The Relational Responding Task: Toward a New Implicit Measure of

Beliefs

Jan De HouwerNiclas Heider

Adriaan SpruytArne Roets

andSean Hughes

Ghent University, Belgium

In press. Frontiers in Psychology (Method paper)

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

I. The “implicit” = “association” fallacy

Hughes et al. (2011, Psychological Record)De Houwer (2014, Soc. and Pers. Psych. Compass)

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

Controlled response …

Automatic, gut reaction …

Two modes of behavior

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

Associations

Propositions

Controlled response …

Automatic, gut reaction …

Conflated with two types of representations

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

Propositions: Beliefs about states in the world“Beer is tasty”“Beer causes a hangover”“I have a presentation tomorrow”

=> Are valid / invalid=> Contains information about type of relation

Associations: Wires between representations“Beer” ----- “Good”“Beer” ----- “hangover”

=> Are not valid / invalid (but simple are)=> Does not contain information about type of relation

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

Associations

Propositions

Controlled response …

Automatic, gut reaction …

Conflated with two types of representations

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

Propositions: Are required for inferences which can lead to controlled responses

=> Does not imply that they cannot also mediate automatic responses

Associations: Allow for automatic spreading of activation which can support automatic responses

=> Does not imply that propositional representations cannot mediate automatic responses

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Functional-cognitive framework – ICPS Amsterdam – 13 March 2015

Associations

Propositions

Propositions

Propositions could mediate both controlled and automatic responding(De Houwer, 2014, SPPC)

Distinction Procedure, Effect, and Theory – Jan De Houwer - 09/06/2006

Learning – Gdansk – 7 July 2007Propositions – ICPS Amsterdam – 14 March 2015

II. Measuring implicit beliefs

IRAP: Barnes-Holmes et al. (2010, Psychological Record)RRT: De Houwer et al. (in press, Frontiers in Psychology)

Introduction

- “implicit belief” = automatic activation or endorsement of a proposition (Shidlovski et al., 2014)

- Measuring implicit beliefs can provide more info than associationse.g., “I AM GOOD”e.g., “I WANT TO BE GOOD”e.g., “I SHOULD BE GOOD”

- New procedure to measure implicit beliefs: Relational Responding Task=> same logic as IRAP: “act as if you believe something”=> but more user friendly than IRAP

Racism study (De Houwer et al., in press)Target task:

Act “as if” you believe that Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants (pro-Flemish task)

Act “as if” you believe that immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people (pro-immigrant task)

Items: 10 pro-Flemish and 10 pro-immigrant statements- Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants- Immigrants are not as intelligent as Flemish people- Flemish people are dumber than immigrants- Immigrants are more intelligent than Flemish people

Inducer task: synonyms of true (e.g., correct) and not true (e.g., wrong)

FLEMISH INTELLIGENT IMMIGRANT INTELLIGENTTRUE FALSE

Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants

FLEMISH INTELLIGENT IMMIGRANT INTELLIGENTTRUE FALSE

CORRECT

IMMIGRANT INTELLIGENT FLEMISH INTELLIGENTTRUE FALSE

Flemish people are more intelligent than immigrants

Body image study (Heider et al., in preparation)In the actual body image RRT, five statements implied that “I AM thin” (e.g., “I possess a slim body”) or “I AM overweight” (e.g., “I am heavy”). Negations of these ten statements led to five statements that imply “I AN NOT overweight” (e.g., “I do not weigh much”) or “I AM NOT thin” (e.g., “I do not possess a slim body”).

In the ideal body image RRT, five statements implied “I WANT TO BE thinner” (e.g., “I desire to weigh less”) or “I WANT TO BE heavier” (e.g., “I desire to be chubbier”). Negations of these ten statements led to five statements that imply “I DO NOT WANT TO BE heavier” (e.g., “I don’t desire to be chubby”) “I DO NOT WANT TO BE thinner” (e.g., “I don’t desire to weigh less”).

High ( n = 31) and low body dissatisfied participants ( n = 33) differed significantly on their EDI scores, M = 19.1 (SD = 4.6) vs. M = 46.4 (SD = 5.2), t(62) = 22.35, p < .001.

As expected, we found a significant interaction of body dissatisfaction and type of RRT, F(1, 62) = 8.80, p = .004, ηρ2 = .12.

Actual BI Desired BI

Satisfied 0.18 -0.11Dissatisfied -0.02 0.00

Future

- Further evidence that type of relation matters (AM, WANT, SHOULD, ..)

- Prediction of actual behavior over and above implicit beliefs

- Automaticity features

- Versions that can capture multiple beliefs

- Don’t expect too much …: No single measure can perfectly predict any behavior