The Relationship between Social Capital, Norm, and Bribery ...

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL EDUCATION

ISSN: 2146-0353 ● © RIGEO ● 11(3), SUMMER, 2021

www.rigeo.org Research Article

The Relationship between Social Capital,

Norm, and Bribery in Indonesia

Istiwanah Perdana Putri1

Universitas Andalas, Padang, Indonesia [email protected]

Elfindri2

Universitas Andalas, Padang, Indonesia

[email protected]

Neng Kamarni3


[email protected]

Harif Amali3


[email protected]

Ikhwani Ratna5

Universitas Islam Sultan Syarif Kasim, Riau, Indonesia

[email protected]

1Corresponding author: Email: [email protected]

Abstract

The study analyzed how social capital affects the bribery behavior of legislators in Riau Province in

drafting the regional expenditure budget (APBD/ Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah). This

study also analyzed social norms as moderating variables (can be weaken/strengthen in the

relationship between social capital and bribery behavior of legislator’s regency/city in Riau Province in

drafting APBD. This research uses a quantitative approach with the locus of the researching is legislators.

The total sample of the study was 214 members of legislators in Riau Province. The results of this study

indicate that social capital affects the bribery behavior of legislators in Riau Province. The stronger social

capital owned by the legislator; the more bribery behavior will increase. The same thing is shown by

social norms which are proven to be able to moderate social capital on the bribery behavior of

legislators in Riau Province in drafting the APBD. Social norms strengthen the relationship between social

capital and the bribery behavior of legislators in Riau Province. The study revealed that social norms

were very dominant to influence the occurrence of bribery, both active and passive. If the existing

social norms in the legislature consider that receiving rewards (money/goods/facilities) was a common

thing and supported by solid social capital, it would be increasing the bribery behavior

Keywords

Social capital, social norms, bribery behavior (active & passive), legislators

To cite this article: Putri, I, P.; Elfindri. Kamarni, N, Amali, H, and Ratna, K. (2021).The Relationship between Social

Capital, Norm, and Bribery in Indonesia. Review of International Geographical Education (RIGEO), 11(3), 513-526 Doi: 10.48047/rigeo.11.3.54

Submitted: 03-01-2021 ● Revised: 02-02-2021 ● Accepted: 04-03-2021

http://www.rigeo.org/

mailto:[email protected]






© RIGEO ● Review of International Geographical Education 11(3), SUMMER, 2021

Introduction

Benjamin Olken (Economics Professor of Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Rohini

Pande (Economics Professor of Harvard University) said that corruption has become a

bureaucratic culture in developing countries. Moreover, bribe is part of the organizational

structure function. In Indonesia, there are many different cultures and ethnicities that affect the

difficulty in defining the deep-rooted and entrenched corrupt behavior (ALMI.or.id, March 2020).

Corruption over the decades in Indonesia resulted economic crisis in the 1998. After all, the new

order collapsed due to corrupt behavior allowed. In many literatures, corruption is very

destructive to the environment, economy, and social structure of developing countries (Davoodi

& Tanzi, 1997; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Seligson, 2002; Steele, 2010). Corruption is

an indication and result of institutional weakness caused the weak economic performance of a

country (Bardhan, 2017). According to Collins (2012), conducting a corruption research should

focus on corruption forms in a limited context. Corruption is not a real thing and it cannot be

calculated like Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Johnston, 2010). Corruption is usually confidential

and occurs in various and regular ways.

The Namibia Institute found nine categories included corruption in the 2012 namely bribery,

embezzlement, fraud, extortion, abuse of power, conflict of interest, favoritism, nepotism and

illegal contributions Grabova (2014). For example, individuals or groups may offer money to

political parties in exchange for some interest. Meanwhile, according to Act No. 31 of 1999

concerning the Eradication of Criminal Corruption, the definition of corruption is anyone who is

categorized as violating the law, committing acts of enriching himself, benefiting himself or

another person or a corporation, abusing their authority or opportunities or facilities because of

the position that destructive to state finances or the state economy. According to the

Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) report, mass corruption occurred in parliament due to the

high-cost politics (Merdeka.com, 2018). Almas Syrafina, a member of ICW Political Corruption

Division, said that campaign is the most draining activity funds of election participants. First, the

parties or election candidates build billboards and conduct survey to attract public attention.

Second, the candidates also give a 'dowry' to attract the political parties’ attention. Third, the

candidates conduct the most expensive stages, campaign. Fourth, the witness payment in the

vote taking also included in the expensive stages. In West Java, there are candidates who

spend Rp. 20 billion for witness funds. Fifth, the preparation and supervision of disputes require

high costs.

The great example of candidates willing to spend a lot of money is the case of the former chief

of the Constitutional Court in 2014. There are election participants’ attempts to influence judges’

decisions on election disputes by conducting bribes. The amount of funds spent causes the

regional heads to return political capital. It is believed that regional heads’ salaries and

alimonies will not cover those funds. It becomes a chance to conduct fraud and corruption

impacted after being chosen. Returning political capital or political debt is carried out by

corruption, sale and purchase positions or ‘playing’ projects (Kompas.com, 2018). Corruption

Eradication Commission (KPK) declared that 4 regional heads to be corruption suspects from

January to June 2020. Most of the cases were due to bribery of Provincial Budget (APBD/

Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah) (http://acch.kpk.go.id). The commission said that the

bribery cases occupied first place (708 cases) over the last 16 years nationally. In addition, the

most of corruption suspects are members of parliament (232 cases).

This study focuses observing the occurrence of corruption in public institutions, especially in the

Indonesia Legislature. The Eradication of Criminal Corruption reported that the Indonesian

legislators occupy the highest position as corruption perpetrators until June 2020. This study will

limit the focus on bribery which the highest corruption in Indonesia when the Member of

Parliament discuss APBD organization. The importance role of the legislature design and

formulate policies and ratification of the consideration effecting APBD misuse that they are

sentenced in court (Nurhayati, Pratiwi, Muniarty, & Kamaluddin, 2020). Bribes can occur to

public officials with discretionary authority over the distribution of resources to the private sector,

in the form of fees or other incentives. Bribes transactions are divided into active and passive.

Active bribery is a person who attempts to influence the public or private official decisions by

offering, giving, or promising money, goods, or other services. While passive bribery is a person

who demands, receives, or expects a gift as a compensation for the abuse of their authority

(Caneppele & Calderoni, 2014). Bribery is a criminalized human behavior, not only in Indonesia

but also in international laws, such in the UK (Jordan, 2011).

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Putri, I, P.; Elfindri. Kamarni, N, Amali, H, and Ratna, K. (2021).The Relationship between Social Capital, Nor……

Social capital is a concern in the corruption literature (Donna Harris, 2007; Wachs, Yasseri,

Lengyel, & Kertész, 2019). Eroğlu and Kangal (2016) define the social capital concept as the

community ability to cooperate in achieving common goals in various groups. The goals to be achieved by the community are achieved with the community by building trust, agreeing on

the rules, networking and reciprocal relationships (Kamarni, Anshori, & Sukmana, 2019). Džunić

and Golubović (2016) adopted trust, social networks and social norms as parameters of social

capital. Empirical results from research conducted by Dzˇunic and Golubovic (2016) that

corruption has a close relationship with social capital and high corruption reflects institutional

weakness Bonding social capital leads to higher levels of perceived corruption, especially public

and political corruption, when trust and cooperation with outsiders is reduced (Dell Harris, 2007).

Based on the social-psychological, norms are very important in explaining and predicting the

specific human behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Schwartz, 1977). Gorsira, Steg, Denkers, and Huisman

(2018) in their research in the Netherlands on private and public institutions, found that social

norms have a major influence on the occurrence of corruption. Social norms are a very

important factor to explain why officials in private and public institutions are involved in

corruption. Corruption of public officials is defined as a moral hazard (Tavits, 2010). Wenzel (2004)

also found that social norms are not directly related to tax evasion, but have a strong

moderating role. This study of Australian citizens found social norms reinforce individual behavior

to commit or not commit tax evasion in Australia. When a high sense of shame is formed in

society towards tax evasion behavior, individuals will not do it. The popularity of a behavior will

force a person to act in accordance with the behavior (Rimal & Real, 2003) because the person

feels that enacting the behavior will provide benefits (expected results) for him. Social norms

reinforce (moderate) descriptive behavior of an individual (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).

Social norms are relevant individuals‘perceptions of the others beliefs and behaviors (Cialdini,

Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). This is a very important relationship between the person and his

environment (Wikström, 2017). A person's social environment can greatly influence non-

normative behavior (Cialdini et al., 1991). Social factors can inhibit, activate, or stimulate

individuals to engage in corruption (Gorsira et al., 2018). Individual behavior that violates the

rules in the workplace is closely related to the violation of norms committed by their co-workers

(Robinson & O'Leary-Kelly, 1998). The theory of planned behavior focuses on subjective norms

referring to the perceived likelihood that others are important to approve or disapprove of a

specific behavior (Ajzen, 1985). Meanwhile, the theory focused on normative behavior

postulates that a person's behavior is not only influenced by individual perceptions of what is

generally agreed or disapproved of legal norms but also people's perceptions of what

descriptive norms usually do (Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). Someone who has a desire to be

corrupt will become weak if other people who are considered important do not accept corrupt

(Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). The researcher uses the theory of social norms defined by Gorsira et al.

(2018) that a person's perception refers to what is important for other people to think and do in a

certain context, so that someone commits corruption more because of the behavior of his co-

workers who are also corrupt.

Based on the description above, the study examines the influence of social capital variables on

bribery behavior of legislature with social norms as a moderator. Norms are considered capable

of explaining human behavior in detail and contributing to corruption (Gorsira et al., 2018). Thus,

the social capital variable can affect the occurrence of corruption by how strong or weak social

norms are. Individuals with weak social norms, weak social capital, bribery behavior can

increase. Based on the previous case described above, corruption is not uncommon thing in

Indonesia. The KPK reported that corruption already entered into all life lines in Indonesia from

the executive at the regional to province and the legislature at the DPRD to the DPR RI.

Moreover, the judicial includes prosecutor, judge, or police conduct corruption. Corruption is

never finished even though the Indonesian government, especially the Corruption Eradication

Commission (KPK) conducted prevention and hand-picking operation against state officials in all

sectors. A Bribery case had involving the legislators of Riau Provincial, especially the 2014

regional expenditure budget changes (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Derah- Perubaha/

APBD-P). The case dragged the Governor of Riau for the 2014-2019 periods where to smooth the

hammer on the 2014 APBD-P ratification, the Governor bribed several legislators. Likewise, the

Governor of Riau in the 2009-2014 periods committed a criminal act of corruption in the form of

bribes to lgisaltors of the Riau Provincial to smooth the National Sport Weeks (Pekan Olahraga

Nasional/PON) budget. Recently, corruption cases involving lgislators in Regency/City in Riau

Province mostly violated government regulation number 110/2000 although now it has been

replaced with government regulation number 24/2004 regarding the financial position of DPRD.

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One of these cases occurred in Kampar Regency, totally 454 lgislators in Kampar regency have

been suspects for violating severance pay (Aditya & Al-Fatih, 2020){Treisman, 2000 #374}. The highest number of corruption cases based on the type is bribery. Then, Gorsira et al. (2018)

found that one of the effecting factors of bribery is social norms. Based on the KPK data and

Gorsira et al. (2018), the study examines and analyzes about the relationship between Social

Capital, Social Norms and Bribery in Indonesia.

Literature Review

Social Capital

The dimension of social capital is inherent in the structure of social relations and social networks

in a society that creates a variety of social obligations, creates a climate of mutual trust, carries

information channels, and sets norms, as well as social sanctions for members of the community

(Eriksson & Rataj, 2019). Putra, Kembauw, Sebayang, and Mukhlis (2020) emphatically states, not

necessarily the shared norms and values that are guided as a reference for behaving, acting,

and behaving automatically become social capital. However, only shared norms and values

are generated by trust. Trust is an expectation of order, honesty, and cooperative behavior that

arises from within a community based on the norms shared by its members. These norms can

contain statements that revolve around noble values (virtue) and justice. The concept of social

capital, which has been the subject of research for various types of science such as sociology,

economics, political science and the science and management sciences recently included in

this list, is treated as a resource that facilitates individual activities and these are defined as

norms and networks, which provide contribution along with important factors such as self-

confidence. Coleman based the term social capital on rational choice theory. Coleman, who

developed a 'Coleman-ish' approach using economics and sociology, generates social capital

based on ideas that include human action within a society. Scope with the neoclassical

principle of individual rationality.Coleman considers not only individuals consider as economists

do, but also social organizations such as sociologists. Coleman states that economic sociology

sees social capital as steps taken to make action, caused by social relations, easier. Thus, social

capital becomes a concept that is of interest to other disciplines.

According to Coleman, social capital explains why people can cooperate even in competition

with the best benefits and how they can achieve hard work. This approach puts social capital at

the center of the famous 'invisible hand' principle of classical economics. With his social capital

theory, in which he defends moving collectively instead of trying to achieve individual goals,

Putnam argues that ongoing social relations affect individual cooperation and their level of

solidarity positively by using available resources. In this case, in a society that is able to change 'I'

into 'we'. Social capital will be an important factor for achieving the 'common good.' Social

capital plays an important role in creating a sense of belonging to a community, a group, and

to express capacities that a person has but is not quite useful. Putnam has sought to source a

strong state, a strong society and a strong economy in his theory of social capital. While Putnam

evaluates social capital at the macro level to reveal social tendencies, Coleman also observes

social capital as public property. Bourdieu, on the other hand, studies social capital at the micro

level within the framework of the family, the social environment and its effects.

Social Norm

Social Norms are unwritten rules about how to behave. These rules are used by a social or

cultural group about values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that are acceptable or

unacceptable (Fetrina, Rustamaji, Nuraeni, & Durrachman, 2017). These regulations may be

written or stated explicitly, or not written or stated explicitly. Failure to follow these rules will result

in a number of possible penalties, one of which is excommunication from the group (Deutsch &

Gerard, 1955; Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). Emile Durkheim discovered social facts about norms,

which revealed a theory about society which has an integrated system involving social and

institutional issues. Durkheim also discovered the concepts of normative order. This can be seen

from his book entitled "Division of Labor in Society" (1893), which describes the type and quality

of reciprocal social ties resulting from the division of labor in modern society. Another book

entitled "The Elementary Forms of Religious Life" (1912), describes the external forces resulting

from moral values that limit individual behavior. The moral values that make up these external

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forces are norms. Durkheim concluded that society functions to produce various levels of social

bonds and rules within groups.Some researchers view companies as victims who are forced to

commit bribery when society institutionalizes bribery and corruption as social norms (Argandoña, 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 2002; Spencer J. and Gomez C, 2014; Vaughan, 1999). Such corrupt

institutions force companies to pay bribes in exchange for even their basic legitimate rights such

as access to infrastructure (Powpaka, 2002). Initially the social norm approach was developed

by Perkins and Berkowitz (1986) in an analysis of patterns of alcohol use in students. In his

research, these students assumed that their friends supported drinking behavior, so they were

able to predict how much they drank. Perkins and Berkowitz (1986) argue that to prevent

students from drinking alcohol is to focus on group behavior towards alcohol. If the group of

students thinks that drinking alcohol is bad, then the prevention pattern can be successful.

Bribery

Bribes are unofficial payments made by an organization to public officials on an ongoing basis

with the aim of obtaining business-related (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). This

provides an overview of the unethical interactions between business people and authorities.

Bribery is defined as an offer, promising (giving) something to a public official to retain or obtain

a business (Boles, 2014; Hess, 2009; Sanyal, 2005). Academics have long recognized the

tendency of companies to pay bribes to achieve organizational goals and identified a number

of factors that can trigger companies to take bribes (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010). Some researchers

see companies as victims of bribery when society institutionalizes bribery and corruption as a

social norm (Argandoña, 2005; Rose-Ackerman, 2002){Spencer J. and Gomez C, 2014 #358}.

Corrupt institutions force companies to pay bribes in exchange for even their basic, legitimate

rights such as access to infrastructure (Powpaka, 2002). Regardless of whether public institutions

force companies to take bribes or vice versa companies actively provide bribes, most of the

literature states that bribery is an economic transaction. Assuming companies will bribe only

when the business benefits outweigh the costs (bribes) incurred (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Brass,

Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Martinez-Vazquez, Boex, & del Granado, 2007; Rose-Ackerman,

2002).

Experts argue that illicit payments (bribes) basically provide businesses with an opportunity to

increase efficiency (Iriyama, Kishore, & Talukdar, 2016; Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010).

Firms that are weaker in the institutional environment can face additional costs from delayed

government approvals or prolonged transactions by public officials (Rottenberg, 1975; Svensson,

2003; Zhou & Peng, 2012). Such companies can use bribes to address the problem of late

payments from public officials. Public officials who have discretionary authority over the

distribution of resources to the private sector either in the form of fees or other incentives, bribes

can occur. Transactions in the form of bribes are divided into active and passive. Individuals,

who try to influence the decisions of public or private officials by offering, giving, or promising

money, goods, or other services, are called active bribes. Whereas individuals who ask for,

receive, or expect gifts in exchange for abuse of their power of authority are called passive

bribes (Caneppele & Calderoni, 2014). Bribery behavior in politicians (legislative) occurs due to

the tendency to profit from a project not because of the priority of the activity or program

(MARTIN, CULLEN, JOHNSON, & PARBOTEEAH, 2007). Legislative preference for the capital

expenditure budget is preferred because it can provide a larger commission than the budget

for social services, education and health (Zabler, 2021).

Social Capital Effect towards Bribery Behaviour

Eroğlu and Kangal (2016) in their research ‘Can Social Capital Be the New Dynamics of

Economic Development’ found that social capital has a positive influence on economic growth.

They also found that social capital can create new dynamics for a country's economic

development. In addition, social capital is one of the factors that influence the economic

development of a country (Požega, Crnković, & Sučić, 2011). On the other hand, corruption can

reduce a country's economy (Anh, Minh, & Tran-Nam, 2016). Therefore, the relationship between

corruptions, which is bribery, has a close relationship with social capital. Social capital becomes

concern in the literature of corruption (Donna Harris, 2007). Kingston (2005) measures social

capital with trust. In their repeated experiments, the trust gained by enabling them to commit

not to pay bribes can reduce the level of corruption.

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Courel-Ibáñez, Suárez, Ortega Toro, Piñar López, and Cárdenas Velez (2013) in their research

found that universal trust (connecting and bridging social capital) which is a positive social capital has a negative relationship with corruption. Conversely, a certain level of trust can be a

negative social capital directly related to corruption.

H1: Social capital influences the bribery behavior of Legislators Regency/City in Riau Province in

drafting regional expenditure budget (APBD)

The social norms role on social capital and bribery behaviour

According to Eroğlu and Kangal (2016) social capital has the effect of reducing asymmetric

information, to gain public trust, information sharing and competitiveness. Social capital is also

able to increase participation in political life and social organization, improve income

distribution and accelerate economic growth. Thus social capital can create new dynamics in

economic development. Majewska (2013) found that there is a level of dependence between

an increase in social capital and a decrease in the scale of corruption in the 104 countries in the

world that he studied. Požega et al. (2011) in their research also found that human capital has

the highest influence on world economic development, followed by moral capital, intellectual

capital and social capital. Uslaner (2004) reports that social capital is measured by the amount

of trust between individuals and individuals who trust each other is a significant cause of

reduced corruption. This research is supported by Porta et al (1997) where trust has a negative

influence on corruption. Trusting societies tend to have efficient governance, less corruption,

which leads to higher levels of economic development (Bjørnskov, 2012; Uslaner, 2004).

Similarly, research by Džunić and Golubović (2016) found that people with higher levels of

general trust and civic engagement tend to have lower levels of corruption. Likewise, research

by Banerjee (2016) reveals that there is a negative relationship between trust and bribery

behavior obtained from the experimental 'bribery game'. Nieuwenboer and Kaptein (2008)

argue that social factors can inhibit, activate, or stimulate individuals to engage in corruption. In

line with this, Robinson and O'Leary-Kelly (1998) found that the behavior of individuals who

violated the rules at work was closely related to the violation of norms committed by their

coworkers. Social normal does not directly refer to personal normative beliefs, but rather refers to

the individual's perception of the relevant beliefs and behaviors of others (Robert B Cialdini,

Kallgren and Reno, 1991). So this is a very important relationship between the person and his

environment (Wikström, 2017). A person's social environment can greatly influence non-

normative normative behavior (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini et al., 1991).

H2: Social norms as moderators in the relationship between social capital and bribery behavior

of district/city legislators in Riau Province in drafting regional expenditure budget (APBD).

Method

This study uses a quantitative approach, with locus in 12 District/City Regional Houses of

Representatives (DPRD) in Riau Province. The independent variable of this study is social capital,

while the dependent variable is bribery behavior and social norms as moderator variables. Data

obtained from questionnaires filled out by respondents using a Likert scale with a gradation of 1

to 5 (strongly agree, agree, disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree). The total population of

district/city DPRD members in Riau Province is 480 people, with a sample of 214 respondents

(Krejcie and Morgan, 1970), and the sample is allocated proportionally to each district and city

area in Riau Province. By using the proportional allocation, the samples in each region are

obtained as follows:

ni= Ni/N x n

Where:

ni = number of samples for each region

Ni = number of population in each area

N = number of population n = total sample

Fom the above formula it can be calculated that the sample for Indragiri Hilir Regency is:

Ni = 45, N = 480, n = 214

ni= 45/480 x 214, then ni = 20.06 (rounded to 20)

With this formula, the sample size for each region is obtained as shown in table 1.

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Table 1

Data Sample by Region

No Region/City Total Sample

1 Indragiri Hilir 45 20

2 Indragiri Hulu 40 18

3 Pelalawan 35 16

4 Kuantan Singingi 35 16

5 Kampar 45 20

6 Pekanbaru 45 20

7 Dumai 30 13

8 Siak 40 18

9 Bengkalis 45 20

10 Rokan HIlir 45 20

11 Rokan Hulu 45 20

12 Kep. Meranti 30 13

Total

480 214

This study uses the theory of bribery from Beets (2005) which was developed by Gorsira et al.

(2018). Bribery is defined as an event (intention) actively (to offer/give/promise) and passive (to

ask/receive/expect) in return for money/goods or services by public officials. Bribery behavior is

measured through 2 indicators of active bribery (in the context of work, I can promise something

to others; I can give preferential treatment to others) and 1 indicator of passive bribery (in the

context of work, I can receive rewards in the form of money/goods/facilities). ) from others.

The measurement of social capital uses the theory of Ridle (1997) in Eroğlu and Kangal (2016).

Ridle combines social capital from Colleman and Fukuyama who share indicators of social

capital with trust, and networks. The measurement of social norms was adopted from the

research of Gorsira et al. (2018).

Social norms are defined as a person's perception of what is important for other people to think

and do in a particular context. So someone commits corruption more because of the behavior

of his coworkers who are also corrupt. Social norms are measured by seven statements, namely:

I believe my close colleagues feel guilty if they receive rewards (money/goods/facilities) for the

services provided; I believe my close friends give preferential treatment to people from outside

the organization; I believe that my close friends receive compensation (money/goods/facilities)

for providing special services; I believe my supervisor gives preferential treatment to people

outside the organization; I believe that my supervisor receives compensation

(money/goods/facilities) from outside the organization for the special services provided; I

believe my close friends receive preferential treatment from people outside the organization;

and I believe my boss receives preferential treatment from people outside the organization Data analysis using Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).

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Result Validity Test

Validity test aimed to measure the accuracy and reliability of the questionnaire as a data

collection instrument. The validity test was conducted by observing at the loading factor value

of each indicator. The loading factor value > 0.5 means that the indicator is valid (Hair Jr,

Sarstedt, Hopkins, & Kuppelwieser, 2014). The first stage is a validity test for each indicator and

the results are that the NS2 is below 0.5. For this reason, NS2 was dropped from the analysis.

Furthermore, the validity test is carried out again. From Table 1 it can be seen that the loading

factor values of all indicators are valid. From Table 2 it can be seen that the loading factor

values of all indicators are valid.

Table 2

Validity Test

Indicator Loading Factor

NS1 .645

NS3 .803

NS4 .832

NS5 .839

NS6 .881

NS7 .878

MS1 .617

MS2 .527

PS1 1.001

PS2 .592

Full Model Test

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Table 3

Goodness-of-Fit

Goodness of Fit

indicates

Cut off Value Hasil Model Keterangan

Chi Square Diharapkan kecil 97,73 Marginal

CMIN/DF 2,0-3,0 2,641 Very Good

Probabibilty ≥ 0,05 0,000 Marginal

GFI ≥ 0,90 0,924 Very Good

TLI ≥ 0,90 0,961 Very Good

IFI ≥ 0,90 0,974 Very Good

NFI ≥ 0,90 0,958 Very Good

RMSEA ≤ 0,08 0,088 Good

Table 2 showed that the dominant goodness of fit value conformed to the requirements, where

the RMSEA value is in the good category, as well as the CMIN, GFI, TLI, IFI, NFI values are 0.90 in

the excellent category.

Hypothesis Test

The hypothesis assay was conducted by the CR value generated AMOS 24 process. The

hypothesis is accepted when the CR value is higher than the critical value (1.96) at the

significance level (p < 0.05). Conversely, the hypothesis is rejected when the CR value is smaller

than the critical value with a significance level (p > 0.05). The parameter estimation results can

be seen in Table 3.

Table 4

Hypothesis Test Result

H Hypothesis C.R. p Ket

1 Bribery

behavior

<--- Social capital 8.331 *** Significant

H1: The social capital effect on bribery behavior produced a CR value of 8,331 with a

probability of *** (< 0.01). It showed that the absolute value of Critical Ratio (CR) > T Statistics

(1.96) or probability < level of significance (alpha (α=5%)). Therefore, it can be interpreted that

social capital has a significant effect on bribery behavior.

H2: The moderation effect is the effect of social capital interaction between social norms

and bribery behavior resulting a CR value of 4,544 with a probability of *** (< 0.01). It showed

that the Critical Ratio (CR) absolute value > T Statistics (1.96) or probability < significance level

(alpha (α=5%)). It can be interpreted that there was a significant influence between the social

capital interaction and social norms on bribery behavior. It means social norms moderated

social capital towards bribery behavior. The results of the social norms influence (moderation

variables) on bribery behavior are stated to be significant. Thus, social norms act as a quasi-

moderator on the social norms influence (moderation variables) towards bribery behavior.

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Table 5

Moderation Test Result

Exogenous Endogen Coeffici

ent

S.E. C.R. P

Social

capital *

Social norm

Bribery

behaviou

r

.006 .001 4.544 ***

Conversion of Path Diagram into Structural Model

Direct & Indirect Model Effect

Exogenous Endogen Path Coefficient

Social Capital Bribery behaviour .535

Social Norms Bribery behaviour .543

Social Capital *

Social Norms

Bribery behaviour .006

PS = 0.535 MS + 0.543 NS + 0.006 MS*NS

From the formula above, it can be informed that:

1. The coefficient of the social capital direct effect on bribery behaviour is 0.535. This value

showed that there is a positive and significant effect of social capital on bribery behaviour. It

means the great social capital will increase the bribery behaviour efficacy.

2. The coefficient of the social norms direct effect on bribery behaviour is 0.543. It showed

that there is a positive and significant influence of social norms on bribery behaviour. It means

higher social norms will increase bribery behaviour.

3. The coefficient of the social capital interaction moderation path towards social norms on

bribery behaviour is 0.006. It showed that social capital has a positive and significant effect on

bribery behaviour. Likewise, the path coefficient of the social capital interaction influence

towards social norms on bribery behaviour is positive. Thus, social norms strengthen the social

capital influence on bribery behaviour.

Discussion

a. The Effect of Social Capital towards Bribery Behavior of Legislaturs in Riau Province

(Regency/City) in Drafting Regional Expenditur Budgeting (APBD)

The test results show that social capital affects the bribery behavior of legislator members in Riau

Province; it means that social capital does not always produce positive externalities (Putra et al.,

2020). More trust and network belong to a person; the tendency for bribery can be increase. This

research is in line with Haris (2007) when trust in certain parties, for example there is a gift in the

form of "goods" as promised, the level of corruption also increases. Haris (2007) also concludes

that countries with high levels of kinship tend to be more corrupt. However, this is different from

research (Džunić & Golubović, 2016) which found that Western Balkan countries characterized

by low levels of public trust and poor levels of civil society development actually have the

highest levels of corruption perceptions among European countries. This is due to the fact that

informal networks as social bonds lack formal institutions that are more efficient in contributing to

the spread of corrupt activities.

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The social capital that is built through the trust of fellow board members sometimes leads them

to fall. When a member of the council trusts his fellow members who are considered to know

more about the ins and outs of the APBD because it is already the 2nd period while he is new, then usually he will follow his colleague's advice. For example, in determining programs or

activities those are needed by the communities which are more easily included in the APBD.

According to the rules, the program or activity may be justified, but it turns out that from the

implementation side it is very sensitive, so that the program or activity is vulnerable to legal

cases, such as community assistance activities. In the end, the program or activity will drag the

board member into a legal realm that he did not know about before. In addition to trust, a

board member must have a wide network including fellow board members. But it was precisely

when the council members had to return the favor to other council members who had helped

him during the campaign period until he was elected. For example, you will promise to pass a

program or activity that is not in the public interest. One example is including the budget for

scholarships for their children in the APBD, even though their children do not meet the

requirements; it is very possible to still get scholarships because budgeting is also the authority of

legislators.

b. Social norms as moderators in the correlation between social capital and bribery

behavior of legislators in Riau Province in Drafting Expenditur Budgeting (APBD). The results of

data processing show that there is an effect of the interaction of social capital with social norms

on the bribery behavior of legislators in Regency/City of Riau Province. This means that social

norms are able to moderate social capital towards bribery behavior. The moderating path

coefficient of the interaction of social capital with social norms on bribery behavior is positive

and the coefficient of the direct influence of social capital on bribery behavior is also positive.

Thus, social norms strengthen the influence of social capital on bribery behavior. Coleman states

that social capital is basically a social structure (network) consisting of various communities,

which helps achieve goals and benefits for its members. In other words, it is the ability of people

to work together towards a common goal. Social capital that develops too strongly linking

various personal relationships both between government officials and politicians who work

together to protect their own interests is closely related to the preference for nepotism and

supporting family members, friends, or others who benefit certain groups, usually this kind of

social capital. Encourage the intensification of corruption (Majewska, 2013). From a social

capital perspective, what is important for achieving goals is not individual attributes but the way

one is embedded in the organization i.e., one's position in the network of social relationships that

provide information and political support (Brass et al., 1998).

However, changes in time cause this instrument (social capital) to fade because someone uses

this opportunity for personal or group interests, thus paving the way for corruption both political

corruption and in other forms (Ndem, 2012). In acting or working together, someone refers more

to individual perceptions of the beliefs and behaviors of other relevant people known as social

norms (Cialdini et al., 1991). In this research, social norms that apply to the community perceive

that getting rewards or receiving gifts in the discussion of the APBD is a normal thing, of course,

the members of the council follow these social norms. Thus social norms strengthen the

relationship of social capital to the bribery behavior of legislative members in Riau Province.

Conclusions and suggestions

a. Social capital is the ability of the community to work together to achieve common goals in

various groups. It is concluded that the bribery behavior of members of the district/city

legislature in Riau Province during drafting regional expenditure budgeting (APBD) will actually

strengthen if their social capital is stronger.

b. Social norms are a person's perception of what is important for other people to think and do in

a particular context. It is concluded that social norms become a moderating variable that can

strengthen or weaken the relationship between social capital and bribery behavior. This

happens when the existing social norms in the institution consider that receiving compensation in

drafting regional expenditure (APBD) is a common thing.

c. The originality of the findings of this study is that social norms are a moderating variable that is

able to strengthen the relationship between social capital and bribery behavior of district/city

legislators in Riau Province in the preparation of the APBD.

d. Practical implications of this research are to contribute in preventing the practice of bribery

behavior during the preparation of APBD in legislative institutions in Indonesia. Having good

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social capital is also not the final solution to reducing bribery behavior. Social capital needs to

be built together with institutional reform. This means that this institutional reform needs to emphasize the people in the institution, namely members of the legislature. This is because the

bond of social capital tends to lead to bribery behavior when a conflict of interest arises i.e.

when board members have to decide between helping family and friends or following the rule

of law. To prevent bribery behavior, commit yourself to have integrity and ‘not justify common

things happen’.

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