisation Rationnelle de l’Energie

N-Am North America

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

R&D Research and Development

RIMAROCC Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate

RTD Research and Technological Development

RWIS Road Weather Information Systems

SC Scandinavia

SCM Standard Cost Model

UK United Kingdom

UN United Nations

UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

US United States

WIPO World Intellectual Property Office

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Deliverable 5: “The role of governance and incentives” addresses the objective how different policy settings foster or hinder the successful implementation of the recommended measures and how these could be improved where necessary. The conclusions are aiming at assisting policy makers as well as planners with the identification of possible policy instruments to foster climate change adaptation activities in transport systems. The present Deliverable is composed of three distinct Parts: actor analysis, policy instruments and innovation managements. In the final part common as well as diverging findings of these aspects of adaptation policy are discussed in front of the background of previous project results.

ACTOR ANALYSIS

Actor analysis and policymaking

The main objective of Part A is to shed some light on the theoretical background of Actor Analysis and underline the reasons that constitute a useful tool for policy makers, by providing an overview of the basic underlying concepts of the existing theories on the method. Although it is far from complete, this review would help the reader to gain a better theoretical understanding of how actors shape policy making, the underlying factors and mechanisms driving their interactions and which are the main approaches and tools/methods for modeling these interactions in order to be able to predict the reactions and the behaviour of actors in respect to certain policy initiatives.

Then the review focuses on the term ‘Stakeholder Management’, which is considered as a special case of Actor Analysis. Four broad categories of actions are identified and discussed which constitute parts of Stakeholder Management methodology:

1. The identification of the various actors in relation to the specific field of transport adaptation. It can be seen from the mapping of actors to policy areas that there is not a single actor per policy field and no actor is active on only a single policy area. Thus, co-ordination is needed for successful long-term adaptation implementation.

2. The analysis of stakeholders/actors by impact and influence.

3. The engagement with the stakeholders: Engagement is primarily focused at getting to know and understand each stakeholder and is the opportunity to discuss and agree expectations of communication and, primarily, agree a set of Values and Principles that all stakeholders will abide by.

4. The planning of stakeholder communications and reporting: In this step the purpose is to use the information gathered in the previous steps in order to develop a communication and reporting plan that documents: the information requirements,

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the frequency of communication and channel of communication for each stakeholder.

Actor analysis and transport adaptation

The purpose of this part is to make a step further towards understanding and mapping the key players and actors in respect to transport adaptation in order to capture and analyse their interrelationships and be able to promote and implement transport adaptation policies and measures efficiently. Beginning from the initial mapping of the actors – stakeholders involved in each transport subsector (road, rail, and air), an overall classification of actors in respect to transport adaptation is proposed, in an attempt to visualize the complex interrelations between actors and better understand the driving forces of policy implementation in the transport environment. More specifically, the proposed actors’ categories in respect to transport adaptation are:

• Public Policymakers

• Funding bodies

• Infrastructure Managers

• Transport Operators

• Planners – Engineers

• Research organizations

• Industries, ITC companies and other stakeholders

• International associations

The interdependencies of the aforementioned actors’ categories were further discussed in respect to the responsibilities, power, resources and interests they have on the following key areas (policy dimensions): Financing, Planning, Operation, Maintenance and Design of transport infrastructures. In the end, useful conclusions are drawn in relation to the identification of the ‘critical’ (key) actors in each policy domain of transport adaptation, its responsibilities and role, which would ease policy making and implementation of innovative adaptation measures.

The relations and interactions between actors are, as said, very generally described. There is no doubt that further research is needed to understand the singularities of each mode and produce a specific framework for action for each transport mode. An additional inherent difficulty inherent to the comprehension of the transport system relies in the fact that the way each transport mode is organized varies according to the Member-State in analysis.

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However, even from this rough qualitative analysis of the actors involved in the transport adaptation process, some useful conclusions can be drawn:

• The identification of the various actors in relation to the specific field of transport adaptation. It can be seen from the mapping of actors to policy areas that there is not a single actor per policy field and no actor is active on only a single policy area. Thus, co-ordination is needed for successful long-term adaptation implementation.

• The ‘interest’ and ‘power’ of all actors: Here one could conclude that a rather important measure for the promotion of transport adaptation would be the conveyance of the concept through campaigns and informational events to users/passengers and funding bodies, which are ‘powerful’ actors but with little knowledge and interest for the topic.

• A first mapping of the objectives that could lead to the identification of ‘conflict areas’. An example could be the promotion of legal framework for the adoption of adaptation measures in a strictly private environment (private terminal managers and operators).

• Initiation of policy measures: The best examples and practices should come from public controlled terminals and transport operators since the private sector is more reluctant to get involved in policies with long-term planning.

• Finally, another useful conclusion concerns the need for motivating the politicians (EU and national level) in combination with informing the private sector (industry – ICT providers).

POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSPORT ADAPTATION

Policy systems dealing with transport adaptation

PART B showed that the adverse impacts of extreme weather events on the European transport system are increasing. Nevertheless, adaptation of transport systems to extreme weather events is hitherto established only to a small extent due to the fact that impacts of extreme weather events on transport systems are not yet perceived as recurring irregular shocks (or risk). Since global warming will continue in changing the impact patterns of extreme weather events systematic fostering of climate change adaptation activities in the European transport sector is necessary. One possible solution to make climate change adaptation in the transport sector more efficient is public intervention in terms of e.g. adapting existing standards and regulations, improving the dissemination of available information, avoiding external impacts and considering long-term consequences in investment decisions (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007; Hallegatte et al., 2011). The targeted effects of such policies must be (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008):

• Mitigation of impacts,

• Reduction of vulnerability and exposure as well as

• Increasing the resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport systems at risk.

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The predicted change in average costs due to weather extremes in the next 40 years hint at regions, where transport systems are affected above-average by extreme weather events, in particular France, Middle Europe and the Alpine region as well as at the probably most affected modes of transport, in particular rail transport. These regional and modal core areas must be focused in future climate change adaptation policies.

Types of adaptation

However, adaptation policies have to address the different effects of climate change on the European transport sector that cut horizontally across different policy sectors and vertically across different levels of government, are uncertain and concern a broad range of non-state actors who often lack capacities to adapt (Bauer et al., 2011). In that context, it is important to note that the literature review showed that risk identification and assessment plays a significant role in setting-up adaptation policy frameworks. Therefore, current frameworks to manage climate change risk of road transportation, such as the RIMAROCC (Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate) method were exemplarily described. In terms of designing policy instruments to foster climate change adaptation it is crucial to distinguish the available strategies. Strategies focussed by the present research were in particular:

• Technical adaptation,

• Soft adaptation,

• Anticipatory adaptation,

• Reactive adaptation,

• Autonomous adaptation,

• Planned adaptation,

• Private adaptation, and

• Joint adaptation.

In addition to these established concepts new concepts emerged in the recent past. In particular, no-regret, safety margins, and reversible strategies have been developed. The no-regret strategy identifies measures that provide net-benefits regardless of climate change effects it avoids the problem of uncertainty (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Cheap safety margins can be produced by including climate change adaptation features in already pursued strategies (Hallegatte 2009; Walker and Liebl, 2010). Reversible strategies are flexible in terms of either heightening the efforts or postponement in case new information is available. Good examples for reversible strategies are classic risk transfer instruments, such as insurance (Hallegatte, 2009).

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Regulation and governance vs. incentives

The available policy instruments to increase the application of certain climate change adaptation strategies are in general regulations or incentives. Regulation or governance is defined as government directives including sanctions aimed to stimulate while incentives are accompanied by a set of prescriptions (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The main characteristic of incentives is that penalties or rewards and the behaviour of the regulated parties are proportional while directives are focussing on setting up sanctions for certain behavioural alternatives (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The imposed costs of regulation are allocated to different categories, such as direct financial costs; compliance costs; indirect financial costs (substantive compliance costs); administrative costs; and long-term structural costs (SCM Network, 2005).

Current policy systems and possible applications in transport adaptation

The final chapter of part B found empirical evidence for the impact of policy instruments fostering energy efficient behaviour in transport and examines possible applications of the derived high-impact instruments in the domain of adapting the European transport system to changing patterns of extreme weather events. In that context and in line with previous findings of the WEATHER project (see also Doll et al., 2011), a combination of information/education/training, infrastructure and social planning/organisation have been proven to be a promising instrument. Regarding energy efficiency in transport 351 current policy instruments in all EU member states have been identified in MURE II database. Among these instruments combined instruments, legislative / normative and fiscal instruments showed the highest semi-quantitative impact, i.e. the transport sector responds especially to these three types of instruments with the targeted behavioural change. 28 of the 38 combined instruments encompass at least information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation. Approximately 73 % of exclusive combinations of information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation were assessed as high or medium impact instruments. Based on the empirical results about the impact of applied policy instruments to foster energy efficiency in transport the following applications of information / education / training, infrastructure and social planning / organisation were derived as promising also in the context of transport adaptation:

• Awareness raising, education and information campaigns considering climate change in planning, operating and using transport systems,

• Information / training on driving behaviour under extreme weather conditions,

• Training / education of staff,

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• Incorporating extreme weather events into emergency and risk management in transport system operations,

• Voluntary certification and labelling related to extreme weather events and reliability/safety of certain transport systems, and

• Improving the knowledge about impacts of extreme weather events on transport via data collection and research.

INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

Learning from mitigation strategies

The analyses of worldwide patent statistics on adaptation technologies by transport sector show that the successful long-term design of complex policies is not an easy task. There does not exist a silver bullet, such as economic instruments as suggested by neoclassical welfare theory, ensuring innovation processes to continuously work and market agents to follow the same goals as society and governmental bodies. It rather takes the consideration of various factors including the decisiveness and long-term orientation of related policy fields, communication structures, market dynamics, customer preferences and the use of management tools in the business sector, as well as education, human resources and the innovation friendliness in the country in question.

Learning from innovation indicators

By means of analysing patent statistics we have generated quantitative indicators of innovation processes and of innovation dynamics in transportation technology fields, which are critical to weather and climate adaptation. We see that across all world regions around 70 % are due to infrastructure, planning and large-scale protection measures. Given that transport system operations cannot be captured by this type of innovation assessment, these findings somehow are in contrast to our earlier findings on suitable adaptation strategies. The spatial distribution of patent applications has shown three main application regions: the US and Canada, Western Europe with a leading role for Germany and eastern Asia, namely Japan and Korea. Surprisingly, China, Brazil or other world regions do not contribute significantly to RTD in resilient transportation systems.

The patent dynamics shows by far the highest application growth rates for those countries which have the least share in world patent application technologies for adaptation in transport. This is namely China (year 2010 / year 1990 =350), followed by the eastern EU Member States (25), the rest of Asia (17) and Eastern Europe and Russia (12). These findings indicate that a dynamic catching-up process is currently going on, such that Europe, the US and Japan may soon be challenged by the transforming economies. This

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may be particularly true as specifically Asia is likely to suffer more from climate change and weather extremes than other world regions.

On the basis of the statistics used in this investigation we can conclude, that if European industries would like to remain a strong partner in supplying other world regions with resilient transport system components research levels need to be maintained. Otherwise there is a certain risk that in one or another market niche strong competitors, e.g. from the so-called BRICS countries, could emerge and challenge Europe’s market share. We can already see this trend in advanced transport Infrastructure networks planned, built and maintained by Chinese companies without direct involvements of western Companies.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

In general, the findings concerning the main actors and the appropriate policy instruments of the four major adaptation areas are consistent and complement each other. It was concluded that the key actors in promoting adaptation activities in transport planning and general protection are the European Union and national governments. That conclusion is in line with the assumption that the public interest and thus of the policy makers in improving the resilience of transport infrastructures and services against climate extremes is significantly higher than the knowledge of ‘powerful’ actors about the issue. Therefore, fostering climate change adaptation in transport planning and general protection should mainly rely on regulatory policy instruments in order to maintain a sustainable change in behaviour.

Regarding infrastructure investments and technology it can be expected that the private sector is more reluctant to get involved (and invest) in policies/measures with long-term planning (because of additional costs). Thus, the basic strategy to promote climate change adaptation in terms of infrastructure and technology is to implement regulations, such as building codes and technology standards. Nevertheless, regulation of this adaptation area should be accompanied by incentives in order to avoid negative feedback and improve the efficacy.

From an actor perspective the adaptation area of vehicle and information technology is mainly located in the domain of ICT providers and the manufacture companies. That finding is in line with the policy conclusion that fostering climate change adaptation activities within this area is mainly driven by an increasing demand and transparency in the market the introduction of (voluntary) certification and labelling systems related to the reliability/safety of vehicles and ICT systems under extreme weather conditions is a major strategy.

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Since the private sector is not willing to invest for long-term horizon it was concluded that public transport operators and public transport infrastructure managers are playing an important role in terms of forerunners to foster the climate change adaptation of transport service operations. A wide range of policy instruments from mandatory or voluntary certification and labelling systems as well as penalties for exceeding of a threshold for the maximum level of weather-induced delays per transport mode to oblige common risk management procedures can be applied. Again, both findings are not contrary but complement each other.

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1 Setting the scene

1.1 Introduction to the WEATHER project

Records of reinsurance companies, statistics by high-level research entities and public institutions, including the European Environment Agency (EEA) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) clearly highlight the rising damages caused by the consequences of climate change, and in particular of natural catastrophes and extreme weather events. While many studies focus on CO2 mitigation in transport, research on the vulnerability of the sector on climate driven effects, namely extreme weather events, is coming up only recently.

Little knowledge has so far been developed on the economic costs of climate and extreme weather driven damages to transport, and even less evidence is available on the options, costs and benefits of adaptation measures. National adaptation programs of EU Member States, the US, Canada, New Zealand and the 4th assessment report of the IPCC provide only indicative measures and global fields of action. Thus there is a need for European studies addressing local conditions.

The third branch of WEATHER research is concerned with the role of transport systems for crisis/disaster management. In the transport literature, the term emergency operation spans a number of topics including logistics, traffic planning, and institutional issues. The major tasks under these topics are the transport of emergency vehicles and search-and-rescue teams, medical evacuation, and distribution of goods and local medical aid. In this field of research European evidence is already available.

1.2 Project objectives and work plan

In front of this background the WEATHER project aims at analysing the economic costs of more frequent and more extreme weather events on transport and on the wider economy and explores the benefits and costs of suitable adaptation and emergency management strategies for reducing them in the context of sustainable policy design. The research is carried out by an international team of eight European institutes, led by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (ISI). The project runs for 30 months from November 2009 until April 2012.The weather project is funded by the 7th RTD framework program of the European Commission and is supervised by the Directorate General for Research.

The project work plan is broken down in two work packages for management dissemination and seven work packages on research:

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• WP1: Weather trends and economy-wide impacts

• WP2: Vulnerability of transport systems

• WP3: Crisis management and emergency strategies

• WP4: Adaptation options and strategies

• WP5: Governance, incentives and innovation

• WP6: Case studies

• WP7: Policy conclusions and final conference

The WEATHER work packages are closely interlinked as sound adaptation and crises prevention strategies require the simultaneous consideration of various aspects of weather trends, transport economics and policy design. Of utmost importance for the weather research are contacts to transport operators and the insurance sector. For this reason each of the core work packages organises workshops to discuss the project findings with transport professionals and academia.

1.3 Position of WP5 in the framework of the WEATHER project

The work of this report builds mainly on the results of WP3 and WP4 in the WEATHER project. Deliverable 3 (Papanikolaou et al., 2011) has already identified a number of key technologies and procedures to make transport more capable to support evacuation and supply chains in emergency cases. Deliverable 4 (Doll et al., 2011) presented an overview of the most promising adaptation measures, including new or modified technologies, organisational procedures and planning principles in all modes of transport, from a mainly micro-economic perspective.

In line with the overall approach of the WEATHER project, D5 considers the issue of adaptation to climate change and weather extremes from the perspective of policy systems and gives an insight to the different actors and mechanisms to foster the implementation of efficient climate change adaptation in transport. The report is based on the analysis of crisis, emergency and recovery measures as well as adaptation strategies developed in WP3 and WP4. Thus, WP5 interlinks the level of developing detailed adaptation measures (WP3 and WP4) and the level of implementation by providing theoretical background knowledge about the main aspects of climate change adaptation.

1.4 Objective of Deliverable 5

This WP shall clarify the role of relevant actors and networks, classify adaptation strategies, and discuss challenges and characteristics of different policy instruments /

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systems as well as the development of innovation and technology in adapting the European transport sector to changing climate and weather conditions. According to the Technical Annex of the WEATHER project Deliverable 5: “The role of governance and incentives” aims specifically at following objectives:

• PART A: Analysing the roles (rights, duties, interests and options for action) of public and private actors and their inter-relations in transport infrastructure and system planning, design, operation, maintenance and financing.

• PART B: Analysing policy instruments and conducting a review of incentive and regulation systems dealing with long-term risk.

• PART C: Exploring the dynamics in the markets for adaptation and emergency management technologies.

The research activities in WP5 are based on a variety of methods, such as expert interviews, comprehensive literature reviews and empirical analysis of policy instruments and patents. The research results will be summarized in Deliverable 5.

1.5 Structure of Deliverable 5

The present Deliverable 5: “The role of governance and incentives” consists of three parts. The structure is based on the underlying aspects of policy systems dealing with climate change adaptation of the European transport sector.

In PART A the method of Actors Analysis is used to facilitate policy reform processes concerning transport adaptation by incorporating the needs of those who have a ‘stake’ (stakeholders or actors involved) or an interest in the reforms under consideration. The chapter initiates with a brief overview of the main theoretical foundations of Actors analysis (Paragraph 2) and then zooms at the political environment of transport adaptation in the European Union applying a qualitative method of Actor/Stakeholder Analysis for pointing out the interactions and interrelationships of the actors involved (Paragraph 3). In the end, useful conclusions emerge in respect to the objectives, interests and power of the various actors and their implication in the policy process of transport adaptation issues.

PART B of the Deliverable initially explores the rationale for setting up policy systems dealing with climate change adaptation in the European transport sector. Subsequently, the overall policy-targeted effects of adaptation policy frameworks regarding transport will be explained. This part of the Deliverable will also examine uncertainty as one main characteristic of global warming and its impact on climate change adaptation policy. In that context, it is important to introduce the different types of climate change adaptation strategies in order to distinguish developed measures. Part B includes also a comprehensive discussion of the main characteristics of two basic policy systems and

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according instruments: regulations and incentives. The Deliverable concludes with empirical insight to the application and the impact of certain policy instruments from the similar policy field of fostering energy efficiency in transport and possible applications in order to adapt transport systems to the changing patterns of extreme weather events.

PART C explores the technologies and policy options, identified as best practice in WEATHER Deliverable 4, with the help of the Sectoral Systems of Innovation approach and international economic development indicators. Market dynamics and the competitiveness of European transport manufacturing and supply industries with respect to the challenges imposed by climate and weather pattern shifts are investigated by the use of patent statistics. Respective patent search strategies for adaptation and emergency management technologies are defined using the reviews by WEATHER Deliverable 4 and are applied to the databases of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the European Patent Office (EPO).

The final PART D summarizes the main conclusions according to the structure and the objectives of the previous chapters and presents policy implications of the derived research results.

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PART A: ACTOR ANALYSIS 2 Introduction to the actor analysis

2.1 Objective of the chapter

The main objective of this part is to identify the public and private actors relevant to transport adaptation which are involved in the policy making process and analyse the different role and position of each actor in the policy formulation process. More specifically, the objectives of the Part A are:

1. Identification and characterization of relevant public and private actors on European and National level.

2. Evaluation of interdependencies in each level in terms of responsibilities, power, resources and interests in relation to the following key areas (policy dimensions):

- Financing

- Planning

- Operation

- Maintenance

- Design

2.2 Methodological approach

The part starts with a short description of the theoretical background of actors/stakeholders management. The basic concepts and objectives of actors’ analysis are briefly discussed in order that one can better understand the scope and significance of applying this type of analysis in adaptation transport policy.

Then the analysis zooms at the adaptation transport policy, aiming at the identification of the key actors that would initiate, formulate and shape policy initiatives in the specific field. The actors involved are identified from the proposed adaptation measures of Deliverable 4 (by assuming the implementation of these measures) of the WEATHER Project and then are characterised according to their roles during the policy formulation process and specifically their different position is highlighted by exploring the roles, interests, and options for action of each actor.

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The analysis is conducted with regard to the different policy dimensions, i.e. transport infrastructure and system planning, design, operation, maintenance, and financing. In the end, a matrix of the various actors involved in the adaptation transport policy is composed, which depicts the interrelationships among actors and between actors and design elements of policy strategies.

Finally, it is noteworthy that the word ‘actor’ in this chapter is perceived similarly with the word ‘stakeholder’ or ‘agent’ borrowed from the management science and the methods of ‘stakeholder analysis and management’ are considered as part of the wider term of ‘Actor analysis’.

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3 Theoretical background

3.1 Understanding Actor Analysis and its position in the Policy Making Process

It is widely accepted that policy making process is becoming a more and more challenging issue in today’s complex world. In general, policies or ‘policy initiatives’ strive for providing solutions and setting forth priorities and future directions for the wellbeing of a society. The ‘Practical Guide to Policy Making’ of Ireland’s Civil Service defines policy making as ‘the process by which governments translate their political vision into programs and actions to deliver 'outcomes' - desired change in the real world’ (NICS, 2003). A more general definition is given by the New Oxford Dictionary in which the term ‘policy’ is defined as "a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by a government, party, business or individual".

Whether a policy is implemented by the government or any other authority, it always aims at providing solutions or/and improving the conditions in respect to well defined problems and critical issues of a certain ‘group of people’, either this is the entire society or a certain subgroup e.g. agriculture sector, transport sector etc. Therefore, by its definition, the policy process involves a number of interested parties (groups of people), each one with different roles, objectives and interests. In the simplest case, the implementation of a policy would involve two interested parties: those who decide and implement the policy and those who are affected by it. However in reality this is hardly the case since during the policy process many interested parties/stakeholders are involved. For example in the transport sector, the implementation of policy measures for the enhancement of intermodal cooperation involves (among others) politicians (the policymakers-initiators of the policy measure), transport operators and terminal managers (decision makers responsible of policy implementation) and users/consumers (who profit from the implementation of successful policies in terms of cost reduction, time savings, increased quality). For this reason it must be highlighted the great importance of analysing the overall political environment in terms of stakeholders involved, key actors, interests and potential behaviour s, reaction of the society, before promoting specific policies in order to safeguard (to a high extent) their successfully implementation.

Bots et al. (2000) states about policy problems that:

“[…,] policy problems are products of subjective judgment. Policy problems exist only because the actors involved make judgments about the desirability of altering some problematic situation. Policy problems are therefore socially constructed, maintained and changed.”

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This is exactly the reason that Actors Analysis constitutes a useful tool for policy makers: its objective is to provide useful insight in relation to the potential reactions, behaviour and interests of the key players in the wider policy framework in order to achieve their efficient implementation and the successful meeting of objectives.

The following Table describes the potential contributions of actor analysis to policy analysis activities as proposed by Enserink et al. (2010).

Table 1: Possible contributions of actor analysis to policy analysis activities

Policy analysis activity Actor analysis can help to …

Research and analyse

Mobilize knowledge and information from a broad actor base, which is likely to improve the quality of the problem analysis

Design and recommend

Create ideas for alternative strategies and tactics by mapping options and interests of different actors. This helps to identify common ground and shared fundamental values, to identify ways in which different actors can contribute to these shared values, and to identify needs and possibilities for compensation or mitigating measures to satisfy particular actors

Advise strategically

Assess the feasibility and potential to implement policy options, by mapping the positions, interests, resources, and relations of actors, providing insight into the opportunities and threats that actors pose for problem solving

Mediate

Map conflicts, identify potential coalitions of actors, and propose a road map for a negotiation process, including agenda items and participants in various stages of discussion

Democratise

Ensure that all the important actors are included in the policy process, and/or that their views and concerns are incorporated in the problem analysis. From a normative point of view, this supports a more legitimate problem analysis

Clarify values and arguments

Include the full range of values and arguments in a problem analysis, which aids a problem analysis that is recognized and accepted by different parties, offering a better basis for agreement and cooperation concerning policy options

Although there is a plethora of theoretical frameworks for actor analysis, there are main common elements since certain fundamental concepts are present in most of the frameworks. The aim of this chapter is neither to introduce a new theory on the topic nor to synthesize different theories into one, but rather to provide an overview of the basic underlying concepts of the various theories of actors analysis in the policy making process in order to gain a better understanding of the method and be able to apply it in a efficient way in regard to transport adaptation.

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3.2 Who is an ‘actor’?

Actors constitute a subset of the public and can be understood as a specific part of the society with certain interests in relation to a specific issue (either this is a policy or any other kind of initiative). In this sense, the terms ‘Public participation’ and ‘Actor participation’ can be differentiated, since the first is referring to a process which is ‘open’ to the citizens at large, while the second implies a certain form of interest or/and relation and acknowledges different members or groups of the general public.

In general, actors may include international, European, national, regional and local government authorities, non-profit organizations, decision-makers, advisory government agencies, private entities (companies, enterprises), citizen/users groups, labor unions, associations, as well as academic experts, research bodies and consultants or individuals. All different parties (actors) have their own interests, goals and strategies and this is one of the main reasons that society is now, more than ever, characterized by great complexity, uncertainty and unpredictability in what concerns the study of social systems in respect to policy and decision making. In this way Actor analysis provides a structured inventory of all parties and their interests in order that one can easily conceive the overall framework of a certain political environment.

In this sense, Actor analysis can be seen as an approach for unveiling the vague interactions between interested parties (actors) in order to: 1) represent the complicated interrelationships between the various actors, and 2) to better understand the impacts of certain decisions, measures or policies (scenario testing). A major challenge of Actor analysis is that actors (which comprise both individuals and groups) often change their existing situation, view or position by their priorities or value systems, which gives a dynamic character (and increases the complexity) of the analysis.

3.3 Actor analysis: Concepts and methodologies

In this paragraph, the fundamental concepts of actor analysis are examined together with an initial recording of the available techniques and methods available. Although it is far from complete, this review would help the reader to gain a better theoretical understanding of how actors shape policy making, the underlying factors and mechanisms driving their interactions and which are the main approaches and tools/methods for modelling these interactions in order to be able to predict the reactions and the behaviour of actors in respect to certain policy initiatives.

There is a wide range of actor analysis methods and different overviews methods. What is notable is that the vast majority of the reviews keep to their own application field or to a single method while only some have taken the challenge to map a broader spectrum of

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actor analysis methods (van der Lei and Herder, 2011). Actor analysis as discussed here is rooted in a method known as ‘stakeholder analyses’. This method has been principally used mainly to support project management and design activities as well as strategic decision making in the corporate sector (see e.g. Mitroff, 1983; Freeman, 1984).

Returning to the interactions between policy making and actors’ analysis, one can notice that policy making requires actors to bargain and negotiate in an environment of conflicting interests, making political compromises necessary. As Hermans (2005) indicates:

“Actors differ in their problem perceptions and interests, and in their ability to articulate them and include them in the policy process. Actors are not equally powerful, but their power is intertwined with their positions in historical, social, political, and economic structures. The result is a policy making process in which actors need to compromise and where it is impossible for an actor to know all the relevant details and mechanisms that affect the realization of its objectives.

Several authors emphasize that public policies are generally generated within net-works in which multiple actors are interrelated in a more or less systematic way (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Klijn, 1997). Looking only at policy networks, however, has a limited potential to explain policy changes if it is not complemented by an analysis at a lower level in terms of actor properties. At this actor level, most theories take into account three basic dimensions that help explain actor behaviour (Enserink et al., 2010): perceptions, values (or objectives), and resources.

These are two conceptual levels that can be distinguished in policy making in a multi-actor context: the network level and the actor level (Hermans, 2005). The fundamental concepts used on these two levels are depicted in Figure 1 and are discussed below.

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Figure 1: Conceptual framework for the multi-actor context of policy making (Source: Hermans, 2005)

On the network level, the fundamental concepts are actors, relations and rules. Together, these factors are modeled to describe the structure of the network that provides the environment for the interactions among actors, which eventually result in policy outcomes. On the actor level, the basic concepts are perceptions, objectives and resources. Together, these factors result in understanding and predicting the actions of actors. Although the labels might differ, these three concepts can be recognized in various theoretical frameworks.

There are several methods available for conducting support actor analysis. In practice, most use is made of approaches for stakeholder analysis/management, which are rooted in strategic management literature (see e.g. Mitroff, 1983; Freeman, 1984; Grimble and

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Chan, 1995; Bryson, 2004). The following Table provides a listing of the most common methods used together with their main focus.

Table 2: Overview of methods for actor analysis

METHOD FOCUS

Network analysis Networks

Social network analysis Structural characteristics of actor networks

Stakeholder analysis Resources and interdependencies

Stakeholder analysis Stakeholder environment to maximize cooperative potential and minimize threat of obstruction

Game theoretic models Resources and interdependencies

Metagame analysis Structure of policy ‘game’ to help identify stable outcomes and advise on strategies for negotiation and coalition building

Hypergame analysis Structure of policy ‘game’ and role of (mis) information and strategic surprise

Transactional analysis Resources and interdependencies

Transactional process models

Potential for exchange of control between different actors, to facilitate policy process

Vote-exchange models Predicted shifts in actors’ positions and outcomes of collective decision-making

Discourse analysis Perceptions of groups of actors

Argumentative analysis Different chains of reasoning used in policy debate and underlying values and assumptions

Narrative policy analysis Opposing views of controversial problems and possible meta-narratives to reformulate those problems

Q-methodology Groups of actors with shared perspectives and their underlying basis

Cognitive mapping Perceptions of individual actors

Self-Q interviews Possibilities to address policy problems through actors’ rationale

Dynamic Actor Network Analysis (DANA)

Perceptions of actors to enable comparative analysis of agreement, conflict, etc.

Preference elicitation Values of actors

Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), multi-attribute assessment

Structure and hierarchy in various attributes and alternatives

Source: Enserink et al., 2010

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However, it is noteworthy that in many cases carrying out an actor analysis that goes beyond an initial scan or exploration is not worthwhile for the problem explored (maybe because of lack of data or sufficient resources) and it may be proved that a qualitative assessment of the actors attributes using a stakeholder analysis method is more useful. These methods which are originated from the business sciences, are flexible enough to cover a wide range of conceptual dimensions and thus useful for an initial problem exploration. In the next paragraph, a brief description of the method commonly known as ‘stakeholder analysis’ is provided, together with the analysis of its methodological steps.

3.4 Stakeholder management as a special case of Actor analysis

The origin of ‘stakeholder’ in management literature can be traced back to 1963, when the word appeared in an international memorandum at the Stanford Research Institute (Elias et al., 2000). Stakeholders were defined as ‘those groups without whose support the organisation would cease to exist’. Ever since, the term mainly refers to methods and tools used for strategic management decision making in order to identify all stakeholders using a modified balanced scorecard for mapping and understanding stakeholders’ expectations and actions.

As already mentioned, literature on Actors and Stakeholders Analysis indicates that both terms are often used almost with the same meaning. In the framework of the current analysis, we adopt the definition of Enserink et al. (2010), which indicates ‘stakeholder analysis’ as a subset of ‘actors’ analysis’ and more specifically as a qualitative methodology for mapping and assessing the objectives, the power, the influence and thus the interdependencies between actors in respect to a certain business, policy or initiative in general. This approach is in line with the objective of the current analysis of this chapter which aims at mapping, analysing and evaluating the inter-relations of public and private actors in regard to the transport adaptation policy making process.

Coming back to the examination of the ‘Stakeholder Management’ term, and even though different organizations approach stakeholder management in different ways, there are certain fundamental principles and processes that can be drawn out. Four broad categories of actions can be identified in all types of methods which are (www.stakeholdermap.com):

1. The identification of the stakeholders/actors involved (discussed hereafter). 2. The analysis of stakeholders/actors by impact and influence (discussed hereafter). 3. The engagement with the stakeholders: Engagement is primarily focused at getting

to know and understand each stakeholder and is the opportunity to discuss and

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agree expectations of communication and, primarily, agree a set of Values and Principles that all stakeholders will abide by.

4. The planning of stakeholder communications and reporting: In this step the purpose is to use the information gathered in the previous steps in order to develop a communication and reporting plan that documents: the information requirements, the frequency of communication and channel of communication for each stakeholder.

For the purposes of this chapter, the first two categories of actions, namely the identification and the analysis of actors, will be used for understanding the policy formulation process in transport adaptation. For this reason these two steps of stakeholder management are discussed in more detail hereafter.

Identification and analysis of the stakeholders/actors

The first step of the process is the identification of actors. The identification includes the recording of all interested parties either internal or external to the organization which conducts the analysis. The identification of the key stakeholders is extremely important to the success of the analysis. Based on the resources available, one must decide on the maximum number of stakeholders to be included in the analysis, since this will affect the entire process.

Following the identification, the next step is the ‘analysis or mapping of actors’. Stakeholder or actor mapping is a term that refers to the action of analysing the attitudes of stakeholders towards something (most frequently a project or a policy). Stakeholder analysis can be done once or on a regular basis to track changes in stakeholder attitudes over time.

The most commonly used techniques for stakeholders mapping constitute combinations of qualitative assessment for the factors power, impact, influence and interest of the respective actors. The following list identifies some of the best known and most commonly used methods for stakeholder mapping:

• Classification of stakeholders based on power to influence, the legitimacy of each stakeholder’s relationship with the organization, and the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the organization.

• Mapping stakeholder expectations based on value hierarchies and Key Performance Areas (KPA).

• Ranking stakeholders based on needs and the relative importance of stakeholders to others in the network.

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• Classify stakeholders according to potential for threat and potential for cooperation.

• Process of identification, assessment of awareness, support, influence leading to strategies for communication and assessing stakeholder satisfaction, and who is aware or ignorant and whether their attitude is supportive or opposing.

In general, some of the commonly used ‘dimensions’ or criteria for stakeholders’ analysis and mapping are:

• Power (high, medium, low) • Support (positive, neutral, negative) • Influence/impact (high or low) • Interest (high or low)

These criteria are evaluated qualitatively using a series of ‘mapping techniques’, usually with the use of grids combining the aforementioned dimensions (Figure 2). The most used and known techniques for stakeholder mapping are (Bourne):

• Influence-interest grid (introduced by Imperial College London)

• Power-impact grid (introduced by the Office of Government Commerce UK 2003)

• The power-interest grid (introduced by Moorhouse Consulting 2007)

• Mendelow's Power-interest grid (introduced by Aubrey L. Mendelow, Kent State University, Ohio 1991)

Figure 2: Representation of power/interest grid (Source Bourne)

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4 Actor analysis of the transport sector in relation to adaptation measures

4.1 Exploring the usefulness of actor analysis in regard to EU transport adaptation policy initiatives

Transport adaptation constitutes an emerging issue which is not sufficiently explored to date. Only recently, a plethora of research endeavors (both national and international) seek to understand and evaluate the impacts of climate change to the transport sector in order to accurately define suitable adaptation measures on the local and global scale. Thus at this point, it seems reasonable the fact of the total absence of a policy framework on the European level as well as the lack of specific legal framework in respect to transport adaptation issues along with more targeted practical guidelines. However as research is progressing and the benefits of transport adaptation are understood and explicitly assessed, this would lead to an increasing pressure to policy and decision makers for taking action.

The purpose of this analysis is to make a step further towards another research direction not explored until now: This of understanding and mapping the key players and actors in respect to transport adaptation in order to capture and analyse their interrelationships and be able to promote and implement transport adaptation policies and measures efficiently. Although actor analysis could be proved a useful tool for experts in transport adaptation in order to comprehend the different elements of the transport political environment and market, in practice no specific study has been made for addressing this issue. This highlights the need for a closer look into the application of actor analysis and its usefulness for policy making and transport adaptation decision makers and experts. Specifically, the current analysis aims at addressing the following research questions:

1) What is the practical use of actor analysis for transport adaptation experts who want to support policy makers?

2) How should an actor analysis be done?

3) Which are the actors involved in the transport adaptation process and which are their interrelationships?

4) What conclusions derive from the actor analysis and how these can be translated to actions in practice?

It is noteworthy that the field of actor analysis itself is a rather fragmented and diverse one, consisting of various methods and applications. Hereafter the research objectives drive the analysis: beginning from an initial mapping of the actors – stakeholders involved

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in each transport subsector (road, rail, air), an overall classification of actors in respect to transport adaptation is proposed, in an attempt to visualize the complex interrelations between actors and better understand the driving forces of policy implementation in the transport environment. Moreover, some of the most common tools and techniques of stakeholders’ management are applied in order to depict and capture the ‘system dynamics’ of the actors involved in transport adaptation and drawn useful conclusions.

4.2 Actors involved in the adaptation policy making process per transport sector

In this paragraph, the research output of Deliverable 4 “Adaptation Strategies in the Transport Sector” (Doll et al., 2011) of the WEATHER Project is used, in order to identify the various actors involved in transport adaptation. For each adaptation measure proposed in the final measures recommended list of D4 (Doll et al., 2011), the respective actors involved in the implementation process of each measure are recorded. The analysis initiates with the recording and classification of the actors involved in adaptation process per transport (sub)sector for the national (specific: the Greek) transport environment and this rationale is then applied to the European scale, proposing an overall categorization of the actors involved in the EU policymaking process in relation to the adaptation measures proposed in D4 (Doll et al., 2011).

Hereafter the actors involved in the adaptation process as derived from the recommended measures list of D4 (Doll et al., 2011) are described, considered on the national level.

Maritime Transport Actors

For the maritime transport sector the main actors involved in the adaptation process and/or affected by it, are the following:

• Passengers / Travelers – these are the group of people whose primary objective is to be transported between an origin and a destination. They are the main user of the transport system and their interest is to travel in comfort, without time delays and with (relatively) low cost;

• Ship owners and operators – Entities that are responsible for exploiting (economically) the ship. Many times the ship owner is different from the entity that operates the ship and runs the business;

• Shipping Agents – Entities that exercise a set of activities in the name of carriers or ship-owners, namely: the fulfillment of the legal or contractual dispositions amongst port authorities or other authorities, and the celebration of maritime transport contracts;

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• Terminal manager – It can be private or a public entity which has as an objective the well-functioning of the port, maximizing its profits from the provided services. Most often terminal managers work under certain political restrictions since the state often constitutes a significant shareholder;

• Port Operators and Work Enterprises – Entities responsible for the loading, unloading and transshipment activities of cargo in ports. This activity is named of stowage and unstowage. In the passenger transport can be important when one consider passenger luggage. These enterprises often also provide the qualified workers for the stowage companies that operate in terminals;

• National Authorities for Ports - These are governmental authorities that specialize the regulations and laws of the central government, provide guidelines for the implementation of the legal framework and are responsible for the observance of the regulations;

• Ministries – Entities which are responsible for the institution of the legal framework in relation to the adaptation process and the transport policy in general.

Land Transport Actors (Rail and Road)

For the land transport sector, the main actors involved in the adaptation process and affected by it, are:

• Passengers / Travelers – the main users of the transport network; • Rail / Road Infrastructures Managers – Organizations / legal entities responsible

for the management of rail and road infrastructures in what concerns: construction, conservation, maintenance, heritage preservation and sources management. These entities grant the right to use railway / road infrastructure and also set and collect charges. Especially the rail entities make effort to meet all requests for capacity from all companies, and may cancel some trains paths if they are being under used. These entities can be public, private or both whether their capital is mainly supported by public or private sources;

• Rail / Road Transport Operators – The entities that provide rail / road transportation services to passengers and freight;

• Wagon and car producers – The entities/companies that manufacture the means of transport per sector;

• (National) Regulatory Authorities – The entities that regulate the specific sector. It is required to remedy in case of unfair or irregular situations and is also responsible for setting the standards (regulatory framework) and supervise their implementation;

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• Ministries – Entities which are responsible for the institution of the legal framework in relation to the adaptation process and the transport policy in general.

Air Transport Actors

In the air transport sector there are also some actors whose functions are similar to the ones described before. Specifically, the main actors involved in the adaptation process for the air sector are:

• Airline operators - They perform the role of providing the transportation services (and / or freight) and also the assurance of the most adequate functioning of the activity.

• Airplane producers - The entities/companies that manufacture the means of transport for the sector;

• Infrastructure managers - In the case of the air transport, these are the managers of airports.

• Ground handling actors – They entities are responsible for the handling of passengers, luggage and freight. Furthermore, are also responsible for the services provided to an aircraft, while it is parked on the floor, usually at the airport terminals. A distinction can be made between airside and landside services, the latter being passenger-related services such as ticketing and baggage handling at the check-in desks. Airside services comprise services such as ramp handling, fuelling and defueling operations, aircraft maintenance and the provision of catering services;

• (National) Regulatory Authorities – The entities that regulate the specific sector. They are also responsible for setting the standards (regulatory framework) in cooperation with the international bodies (ICAO, IATA) and supervise their implementation;

• Ministries – Entities which are responsible for the institution of the legal framework in relation to the adaptation process and the transport policy in general.

4.3 Actor analysis for the transport adaptation policymaking process on European level

In this paragraph the application of Actors analysis in relation to the transport adaptation policy process takes place, aiming at analysing the interrelations between the actors involved and evaluating their interdependencies in terms of responsibilities, power, resources and interests.

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The purpose of this analysis is to provide a general overview and mapping of the actors involved in the transport adaptation process in Europe, drawing some (first) useful conclusions concerning the position and role of each actor in transport adaptation. To our knowledge, the current analysis constitutes the first attempt for conducting an Actor analysis for solely transport adaptation purposes in the EU. Although there was lack of quantitative data sets for using more detailed modeling techniques (since this was out of the scope of the present study), the present qualitative actors analysis comprises a useful initial representation of the various elements of the transport adaptation sector and in the same time highlights important aspects for the policymakers.

The steps of the Actors’ analysis are the following:

1. Identification of the Actors involved in adaptation on the European level. 2. Mapping the Actors’ network and interrelationships. 3. Description of Actors’ interrelationships and interdependencies. 4. Inventory of Actors interests, power and objectives. 5. Interpretation of analysis – conclusions.

Each one of the steps is discussed in more detail herein.

Identification of the Actors involved in adaptation on the European level

Transport sector constitutes an intermodal chain which is composed of several actors, with different functions and objectives, which allows the establishment of diversified types of relations between them. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify similar groups of actors amongst the transport sectors. The classification of actors proposed below is based on the simplification of the categorization discussed in the previous paragraph. At this point, the consideration is not per transport mode, but a more general classification is proposed, covering the transport actors of all modes. More specifically, the proposed actors’ categories in respect to transport adaptation are:

Public Policymakers

This group comprises representatives from European Directorates (European level) to Ministries (national level) and regional authorities. Their involvement and responsibilities regarding transport adaptation to climate change are related to the policy decision making and the development of strategic plans. The determination of the necessary legislative framework is crucial for the effective incorporation of the new needs, related to climate change response, in all aspects of transport planning and management (guidelines and standards, funding alternatives, operational management and maintenance). Finally, local authorities are responsible for the effective implementation of new legislation and for the required monitoring of the new procedures. These type of actors are most likely to interact

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with every other actor participate in transport system planning, design, operation, maintenance and financing.

Funding bodies

This group comprises all funding actors taking place in the financing of projects such as banks, national or European finance contribution, various grants etc. Their main role is the financing support of every project needed as part of the climate change adaptation of a region. Moreover, they can contribute to a great extent to the research part of the procedure through financing innovative research topics and cutting edge technologies that are going to be part of an adaptation project.

Infrastructure Managers

This group comprises managers who are responsible for the operational and performance management of specific transport infrastructures. The respective institutions or companies can be independent entities or entities related to a public authority or private transport operator. Their involvement in transport adaptation and crisis prevention is required not only for the operational part of the transport service and the maintenance of the sites but to the transport infrastructure and system planning as well considering that their insight from previous experience and the determination of their needs is integral part of the development of any adaptation plan.

Transport Operators

This group comprises operators of the modes air, rail, bus and ferry dealing with long- and short-distance transport services. As with the previous actors group, transport operators’ involvement in transport adaptation and crisis prevention lies in the fact that their needs and experience are necessary components for every change in transport operation for the sake of climate change.

Planners – Engineers

Taking into account the fact that one important parameter of transport climate change adaptation is the implementation of new design criteria and standards for new infrastructures and the alteration of existing infrastructures’ maintenance procedures, planners, design engineers and construction engineers and companies, coming mainly from the private sector, play an important role in the proper implementation of these new standards and guidelines.

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Research organizations

This group comprises universities and other research institutions whose main research activities deal with environmental issues, Transport planning and management, Information and Communication Technologies, infrastructure engineering and operational research. They can be either public or private actors with a main concern to promote new technologies and research results in order to provide the best solutions for infrastructure designing issues deriving from climate change. Identification of areas at risk, use of new, weather resistant and eco – friendly construction materials, implementation of cutting edge ICT in transport sector, reliable prediction of future climate conditions and development of innovative infrastructures (flood gates, pile construction for buildings etc) are some of the topics needed to be further examined by researchers as part of the climate change response.

Industries, ITC companies and other stakeholders

Regarding the policy dimension (i.e. transport infrastructure and system planning, design, operation, maintenance and financing) there are different types of industries that contribute to some extent to transport adaptation. As regards transport infrastructure and system planning as well as design and maintenance, heavy industry such as production of structural materials, automotive industry and manufacturers of transport means’ vehicles contributes a great deal not only to the adaptation and reinforcement of transport infrastructure but also to the enlightenment of the research sector on related issues. As for transport operation’s adaptation, light industry such as ITC companies and ITS providers are the key actors for the effective alteration of the operational procedures in accordance with the needs derived from crisis prevention. In this case also the companies can become part of the research procedure in quest of new, innovative technologies.

International associations

In order to assure that transportation is developed in an integrated way, taking advantage of the best characteristics of each transport mode, it is necessary to define minimum quality standards. In this way, different actors from different transport modes are interlinked in order to serve a shared objective: provide the best quality of transportation services guarantying the safety of people and goods. However the quality standards as well as the regulatory framework of each transport (sub)sector are set by a number of international transport associations whose role is to define standards and recommended practices for the safe and orderly development of transport in each sector.

Such international associations are (among others): the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Air Transport Association (IATA) for the air transport, the

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International Maritime Organization (IMO) for the maritime sector, the International Union for Railways (UIC) for rail and International Road Transport Union (IRU) for the road transport.

Mapping and description of Actors’ network and description of interrelationships

The several aforementioned actors, interlinked somehow in order to develop efficient, safe and high quality transport services. However, the type of relations and the roles of each of them is not defined yet. In this paragraph the relations between the different actors are depicted and discussed. It must be said that the relations represented are not unique, nor even homogeneous considering the several Member-States of the EU, or the different transport modes. However this constitutes a useful attempt to organize the bilateral functions and interdependencies of each actor, considering the transport sector in a generalist approach, taking into account the common sectors’ players that exist in each transport mode.

The two Figures discussed hereafter representing the networks of actors and constitute a simplified way for representing the actors involved in the adaptation process and their relations, in respect to the following key areas (or policy domains):

• Financing of transport projects

• Transport Planning

• Operations and management of transport infrastructure and services

• Deployment of ICT solutions and technological innovation

• Maintenance of transport infrastructure

• Design and construction

The objective is to map the network of actors involved in the adaptation process in order to better understand the ‘position’ of each actor in respect to the six (6) key areas mentioned. It was concluded from the analysis that these six broad policy domains of the transport sector could be divided in two separate categories in regard to the structure of the networks and the interrelationships that exist among the actors.

Figure 3 below, represents the Actors’ network structure in regard to policies for operations and management of transport infrastructure and services as well as the deployment of ICT solutions.

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Figure 3: Network of actors for operational management and ICT solutions

On the other hand Figure 4 represents the Actors’ network structure in regard to policies for planning, construction, design and maintenance of transport infrastructure.

OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF ICT SOLUTIONS

Research Bodies

Governmental AuthoritiesGovernment

Transport Operators

End Users (Travelers)

Industry – ICT Providers

Infrastructure Managers

European Union International Associations

Fund

ing

sour

ces

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Figure 4: Network of actors for planning, construction, design and maintenance of transport infrastructure

Regarding the figures above, one should note that, in each country, the government is above all other agents, given its role in land use planning, accessing necessities of the population, namely, transport demand, and defining priorities concerning the provision of transport services. Nevertheless, the government takes into account advices of all the actors of the subsequent level (planners, infrastructure managers and the industry). Moreover above the national policy level and on the highest level of the figures, one can see the policy level of the European Union, which communicates with the international

PLANNING, DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE OF INFRASTRUCTURE

Research Bodies

Governmental AuthoritiesGovernment

Planners - Engineers

End Users (Operators or Travelers)

IndustryInfrastructure Managers

European Union International Associations

Fund

ing

sour

ces

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associations as well as with the national governments in order to promote and efficiently implement the European policy agenda as well as the application of common international standards.

On the second level, Governmental Authorities, either public or private, respect governmental directives and assure the well-functioning of the transport system. To function, the transport system relies in three very important entities: the producers of transport means, the providers of transport services (transport operators), and the infrastructure managers. The producers of transport means deal directly with the providers of transport services, since the vehicles or other devices necessary to transport passengers should be in line with the real necessities of the transport service. For instance, if in one part of a city it makes sense to use bus vehicles of 50 people; in other peripheral regions it could be more efficient to use smaller vehicles. So, there should be cooperation between these two entities. Additionally, providers of transport services base its activities in consecutive periods of effective transport and stops at terminals. These terminals are managed by infrastructures managers, reason why there must be communication and integration of activities between these two organisms.

To be able to communicate in several directions and regarding different levels of data complexity, the ICT providers (industry) are irreplaceable. They provide actors with up-to-date information on the technological developments in transportation, which allow a more efficient management of services and an easier control of the transport system. More, they also facilitate communication between entities and allow passengers to access information about the transport services to use.

Finally, users or travelers are the central actors in the transport system since, without demand; there is no sense in creating transport services. They are the vital players of the transport network, and the focus of the services. All the organizations/entities described before are organized in order to enhance, improve and perform according to users’ expectations.

Inventory of Actors interests, power and objectives

The existence of a great variety of agents in an intermodal chain often hinders the development of the transport activity. In fact, interests, roles and objectives of the several transport actors described in the past paragraphs justify the difficulty inherent to an optimization of the transport network. The objectives of each actor are not only different, as also change consonant one focus in the medium term or in the long-term. Therefore, it is of great importance to determine the long- and medium-term objectives of the actors involved in transport adaptation in order to identify potential areas of conflict. These objectives are described in the Table that follows.

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Table 3: Objectives of the several agents in an intermodal transportation system

Actors/ Period time Long term Medium Term Potential conflict

Passengers / Users of public transport

systems

Utility maximization in terms of cost, time 

and quality 

 

Punctuality and reliability, good connections and cross‐modality in case of extreme 

events 

With terminal managers and transport 

operators in case of delays (due to extreme events) 

Companies/Private entities

Using transport sector as an input for their production activities, this 

translates into profit maximization 

Profit Maximization

With transport operators and 

managers in case of inefficient equipment provided 

Government (EU and national)

 

Maximization of social welfare. In general this implies 

guaranteeing economic efficiency and fair competition, 

safety and minimization of negative external 

effects

It will depend largely upon the mode of transport and the actual legal and market structure of the type of 

transport. For the reduction of negative external effects a number of medium targets such as internalization of the external costs, the reduction of accidents, the promotion of public transport, etc., can 

be set 

With transport operators and 

terminal managers in case of enforcing costly adaptation 

measures 

International associations and

governmental authorities

Increase of their influence and responsibilities 

Determine and prioritize the future challenges – setting the agenda and standards 

With terminal managers and transport 

operators in case of inappropriate guidelines or regulations 

Terminal managers

Profit Maximization (in case of private 

entity) or maximization of social welfare (public) 

Profit Maximization (in case of private entity) or maximization of social 

welfare (public) 

With the governmental 

authorities as well as the government in case of law 

enforcements for adopting expensive and non‐viable adaptation measures 

(especially in case of private entities) 

Transport operators

Profit Maximization (in case of private 

entity) or maximization of social welfare 

Costs minimization: the way in which is realized will depend upon a number of intermediate targets such as the generation of added value, the increase of the 

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Actors/ Period time Long term Medium Term Potential conflict

market share, the improvement of safety and quality, etc. Whether quality issues would prevail and adaptation measures 

implemented depends on a number of factors such as the market structure, the mode and type of transport, the capital and ownership 

structure, etc. 

 

Funding bodies Profit Maximization and Social Welfare  Profit Maximization  No conflict 

Another important issue of the actors’ analysis is to understand the impact of each actor in the adaptation process, which can be derived from the evaluation of the level of involvement (or not) of each actor in relation to the various policy dimensions. Table 4 that follows describes the level of involvement of the various actors in relation to the policy dimensions considered.

Finally, Figure 5 provides a qualitative assessment of the various interactions of actors in terms of power and interest for the adaptation sector by using the Power / interest grid technique.

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Table 4: Actors and their involvement in the policy areas

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Figure 5: Power / interest grid of transport adaptation actors

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5 Conclusions on the Actor Analysis

5.1 Actor analysis and policymaking

The main objective of this paragraph is to shed some light on the theoretical background of Actor Analysis and underline the reasons that constitute a useful tool for policy makers, by providing an overview of the basic underlying concepts of the existing theories on the method. Although it is far from complete, this review would help the reader to gain a better theoretical understanding of how actors shape policy making, the underlying factors and mechanisms driving their interactions and which are the main approaches and tools/methods for modelling these interactions in order to be able to predict the reactions and the behaviour of actors in respect to certain policy initiatives.

Then the review focuses on the term ‘Stakeholder Management’, which is considered as a special case of Actor Analysis. Four broad categories of actions are identified and discussed which constitute parts of Stakeholder Management methodology:

1. The identification of the stakeholders/actors involved. 2. The analysis of stakeholders/actors by impact and influence. 3. The engagement with the stakeholders: Engagement is primarily focused at getting

to know and understand each stakeholder and is the opportunity to discuss and agree expectations of communication and, primarily, agree a set of Values and Principles that all stakeholders will abide by.

4. The planning of stakeholder communications and reporting: In this step the purpose is to use the information gathered in the previous steps in order to develop a communication and reporting plan that documents: the information requirements, the frequency of communication and channel of communication for each stakeholder. 

5.2 Actor analysis and transport adaptation

The purpose of this part is to make a step further towards understanding and mapping the key players and actors in respect to transport adaptation in order to capture and analyse their interrelationships and be able to promote and implement transport adaptation policies and measures efficiently. Beginning from the initial mapping of the actors – stakeholders involved in each transport subsector (road, rail, and air), an overall classification of actors in respect to transport adaptation is proposed, in an attempt to visualize the complex interrelations between actors and better understand the driving forces of policy implementation in the transport environment. More specifically, the proposed actors’ categories in respect to transport adaptation are:

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• Public Policymakers

• Funding bodies

• Infrastructure Managers

• Transport Operators

• Planners – Engineers

• Research organizations

• Industries, ITC companies and other stakeholders

• International associations

The interdependencies of the aforementioned actors’ categories were further discussed in respect to the responsibilities, power, resources and interests they have on the following key areas (policy dimensions): Financing, Planning, Operation, Maintenance and Design of transport infrastructures. In the end, useful conclusions are drawn in relation to the identification of the ‘critical’ (key) actors in each policy domain of transport adaptation, its responsibilities and role, which would ease policy making and implementation of innovative adaptation measures.

The relations and interactions between actors are, as said, very generally described. There is no doubt that further research is needed to understand the singularities of each mode and produce a specific framework for action for each transport mode. An additional inherent difficulty inherent to the comprehension of the transport system relies in the fact that the way each transport mode is organized varies according to the Member-State in analysis.

However, even from this rough qualitative analysis of the actors involved in the transport adaptation process, some useful conclusions can be drawn:

• The identification of the various actors in relation to the specific field of transport adaptation. It can be seen from the mapping of actors to policy areas that there is not a single actor per policy field and no actor is active on only a single policy area. Thus, co-ordination is needed for successful long-term adaptation implementation.

• The ‘interest’ and ‘power’ of all actors: Here one could conclude that a rather important measure for the promotion of transport adaptation would be the conveyance of the concept through campaigns and informational events to users/passengers and funding bodies, which are ‘powerful’ actors but with little knowledge and interest for the topic.

• A first mapping of the objectives that could lead to the identification of ‘conflict areas’. An example could be the promotion of legal framework for the adoption of adaptation measures in a strictly private environment (private terminal managers and operators).

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• Initiation of policy measures: The best examples and practices should come from public controlled terminals and transport operators since the private sector is more reluctant to get involved in policies with long-term planning.

• Finally, another useful conclusion concerns the need for motivating the politicians (EU and national level) in combination with informing the private sector (industry – ICT providers).

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PART B: POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND TRANSPORT ADAPTATION

6 Policy systems dealing with transport adaptation

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2001) defines adaptation to climate change as “adjustments in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”. Levina and Tirpak (2006) understand adaptation as “a process by which strategies to moderate, cope with, and take advantage of the consequences of climatic events are enhanced, developed, and implemented”. The overall goals of adapting transport systems to extreme weather events are the mitigation of impacts and the reduction of exposure as well as the increasing of resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport modes at risk (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008). In order to foster adaptation in transport systems in European regions, authorities can set up two basic policy systems: regulations or incentives. Regulations are designed and controlled by public authorities and include principles, rules, or laws regarding adaptation, that must be followed by e.g. transport operators. Incentives are understood as rewards for the voluntary implementation of certain adaptation measures, but also as penalties for not initiating adaptation activities.

This chapter derives first particular drivers for setting-up policy systems to manage consequences of climate change and to foster adaptation activities in the European transport sector. Beside the rationale for policy systems dealing with transport adaptation the chapter will examine also the targeted effects and the challenges of policies dealing with transport adaptation as well as adaptation frameworks and the role of risk-based policy.

6.1 Rationale, effects and challenges

This introductory section focusses on analysing the basic rationale to foster the adaptation of transport systems to climate change by the use of certain policy systems. Furthermore, the overall policy-targeted effects of such policy systems will be derived. Subsequently, challenging issues in transport adaptation, in particular uncertainty of future climate change patterns will be discussed in depth.

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6.1.1 Rationale

Lecocq and Shalizi (2007) made a first attempt to identify the rationale for public intervention with regard to climate change adaptation in countries. They postulated that “public intervention may be justified for efficiency and equity reasons, since there are many instances in which the private supply of adaptation response by households, firms or local communities could be insufficient”. The reasons for public intervention presented by Table 5 can be easily assigned to the transport sector.

Table 5: Rationale for public intervention for adaptation

Rationale Description

Poor dissemination of available information

Experience suggests that information that exists on climate change, its impacts and on adaptation options is not available today in sufficiently large quantity, particularly in developing countries. This creates asymmetrical situations in terms of information that may lead, on the one hand, to maladaptation situations and, on the other, may stand in the way of good market operation, create location advantages and produce new inequalities (between and within countries). Public authorities and the international community have an important role to play in this case in the production of information (fundamental research, R&D) and in the dissemination of this information between countries and to households, firms and local communities within countries.

Barriers to collective action at the local level

Adaptation often requires considerable cooperation between actors at the local level for the provision of local public goods (irrigation networks, seawalls, etc.). This is particularly true for the management of transborder resources such as large drainage basins. Public action and international coordination may be necessary to facilitate negotiations between concerned stakeholders. Coordination support may be provided, for example, by the setting of standards and norms, as well as by an action on institutions such as the creation of discussion forums or national or international mediation activities.

Moral hazard / free rider problems

Private decisions regarding adaptation measures might be biased if households, firms or local communities, expecting the government or international relief agencies to provide for part or all of reactive adaptation costs, respond by adopting behaviours that are more risk-prone than they would otherwise have.

Decision routines and inadequate consideration of long-term consequences on private investment decisions

Private investment decisions do not always adequately take long and very long-term consequences into account (for example, future snow conditions in medium-altitude ski resorts), which could justify public action. In the same way, the provision of basic services by public authorities is often taken for granted, whereas major changes in climate conditions could make these services impossible or too costly (for example, access to water for agriculture on the long-term). This could justify a public action to make it easier to address this new

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Rationale Description situation.

External impacts Some adaptation actions are not profitable from the private point of view but may be for the community at large. For example, it may not be profitable for a homeowner to insulate his home to reduce energy consumption linked to airconditioning, whereas the collective benefit is considerable if a large number of homeowners do it. In contrast, it may be profitable for a developer to build in a floodprone area, whereas the cost of flooding for the community is much greater (pressure on the healthcare system, temporary relocation of flood victims, etc.). An optimal action for a stakeholder may therefore have negative external impacts on other stakeholders and not correspond to the socially optimal action, thus requiring public action in order to avoid these effects induced ex ante, through, for example, standards, tax measures or institutions.

The role of major infrastructure networks for the public benefit

Among the assets to be protected from climate change are networks (rail, road, communication, energy, information, etc.) that can be considered as public goods (as well as high fixed costs). Protecting these networks from climate change is all the more important since they generate important returns for society by providing essential services such as energy, transportation and communications – services whose production must be ensured, even during crises. In addition to standards that make it possible to influence private action in these sectors, adaptation also concerns public investment.

Inadequacy of existing standards and regulations

Some economic sectors are highly regulated, to the point that stakeholders may not react to climate change since they only take environmental and climatic aspects into account by complying with fixed regulations and standards. This is largely the case in the civil engineering sector, for example. In such situations, we cannot expect spontaneous adaptation without additional incentives, and public action is therefore necessary for adaptation, either by modifying the standards and regulations so as to take climate change into account, or to delegate adaptation to the stakeholders by changing regulatory limits so that spontaneous adaptation becomes possible.

Poverty and budget constraints

The preceding interventions are related to the efficiency of resource allocation. However, another major reason that justifies public intervention is equity. Some individuals, firms, local communities and even countries may be unable to afford adaptation measures themselves, even if these measures are in their own interest. Government (local, regional, national or international) may want to help these actors through transfer mechanisms, e.g., fiscal, or international transfers.

Source: Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007, p 9-10; Hallegatte et al., 2011, p 10-11

The following climate change induced policy drivers were already stressed and examined in depth by previous work packages of the WEATHER project and will be not explained in detail again. Deliverable 2 (Enei et al., 2011) of the WEATHER project had already proved

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that transport systems in several European regions are repeatedly affected by adverse impacts of extreme weather events (cf. Enei et al., 2011):

“For the period 1998–2009, EEA (2010) reports 576 disasters due to natural hazards causing near to 100 000 fatalities, and close to EUR 150 billion in overall losses. During this period, more than 11 million people (out of a population of 590 million, approximately, in the EEA member countries) were somehow affected by disasters caused by natural hazards. Extreme temperature, storms and floods made up nearly 90% of all natural disasters.”

Source: Enei et al., 2011, p 27

Moreover, it was shown that adverse impacts on transport systems already increased under climate change conditions (cf. Enei et al., 2011):

“According to EEA (2010), the number of disasters in Europe has been showing an upward trend since 1980, largely due to the continuous increase of meteorological and hydrological events.”

Source: Enei et al., 2011, p 27

The overall trend in natural disasters from 1998 to 2009 is depicted by Figure 6. The majority of the disasters were triggered by climatological, hydrological, and meteorological events. In that context, it should be kept in mind that the increasing trend of natural disasters in the precedent period is mainly driven by substantial changes in exposure (e.g. aggregation of values and infrastructure density). At least for following climate extremes substantial changes in course of global warming were assumed (Enei et al., 2011, p 28-29):

• Increased risk of more intense, more frequent and longer-lasting heat waves;

• Precipitation tends to be concentrated into more intense events, with longer periods of little precipitation in between;

• increase in the likelihood of very wet winters is projected over much of central and northern Europe due to the increase in intense precipitation during storm events;

• increased chance of flooding over Europe [...] due to more intense rainfall and snowfall events producing more runoff;

• Projections [...] indicate [...] an eastward extension of the Atlantic storm-track into Europe;

• There is likely to be a decline in the frequency of cold air outbreaks.

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Figure 6: Disasters due to natural hazards in EEA member countries, 1980–2009 (Source: EEA, 2010, p 27)

Apart from the general reasons for public intervention in climate change adaptation and the depicted change of impact patterns an additional argument stresses the need for fostering climate change adaptation activities in the European transport sector via policy instruments. The European Commission defines the role of “Transport infrastructure [as] fundamental for the smooth operation of the internal market, for the mobility of persons and goods and for the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the European Union” (EC, 2009a). This definition leads to two basic conclusions; (i) safe mobility of persons and goods is a fundamental precondition for economic activities in almost all sectors and (ii) the disruption of transport systems triggers far-reaching impacts.

According to this statement, the transport system can be considered as Critical Infrastructure (CI), since it provides services of vital or public interest. The OECD (2008) defines CI “as physical or intangible assets whose destruction or disruption would seriously undermine public safety, social order and the fulfilment of key government responsibilities. Such damage would generally be catastrophic and far-reaching. Sources of critical infrastructure risk could be natural (e.g. earthquakes or floods) or man-made (e.g. terrorism, sabotage)” (OECD, 2008). The European Commission took account of CI

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by publishing a Green paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (COM (2005) 576).

Table 6 highlights the overall importance of transport by giving common national definitions of CI.

Table 6: National Definitions of Critical Infrastructure

Country Definition of CI

Australia

“Critical infrastructure is defined as those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security.”

Canada

“Canada’s critical infrastructure consists of those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians or the effective functioning of governments in Canada.”

Germany

“Critical infrastructures are organisations and facilities of major importance to the community whose failure or impairment would cause a sustained shortage of supplies, significant disruptions to public order or other dramatic consequences.”

Netherlands

“Critical infrastructure refers to products, services and the accompanying processes that, in the event of disruption or failure, could cause major social disturbance. This could be in the form of tremendous casualties and severe economic damage… ”

United Kingdom

“The [Critical National Infrastructure] comprises those assets, services and systems that support the economic, political and social life of the UK whose importance is such that loss could: 1) cause large-scale loss of life; 2) have a serious impact on the national economy; 3) have other grave social consequences for the community; or 3) be of immediate concern to the national government.”

United States

The general definition of critical infrastructure in the overall US critical infrastructure plan is: "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters." For investment policy purposes, this definition is narrower: “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security."

Source: OECD, 2008, p 4

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The main drivers for policy regimes that foster adaptation activities in order to limit the risk of adverse impacts of extreme weather events on transport are in particular:

• Increase of natural disaster risk under climate change conditions;

• Transport systems as CI with high damage potential; and

• Due to economic, competitive, and structural reasons adverse impacts of weather extremes on transport systems are not perceived as recurring irregular shocks (or risk) and are not yet addressed sufficiently by the transport sector.

6.1.2 Policy-targeted effects

In terms of economic regulation of transport infrastructure facilities and services the United Nations (UN) (2001) published a definition that might be helpful in identifying the objectives of regulatory regimes:

“[… . …,] regulation can either prevent undesirable behaviour, actions and activities or enable and facilitate desirable ones. […]. However, regulation also embraces those actions designed to affect the social behaviour and activities of companies, organizations or individuals […].”

Taking the overall aim of reducing the adverse impacts of extreme weather events on transport systems into account, the policy-targeted effects should be (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008):

• Mitigation of impacts;

• Reduction of vulnerability and exposure; as well as

• Increasing the resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport systems at risk.

The IPCC defines vulnerability as (IPCC, 2001, p 995):

“The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity.”

Furthermore exposure is understood by the IPCC as (IPCC, 2001):

“The nature and degree to which a system is exposed to significant climatic variations.”

Concerning adaptive capacity several definitions exist (e.g. IPCC, 2001; Burton et al., 2002; Adger et al., 2002) (Brooks, 2003). According to the IPCC adaptive capacity is mainly (IPCC, 2001):

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“The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences.”

Regarding vulnerabilities a comprehensive foresight for modal and regional patterns of total costs due to weather extremes until 2050 is provided by Fraunhofer ISI. In this case, total cost represents a pragmatic indicator for setting future policy priorities. Regarding road transport an increase of infrastructure costs of approximately 80 % is predicted by the analysis (see Figure 7). While in Scandinavia and Eastern Europe service and user costs may experience a modest increase (see Figure 7). In contrast, a considerable decrease of more than 20 % in infrastructure, service and user costs in road transport related to extreme weather events is predicted for Germany, Spain and Italy (see Figure 7).

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Figure 7: Change in Average Costs due to Weather Extremes by 2010-2050 (Source: Fraunhofer ISI)

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Results of the conducted analysis showed also that rail transport will experience the most substantial increase in all cost categories (see Figure 7). Especially France, Scandinavia as well as the British Islands have to cope with growing service and user costs (e. g. delays) in rail transport due to extreme weather events. Nevertheless, rail transport in Central and Eastern Europe must be prepared for increasing costs as well (see Figure 7). In general the impact of weather extremes on aviation is modest. However, the Mediterranean Area and again France will be confronted by increasing service and user costs (see Figure 7). Total costs for aviation due to weather extremes in Central Europe, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe will probably undergo no substantial changes.

The previous results of WEATHER project presented above hint at regions, where transport systems are affected above-average by extreme weather events, in particular France, Middle Europe and the Alpine region as well as at the probably most affected modes of transport, in particular rail transport (see Figure 7).

Experiences of past catastrophes and research results of the WEATHER project showed also that extreme weather events are not sufficiently addressed by transport systems and in particular by risk or emergency management procedures within the transport sector (see also Papanikolaou et al., 2011). It must be assumed that due to economic, competitive, and structural reasons adverse impacts of weather extremes on transport systems are still perceived as individual isolated events and not as recurring irregular shocks. Thus, there is a need for making transport to be more resilient to extreme weather events through improving related risk and emergency management processes.

Accordingly, a roadmap based on general emergency management principles with general policy guidelines and best practices for transportation professionals and policy makers dealing with the organisation of Emergency Transport Management (ETM) in cases of extreme weather events has been developed (Papanikolaou et al., 2011, p 127-128):

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Policy making with regard to improve ETM in the local level has to take into account certain facts and realities of the area under examination. The major issues that are concerned belong to the broad categories of organisational and technological aspects (Papanikolaou et al., 2011). The organisational and technological aspects are summarised in Table 7 (Papanikolaou et al., 2011, p 128-130).

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Table 7: Main Policy issues in the local level

Source: Papanikolaou et al., 2011, p 129

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6.1.3 Challenges

The development and implementation of adaptation policy is facing four major challenges (Bauer et al., 2011). According to Bauer et al. (2011) adaptation policy “have to cope with current and future climate change effects that:

3. cut horizontally across different policy sectors and

4. vertically across different levels of government,

5. are uncertain, and,

6. concern a broad range of non-state actors who often lack capacities to adapt”.

A variety of policy fields are relevant to climate change adaptation, such as water and coastal management, housing, spatial planning, public health, tourism, public infrastructure, agriculture, forestry, and transport (Bauer et al., 2011). Therefore adaptation mainstreaming demands for policy integration either through hierarchies (command and control), markets (financial incentives), or networks (collaboration among actors with common interests or complementary resources) (Bauer et al., 2011). In most of the cases the ministry/department of environment is the key-responsible for adaptation (see Table 8).

Adaptation is also cutting across different jurisdictional levels, “from the EU via the national to the provincial and local levels of policy making” (Klein et al., 2007; Bauer et al., 2011). However, “the dynamic nature of linkages between levels of governance is not well-understood, and the politics of the construction of scale are often ignored” (Adger et al., 2005). Policy-making at different jurisdictional levels “is not always joined-up and coordinated well” and hence the cross-scale interdependencies are not combined with the cross-scale linkages in adequate manner (Adger et al., 2005; Bauer et al., 2011). In order to coordinate adaptation policy-making vertically hierarchies, markets, or networks can be applied (Scharpf, 2000; Benz, 2004; Schimank, 2007).

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Table 8: Policy frameworks and responsibilities for adaptation governance in ten OECD countries

Source: Bauer et al., 2011, p 10

Uncertainties play a significant role in adaptation planning and decision-making. Science is therefore responsible for providing information and knowledge as main input to adaptation policy-making in terms of (Barnett, 2001; Tol, 2005; Ford, 2008; Bauer et al., 2011):

• developing climate scenarios in general,

• assessing the variations of regional impacts and vulnerabilities in particular,

• identifying resulting adaptation needs, options and priorities, and,

• in evaluating the effectiveness of actual adaptation policies”.

In that context, Bauer et al. (2011) conclude that “integrating scientific knowledge into decision making, researchers and policy makers face not only the problem of uncertainties

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(and not only with respect to policy options but also regarding the often anticipatory scientific knowledge itself)” and “the integration of knowledge in decision-making contexts requires managing complex science-policy(-society) relations”.

Another challenge is the participation of non-state stakeholders and the broader public in adaptation governance (Bauer et al., 2011). Non-state stakeholders “have valuable knowledge on and experience with local or sectoral particularities in the context of climate change adaptation and are crucial actors in the implementation of adaptation policies and measures” (Bauer et al., 2011).

Participation can be distinguished into three modes of participation: informative, consultative or decisional (Bauer et al., 2011). Informative participation consist of information campaigns in order to inform stakeholders, consultative participation comprises the stakeholders contribution in terms of expertise to the policy making process, and decisional participation means that common decisions are taken by the policy-makers and stakeholders (Green and Hunton-Clarke, 2003).

6.2 Adaptation policy frameworks

Since research changed its focus from impact assessment to adaptation priorities, the need for comprehensive Adaptation Policy Frameworks (APFs) emerged (Burton et al., 2002). So far, only few APFs have been developed already. In the following some available and already developed frameworks addressing central issues in adaptation will be presented and discussed with regard to transport systems.

One of the first and most detailed ones is the APF of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) edited by Lim and Spanger-Siegfried. The APF represents a normative approach on how adaptation should be implemented into policy-making. The overall objective of this framework is to provide instructions to developing countries in order to design and to implement national policy instruments for adaptation to climate change (Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007).

The approach presupposes that adaptation to present “short-term climate variability and extreme events serves as a starting point for reducing vulnerability to longer-term climate change” (UNDP, 2004). The APF consists of five basic steps; whereas engaging stakeholders and assessing as well as enhancing adaptive capacity are crosscutting issues (UNDP, 2004; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007) (see also Figure 8).

Since the APF is inspired by the IPCC guideline to adaptation assessment it contains a risk-based approach (Step: Assessing future climate risks) to address uncertainties in terms of future climate (UNDP, 2004; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007). The output of the

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third step is a set of future climate scenarios and an analysis of relevant risks (UNDP, 2004; Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007).

Figure 8: Outline of the Adaptation Policy Framework process (Source: UNDP, 2004, p 11)

However, several risk-based approaches to adaptation exist. These approaches are addressing the uncertainty of future climate and impacts of climate change from a top-down perspective (Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007). Table 9 gives an overview about the main assessment steps of risk-based approaches to adaptation policy.

Table 9: Assessment steps of risk-based approaches to adaptation policy

Step Carter et al., 1994 Jones, 2001 UNDP, 2004

1 Define problem (including study area, its sectors, etc.)

Identify the key climatic variables affecting the exposure units being assessed

Scoping and designing an adaptation project

2 Select method of assessment most appropriate to the problems

Create scenarios and/or projected ranges for key climatic variables

Assessing current vulnerability

3 Test methods/conduct sensitivity analysis

Carry out a sensitivity analysis to assess the relationship

Assessing future climate risks

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Step Carter et al., 1994 Jones, 2001 UNDP, 2004 between climate change and

impacts

4 Select and apply climate change scenarios

Identify the impact thresholds to be analysed for risk with stakeholders

Formulating an adaptation strategy

5 Assess biophysical and socio-economic impacts

Carry out risk analysis Continuing the adaptation process

6 Assess autonomous adjustments

Evaluate risk and identify feedbacks likely to result in autonomous adaptations

7 Evaluate adaptation strategies

Consult with stakeholders, analyse proposed adaptations and recommend planned adaptation options

Source: Carter et al., 1994; Jones, 2001; UNDP, 2004

Willows and Connell (2003) developed an eight-step decision-making process under climate change conditions. The specific features of the framework will “promote good decision making principles” (Willows and Connell, 2003).

First, the process is circular, i.e. adaptation measures will be implemented sequentially and revisited after new information on climate change and its impacts are available (Willows and Connell, 2003). Secondly, feedback and iteration is stimulated to refine the problem, objectives, decision-making criteria and options in order to take robust decisions. Furthermore, the stages 3 (assess risk), 4 (identify options) and 5 (appraise options) are tiered, which “allows the decision-maker to identify, screen, prioritise and evaluate climate and non-climate risks and options, before deciding whether more detailed risk assessments and options appraisals are required” (Willows and Connell, 2003).

However, within step 1 (identify problem and objectives) and 2 (establish decision-making criteria) the character of the problem, the decision-maker’s objectives and decision-making criteria to distinguish options will be defined. These were applied to avoid inefficient decisions, especially with regard to long-term objectives or consequences resulting in great uncertainty (Willows and Connell, 2003). Following a risk-based assessment both initial steps need to be revisited.

At step 3 the decision and the associated climate change risks will be identified and assessed. Detailed climate information, such as climate scenarios, plays a significant role within this stage (Willows and Connell, 2003). The main result of the risk assessment is the identification of the greatest risk related to climate change (Willows and Connell,

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2003). This will need a revelation of the relation between climate variables and potential impacts, i.e. what are the effects of average climate changes and changes in extreme climatic conditions (Willows and Connell, 2003). However, average changes in climate conditions are much more predictable than changes in extreme conditions.

In stage 4 the decision-maker is dealing with the identification of robust options in light of climate change and the objectives and criteria defined in step 2. Willows and Connell (2003) emphasise the fact, that the decision-maker “should try to find ‘no regret’ and ‘low regret’ options”. No-regret strategies can be seen as one of the most relevant link between risk-based strategies and adaptation strategies (Hallegatte et al., 2011). The identified options will be examined by the help of the criteria of stage 5 in order to determine the ‘preferred’ or ‘best’ option (Willows and Connell, 2003). In the end the options will be refined until the one with lower social, economic and environmental consequences is found. Furthermore, “the decision-maker will be making choices about how much adaptation is required – for instance, how large a safety margin or climate headroom allowance – and when to carry out the measures” (Willows and Connell, 2003). Since a greater safety margin involves higher costs “the option chosen will therefore be determined by the decision-maker’s attitude to the risks associated with over- or under-adaptation” (Willows and Connell, 2003).

In stage 6 the decision maker evaluates whether the problem is defined correctly and the defined criteria are met by the developed option or not (Willows and Connell, 2003). Subsequently, the option is implemented and followed by a programme of monitoring, evaluation and review in order to check the actual benefits of the decision (Willows and Connell, 2003). Willows and Connell (2003) suggest also a methodological toolbox for each stage by presenting a comprehensive overview of available quantitative and qualitative tools and techniques, such as scenario analysis, expert judgement, Monte Carlo simulation, or multi-criteria analysis.

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Figure 9: A framework to support good decision-making in the face of climate change risk (Source: Willows and Connell, 2003, p 7)

Walker and Liebl (2010) defined also an approach to structure the adaptation decision-making process. This framework addresses in particular the central problems of climate change adaptation – uncertainty, indirect benefits, and planning horizon (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Since this concept is more related to social and ecological systems the questions will be translated into the context of transport systems. Walker and Liebl (2010) proposing a process based on questions about six areas evaluating adaptation policy:

• Scope, scale, and time frame (related to predictive uncertainty and planning horizon)

• Benefits and harms (related to values uncertainty)

• Actors and actions (related to lack of direct benefits and planning horizon)

• Strategy focus (general policy question)

• Criteria for evaluation (general)

• Suggested common strategies (general)

The first set of questions (Scope, scale, and time frame) is aimed at understanding the effects and impacts of climate change on social, economic and ecological systems (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Regarding transport this could be extended to modes of

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transport and stakeholders (e.g. operator, passengers, and logistic companies) (Walker and Liebl, 2010):

• What is the geographic area involved? Is it contiguous or fragmented?

• What is the social breadth involved? Are there many or few groups or cultures? How similar are they?

• What parts of the scale of social or ecological organization will feel the greatest effect from the impacts? To what parts are the strategies aimed?

• How soon are impacts likely to arise (or have they already arisen)? For how long are impacts likely to endure?

• How much lead time is required for strategies to be effective? How quickly can strategies be altered?

Concerning benefits and harms the questions are focussing the ambivalent nature of the climate change effects in terms of benefits or harms (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Furthermore, the questions raise the issue of individual or collective benefits and harms as well as indirect effects, such as triggering economic decline due to transport infrastructures at risk in certain regions or indirectly affected economic sectors (cf. Walker and Liebl, 2010):

• Are the impacts harmful or beneficial (or is it too early or difficult to tell)?

• How will benefits and harms vary among affected groups or places?

• Are there significant impacts indirectly related to climate change (e.g., impacts from human migration)?

• When there are multiple benefits and harms, do they aggregate into an overall benefit or harm or are the combined effects indeterminate?

• Is determining benefits and harms objective or subjective?

• Will the strategies affect some groups differently than others?

• Will the strategies have negative (or positive) spillover effects (unintended consequences, externalities)?

The third set of questions will help policy-makers to identify actors and actions. The related questions should also clarify “who will take action" and "what benefits they will receive" in order to identify indirect benefits (Walker and Liebl, 2010):

• To whom are the adaptation strategies addressed?

• Is the audience expected to take action to implement the strategies or will others take actions?

• Who or what is most affected by the impacts under consideration?

• Is the focus on human or ecological systems? Or are they connected?

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• What benefits are expected for the actor from their actions?

The remaining questions sets are focussing policy design issues. First, the nature of the adaptation strategies considered in terms of different aspects, such as objectives and directions, will be clarified (Walker and Liebl, 2010):

• Are strategies meant to reduce impacts as such or to reduce exposure or harm from impacts?

• Do strategies respond directly or indirectly to a climate impact?

• Are strategies focused on deliberate, planned, and centralized actions?

• If strategies use autonomous adaptation, are policy actions needed to support it?

• Are the strategies aimed at changing processes (e.g., changing the governing rules or professional practices by which decisions are made) or achieving outcomes (e.g., building a new storm drain)?

Since policy-makers have to consider a variety of possible strategies developing criteria is crucial to compare and rank them and is supported by following questions (Walker and Liebl, 2010):

• Which impacts and strategies are of greatest importance?

• What criteria are most pertinent to evaluating importance?

− Risk or urgency (i.e., a matter of survival or mere accommodation)?

− Feasibility and cost?

− Positive or negative spillover effects, including co-benefits?

− Predictive uncertainty?

• What strategies would be worth doing even without their climate adaptation benefits?

Finally, Walker and Liebl (2010) suggest common categories of adaptation strategies:

• Information: Generating and sharing information about climate change and adaptation. Including monitoring and early warning capacity.

• Research: Researching impacts of climate change. Supporting public and private innovation through theoretical and applied research.

• Mainstreaming: Incorporating climate adaptation issues in other government policies and procedures.

• Infrastructure: Strategies to build or modify infrastructure.

• Resilience and adaptive capacity: Increasing resilience and adaptive capacity of ecological or social systems, including removing barriers to adaptation.

• Inequality: Addressing social inequality in distribution of climate impacts.

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• Market mechanisms: Using regulated markets (taxes, trading systems) or private businesses to foster adaptation.

• Externality control: Regulating negative externalities from other adaptation strategies, including autonomous adaptations.

Hallegatte et al. (2011) published an economic framework for climate change adaptation policies (see Table 10). The proposed framework consists of seven implementation steps (Hallegatte et al., 2011). The process developed “is based on the main idea that adaptation is a dynamic process”, i.e. the strategy is designed “for only several years, but one that takes the long-term into account and that can be readjusted throughout the century as new information becomes available” (Hallegatte et al., 2011). From the methodological point of view the approach relies in particular on multi-criteria analysis and cost-benefit analysis (CBA), whereas the latter must be informed by very detailed and comprehensive data.

The first step of the framework deals with the complete collection of possible adaptation measures. The possible adaptation measures are mainly proposed by the stakeholders and institutions. It must be ensured that the adaptation plan contains all information concerning the major impacts, the major economic sectors, all of the territories and all of the social categories (Hallegatte et al., 2011). Subsequently, the adaptation measures must be prioritised (Hallegatte et al., 2011).

Secondly, through prioritisation the most adequate measures can be selected. Priority measures are “those that aim at reducing impacts” (Hallegatte et al., 2011). The importance of impacts is determined by occurrence (Hallegatte et al., 2011).

Step 3 can be pursued by either quantitative models and methods or qualitative analyses and expert opinions in absent of quantitative models (Hallegatte et al., 2011). However, the evaluation must consider certain aspects (Hallegatte et al., 2011):

• Integration of monetary market costs,

• Integration of impacts on the quality of life, impacts on health, impacts on biodiversity, impacts on inequalities and the distribution of wealth, individual and social security,

• Determination of main financial sources for a measure,

• Identification of redistribution effects and the direct beneficiaries and benefactors of the measure,

• Consideration of the geographic and temporal distribution of costs and benefits,

• Determination of point in time when costs (initial investment vs. annual cost) and benefits of the measure will materialise,

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• Consideration of synergies (and conflicts) with other policy objectives and sectorial policies, and

• Assessment of robustness to uncertainty.

The aim of step 4 is to identify a set of promising measures by the mean of in-depth studies in particular CBA with regard to the aspects of step 3 (Hallegatte et al., 2011).

Based on the results of the previous analyses (multi-criteria analysis and CBA) appropriate measures will be selected in step 5. In that step decision-makers must pay attention to the interdependencies (trade-offs) between different adaptation measures and related side-effects as well as consistency with other sectorial policies (Hallegatte et al., 2011).

In the second to last step associated indicators and the time horizon for the selected measures should be identified in order to monitor the efforts and the timely progress of adaptation activities in step 7. Hallegatte et al. (2011) suggests revising the implemented strategy every five to ten years also in case monitoring is a continuous process.

Table 10: Economic framework for climate change adaptation policies

Step

1 Construction of climatic and economic scenarios on which the work will be based, and identification of the impacts of climate change and possible adaptation measures.

2 Screening of identified adaptation measures, taking into account the urgency of their implementation. The selection of measures depends both on the dynamics of climate change impacts and the dynamics of the concerned economic sectors.

3 Identification of different possible adaptation measures for each impact and evaluation of their costs and benefits by a relatively simple multi-criteria analysis.

4 Identification of a reduced set of promising measures through in-depth studies, such as cost-benefit analyses.

5 Selection of measures on the basis of the results of different analyses – particularly multi-criteria and cost-benefit – and the resources that are available.

6 For each of the measures selected, an adaptation plan must include indicators of the effectiveness of the measure, as well as a time horizon for which effects must be visible on the indicators.

7 Evaluation and adjustment of the effectiveness of the adaptation strategy in relation to: (1) the results of preceding measures, using indicators defined when the measures were implemented; (2) new scientific information about climate change; (3) socio-economic and technological changes that could have taken place.

Source: Hallegatte et al., 2011, p 26-28

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6.3 Risk and risk-based policy

The following section will look at risk as one of the main issues of climate change and adaptation. Therefore several definitions of risk will be reviewed and already developed risk assessment and management frameworks in (road) transport presented. Based on the process approach of Bressers and Klok (1988) as well as the explained frameworks a qualitative model of adaptation policy in transport will be developed.

6.3.1 Defining risk

Crichton (1999) defines risk as "[...] the probability of a loss, and depends on three elements, hazard, vulnerability and exposure”. Other definitions of risk do exist, highlighting the different aspects of the concept. Brooks (2003) summarized the main important definitions as shown by Table 11.

Table 11: Definitions of risk and hazard

Author(s) Risk definition

Smith, 1996 (p 5) Probability x loss (probability of a specific hazard occurrence); Hazard = potential threat

IPCC, 2001 (p 21) Function of probability and magnitude of different impacts

Morgan and Henrion, 1990 (p 1)

“Risk involves an ‘exposure to a chance injury or loss’”

Adams, 1995 (p 8) “a compound measure combining the probability and magnitude of an adverse effect”

Jones and Boer, 2003; (also Helm, 1996)

Probability x consequence

Hazard: an event with the potential to cause harm, e.g. tropical cyclones, droughts, floods, or conditions leading to an outbreak of disease-causing organisms.

Downing et al., 2001 Expected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged, and economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period

Hazard: a threatening event, or the probability of occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within a given time period and area.

Downing et al., 2001 Probability of hazard occurrence

Hazard = potential threat to humans and their welfare

Crichton, 1999 “Risk is the probability of a loss, and depends on three elements, hazard, vulnerability and exposure.”

Stenchion, 1997 “Risk might be defined simply as the probability of occurrence of an undesired event [but might] be better

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Author(s) Risk definition described as the probability of a hazard contributing to a potential disaster…importantly, it involves consideration of vulnerability to the hazard.”

UNDHA, 1992 “Expected losses (of lives, persons injured, property damaged, and economic activity disrupted) due to a particular hazard for a given area and reference period. Based on mathematical calculations, risk is the product of hazard and vulnerability.”

Source: Brooks, 2003, p 7

Policy systems dealing with risk-based adaptation face three main aspects (UN, 2001):

• Defining and assessing risks,

• Risk management, and

• Legitimacy.

In the following these three aspects will be explained in detail. A structured risk assessment provides information about the economic impacts and probability of occurrence (UN, 2001). Studies exploring the impacts of climate change on transportation must focus the regional and local-scale instead of global impact assessments (Love et al., 2010). In addition, the effectiveness of adaptation activities depends on continuous feedback and modifications based on analysis of long-term monitoring (Love et al., 2010). An important output of risk assessments, beside quantitative information about economic impacts and the probability of occurrence, is the establishment of societies risk preference (UN, 2001). The level of risk acceptance, i.e. the socially and economically acceptable extent of impacts on transport (e. g. in terms of annual delay minutes or number of re-routings caused by adverse weather events), defines what impacts on transport related to a certain weather event will be perceived as adverse (Beroggi, 2011).

Risk management includes “regulating risks in an effective and acceptable manner” (UN, 2001). It involves the decision whether a risk is of public concern or can be left to private resolution (UN, 2001). Furthermore, the risk management process encompasses the selection of appropriate regulations or “techniques to target the identified risks” (UN, 2001). Four major strategies to manage the identified and assessed risks do exist (cf. Dorfman, 2007):

• Avoidance (withdraw transport systems from regions at risk);

• Reduction (apply adaptation measures);

• Sharing (outsource or transfer costs of extreme weather event impacts); and

• Retention (accept and budget the risk).

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Apart from risk definition and assessment as well as risk management legitimacy is crucial for policy systems dealing with risk-based adaptation. Policymakers are confronted with legitimacy in decision-making due to several reasons. First, there is a “potential gap between lay and expert opinion” (UN, 2001). Furthermore, political inference and influence that is motivated by interests other than adaptation and risk management (cf. UN, 2001). The lack of knowledge, data and analytical processes, which is obviously the case with climate change and transport adaptation, limits the quality of the development process of policy systems (cf. UN, 2001). The aforementioned issues are addressed by the concept of an independent regulator (IR). The IR “will be specialized, expert and sufficiently focused to develop and implement a rational risk management programme” (UN, 2001). It is assumed that independence and expertise will increase the level of acceptance by the regulated parties (cf. UN, 2001). However, producing legitimacy of decisions in transport adaptation policy-making should consider the:

• Reliability of basic climate change scenarios and projections;

• Completeness of data sources;

• Quality of the analytical process (including working methods) and of the outputs;

• Level of risk acceptance.

6.3.2 Managing climate change risk in road transportation

In road transportation common risk analysis and management frameworks addressing climate change have been issued in recent years by road authorities. Table 12 gives a brief overview of the few completely elaborated risk management frameworks in road transportation.

Table 12: Risk analysis and management frameworks in road transportation

Framework Institution

Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate

(RIMAROCC)

ERA-NET ROAD

Climate Change Risk Assessment Highways Agency, UK

Natural Hazard Road Risk Management Land Transport New Zealand

Risikokonzept Naturgefahren Nationalstrassen Bundesamt f. Strassen ASTRA, CH

In the following key aspects of two approaches, the RIMAROCC (Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate) method and the Climate Change Risk Assessment of Highways Agency will be described briefly and exemplarily.

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The main input to the RIMAROCC approach is formed by existing risk analysis and risk management tools in ERA-NET ROAD member states (Bles et al., 2010). The RIMAROCC approach “is designed to be compatible and function in parallel with existing methods, allowing specific and functional methods for data collection, calculations and cooperation within each organisation to be maintained” and “is also in line with the ISO 31 000 standard on risk management” (Bles et al., 2010). The method represents a step-by-step procedure that is adaptable to the already existing risk analysis and risk management process of road administrators (Bles et al. 2010). A broad range of working methods are suggested, ranging from qualitative tools, such as interviews and expert judgment to more quantitative ones, such as statistical downscaling (Bles et al., 2010). The framework consists of seven main steps: context analysis, risk identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, risk mitigation as well as monitoring and re-planning (Bles et al., 2010) (see Table 13).

Table 13: Steps of RIMAROCC process

Source: Bles et al., 2010, p 28

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A central element of RIMAROCC is the context and the scale of analysis. The infrastructure context includes three dimensions: the external context, internal context, and the context of the risk management process (Bles et al., 2010). The external context includes (Bles et al., 2010):

• “The social and cultural, political, legal, regulatory, financial, technological, economic context, as well as the natural and competitive environment context, at international and national level;

• Key drivers and trends that have an impact on the objectives of the Road Authorities; and

• Relationships with and perceptions and values of external stakeholders”.

While the internal context is determined by (Bles et al., 2010):

• “Governance, organisational structure, roles and accountabilities;

• Policies, objectives and the strategies that are in place to achieve them;

• Capabilities, understood in terms of resources and knowledge (e.g. capital, time, people, processes, systems and technologies);

• The relationships with and perceptions and values of internal stakeholders and the organisation's culture;

• Information systems, information flows and decision-making processes (both formal and informal);

• Standards, guidelines and models adopted by the road authority; and

• The form and extent of contractual relationships”.

The context of the risk management process comprises following factors (Bles et al., 2010):

• “Goals and objectives of the risk management activities;

• Responsibilities for and within the risk management process;

• Scope, defining the depth and breadth of the risk management activities to be carried out;

• Description of activities, processes, functions, projects, products, services or assets included in the risk management process in terms of time and location;

• Relationships between a particular project, process or activity and other projects, processes or activities of the organisation;

• The way performance and effectiveness are evaluated in the management of risk”.

In addition, the scale of analysis plays a significant role within the RIMAROCC approach. The scale of analysis determines the orientation as well as the objectives of the study

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(Bles et al., 2010). Table 14 summarizes the orientation and objectives of each scale considered by the RIMAROCC framework.

Table 14: Scale, orientation and objectives of the RIMAROCC method

Scale Orientation Objectives

Territory Territorial scale orientation (territories serviced by the road network) is the stage on which the climate event could affect most or all of the territory. It is also the only scale of analysis where all the territorial stakes related to the road network can be addressed. Authorities responsible for various sectors co-operate to adapt the territory to climate change. For the territorial scale, the National Road Authority could be one such authority.

Identify climatic evolution for the territory on various horizons,

Identify the most vulnerable territorial assets and functions regarding climate factors,

Identify network(s) or parts of network which are vulnerable with regard to climate factors,

Estimate risks and the order of magnitude of the economic consequences of traffic interruption on the regional or national level, for both the operator and the territorial stakeholders,

Examine alternative solutions with other modes of transport,

Define an adapted strategy for the long- term, including the definition of network(s) or parts of networks to be analysed thoroughly, and the complementarities to develop with other modes of transport if necessary.

Network Network scale orientation is necessary to identify the main vulnerabilities of a road network before focusing on critical sections, nodes or structures. Both territory and network scales correspond to strategic approaches, based on climate scenarios and qualitative analysis (expertise) of vulnerability and consequences. The network approach can also be implemented on a more detailed and technical level through a consolidated approach (aggregation) of the road section scale analysis.

Identify the most vulnerable sections and structures with regard to climate factors,

Estimate risks and the order of magnitude of the financial consequences of traffic interruption on the regional or national level, for the road operator,

Elaborate action plans, organise and schedule the next steps in order to preserve the network during the 21st century.

Section Section scale orientation is either conducted prior to the network scale consolidated approach when

Identify elements of the section which are vulnerable with regard to climate factors,

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Scale Orientation Objectives critical sections are already known (high levels of traffic, no alternative route, sensitive environment …), or after having identified the vulnerable sections through the network approach in order to refine the analysis. From a methodological standpoint, the section scale is more thorough and technical than the network scale. The approach will be of a qualitative or quantitative nature according to the availability of data and models required for a comprehensive analysis.

Evaluate risks and consequences for the road operator and the surrounding environment (local stakeholders),

Elaborate action plans and set priorities for the coming years.

Structure Structure scale orientation is devoted to analysing critical points of a section, such as a viaduct, a tunnel, a node (interchange), etc. These critical points can be identified through the network and/or section approach. As the analysis focuses on a single object, it is easier to implement a comprehensive and technical (quantitative) approach.

Identify vulnerabilities of the structure with regard to climate factors,

Evaluate risks and consequences for the road operator and the surrounding environment (local stakeholders),

Define mitigation or adaptation measures and the appropriate schedule.

Source: Bles et al., 2010, p 22-24

Following the Climate Change Act 2008 Highways Agency has set up an assessment framework to inform the National Adaptation Programme of the UK (Highways Agency, 2011). The Climate Change Act 2008 represents a “robust statutory framework for adaptation” (Highways Agency, 2011) and is the “world’s first long-term legally binding framework to tackle the dangers of climate change” (DECC, 2011). The Act targets infrastructure owners in order to conduct “reports which consider their risks from climate change and require them to put together programmes of measures to deal with these risks” (Highways Agency, 2011). The Climate Change Adaptation Strategy and Framework established by the Highways Agency is used to consider climate change in design standards and specifications, routine maintenance, operating procedures, and the development of contingency plans in a structured manner (Highways Agency, 2011).

The initial step of the framework is to define objectives and decision making criteria (Highways Agency, 2011). Secondly, changes in climate that may affect the activities of Highways Agency will be identified (Highways Agency, 2011). The assumptions are based on the latest scenarios form the UK Climate Projections developed by the Met Office

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(Highways Agency, 2011). Third, vulnerabilities, i.e. assets and activities that are affected by climatic trends due to “the way these assets are designed; maintained and operated”, will be identified (Highways Agency, 2011). In order to specify the vulnerabilities in a consistent manner, a vulnerability schedule has been established (Highways Agency, 2011). By the help of primary criteria, such as uncertainty, extent of disruption, severity of disruption and rate of climate change, the identified vulnerabilities can be prioritised within the risk appraisal step (Highways Agency, 2011). All criteria are ordinal (high, medium, and low). Table 15 describes the basic criteria to assess the identified vulnerabilities.

Table 15: Primary criteria to assess vulnerabilities

Criterion Description

Uncertainty Compound measure of current uncertainty in climate change projections and the effects of climate change on the asset/activity.

Extent of disruption Measure taking account of the number of locations across the network where this asset or activity occurs and /or the number of users affected if an associated climate related event occurs. Therefore, an activity could be important if it affects a high proportion of the network, or a small number of highly strategic points on the network.

Severity of disruption Measure of the recovery time in the event of a climate related event, e.g. flood, or landslip. This is separate from ‘how bad’ the actual event is when it occurs e.g. how many running lanes you close; it focuses on how easy/difficult it is to recover from the event i.e. how long it takes to get those running lanes back into use.

Rate of climate change

Measure of the time horizon within which any currently predicted climate changes are likely to become material, relative to the expected life/time horizon of the asset or activity.

Source: Highways Agency, 2011, p 18

Subsequently, the prioritized vulnerabilities are informing timescales for action and key focus areas in adaptation strategies (Highways Agency, 2011). Highways Agency is currently elaborating sets of adaptation plans referring to each asset, such as structures, pavements, geotechnics, and drainage (Highways Agency, 2011). The risk management options will be developed with regard to the identified vulnerabilities and are assessed in a four-stage process: identify feasible options, determine expected outcomes, estimate costs and benefits, and determine preferred option (Highways Agency, 2011). Figure 10 depicts the Highways Agency adaptation framework.

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Figure 10: Highways Agency adaptation framework (Source: Highways Agency, 2011, p 17)

6.3.3 An adaptation policy process in transport

Assumptions about impacts of extreme weather events form the main inputs to the decision making for adaptation activities in transport. Meanwhile, consequences of climate change in transportation systems are slowly evolving and are uncertain in terms of impact (e.g. Love et al., 2010). Regarding transport adaptation, uncertainty about climate change patterns and impacts on transport systems is by far the most important issue (Dessai and van der Sluijs, 2007; Walker and Liebl, 2010; Hallegatte et al., 2011). As already shown above, transport operators, such as road maintenance authorities, try to address the issue of uncertainty by establishing risk assessment and management frameworks. Therefore, it is useful that adaptation policy systems consider a risk-based approach.

Inspired by the process approach of Bressers and Klok (1988) (see Figure 11) for environmental policies as well as the aforementioned risk management frameworks a qualitative model of an adaptation policy process in transport has been developed. Bressers and Klok (1988) tried to develop a causal model of the interdependencies between instruments, circumstances and effects. The presented model consists of two

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parts: the implementation process as multi-actor model and the process targeted at regulation as single-actor model.

In general, central circumstances are the main characteristics of the actors which influence the result of the policy process directly (Bressers and Klok, 1988). All less direct influences including the policy instruments (e.g. directives and incentives) are summed up as external circumstances. The external circumstances determine the results of the policy process, i.e. the effects, indirectly via the influence on the relevant characteristics of the actors (Bressers and Klok, 1988). External circumstances, i.e. policy instruments and other external influences, change the values of the central circumstances of the process (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Regarding transport, adaptation patterns of climate change and thus of extreme weather events, such as hazard, vulnerability and exposure can be regarded as external and represent inherently the risk perspective within the model. In case of transport, these three external characteristics can be specified in more detail. The influence of hazard is determined by the frequency, the severity and the type of extreme weather events. Vulnerability refers to infrastructures, infrastructure operations, vehicles, vehicle operations, user time and health & life while exposure encompasses factors, such as location of transport systems, geographic and topographic environment. Furthermore the central circumstances of the adaptation policy process in transport include the relevant actors and their characteristics:

• Mode of transport,

• Economic and societal importance,

• Network capacity,

• Infrastructure assets and services,

• Public or privately owned.

In that context it is important to note that certain adaptation strategies are inextricably linked with sets of certain policy instruments, leading to either positive or negative policy-targeted effects (cf. Hahn and Stavins, 1991). Thus, policy systems (implementation process and policy-targeted process) play a significant role for the overall success of adaptation strategies. Therefore the transport system considered and its characteristics affect not exclusively the development of adaptation strategies but also the choice of policy systems. The actors within the implementation process can be divided into two groups: concerned authorities and regulated parties. The targeted effect of the policy is “the extent to which the policy instrument causes the intended changes in the behaviour of those regulated” (Bressers and Klok, 1988). In terms of transport adaptation to climate change the policy-targeted effects are (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008):

• Mitigation of impacts;

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• Reduction of vulnerability and exposure; as well as

• Increasing the resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport systems at risk.

Vulnerability is an internal factor; it can be influenced directly by adaptation while hazard as external side of risk cannot be influenced by adaptation policies. Bressers and Klok (1988) assume that the policy-targeted process for regulation is a single-actor decision-making process with each regulated party, such as transport operator or infrastructure manager, as actor. Therefore subjective and rational factors (e.g. cost and benefits) are influencing the adoption of certain behavioural alternatives and hence the policy-targeted effect (Bressers and Klok, 1988). These factors are (Bressers and Klok, 1988):

• Available alternatives;

• Actor's information on the available alternatives;

• Pros and cons of these alternatives;

• Actor's information on these pros and cons;

• Importance the decision maker attaches to these pros and cons.

Within the decision-making process of the actor pros and cons of the behavioural alternatives are the most important variables. Bressers and Klok (1988) therefore distinguish between three types of pros and cons in terms of behavioural alternatives:

• Cost and benefits out of self-interest;

• Extent of conformation or deviation from the regulations;

• Benefits to society out of altruistic or "ethical" motives.

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Figure 11: A Process Model of the Efficacy of Policy Instruments (Bressers and Klok, 1988, p 27)

Concerning the implementation process Bressers and Klok (1988) assume a multi-actor model. Therefore the perspective of the five factors determining the decision-making process for the behavioural alternatives must be changed (Bressers and Klok, 1988). In contrast to the policy-targeted process the pros and cons of certain behavioural alternatives can be influenced by interactive processes between different actors (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Furthermore the information within the interactive process includes the additional characteristics objectives, information and power (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Finally, the actors in a multi-actor model are not only interested in the direct consequences of certain behavioural alternatives but also in the consequences of objectives of other actors within the process, such as conflict or co-operation, and what are the cost and benefits of the interactive process (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The counterparts in the multi-actor model of the five central circumstances of the single-actor model are (Bressers and Klok, 1988):

• Power of the actors which can be used to manipulate the presence and consequences of alternatives;

• Information of actors also as regards objectives, information and power of the other actors;

• Objectives of the actors also as regards the development of the process.

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7 Types of adaptation

It must be assumed that in terms of climate change adaptation the current state of activities is not optimal (Hallegatte et al., 2011). Usually, observed levels of protection “are not the result of a specific risk analysis and an explicit policy choice” but “the result of an empirical historical risk management process” (Hallegatte et al., 2011). This leads to two different situations (cf. Hallegatte et al., 2011):

• The current level of weather-related risk is higher than the desired level of risk, i.e. the socially and economically acceptable extent of impacts.

• The level of protection is too low in relation to the level of weather-related risk.

Adaptation strategies differ in terms of assuming that the level of weather-related risk is optimal or sub-optimal (cf. Hallegatte et al., 2011). According to Hallegatte et al. (2011) the current state of climate change adaptation is represented by square 1 in Figure 12, a not necessarily optimal level of weather-related risk. Figure 12 represents different definitions of climate change adaptation and related risk levels that can be interpreted as follows (Hallegatte et al., 2011):

• “The passage from square 1 to square 2 is the reduction of the “adaptation gap”, i.e., the passage from a sub-optimal situation to a situation that would be optimal in the absence of climate change.

• The passage from square 2 to square 4 is adaptation in the strict sense, i.e. the investment necessary because of climate change alone, to go from an optimal state without climate change to a new optimal state with climate change. This type of adaptation can be qualified as "adaptation stricto sensu" and corresponds to actions that would not be desirable without climate change and that only become desirable because there is a change in climate.

• The direct passage from square 1 to square 4 is the trajectory that should be followed in practice, i.e., passage from the current sub-optimal situation without climate change to an optimal situation with climate change. This adaptation can be qualified as "optimal adaptation".

• Finally, the passage from square 1 to square 3, i.e., maintaining the risk at its initial level, can be qualified as "constant level adaptation". This type of constant level adaptation is often that which is analyzed in the scientific literature when authors begin with the premise that the current situation is optimal.”

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Figure 12: Risk level and climate change adaptation (Source: Hallegatte et al., 2011, p 33)

A categorization of different climate change adaptation activities is crucial in terms of defining different perspectives on adaptation activities and thus on related policy systems. As already mentioned above a simple concept to distinguish adaptation activities is the division into safety engineering features of transport infrastructures (structural or technical adaptation) and “soft” strategies (non-technical adaptation) regarding operation, processes, organisation and education as well as communication (cf. Lindell et al., 2006; Edvardsson Björnberg and Svenfelt, 2009). Usually, structural or technical adaptation has a long lifetime of investment and requires foresight and long-term planning, whereas “soft” strategies can be planned in relatively short-term and can be implemented quickly (cf. Hallegatte, 2009). Figure 13 illustrates that difference exemplarily for the design life of infrastructure assets in road transport.

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Figure 13: Design life of road infrastructure assets (Source: Highways Agency, 2011, p 22)

First, it is important to denote the main barriers in developing adaptation strategies. Hallegatte et al. (2011) identified uncertainties about the climate change scenarios at the global and local level, uncertainty about the reaction of major cycles, the dynamic character of adaptation, and the inertia of the socio-economic systems as main difficulties (see also Table 16). In addition, Walker and Liebl (2010) identified also uncertainty and planning horizon as main problems as well as the problem of indirect benefits, i.e. due to the long-term character of climate change adaptation "there is a lack of direct benefit to present-day actors" and therefore only few incentives exist to implement adaptation today. The actors who plan and implement adaptation activities are not the ones who benefit (cf. Walker and Liebl, 2010). With regard to the planning horizon in transport, road infrastructures for instance have a very long time frame of up to 40 years for concrete pavement and at least 100 years for bridges (Highways Agency 2011).

Table 16: Difficulties for developing adaptation strategies

Difficulties for developing adaptation strategies Description

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Difficulties for developing adaptation strategies Description

Uncertainty about the global scenario of climate change

The impacts of climate change and their associated risks are not comparable depending on whether we choose a scenario in which anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and climate sensitivity lead to an average temperature increase of +2°C or one of +4°C. It would be dangerous to plan to only one of these two scenarios today. Taking the 2°C scenario, we run the risk of putting off taking the measures necessary to deal with the impacts of a 4°C scenario until it is too late. Taking the 4°C scenario, we run the risk of overinvesting in adaptation actions and therefore wasting scarce resources.

Uncertainty how global scenarios will translate at the local level

For example, even for a given amount of global warming (measured as a change in global mean temperature); climate models diverge on the way in which climate change will affect the frequency and intensity of storm events in the north of Europe. Similarly, half of the climate models project an increase in precipitation in West Africa; the other half projects the opposite. Uncertainty is therefore exacerbated when we have to assess the local impacts of climate change to establish an adaptation strategy. Moreover, local climate changes are obscured by natural variability, making it particularly difficult to detect them.

Uncertainty about the reaction of major cycles (e.g., water), ecosystems and societies to global and local climate changes

The response of ecosystems and human communities to changes in local climates is also extremely uncertain, but it influences what is an effective adaptation strategy. For example, the ability of coral reefs to cope with sea water warming, seal level rise and ocean acidification is highly uncertainty, but relevant adaptation options for small islands depend strongly on this issue. Adaptation strategy design needs to include this uncertainty from the earliest stages.

The dynamic character of adaptation

Adaptation is not a specific action, aimed at going from a stable situation to a new one that is different but stable as well. On the contrary, societies will have to adjust to a climate that will change at a sustained rate for centuries to come. The challenge is therefore to know how and at what price we can adapt our life styles and our economic system to a "perpetually changing" climate. To address this challenge, it is important to consider adaptation as a basically long-term transitory process. In other words, an adaptation plan for several years would only be part of a very long-term plan.

The inertia of the socio-economic systems

The uncertainty and the dynamic character of adaptation would be easier to take into account if it was possible to correct easily adaptation trajectories. However, many

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Difficulties for developing adaptation strategies Description

sectors have a high degree of inertia that forces us to make choices with long-term and even very long-term consequences. The time scales of several economic sectors like the forestry sector or those with heavy infrastructure (housing and urbanism, energy production, flood management, etc.) are therefore of the same order of magnitude than the time scale for climate change. Decisions concerning the localization of assets have particularly long time horizons that considerably exceed the lifespan of the installed capital. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that inertia is not just technical, and institutional: regulatory and even cultural inertias must be taken into account. The socio-economic inertia that results from all of these mechanisms has three consequences:

Defining adaptation measures becomes more complex because it is necessary to take action very far ahead of time

The combination of uncertainty on climate change and of the long asset lifespan leads to the risk of maladaptation

Adaptation and climate change time scales are too long for us to be able to learn much from experience or to learn by doing

In many cases, it is too costly or technically impossible to adapt "at the margin" while maintaining the same activities or services under a new climate. Adapting to climate change therefore may require "bifurcations" towards new activities and/or towards new locations

For example, it is likely that low and medium-altitude winter sports resorts will no longer be able to provide ski activities at some point in the future and it might be underoptimal trying to preserve these activities at high cost. To be able to foresee these types of bifurcations, adaptation policies must be developed within an intersectoral framework where overall land-use development is taken into consideration. Moreover, experience shows that such economic bifurcations often involve difficult problems, in particular in terms of employment, and are difficult to trigger and drive.

Source: Hallegatte et al., 2011, p 5-7

Smith and Lenhart (1996) introduced the concept of anticipatory adaptation. Anticipatory means in general “measures that are taken in advance of climate change” (Smith and Lenhart, 1996). Furthermore, it is postulated that anticipation “requires foresight and planning” (Fankhauser et al., 1998). Anticipatory actions for example are the integration of expected climate change patterns into transport infrastructure design. However, anticipation should also fulfill two criteria: “flexibility and the potential for benefits to exceed costs” (Smith and Lenhart, 1996). In that sense flexibility means that anticipatory actions must cover the broad range of uncertainties related to climate change (Smith and

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Lenhart, 1996). The opposite strategy of anticipation is reactive adaptation. In contrast to anticipatory adaptation reactive anticipation would only consider current and past extreme weather events (cf. Fankhauser et al., 1998). Thus, reactive measures can be understood as response to real events and “will probably be unsuccessful in mitigating the impacts of climate change” (Smith and Lenhart, 1996).

Furthermore, adaptation can be divided in autonomous and planned adaptation. Levina and Tirpak (2006) defined autonomous or spontaneous adaptation as “adaptation that does not constitute a conscious response to climatic stimuli but is triggered by ecological changes in natural systems and by market or welfare changes in human systems”. While planned adaptation “is the result of a deliberate policy decision, based on an awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change and that action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state” (Levina and Tirpak, 2006).

Mendelsohn (2000) distinguishes adaptation activities into private and joint ones. Sometimes private adaptation is also referred to as spontaneous adaptation (Hallegatte et al., 2011). Private adaptation is mainly driven by self-interest of individuals and firms and is considered as private when “the decision-maker is the only beneficiary” (Mendelsohn, 2000). In case the net-benefit of the decision-maker is maximized by certain actions private adaptation is efficient (Mendelsohn, 2000). But private adaptation may also produce substantial externalities that have adverse effects on other stakeholders and systems (Mendelsohn, 2000). The involvement of externalities, such as adverse impacts on other ecological or human systems, makes private adaptation inefficient (Mendelsohn, 2000). Furthermore, uncertainty about climate change patterns and impacts and thus about the future benefits of adaptation reduce the chance of private adaptation and especially ex-ante investments into adaptation projects (Mendelsohn, 2000).

Due to the inability of the individual to predict the (local) future climate patterns and impacts as well as to develop adequate countermeasures Mendelsohn (2000) concludes “that there will be limited ex-ante private adaptation”. Mendelsohn (2000) introduced additionally the concept of joint adaptation. Joint adaptation can be understood as the response to climate change “where there are many beneficiaries to each action” (Mendelsohn, 2000). But joint adaptation is not the aggregation of individual adaptation activities (Mendelsohn, 2000). The benefits of individual adaptation are shared among the decision-makers (Mendelsohn, 2000). Nevertheless, it is difficult for governments to provide efficient levels of public adaptation due to the free rider problem, i.e. “an individual who spends personal resources becoming informed about her collective choices will receive the same reward as the individual who looks after only his own private affairs” (cf. Mendelsohn, 2000). Thus, efficient outcomes of public adaptation are mainly challenged by (Mendelsohn, 2000):

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• The groups perception of a collective gain;

• The agreement of the collective body on the level of action; and

• Beneficiaries are often more interested in maximizing their private gain rather than maximizing the value to society.

Table 17 summarizes again the main characteristics of the types of adaptation presented above.

Table 17: Concepts of adaptation

Concept Characteristics

Technical adaptation Adaptation of transport infrastructure assets

Application of safety engineering features

Requires long-term planning

Long lifetime of investments

Soft adaptation Adaptation of operations, processes, and organisation

Application of education and communication

Short-term planning and implementation

Requires relatively low investments

Anticipatory adaptation Measures taken in advance of climate change

Requires foresight (predictions) and planning

Must cover the broad range of uncertainties

Reactive adaptation Response to real events

Considers current and past extreme weather events

Requires no foresight and planning

Autonomous adaptation No conscious response to climate change impacts

Triggered mainly by changes in natural and human systems

Planned adaptation Result of a deliberate policy decision

Awareness that conditions have changed or are about to change

Action is required to return to, maintain, or achieve a desired state

Private adaptation Mainly driven by self-interest of individuals, firms, or organisations

Decision-maker is the only beneficiary

Efficient in case net-benefit is maximized

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Concept Characteristics

May produce substantial externalities

Joint adaptation Many beneficiaries of adaptation activities

Benefits are shared among the decision-makers

Free rider problem

In addition to the established concepts of adaptation presented above new concepts emerged in the recent past. In particular, no-regret, safety margins, and reversible strategies have been developed. Hallegatte (2009) defines no-regret adaptation as strategies that “yield benefits even in the absence of climate change”. Since the no-regret strategy identifies measures that provide net-benefits regardless of climate change effects it avoids the problem of uncertainty (Walker and Liebl, 2010). No-regret strategies address the short-term long-term mismatch and uncertainty (Hallegatte et al., 2011). In comparison, safety margin strategies are not robust if the direction of change is unknown. No-regret strategies do implicitly consider this uncertainty (Hallegatte et al., 2011). However, not many no-regret actions are implemented yet due to financial and legal constraints, lack of information, or transaction costs (Hallegatte, 2009).

Another innovative strategy is formed by the concept of safety margins. Basically, cheap safety margins can be produced by including climate change adaptation features in already pursued strategies (Hallegatte, 2009; Walker and Liebl, 2010). For example, transport infrastructure planning standards can be adapted to include an additional climate change related safety margin, “beyond that supported by short-term cost benefit analysis” (Walker and Liebl, 2010). The identification and implementation of cheap safety margins is especially important for adaptation measures that are not reversible or only modifiable after the design phase through high investments (Hallegatte, 2009). It is important to note, that the minimum safety level and the “extra” margin of climate change related safety must be cheaper than alternative climate change adaptation strategies (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Hallegatte (2009) also argues that decision-makers should favor reversible strategies. The overall aim of reversible strategies is to minimise the cost of “being wrong of future climate change” (Hallegatte, 2009). Reversible strategies are flexible in terms of either heightening the efforts or postponement in case new information is available. Good examples for reversible strategies are classic risk transfer instruments, such as insurance (Hallegatte, 2009). Another example of reversible strategies is the implementation of early warning systems, such as road weather information systems (RWIS) (cf. Papanikolaou et al., 2011). The reversibility of a certain strategy can be assessed through the “option value” or multi-criteria decision making (Ha-Duong, 1998; Hallegatte, 2009). Walker and Liebl (2010) introduced additional criteria, such as short planning horizon, reduction of complexity and scope, planning to variances, and reduction of the decision-making time

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horizon to evaluate innovative climate change adaptation strategies in light of uncertainty concerns (see Table 18).

Table 18: Criteria for evaluating climate change adaptation strategies in light of uncertainty concerns

Criteria Description

No-regrets Strategies with a net benefit, independent of climate change

Cheap safety margins Modifications yielding low-cost "extra" margin of safety

Changeability / Reversibility Strategies that are easy for people to change in future

Short planning horizon Short-lived policies allowing for repeated adjustments

Reduce complexity and scope Favor the narrow and simple over the complex

Plan to variances Incorporate variances in planning, not just averages

Reduce decision-making time horizon Reduce the lifetime of investments Source: Hallegatte, 2009, p 244-245; Walker and Liebl, 2010, p 10

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8 Regulation and governance vs. incentives

This chapter will give distinct definitions of regulatory as well as incentive-based policy systems by focusing the main differences. In that context, regulation or governance will be defined as government directives including sanctions aimed to stimulate while incentives are accompanied by a set of prescriptions (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Consequently, each policy system will be understood as a set of individual instruments which follow similar mechanisms.

8.1 Defining regulatory policy systems

In order to foster adaptation in transport systems in European regions authorities can set up two basic policy systems: regulations or incentives. According to Levi-Faur regulation can be defined from different, mainly ideological, perspectives that are predominantly connected to the policy objectives rather to mechanisms (Levi-Faur, 2010). Laffont, for instance, defines regulation from a state-centered view as the “public economics face of industrial organization” that relies on state-made laws (Laffont, 1994). In contrast, the society-centered concept ignores the state and regards regulation as “the work of social actors who monitor other actors, including governments” (Levi-Faur, 2010). In addition, several other perspectives do exist (cf. Levi-Faur, 2010).

Nevertheless, a number of basic principles of regulatory policy systems can be derived. In Europe, regulation was understood as government intervention and “with all the efforts of the state, by whatever means, to control and guide economy and society” (Levi-Faur, 2010). The European Commission defines regulation as “the most direct form of the EU law” (EC, 2011). Regulations are “on a par with national laws” and do “have binding legal force throughout every Member State” (EC, 2011). Furthermore “national governments do not have to take action by themselves to implement EU regulations” (EC, 2011). The UN defines regulation as “[…] the sustained and focused control, normally exercised by a public agency, over activities that are valued by a community” (UN, 2001). Thus, the major characteristic of a state-based regulation is the application of direct legislative means that are exclusively implemented by the government (cf. Levi-Faur, 2010). In that sense, regulation can also be labelled as directive or direct regulation (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Furthermore, regulations are designed and controlled by public authorities and include principles, rules, or laws regarding a specific policy field. In case of misconduct sanctions, such as a fine, are imposed. From a government point of view regulation tries to generate certain outcomes that might not appear in case of non-regulation. Therefore a mandatory character of regulatory actions is inevitable. With regard to long-term risks of extreme weather events in transport regulation focuses primarily on avoiding or at least minimizing

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adverse impacts on infrastructures, networks, and services through the implementation of principles, rules, or laws referring to certain adaptation activities.

Since a mandatory character is inherent to regulation enforcement plays a significant role for the effectiveness of adaptation. The main objective of enforcement is to gain compliance with the regulation (UN, 2001). A wide range of techniques, such as formal enforcement and prosecution, education, advice, persuasion as well as negotiation, are available to regulators to achieve that objective (UN, 2001). Regarding the techniques two enforcement approaches can be distinguished: deterrence and compliance (UN, 2001). Compared to deterrence compliance approaches “are flawed and are indicative of capture and an insufficiency of enforcement resources" (UN, 2001). While deterrence is regarded as "highly effective in changing corporate cultures so as to improve standards of behaviour and reduce the risks of the infringement of rules and regulations" (UN, 2001). On the other hand a compliance approach is reducing expensive prosecution significantly, it is considered to be more cost-efficient than deterrence. Furthermore, "deterrence may alienate public support for regulation if it leads to the closure of firms and therefore unemployment" (UN, 2001). However, it is possible to regard enforcement as step-wise progression from strategies relying on compliance to sanctions (UN, 2001). In fact, the success of regulatory regimes is determined by a balanced mix between persuasion and punishment.

Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) developed the concepts of enforcement and sanctions pyramids (UN, 2001) (see Figure 14). The enforcement pyramid represents a model of “responsive regulation”, i.e. regulated parties “are subject to increasingly interventionist regulatory responses as they continue to infringe and less interventionist regulatory strategies as they increasingly comply” (UN, 2001). Concerning sanctions a similar hierarchy exists. The sanction pyramid defines the escalation levels of enforcement (UN, 2001).

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Figure 14: Enforcement and sanctions pyramids (Source: UN, 2001, p 13)

Furthermore, the application of enforcement methods should follow specific rules. Regulators need to establish detailed criteria to identify compliance or deviance (UN, 2001). The UN (2001) developed five basic recommendations in terms of drawing up rules of regulation and enforcement:

• “The appropriate degree of specificity and precision;

• There is sufficient coverage and inclusiveness;

• Accessibility and intelligibility;

• The appropriate legal status and force;

• The necessary prescriptions and sanctions for breaches of the rules”.

In terms of enforcement regulators must also consider who intervenes when and how much. Possible regulatory bodies of transport systems are (UN, 2001):

• Self-regulators;

• Local authorities;

• Courts and tribunals;

• Central government departments;

• Regulatory agencies;

• Directors General.

The characteristics of the regulatory institution have impacts on “the style of regulation, the regulatory strategies employed, and also on the achievement of the regulatory objectives” (UN, 2001). Table 19 presents the advantages and disadvantages assigned to the main characteristics of regulatory institutions.

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Table 19: Advantages and disadvantages of regulatory institutions

Regulatory institution Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages

Self-regulators

main examples of self-regulation are found in trade or industry associations and professions

some cartels, such as liner shipping conferences, are sometimes regarded as self-regulators

self-regulation bodies usually receive industry support and expertise

the operators’ interests and those of consumers and the public may not coincide

due to low accountability and a lack of independence in the resolution of complaints, self-regulation may require government oversight and judicial scrutiny

Local authorities

local authorities often have responsibility for regulating environmental development and infrastructural investment related to urbanization

local authority regulation provides for democratic control by those with a detailed knowledge of an area, control that is likely to be more responsive to particular regional concerns than a regulatory regime run by a central government department or agency

weak on coordination

Courts and tribunals

regulation through the judicial procedures of the courts and of tribunals is common in the railways, ports, inland waterways, and air transport

procedures are usually seen as fair and open

conflicts with government policies may undermine regulatory functions

case law may develop only sporadically and there is unlikely to be any systematic development of regulatory guidelines or plans

Central government departments

regulation directly by government departments is still common in areas such as safety, shipping, and mineral extraction

Ministerial accountability and the ease of coordination with government policy are the main advantages of this form of regulation

lack of independence, dynamism and expertise

party politics will become involved when regulatory decisions are taken

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Regulatory institution Characteristics Advantages Disadvantages

Regulatory agencies

regulatory agencies are independent bodies that act on behalf of central government, but are not central departments of state

regulate specific sectors such as civil aviation and are managed by expert career regulators

have the ability to combine governmental functions by deciding disputes between parties, and promulgating and enforcing rules

have the ability to develop policy and plan the regulation of an industry on a continuing basis

accountability of such agencies may be limited and may suffer political interference

Directors General

privatizations of utilities, particularly in the United Kingdom, were effected by statutes that gave regulatory powers to individuals called Directors General appointed by the Secretary of State with duties and powers prescribed by law

decisions of Directors General can be challenged in courts of law

accountability to the government is exercised through annual reporting and treasury financial controls

main advantage of this approach is that it promotes decisiveness and accountability since this lies with an identifiable individual

disadvantages are that discontinuities can arise when there is a change of Director General

there is a risk of exposure to the ‘cult of personality’

Source: UN, 2001, p 9-10

The decision of when to intervene determines the “appropriate timing or stage of intervention” (UN, 2001). In general, three stages of intervention can be identified:

Preventive actions “are justified where the costs of rectifying a breach of the rules or regulations is very costly relative to the costs of prevention” (UN, 2001).

Act-based interventions are taken “when an act occurs that breaches the rules may sometimes be less expensive than preventive measures. This is common where providers of infrastructure facilities and services are held accountable under the terms of franchising or concession agreements. For example, if a train operator reduces service frequencies

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below an agreed level, then it is relatively simple for the regulator to identify the breach of contract and seek a remedy” (UN, 2001).

Harm-based interventions are based on the fact that “enforcement costs may sometimes mean that it is more cost effective to prosecute and make an example of those few firms that actually cause harm or significant costs as a result of a breach of the regulation. This is cheaper than attempting to identify all breaches including those that do not result in actual harm. Examples abound in the area of health and safety regulation” (UN, 2001).

Finally, regulators have to decide about the level of enforcement in order to achieve compliance (UN, 2001). However, it is “almost impossible to achieve perfect compliance” (UN, 2001). The socially optimal level of enforcement is reached when the extra costs of enforcement exceed the extra benefits to society (UN, 2001). A further key aspect in terms of optimal level of enforcement is the deterrence of regulators current or future approach to enforcement (UN, 2001). The costs of enforcement comprise following items (UN, 2001):

• “The costs of agency monitoring;

• The expenses of processing and prosecuting cases;

• The defence costs of guilty and innocent parties;

• The costs of misapplications of law, convicting the innocent, and deterring desirable behaviour ”.

8.2 Costs of regulatory policy systems

Beside its core business of risk minimization, i.e. the reduction of adverse impacts of extreme weather events on transport systems, regulation is associated with a number of burdens. A regulatory regime with regard to adaptation and transport imposes regulatory obligations and requirements which causes expenses for the transport sector. In that context, the Standard Cost Model (SCM) provides a framework to assess the costs for the transport sector imposed by regulatory regimes.

However, regulation can impose different types of cost on the transport sector. The costs of regulation include: direct financial costs; compliance costs; indirect financial costs (substantive compliance costs); administrative costs; and long-term structural costs (see also Figure 15) (SCM Network, 2005). Direct financial costs are caused by directive to transfer money to the Government or the responsible authority (e.g. regulatory agency) (SCM Network, 2005). Direct financial costs comprise administrative charges, fees, taxes, and in particular fines for misconduct (cf. SCM Network, 2005; cf. Better Regulation

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Executive, 2005). An example for direct financial costs in terms of transport adaptation would be a fine for misconduct against emergency or risk management regulations related to extreme weather events.

Figure 15: Types of costs of regulation to businesses (Source: SCM Network, 2005, p 6)

Except of direct financial costs and long-term structural costs the category of compliance costs include all costs that are related to all compliance activities in order to fulfil regulatory obligations and requirements (SCM Network, 2005). Compliance costs are divided into two subcategories: indirect financial costs (substantive compliance costs) and administrative costs (SCM Network, 2005; Better Regulation Office, 2008). Indirect financial costs (substantive compliance costs) are mainly referring to the capital and production costs that are required by regulation (Better Regulation Office, 2008). These costs are often based on regulations that define requirements for businesses or the public sector to invest in new equipment, adapt infrastructure and to maintain equipment and infrastructure as well as implement training of employees in order to meet government obligations (cf. Better Regulation Office, 2008). Indirect financial costs also include the costs of producing and disseminating publications for third parties that are required by regulation (Better Regulation Office, 2008).

The second category of compliance costs is formed by the administrative costs. The overall administrative costs are divided into business administration costs and administrative burdens (see Figure 16) (SCM Network, 2005). Administrative costs can be also regarded as paperwork costs (Better Regulation Office, 2008). On the one hand they are carried by businesses and the public sector “when demonstrating compliance with a regulation” imposed by information obligations and on the other hand “by government in administering the regulation” (Better Regulation Executive, 2005; Better Regulation Office,

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2008). Furthermore, administrative costs “also encompass the administrative activities that the businesses will continue to conduct if the regulations were removed” (Better Regulation Executive, 2005). Nevertheless, administrative activities that are not related to regulation are not included in the SCM, “i.e. administrative tasks that the business carries out in connection with running the business and that are not necessary to comply with regulatory requirements” (SCM Network, 2005). In contrast, “administrative burdens are the part of administrative costs that businesses sustain simply because it is a regulatory requirement” (SCM Network, 2005).

Figure 16: Administrative costs and burdens (Source: Better Regulation Executive, 2005, p 16)

The third category of the SCM is long-term structural costs. This category sums up all indirect costs and economic impacts of regulation “that affects market structures or consumption patterns”, i.e. create barriers to entry, limit competition, and impose opportunity costs (Better Regulation Office, 2008). Hence, substantial regulatory costs can be imposed on businesses through long-term structural changes in terms of barriers to innovation, decreased choice and quality for consumers as well as higher prices (Better Regulation Office, 2008).

In addition to the aforementioned cost categories it is reasonable to distinguish also between one-off costs and recurring costs. One-off costs are costs that are sustained in case businesses have to adapt to a new obligation/regulation and do not encompass costs that businesses may have when complying with already existing regulations (Better Regulation Executive, 2005). Therefore one-off costs do not increase “.e.g. as a

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consequence of increased turnover or expansion with new areas of activity in the business” (Better Regulation Executive, 2005).

Information obligations form regulation may also require the constant demonstration of compliance and impose recurring administrative costs on the regulated parties (SCM Network, 2005). Recurring costs may encompass costs “that arise at regular intervals”, such as VAT returns (SCM Network, 2005). But recurring costs can also arise at irregular intervals, e.g. in case of submitting a planning application (SCM Network, 2005). However, an individual firm may be confronted with certain administrative tasks only on one occasion, e.g. in connection with applications for a tax identification number, licenses or for authorisation (SCM Network, 2005. Both types of costs can arise from particular situations, such as starting and expanding an individual firm (SCM Network, 2005). In that context, recurring means that these costs “recur at the level of the whole economy” or at least at the level of a particular sector (SCM Network, 2005).

8.3 Defining incentive-based policy systems

The majority of the already presented adaptation activities are supposed to be implemented by private actors (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). Since the benefits of adaptation activities may vary from public to private (individuals or firms) adaptation should not always be driven by directives or regulations but also by the self-interest of the affected actors to reduce vulnerability to climate change (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). In addition, the need for adaptation is confronted by the restrictions of the available public budgets (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). Especially in terms of private actors (individuals or firms) it was postulated that the “beneficiaries are often more interested in maximizing their private gain rather than maximizing the value to society” (Mendelsohn, 2000). In case the internal or private impacts / benefits are dominated by external or public impacts / benefits adaptation activities are not profitable from a business point of view (Hallegatte et al., 2011). Hallegatte et al. (2011) concludes therefore that “an optimal action for a stakeholder may therefore have negative external impacts on other stakeholders and not correspond to the socially optimal action”. Furthermore, uncertainties of climate change impacts as well as short business planning horizons are substantial barriers for independent private sector adaptation (Agrawala et al., 2011). It can be assumed that due to economic and competitive reasons a number of useful and necessary adaptation activities were not undertaken so far. However, adaptation activities “do not have to be directed centrally by a public authority” (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). Nevertheless, the task of governments is still to provide, as in the case of markets, basic framework conditions that allow private actors “to make timely, well-informed and efficient adaptation decisions” (Agrawala and Fankhauser, 2008). The access point of

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incentives, i.e. penalties and rewards, is set by the fact that private actors are predominantly driven by the internal benefits of adaptation. Thus, governments can foster adaptation activities by using deliberately incentives to set up an environment that is increasing the self-interest of relevant private actors in terms of adaptation.

According to Bressers and Klok (1988) “there is no clear-cut distinction between directives and incentives”. In that context, regulation or governance will be defined as government directives including sanctions aimed to stimulate while incentives are accompanied by a set of prescriptions (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The main characteristic of incentives is that penalties or rewards and the behaviour of the regulated parties are proportional while directives are focussing on setting up sanctions for certain behavioural alternatives (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Moreover, Bressers and Klok (1988) see the portfolio of available policy instruments as a continuum “running from a pure directive to a pure incentive”. In doing so, a policy instrument can be understood as the mean to achieve the overall policy-targeted effect (Hahn and Stavins, 1991). In reality, the choice of the policy-targeted effect and the policy instrument are inextricably linked (Hahn and Stavins, 1991). In order to distinguish between instruments within the directive-incentive continuum the following seven criteria were introduced (Bressers and Klok, 1988):

• “The degree to which those regulated are morally bound to the demands of an authority whose legitimacy they recognise up to a point. Directives make that appeal, incentives do not.

• The degree to which the authority's response is proportional to the regulated party's behaviour. The higher the proportionality, the more the instrument will act as an incentive.

• The comparative severity of the authority's response to the regulated party's behaviour.

• The question of whether positive or negative sanctions are involved.

• The aspect of behaviour whose consequences the instrument aims to change. For example, whether sanctions are coupled to production methods, products, procedures or to their immediate social consequences, e.g. regulation by objectives.

• The question of whether the application of the instrument should be initiated by the executive bodies or by the regulated parties.

• The degree to which demands have a general or individual nature”.

The proportional relationship between authority’s response and the behaviour of the actors affected by incentives can be represented in graphs (see Figure 17) (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The incentive is attached to a certain penalty or reward level and to an indicator of a certain type of behaviour (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Thus, the level or severity of the authority’s response is determined in the presented example “by the intensity of the stimulus per unit of behaviour” (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Since the

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regulated party determines for itself to what level the behaviour is profitable the mechanism represents a pure incentive (Bressers and Klok, 1988).

Regarding the implementation processes and the targeted process it is essential to expose the interdependencies between the policy instruments and the processes (Bressers and Klok, 1988). In that context it is important to know that the instruments can be changed considerably during the processes (Bressers and Klok, 1988). Especially main characteristics of incentives, such as “the proportionality between the regulated party's behaviour and the authority's response, including the degree of behaviour that remains unsanctioned (e.g. by a fine) and the relative severity of the authority's response to the regulated party's behaviour”, may change in the course of the implementation and targeted process (Bressers and Klok, 1988). These characteristics were summarised by Bressers and Klok (1988) as the “form of the instrument” and consist of:

• The specific measure of behaviour to which the authority does not respond (e.g. the level of weather-induced delays in hours per month in rail transport that is left unsanctioned).

• The degree in which authority response is in proportion to the behaviour. This could involve the degree to which the severity of the sanction corresponds with the behaviour.

• The comparative severity of the authority's reaction to the behaviour of the regulated parties. The issue here is the level of the punishment, the subsidy or the charge.

Obviously, policy instruments, such as grants and subsidies, cannot be classified according to these characteristics (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The final form of the policy instruments “can only be established in respect to its concrete elaboration” and may differs from the initial “paper” instrument designed during the formal policy-making process due to a lack of formal consistency in the implementation process (Bressers and Klok, 1988).

Furthermore, the “form of the instrument” and the implementation are crucial in terms influencing the ratio between costs and profits of the policy-targeted effects, i.e. the intended behavioural change, for the regulated parties (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The ratio between costs and profits represents the key factor in economic theory formulation on policy instruments and depends highly on successful policy implementation (Bressers and Klok, 1988).

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Figure 17: Pure incentive and hybrid instrument (Source: Bressers and Klok, 1988, p 35-36)

According to Stavins (2001) incentives are the main part of market-based instruments (MBIs). A MBI stimulates the intended behaviour of the regulated party by setting up certain market signals, such as trading mechanisms, auctions or prices, instead of directives, such as regulations / obligations (Coggan and Whitten, 2005). Therefore MBIs are in principal built upon prices, rights / quantities and market friction (see Figure 18) (Coggan and Whitten, 2005).

Price-based MBIs modify prices of goods and services by imposing charges, taxes or subsidies within existing markets in order to reflect the relative consequences of the behaviour of the regulated parties or sector (Whitten et al., 2004; Coggan and Whitten, 2005). Ideally, regulated parties respond to the modifications in market signals by adopting the system (e.g. transport processes and infrastructures) that offers them the greatest benefit and leads to a better risk management (cf. Coggan and Whitten, 2005).

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Figure 18: Range of market-based instruments (Source: Stavins, 2001; Whitten et al., 2004, p 9; Coggan and Whitten, 2005, p 5)

Instruments based on quantities or tradeable permits create a market to control the quantity of goods and services by restricting or enabling activities for participants (Whitten et al., 2003; Coggan and Whitten, 2005). The efficient allocation of permits is determined by market exchanges (Coggan and Whitten, 2005). In contrast to price-based MBIs which run as long as funding is available quantity-based MBIs cause significant institutional change and require greater legislative backing (Coggan and Whitten, 2005). Therefore quantity-based MBIs are not a feasible tool for regulatory bodies such as self-regulators, local authorities or courts and tribunals (cf. Coggan and Whitten, 2005).

The aim of market friction mechanisms is to improve the functions of current markets through reducing market transaction costs and improving the information flow (Whitten et al., 2004; Coggan and Whitten, 2005). The response of the regulated parties to market friction MBIs tend to be less certain and longer term (Whitten et al., 2004).

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9 Current policy systems and possible applications in transport adaptation

Policy systems dealing with the long-term risk of global warming were invented in order to achieve climate change mitigation goals. A variety of policy instruments, i.e. specific means to control emissions, reduce pollution levels, make mobility more efficient and to increase energy efficiency were developed in the past. Several studies assessed the current environmental policy instruments in use. This chapter will present the most common policy instruments in terms of fostering energy efficiency of buildings and of transport systems. Based on the review possible applications of the policy instruments to foster transport adaptation will be derived.

9.1 Policy systems dealing with energy efficiency

Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007) analysed 20 different policy instruments that are frequently used to increase the energy efficiency of buildings (see Table 20).

Table 20: Frequently used policy instruments

Policy instrument Definition

Appliance standards Define a minimum energy efficiency level for a particular product class such as refrigerators, to be fulfilled by the producer (Birner and Martinot, 2002).

Building codes Address the energy use of an entire building or building systems such as heating or air conditioning (Birner and Martinot, 2002).

Procurement regulations Provisions for energy efficiency in the public procurement process.

Energy efficiency obligations and quotas

Requirement for example for electricity and gas suppliers to achieve targets for the promotion of improvements in energy efficiency for instance in households (Lees, 2006).

Mandatory labelling program Mandatory provision of information to end users about the energy-using performance of products such as electrical appliances and equipment, and even buildings (Crossley et al., 2000).

Mandatory audit programs Mandatory audit and energy management in commercial, industrial or private building, sometimes subsidized by government.

Utility demand-side management (DSM)

Planning, implementing, and monitoring activities of energy efficiency programs among/by utilities.

Energy performance contracting A contractor, typically an Energy Service Company (ESCO), guarantees certain energy savings for a location

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Policy instrument Definition over a specified period; implements the appropriate energy efficiency improvements, and is paid from the actual energy cost reductions achieved through the energy savings (EFA, 2002).

Cooperative procurement Private sector buyers, who procure large quantities of energy-using appliances and equipment work together to define their requirements, invite proposals from manufacturers and suppliers, evaluate the results, and actually buy the products, all in order to achieve a certain efficiency improvement in products equal or even superior to world best practice (Crossley et al., 2000).

Energy efficiency certificate schemes

Tradable certificates for energy savings (often referred to as “white certificates”).

Kyoto flexibility mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM).

Taxation (on CO2 or household

fuels)

Imposed by government at some point in the energy supply chain. The effect is to increase the final price that end-users pay for each unit of energy purchased from their energy supplier, although the tax may be levied at any point in the supply chain (Crossley et al., 2000).

Tax exemptions / reductions Used to provide signals promoting investment in energy efficiency to end use customers (Crossley et al., 2000).

Public benefit charges Raising funds from the operation of the electricity or energy market, which can be directed into DSM / energy efficiency activities (Crossley et al., 2000).

Capital subsidies grants, subsidised loans

Financial support for the purchase of energy efficient appliances or buildings.

Voluntary certification and labelling

Provision of information to end users about the energy-using performance of products such as electrical appliances and equipment, and even buildings. Voluntary for producer (Crossley et al., 2000).

Voluntary and negotiated agreements

Involve a formal quantified agreement between a responsible government body and a business or organisation which states that the business or organisation will carry out specified actions to increase the efficiency of its energy use (Crossley et al., 2000).

Public leadership programs Energy efficiency programs in public administrations, demonstration projects to show private sector which savings and technologies are possible.

Awareness raising, education, information campaigns

Policy instruments designed by government agencies with the intention to change individual behaviour, attitudes, values, or knowledge (Weiss and Tschirhart, 1994).

Detailed billing and disclosure Display detailed information related to the energy

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Policy instrument Definition programs consumption to the user either on bill and/ or directly on

appliance or meter. Source: Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007, p 10-11

According to the IEA (2005) as well as to Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007) four different categories of policy instruments in the energy efficiency policy field do exist:

• Regulatory and control mechanisms: “laws and implementation regulations that require certain devices, practices or system designs to improve energy efficiency” (IEA, 2005). According to the MURE (Mesures d’Utilisation Rationnelle de l’Energie - database on energy efficiency policies and measures) methodology, these instruments can be subdivided into regulatory-normative for standards and regulatory-informative in case only information is given and no obligation is implemented (e.g. labelling).

• Economic / market-based instruments are usually based on market mechanisms and contain elements of voluntary action or participation, although often initiated / promoted by regulatory incentives.

• Fiscal instruments and incentives usually correct energy prices either by a Pigouvian tax aimed at reducing energy consumption or by financial support if first-cost related barriers are to be addressed.

• Support, information and voluntary action. These instruments aim at persuading consumers to change their behaviour by providing information and examples of successful implementation.

Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007) classified the enlisted 20 policy instruments examined within the study according to four categories: control and regulatory instruments, economic and market-based instruments, fiscal instruments and incentives and Support, information and voluntary action (see Table 21).

Table 21: Classification of the enlisted 20 energy efficiency policy instruments

Control and regulatory instruments

Economic and market-based instruments

Fiscal instruments and incentives

Support, information and voluntary action

Normative:

Appliance standards

Building codes

Procurement regulations

Energy efficiency obligations and

Informative:

Mandatory audits

Utility demand-side management programs

Mandatory labeling and

Energy performance contracting

Cooperative procurement

Energy efficiency certificate schemes

Kyoto flexibility

Taxation

Tax exemptions/ reductions

Public benefit charges

Capital subsidies, grants,

Voluntary certification and labeling

Voluntary and negotiated agreements

Public leadership programs

Awareness raising,

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Control and regulatory instruments

Economic and market-based instruments

Fiscal instruments and incentives

Support, information and voluntary action

quotas certification programs

mechanisms subsidized loans

education, information campaigns

Detailed billing and disclosure programs

Source: Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007, p 11

Regarding energy efficiency in transport 351 current policy instruments in all EU member states can be identified in MURE II database. The derived instruments were already assessed by experts concerning type and impact (semi-quantitative impact) (Schlomann and Eichhammer, 2009). Figure 19 gives an overview about the frequency of each type of policy instrument. In terms of increasing the energy efficiency of transport systems legislative/normative instruments and instruments related to infrastructures are most often used. Fiscal instruments and information / education / training are playing also a significant role in the portfolio of energy efficiency policies. However, combined instruments, i.e. a combination of different types of policy instruments, are less applied in transport.

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Figure 19: Frequency of current instruments applied to foster the energy efficiency in transport (Source: MURE II database, www.mure2.com)

The MURE II database provides also information about the impact of the considered policy instruments (Schlomann and Eichhammer, 2009). All instruments were assessed by experts distinguishing between low, medium and high impact in order to achieve the policy-targeted effect (Schlomann and Eichhammer, 2009). Although, the list of instruments examined by MURE are related to energy efficiency it inevitably consider the structure of the transport sector. Therefore the patterns derived concerning the impact of the policy instruments can also give useful hints at promising instruments in terms of fostering adaptation activities in the transport sector.

When looking at the semi-quantitative impact the numbers show that the high-impact instruments are dominantly combined instruments, legislative / normative and fiscal instruments (see Table 22). Therefore, it can be assumed that the transport sector responds especially to these three types of instruments with behavioural change.

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Table 22: Number and frequency of high, medium and low impacts per policy instrument type

Semi-quantitative impact

Type High Medium Low Total

N % N % N % N

Co-operative Measures 1 4 13 48 13 48 27

Combined 15 39 8 21 15 39 38

Financial 9 19 15 32 23 49 47

Fiscal 17 33 19 37 15 29 51

Information/Education/Training 8 16 16 33 25 51 49

Infrastructure 11 20 16 29 29 52 56

Legislative/Informative 2 11 6 32 11 58 19

Legislative/Normative 19 34 13 23 24 43 56

Social Planning/Organisational 1 13 1 13 6 75 8

Total 83 24 107 30 161 46 351 Source: MURE II database, www.mure2.com

Furthermore, regarding the 38 combined instruments it can be useful to analyse which instruments are combined the most and what is the level of impact. 28 of these combinations encompass at least information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation. Approximately 73 % of combinations of information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation were assessed as high or medium impact instruments (see Table 19). These findings are in line with the results of Deliverable 4 (see also Doll et al., 2011). According to Doll et al. (2011) training and information, such as security and awareness programmes as well as improved education / qualification of civil engineers in terms of already known adaptation technologies play a significant role in mitigating the adverse impacts of extreme weather events on transport across all modes of transport.

Table 23: Number of high, medium and low impacts per combination of policy instrument types

Semi-quantitative impact Combination of policy instrument types High Medium Low TotalCo-operative Measures + Financial 0 1 1 2 Co-operative Measures + Financial + Infrastructure 0 1 0 1 Co-operative Measures + Fiscal 1 0 0 1 Co-operative Measures + Information/Education/Training 0 1 1 2

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Semi-quantitative impact Combination of policy instrument types High Medium Low TotalCo-operative Measures + Information/Education/Training + Legislative/Informative

1 0 0 1

Co-operative Measures + Infrastructure 1 1 1 3 Cross-cutting with sector-specific characteristics 1 1 0 2 Financial + Fiscal 2 0 2 4 Financial + Information/Education/Training 0 0 2 2 Financial + Legislative/Normative 1 0 0 1 Information/Education/Training + Infrastructure 4 1 1 6 Information/Education/Training + Infrastructure + Social Planning/Organisational

3 1 0 4

Information/Education/Training + Legislative/Informative 0 0 1 1 Information/Education/Training + Legislative/Normative 0 0 2 2 Information/Education/Training + Social Planning/Organisational

0 0 1 1

Infrastructure + Legislative/Normative 0 0 1 1 Infrastructure + Social Planning/Organisational 1 1 2 4

Source: MURE II database, www.mure2.com

In detail, the instrument types of information / education / training, infrastructure and social planning / organisation are applied in order to implement several specific measures (see Table 24).

Table 24: Measures implemented through information / education / training, infrastructure and social planning / organisation

Information / education / training Infrastructure Social planning /

organisation

Information / training on energy efficient driving behaviour

Improvement of intermodality / interconnection of transport modes

Better organisation of the goods distribution in the cities

Information on public transport

Inter-urban traffic management and optimisation

Car-sharing / increased occupancy of cars

Promotion of cycling or walking

Modal shift toward public goods transport

Commuter plans for companies

Reduction in traffic volume Increased load factor for goods

Urban traffic management and optimisation

Teleworking

Work and school hours

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Information / education / training Infrastructure Social planning /

organisation scheduling

Source: MURE II database, www.mure2.com

9.2 Possible applications in transport adaptation

Based on the presented empirical results about the impact of applied policy instruments to foster energy efficiency in transport the following types of instruments were derived as applicable and promising also in the context of transport adaptation:

• Fiscal (incentives),

• Legislative/normative (regulations) and

• Combined (information/education/training, infrastructure, social planning/organisation).

In order to develop possible applications of policy instruments the policy-targeted effects in terms of transport adaptation must be re-considered (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008):

• Mitigation of impacts;

• Reduction of vulnerability and exposure; as well as

• Increasing the resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport systems at risk.

However, taking account of the derived policy instruments and the policy-targeted effects in terms of transport adaptation several possible applications can be developed. Table 25 presents first examples of possible applications of fiscal, legislative/normative and combined policy instruments. The overall conclusions of PART B can be found in the concluding PART D of the present Deliverable.

Table 25: Possible applications of policy instruments in transport adaptation

Type of policy instrument Application

Fiscal (incentives) Tax exemptions / reductions in case of verified transport adaptation activities

Public benefit charges in case of absent of transport adaptation activities

Capital subsidies, grants, subsidized loans to support certain adaptation activities

Legislative/normative (regulations)

Building codes for transport infrastructures considering climate change

Procurement regulations for vehicles and equipment considering meteorological parameters

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Type of policy instrument Application

Obligations and thresholds concerning the maximum level of weather-induced delays per transport mode

Combined:

information/education/training

infrastructure

social planning/organisation

Awareness raising, education and information campaigns considering climate change in planning, operating and using transport systems

Information / training on driving behaviour under extreme weather conditions

Training / education of staff

Incorporating extreme weather events into emergency and risk management in transport system operations

Voluntary certification and labelling related to extreme weather events and reliability/safety of certain transport systems

Improving the knowledge about impacts of extreme weather events on transport via data collection and research

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10 Conclusions on Policy Instruments

10.1 Policy systems dealing with transport adaptation

PART B examined that the adverse impacts of extreme weather events on the European transport system are increasing. Nevertheless, adaptation of transport systems to extreme weather events is hitherto established only to a small extent due to the fact that impacts of extreme weather events on transport systems are not yet perceived as recurring irregular shocks (or risk). Since global warming will continue in changing the impact patterns of extreme weather events systematic fostering of climate change adaptation activities in the European transport sector is necessary. One possible solution to make climate change adaptation in the transport sector more efficient is public intervention in terms of e.g. adapting existing standards and regulations, improving the dissemination of available information, avoiding external impacts and considering long-term consequences in investment decisions (Lecocq and Shalizi, 2007; Hallegatte et al., 2011). The targeted effects of such policies must be (cf. Warren and Egginton, 2008):

• Mitigation of impacts,

• Reduction of vulnerability and exposure as well as

• Increasing the resilience by improving the adaptive capacity of transport systems at risk.

The predicted change in average costs due to weather extremes in the next 40 years hint at regions, where transport systems are affected above-average by extreme weather events, in particular France, Middle Europe and the Alpine region as well as at the probably most affected modes of transport, in particular rail transport. These regional and modal core areas must be focused in future climate change adaptation policies.

10.2 Types of adaptation

However, adaptation policies have to address the different effects of climate change on the European transport sector that cut horizontally across different policy sectors and vertically across different levels of government, are uncertain and concern a broad range of non-state actors who often lack capacities to adapt (Bauer et al., 2011). In that context, it is important to note that the literature review showed that risk identification and assessment plays a significant role in setting-up adaptation policy frameworks. Therefore, current frameworks to manage climate change risk of road transportation, such as the RIMAROCC (Risk Management for Roads in a Changing Climate) method were exemplarily described. In terms of designing policy instruments to foster climate change

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adaptation it is crucial to distinguish the available strategies. Strategies focussed by the present research were in particular:

• Technical adaptation,

• Soft adaptation,

• Anticipatory adaptation,

• Reactive adaptation,

• Autonomous adaptation,

• Planned adaptation,

• Private adaptation, and

• Joint adaptation.

In addition to these established concepts new concepts emerged in the recent past. In particular, no-regret, safety margins, and reversible strategies have been developed. The no-regret strategy identifies measures that provide net-benefits regardless of climate change effects it avoids the problem of uncertainty (Walker and Liebl, 2010). Cheap safety margins can be produced by including climate change adaptation features in already pursued strategies (Hallegatte 2009; Walker and Liebl, 2010). Reversible strategies are flexible in terms of either heightening the efforts or postponement in case new information is available. Good examples for reversible strategies are classic risk transfer instruments, such as insurance (Hallegatte, 2009).

10.3 Regulation and governance vs. incentives

The available policy instruments to increase the application of certain climate change adaptation strategies are in general regulations or incentives. Regulation or governance is defined as government directives including sanctions aimed to stimulate while incentives are accompanied by a set of prescriptions (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The main characteristic of incentives is that penalties or rewards and the behaviour of the regulated parties are proportional while directives are focussing on setting up sanctions for certain behavioural alternatives (Bressers and Klok, 1988). The imposed costs of regulation are allocated to different categories, such as direct financial costs; compliance costs; indirect financial costs (substantive compliance costs); administrative costs; and long term structural costs (SCM Network, 2005).

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10.4 Current policy systems and possible applications in transport adaptation

The last chapter found empirical evidence for the impact of policy instruments fostering energy efficient behaviour in transport and examines possible applications of the derived high-impact instruments in the domain of adapting the European transport system to changing patterns of extreme weather events. In that context and in line with previous findings of the WEATHER project (see also Doll et al., 2011), a combination of information/education/training, infrastructure and social planning/organisation have been proven to be a promising instrument. Regarding energy efficiency in transport 351 current policy instruments in all EU member states have been identified in MURE II database. Among these instruments combined instruments, legislative / normative and fiscal instruments showed the highest semi-quantitative impact, i.e. the transport sector responds especially to these three types of instruments with the targeted behavioural change. 28 of the 38 combined instruments encompass at least information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation. Approximately 73 % of exclusive combinations of information / education / training, infrastructure and / or social planning / organisation were assessed as high or medium impact instruments. Based on the empirical results about the impact of applied policy instruments to foster energy efficiency in transport the following applications of information / education / training, infrastructure and social planning / organisation were derived as promising also in the context of transport adaptation:

• Awareness raising, education and information campaigns considering climate change in planning, operating and using transport systems,

• Information / training on driving behaviour under extreme weather conditions,

• Training / education of staff,

• Incorporating extreme weather events into emergency and risk management in transport system operations,

• Voluntary certification and labelling related to extreme weather events and reliability/safety of certain transport systems, and

• Improving the knowledge about impacts of extreme weather events on transport via data collection and research.

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PART C: INNOVATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

11 Innovation Potentials

11.1 Adaptation and mitigation policies

The WEATHER project has not primarily been focussed on climate change as the single determinant of changing weather patterns. Nevertheless, we believe that man made contributions to global CO2 concentrations will drive important atmospheric and hydrological processes altering weather patterns worldwide. Climate change has been recognised as a global policy field requiring fast and concerted actions by local, country and supra-national decision-makers in many world regions, organisations and companies. Thus, adaptation must not be considered in isolation from GHG mitigation policy. This is particularly true as until the end of the 21st century a rise of global mean temperatures of 2°C above pre-industrial levels with all consequences on heat, storm and precipitation patterns seems to be unavoidable.

Mitigation and adaptation policies are complex and might well be exacerbated by other stresses. These arise from, for example, current climate hazards, poverty and unequal access to resources, food insecurity, trends in economic globalisation, conflict and incidence of diseases such as HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the costs and cross-sector impacts of adaptation strategies are not yet fully understood (IPCC, 2007). Therefore, linking adaptation to mitigation policies and to make use of synergies wherever they exist would help policy processes to get successful. Examples for synergies between mitigation and adaptation would be the re-naturalisation of coastal and river side areas for flood retention providing space for more trees. A similar example is the greening of city centres improving climate during summer heat and binding CO2 by additional plants.

It must, however, be acknowledged that in many cases such synergies do not exist, are of marginal effect or that even mitigation and adaptation point into different directions. Examples for the latter could be more air conditioning during hot summer requiring energy mainly produced by fossil sources and thus causing C02 emissions.

Hulme and Neufeldt (2010) take up these potential contradictions and emphasis that climate change mitigation and adaptation policies cannot be pre-scheduled, need to be followed at the same time and need to be balanced depending on local and sector-specific

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conditions. But the complexity of the matter must not be used to excuse inaction; it is better to follow – and periodically adjust – policies under uncertainty moving towards a commonly agreed goal than to wait until certainty improves.

Mitigation and adaptation policies are decided and managed on different policy levels (Hulme and Neuhardt, 2010). Mitigation policies are usually managed on a national governmental level, e.g. by setting emission or fuel quality standards, or by determining energy strategies. Adaptation policies are often planned and managed on the local level as the specific risk and vulnerability patterns require so. Examples are the design of dikes and flood gates, embankments and river deepening, polders, winter maintenance preparation or vehicle fleet management. But the framework conditions are also decided by high level policy institutions, affecting e.g. building code or planning tools and procedures.

In long term policy strategies innovation is of key importance. If the introduction of a policy can successfully impact framework conditions in such a way that the policy itself gets stimulated acceptance and efficiency of public funds can be maximised. Examples are the deduction of London congestion charging toll for low carbon vehicles. This has created an enormous market hybrid and electric vehicles, again stimulating production and bringing prices down. The same mechanism is hoped for in other countries, were electric cars are subsidised with public money hoping that in the long term prices of batteries go down and the cars get economically competitive to conventional vehicles. (Doll, 2008, compare also Rothengatter et al., 2011).

When talking about innovations for climate mitigation or, in a broader sense, from Eco-innovations Schade and Rothengatter (2011) say that they “can be distinguished by two dimensions: (1) their target of innovation, and (2) the mechanisms of innovation. Together, these dimensions provide the possibility space for eco-innovations. According to the OECD the most effective eco-innovations in terms of mitigating environmental impacts will be in the top-right area of Figure 20 as they involve systemic changes (OECD, 2009, p 14). Target of innovation refers to the basic focus of an eco-innovation (e.g. a product or a process, or organisation methods like logistics), while mechanism of innovation relates to the method by which the change in the eco-innovation target takes place or is introduced. Modification and Re-design refer to improving an existing product/process/etc., the former by an incremental step and the latter by a significant change. Alternatives means to create a substitute for an existing product/etc. and Creation would generate a new product/etc. that did not exist before. “

The categorisation of the most promising measures in mitigating transport CO2 emissions in Figure 20 confirms the findings for adaptation measures. In Doll et al. (2011) we have

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identified staff training and preparedness (Institutions and norms) and co-operations between market actors (organisation and marketing methods) as more effective than expensive technical solutions. A major difference to mitigation policy, however, is the conclusion that in adaptation all necessary technologies are available already now. In this case re-design and alternatives are more relevant mechanisms than creation of new solutions. Only in some technical fields, e.g. sensor and communication technologies, this may be the case.

Processandproducts

Organisationand marketingmethods

InstitutionsNorms / values

Targ

et o

fin

nov

atio

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Modification Re-design Alternatives Creation

Mechanism of innovation

CO2 emissionlimits road vehicles

InternalisationRe-engineering tax

Carbon neutralfuels

Driver educationLogistics control sys.

Mobility conceptsFifth mode

Walking + cyclingin visionary cities

High-speed railbackbone connect.

Cooperativelogistics

Tri-modal freightintermodality

Clean maritimeshipping

Source: Schade and Rothengatter (2011)

Figure 20: Categorising promising eco-innovations in climate mitigation by mechanism and target of innovation

For the joined consideration of mitigation and adaptation policies this implies, that in particular at national and supra-national planning and policy strategy levels initiatives and regulations shall be screened with respect to potential conflicts between the two branches of climate policy.

11.2 Instruments, policies and the system of innovations

Long-term climate policy needs to stimulate the factors determining innovations in products and services (Lückge et al., 2011; Walz et al., 2008). In front of this background this section aims at providing an overview of key approaches to judge the innovation effect of selected policy measures. The policy actions are taken from environmental policy as these consist of similar time horizons and complexity than climate adaptation and mitigation strategies. We have to acknowledge that not all technical and organisational innovations can be impacted by policy measures; this is only possibly for endogenous

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changes, but not for exogenous technological or organisational developments. Moreover, technological change and innovation diffusion can impact policy options and thus create positive or negative feedback mechanisms. Eventually, the coice of suitable policy instruments is not inependent of the scientific paradigms assumed with respect to innovation and economic theory.

According to the Hicks theorem of induced technological change policy instruments need to create constant incentives for the application of new technologies. Neoclassical welfare theory finds that such incentives are best created by differentiated fiscal measures like emission trading schemes (ETS) and pricing instruments. The rationale is that, in contrast to regulations and the setting of limit values, residual external effects are always priced and thus provide an incentive to further improve technologies and management procedures even beyond any target level (Michaelis, 1996). But the latest implementation of the EU-ETS showed, that details of the implementation structure have a decisively impact innovation procedures (Schleich et al., 2009; Rogge et al., 2011). Current evaluations aim at analysing these mechanisms in detail.

Neoclassical welfare theory is rather critical on the application of regulation policies to stimulate innovations. As soon as limit values or regulation targets have been met, there was no incentive to further improve and thus to consider innovative technologies and operations (Cansier, 1993). It can even be suspected that companies avoid publishing existing options for further improvements in order not to sharpen regulations (Michaelis, 1996).

But with an extended model of induced technological change Newell et al. (1999) demonstrate that, when shadow prices unutilised efficiency gains are considered, regulation and economic instruments get closer with respect to impacts on innovation dynamics. Porter und van der Linde (1995) support the efficiency of well-structured eco regulations by arguing that companies can even over-compensate the costs of complying to the regulations by so-called “innovation offsets”.

The concern on the relevance of implementation details might even be more relevant for adaptation policies where target levels – reduction pricing of CO2 emissions - are far less clear and standardised as in the European ETS. It can be suspected that addressing particular adaptation technologies by incentive schemes is even not possible as virtually all technologies that can be used to make transport systems more resilient against natural hazards will also serve alternative purposes (compare Doll et al., 2011).

Beyond the debate on instruments to reach long-term policy goals is challenged by the finding of some authors on the relevance of policy styles. E.g. a policy style which sets incentives for eco-friendly behaviour stimulates innovations both at user and supplier level

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and supports the co-operation of innovation and diffusion processes (Klemmer et al., 1999). Important ingredients for good policy practice are cooperations dialogue processes, decisiveness of all actors and long-term orientation of goals and strategies (Blazejczak et al. 1999). In this line of argumentation the instruments to he applied are considered of second order by policy analysts, which Jänicke (1996) backs by a series of international studies on eco innovations.

For a more adequate explanation of innovation mechanisms more recent innovation research makes use of the heuristics of the “systems of innovation” (compare e.g. Edquist, 2005 or Malerba, 2005). The core message of this approach is that the invention and diffusion of new products and processes is not only depending on incentives for innovators or adapters, but also on the inter-relationship between the actors and institutions involved in the innovation process. The innovation system approach is not a closed theoretical theory. It is deliberately structured in a heterodox manner to be able to consider as many as possible relevant processes and to be applicable to real world cases. In the framework of this heuristics the number of factors influencing innovation and diffusion is broadened.

Demand for renewable energytechnologies

Public utility regulation

Inte

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hnol

ogy

trade

/ el

ectri

city

con

sum

ers

(inte

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General framework conditions for innovations

Research System

Suppliers oftechnology

R&D Policy

Policy-coordi-nation

Environmentalregulation

Context factorsfor policy design

and impacts

Transmission anddistribution of

electricity

Investors,financial sector

Conventionalgeneration

Market Regulation

Source: Walz et al. (2008)

Figure 21: Heuristic scheme of an innovation system. Example: renewable energies

The example of a sectoral innovation system for renewable energies in Figure 21 indicates that there is a particularly strong influence of the state sector. This constitutes a

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specific characteristic of the innovation system with eco-innovations for line-based infrastructure (electricity, water supply and transport): these underly a triple regulatory challenge (Walz, 2007). Besides measures to mitigate externalities of knowledge spill-overs and measures to reduce environmental externalities, the specific regulatory requirements of the business sector have to be considered.

The avaiable empirical evidence on the inter-dependency between environmental policy and innovations delivers a mixed picture. An obvious problem is the availability of statistically sound variables, in particular for determining factors, which often have to be approached by auxiliary quantities. The stringency of environmental policy thus is often expressed by environmental policy expenditure, while innovation is measures by patent indicators. By analyses on energy efficiency innovations over energy prices Schleich (2004) arrive at a positive correlation of the two variables, but these are statistically weak and many specific influencing factors had to be excluded. The same concerns are found by company interviews: the combination of environmental policy, the use of management systems, and the general innovation potential of the undertaking, market dynamics and customer preferences determine the innovation effects of certain policies (Horbach et al., 2007; Popp et al, 2008). Finally case studies also suggest that regulation can impose positive innovation stimuli, but due the complexity of framework conditions a generalisation is difficult.

Particularly detailed are the available studies on innovation effects in the field of renewable energies. They conclude that policy measures are core drivers of innovation processes and put into perspective the neoclassical welfare theory position on the clear and positive impact of economic instruments on innovation. The cases underline critical framework conditions, including communication, RTD policies and reliable long-term policy goals for successful policy implementations. I.e. innovation processes are to a large extent determined by the interaction of policy measures and functional interdependencies.

11.3 Innovations in sustainable transportation markets worldwide

Against the backdrop of the fast development in rapidly growing economies, the challenge presented by sustainable development is becoming more and more urgent from a global perspective. Taking the strong and increasing links between many transformation and newly industrialising countries (NIC) and Germany into account raises the question of how to design these links so that they promote global sustainability. In the context of the further development of the European Research Area, the EU is also emphasising the objective of contributing to sustainable development through increased Science and Technology (S&T) cooperation with rapidly growing economies. In front of this background Walz et al.

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(2008) determines the research and technological competence in the BRICS countries plus Germany in six selected fields of sustainability, including transport infrastructures and mobility. For the purpose of the WEATHER study the results are utilised to transfer statements on the innovation potential the investigated BRICS contries plus Germany to the question of climate change adaptation potentials.

In Europe, innovation of key technology sector is stimulated for the Union by the EU Sustainability Strategy and on national levels, e.g. by the German High Tech Strategy. The objective of these strategies is to identify first mover countries and to establish Europe a lead markets for essential and sustainable technologies. The underlying policy objective for doing this is to combine long-lasting competitive advantages with demand that is open for innovations (Meyer-Krahmer, 2004; Beise/Rennings, 2005; Walz, 2005; Jacob et al., 2005; Walz, 2006). According to international assessments of national innovation potentials in Walz et al. (2008) Eastern Europe, China and India are rapidly catching up in sustainability technologies entering a position to create knowledge on their own. In these world regions it appears to be easier to establish lead markets as the economic and technology development structures are not yet as rigid as they are in early industrialised economies.

The data on quantitative innovation capacity give a first indication of the general conditions for innovation. The volume of national R&D expenditure, the sectoral share of the R&D expenditure of industry or the number of scientists is much higher in China than in the other BRICS countries. As far as the specific values are concerned, the BRICS countries are on a similar level, except for India, which lags behind. Based on the main indicator of R&D intensity, however, there is still a clear gap between BRICS and OECD countries (Walz et al., 2008, compare Figure 22).

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Russia China Brazil South Africa India Germany

1. Human resources

2. Technology absorption

3. Innovation friendliness

4. Environmental protection

Source: Walz et al. (2008)

Figure 22: Survey based profile of general innovation conditions for sustainability innovations

The technological capability of the BRICS+DE countries is examined with the help of patent and foreign trade indicators. The methodology was adapted and applied as follows: the technologies relevant to sustainability had to be identified in the patent and foreign trade classification. In order to cope with the international scope of analysis, the data searches concentrate on transnational patent applications and global trade which encompasses all the countries. The strong position of Europe is already apparent from the fact that 20 % of international patents and 15 % of global exports in the sustainability-relevant technologies regarded originate in Germany alone. It is clear that Europe has enormous potential and, at the same time, the global responsibility to provide knowledge and technologies needed for sustainable development at a global level.

The technologies in the field of sustainable mobility are grouped into five sectors for detailed analysis (Walz et al., 2008):

• Vehicle engineering

• Propulsion technology and fuels

• Infrastructures and transport systems

• Emissions reduction and

• Biofuels

Measured by the development in patent applications, the greatest dynamics are seen in propulsion and emission reduction technologies, alternative fuels and, to a lesser extent,

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vehicle engineering. In contrast to this, transport infrastructures show a more constant patent development.

0.0%

2.5%

5.0%

7.5%

10.0%

BR CN IN RU ZA DE

valu

es B

RIC

S

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

valu

es D

E

patent share world trade share patent share DE world trade share DE Source: Walz et al. (2008)

Figure 23: Shares of the BRICS+G countries in world exports and international patents in the field of mobility

The combined share of BRICS countries in global patents is just over 2 % and thus about one tenth of the annual patents from Germany alone. Russia and China hold the biggest shares among the BRICS countries. A world trade share of about 12 % shows the greater significance of the BRICS countries in foreign trade. Here, the share of BRICS countries in the identified, sustainability-relevant mobility technologies almost equals that of Germany, which is about 13 %. China has the largest share of the BRICS countries with over 9 %, followed by Brazil with 2 %. In both countries, exports are more than double the imports.

The review of BRICS countries in Walz et al. (2008) demonstrates the leading role of industrialised countries (here with the example of Germany) takes a leading role in advanced technologies compared to the rapidly growing but still low performing BRICS countries. But looking at world market shares of China in sustainable mobility technologies this might change in the future.

11.4 Conclusions

The analyses in this chapter have shown that the successful long-term design of complex policies is not an easy task. There does not exist a silver bullet, such as economic instruments as suggested by neoclassical welfare theory, ensuring innovation processes to continuously work and market agents to follow the same goals as society and governmental bodies. It rather takes the consideration of various factors including the decisiveness and long-term orientation of related policy fields, communication structures, market dynamics, customer preferences and the use of management tools in the business

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sector, as well as education, human resources and the innovation friendliness in the country in question.

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12 Competitiveness of European transport supply industries

12.1 Methodology for comparing innovation potentials across countries

12.1.1 Concept and objectives

Innovation activities in countries, economic sectors, product classes or even in single technologies can be measured by patent statistics. In most technology developing industries the number of patent applications gives an indication of the investments in research and technological development (RTD) of private and public entities. This is truer for heavy industries than for software development or planning sectors. Moreover, application practices in some cases differ between countries and sectors and alter over time. The latter is particularly true for the opening markets in Eastern Europe and China after the breakdown or transformation of the communist economies.

Another issue is that the identification of specific technologies, in particular if they are defined by the objective of their application, is virtually impossible via patent records. This is certainly the case for adaptation technologies, which usually serve multiple objectives. To make use of innovation indicators, for which patent analyses are commony the most important pillar, and at the same time to overcome the identification problem of adaptation technologies we use the potential approach. The potential approach assumes that industries, which are innovative in wider technology fields, are likely also have a considerable innovation potential in specific sub-areas of that field. E.g. countries which have a high patent share in road surface materials are more likely to be able to develop temperature resistant materials than countries which are less active in this field.

In the following investigation we use international patent data to identify the innovation potential of Europe compared to other world regions. Specific adaptation technologies are identified as precisely as possibly under the methodological conditions. The output shall answer two questions:

• Are European transport industry suppliers sufficiently well prepared for the expected changes in climate and weather patterns?

• If yes, may adaptation technologies be an economically interesting technology export sector for Europe to other world regions.

These questions shall be addressed for the four main fields (or sectors) of adaptation technologies identified in WEATHER Deliverable 4 (Doll et al., 2011). These are

• Planning and large scale protection measures

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• Infrastructure technologies

• Vehicle technologies

• Transport service operations

Service operations is a typical field were patent applications cannot be expected. Thus we restrict the analysis to the first three of the above listed adaptation sectors. In the subsequent sections the methodology applied and the results to the above questions are described in detail.

12.1.2 Input data

National bodies, the European Patent Office (EPO) or the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provide statistics on the number of patents applied as well as the patent texts in a standardised nomenclature, the International Patent Classification (IPC). For an international assessment of patent activities all of these sources have to be consulted as companies might follow different patent application strategies from only national, multi-national or worldwide, depending on market access strategies and cost considerations. Accordingly, the multiple counting of the same patent appearing on multiple levels has to be excluded by means of data processing.

For this investigation, WIPO data has been used. By this approach we lose national activities of transport infrastructure or equipment suppliers, but we safe from multiple counting of patents registered on various country or international levels. As patents are registered by all individuals or companies participating in the invention, patent counts have been assigned with equal shares to all registration countries. By this approach we ensure that the innovation potential of smaller countries not hosting multi-national companies is considered.

12.1.3 Patent search strategy

The analysis of relevant patents was undertaken using the on line search engine “Espacenet” provided by the European Patent Office EPO (Espacenet, 2012). The database can be searched by IPC codes, literal expressions or a combination of both by programming more complex search terms. In a first step relevant IPC codes on a higher hierarchy have been identified by entering literal expressions for the three main adaptation sectors (planning and general protection measures, infrastructure technologies and vehicle technologies) into the database. The expressions have been identified from each of the key adaptation measures elaborated in WEATHER Deliverable D4 (Doll et al., 2011). From the returns of the Espacenet database 20 to 30 patents for each of the 49

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adaptation measure have then been verified manually whether they match to the topic and which IPC codes they refer to.

In a second step, the appropriate level of the IPC codes has been determined by checking the hierarchy in each case. By doing so, each of the three adaptation sectors was defined by up to fifteen IPC codes. The final search strategy used to identify the patent counts per sector was eventually defined by a mix out of the most relevant search terms and the IPC codes describing it. For details please see Table 26:

It must be re-emphasised here that even the combination out of literal search terms and IPC codes guaranties a perfect filter perfectly separating between patents relevant for transport sector adaptation to weather extremes and climate change from all other patents. As described above we face a rather wide range of uncertainty as the term adaptation-relevant is not clearly defined, as inventions may be used for many very different purposes and as patents may be assigned to rather unexpected IPC code. But we believe that the strategy applied here approaches the needs of this investigation sufficiently well.

12.1.1 Dimensions

We use patent counts from 1990 to 2010. Earlier counts are difficult due to the transformation of big world economies in Eastern Europe, Russia and China after the early 1990s. Patent data after 2006 is available, but is not very reliable as the complete processing of national applications into supra-national databases of WIPO and EPA may take several years. But as this phenomenon is expected to appear in all world regions the international comparison of patenting structures is expected not to be biased to a large extent by this fact.

Patent counts are allocated to single countries by the multi applicant approach as described above. A pre-scan of application results in conjunction with the objective of this analysis has been used to match countries to world regions. Figure 24 gives an overview of the countries and their share at total patent applications in the analysis period 1990 to 2010 across all three adaptation sectors.

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Table 26: High-Leven IPC chapters considered in the patent search strategy

Code Name SPATIAL PLANNING AND LARGE SCALE PROTECTIONA01G HORTICULTURE; CULTIVATION OF VEGETABLES, FLOWERS, RICE, FRUIT, VINES, HOPS, OR

SEAWEED; FORESTRY; WATERING B01D SEPARATION E02B HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING E02D FOUNDATIONS; EXCAVATIONS; EMBANKMENTS; UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER

STRUCTURES INFRASTRUCTURE TECHNOLOGIES B01D SEPARATION B08B CLEANING IN GENERAL; PREVENTION OF FOULING IN GENERAL B28B SHAPING CLAY OR OTHER CERAMIC COMPOSITIONS, SLAG OR MIXTURES CONTAINING

CEMENTITIOUS MATERIAL, e.g. PLASTER B60H ARRANGEMENTS OR ADAPTATIONS OF HEATING, COOLING, VENTILATING, OR OTHER AIR-

TREATING DEVICES SPECIALLY FOR PASSENGER OR GOODS SPACES OF VEHICLES B61B RAILWAY SYSTEMS; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR B61D BODY DETAILS OR KINDS OF RAILWAY VEHICLES C04B LIME; MAGNESIA; SLAG; CEMENTS; COMPOSITIONS THEREOF, e.g. MORTARS, CONCRETE

OR LIKE BUILDING MATERIALS; ARTIFICIAL STONE; CERAMICS; REFRACTORIES; TREATMENT OF NATURAL STONE

C08K USE OF INORGANIC OR NON-MACROMOLECULAR ORGANIC SUBSTANCES AS COMPOUNDING INGREDIENTS

E01B PERMANENT WAY; PERMANENT-WAY TOOLS; MACHINES FOR MAKING RAILWAYS OF ALL KINDS

E01C CONSTRUCTION OF, OR SURFACES FOR, ROADS, SPORTS GROUNDS, OR THE LIKE; MACHINES OR AUXILIARY TOOLS FOR CONSTRUCTION OR REPAIR

E01D BRIDGES E01F ADDITIONAL WORK, SUCH AS EQUIPPING ROADS OR THE CONSTRUCTION OF PLATFORMS,

HELICOPTER LANDING STAGES, SIGNS, SNOW FENCES, OR THE LIKE E01H STREET CLEANING; CLEANING OF PERMANENT WAYS; CLEANING BEACHES; CLEANING

LAND; DISPERSING FOG IN GENERAL E02B HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING E02D FOUNDATIONS; EXCAVATIONS; EMBANKMENTS; UNDERGROUND OR UNDERWATER

STRUCTURES E03F SEWERS; CESSPOOLS E04H BUILDINGS OR LIKE STRUCTURES FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSES; SWIMMING OR SPLASH

BATHS OR POOLS; MASTS; FENCING; TENTS OR CANOPIES, IN GENERAL E21D SHAFTS; TUNNELS; GALLERIES; LARGE UNDERGROUND CHAMBERS F16K VALVES; TAPS; COCKS; ACTUATING-FLOATS; DEVICES FOR VENTING OR AERATING F16L PIPES; JOINTS OR FITTINGS FOR PIPES; SUPPORTS FOR PIPES, CABLES OR PROTECTIVE

TUBING; MEANS FOR THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL F17D PIPE-LINE SYSTEMS; PIPE-LINES F24F AIR-CONDITIONING; AIR-HUMIDIFICATION; VENTILATION; USE OF AIR CURRENTS FOR

SCREENING F25D REFRIGERATORS; COLD ROOMS; ICE-BOXES; COOLING OR FREEZING APPARATUS NOT

COVERED BY ANY OTHER SUBCLASS G01N INVESTIGATING OR ANALYSING MATERIALS BY DETERMINING THEIR CHEMICAL OR

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES G01P MEASURING LINEAR OR ANGULAR SPEED, ACCELERATION, DECELERATION, OR SHOCK;

INDICATING PRESENCE, ABSENCE, OR DIRECTION, OF MOVEMENT G01W METEOROLOGY (radar, sonar, lidar or analogous systems, designed for meteorological u G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING G06G ANALOGUE COMPUTERS H05K PRINTED CIRCUITS; CASINGS OR CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF ELECTRIC APPARATUS;

MANUFACTURE OF ASSEMBLAGES OF ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES A61G TRANSPORT, PERSONAL CONVEYANCES, OR ACCOMMODATION SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR

PATIENTS OR DISABLED PERSONS; OPERATING TABLES OR CHAIRS; CHAIRS FOR DENTISTRY; FUNERAL DEVICES

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Code Name B29C SHAPING OR JOINING OF PLASTICS; SHAPING OF SUBSTANCES IN A PLASTIC STATE, IN

GENERAL; AFTER- TREATMENT OF THE SHAPED PRODUCTS, e.g. REPAIRING B60G VEHICLE SUSPENSION ARRANGEMENTS B60H ARRANGEMENTS OR ADAPTATIONS OF HEATING, COOLING, VENTILATING, OR OTHER AIR-

TREATING DEVICES SPECIALLY FOR PASSENGER OR GOODS SPACES OF VEHICLES B60J WINDOWS, WINDSCREENS, NON-FIXED ROOFS, DOORS, OR SIMILAR DEVICES FOR

VEHICLES; REMOVABLE EXTERNAL PROTECTIVE COVERINGS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR VEHICLES

B60Q ARRANGEMENT OF SIGNALLING OR LIGHTING DEVICES, THE MOUNTING OR SUPPORTING THEREOF OR CIRCUITS THEREFOR, FOR VEHICLES IN GENERAL

B60R VEHICLES, VEHICLE FITTINGS, OR VEHICLE PARTS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR B60T VEHICLE BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR PARTS THEREOF; BRAKE CONTROL SYSTEMS OR

PARTS THEREOF, IN GENERAL; ARRANGEMENT OF BRAKING ELEMENTS ON VEHICLES IN GENERAL; PORTABLE DEVICES FOR PREVENTING UNWANTED MOVEMENT OF VEHICLES; VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS TO FACILITATE COOLING OF BRAKES

B60W CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT

B61D BODY DETAILS OR KINDS OF RAILWAY VEHICLES B61F RAIL VEHICLE SUSPENSIONS, e.g. UNDERFRAMES, BOGIES, ARRANGEMENTS OF WHEEL

AXLES; RAIL VEHICLES FOR USE ON TRACKS OF DIFFERENT WIDTH; PREVENTING DERAILING; WHEELS GUARDS; OBSTRUCTION REMOVERS OR THE LIKE

B62D MOTOR VEHICLES; TRAILERS B82B NANO-STRUCTURES FORMED BY MANIPULATION OF INDIVIDUAL ATOMS, MOLECULES, OR

LIMITED COLLECTIONS OF ATOMS OR MOLECULES AS DISCRETE UNITS; MANUFACTURE OR TREATMENT THEREOF

B82Y SPECIFIC USES OR APPLICATIONS OF NANO-STRUCTURES; MEASUREMENT OR ANALYSIS OF NANO-STRUCTURES; MANUFACTURE OR TREATMENT OF NANO-STRUCTURES

E04C STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS; BUILDING MATERIALS F16L PIPES; JOINTS OR FITTINGS FOR PIPES; SUPPORTS FOR PIPES, CABLES OR PROTECTIVE

TUBING; MEANS FOR THERMAL INSULATION IN GENERAL F24F AIR-CONDITIONING; AIR-HUMIDIFICATION; VENTILATION; USE OF AIR CURRENTS FOR

SCREENING G01C MEASURING DISTANCES, LEVELS OR BEARINGS; SURVEYING; NAVIGATION; GYROSCOPIC

INSTRUMENTS; PHOTOGRAMMETRY OR VIDEOGRAMMETRY G01M TESTING STATIC OR DYNAMIC BALANCE OF MACHINES OR STRUCTURES; TESTING OF

STRUCTURES OR APPARATUS, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR G01S RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY

USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES

G06F ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING G06K RECOGNITION OF DATA; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING

RECORD CARRIERS G06T IMAGE DATA PROCESSING OR GENERATION, IN GENERAL G08C TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR MEASURED VALUES, CONTROL OR SIMILAR SIGNALS G08G TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS H04B TRANSMISSION H04H BROADCAST COMMUNICATION H04L TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION H04N PICTORIAL COMMUNICATION, e.g. TELEVISION H04Q SELECTING H04W WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

Source: Fraunhofer-ISI with information from www.wipo.int/ipcpub/#refresh=page

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The figure shows the big three countries from the perspective of patenting adaptation technologies: US (27 %), Germany (19 %) and Japan (14 %). All together these three countries hold 60 % of world patents applied in 134 counntries on adaptation technologies. This is not surprising as similar concentrations of patenting activities have been observed in previous studies (Walz et al., 2008).

Share of patent cunts by country 1990 ‐ 2010

DO FR SA AD AE AG AM AN AR AT AU

BA BB BD BE BG BH BJ BM BN BR BS

BY CA CG CH CK CL CM CN CO CR CS

CU CY CZ DE DK DZ EC EE EG ES FI

GA GB GE GI GN GR GT HK HR HU ID

IE IL IN IR IS IT JM JO JP KE KP

KR KW KY KZ LB LC LI LK LT LU LV

MA MC MD MK MT MX MY NA NL NO NZ

PA PH PK PL PT QA RO RS RU SC SD

SE SG SI SK SL SM SN SU SY TC TH

TM TN TO TR TT TV TW TZ UA US UY

VC VE VG VN VU YU ZA ZW AO BI NG

PE ZMJP

DE

US

UKKR

SE

IT

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 24: Share of patent counts. All sectors 1990-2010 by country

Out of these countries a world country grouping was developed as follows. First, Europe has been subdivided into the 8 climate zones identified in Deliverable D4 (Doll et al., 2011) and previous reports plus the rest of the continent:

• AL (Alpine area): Switzerland, Austria and Slovenia

• BI (British Islands): UK and Ireland

• EA (Eastern Europe): Poland, Czech Rep., Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria

• FR (France): Defined as a single climate region

• IP (Iberian Peninsula): Spain, Portugal and Gibraltar

• MD (Mediterranean area): Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta

• ME (Mid Europe): Germany and the Benelux-Countries

• SC (Scandinavia): Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania plus Iceland

• Others: all other countries east of the European Union incl. Russia

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North America (N-Am) only contains two countries: USA and Canada. Mexico and central America countries are allocated to the “Rest of the World”. Asia was subdivided into three regions: Japan, China and others, including the more important countries Korea and the Australia-Pacific region. The rest of the world (ROW) finally contains Africa, South America and Central America up to Mexico.

12.2 Results for Innovation Indices for Adaptation Technologies

12.2.1 Patent applications by region

The share of patent counts across all three adaptation sectors for the entire analysis period 1990 to 2010 are shown in Figure 25 Besides the importance of the three big players (US, JP and Mid Europe) indicated above the results allows for the following statements:

• Patent share of China (CN) as well as the rest of Europe and the rest of the world (ROW) are astonishingly low. The huge investment programmes in connecting Eastern Europe to the EU and within China would have suggested a higher relevance of these regions. In particular ROW including the whole of Africa, Latin and Central America contains regions highly affected by the consequences of climate change.

• In contrast, the rest of Asia, mainly driven by Korea, holds a considerable share at adaptation patents. This indicates that the level of patent applications is rather a question of the maturity of industries and business processes than of their size or the external pressure to generate particular solutions.

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Asia CN1% Asia JP

14%

Asia‐other7%

Europe AL3%

Europe BI5%

Europe EA0%

Europe FR7%

Europe IP1%

Europe MD3%

Europe ME23%

Europe SC5%

Europe‐other1%

N‐Am CA2%

N‐Am US27%

ROW1%

Share of patents by region 1990 ‐ 2009

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 25: Share of patent counts. All sectors 1990-2010 by world regions

12.2.2 Patent applications by adaptation sector

In this section we add the sector component to the discussion. As described above we have grouped the patent counts into three adaptation sectors. For these we find the following shares at world patent across the two decades 1990 to 2010:

• Infrastructure technology: 60 %.

• Planning and large-scale protection 8 %.

• Vehicle technologies: 32 ‘%.

This sector share does not alter dramatically across the world regions (Figure 26). The highest shares of infrastructure patents can be seen in Alpine area (Europe-AL), the Russia and Eastern Europe (Europe other) and the rest of the world (ROW). Planning and general adaptation seems to be more important in Europe than in Asia and North America.

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0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

Share of patents per region 1990 ‐ 2009 by adaptation sector

Vehicles

Planning

Infra

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 26: Sector shares of patent applications by world regions 1990 - 2010

The focus of some countries on infrastructure-related adaptation rather than on vehicle technologies may have different causes. The Alpine region for instance is characterised by a stable economic performance, but with high infrastructure damage risks and a long-lasting tradition in protecting infrastructures and settlements. In contrast the countries east of the EU and the ROW regions are mostly suffering from more difficult economic performance figures and the absence of advanced vehicle and supply industries. For these regions infrastructure innovations are suspected to be more easily accessible than vehicle or advanced sensor technology development.

Comparing the absolute patent counts by world regions we receive a much more pronounced picture (Figure 27). The joined area of Germany and the Benelux countries is only around 20 % below the patent counts of the US. Taking the EU27 plus Switzerland and Norway Table 27 reveals that the absolute number of patents (52003) exceeds the US figure by 50 % (31718).

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0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000Total patents by region and adaptation sector 1990 ‐ 2009 

Vehicles

Planning

Infra

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 27: Absolute patent counts by sector 1990-2010

12.3 Patent densities

Total patent numbers are commonly not very helpful for deciding on the relative position of a country. For the three main players (EUR29 consisting of the EU27, Switzerland and Norway), US plus Canada and Japan we have thus computed patent densities related to the gross domestic product (GDP) and the population numbers. The results in Table 27 suggest, that related to both benchmarks Europe has the highest patent density, followed by Japan, while US and Canada are ranked least. One reason for this clear result could be the fact that we have picked out the most industrialised part of Europe and Japan with its very dense industrial networks, and compare this to nearly an entire continent. The US federal states and the Canadian provinces have shown very different economic structures and could thus be filtered in a similar way.

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Table 27: Adaptation patent density indicators for selected world regions

Indicator EU29 US+CA Japan

Patents 1990-2010 52003 31718 15012

GDP 2010 (bill. €) 12976 12275 4122

Patents/GDP (1/bill. €) 4.0 2.6 3.6

Population 2008 (mill.) 301.1 344.4 126.5

Patents/capita (1/mill.) 173 92 119

Disaster losses 2000 (US$ mill.) * 165 204 401

Patents/loss (1/US$ mill.) * 315 155 60

Source: Fraunhofer ISI with data from Eurostat, Statistics Canada and Munich RE

* Damage and patent data for Asia in total

The density of adaptation patents with respect to the economic losses of natural disasters is most likely a better indicator for expressing patent densities. But here available data did not allow for the separation of Japan from the rest of Asia; we have considered this by using total Asian patent counts in this case. According to this data, again the patent density of Europe is ranked ahead of North America and far above the Asian quota. We assume that the latter would alter as soon as we use only Japanese data due to the reasoning given above.

For Europe we are able to compare the level of patent applications to the expected damage costs to the transport sector in the period 1998 to 2010. As for the patent search strategy we concentrate on road and rail transport. The values are available by climate region in WEATHER Deliverables D1 (Enei et al., 2011) and D1 (Przyluski et al., 2011). The resulting values are presented by Figure 28.

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0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

AL BI EA FR IP MD ME SCPatents 1

990‐20

ß10 / damage costs 

(1 / €mill.)

European climate region

Patent density by damage costs

+ Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 28: Patent densities by damage costs road and rail 2010 by climate region

Given the very different data sources the patent densities remain, with only few exceptions, within a remarkably narrow range. The exceptions are Mid Europe (MD) on the upper range and Eastern EU (EA) and the Iberian Peninsula (IP) on the lower margin. The high values for Mid Europe are dominated Germany, which is hosting some of the global vehicle, equipment and construction industries. For the eastern part of the EU and the Iberian Peninsula these industries are partly missing, in particular the vehicle construction sector.

12.3.1 Dynamics of patent applications

The development of patent applications over time is as important as their absolute number and density for judging regional capacities to develop suitable adaptation technologies. Figure 29 reveals that the dynamics in developing adaptation patents are very different in the selected world regions. The first impression is, that China’s development in patenting relevant technologies for adapting transport to weather extreme is outshining the growth rates of all other regions, coming from no patent in 1990 to 350 applications in 2010. Of course the total number is still marginal compared to EU, US or Japan, but China’s growth rate is stable and even accelerated during the last years. Due to its size and the several climate zones China has rich experiences with various weather and climate phenomena. Moreover, the country presumably has a strong interest in supporting its ever growing economic development by robust transport networks and services.

The US, which was applying for most patents in the entire two decade period shows a rather low development rate

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0.00

50.00

100.00

150.00

200.00

250.00

300.00

350.00

400.00

1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

Relative

 paten

t coun

ts (19

90 = 1)

Development in patent applications, all sctors

ROW

Europe SC

Europe MD

Europe ME

Europe FR

Europe BI

Europe AL

Europe‐other

Europe EA

Europe IP

Asia JP

Asia CN

Asia‐other

N‐Am US

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 29: Relative patent development indicators 1990 to 2010 by world region

As Figure 29 does hardly allow to analyse the trends of other countries but that of China, Figure 30 zooms into all other countries. Also here we see at the top rank a candidate with marginal total patent counts, which is eastern part of the EU (Europe EA), followed by the rest of Europe incl. Russia, the rest of Asia driven by Korea and the rest of the world (ROW).

Out of the big ones, Japan is leading the ranking by dynamics with roughly increasing its number of adaptation patents by a factor four over the past 20 years. The US and the highly industrialised western parts of the EU remain at a high but not very dynamic level of patent application.

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0.00

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

30.00

1991 1995 1999 2003 2007

Relative

 paten

t coun

ts (19

90 = 1)

Development in patent applications, all sctors excluding China

ROW

Europe SC

Europe MD

Europe ME

Europe FR

Europe BI

Europe AL

Europe‐other

Europe EA

Europe IP

Asia JP

Asia‐other

N‐Am US

Source: Fraunhofer ISI

Figure 30: Relative patent development 1990 to 2010 by world region excluding China

These findings are not necessarily problematic for the early industrialised countries, but they indicate that a dynamic catching-up process is currently going on, such that Europe, the US and Japan may soon are challenged by the transforming economies, in particular by China.

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13 Conclusions on Innovation Policies

13.1 Learning from mitigation strategies

The analyses in Part C have shown that the successful long-term design of complex policies is not an easy task. There does not exist a silver bullet, such as economic instruments as suggested by neoclassical welfare theory, ensuring innovation processes to continuously work and market agents to follow the same goals as society and governmental bodies. It rather takes the consideration of various factors including the stringency and long-term orientation of related policy fields, communication structures, market dynamics, customer preferences and the use of management tools in the business sector, as well as education, human resources and the innovation friendliness in the country in question.

13.2 Indicators and international Benchmarking

By means of analysing patent statistics we have generated quantitative indicators of innovation processes and of innovation dynamics in transportation technology fields, which are critical to weather and climate adaptation. We have seen that across all world regions around 60 % of patent applications are due to infrastructure, planning and large-scale protection measures. Given that transport system operations cannot be captured by this type of innovation assessment, these findings somehow are in contrast to our earlier findings on suitable adaptation strategies. In Doll et al. (2011) we have concluded that expensive infrastructure investments in many cases shows a rather bad benefit-over-costs performance, and that staff training, company co-operations and intelligent sensor and vehicle technologies may be used to approach most of the changes in weather and climate patterns.

The spatial distribution of patent applications has shown three main application regions: the US and Canada, Western Europe with a leading role for Germany and eastern Asia, namely Japan and Korea. Surprisingly, China, Brazil or other world regions do not contribute significantly to RTD in resilient transportation systems. The patent densities by inhabitant, by unit of GDP as well as by unit of damages caused by natural catastrophes shows European application in the top rank. But these rankings are not always very clear and could alter as soon as databases are updated.

The patent densities of European climate regions with respect to weather damage costs to the road and rail sector 1998 to 2010 shows a remarkably harmonic picture: Although economic losses are very different we find a rather stable average ratio of around 20 patents (in 20 years) per 1 million € of annual damage costs, i.e. one patent per one

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million euros. The position of Germany is a bit exposed while the eastern EU and the Iberian Peninsula show rather low values.

The patent dynamics shows by far the highest application growth rates for those countries which have the least share in world patent applications for adaptation in transport. This is namely China (year 2010 / year 1990 =350), followed by the eastern EU Member States (25), the rest of Asia (17) and Eastern Europe and Russia (12). These findings indicate that a dynamic catching-up process is currently going on, such that Europe, the US and Japan may soon be challenged by the transforming economies. This may be particularly true as specifically Asia is likely to suffer more from climate change and weather extremes than other world regions.

13.3 Policy implications

The lessons learned from these findings are rather modest. Europe seems to be in a good position regarding its RTD output with respect to resilient and adaptive transportation systems. But first, the differences are not overwhelming as the ranking alters with the way we look at patent densities and second; the methodology for measuring innovation potentials itself is a coarse instrument which needs to be interpreted with sufficient care. On the basis of the statistics used in this investigation we thus can conclude, that if European industries would like to strong partner in supplying other world regions with resilient transport system components research levels need to be maintained. Otherwise there is a certain risk that in one or another market niche strong competitors, e.g. from the so-called BRICS countries, could emerge and challenge Europe’s market share. We can already see this trend in advanced transport Infrastructure networks planned, built and maintained by Chinese companies without direct involvements of western Companies.

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PART D: OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 14 Main conclusions and recommendations

In the previous parts and chapters of this report we have looked at the structure of actors, policy instruments and innovation issues in the light of climate change adaptation and resilience of the transport sector to changing patterns of weather extremes. The main findings that can be drawn out of the work point into the direction of stimulating awareness, preparedness and training of the relevant actors with means of incentives, positive policy guidance and RTD support. Expensive infrastructure investments and hard regulations are generally considered as too expensive and inflexible across all fields of adaptation, actors, transport modes and climate areas.

Under specific conditions this general recommendation might, however, look very different. Accordingly we have structured the following main conclusions along the four major adaptation areas identified in WEATHER Deliverable 4 which are planning and general protection, infrastructure technology, vehicle technology and system operations. For each of those areas we revisit the findings of this report and point out possible policy application examples.

14.1 Transport planning and general protection

Main actors: Key actors for the promotion and incorporation of adaptation in transport planning constitute the European Union and the national governments. Here one could conclude that a rather important measure for the promotion of transport adaptation would be the conveyance of the concept through campaigns and informational events to the political representatives and, at the same time, to users/passengers and funding bodies, which are ‘powerful’ actors but with little knowledge and interest for the topic. Thus the critical factor is the gain of ‘knowledge’, aiming at raising awareness to both people and political staff.

Appropriate policy instruments: The decision about appropriate policy instruments to foster transport planning and general protection activities is influenced by the particular risk and the scale of probable damages. Regarding, for instance, the increasing risk of storm surges and flooding in coastal and river side regions policy makers are seeking the highest level of protection for inhabitants, property and infrastructure assets in terms of quantity and quality. To ensure an immediate and broad change of planning behaviour

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appliance standards, building codes and settlement obligations can be set up or already existing ones can be adapted by including an additional climate change related safety margin. These instruments are falling into the category of regulatory instruments and may impose higher costs of regulation (e.g. substantive compliance costs) for the regulated parties as well as sufficient enforcement resources of the regulator. Issues of general protection (e.g. evacuation in case of emergency, driving under extreme weather conditions, emergency management strategies) can be additionally addressed by initiatives including information, education, training, social planning and organisation.

European market position: With 8 % of world patent applications general protection measures are a rather small field for technology development and innovation. However, within this area Europe takes a relatively specialised position with a patent share of up to 15 %. Considering the big challenge of managing sea level rise and rising flood intensities not only for transport, but to protect settlements all over the world, Europe could set worldwide technology standards and bring itself into the position of a major technology exporting and knowledge generating area. This good starting position should be supported by sufficient RTD funding.

14.2 Infrastructure investments and technology

Main actors: Initiatives in relation to transport infrastructure investments and adaptation should originate from the public owned infrastructures since the private sector is more reluctant to get involved (and invest) in policies/measures with long term planning (because of additional costs). For this reason another important factor could be the development of a binding legal framework and/or the provision of motives for taking into account adaptation considerations from the design (or during the maintenance) phase of an infrastructure investment by the construction companies.

Appropriate policy instruments: According to Deliverable 4 (Doll et al., 2011) the hot spots in terms of infrastructure adaptation are road and rail infrastructure, inland waterways and sea ports. The decision about policy instruments must take into account the operator (government ownership, private ownership, Public Private Partnership) and the exposure of the particular transport infrastructures. Climate change related investments for state-owned infrastructures can be required by adapted building codes and technology standards including a detailed definition of exposure of the regulated transport infrastructures to avoid unnecessary investments. In that case the regulator and the regulated party are identical. In general, private transport infrastructures and PPPs can be regulated by directives as well. In both cases pure directives are imposing substantial costs of regulation on the infrastructure operators and may alienate the support of the transport sector for climate change adaptation, but guarantee in the same

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time a substantial change of behaviour by the mean of formal enforcement. An alternative strategy is to combine directives with incentives, such as tax exemptions / reductions in case of verified transport infrastructure adaptation activities, public benefit charges in case of absent of certain transport infrastructure adaptation activities, capital subsidies, grants, subsidized loans to support certain transport infrastructure adaptation activities.

European market position: Europe does not appear to be particularly strong in the field of resilient transport infrastructures. But it can be observed that particularly less developed world regions, i.e. non OECD countries, show a relative strength in infrastructures related to other adaptation areas. In front of the on-going catching-up process of these countries Europe needs to invest much more in RTD support to maintain its position as one of the technology leaders in transport infrastructures.

14.3 Vehicle and information technology

Main actors: Key actors here constitute the ICT providers and the manufacture companies. Both should provide transport community (operators, terminal managers etc) with up-to-date information on the technological developments in transportation, which allow a more efficient management of services, vehicles, fleet etc, and an easier control of the transport system.

Appropriate policy instruments: Private industries are the main developers of innovative vehicle and information technologies. Thus, an increasing demand for innovative vehicle and information technology is the main reason to encourage such activities. The introduction of (voluntary) certification and labelling systems related to the reliability/safety of vehicles and ICT systems under extreme weather conditions could be a selling point to increase demand and transparency in the market. Possible regulatory instruments are climate change related procurement regulations, obligations or appliance standards for vehicles and ICT systems considering certain specifications, such as driver assistance technologies. Furthermore, public RTD funding schemes related to climate change adaptation of vehicles and ICT systems can be set up.

European market position: Quite a high share - 32 % - of overall world patent applications are attributed to resilient transport vehicle and information technologies. Among these, however, Europe maintains a rather low share of 20 % to 30 %. In this dynamic and - according to our previous findings - most suitable adaptation area Europe should able to re-gain its technology leadership, but this requires sufficient RTD funding in combination with the installation of policy frameworks encouraging private industries to so either.

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14.4 Transport service operation

Main actors: Best examples and practices in relation to innovative transport services and operations in relation to adaptation should come from the public terminals and transport operators since the private sector is not willing to invest for long term horizon. In this sense the main actors for the incorporation of adaptation considerations in transport services constitute the (public) transport operators (of all modes) and the public infrastructure managers. Another issue is that public private partnerships could play an important role towards this direction (involvement of technological providers and private construction companies in transport operations).

Appropriate policy instruments: Within the field of transport service operation different policy instruments can be applied to foster climate change adaptation. Again, mandatory or voluntary certification and labelling systems related to the reliability/safety of transport services under extreme weather conditions to inform and support the customer decision for a particular transport mode. Furthermore, knowledge about impacts of extreme weather events on transport can be improved by mandatory data mining systems and disclosure programs collecting and publishing information about weather-induced delays for each mode of transport. In that context, the implementation of a threshold for the maximum level of weather-induced delays per transport mode and penalties for exceeding it might be useful. Regarding support and information the initiation of campaigns raising the climate change awareness in using and operating transport systems, such as training on driving under extreme weather conditions and emergency exercises for the operator’s staff should be taken into consideration. However, the implementation of common risk management procedures plays a significant role. A first step towards harmonizing the methods used for identifying and managing risks among the different actors involved in the development and operation of European transport systems was the definition of a common safety method (CSM) on risk evaluation and assessment for the railway sector in 2009 by the EC (see also Commission Regulation (EC) No 352/2009 of 24 April 2009). The EC identified the absence of a CSM for specifying and demonstrating compliance with safety levels and requirements of the railway system as one of the main obstacles to the liberalisation of the Community’s railway market (EC, 2009b).

European market position: Here the patent analysis does not contribute knowledge as operational procedures are barely protected by intellectual property rights.

14.5 Final remarks

In general, the findings concerning the main actors and the appropriate policy instruments of the four major adaptation areas are consistent and complement each other. It was

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concluded that the key actors in promoting adaptation activities in transport planning and general protection are the European Union and national governments. That conclusion is in line with the assumption that the public interest and thus of the policy makers in improving the resilience of transport infrastructures and services against climate extremes is significantly higher than the knowledge of ‘powerful’ actors about the issue. Therefore, fostering climate change adaptation in transport planning and general protection should mainly rely on regulatory policy instruments in order to maintain a sustainable change in behaviour.

Regarding infrastructure investments and technology it can be expected that the private sector is more reluctant to get involved (and invest) in policies/measures with long term planning (because of additional costs). Thus, the basic strategy to promote climate change adaptation in terms of infrastructure and technology is to implement regulations, such as building codes and technology standards. Nevertheless, regulation of this adaptation area should be accompanied by incentives in order to avoid negative feedback and improve the efficacy.

From an actor perspective the adaptation area of vehicle and information technology is mainly located in the domain of ICT providers and the manufacture companies. That finding is in line with the policy conclusion that fostering climate change adaptation activities within this area is mainly driven by an increasing demand and transparency in the market the introduction of (voluntary) certification and labelling systems related to the reliability/safety of vehicles and ICT systems under extreme weather conditions is a major strategy.

Since the private sector is not willing to invest for long-term horizon it was concluded that public transport operators and public transport infrastructure managers are playing an important role in terms of forerunners to foster the climate change adaptation of transport service operations. A wide range of policy instruments from mandatory or voluntary certification and labelling systems as well as penalties for exceeding of a threshold for the maximum level of weather-induced delays per transport mode to oblige common risk management procedures can be applied. Again, both findings are not contrary but complement each other.

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15 Study goals and achievements

This section revisits the objective of WEATHER Work Package 5 (Governance, incentives and innovation) and compares them to the achievements made by this deliverable. The objectives stated by the WEATHER technical annex listed in turn:

Objective 1: Analyse the roles (rights, duties, interests and options for action) of public and private actors and their inter-relations in transport infrastructure and system planning, design, operation, maintenance and financing

Initiating from the theoretical foundation of Actor Analysis, the research has then focused on the European transport adaptation policy. The adaptation policies and measures identified in WEATHER Deliverable 4 were considered as potential policy initiatives in order to identify the key actors (public and private) involved in their implementation. This led to a proposed categorization of actors for the field of transport adaptation and subsequently to the analysis of their roles, strengths, interests and rights in the framework of the policy formulation process. Different policy dimensions (planning, design, operation, maintenance and financing) were taken into account and useful conclusions emerged concerning the interrelations of actors in the area of transport adaptation, thus fully meeting the initial objectives stated in the WEATHER technical annex.

Objective 2: Analyse policy instruments and conduct a review of incentive and regulation systems dealing with long-term risk

This objective has been fully met. An analysis of policy instruments, in particular incentives and directives, considering relevant aspects and implications, such as enforcement and costs, have been conducted. In connection to D4 different types of general climate change adaptation strategies have been collected and examined. Finally, available policy instruments in related sectors were analysed empirically in terms of impact and possible applications to foster climate change adaptation activities in the European transport sector have been derived.

Objective 3: Explore the dynamics in the markets for adaptation and emergency management technologies

The adaptation technology priorities identified in WEATHER Deliverable 4 have been successfully transformed into patent search strategies. There application to the international patent databases of WIPO and EPO then delivered indicators on the innovation potential of European countries compared to other world regions in the field of transport technologies relevant for climate adaptation and the resilience towards weather extremes. By linking these to discussions on the basis of the Systems of Innovation theory

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we were able to provide profound policy advice and thus fully meet the objectives stated in the WEATHER technical annex.

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