The Research of Audit Committee Characteristics and BY Chong...
Transcript of The Research of Audit Committee Characteristics and BY Chong...
The Research of Audit Committee Characteristics and
Changes of Auditor in Hong Kong
BY
Chong Sai Wai
10020195
Accounting Concentration
An Honours Degree Project Submitted to the
School of Business in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Graduation Requirement of the Degree of
Bachelor of Business Administration (Honours)
Hong Kong Baptist University
Hong Kong
April 2012
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Acknowledgement
I wish to express my genuine appreciation to my supervisors, Professor Raymond Chan. I
would like to thank for his intellectual advice, valuable comments and helping me to
overcome the problems and provide guidance. Thanks for his kind support.
1. Abstract
This research would like to study whether the audit committee nature are related to
external auditor changes in Hong Kong. Even though audit committee was required to be
established under the board of directors and the basic functions and nature of audit committee
was regulated under the Listing Rules for the listed companies, it can still worthwhile to
perform a research to find out whether there are still have significant relationship under
current situation. In this research, five qualities of audit committee including independence,
financial expertise, and frequency of audit committee meetings, governance expertise and
firm specific knowledge were widely supported and practiced by regulators and identified for
this study. In order to have a clear result, we examine auditor change firms for only four
reasons and others would be excluded, the reasons include accounting disagreements, auditor
resignation, audit fee disagreements and issuance of audit qualified opinion. By applying the
logistic regression model, the result was found that it may not have any statistically
significant relationship on above characteristics with the auditor change. Besides, the research
also have studied whether each Big 4 firm have a slightly difference between each other on
the possibility of dismissed by their clients related to audit committee characteristics. This
research is quite different from the other research. Since the previous research has stated that
the higher independence of committee member, more knowledge on the firm and the more
financial expertise in the firm would be facilitate for the reduction of the chance of auditor
switches. However, it may still a valuable study because effectiveness of audit committee may
not be the critical factor of the auditor change activities in Hong Kong.
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Table of Contents
1. Abstract 1
2. Introduction 3
3. Literature review 7
4. Statement of hypothesis 15
5. Methodology 17
6. Results 20
7. Discussion 26
8. Conclusion 29
9. Reference and citations 32
10. Appendices 36
List of table and figures
Table 1A: Number of Auditor Change Firms from 2004 to 2011 36
Table 1B: Selection of Auditor Change Firms from 2004 to 2011 36
Table 1C: Descriptive Details for sample and control 37
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Univarite Results 38
Table 3: Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables 38
Table 4: Logistics Regression Results Auditor Change Model 39
Table 5: Logistic regression results with Modified Audit Variable 40
Fig. 1: Probability on changing external auditor related to independence 41
Fig. 2: Probability on changing external auditor related to financial expertise 41
Fig. 3: Probability on changing external auditor related to number of meeting 42
Fig. 4: Probability on changing external auditor related to board served 42
Fig. 5: Probability on changing external auditor related to years serving in board 43
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2. Introduction
2.1.Statement of problem
The separate of ownership and the control was occurred and practiced from many
decades ago. The mangers operate and control the corporation and the shareholders act as the
owner and investor of company. Board of directors acts for the highest responsible person and
body to manage and direct the whole corporation on behalf of the company’s shareholders
(Miller 1998). Their duties include preparing reports to shareholder under their stewardship
and monitor the manager’s operations. Financial report with audited by an external auditor is
one of the reports providing for all shareholders.
Audit committee is a kind of board of directors’ sub-committees which is formulated by
the members of board of directors and supposing they are outside directors who are only
insignificant dependence on the management (Carcello and Neal 1997). In U.S., audit
committee is mandated by regulators such as New York Stock Exchange. In 2002, the U.S.
Congress had passed the law, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, requiring the audit committee is fully
independent and contains with financial expert (Lee, Mande, and Ortman, 2004). However,
since Hong Kong was previously the colony of U.K. for over 150 years. Many laws, practices
and principles follow the U.K. standard including the corporate governance frameworks and
audit committee formulation. In 1999, the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) had
revised the Code of Best Practice, which is the code that originally based on the code of the
London Stock Exchange. In this revised Code, audit committees in the listed corporations are
recommended. At the end of 2000, most listed firms formed the audit committee. It leads to
the criticism of market regulators such as Securities & Futures Commission and poor
reputation in public. (Firth and Rui 2006). Nowadays, the Listing Rule was be revised in order
to to comply the updated requirement for corporate governance, audit committee is enforced
to be established as the company’s compulsory subcommittee.
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According to research of Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009), Blue Ribbon Committee
in U.S. distinguishes five fundamental characteristics of effective audit committee which are
the independence of audit committee members, committee member’s responsibilities
commitments, financial expertise existence, firm specific knowledge and corporate
governance expertise. These qualities of auditor committee members would positively affect
the effectiveness of audit committee under prior studies. Also the desired financial reporting
quality would be increased and improved under the mentioned key characteristics (Robinson
and Owens-Jackson 2009).
Under previous researches, there are several reasons for the auditor switches. Firstly are
the audit fee arguments, which means auditors may charge the firm a premium; Secondly is
the accounting disagreement between management and external auditor, which may lead to
the inappropriately statement and improper disclosures on financial reporting; Thirdly is the
public release of qualified opinion with going concern statement to the financial statement,
which the management is seeking for the favorable audit opinion by change the new auditor;
And fourthly is the auditor resignation, which can affect the change of audit fees payment and
lead the audit quality fluctuations (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009).
In these years, some Hong Kong listed companies always change the auditors for
preparing the external audit report, for example, Lam Soon (HK) and Tianyi Fruit. List
companies change auditors under different reasons and circumstances, for example, fees
charged on the audit and non-audit services, auditor’s voluntary resignation and existing
auditor was dismissed by existing audit committee.
Thus, this research would try to analyze and establish the relationship of whether the five
qualities of the audit committee affecting the auditor changes under the above four resignation
reasons by applying the similar model and tests under Robinson and Owens-Jackson. Also,
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this research would try to link up with the previous research around the auditor resignation
and observe whether this research can obtain the similar results with prior research or not.
2.2.Objectives of study
Nowadays many auditor switches happened in Hong Kong due to many reasons, for
example, audit fee dispute or different opinion with the management and external auditor.
Audit committee is usually to be elected by the board of directors and usually come from
existing company’s board of directors. No matter the members of audit committee are
working according to the rules, procedures and guidelines set up within the company or under
their favorite and self-interest, they have the rights to choose or change the auditor for
providing the audited financial reports service, and then recommend to all shareholders in the
annual or extraordinary general meeting. Although according the company ordinance in Hong
Kong, the auditor switches should be finally approved by the voting of all shareholders in the
general meeting within a certain period. This action implies that the switch of auditor is the
final collaboratively decision of all shareholders. However, if the company is majorly
controlled by one or several shareholders such as family business, which is family members
or founders of companies, they may tend to protect their interest at a priority. One of possible
situations is that, the powerful members of companies would like to put themselves as the
members of board of directors, with some other “amicable and trustable” person into the
board as the non-executive director and member of audit committee. The company daily
operation although is done by the managers, however, the manager positions may be tightly
controlled by the board of directors or the managers are originally following with these
influential shareholders before the company was listed in stock exchange. When the company
management has some accounting disagreement on change of accounting policies, treatment
of assets and earnings for the year etc, the board and audit committee may decide on auditor
switch in order to produce their acceptable audited financial reports to the public, especially
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the bondholders, lenders and minority shareholders of company. This action may try to protect
the major shareholders’ interest, for example, the share price may be prevented from any
fluctuation. However, once some possible problems exist and this will lead all shareholders
and bondholders and the stakeholders suffers in the loss. This study on audit committee and
auditor change relationship is expected to help the investors and stakeholders like minor
shareholders and bondholders and public in Hong Kong to know more on the relationship
between audit committee, which may appointed or recommended by the board of directors,
and the auditors, and also let them to pay the proper attention on the auditor switches in the
Hong Kong listed firm to protect their financial interest.
The study would like to know whether the research of Robinson and Owens-Jackson
(2009) is validly applying in Hong Kong in current situation. Since their research was
performing in the U.S., with under the U.S. situation and regulation in the U.S. and analysis
of the U.S. stock market like New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Before 2005, audit
committee was not required for the listed firm. Nowadays, Hong Kong Listing rule required
all listed firm must establish the audit committee as the sub-committee of the board of
directors. With adopting same audit committee characteristics mentioned by Robinson and
Owens-Jackson, this research is purposely attempting to understand the conclusion made in
their paper can be simply applied in Hong Kong with a consistently similar result or a
substantially different outcome with the prior research..
This research may also benefit to other stakeholders like boards of directors and
management as well, since it can provide the clear picture on the relationship to the boards.
The board can choose the best person to perform the member of audit committee and this will
help to encounter the special problem of the financial reporting in each firms. (Robinson and
Owens-Jackson 2009)
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Accounting professional and external auditor can also use this research to be the
reference as they can aware on the qualities of the audit committee in each audit client They
can take the consideration of audit committee as the a part of assessing the audit risk before
the acceptance of audit engagement. (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009)
3. Literature review
The studies included some studies of experiential research and academic literature about
the properties of board of director and audit committee and reasons of auditors’ resignation.
In Hong Kong situation, according to Listing Rule of equity security SEHK Chapter 3,
audit committee was required to establish under the board of directors, it stated the
preliminary requirement of the members. In the Listing Rules Appendix 14, it stated that the
major functions of audit committee with transparent and formal policies should be
well-developed. They have also recommended for guidelines, and functions of the audit
committee. It included full minute of meeting should be taken and be kept, keeping
relationship with firms external auditor. The members have the responsibility to review the
financial information, internal control and financial reporting systems of the firms. Also, the
committee needs to make recommendation on choices of external auditors, and appointment,
resignation or dismissal of external auditor. The committee should be ensured that sufficient
resources should be provided for exercise their authority and deal with its responsibility.
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants (HKICPA), which is the recognized
accounting professional body in Hong Kong, also released the guidelines for the effective
audit committee (2002). They have established more detailed guidelines for the high quality
audit committee. HKICPA is not just inform the responsibility and function of audit
committee, but also suggested some membership qualifications, the operation, conducts and
procedures required for the committee. For instance, they have suggested the size of each
committee, frequency of meetings and positions and their specific responsibility needed for
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committee, who can be attended to the committee meetings. Also, they have established the
guideline for the communication with the board and the details for disclosure of the audit
committee to the shareholders. HKICPA have also issue the other guideline to the purpose of
improving the understanding, communication and interaction between board members, audit
committees and external auditors. It provides the aid to audit committees to have effectively
cooperated with external auditor with better understanding on the role, responsibility and
scope of external audit and the consideration of audit quality factors. This guideline suggested
the external auditor should inform the audit committee for 5 qualities of audit, including the
audit firm’s culture, audit partners and staffs’ skills and personal qualities, audit process
effectiveness, audit reporting reliability and usefulness, factors outside the control of auditors.
With understanding and familiar more on nature and responsibility of external auditor, this
reduces the possibility of change auditor because of misunderstanding and misconception of
the view towards external auditor by the audit committee.
For the independence of the committee, since the companies are be required appointing
the independent non-executive director, this can ensure the independence of audit committee.
According to the Hong Kong Institute of Directors (HKIOD), they have drafted up the
Guideline for Independent Non-executive Directors. Besides they stated that some qualities of
independent non-executive directors must have, like independence, devoting sufficient time
on the board, familiar with the company’s business, the matters confidentiality and disclosure
of its interest, they also suggesting that if these independent non-executive directors are
requested for joining the audit committee. Director should reconsider again that whether they
have sufficient time and skills to apply in the work of audit committee. HKIOD suggested that
audit committee member have required heavy workload with apply much accounting
specialized knowledge and skills. Thus, since being the committee member would also be
required for exercising due care and skills as the board member, these directors should reject
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the offer of committee members if they are unable to exercise the duties.
As mentioned before, Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) state that there are five
properties on the audit committee and they found out the relationship between them and the
switched of auditor. They reported that three out of five properties of audit committees are
substantially affecting to the external auditor changes. They are including independence,
financial specialist and distinctive knowledge to the firm which these are conversely
connected with auditor change, when these three factors increase, the auditor change would be
theoretically decreased. Although the remaining two factors, diligence and governance
expertise, do not have the significant relationship with auditor change, this is still important
because this research outcome is match with the suggestion of prior research, such as change
of auditor can cause to the reduction of audit quality and agrees with the suggestion of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in U.S. 2002. The result directs the attention of independence and
financial expertise which would benefit to audit committee effectiveness (Robinson and
Owens-Jackson, 2009)
Also, according to Carcello and Neal (2000, 2003), state that the lower chances of
dismissal of existing auditor after issuing the report with the paragraph stating the going
concern problem under the situation of highly independence member of audit committee who
have more experience on the related position on board of directors or management at the same
time. Their papers established that some audit committees’ characteristics affect audit
committee effectiveness in positively way and reduce chance of switches auditor.
Lee, Mande and Ortman (2004) also report that the independence of audit committee and
the board of directors would diminish the possibility of auditor resignation. They found that
they have greater incentive to serve for the firm’s external auditor and reduce the hidden audit
risk of auditors. And the successor auditor would likely reduce the audit quality than before
under the situation of non- fully independent audit committee.
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According to the research of Biedma, Ruiz-Barbadillo, and Gomez Aguilar (2010), they
have also found that the importance of audit committee independence to auditor change might
be less happened under more independent audit committee even though the company has
received the qualified opinion on audit report. Also, more independent audit committee may
choose to dismiss auditor even though they issue the clean opinion. In other words, the
independent audit committee would choose to dismiss the auditor under the condition that not
to weaken their potential independence of the audit committee Besides, more independent
committee will tend to find the auditor that have lower economic dependence to the company,
which implies that they tend to recommend the auditor for more professional and
independence on the external audit. This reflects more independent audit committee would
tend to support the auditor opinion choices. Also, as per Lennox (2002), it stated that if the
management understands that the existing auditor likely to issue the qualified opinion, they
would skillfully dismiss the existing auditor in advance and appoint the new auditor, and
some cases of auditor dismissal are happened with the absences of discussion and without
consents of audit committee. It reflects that effective audit committee would lead to reduce
the auditor changes.
Klein (2002) stated that inverse relationship between independent audit committee and
earning manipulation is demonstrated in their research, also they found that more structures
and independence board of director would be more effective in supervising the financial
accounting procedures in the company. This would help to analyze the reason of auditor
resignation as their personal reasons. Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) reported that the auditor
would reduce the audit risk by several ways, for example, increase audit fee to perform more
audit procedures and ensure the audit quality, providing more improved audit quality, better
planning, larger chance to issuance of audit modified opinion and going concern opinion,
increase the client portfolio by selecting the client and thus quitting the high risk job. The
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potential legal risk will lead to withdrawal of the audit engagement. This study concludes that
the ligation risk is highly associated with the auditor dismissal and resignation. They also
summarize that auditor would choose resignation rather than waiting for the dismissal by the
client due to high financial stress, lower auditor independence, long seniority to performing
for the same job client, high fluctuated and receipt the modified opinion. The existence of
financial professional is important for audit committee. Krishnan, and Lee (2009), stated that
more financial expertise can reduce the ligation risk once they can establish the good
corporate governance. Also, Rich (2009) demonstrated that more financial expertise in the
audit committee would improve the financial statement and reporting quality and enhance the
corporate governance, since they have involved in the financial monitoring.
Audit committee is not only established for adopt the Listing Rule requirement, but also
need to practice its functions. It is difficult to determine its diligence and only can measure
that as the number of meetings. Raghunandan and Rama (2007) demonstrated that more audit
committee meeting would be existed that more members appointed, more meetings on board
of directors, higher non-insider holdings on the shares and the firms’ industry that with high
risk of legal actions. Also they also demonstrated that more financial experts in the committee
would be tend to hold more meetings and it may connect to a better results on the firm’s
financial reporting and auditing.
Abbott, Parker and Peters (2003) found that there are the existence of relationship
between the audit fee charged and the properties of audit committee. This paper suggests that
an audit fee is related the independence of audit committee and the existence of financial
experts in the audit committee positively in a large extent but except the relationship between
audit fee and the frequency of audit committee meeting in a financial year. This paper can
assist for this current research in Hong Kong since audit fee is one of criteria of auditor
change for considering the sample which should include in the test.
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DeZoort and Salterio (2001) found that audit committee members who have more
governance experience that can make judgments and decisions in a consistent way and the
independent directors would tend to put a comparatively greater support for external auditors
in the dispute between auditor and the listed firm.
Knowledge on firms is also an important element; Hermalin and Weisbach (2001)
mentioned that the board composition would affect the firm performance. With the
independent directors from outside and having longer tenure, more firm-specific knowledge
could be accumulated and improve the firm’s profitability. Thus, more knowledge on the firm
may reasonable predicted that also benefit to audit committee performance if they are elected
as the members of audit committee.
However, some prior research has discovered that the audit committee. Chan, Lau and
Ng (2010) reported that the satisfactory compliance on appointing member with independence,
and financial expertise would not add the firm’s value. They suggest that insufficient
resources allocated and lack of meetings were the reasons for the ineffectiveness of audit
committee. Nevertheless, audit committee would work in effective way only base on the
combination of interacting of important characteristics and the actual practices of the board.
Beasley (1996) states his findings that the outside director characteristics and proportion
would negatively related to the fraud in the financial reporting. This suggests that the outside
auditor can contribute to the audit committee to fulfill their sight and responsibilities on
financial reporting.
Lin, Xiao and Tang (2008) found that the group of stakeholders of Chinese listed
corporations such as investors, creditors, external auditors and the company’s important
position to investigate that their degree on generally acceptance on the formal capacity and
responsibilities and audit committee. These stakeholders agree that this can improve the
auditor and the board of director communications and reduce both sides’ conflicts, and obtain
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a better the corporate governance images. But the stakeholders are not familiar on the specific
duties of audit committee such as regulation fulfillment, better internal control maintaining
good financial reporting of companies. The outcome of this paper may not directly related to
auditor resignation since, in my opinion, the research of Lin, Xiao and Tang on the audit
committee in China would still be benefit and can assist for this research, since nowadays
many Chinese incorporated companies, including stated-owned enterprises listed and
proposed to list in Hong Kong.
For the information about auditor change, it is not just the effect of the audit committee
characteristics but also may have other reasons, for example, as the research done by Ahmed
(2010), he suggests that the increase of audit fee due to structural change of law regulations
cause the auditor switches. The smaller firms may tend to switches the auditor from the big
auditor to the non-big auditors due to reduction the growth rate of audit fee expenses rather
than the largest firms. Also, the failure of auditor business may cause the voluntary and
involuntary auditor changes. Tanyi, Raghunandan and Barua (2010) mentioned that the firm
following the original partner of original audit firm (involuntary changes) can have a shorter
time lag on preparation of audit report than the clients change to auditor and not appoint the
staff of previous firm for auditing service. This kind of auditor change may affect the choice
of auditor which it is suggested that choices of auditor either choose the completely new
auditor as an auditor rotation or choose auditor who can familiar with the company’s business.
Also, Abu Thahir, Emelin, and Hudaib et. al. (2006) suggested that the chance to audit change
depends in the tenure of the auditor. Long period audit engagement with the same auditor on a
specific client appears as auditor independence threats. Tenure of serving the client who the
client chooses to switch from small to larger auditor is slightly shorter than the auditor change
from large to smaller. Big4 auditors are able to remain longer time to serving the client than
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the small auditors. Moreover, large size companies have tended to remain the existing auditor
more than the small size companies.
According to the research of Whisenant (2003), auditor change and removal were mostly
initiated by the clients and relatively lower proportion was due to the auditor’s decline to
stand for reelection of new engagement. The research discovered that many kinds of the
reasons of auditor switches, and they are generally divided into structural changes,
client-initiated changes (including fee dispute), auditor-client frictions changes (including
accounting disagreement and issuance of qualified opinion) and unclassified items. In our
study, we have deal with the reasons except unclassified items which is not related to audit
committee characteristics.
Finally, Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) had applied the same model to each of the Big 4
firm to see whether there is different result. Also, Gabre stated that if the audit committee
members are not responsible or being rejected the recommendation on the audit firm, the
firm’s management would comparatively higher dissatisfy Big 4 firms rather than local firms.
As mentioned, many China firms have listed and arrange to list in Hong Kong, change of
auditor would imply corporate governance problem. Liu (2007) stated that firms’ switching to
a larger auditor is the sign of good quality on earnings while switching to small auditor is the
negative effect on the abnormal earnings. Also, firms with larger controlling owners, and in
which the positions of the Chief Executive Officer and the board chairman would less likely
to appoint large auditors. With the change of auditor, quality of corporate governance and
audit committee would be indicated that as declining. Nevertheless, Chen and Zhou (2007)
stated that the companies which present a more active and bigger audit committees and more
board independence prefer to choose a Big 4 as new auditor.
In this research the model applied will be consistent with the paper of Robinson and
Owens-Jackson (2009), which is consistence with Beasley (1996) and Carcello and Neal
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(2000, 2003) and other prior research like Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) mentioned.
4. Statement of hypothesis
The hypothesis of this research would be applying the hypothesis of Robinson and
Owens-Jackson (2009); they had produced five hypotheses between the nature of audit
committee and the resignation of auditor which they are all negatively related. These
hypotheses would be applied in this research same as Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009).
Hypothesis 1: Higher possibility of auditor changes when the firms have a lower
percentage of independent audit committee members. Carcello and Neal (2003) found that
decreasing probability of auditor change if the committee standing as independent and not to
stand as the same side as management. Since the audit committee members should have a
more objective sight on the management and thus they can exercise a better internal control
and supervise the activities of management. If they are independent, they can have a lesser
economies and social ties to the firm and fairly judge on disputes and problems (Robinson
and Owens-Jackson 2009). This would consider that the percentage of the independent
member sitting in the committee, which independent means who is not a current and former
staff and officer of the firm, related parties employee, management relatives and professional
advisor to the firm, significant suppliers or customers officer, interlocking director, and one
who has no significant transaction with the company. (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009)
Hypothesis 2: Higher possibility of auditor changes when the firms have a lower
percentage of financial expertise as the members audit committee. Abott et al. (2004) stated
that material negative association between the financial restatements and the financial
specialist’s occurrence in the audit committee; this is expected also to have the same
relationship in the auditor changes. For purpose of this study, either CPAs or CFO experience
would be treated as the financial professionals, which is also the requirement under Main
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Board Listing Rule of equity securities in Hong Kong (Chapter 3). (Robinson and
Owens-Jackson 2009)
Hypothesis 3: Higher possibility of auditor changes when the firms have a fewer audit
committee meetings. According to hypothesis of Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009), more
audit committee meeting can reflect the greater promises towards to the firm and reflect their
interest on monitoring their company. Also, the risk of the financial restatement and legal
action taken with the external auditor would be reduced. This is expected to exercise the
effective control towards the company and effectively exercise their diligence. Abott et al.
(2004) also presented that more meetings of audit committee would stronger the audit
commitment and eventually reduce the chance of restatement of financial reports.
Hypothesis 4: Higher possibility of auditor changes when the firms’ audit committee
members have worked for fewer number of the board of directors. Carcello and Neal (2003)
reported that more directors with more board experience in the board would reduce the
occurrence of auditor dismissal. According to Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009), since
audit committee members may need to deal with the financial reporting trouble with hardship,
if they have experience on serving in board of director in the previous company, this can help
the company to better dealing with the troubles and problems in a more experienced way. This
would be measured as average number of board served before of all audit committee
members.
Hypothesis 5: Higher possibility of auditor changes when there are shorter and decrease
on the average years of serving as the company’s audit committee member who is working on
the existing board of director or with the existing company. According to previous research,
when they have a higher seniority in the board, the members can have adequate ability to
accumulate more specific firm-based knowledge. This would lead the better earning ability,
with the effect on increase the quality of financial reporting and exercising a better and
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effective supervision with company. This would be calculated for the average tenure of
members working in the company. (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009)
5. Methodology
5.1. Data Collection
Sample would be collected that appeared in the auditors change listed firms in the
website of Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK), Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing
Limited (HKEX). The auditor change of all listed firm are published under the
“Announcements Concerning Changing Auditors of Listed Issuers” in HKEXNEWS website,
which is the public sources for searching the documents of announcement and notice from
2004. In the research, the data sample would be expected to collect through from 2004 to
2011. All samples would be tried to be identified by four reasons which were mentioned by
Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009), this includes accounting disagreements between
external auditors and company’s management; audit fee disputes; auditor resignation due to
independence issues and person reasons; the external issuing the qualified opinion to the
listed clients.
According to Robinson and Owens-Jackson, in order to avoid making results in the
complex way, no firms of auditor change with other reasons, which is not fall in the above
mentioned reasons, like effect of fraud cases and financial restatements would be included in
the sample. In this research, some unclear reasons were also excluded like serving for the
interest of whole group and firm, streamline the audit process by changing auditor. However,
auditor resignation due to the restructuring, merger and reorganization of auditor itself would
be counted as auditor resignation, since the personnel serve for auditing, procedure and
quality would be changed and this may affect the audit committee choices of auditors.
In this research, there are the 752 samples are suitable for tested and only 130 sample
firms would be randomly selected and be tested
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5.2.Selection of control firms
This research would like to apply the tests written by Robinson and Owens-Jackson
(2009). In this research, the control firms would be match with at least two factors with the
sample. One is the time period and the other factor is either the firm size or industry. Firm’s
Industry would be classified as the Hang Seng Industry Classification System. Unlike the
prior research, the information of firm size would be measured on the asset value rather than
net sales generated for the year of altering auditor of the corresponding testing firm, since it
can reduce the difficulty of defining the meaning of sales turnover and calculating the net
sales. Also, some prior research stated that management tends to manage and play tricks on
reported earnings if the actual growth of earnings was less than expectations, which the
managers were willing to manage the earnings in order to impress the stock markets and
persuade the regulators. (Dechow and skinner 2000 and Skinner and Sloan 1999) All firms
with earnings restatement and fraud cases, which are similar with test variables, plus auditor
substitutions for any reason, were being excluded. Also, these control firms selected should
not have any incidence of auditor switches occurred beyond the change year of auditor of both
control and test firms. Since there may have time lag of auditor change and the ending date of
financial statement. This would require for the examination on two years beyond the year of
auditor switch for confidence. (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009) Also, the number of
control firm is 130 which is same number as tested firms. The total number of firms for
research is 260.
5.3. Research design
Statistical model: This research would be applying in the research model used by Robinson
and Owens-Jackson, which is consistent with those prior researches mentioned in their paper.
The attached logistic regression model would be used for testing the mentioned hypothesis
studying the connections between the auditor switches and audit committee qualities.
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𝐴𝐶 = 𝛽0 + β1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽2𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 + 𝛽3𝑀𝐸𝐸𝑇 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃 + 𝛽5𝐾𝑁𝑂𝑊 + 𝛽6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻
+ 𝛽7𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽8𝐴𝑈𝐷𝐼𝑇 + 𝛽9𝐹𝐸𝐸
According to Robinson and Owens- Jackson (2009), all test and control variables will be
included. In this research, the research model; dependent, test and control variables of their
paper would be applied in this study as much as possible.
Dependent variable (AC) equals one when any auditor changes was existed due to accounting
disagreements; audit fee disagreements; auditor resignation and qualified audit opinion issued
and coded zero once there is no auditor change.
Test variable: Proxy documents, annual reports and other relevant documents filed in the
SEHK and these documents are appeared publicly with no charges. They supply information
for the audit committee activity and committee members’ information
Independence (INDP), which is recorded at the percentage of independent members out
of all members on audit committees.
Financial expertise (TECH), which is proportion of members in audit committee who
have previous and current experience in CPA or CFO position.
Diligence (MEET), which is the frequency of audit committee meetings were held within
the year of auditor switches.
Governance expertise (GEXP), which is the average number of boards of directors which
each audit committee member have performing or previously performed for as at the
year of the change of auditor.
Knowledge of firm (KNOW). It included averaging number of years of audit committee
members serving on the existing board or as management in current firm.
Control variables: The control variables will be totally four, three from under the Robinson
and Owens-Jackson designs which includes growth, company size and audit firm size and
plus one additional control variable which is factor of audit fee.
20
Growth (GROWTH) is measured as the percentage change in total assets for two years
ending before the occurrence of auditor change corresponding to testing firms, which is
following the Robinson and Owens-Jackson approach (2009) and Beasley (1996). Firms
without correction on earnings was presented a comparatively a lower growth rate than
the firms that having restatement of earnings (Defond and Jiambalvo 1991). If using
growth in earnings approach, since management may always try to gain acceptance on
their decisions from the external auditor by auditor fees, the data generated may not be
reliable than the figures on growth of assets.
Firm size (SIZE) is determined as the natural logarithm of book value of total assets,
since size of listed firm will either lead the management more power incentive to make
change in the auditor or the reduction of incentive change in external auditor since firms
have more resources for better internal control (Robinson and Owens-Jackson 2009).
Auditor size (AUDIT) will put a value of either a large audit firm (which is Big 4
nowadays) or the other audit firms. The size of auditor may affect the financial reporting
quality, however, supplying the non-audit engagement services like consultation services
may also threatened the auditor independence.
Audit fee (FEE) is the final control variable this is the percentage change of the auditors’
remuneration. Fee dispute and fee arrangement would affect the choice of auditors, for
example, reducing cost on audit service by changing to small audit firm, this is related to
the interest of the shareholders and the company.
6. Results
6.1. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 in Appendix is the comparison of means and median of each independent variable
for both test and control firms samples. Some of the audit committee characteristics are
comparatively little different between the test and the control firms. Also, control firms which
21
are no switches of auditor have a significant difference on number of meeting of audit
committee (MEET) and the firm-specific knowledge (KNOW) aspect. It implies the slightly
higher in the knowledge specifically on the firm of control firm than the test firm. Perhaps it
may surprise, there are slightly fewer audit committee meeting in the control firms comparing
with the sample firms. The remaining three variables, including the independence of audit
committee (INDP), financial expertise members (TECH) and the number of board previously
served (GEXP) were not significant. For the control variables, only AUDIT component,
which is the size of auditors, is significant effect in both set of data, while the remaining three
control variables are not significant enough. It reflected that the control listed firms tend to
choose larger size of auditor for performing audit than the test firms.
Table 3 in Appendix shows the result of correlation coefficients for the independent
variables. As Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) mentioned, the presence of high
correlations, which the magnitudes are +/-0.80 or greater, would be problematic on the
research. Based on Table 3, the highest correlation is -0.299. This suggests that the variables
are not multi-collinear, which it causes no matter.
Correlations for all independent variables, including GROWTH, SIZE, AUDIT and FEE
with all the audit committee variables are mixed, which different variable would be positively
or negatively related with varied audit committee characteristics
For GROWTH, the lower growth of the listed firm, implies more likely to have more
independent members, with financial expertise and board experiences. Oppositely, higher
growth rate companies may tend to have directors with and number of meeting and firm
specific knowledge.
For SIZE, larger size of listed firms may tend to appoint more independent, with
financial expertise directors and they are more willing to hold more audit committee
22
meeting. However, smaller firm size tends to have the members who have more board
experiences and higher seniority on serving the board.
For AUDIT, the large external auditor would tend to connect with audit committee with
more higher independence and more audit committee meetings while the smaller
external audit firms would appear to associate with the committee with more financial
expertise, with members of more boards served before and more members with firm-
specific knowledge.
Finally, for the FEE, the audit committee with holding more meetings, and the members
with more board experience and more knowledge towards to the firm, they are willing to
accept the higher auditor remuneration expenses. On the contrary, the audit committee
with more independence and contains more financial expertise may tend to choose to
concern on control of audit fee expenditure.
6.2.Regression analysis
Table 4 in Appendix shows the result generated from SPSS by applying logistic
regression model. This model is significant at the p<0.01 level (Two tail). The goodness of fit
(𝑅2 or pseudo-𝑅2) figure is 0.292 and the concordant pairs’ measure is 0.65. The figure of
goodness of fit is similar to the research of Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) and other
audit committee studies like Carcello and Neal (2000, 2003). However, unlike the prior
research, this study shows only insignificant support to overall hypothesis that reduce the
auditor switches incidents with more of the satisfactory characteristics of audit committee.
Since no test variables, which are the audit committee characteristics, reflect as significant
explanatory variables since they have a high p-value. The comparatively significant variables
are the number of meetings of audit committee (MEET, p=0.123) and the firm-specific
information by committee members (KNOW, p=0.259). The remaining three audit committee
nature were unlikely significant. Interestingly, two audit committee variables, number of
23
boards each committee member served (GEXP) and firm-specific information by board
members (KNOW) are not consistent to the hypothesis and prior research, although they are
both not significant. For the control variables, firms’ growth, firms’ size and external auditor
size are shown as significant, while only audit fee are not be classified as significant.
Although all audit committee characteristics are not significant, this model for studying
auditor switches is a logistic model, the probability of the change of auditor can be displayed
by the different levels of various audit committee nature. For each of following figures, all
remaining variables in model would be set at average value and only one specific variable of
the audit committee nature. All graphs are attached in the appendix.
Figure 1 is the testing of independence members of audit committee with the predicted
probability of the auditor change of listed firms, although the result is insignificant. The
proportion of independence increases from 0.3 to 1, the probability changes in the range of
0.36 to 0.58. At the lowest proportion, 0.3 and the highest proportion, 1.0 has the same
probability of change auditor which is 0.5. The shows the independence characteristics may
not have a direct relationship with auditor change.
Figure 2 is the testing of proportion of members of audit committee with financial
professional and predicted probability of the auditor change of listed firms which the result is
also insignificant. When the proportion of financial expertise in the committee increases from
0 to 1, the probability would be varies in the range of 0.15 to 0.6. But generally it shows the
reducing trend on probability of auditor change when the proportion of financial expertise
increases, when the proportion is 0 to 1, the probability is 0.6 and 0.45 respectively. Inverse
relationship of audit committee member with financial expert and auditor change was
reflected and it reflects the importance on existence of financial expertise in audit committee.
Figure 3 shows the testing of number of audit committee meetings during the fiscal year
and predicted probability of the auditor change of listed firms which this is the significance of
24
this variable is p=0.123, which is still not statistically significant. This evidence also shows
the inverse relationship between the probability of change auditor and the number of audit
committee meetings held in the year. The range of probability is 0.2 to 0.55 as the number of
meetings increase from 0 to 7. The probability is reduced from 0.5 to 0.2 under the number of
meeting increases from 0 to 7, and this reflects the importance to increase of meeting times in
order to reduce the likelihood of changing the auditor.
Figure 4 displays that the relationship between the governance expertise in audit
committee and the predicted probability of the switches of auditor, which the statistically
insignificance were observed. The range of probability is between 0.18 and 0.75, under the
condition of the number of the board served increases from 0 to 12. However, no general
trend can be identified since the graph shown the large fluctuation. This reflects the
independence characteristics may probably have weak relationship with auditor changes. The
switches of auditor due to the reason of different board experience of members were varied by
different companies’ size, growth or industries etc.
Figure 5 presents the relationship of the year of service on the current board and work for
the existing company, and the predicted probability of the switches of auditor, which it is
again statistically insignificant. The range of probability is between 0.25 and 0.8, under the
condition of the number of year serving the current companies increases from 0 to 15. It also
shows the direct relationship generally since there are the increasing trends from the 0.4 to 0.8
at 0 years of experience and 15 years of experience. This finding is not consist with the prior
research since the finding of Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009) reported that there are
negative relationship between these two factors, where the chance of changing auditor should
be lower when the members’ year of service on existing firms increases. Oppositely, in this
research, the increase of firm’s specific knowledge by staying in the existing board of the
companies for longer period can increase the likelihood to change the auditor.
25
Firm growth, firm size and auditor size are the control variables that having the statistical
significance. Higher growth listed companies are comparatively less likely to change auditor
since the coefficient appears at negative value. Also, the larger firm size of listed companies
would less likely to change the existing external auditor. Interestingly, the auditors’ firm size
has negative relationship with the auditor change, reflecting that larger auditors are high
chance to be dismissed and retired by the audit committee. For the remaining control variable,
audit fee changes, it shows that the larger change audit fee may cause less likely to change of
auditor, however it is not statically significant, so this variable might be rejected.
6.3. Logistic regression results with Modified Audit Variable
In this study, performed as the study performed by Robinson and Owens-Jackson (2009),
the situations of specific large CPA firms, which are the ‘Big 4’, would be further
investigated in order to study whether these firms have greater and lesser opportunities of
being dismissed and switches by clients due to the different audit committee characteristics.
Accordingly, the additional tests were done repeatedly to obtain the specific result. The
objective is to determine whether auditor switches occur in listed firm that audited by these
specific audit firms. Existing logistic regression was re-performed with the same sample and
variables, except the auditor variable (AUDIT) would be replaces as modified auditor variable
called AUDITM. AUDITM would be coded as 1 for the Big 4 firms tested and 0 would be
coded for other audit firms. For example, if tested audit firm is KPMG, the modified auditor
variable would be coded as 1 if the sample is KPMG and other CPA firms including other
three Big4 firms would be coded as 0. This revised regression would be performed for all Big
4 firms and four regression results of these 4 firms were displayed in Table 5 in Appendix.
Among the 4 largest audit firms in the market, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers were
shown that the statistically significant effect with the positive coefficients. It implies the
existence of the chances on switches of auditors have a comparatively higher risk to be
26
changed by the clients, while the chance of auditors were relatively lower under the other two
firms Deloitte and Ernst and Young. For the audit committee variables, all of these firms have
significant results on the number of meetings of audit committee. With the negative
coefficients on all CPA firms, it implies that more audit committee meetings would decrease
the possibility of change of auditor by the client dismissal. For the control variables, the listed
firm’s growth were displayed a significant results towards all Big 4 firms. Again, with the
negative coefficients appeared in all CPA firms, it implies that higher growth of client firm
would less likely to change of auditor and dismiss them.
7. Discussion
For the reasons of change auditors, including accounting disagreements, auditor
resignation, auditor remuneration dispute and receipt of qualified opinion, over a half is
falling to the fee disputes and only a few cases are related to the accounting disagreement and
audit qualified opinion. Perhaps the reason is the auditor firm may avoid being the
whistle-blower. Since the auditor may find some queries on the company’s behavior but may
not gather adequate evidence to prove them. They might choose to resign the audit
engagement and inform the public that because of other reasons arising at the same time
rather than disclose their doubt directly and simultaneously. This can remain audit firm’s
reputation in auditing industry and avoid lose clients by making clients frightened on the
sudden disclosure of the company business information.
Nowadays, according to the Listing Rule of equity securities Appendix 14 “Corporate
governance code and corporate governance report”, public listed companies are required to set
up the audit committee, and according to Listing Rule of equity securities Chapter 3, at least
one independent non-executive director should have appropriate accounting professional
qualifications or related financial management expertise and audit committee should consist
with non-executive directors only. As the result, during the collection of data, there are rare
27
cases for the large number of the directors without independence and sit in the audit
committee. Also, there are only few cases that with the absence of financial professional in
the audit committee, so it is probably the reason to explain the weak linkage between audit
committee independence and expertise and auditor change.
Moreover, although there are insignificant effects statistically on variable of governance
expertise and firm-specific knowledge, the positive coefficients existed in this research, which
is contradicted with the prior research. These positive signals imply some positive correlations.
The higher chances of existence of auditor change when the committee members have more
board experience and serving for current firms for longer period. Nevertheless, it has some
reasons behind these outcomes. Since the committee members have more experience on
performing the director duties, on the one hand, they may more concerning on the auditing
quality since they have experience on dealing with auditors. On the other hand, they may
know that what auditor would more concern on some aspects of financial statement, they
might have skills to hide up something and they might suggest for the change of external
auditor in order to avoiding any qualified opinion. If the members have served for a longer
period with the existing company’s board, they might understand more the financial position
and the operating situation of company with the updated information. On the negative side,
they might want to avoid any modified opinion on the auditors’ report and they might have
disagreement on the accounting and the internal control of the firm, however, on the bright
side, they might choose to change auditor because of the need of the streamline the auditing
process with the related parties like subsidiaries or parent company, and probably the need to
change of auditor in order to stimulate the new inspiration on the business operation and
internal control systems by cooperation.
Number of audit committee meeting is a negative correlation with the change of auditor.
Since if the audit committee can communicate with the auditors more frequently, like have
28
more regular meetings. Both sides can be more informed and audit committee can understand
more on the characteristics and the effectiveness of audit, the objective of audit and the
problems appears during the audit process. Auditor also can be ensured for adequate
opportunities to inform the committee for the material matters on their firm should be noticed
and discuss for the fee charged. Thus, more communication of the audit committee and
external auditor will lead them understand the needs of each other and enhance for the closer
cooperation and relationship and reduce the possibility to change of auditor.
For logistic regression results with modified audit variable on the specific audit firm,
KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers clients were shown that they have comparatively higher
possibility on the change of auditor. This reflects that they may have more disagreement
between them and their client than Deloitte and Ernst & Young. This situation can be
interpreted that Deloitte and Ernst & Young have a better customer relationship, provide the
more valuable services to their clients, and have charged fees for audit and non-audit service
that the clients may think that more reasonable. However, according to ideas of Robinson &
Owens-Jackson, it can be explained as what extent of standard has been practiced. In this case,
they may reflect that KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers may exercise the relatively more
strict standards on the auditing internally and lead to more clients would like to choose to
switch their auditors.
Finally, unlike prior research, no significance on the audit committee characteristics was
found in this research. The further research should be performed in the future and it should
explore more variables and more suitable measure for testing, it can be explained in two ways.
Firstly, the effectiveness of some audit committee could be doubted and at least have the room
for improvement, which means that some audit committee nature may not be identified but
still can affect the change of the auditor. This also implies that more requirements and some
natures that audit committee should have but are still not discovered. Secondly, on the
29
contrary, perhaps it is a good signal on the corporate governance in Hong Kong current
situation. Since audit committee of listed companies in Hong Kong were enforced to be
established, with consisting of independent non-executive directors and financial expertise as
the members and requiring meetings frequently. Most of the listed public companies can
adopt the audit committee characteristics in a relatively higher standard and thus increase the
degree of corporate governance. This implies the reasons of auditor change happened in these
years may not because of the weak audit committee and poor corporate governance but
because of pure commercial reasons or reasons that already discovered by audit committee.
8. Conclusion, limitation and Recommendations
To conclude, audit committee members were suggested that to have acquired the key
characteristics, for example, independence of members, professionals in the financial areas.
Those qualities of audit committee members are reflected as necessarily and effective factors
an audit committee. Also, accounting professions and regulators, which includes HKEX have
point out some requirements and critical natures for the success of audit committee and
increase its intrinsic value to the firms. In this research, five critical nature of audit committee
identified by Robinson & Owens-Jackson (2009) including independence of members,
financial expertise, audit committee meetings number, corporate governance experience and
seniority in the firm served were used for testing. This study is examining the relationship
between the mentioned five characteristics identified by the prior research whether this
relationship may still suitable in current situation of Hong Kong. However, this research
results told us that all characteristics are not significant associated with the auditor switches.
Indeed, this shows that only little effects and unclear relationship on the auditor changes with
five characteristics, and enhancing the good qualities of audit committee seems only little help
to reduce auditor changes.
30
Some limitations were consisted in this research that may affect the completeness and
accuracy of the research result. Firstly, this research is based on the list released in the Hong
Kong Exchange (HKEX) website announced by the listed companies Most of the auditor
change firms are the enterprises that comparatively small in size. The assets value of the
sample firms collected and reviewed are mostly below one billion Hong Kong dollars, and the
large size companies with one billion dollars assets value above are rarely change auditors. So
the research may not be comprehensive enough. Secondly, most of annual reports of listed
companies would disclose the bibliophiles of all directors and senior managements, however,
most of them only disclose the general information of the mentioned important figures. They
would not fully describe the previous board experience of the directors, for example, they do
not disclose the number of firm served before be appointed for the existing firm’s director.
Even though search of director can be made in HKEX website, it is still not sure that whether
the director has served the overseas companies and private companies. Nevertheless, the data
on previous board served has been ensured that have been collected as accurate as possible.
During the research, although all listed companies are required to set up the audit
committees for fulfilling the listing rules. First at all, the listed companies in the main board
should be enforced to released quarterly reports, which as same as the listed companies in
GEM Board requirement. (Listing rules of equity securities of GEM Board Chapter 18). Since
audit committee are required to preliminary review the result before the release to the public,
the number of audit committee meetings of GEM board companies would be relatively higher
than main board companies, so the research reflects more board meeting and increase the
probability of change auditor. Secondly, in this research and the prior research of Robinson &
Owens-Jackson, the research did not involve element of average attendance of the audit
committee meetings. Since I have found that some independent non-executive director did not
attend the audit committee meeting, in order to increase the corporate governance quality, the
31
regulators and HKEX should amend the listing rules to requiring the independent
non-executive director should attend at least 50% of meetings. Otherwise, the directors should
disclose the reason why they did not attend meetings and the board of directors should not
recommend this director to shareholder for the re-appointment for some period. Since the
independent non-executive director should consistently practice their professional duties and
they should put sufficient time on the company (Guideline of independent non-executive
director P.3-4), even though they are under pressure, if these directors did not attend the
meetings, there is the doubt that whether they have spending time, efforts and abilities on
managing and supervising the listed firm effectively.
Even though the research result may not be clear to show the relationship, it can be
considered that this result still expresses some remarkable signals. Firstly, this suggests that
the change of auditor may mainly because of normal and reasonable business reasons, for
example, reduce the audit fee for the company’s interest. And it shows that change of auditor
not mainly due to tricks of some dominant shareholders and powerful directors played in the
audit committee. The high quality of audit committee would provide the confidence and more
meaningful financial reporting to the investors, potential investors and the other related users.
However, since nowadays many listed companies would change their external auditor at the
time of financial situation variations, which may tend to be bad side, the regulators and
accounting professionals and other stakeholders, should concern and explore more necessarily
and qualitative characteristics of audit committee in order to polish and update the recent
standards on audit committee and increase effectiveness of audit committee. Regulators,
accounting professions and directors and audit committee members and other stakeholder
should keep on work hard and maintain high standard of quality of audit committees.
32
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10. Appendices
Table 1A: Number of Auditor Change Firms from 2004 to 2011
Number of notice about auditor change firm listed at Hong Kong Stock
Exchange website 1234
Less: number of the duplicate notice (with describing the same audited
change incidents) 186
1048
Less: number of firms with no clear reasons 68
Less: number of firms with other reasons than accounting disagreement,
auditor resignation audit fee disputes and receipt of qualified opinion 158
226
Total number of firms with reasons mentioned
822
Table 1B: Selection of Auditor Change Firms from 2004 to 2011
Accounting
Disagreement
Auditor
resignation Fee dispute
Audit Qualified
opinion Total
Auditor change firms 2004-2011 18 293 503 8 822
Less:
Firms with not enough audit committee data 0 5 35 1 41
Firms with not enough financial data 1 15 13 0 29
Total number of firms suitable for research 17 273 455 7 752
Total number of firms randomly chosen
for the sample 6 35 86 3 130
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Table 1C: Descriptive Deaitls for sample and control (con'd)
Industry
Sector
Sample
firm
Control
firm Total
00 Energy 001 Oil & Gas 5 7 12
002 Coal 5 2 7
05 Materials
051 Gold & Precious Metals 0 0 0
052 Diversified Metals & Minerals 3 3 6
053 Basic Materials 6 2 8
10 Industrial Goods 100 Industrial Goods 12 10 22
20 Consumer Goods
201 Automobiles 1 2 3
202 Household Goods & Electronics 3 8 11
203 Textiles, Clothing & Accessories 7 10 17
204 Food & Beverages 1 6 7
205 Health & Personal Care 16 8 24
206 Agricultural Products 0 0 0
30 Services
301 Retailers 2 3 5
302 Hotels, Casinos & Leisure Facilities 4 6 10
303 Media & Entertainment 4 9 13
304 Transportation 2 2 4
305 Support Services 5 8 13
35 Telecommunications 350 Telecommunications 1 1 2
40 Utilities 400 Utilities 3 3 6
50 Financials
501 Banks 0 0 0
502 Insurance 0 0 0
503 Other Financials 10 9 19
60 Properties & Construction 601 Properties 11 14 25
602 Construction 3 4 7
70 Information Technology
701 IT Hardware 10 4 14
702 Software & Services 9 8 17
703 Semiconductors 0 0 0
80 Conglomerates 800 Conglomerates 3 1 4
Unclassified 4 0 4
Total 130 130 260
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Table 1C: Descriptive Details for sample and control
Sample firm Control firm Total
Listed in Main Board 98 106 204
Listed in GEM Board 32 24 56
130 130 260
Sample firm Control firm
Asset value (HKD in Million) - Mean 4075 4907
Asset value (HKD in Million) - Median 578 539
Table 2 : Descriptive Statistics Univarite Results
Variable
Auditor change Firm (n=130) Control Firm (n=130)
Mean Median Std.
Deviation
Mean Median Std.
Deviation
Diff in
Means t-test
INDP 0.949 1.000 0.113 0.939 1.000 0.139 0.010 -0.610
TECH 0.351 0.333 0.167 0.336 0.333 0.178 0.014 -0.673
MEET 3.077 3.000 1.350 2.808 2.000 1.020 0.269 -1.813*
GEXP 1.943 1.333 1.962 2.101 1.333 2.224 -0.158 0.609
KNOW 3.416 3.000 2.311 4.010 3.333 2.910 -0.594 1.823*
GROWTH 0.572 0.151 1.512 0.229 0.082 0.718 0.343 -2.335**
SIZE 8.740 8.762 0.800 8.738 8.732 0.836 0.002 -0.018
AUDIT 0.346 0.000 0.478 0.217 1.000 0.482 0.129 4.910***
FEE 0.291 -0.001 0.903 0.217 0.071 0.804 0.074 -0.694
* = p-value <0.10 , ** = p-value <0.05, *** = p-value <0.01
variable definition
INDP = the independent audit committee members on the audit committee proportion
TECH = the audit committee members on the audit committee with financial expertise (CPA / CFO Experience)
MEET = the number of audit committee meetings held during the firm's reporting year
GEXP = the average number of boards of directors which the audit committee members have served on
KNOW = the average number of years audit committee members have served with the current particular firm
GROWTH = the average percentage change in total assets for two years ending before the occurrence of auditor change
SIZE = The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets at the year of auditor change
AUDIT = The external auditors' firm size where an audit done by BIG4 =1 and other small audit firm =0
FEE = The change of audit fee at the year of auditor change with the previous year
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix: Independent Variables
INDP TECH MEET GEXP KNOW GROWTH SIZE AUDIT FEE
INDP 1.000 -.023 -.014 -.049 .069 -.039 .151 .059 -.003
TECH 1.000 -.023 -.152 -.045 -.075 .101 -.008 -.019
MEET 1.000 -.014 .012 .074 .153 .060 .133
GEXP 1.000 -.065 -.040 -.129 -.036 .027
KNOW 1.000 .067 -.165 -.038 .145
GROWTH 1.000 -.160 .054 -.149
SIZE 1.000 -.299 .049
AUDIT 1.000 -.196
FEE 1.000
Table 4: Logistics Regression Results Auditor Change Model
Variable Predicted Sign Estimated Coefficients Wald Statistic
INTERCEPT None 2.571 1.502
INDP - -0.029 0.001
TECH - -0.441 0.313
MEET - -0.180 2.383
GEXP + 0.033 0.253
KNOW + 0.061 1.276
GROWTH - -0.243* 2.705*
SIZE - -0.304* 2.674*
AUDIT + 1.285*** 19.575***
FEE - -0.169 0.999
Number of Observation 260.000
Goodness of fit 0.292
Concordant Pairs 65%
*** Statistically significant at less than the .01 level
** Statistically significant at less than the .05 level
* Statistically significant at less than the .10 level
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Table 5: Logistic regression results with Modified Audit Variable^
Deloitte Touche
Tohmatsu Ernst & Young KPMG PricewaterhouseCoopers
variables
Estimated
Coefficient
Wald
Statistics
Estimated
Coefficient
Wald
Statistics
Estimated
Coefficient
Wald
Statistics
Estimated
Coefficient
Wald
Statistics
INDP -.272 .068 -.485 .216 .033 .001 -.255 .058
TECH -.581 .572 -.369 .235 -.283 .139 -.383 .253
MEET -.209 3.445* -.200 3.162* -.249 4.746** -.251 4.852**
GEXP .046 .525 .048 .571 .036 .325 .037 .339
KNOW .074 2.081 .075 2.065 .056 1.060 .076 2.177
GROWTH -.300 4.224* -.284 3.769* -.285 3.767* -.285 3.690*
SIZE -.086 .257 -.128 .553 -.132 .591 -.163 .862
AUDITM^ .339 .956 .655 2.460 1.696 4.312** .764 3.556*
FEE -.057 .124 -.042 .071 -.061 .144 -.044 .077
Constant 1.516 .578 1.952 .951 1.720 .736 2.194 1.158
*** Statistically significant at less than the .01 level
** Statistically significant at less than the .05 level
* Statistically significant at less than the .10 level
^In the logistic Regression, AUDITM = 1 if the external auditor is specific Big 4 audit firm and otherwise is 0
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