THE ROAD TO THE "WAR OF GREATER EAST ASIA"

By K. H. ABSHAGEN

On December 8 war broke out in tho Pac-jfic. We have asked ou-rTokl/o collaborator to describe the 1'oa4 to this war 011 tllO basis of hisobservations as a ;ournalut in the Japanese capital and taking intoaccount the docum~l1ItaTtl material published dlLring the last few weeks.(Som6 of it is to b6 found in our documentarl/ append'ix.)

Mr. K. H. Abshagon is known to o-ur readers by his penetrat­ing and amus-ing article "Soc-jety Dies Ha-rd" -in OlLr December issue.-K.M.

What is it that was responsible forthe bitter hostility of the United Statestowards Japan, a hostility which hasnow culminated in war? Is it to befound in the economic field'/ Hardly.

The stake of the United States inChina was small compared with Britishinterests, and American exports toJapan over a long period of time havebeen from two to four times as high88 those to China. Japan has beenone of the United States' best cus­tomers.

And yet, since the days whenTownsend Harris, the first United Statesconsular and diplomatic envoy to Japan,complained of what he regarded asduplicity and ill-willed procrastinationon the part of the Japanese negotiators,the road of Japanese-American re­lations lu"ls been strewn with bouldersof misunderstanding and reciprocalmisrepresentation of motives and in­tentions.

It would be too simple to try andexplain these misunderstandings merelyby an alleged incompatibility of Easternand Western ideas. What we arewitnessing is the final clash of twovery definite national mentalities.THE MISS10NARY SPIRIT

Ever since the United States in thenineteenth century began to take aninterest in areas beyond their ownfar-flung frontiers and commenced com­mercial and diplomatic activities inthe Far East, these activities have

been permeated with a strong mis­sionary spirit. It is more than merechance that the majority of Christianmissionaries in China and Japan areAmericans and that there is no regionin the whole world where Americanmissionaries are so numerous as in theFar East. One would do the greatmajority of these workers in the Lord'svineyard grave wrong if one doubtedthe purity of their intentions. On theother hand, very many of them, com­ing as they did into the domains of acivilization many centuries older thantheir own with the fixed idea of savingpoor illiterate heathens, must have hadan exasperating effect on the peoplewhom they carne to save.

The Chinese with their innate senseof humor succeeded in making the bestof it, deriving what advantage theycould from the works of the mis­sionaries, particularly their hospitals,schools, and universities. Moreover,they made very clever use of mis­sionary organizations as a channel fortheir own propaganda in the UnitedStates, in the same way that theysucceeded in making Geneva, as longas it lasted, a powerful sounding-boardfor their complaints and desires.

The Japanese, on the other hand, apeople who derive their origin fromheaven, never took very kindly to themissionaries and their works. Theirpride forbade them to curry favorwith them; their insularity of outlookmade them underrate the political value

6 THE XXth CENTURY

of the propaganda organ at theirdisposaL Thus from the outset themissionaries became a powerful factorin China's favor, which at thesame time was bound, unintentionally,to influence public opinion in theUnited States in a manner unfavorableto Japan.

All this might not have been ofdecisive importance. However, it is anundeniable fact that the whole diplo­macy of the United States has carriedthe stamp of being quasi-missionary.Nothing has been more exasperatingto the Japanese mind than the oft­repeated enunciation of general prin­ciples by successive administrations inWashington. From John Hay's OpenDoor notes in 1899 to Elihu Root'srevised draft of the four BalfourPrinciples in 1922; from HenryStimson's "idealistic" interference withthe Manchukuo and Shanghai affairs in1931 and 1932 to Cordell Hull's recentstatements of principles, there exists along series of pronouncements of thesuccessive United StatES administrations,most of them full of self-righteousness,all of them saturated with good in­tentions, high principles, and moralsuperiority.MUTUAL SUSPICION

The Japanese might have takenmore kindly to such lecturing if theyhad been able to believe in its sincerity.But the demand for the Open Door inChina was accompanied from a veryearly date by the erection of higherand ever higher legal fences againstthe immigration of Japanese and theirenjoyment of equal rights in theUnited States. Furthermore, whileAmerica assumed the right to criticizeJapan's measures in Manchukuo andChina, what is generally called"Dollar Diplomacy" was carried on inthe Latin American countries, if pos­sible with even less disguise than be­fore. The enforcement of anti­Japanese trade policies in a number ofSouth American states during the lastfew months under US pressure andthe ejection of the recalcitrant Pres­ident of Panama are the most recentexamples.

On the other hand, Japan's declaredpolicy of a New Order in East Asiahas not found a sympathetic echo onthe other side of the Pacific. Americahas never believed in the sinceritywith which Japan regards her missionin East Asia. She has seen in itonly the camouflage for a rapaciousimperialism.UNREQUITED LOVE

In addition to all this, the historyof Japanese-American relations is theold, old story of unrequited love.When Japan in the Meiji Era beganto adopt Western technical civilization,it was primarily to the United Statesthat she went for instruction andmodels. American high schools, uni­versities, and technical colleges trainedmany of the men who became theleading spirits in the wholesale in­troduction of new industrial methodsand processes into a land that forcenturies had been intentionally cutoff from every intercourse with theoutside world. Strong sympathy forAmerica continued to exist in Japanin spite of American discriminationagainst Japanese, in spite also of thelong series of disagreements in thenaval disarmament conferences andthe refusal of naval parity by theAnglo-Saxon powers. I t is a small yetsignificant item that Townsend Harris,who laboriously negotiated and con­cluded the first commercial treatybetween his own country and Japan,is an almost forgotten man in America,while his memory is to this day aliveand honored in Japan. On the easternshores of the Pacific, the echo toJapanese sympathy, expressed and un­expressed, has been weak. A strongcurrent of pro-Chinese sentiment haslong dominated public opinion inAmerica. Indeed, it has been so strongthat it probably decisively influencedthe negotiations of last autumn atvarious stages, for the Washingtonadministration would not have daredface the public with any agreementwhich, by J apanophobe propaganda,could have been represented as "sellingfour hundred million Chinese downthe river."

THE ROAD TO THE "WAR OF GREATER EAST ASIA" 7

THE CHINA INCIDENTIt is against such a background as

this that the attempts at conciliationmust be judged. For a considerabletime before the beginning of theWashington negotiations last April,Japanese - American relations had beengoing from bad to worse. Since theexchange of messages between KokiHirota and Cordell Hull, at theformer's initiative, in 1934, a morecordial atmosphere had prevailed fora time between the two countries, anatmosphere which had not even beentoo badly influenced by the finalbreakdown of the naval agreement in1935. Immediately after the outbreakof hostilities in China in 1937, how­ever, a new deterioration set in. Thefirst reaction of the American Govern­ment after the outbreak of hostilitieswas a statement by Secretary ofState Cordell Hull (July 16, 1937)limited to generalities: condemning"the use of force" and the "interferencein the internal affairs of other na­tions"; advocating "faithful observanceof international agreements" and mak­ing the modification of treaties subjectto "orderly processes carried out in aspirit of mutual helpfulness and ac·commodation" without specific refer­ence to the Far East. But meanwhilethe Pa.11.aY incident had inflamed anti­Japanese feelings in the United States,and the continued fighting in Chinaresulted in more and more open sup­port of the Chiang Kai-shek Govern­ment on the part of America.ENTER THE NEW ORDER

In the diplomatic exchanges thatwent parallel to the military events,the American Government based itsvarious protests and claims mainly onthe Nine Power Treaty of 1922. Inher note of November 18, 1933, Japanstated that there was no intention ofinterfering with American rights andinterests in China. For the first timesbe made it clear that she could notallow the New Order in China, whichshe was trying to establish, to behampered by the dead letter of adiplomatic document; for this docu-

ment had become obsolete throughdevelopments which, at the time ofthe conclusion of the treaty, hadbeen unforeseeable. This difference ofopinion in the years 1937 and 1938 istypical of the attitudes of the twosides such as can be observed in allthe following negotiations up to thefinal events in the winter of 1941.TWO VIEWS ON EUROPE

A new element was introduced intoJapanese-American relations when Ja­pan, in September 1940, signed theTripartite Pact with Germany andItaly. It will be useful to rememberthat, from the very beginning, afundamental difference can be observedbetween the two valuations of thispact-Japan's on the one hand and theUnited States' on the other. Thisdifference is in turn closely connectedwith the policy of both states in re­lation to the question of the limitationor extension of the war in Europe.Japan consistently followed a policy ofconcentration on her own immediateaims in the Far Eastern sphere. Shemade no use of Britain's weaknessafter Dunkirk to obtain, either bythreats or by main force, Britishterritories in China or the MalayPeninsula; nor did she even undertakea great commercial drive into partsof the globe where the industries ofthe European belligerents were nowhampered by blockade and counter­blockade. Japan's adherence to theTripartite Pact, in the light of eventsbetween its conclusion and the out­break of the present war in thePacific, seems to have been dictated bythe desire to limit the European con­flict, to avoid a clash in the Pacific,and to concentrate all her forces onthe establishment of what has becomeknown as the Greater East Asia Co­Prosperity Sphere, with as little inter­ference as possible from outside.

The United States, on the otherhand, or at least Pre ident Roosevelt,militantly unfurled the banner ofdemocracy from the very beginning ofthe war in Europe. As time went onit became increasingly clear that, evenat the time when the Neutrality Legis-

B THE XXth CENTURY

lation was still nominally valid, theWashington administration was takingnot only an active but a leading partin the fight against the European Axispowers. The question was only howquickly the forming of American publicopinion- subjected to a powerful inter­ventionist publicity campaign from theWhite House-and the transfer ofAmerican industry from peace to warproduction would permit the full andopen participation of the United Statesin the war. This is why the UnitedStates Government regarded the Tri­partite Pact as a menace to its ownwar policy and has been trying, un­successfully, to undermine Japan'sloyalty to its Axis partners in Europe.WASHINGTON PROCLAIMS

GENERAL PRINCIPLESIn the series of negotiations which

began last April, Washington took theinitiative with a dra,ft proposal rangingover a wide field of political and eco­nomic problems. Though the details ofthis proposal are not so far available,from the Summary of the Negotiationspublished by the Japanese Governmentit can be assumed that the generalprinciples proclaimed by Cordell Hullin July 1937 and which descend in adirect line from John Hay's Open Doornotes were again extolled. But thistime they were coupled-the JapaneseSummary is definite on this point­with the demand that Japan shouldundertake not to go to war in thePacific against the United States shouldthe latter participate in the war inEurope "in self-defense." The onlyother detail of the American draftpropOsal available so far is that theUS Government offered to use its goodoffices to initiate peace negotiationsbetween Japan and Chungking "on suchterms as were acceptable to the UnitedStates." Obviously the US Governmentwas not prepared to accept the J apa­nese conception of the New Order inEast Asia. Yet the Japanese Govern­ment agreed to negotiate.THE KONOYE MESSAGE

The danger of a complete breakdownarose when in July the Japanese con-

cluded the agreement for the commondefense of French Indo-China, and, ac­cording to its terms, garrisoned J apan­ese troops in southern Indo-China.Prince Konoye, however, made a fur­ther determined attempt to save thenegotiations. In his message to Presi­dent Roosevelt last August, he suggesteda personal meeting with the President,but the US Government, putting thecart before the horse, insisted thatagreement on fundamentals and essen­tials must precede such a meeting. Itwas at this stage that in circles insideand outside of the Japanese Governmentthe suspicion became almost a certaintythat the US Government was not seriousin its desire to reach an agreement,the more so since the military prepara­tions directed by all the countries ofthe ABCD front against Japan weresteadily increasing in intensity. Inspite of this the Japanese Governmentrepeatedly submitted new proposals,and the Tojo Cabinet, though at itsformation branded by the Anglo-SaxonPress as a war cabinet, went evenfurther in its concessions to UnitedStates demands than any of its pre­decessors.

The only result was that, after re­peated exchange of draft proposals andconversations, in which AmbassadorKurusu took part, Secretary Hull onNovember 26 handed the Japanesenegotiators a memorandum which theJapanese considered a slap in the face.From the very proposals contained inthis document and the inquiries ad­dressed concurrently to the Japaneseside by Undersecretary Sumner Wellesin President Roosevelt's name, it seemsas if the US Government thought Tokyowould anyway eventually accept what­ever Washington demanded. The un­preparedness of the US Pacific Fleetwhen the Japanese attacked PearlHarbor seems to bear out this inter­pretation of the intentions behind theHull Memorandum of November 26.FACTS VS. PREACHING

But let us return for a moment tothe substance of the negotiations asfar as it can be gauged from avail­able information. The Japanese Press

THE ROAD TO THE "WAR OF GREATER EAST ASIA" 8

reflecting, it may be assumed, the of­ficial viewpoint, repeatedly complained,during the weeks preceding the finalbreakdown, that the American sidecontinued to propound generalities andfailed to face the real situation in EastAsia. The data contained in the doc­uments published by the JapaneseGovernment on the whole bear out thecontention that, to every attempt onJapan's part to come down to the re­alities of the situation, the US Govern­ment replied in the tone of the priesttalking down to the sinner, preachingin the best-or worst-missionary style.

However, the various American pro­posals and counterproposals, besidesthe enunciation of general principles,contain some concrete suggestionswhich allow one to judge of Washington'sunderlying intentions. There was firstthe question of the Tripartite Pact.Washington demanded nothing lessthan denunciation de jure or at leastde fa,cto of a treaty freely signed andespecially solemnized by an ImperialRescript. In this the United StatesGovernment not only clearly over­reached itself, but acted in a mannerwhich does not tally with the oft­repeated American pronouncements infavor of unconditional observance ofinternational treaties.OLD FRIEND IN NEW GUISE

Next there was Washington's insist­ence on the "principle of non-dis­crimination in international commercialrelations "-old friend Open Door innew guise. Here the Japanese Govern­ment turned the tables on the UnitedStates by recognizing the principle tobe applied to the whole Pacific area,including Chi.na, on the understandingthat it also be applied to the rest ofthe world. But the Roosevelt Govern­ment finds general principles usefulonly as long as they fit into its ownplans or apply to other nations, whileit is not willing to submit its ownactions to the same standards. Un­conditional acceptance of the Open Doorpolicy in China, coupled with what theJapanese call joint international con­trol of China: such were the demands

which were brought forward in anSwerto Japan's compromise formula - de­mands which, if accepted, would havemeant the end of Japan's New Orderand of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In the third question, that of theevacuation of Japanese troops fromChina and French Indo-China, theJapanese Government went as far ascould be expected of a proud militarynation. In her proposals of November20 Japan offered to remove her troopsstationed in southern Indo-China tothe north of the country, upon con­clusion of the proposed agreement, toshow that she was not planning furthermilitary expansion toward the south.Cordell Hull's answer, however, wasthe blunt demand for total with­drawal of all Japanese troops fromChina and Indo-China. It is difficultto imagine how any responsible personin Washington could have believed thatJapan would or could accede to suchdemands, unless, as we suggested be­fore, he assumed that Japan had beenweakened by economic warfare andencirclement to the point where shewould swallow practically anything.

THE ROLE OF' GREAT BRITAIN

There remain two further points inthe last phase of the Washingtonconversations, regarding which thedocumentary evidence so far availableadmits only of guesswork. There is inthe first place the question of the partplayed by the other members of theABCD front, especially that played bythe British Empire. And secondlythere are the reasons for the suddenstiffening - to breaking-point - ofWashington's attitude as expressed inthe Hull Memorandum of November 26following the more accommodating,though never - from the Japaneseviewpoint - satisfactory proposalsbrought forward by the Americannegotiators during the preceding ex­changes. There is reason to believethat these two questions are closelyrelated.

It is not by accident or willfulomission that we have so far dealt

10 THE XXth CENTURY

almost exclusively with the Japanese­American angle of the problem. As amatter of fact, the role played byGreat Britain during the whole courseof the negotiations has been that of avassal state to the United States.Great Britain and the British Do­minions at every single moment of thecontroversy took their cue from Wash­ington. They followed suit whenWashington opened economic warfareagainst Japan, and they did not eventry to take an active part in thenegotiations but were satisfied to giveWashington their views, if any, inprivate. All this in spite of the factthat it was easily discernible from aglance at the British press during thecritical stages of the Washington talksthat Great Britain, for more than onereason, was in deadly fear of openconflict in the Pacific; for, whateverits outcome, it was bound to put anend to her powerful political andeconomic position in China and reduceto nought the hundreds of millionpounds sterling invested in Shanghaiand the Yangtse valley as well as inHongkong.

JAPAN'S CHOICEThe Netherlands East Indies, under

the influence of the refugee governmentof Holland in London, followed theBritish example. And one might sayhere that Japan did not even try thepolicy of divide et impera by seekingdirect negotiations with one of theweaker partners of the ABCD front.She took the bull by the horns and,with Oriental patience and thorough­ness, outwardly unmoved but inwardlyforgetting nothing, carried on thenegotiations with the United States tothe bitter end. The last hope wentwith Cordell Hull's Memorandum ofNovember 26, and with the President'srefusal to consider a three-months'stopgap agreement for a furtherattempt to surmount the crisis.

On November 29 the UnitedPress reported from Washington: "TheUnited States yesterday took an ap­parently immovable position in theface of the acute Far Eastern crisis,

insisting on maintenance of the statusquo together with removal of Japaneseinfluence in China and French Indo­China. The highest authoritativequarters in the Government stated thatthe question of continued peace in thePacific depends on whether Japanresponds at the last moment toAmerican efforts to induce her tofulfill this program. The highestGovernment source said that no com­promise was possible on the Chinaquestion, thereby crushing Japanesehopes for a stopgap agreement wherebyJapan would hold her present gains butwould not attempt new aggressions,"

The idea of such a temporary agree­ment during the month preceding thebreakdown of the negotiations had beenrepeatedly mooted by diplomats inWashington and Tokyo. By openlydropping this idea just one day afterthe handing of the Hull Memorandum,the President made it quite clear thathe wanted a decision one way or theother and that there was no alternativefor Japan other than "ar or submis­sion.

What induced the President to takethat stand, we, again, can only guess.But to all appearances it is more thanmere chance that, in the days im­mediately preceding the fateful de­Cisions in Washington, the ChungkingAmbassador was particularly activeand made no secret of his determina­tion to do his utmost to prevent anyagreement between Japan and theUnited States, even a temporary onefor three months, if necessary by thethreat of Chiang Kai-shek's secessionfrom the ABCD camp. We havealready said that Washington could illafford to run foul of the pro-Chinesepropaganda in America. And so itseems that the moderating counselfrom Britain, offered in ca?ne1'a only,was of no avail.

War became inevitable. Again, as inthe case of Germany and the USSR, itwas a question of speed against mass.On December 8 Japan struck quickand hard. The "War of Greater EastAsia" was on.