THE ROLE OF CATALOGUES OF THREATS AND SECURITY … · 5.0 All Subjects Factors Mean quality of...

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TUTORIAL ON GRC FOR SERVICES 2011 COPYRIGHT UNIVERSITY OF TRENTO 1 THE ROLE OF CATALOGUES OF THREATS AND SECURITY CONTROLS IN SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH ATM PROFESSIONALS Joint work with M. De Gramatica, K. Labunets, F. Paci, A. Tedeschi Fabio Massacci University of Trento – Italy securitylab.disi.unitn.it THE PROBLEM ENAV – national large air traffic management authority New cyber operational concepts (eg Remotely Operated Tower) Must identify cyber security measures Lots of domain specialists but few security experts Use a Risk Based Methodology, but which one? ISACA’s CoBIT, SABSA focus on Business Goals US NIST 800-53, UK’s IAS focus on Threats Eurocontrol or SESAR’s SecRAM focus on Assets Who should execute the methodology? Ask security experts they are expensive and in high demand. Use a threat/controls catalogue which one? is bigger = better? ISO27002 general measures German’s BSI general measures with specific details Eurocontrol’s Risk Toolkit specific to Air Traffic Management 09/04/15 2 Fabio Massacci - REFSQ - ESSEN WHAT IS A SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD? A SRA method examines system’s security threats proposes set of system changes (security measures, controls, requirements) to bring system within acceptable risk Example statements X helps enterprises create optimal value from IT by maintaining a balance between realising benefits and optimising risk levels and resource use. Y is a proven methodology for developing business-driven, risk and opportunity focused Security Architectures W collect business requirements from risk owners and budget holders. Abstract them in business-language into business drivers for security then execute and measure value The aim and purpose of Z is to analyse a proposed or existing system to identify risks and estimate the levels of those risks; Select appropriate controls to manage the treatable risks. 09/04/15 3 Fabio Massacci - REFSQ - ESSEN SIZE MATTERS… German’s IT-Grundschutz Catalogue (aka BSI) Intro 40 pages Assets 350 pages Threats 1.000 pages Controls 3.000 pages Eurocontrol’s ATM Security Risk Management Toolkit Guidance Material 100 pages ATM specific Threats 57 pages ATM specific controls 99 pages (pre 72 + 27 post) Remotely Operated Tower Scenario Operational Focus Area Description 100+ pages Short “essential” description 24 pages 09/04/15 4 Fabio Massacci - REFSQ - ESSEN

Transcript of THE ROLE OF CATALOGUES OF THREATS AND SECURITY … · 5.0 All Subjects Factors Mean quality of...

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TUTORIAL  ON  GRC  FOR  SERVICES   2011  

COPYRIGHT  UNIVERSITY  OF  TRENTO   1  

THE ROLE OF CATALOGUES OF THREATS AND SECURITY CONTROLS

IN SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH ATM

PROFESSIONALS Joint work with M. De Gramatica,

K. Labunets, F. Paci,

A. Tedeschi

Fabio Massacci University of Trento – Italy

securitylab.disi.unitn.it

THE PROBLEM

q ENAV – national large air traffic management authority •  New cyber operational concepts (eg Remotely Operated Tower) •  Must identify cyber security measures •  Lots of domain specialists but few security experts

q Use a Risk Based Methodology, but which one? ü  ISACA’s CoBIT, SABSA à focus on Business Goals ü  US NIST 800-53, UK’s IAS à focus on Threats ü  Eurocontrol or SESAR’s SecRAM à focus on Assets q Who should execute the methodology? ü  Ask security experts à they are expensive and in high demand. ü  Use a threat/controls catalogue àwhich one? is bigger = better? •  ISO27002à general measures •  German’s BSI à general measures with specific details •  Eurocontrol’s Risk Toolkit à specific to Air Traffic Management

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WHAT IS A SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD? q  A SRA method ü  examines system’s security threats ü  proposes set of system changes (security

measures, controls, requirements) ü  to bring system within acceptable risk q  Example statements

•  X helps enterprises create optimal value from IT by maintaining a balance between realising benefits and optimising risk levels and resource use.

•  Y is a proven methodology for developing business-driven, risk and opportunity focused Security Architectures

•  W collect business requirements from risk owners and budget holders. Abstract them in business-language into business drivers for security then execute and measure value

•  The aim and purpose of Z is to analyse a proposed or existing system to identify risks and estimate the levels of those risks; Select appropriate controls to manage the treatable risks.

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SIZE MATTERS…

q German’s IT-Grundschutz Catalogue (aka BSI) ü  Intro à 40 pages ü  Assets à 350 pages ü  Threats à 1.000 pages ü  Controls à 3.000 pages q Eurocontrol’s ATM Security Risk Management Toolkit ü  Guidance Material à 100 pages ü  ATM specific Threats à 57 pages ü  ATM specific controls à 99 pages (pre 72 + 27 post) q Remotely Operated Tower Scenario ü  Operational Focus Area Description à 100+ pages ü  Short “essential” description à 24 pages

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

q How do we evaluate a method with a catalogue? ü  A clinical procedure with a physician’s desk reference (aka drug index)

à We know well how to evaluate it àclinical trial protocol ü  A risk assessment procedure with security catalogue à Same idea q Research question: do catalogues make a difference? ü  Evaluate 15 ATM Professionals applying an ATM Risk Method • Domain Security Experts without catalogue • Domain Experts with a generic catalogue (BSI) • Domain Experts with a specific catalogue (Eurocontrol)

ü  We apply a trial protocol to estimate the efficacy of a methodology with and without catalogues

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OUR EXPERIMENTAL PROTOCOL

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PROTOCOL ACTORS

q Participant ü  Important to have both students (novices to the treatment but unbiased

opinion) and practitioners (expert but may have prejudices on what it works). •  Students à preliminary pilot •  ATM Practitioners à THIS Paper at REFSQ 2015

q Designer à Expert in the method ü  Provide the best possible training for the method. •  Security Trainer at Eurocontrol

q Customer à Expert in the scenario ü  Indipendent validation of quality of results (irrespective of treatment!) •  Any method can produce “enough” security requirements if quality doesn’t matter.

ü  Expert in method ≠ Expert in domain à former may give good score if method is followed à bias

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q Training Participants ü  Designer(s) train on treatment ü  Customer(s) describe scenario q Application ü  Participants apply treatment for

a time span that is sufficiently long (>1day) to be challenging

q Evaluation ü  Customers evaluate results of

participants ü  Participants tell their opinion on

how the experiment went ü  Designers evalute results

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q No initial learning bias ü  Avoid my stuff vs competitor’s stuff ü  Not wrong focus q Can test actual efficacy ü  Experiments <1h too short to tell

results apart ü  With large catalogues/scenarios 1h

not enough even to browse docs q Measures different things ü  Customers à actual efficacy ü  Participants à perceived efficacy ü  Designers should only evaluate

compliance

PROTOCOL STEPS

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PROTOCOL MEASUREMENTS

q Actual Efficacy ü  Participants Reports • Quantitative (#threats/controls) à easy to generate huge numbers (of junk) • Qualitative Analysis àlikert scale

q Perceived Efficacy ü  Questionnaires à likert scale q Qualitative analysis ü  Post-it notes • Affinity Analysis

ü  Focus Groups Interviews • Coding, qualitative analysis

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q Actual Efficacy - AE ü  whether the treatment improves

performance of the task q Perceived Efficacy – PE ü  Perceived Ease Of Use – PEOU •  the degree to which a person

believes that using a treatment would be free of effort

ü  Perceived Usefulness – PU •  the degree to which a person

believes that a treatment will be effective in achieving its intended objectives

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q AE Null Hypothesis ü  No difference between the

treatements in identified risk/controls measured as •  5 point scale of expert evalutaion

q PE Null Hypothesis ü  No difference between the

perceived efficacy (PEOU, PU) by the participants measured as •  5-point scale on questionnaire

about identifying threats •  5-point scale on questionnaire

about identifying security measures

PROTOCOL MEASUREMENTS - II

ACTUAL EFFECTIVENESS

q  Quality of identified threats and controls

q  Median Scores (Controls): Expert+No Cat NoExpert+ATM Cat ü  Actual Efficacy à 3.0 vs 3.5 ü  Perceived Ease of Use à 4.0 vs 3.0 q  Summary ü  No catalogues slightly worse results + Catalogues slightly worse to use ü  No statistical diff q  Domain Experts + Security Catalogues ≈ (Domain + Security) Experts

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q  Key features emerging from qualitative analysis

ü  Structure and Navigation ü  Coverage and Size (*) ü  Common Language (*) ü  Checklist ü  Quality of knowledge (*) q  (*) present in qualitative study on

which features are important in a ATM risk assessment

ü  20 Experts working on Risk Assessement in SESAR •  Labunets et al. SESAR’s Innovation

Conference 2014. q  Big difference between expert

and non-experts

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q  Experts ü  Common Language ü  Checklist •  “The first step is to use your own

experience and then to use the catalogue to cover generic aspects that could be forgotten”

q  Not Experts ü  Navigation is judge, jury and

executioner •  “I saw people near to me; they were not

able to find out stuff in the catalogue, they kept on getting lost in the pages and eventually they came up always with the same two or three items” •  “Once identified the threat, finding out

controls was really a mechanical work”

WHY DO THINGS WORK?

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SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENT

q Do catalogues work? ü  MAYBE YES à not experts perfomed equally to experts without catalogues ü  BUT à people work better with domain specific information ü  AND à experts and non-experts use them in radically different ways q Open Issues ü  What about comprehensibility of results? •  Risk assessment must be piped down the line for implementation •  This was a critical issue when we interviewed stakeholders in ATM

ü  What about scaling to really large risk assessment? q What is next ü  More Info? à http://securitylab.disi.unitn.it ü  Want to join the effort? à we are looking for replications

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ADVERTISING

q We are hiring for a industry-academia lab ü  European Electronic Crime Task force q Positions ü  2 Phd Students à deadline 20May ü  2 Post-doctoral positions à open q Further info on Trento ü  [email protected] ü  http://securitylab.disi.unitn.it ü  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Electronic_Crime_Task_Force

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DISCUSSION OF TONG’S PAPER

q What can we do now that we could not do before? ü  Try to model different aspects of a design (from business to physical) q How sound is the solution? ü  A formal model is behind the graphs à a minimal Tarski semantics exists ü  A small scale scenario was modelled by the author(s) q Whose goals are served or helped by this? ü  One can fend off attacks across different layers q What is the next step to take? ü  Demonstrate that you really capture and fold cross layers attacks ü  Address scale à goal models quickly evolve into “spaghetti” models q Controversial Question: How do you avoid the “beholder” effect? ü  “Beauty is in the eye of the beholder” ü  You are the only one who really used it. How do we know it really works?

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