VANDEN BROECK Laurent Attaché Logistiek en Mobiliteit Haven van Brussel

The redeployment of maritime traffic in the Port of Brussels: How to attract new maritime traffic – an analysis of opportunities and constraints (SWOT).

Wetenschappelijke paper afgelegd tot het behalen van het universitaire getuigschrift permanente vorming Havenbeheer.

Promotor: Dhr. De Decker

Commissarissen: Dhr. Hendrik-Jan Van Engelen

Dhr. Marc Seynaeve.

Universiteit Gent en Havenbedrijf Gent Academiejaar 2014-2015

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“There are doors to the sea that opened with words”

Rafael Alberti (1902-1999)

I would like to thank all the persons who helped me in the redaction of this paper, especially:

Cap. L.Delprat, M.Haesen, G.Origer, A.Moens, M.De Decker, C. Huygens, N. Slater for her corrections

and all the persons I forgot.

Preamble:

This paper has been prepared in English with the agreement of our promotor and the Faculty.

The footnotes included in this paper come from various sources in various languages (NL, UK,

FR). Therefore, we have decided to mention those sources in footnotes in the original

language of the document.

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Table of contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4

Methodology .......................................................................................................................................... 5

EU working definition of “Shortsea” Shipping: ..................................................................................... 5

1. History of the Brussels Canal and Maritime Installations from XVI century to 2015 ................... 6

a. Beginning (1551 – 1896): ............................................................................................................ 6

b. Creation of the SA “Brussels Canal and Maritime Installations” (1897-1993): ........................ 7

1. 1897 – 1922: creation of the Maritimes Installation, WW I, reconstruction: ....................... 7

3. 1955 – 1993: Industry Growth and Modernization of Maritime Infrastructures ................. 8

c. Regionalisation and creation of the SA “Port of Brussels” (1993-2014): .................................. 9

2. Conclusions on the history of the PoB’s evolution: ..................................................................... 12

3. Technical specifications – Localisation, Geography, Vessel Size, Locks & Bridges: .................... 14

4. Shortsea Traffic and European Policies Evolution: ...................................................................... 23

5. Regulation and Economic context – Regional, Interregional and Federal Context: ................... 25

a. Regional context: ...................................................................................................................... 25

b. Interregional/federal context: ................................................................................................. 26

i. “Law Major”: ......................................................................................................................... 26

ii. Pilotage, dockage and mooring exemptions - Harbour Rights: W&Z et PoB ..................... 27

6. International trade relations and international representation: ............................................... 30

7. SWOT Analysis and recommendations: ....................................................................................... 31

a. Strengths: .................................................................................................................................. 31

b. Opportunities: ........................................................................................................................... 32

c. Weaknesses: ............................................................................................................................. 32

d. Threats: ..................................................................................................................................... 34

8. Conclusion: .................................................................................................................................... 36

9. Bibilography: ................................................................................................................................. 38

10. Acronyms index: ....................................................................................................................... 40

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Introduction

The Port of Brussels (PoB) is the second most important inland port in Belgium after Liège and one of

the most efficient (t/m²) inland ports in Europe. The PoB is also – although it is not particularly well

known – an inland maritime port1.

Due to economic evolutions, the Second World War, and indeed since the end of the industrial

revolution, the PoB has encountered a decrease in its maritime traffic. Moreover this maritime traffic

is nowadays quasi inexistent even though the Maritime Canal Brussels-Schelde (Zeekanaal)

infrastructure allows vessels of up to 4,500t access to the Brussels Region. Indeed, the PoB disposes

in the outer harbour of 2km of maritime docks, a Multimodal Containers Terminal, bridge clearance

of up to 33m and a water depth of 6.50m.

At the moment, the PoB is still a major actor in inland waterway transport (4.4 million tons – 2014

own traffic)2 and plays an important role for the region as an Urban Distribution Actor and Logistics

Facilitator3. It also plays an important role in terms of modal shift promotion in order to reduce the

external impact on the environment, infrastructure and welfare in the city.

Nevertheless, considering the increasing congestion in the Brussels Region and also at Belgian and

European scale and taking into account the increase of external costs created by road transport,

Waterways and Sea Shipping appear to be a possible solution to reduce these external costs.

In this context and because the potential exists4, indeed there were 1,063,229 tons Short Sea

Shipping (SSS) on the Zeekanaal in 20145, our aim is not only to understand why Brussels has

experienced a decrease in maritime traffic but rather to analyse the opportunity for stimulating new

traffic such as SSS, Estuary Shipping, etc. and to identify through a SWOT analysis the opportunities

that could be seized in order to redeploy (or not) the maritime traffic on Brussels’ part of the

“Zeekanaal”. The SWOT6 will be set up in correlation with the micro (regional/local), meso (federal),

and macro context (European) in order to take into account Belgium’s territorial complexity and a

global approach at European level.

In this paper, we will – using the SWOT analysis – highlight the technical capacity in terms of

infrastructure, accessibility for different type of vessel and also the traffic attraction possibility in

view of the existing traffic and foreseen developments.

These different steps will lead us to draft recommendations in order to promote and develop

maritime traffic in Brussels and generally in the Hinterland of Antwerp and other great Flemish sea

ports.

1 The Port of Brussels – as history confirms – is considered as a maritime port thanks to its canal and its access to the sea. Of course this status has to be nuanced in comparison with great Flemish Sea Ports (Zeebrugge, Antwerpen, Ghent, etc.) but its evolution has been consistently driven by attempts to reach the sea. Internet source : http://www.portdebruxelles.be/nl/11/Historique 2 PORT DE BRUXELLES, Communiqué de presse : trafics 2014, 30 janvier 2015. 3 HAVEN VAN BRUSSEL, Beheerscontract tussen Brussels Hoofstedelijk Gewest en de Haven van Brussel 2013-2018, hoofstuk 3, 7 mei 2013, p.35. 4 This paper will frame the potential. Indeed not every vessel can reach Brussels and the million tons conveyed on the Zeekanaal are not to be seen as a global potential. The PoB is of course limited by its infrastructure (see below). 5 PROMOTIE SHORTSEA SHIPPING VLAANDEREN, Aboard nieuwsbrief, Shortsea in beweging, April 2015, p.4. 6 SWOT analyse defintion : A study undertaken by an organization to identify its internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as its external opportunities and threats. Internet source : www.oxforddictionaries.com

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Methodology

First of all we have decided to retrace the historical framework of the PoB’s History and its evolution

since its creation in 1551. This framework will be particularly interesting in order to understand the

centrifugal forces impacting the evolution of the PoB through almost five centuries.

After a review of the PoB’s history, this paper will focus on the opportunity to (re)place Brussels on

the map of the Maritime World or not and also on the potential traffic types which the PoB could

attract to redeploy its maritime traffic.

In order to develop the SWOT analysis and to assess the opportunity to redeploy maritime traffic, we

have chosen to base our methodology on two research approaches. The first will be based on desk

research and data collection within PoB archives and library. The second will be led by several

interviews with key persons and stakeholders within the PoB, Administration and business.

EU working definition of “Shortsea”7 Shipping:

Before delving into the history of the creation of the PoB, we must establish a framework and set a definition of Short Sea Shipping and what this terminology includes. Therefore, we have chosen the working definition that the EU Commission defined in 1999 within its Communication on The Development of Short Sea Shipping in Europe: A Dynamic Alternative in a Sustainable Transport Chain (COM(1999) 317 final):

“Short sea shipping’ means the movement of cargo and passengers by sea between ports situated in geographical Europe or between those ports and ports situated in non-European countries having a coastline on the enclosed seas bordering Europe.

Shortsea shipping includes domestic and international maritime transport, including feeder services along the coast, to and from the islands rivers and lakes. The concept of shortsea shipping also extends to maritime transport between the Member States of the Union and Norway and Iceland and other States on the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.”8

Furthermore, in order to understand correctly which type of transport we will speak about, we have chosen to point out the definition of Sea-River shipping from SSS Promotie Vlaanderen, which corresponds to Brussels maritime opportunities as we will see further in this paper.

“Sea-river shipping is one of the forms of shortsea transport. Its concept is simple; one vessel, sailing coastal and inland waters alike. Sea-river vessels share specific characteristics such as draught, height and length, relating to the navigating possibilities offered by rivers and canals. Usually sea-river vessels do not exceed 3,000 dwt with draughts limited to 5 and bridge clearance to 9 m. Although at present these vessels are mainly employed to convey conventional and bulk loads, container transport is on the increase as well.”9

7 In order to be clear and in accordance with “Promotie Shortsea Shipping Vlaanderen” apart from the quotation, we have decided to use “Shortsea” as a generic term instead of using the UK terminology “Short Sea”. The aim of this choice is to use “Shortsea” as a word determining the type of transportation. 8 http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/sss/doc/com_99_317_en_final.pdf

9 http://www.shortsea.info/definition.html

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1. History of the Brussels Canal and Maritime Installations from XVI century to 2015

Brussels developed around the Xth century along the “Senne River” and became, after a few

centuries, an important commercial core in North West Europe and more specifically in Flanders.

a. Beginning (1551 – 1896)10:

It was in 1477 that “Marie de Bourgnogne” allowed the digging of a canal from Brussels to the Rupel

parallel to the Senne. Nevertheless, the project only started in 1551 and was completed in 1561. The

reasons for this delay were several wars and tension between Brussels and Malines (Mechelen)

concerning the Malines’ Toll instituted by the city. At the time, the cost of construction was the

responsibility of the City of Brussels. The city’s aim was to create a better connection with Antwerp,

which was already one of the most important trade centres in Europe.

Several docks were built within the city, the most ancient of which is the “Bassin de Saint-Catherine”

(1565-1850) in the current inner city centre of Brussels. The draught of the canal was around two

metres and was foreseen for pulled-barges. This infrastructure and installations remained in use for

250 years without any adaptations (see map).

Brussels map during the Netherlands period11

1010 J.STRUBBE, Les ports maritimes belges : un héritage pour demain, Lannoo, Tielt, 1989, p. 162. 11 M.PLAIZIER, Brussels tijdens het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden: 1815 – 1830, Brussel deze Week, n°1468, donderdag 2 april 2015, p.20. Sources : http://denederlandenverenigd.nl/?product=kaart-brussel-tijdens-het-verenigd-koninkrijk-der-nederlanden-1815-1830 – H.SOMERHAUSSEN, 1827 – J.-B. DE BOUGE – 1823 – Cartography: Michel Plaizier

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Between 1829 and 183612, with the industrial revolution and the increase of goods demand, the

draught of the canal was adapted to 3.20 metres in order to attract new traffic.

In 1863, after the end of the Schelde’s blocus and the signature in 1839 of the Treaty between

Belgium and the Netherlands relating in particular to the use of the Schelde and borders between

both countries, Antwerp experienced a new prosperity which was favourable for the PoB.

At the end of the XIXth century, the Brussels Authorities were considering whether to modernise the

infrastructure in order to adapt the canal to modern maritime standards. However the city did not

have the necessary funds to support the whole modernisation project. For this reason, the Belgian

State became involved in the project in order to support a part of the costs. Nevertheless,

negotiations between the City and the State were quite extensive. After several attempts by the

“Cercle des installations maritimes de Bruxelles”, an agreement was finally reached between

Belgium, the Brussels-City, the Province of Brabant and some suburban municipalities13. This

agreement created the “Société Anonyme du canal et des installations maritimes de Bruxelles” which

was in charge of the management of the waterway and its lands from 1895 to 1993.

b. Creation of the SA “Brussels Canal and Maritime Installations” (1897-1993):

1. 1897 – 1922: creation of the Maritimes Installation, WW I, reconstruction:

The adaptation works started in 1900 with the aim of

creating an infrastructure of 6.50 metres draught, a

higher vertical clearance and 35 metres minimum

width14. Nevertheless, the inauguration, foreseen on

20th August 1914, was postponed until 12th

September 1922 due to war damages. At that time,

discussions about maritime traffic were focused on the

spatial localisation for the maritime trade. The City’s

idea was to have the maritime quays as close as

possible to the inner city. Therefore, the Vergote Dock

and the Beco Dock were built. The former was created

especially to welcome maritime vessels with its 1,800

metre accessible quays and 12 hectares of spatial

availability. The latter was much more focused on the construction material trade. However, there

were several discussions about the location because of the “rail bridge” in Laeken which could

reduce accessibility for maritime vessels. This led to the creation of the current Outer-Port in the

north of Brussels-Region. It was also at this time that Brussels-City annexed, in compensation for the

retreat of the maritime infrastructure to the Outer-Port, the municipalities of Laeken, Neder-over-

Hembeek and Haren (1921)15.

12 J.STRUBBE, op.cit., p. 162. 13 T.DEMEY, Un canal dans Bruxelles – Bassin de vie et d’emploi, Guide Badeaux, 2008, p.58-97. 14 Ibid., 1989, p.163. 15 Ibid., 2008, p.92.

Figure 1 Laeken Rail Brigde - 1908

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2. 1922 – 1955 : Economic crisis, WW II and reconstruction:

Between 1928 – 1939, the Outer-Port’s infrastructure was built with long delays due to the economic

crisis. The aim was to build maritime quays with a length of 1800 metres on the right bank and host

industrial activities on the land beside the quays. Once completed, the PoB reached its final state but

then WWII started, with the ensuing destruction. Once the Germans were defeated, they blew up all

of the remaining bridges during their retreat. This led to the construction of temporary bridges after

the war, some of which still exist today (Van Praet, Petit-Iles, Laeken, etc.)16.

The vertical clearance limit was not respected at the time because of the necessity of reconnecting both parts of the City. The period from 1939 to 1955 led to the total disappearance of maritime traffic in Brussels. In 1955, Buda Bridge was rebuilt and started working again and maritime traffic restarted gradually.

3. 1955 – 1993: Industry Growth and Modernization of Maritime Infrastructures

Although maritime accessibility was restored in 1955 with the commissioning of Buda Bridge, the infrastructure was no longer adapted to the evolution of great maritime and inland navigation. Therefore the “Société du Canal et des Infrastructures Martimes de Bruxelles” once again launched several measures in order to adapt its capacity to attract new traffic and industries but also to reduce the navigation time between Antwerp and Brussels (< 5 hours). Apart from in times of war, the XXth century experienced a

constant increase in traffic but the infrastructure was quickly

saturated, especially at the locks. Nevertheless, once the

modernisation programme was launched, Belgium experienced

an industrial decline in the 70’s especially on the Charleroi-Brussels axe. This industrial decline,

coupled with political indecision, led the industries to stop their investments in the southern section

of the PoB and to settle their activities to the North of the City and even

in Flanders (Vilvoorde, Puurs, etc.).

In 1967, a modernisation plan was launched with the triple objective of: making the canal accessible from the Schelde to Brussels for maritime vessels of 5,000dwt, pushed-convoys of 10,000t and from the Schelde to Willebroek for maritime vessels of 10,000dwt; better linking and crossing the rail and road networks to avoid perturbation with the waterway; adapting the land infrastructure and equipment to attract industries.17 The construction of a complex of two new locks was undertaken in Zemst and Wintam (Hingene). Due to the financial crisis and the decrease in available credits, the project experienced delays. The first lock was finished in 1973 but the second one only in 1997. Nowadays the Zeekanaal Schelde-Brussel can welcome maritime vessels of between

4,500t to 6,000t and pushed-barges of 9,000t.

16 The PoB knows a vertical clearance limitation with its bridges from Van Praet bridge to the South part of the canal. This is a limitation for inland navigation (air draft of 5.40m) and also for maritime traffic which cannot reach the Vergote (initially maritime) and Beco docks. 17 Ibid., 1989, p.66.

Figure 2 Port of Brussels localisation

Figure 3 The Artemis – Outer port 2014

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Between 1971 and 1985, although maritime traffic represented only a small percentage (4-8%) of the global traffic, this traffic was quite stable (between 0.6 and 0.8 million tons)18. The last decade of the XXth century and the beginning of the XXIth century have seen a large decrease in maritime traffic and also a slowdown in inland waterway transport.

c. Regionalisation and creation of the SA “Port of Brussels” (1993-2014):

Since 1st June 1993, the PoB, known as a landlord19 port, has been responsible for managing the waterway and its infrastructures (bridges, locks, quay walls, etc.) as well as the lands along the canal with a view to economic development and logistics. The regionalisation of Belgium led to a splitting of the “Société des installations Maritimes et du Canal de Bruxelles” into two separate regional entities: Waterwegen and Zeekanaal in Flanders and the PoB in Brussels Region. Since the regionalisation, the PoB has been enclosed by the Flemish Region and does not have at its

disposal as much space as other ports in the world. In other words, this means that PoB does not

have the opportunity to grow outside of the regional borders. For G.Origer, former Development

director of the PoB, the fact that traffic decreased to less than 5 million tons at the beginning of the

nineties is due to the context of real estate pressure on harbour land20; but also to the misperception

by Public Authorities of the strategic importance of harbour activities for environment and mobility

within the city. The PoB has to communicate with the public more and more to explain its role and

importance for the Region in order to maintain and preserve sufficient lands for its activities.

During the last decades, the traffic to and from Brussels has increased by more than 210% in 20 years21 (graphic: Tonnage 1994 - 2014), passing from 2 Mio tons in 1994 to an average of 4,4 million tons in 2014. However this increase concerns almost exclusively fluvial traffic. Indeed, maritime traffic still exists but is really rather insignificant. They have passed from an average of 250,000t in 1993 to almost nothing, 30,000t in 2014 (see graphics – page 10: Maritime traffic).

18 Ibid., 1989, p.169-170. 19 “Landlord ports: the port authority owns only the basic infrastructure, leasing it out to operators, mostly on a long-term concession basis, while retaining all regulatory functions. Port operations are carried out by private companies, which provide and maintain their own superstructure, including buildings and cargo-handling equipment at the terminals. In landlord ports, dock labour is managed by private terminal operators, although in some ports it may be provided through a port-wide labour pool system […]. Most EU ports are landlord ports. Examples include Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp”. I.KATSEROVA, Liberalisation of EU port services: issues and consequences for dock workers, Library Briefing, European Parliament, 20 March 2013, p.2. 20 G.ORIGER, Vingt ans de politique portuaire à Bruxelles, vol.I, Cahier Hebdomadaire du CRISP, Bruxelles, 2013, p.96-97. 21 PORT OF BRUSSELS, Dep. Marketing and Development – Statistics 1994-2014.

0

1.000.000

2.000.000

3.000.000

4.000.000

5.000.000

Tonnage 1994 - 2014

Tonnage 1994 - 2014

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Nevertheless, several companies still exist and use Brussels infrastructure in order to import or export goods overseas. Brussels Shipping and Kennedy Hunter are two of these companies. Traditionally, they were active as bulk carriers: “coils, timbers, sawed timbers, coal, salt, steel, porefire, etc.”22 With the decline of the Wallonian steel and coal industries but also in Brussels, the maritime traffic lost their export charges which de facto led to a decrease in maritime exportation.

Figure 4 - Maritime Traffic 1993-2014

22 Interview, Alfons Moens, Director General - Port of Bruxelles, March 2015.

Année I/O

Produits

agricoles

Denrées

alimentaires

Combustibles

solides

Produits

pétroliers

Minerais,

ferrailles

Produits

métallurgiques

Matériaux

constructions

Produits

chimiques

Divers ou

n.d.a.Total In/Out Total

1993 ENTREE 22.525 36.137 66.840 14.660 140.162

SORTIE 2.028 8.375 146 89.733 10.046 430 110.758 250.920

1994 ENTREE 54.436 10.401 78.332 6.918 150.087

SORTIE 21.883 9.450 1.250 30.911 12.763 76.257 226.344

1995 ENTREE 17.076 1.768 124.525 143.369

SORTIE 1.350 19.570 4.383 5.850 41.375 7.327 79.855 223.224

1996 ENTREE 23.708 969 11.793 62.172 2.200 100.842

SORTIE 68.700 7.952 65.002 15.627 157.281 258.123

1997 ENTREE 72.091 1.023 65.486 138.600

SORTIE 1.561 91.955 6.350 100.560 25.618 226.044 364.644

1998 ENTREE 135.365 2.300 71.562 209.227

SORTIE 33.774 2.364 2.600 87.153 13.503 139.394 348.621

1999 ENTREE 208.429 64.584 273.013

SORTIE 503 45.453 29.334 5.016 80.306 353.319

2000 ENTREE 103.478 54.649 5.850 163.977

SORTIE 29.220 3.000 3.766 35.986 199.963

2001 ENTREE 85.074 68.405 153.479

SORTIE 17.460 6.661 1.512 905 1.825 28.363 181.842

2002 ENTREE 105.549 53.385 158.934

SORTIE 4.000 4.000 8.000 166.934

2003 ENTREE 79.063 53.931 8.000 140.994

SORTIE 2.251 2.251 143.245

2004 ENTREE 27.109 59.089 3.960 90.158

SORTIE 1.200 1.200 91.358

2005 ENTREE 29.563 40.542 5.946 76.051

SORTIE 2.942 1.112 4.054 80.105

2006 ENTREE 55.147 29.648 11.583 96.378

SORTIE 13.005 13.005 109.383

2007 ENTREE 28.297 1.551 33.276 63.124

SORTIE 7.645 7.645 70.769

2008 ENTREE 21.336 28.334 49.670

SORTIE 8.100 3.301 1.147 12.548 62.218

2009 ENTREE 14.610 953 15.563

SORTIE 2.305 2.305 17.868

2010 ENTREE 12.259 10.106 2.826 25.191

SORTIE 0 25.191

2011 ENTREE 41.223 7.348 2.119 50.690

SORTIE 1.566 1.155 2.721 53.411

2012 ENTREE 7.917 5.219 13.136

SORTIE 1.055 1.055 14.191

2013 ENTREE 1.819 5.136 6.955

SORTIE 0 6.955

2014 ENTREE 23.692 3.467 27.159

SORTIE 3.163 3.163 30.322

Total général 1.198.214 332.377 22.090 46.538 73.775 1.438.548 140.228 25.603 1.577 3.278.950

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In the graphics and the table above, we can see the evolution of in/out maritime traffic over the last two decades. Until 1999, the traffic was quite balanced thanks to agricultural products and metallurgy importation and, to a lesser degree, exportation. After that period, outbound traffic decreased significantly. This can be explained by the decision of Brussels Mill Company to no longer import cereals from the UK (probably due to the fact that the UK authorised GMO cultures). The major importations were reported on inland waterways (FR/GER) for grains. Furthermore we also noticed in the table that since 2000 the PoB has lost almost all its outbound metal products traffic due to the closure of Wallonian industry and the ongoing decline of Brussels’ metallurgy especially in Molenbeek and Anderlecht since the 70s. The bankruptcy in the 90s of “Meyers & Gerth” which was importing metallurgic product from Charleroi to Brussels by train to then be directly shipped on SSS could also explain the decline of such traffic23. As stated in our introduction, there is a potential for Shortsea, more than one million tons in 2014 on the Zeekanaal, in general and also on the section covering Brussels. The potential exists thanks to the PoB’s infrastructure and accessibility24, as will see below. Nevertheless, we should nuance the potential because of the lack of industrial production in Brussels and also due to the fact that 83%25 of Shortsea traffic on the Zeekanaal consists of importations. This de facto creates an unbalance in the external trade balance (more importation than exportation) but also creates a distortion in the supply chain for full front and empty backhauling. These facts generate an increase in transport costs and are de facto weaknesses for developing Shortsea in Brussels, although we will see below that some reflexion paths exist to solve those weaknesses, in particular with rail transportation and the development of distribution centres.

* * *

23 Interview Valérie TANGHE, Development Director of the Port of Brussels, 7th May 2015. 24 See section 3, « Technical specification » on page 14. 25 PROMOTIE SHORT SEA SHIPPING VLAANDEREN, Aboard nieuwsbrief, Shortsea in beweging, April 2015.

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2. Conclusions on the history of the PoB’s evolution:

In general, we have noticed that the whole history of the construction of the Zeekanaal has been

subject to political indecision around large investments in the controversial project to make Brussels

a maritime port terminal. Since the beginning of the construction, we have seen that interests

between Senne’s toll owners in Malines and Brussels merchants were subject to conflict. The

discussions later turned to the responsible entities (City, Province and States) able to finance the

enlargement of the canal. In general, without entering into details, delays and conflicts were

particularly present throughout the history of the canal.

Figure 5 Illustration of controversy around Sea Port Brussels 26

Real estate speculation on harbour lands is currently very strong but it would appear that this has

been the case ever since the creation of the Port27. The pressure of citizens and environmental

associations against the harbour project and the “Nimby”28 syndrome have a strong impact on the

realisation of harbour projects, such as the BILC (Brussels International Logistics Centre)29.

Nowadays, we are also aware of similar problems of indecision regarding the future of the canal, its infrastructures and surrounding industrial lands and today regarding the whole zone with the “Canal Plan30” of A. Schemetoff. Michel De Bièvres said of the “Canal Plan” that “it focused on housing […] [and that] in the past there was not global view or political vision on the future of the Port and of the

26 Bruxelles, Port de Mer, AVB, Photothèque, M-2900 27 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol.III, p. 31-40 : l’extension du centre TIR : de l’abandon du BILC au nouveau projet TACT. 28 « Not In My Back Yard » Syndrome. 29 M.STRALE, La logistique, localisation des activités et impacts territoriaux, dir. C.VANDERMOTTEN, Mars 2013, p.270-279. 30 GRBC, Plan directeur pour la zone canal (« Plan Canal »), 2014.

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canal”31. This political indecision also has a particularly negative effect on port activities, economic development and the investments of companies and industries active in and around the canal area (see figure 6)32. Diversity of function is often seen as a solution to densified land utilisation but it is against port activities which are mono-functional. The PoB’s evolution shows that from an inner-city

port serving merchants in the city, the PoB has

evolved and moved step by step outside of the inner-

city and has always been pushed back to the north.

Currently, the majority of the traffic is realised in the

outer-port (the maritime part) in the North of Brussels

Region and the inner-city centre is no longer served by the canal. Nevertheless, the fact is that with

regionalisation, borders are fixed and the course to the North cannot be pursued without risking the

disappearance of the PoB and its economy for the benefit of the Flemish Region. Several studies led

by the PoB have shown that the availability of land is a specific constraint in the Brussels Region and

represents a real threat to the harbour’s economic activities33.

The PoB Masterplan34 foresaw an extension of its activities (containers, agro-logistic cluster, urban distribution centre, trimodal

accessibility) on the Schaerbeek-Formation in the period leading up to 2025-2030 (see figure 7)35. All the studies concerning this extension and economic activities led by the PoB have shown that such an extension could potentially be an opportunity36 to further strengthen the role of the PoB within the Region as a logistical facilitator and for sustainable urban distribution37. Moreover this extension would also lead to jobs and added-value creation38 for the Region; not only in socio-economic terms but also with a view to reducing the environmental impact of road freight on well-being in the Brussels Region. The existence of unoccupied land next to the maritime part of Brussels canal in the outer-port can be seen as an opportunity for maritime traffic and the extension of its activities. This opportunity could also be seen as a potential for developing Distribution Centres deserving a major consumption centre: the Brussels Region and its Metropolitan area. With this in mind, it is especially important for the PoB to position

itself within the hinterland of great Belgian maritime ports such as

31

J.L.VANDEVOORDE, Port and Business, Interview Michel De Bièvres – Président de la Communauté Portuaire de Bruxelles, n°4, avril-mai

2015, p.15. 32 Land planification in Brussels for economic activities in 2014 – ADT, DES OPPORTUNITÉS AU COEUR DE BRUXELLES, 2013, p.14-15 33 TECHNUM, Etude de l’impact socioéconomique d’une relocalisation potentielle des activités économiques des bassins Vergote et Biestebroeck vers l’avant-port, Port de Bruxelles, 2014, p.48. 34 PORT OF BRUSSELS, Masterplan du Port de Bruxelles à l’horizon 2030, 2013. 35 ADT, op.cit., 2013, p.17. 36E.HAEZENDONCK, M.DOOMS, A.VERBEKE, Sociaal-economische evaluatie van de haventrafieken te Brussel, ECSA, Port de Bruxelles, 9 januari 2015, p.64-65. 37 BRUXELLES MOBILITE, Plan Stratégique pour le Transport de Marchandise en RBC, GRBC 11 juillet 2013. HAVEN VAN BRUSSEL, Beheerscontract tussen Brussels Hoofstedelijk Gewest en de Haven van Brussel 2013-2018, hoofstuk 3, 7 mei 2013, p.35. 38 Ibid., 9 januari 2015, p.64-65.

Figure 6 - Land planification in Brussels for economic activities in 2014

Figure 7 - Future plan for land planification related to transport &

logistics

14

Antwerp and Zeebrugge in order to put in place frequent lines (containers, RoRo) and support the

growth of global traffic in order to reduce congestion within maritime terminals. With the future

truck toll (2016), the PoB’s position in the hinterland of Antwerp and Zeebrugge will increase the

competitiveness of waterway transport and provide an alternative to road freight.

For T. Notteboom, inland ports are called upon to play a great role within containerised trade at the regional market level in close collaboration with the sea ports39. Therefore, a means of further (re)developing connections between major maritime ports and inland terminals could be the development of container estuary lines from Zeebrugge or Antwerp to the Trimodal Terminal of Brussels (TTB). In order to compensate for the lack of industrial production in Brussels, another missing link has to be

solved: “the rail connection”. In the past, it was common to send freight trains to Brussels in order to be exported by bulker sea ships to the UK, the Baltic countries or Scandinavia. Nowadays, rail freight is suffering from road competitiveness and also from rail passengers’ priority40. The national rail logistics company has been drastically decreasing all its traffic and is currently neither reliable nor profitable. However, if good rail freight connections and better interoperability within the European Union, through EU freight corridors, were put in place, Brussels and Belgium could become, thanks to its central position and its high density, a focal point for rail freight41.

3. Technical specifications – Localisation, Geography, Vessel Size, Locks & Bridges:

It is unrealistic to think that the PoB could attract huge sized vessels to its canal. The gauge restrictions are numerous and limit navigation to small maritime vessels. Apart from vessels from the Defence which come almost every two years for the pleasure of children during the “Port’s Day”, the remaining maritime traffic in the PoB consists of vessels limited to 5,000dwt.

While in its external communication, the PoB maintains a limit of 4,500t for maritime traffic this limit is not coherent due to the fact that accessibility in terms of tonnage really depends on the size of the vessels and how the charges are distributed on the boat42. Communicating only on tonnage is not really relevant at that point and it would be interesting for the PoB to differentiate in its communication regarding the accessibility for fluvial barges (up to 4,500t single barge or 9,000t in conveyed pushed barges) and maritime accessibility in terms of infrastructure limitations. According to Captain L. Delprat, the PoB has the capacity

and has already welcomed vessels of up to 6,000 tons in the past.

39

T. NOTTEBOOM, J.P.RODRIGUE, Inland Terminals, Regions and Supply Chains, Antwerp, 2009, p.35. 40 CEMT, Evolution des transports : 1970-2002, OCDE, Paris, 2004, p. 19. 41

N.SIMONS, Mémoire : Les avantages et les désavantages compétitifs des modes alternatifs de transport, Solvay Business School,

Brussels, 2009, p.20-27. 42 Interview of Port of Brussels’ Harbour Master, Luc DELPRAT, 19.03.2015.

Figure 8 Terminal Trimodal Brussels (TTB)

Figure 9 - SA SMET

15

Still on the topic of accessibility, the PoB, because of its Maritime Statutes, is accessible in the outer

port 24/7. Its waterway gauge is classified as VIb in the European waterway classification43. This

statute is really exceptional in comparison with other inland ports (accessible only during the week

and day) and has to be seen as an opportunity44. The PoB also disposes of international services such

as custom and dedicated custom storage allowing companies to avoid “clearance” goods before they

leave the “custom storage space” and really enter Belgian/Shengen territory. For G. Origer, this

opportunity was underestimated by the Brussels authorities, after 1993 and the opening of the EU

Single Market, for attracting extra-EU Shengen goods45.

While the locks were theoretically built in order to accommodate boats of up to 250m in Wintam and 205m in Zemst locks, the limitation of the “Rail Turning Bridge” in width is restricted to 19.9 metres.

Furthermore, the draught decreases between Wintam (9.5m), Zemst (6.5m) and Brussels (6.5m)46

. In

Brussels, inter alia because of dredging47, the available draught is currently 5.8 metres48

.

Maritime and inland navigation accessibility

in the Port of Brussels

Air draft – Brussels 33 metres

Draught – Brussels 6.5 metres – 5.8 metres

Lock – Wintam 250m – 25m – 9.50m

Lock – Zemst 205m – 25m (19.90m Rail Turning Bridge ) – 6.50m

The air draft is actually not a problem because it can reach a height of 33 metres along the Zeekanaal. However, the infrastructure (lift bridges, locks, etc.) these vessels have to pass through has a low but negative impact on navigation time. Another constraint which impacts waterway traffic is the bridges owned by SNCB/NMBS (national train companie), especially the one in “Kappelle op den Bos”49 on which the line Malines – Dendermonde crosses the Zeekanaal. This line has a high train frequency for passenger traffic but also for freight because the line links Muizen inland container terminal and Zeebrugge. Indeed, the drawbridges are managed by the SNCB/NMBS and the ship captains have to ask for permission to pass through the bridge50. But for security reasons and due to the priority given to train transportation, vessels can be blocked from a few minutes up to an hour depending on the train traffic density. Nevertheless, navigation time is not a real weakness because of the PoB’s localisation within one of the most important consumption centres in Belgium which compensates for the five hour navigation and only two locks needed to reach Brussels.

43 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol.I, p.28. 44 Ibid., p. 34 45 Ibid., p.28. 46 http://www.wenz.be/opencms/export/sites/default/downloads/shipping_guides/quay-Zeekanaal.pdf 47

Dredging is an indirect threat because a contrario of other ports, the PoB has to dredge the canal for the Region. This is financed by the

Region through dotation and de facto has an impact on the regional budget. A reduction of this budget could lead to accessibility problems. 48 For security reason, the PoB guarantee a draught of 5.80m due to little incidences of lockage on water level in the Zeekanaal. 49 See page 19. 50 A.MOENS, Director General – Port of Brussels, second interview conducted on 7.05.2015.

16

Furthermore, as explained in an OECD report “the advantage of inland ports over coastal ports is that they are usually closer to the final destination of their cargo. However, their main disadvantage is that waterborne accessibility is usually more limited, particularly for larger vessels”51. However, there are also constraints for shippers in terms of draught in front of their quays. At the moment, the PoB guarantees a draught of 5.80m in the outer port but for the users, it seems that the level of dredging is always guaranteed at 5.80m in the channel and ship captains still have to contact the harbour master in order to be sure that the dredging level is clear for dockage, said Mr Haesen52. Nevertheless, Mr Haesen said that the cooperation with the Harbour Master is excellent and that all the necessary measures are taken in order to satisfy the shippers’ needs.

Nevertheless, we have identified three types of vessels which can access the PoB from the sea. The

first ones are smaller marine boats belonging to the Belgian Defence (Mine dredgers, etc) or new and

former school boats (Godetia, Mercator, etc.), the second ones are small shortsea ships or coasters

coming from the UK, Baltic sea or Scandinavia and the third ones are sea-river ships. Moreover, we

have also identified a fourth intermediate type, estuary ships, as an opportunity for the PoB. Indeed,

estuary ships are really interesting with a view to developing a new type of traffic thanks to their

ability to navigate at sea and on rivers/canals without having to use “maritime statutes” in maritime

ports thanks to the “double letter of gauge”53. The sole issue is that estuary ships, because of their

double role, are counted within statistics54 as fluvial transportation even if they have been shipped in

a coastal port (e.g.: Zeebrugge) or even from inland sea ports such as Ghent. Moreover, estuary

vessels are not - thanks to the “double letter of gauge” – subject to maritime taxes and obligations

(steering, harbour work, etc.) and are therefore more cost reliable than a common coaster or sea

vessel.

51 OECD, COMPETITION IN PORTS AND PORT SERVICES, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, ref. DAF/COMP(2011)14, 2011, p. 26. Internet source : http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/48837794.pdf 52 Interview: Michel Haesen, Vice-President of the CPB and President of the port users association of Brussels and Vilvoorde, 20 April 2015. 53 NL : Dubbel meetbrief – FR : double lettre de jauge. 54 A solution could be to add a third category of traffic: estuary plus fluvial and proper maritime traffic.

Figure 10 - Port of Brussels' Accessibility

17

Moreover we have seen in several cenacles that

estuary vessels are potentially interesting for

maritime ports and their hinterland55. Indeed,

estuary vessels are known as sea vessels when

they are navigating at sea and as inland vessels

when on rivers or canals. But there are

restrictions for those vessels which can only

navigate into national maritime domains

between seaports and their hinterland. Indeed,

Belgium remains competent to regulate its maritime and inland waterways navigation. Moreover,

estuary vessels appear to provide a good solution for linking great sea ports to their hinterland

through modal shift and reducing truck congestion within sea ports and national roads.

Furthermore, it appears that The Netherlands are also looking to further develop estuary navigation

in order to strengthen the accessibility of coastal ports, such as Oostend and Zeebrugge, for

petroleum products and containers56. Why not imagine a line from the Netherlands (Rotterdam) to

Brussels?

Considering the development and the growth in estuary navigation for freight, there may be an opportunity for Brussels to join the battle in order to attract such traffic. An idea to be further analysed could be the development of container lines between Zeebrugge and Brussels57. The fact is that Brussels, as a great consumption centre, could attract front hauling containerised goods conveyed by estuary vessels and become a collection centre for empty containers for the Metropolitan area in backhauling. That was also the position of Minister Grouwels (CD&V) in 2013, who stated in an interview with G. Origer that the “container terminal in Brussels could become an “extended gateway” for Antwerp. The Brussels Terminal should, to do so, invest in an “empty containers hub”, with the manner that ships owner find the container terminal in Brussels and come to

enlarge it”58. Nevertheless, as Promotie SSS Vlaanderen and PUAVB have recognised, it is not because the infrastructure at the PoB is suitable for organising an “empty containers hub” or for reasons of accessibility that the naval armaments will use it. “The shipper remains the key factor”59. Generally, naval armaments are not eager to leave their empty containers in a place where the chances of them being reloaded are really low (as previously explained, Brussels is not an exportation or production centre anymore). While we will not analyse this topic in depth, it appears that considering the congestion in Antwerp

at the containers terminal, road congestion and increasing external costs, estuary vessels and

shortsea would be an interesting alternative to road freight. For example (see figure 11), the Deseo60

55 VLAAMS PARLEMENT, Verslag van Gedachtewisseling over de estuaire vaart, 1468 (2011-2012) – n°1, ingediend op 3 februari 2012. 56 P.QUIST,M.DE JONG, H.J.VEHEIJ, Staat van de scheepvaart en de binnenvaarwegen in Nederland 2011, TU Delft, 2011, p.12. 57 Experiences have been tested in the 2000’s but have been stopped nowadays. 58 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol. III, p.74. 59 Willy De Decker, Short Sea Shipping Vlaanderen, interview on 5 May 2015. 60 http://www.binnenvaart.eu/motorvrachtschip/7235-deseo.html

Figure 12 The MERCATOR AT BUDA BRIGE 2008

Figure 11 Estuary Vessel: DESEO - Credit: J.DRIESSEN

18

of Portconnect which is active in Zeebrugge and Antwerp, perfectly fits the technical specifications of

the PoB: “109.98m x 17.04m x 4.50m - 5526 dwt”61.

Nevertheless, PUAVB has identified an infrastructure constraint within the Port of Brussels for

Shortsea and coasters, namely the lack of land space for storing goods on the quays. This issue could

be solved by organising direct transhipment from vessels to trains, barges or trucks. But the current

infrastructure at the Container Terminal is not yet sufficient to proceed to “direct transhipment” 62.

The crane is not tall enough to allow such handling from SSS to a fluvial barge for example. This could

be compensated by investing in a straddle carrier or a reach stacker but has never been done63. The

reason is perhaps to be found in the low volume figure handled within the TTB terminal. Another

reason is the fact that the “rail” is a missing link and also impeaches the development of multimodal

direct transhipment. Indeed, almost all the connections with production centres have been

dismantled in industrial regions, especially in Wallonia.

*

* *

61 Interview: Port of Brussels’ Harbour Master, L.DELPRAT, 19.03.2015. 62 Interview: Michel Haesen, Vice-President of the CPB and President of the Port Users association of Brussels and Vilvoorde (PUAVB), 20 April 2015. 63

Interview: Michel Haesen, 20 April 2015.

64

64

Port of Brussels, Archives, 1986 – 1988.

Figure 13 - Maritime Canal under the "Company of Brussels Maritime Infrastructure and the Canal" (Before 1993)

20

65

65

Port of Brussels, Archives, 1986 – 1988.

Figure 14 - Evolution of The Maritime Canal before the Regionalisation (1989)

21

Figure 15 - Profile of Brussels' Zeekanaal Section

22

Credits figures 15 & 16 : Port of Brussels

Figure 16 - Profile ABC Axe: Schelde - Brussels - Charleroi

4. Shortsea Traffic and European Policies Evolution:

Since the 70s, road freight has been responsible for the large majority of inland transport charges. In the meantime, containerisation has led to competition between charterers and ship-owners in order to build bigger and bigger vessels, leading to the current situation. Moreover the loading flexibility of containers for any type of goods has also been a strike to the competitiveness of common carrier ships (bulkers). With that course to cut costs, loading uniformisation and due to the increasing size of container ships, it appears that Shortsea Ships (SSS) or Coasters are also competitively declining for continental shipping in comparison with road transport because of “bulk breaking”66 and the multiple handling needed. Nevertheless, SSS has become an interesting solution for creating links between major sea ports, their hinterland and/or other coast ports and reduce congestion. Therefore it is the role of the “Inland port to develop door-to-door” solutions with “pre- and endhauls by trucks”67. The reason for this can be explained by great sea ports’ attraction for those mega vessels and by the fact that road transport will be cheaper than shortsea, inland navigation or even rail. A part of the explanation can also be found in the flexibility of road transport in terms of less “break bulking” (road direct delivery from A to B), the lack of internalisation of external costs, the social distortion of work costs within Europe in road freight transport (since European integration), etc. Nevertheless, in 2009, the EU Commission set up a Communication on Strategic goals and recommendations for EU maritime transport policy until 2018 which encounters those problems:

“The challenge is to provide the right mix of measures to ensure that ports can cope efficiently with their gateway function. This would require both providing new infrastructures and improving the use of existing capacities by increasing port productivity. The existing system, including hinterland connections and freight corridors, has to be adapted to cope with the expected growth. In that regard, the main priorities should be to:

[…] – Ensure the right conditions for attracting investment flows to the port sector, prioritising modernisation and expansion of port and hinterland connection infrastructure projects in those areas that are more likely to suffer from congestion problems.

[…] – EU funding programmes such as the Trans-European Network Transport projects, Marco Polo or the Regional Policy instruments should assist in those developments and address modal shift factors.

[…] – In the above context, examine economic instruments (such as taxes, charges or emission trading schemes) for "getting the prices right" encouraging users to make use of short sea shipping alternatives addressing road congestion problems and, in general promoting market solutions that contribute to the sustainability of the transport chain as a whole”68.

In the meantime, the great seaports have had to constantly improve their infrastructure in order to

host those megaships69 and to organise their logistics to convey containers to their hinterland. To do

66 Multiple loading and unloading in the supply chain which generate handling costs. 67 T. NOTTEBOOM, J.P.RODRIGUE, Inland Terminals, Regions and Supply Chains, Antwerp, 2009, p.28-29. 68 COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018, COM(2009) 8 final, Brussels, 2009, p.11. 69 N.SIMONS, Mémoire : Les avantages et les désavantages compétitifs des modes alternatifs de transpor, Solvay Business School, Brussels, 2009, p.31.

24

so, it is road freight which is privileged because of its low cost and its flexibility. Nevertheless, with

the increase of global trade and globalisation, numerous countries, especially in Europe, are currently

facing road congestion and environmental problems caused, amongst others, by freight. Brussels is

not spared from this phenomenon.

Considering the environmental, external costs and congestion impacts of road freight, the European

Union and its Members States are eager to tackle these problems in order to maintain well-being on

our continent. Therefore, for a long time, the European Commission has been promoting through

reports and communications maritime transport on short distances in order to promote and develop

such transport.

In 2004, the Commission stated in a Communication to the Council and the Parliament that:

“Whereas Short Sea Shipping was considered for many years to be a less performing mode, it

has now proven its ability to reach levels of competitiveness normally attributed to road

alone. Nevertheless, expected growth in European goods transport makes it necessary for

Short Sea Shipping to expand even further so as to make its full contribution towards

alleviating current and future transport problems in Europe”70.

In that Communication, the Commission also pointed out that the development of shortsea shipping

should not be considered as a short term vision and has be seen from a long term development view.

Nevertheless, for many years, shortsea has been seen as a possible part of the solution for freight

transport.

In 2011, the Commission published a “White Paper” on transport. The Commission’s guidelines are

quite clear on the necessary interconnection between great sea ports and the hinterland. In its “Ten

Goals for a competitive and resource efficient transport system: benchmarks for achieving the 60%

GHG emission reduction target”, the sixth goal has the following aim:

“By 2050, connect all core network airports to the rail network, preferably high-speed; ensure

that all core seaports are sufficiently connected to the rail freight and, where possible, inland

waterway system”71.

Furthermore the Commission also advocates for better multimodal connections between major cities

and ports:

“The core network must ensure efficient multi-modal links between the EU capitals and other main cities, ports, airports and key land border crossing, as well as other main economic centres. It should focus on the completion of missing links – mainly cross-border sections and bottlenecks/bypasses – on the upgrading of existing infrastructure and on the development of multimodal terminals at sea and river ports and on city logistic consolidation centres. Better rail/airport connections must be devised for long distance travel. The Motorways of the Sea will be the maritime dimension of the core network”.72

70 COM (2004) 453 final {SEC (2004) 875},COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL,THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, on Short Sea Shipping, 2004. 71 WHITE PAPER, COM (2011) 144 final, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, 2011, p.9. 72 Ibidem, p.14.

25

The “White Paper” and the different European programmes, such as the former Marco Polo I & II or

current TEN-T and ERDF73, are real opportunities for ports to secure funding in order to adapt their

infrastructure (e.g.: Seine – Schelde : North Europe) and to connect with other transport modii such

as rail, air and road. Nevertheless, since 2013 and the end of the Marco Polo programmes, there is –

at the moment – no new programme to help the launch of new shortsea lines services. The lack of a

funding programme for services is for Promotie SSS Vlaanderen a weakness within EU policy, which is

not to say that subsidies are the solution but rather that they can help to convince charterers to

launch new projects74.

5. Regulation and Economic context – Regional, Interregional and Federal Context:

a. Regional context:

Since 1993, the Port of Brussels has been responsible for managing the waterway and its

infrastructure (bridges, locks, quays walls, etc.) as well as the lands along the canal, with a view to

economic development and logistics. As already explained hereabove, the PoB is enclosed by the

Flemish Region and does not have at its disposal as much space as in Flanders. In other words, the

PoB does not have the opportunity to grow outside of the Regional Border.

More than competition between inland ports75 (e.g. Vilvoorde), if Brussels authorities consistently

push the harbour activities to the north of the Region and erase the current more central activities,

the economic activities will probably settle outside of the Region and create competitiveness

distortion with the two other Regions. This is a threat for the harbour and employment in Brussels

but is seen as an opportunity for Flanders and Wallonia to settle in their “Brabants” logistical

activities serving Brussels76. Even certain civil servants near the CVP in Brussels considered moving

harbour activities outside of the Region at the time that the Cargovill project was launched in

Vilvoorde77.

Furthermore, with the regionalisation of Belgium, several competences were transmitted to the Regions but the fact is that Brussels is a small actor within the decision-making process and as inland port authority (only 14KM waterway) and does not dispose of the same tools as other Belgian regions. For example, in 2001, Flanders created a promotion office for Shortsea Shipping (SSS Vlaanderen) and to participate in the European Shortsea Network. Brussels has the willingness to participate in this office but Flanders refuses logically under the principle of regionalisation. In the end, it was

decided that SSS Vlaanderen would represent the three regions at European level78 as SSS Belgium Centre. But at national level, Brussels stands alone with its low ability to promote itself due to its smaller position. This example demonstrates the way in which Brussels is limited in promoting its activities to companies.

73 EFRO/FEDER 74 W.DE DECKER, Promotie Shortsea Shipping Vlaanderen, interview 5 May 2015. 75 OECD, Competition in Ports and Ports Services, Policy roundtables, 2011, p.9-14. 76 G.ORIGER, op.cit, vol.I, p.35. 77 Ibid., p.55. 78 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol I, p. 35.

Figure 17 RMS VOERDE - Palets Coaster - Outer port 30

th March 2011 – 2200 tons

22

26

This opinion is showed by the CPB (Port Community of Brussels), which “deplore the splitting of the

former Canal Society into two entities impeaching to create better links and collaboration with coast

ports […] because of the two different existing regions which led to competitive relations”79.

The Sixth State Reform brought several new competences for the Brussels Region but they are not

especially useful for the PoB due to its location and the regional context, only 14km of waterways.

The negotiations regarding implementation are still ongoing but the fact is that the PoB does not

have the opportunity to implement these transfers correctly in terms of human resources and

infrastructure (eg.: collection of boats waste, technical control for boats, gauge certificates …) and it

would prefer to recognise certification from the two other Regions instead of creating its own

services for the very few mariners settled in Brussels80.

b. Interregional/federal context:

i. “Law Major”:

On the national side of the port regulation, Belgium is rather unique because of its restrictive

legislation on “harbour work”. Indeed, the labour market in harbours in Belgium is reserved for

recognised workers through collective work agreements. The law of 8th June 1972, called “Law

Major”, stated that harbour work can only be realised by recognised harbour workers. The

recognition of these workers is fixed by the “paritaire commission”81 which gathers diverse harbour

zones under the AR of 12th January 197382.

Brussels and Vilvoorde are coupled into their own “paritaire commission” and the limits of the zone

are “Sainctelette Place to Humbeek Bridge”. This means that companies must use recognised

workers for handling goods within the zone. The fact is that harbour work is expensive and tariffs are

fixed by a sort of workers’ syndicate. This constitutes a real lack of competitiveness for Belgian ports

due to high wage rates imposed by the syndicate defending harbour work.

Nevertheless, for many years, there have been discussions concerning the legality of such a law in a

free market economy for workers and services. An example of controversy regarding the Law Major

is: in 2012, the Minister Monica De Coninck called for a modernisation of the Major Law in order to

further strengthen the competitiveness of the Belgian Harbour83. However nothing has changed since

this hypothesis, although Katoen Natie introduced a complaint to the EU against the Law Major and

Belgium in 201384. The complaint does not only focus on harbour work but rather on logistics.

Indeed, for the Belgian social inspection agency, harbour work also includes logistical work which is

not properly linked with the loading and unloading of boats. This point of view is contested by

79 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol. III, p.83 : entretien avec la CPB. 80 Legal department, Port of Brussels, 2015. 81 Commission paritaire : « collective working agreement » gathering management and workers. 82 l’AR du 12 janvier 1973 instituant la Commission paritaire des ports et fixant sa dénomination et sa compétence : « Article 1. Il est institué une commission paritaire, dénommée "Commission paritaire des ports", compétente pour les travailleurs en général et leurs employeurs qui, dans les zones portuaires : (A.) effectuent, en ordre principal ou accessoirement du travail portuaire, à savoir toutes les manipulations de marchandises qui sont transportées par des navires de mer ou des bâtiments de navigation intérieure, par des wagons de chemin de fer ou des camions, et les services accessoires qui concernent ces marchandises, que ces activités aient lieu dans les docks, sur les voies navigables, sur les quais ou dans les établissements s'occupant de l'importation, de l'exportation et du transit de marchandises, ainsi que toutes les manipulations de marchandises transportées par des navires de mer ou des bâtiments de navigation intérieure éa destination ou en provenance des quais d'établissements industriels. Il faut entendre par : (…) 4. Champ de compétence. - Zones portuaires : (…) Pour Bruxelles et Vilvorde. La zone comprenant les bassins maritimes et fluviaux et les quais, ainsi qu'une bande de 50 mètres de large le long des deux rives du canal maritime à partir du pont de la place Sainctelette jusqu'au pont de Humbeek. » 83 De Standaard, De Coninck wil modernisering van havenharbeid, 25 january 2012. 84 http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/regio/antwerpen/1.1797666

27

Logisport (part of Katoen Natie) for which if logistics work is not considered as harbour work for

“public companies”, it should be the same for private companies.

Furthermore, it appears that the Law Major is also a kind of protectionism since the law impeaches

other European workers without recognition to offer their services within a Belgian port. In 2002, the

Brussels Work Court cancelled a decision of Belgium to inflict an administrative penalty on a

company which had not used harbour workers for harbour work. The Court stated that the Law

Major is in contradiction of article 49 of the European Community Treaty as a restriction of free

services benefits within the Community Area85. However, Belgium is not the only country to have

such a regulation. Spain has a similar regulation that has also been subject to revision due to its

contradiction with European regulation86.

The fact is that Brussels Harbour work also falls under the Law Major and therefore creates a price

increase in maritime goods handling within the PoB domain.

ii. Pilotage, dockage and mooring exemptions - Harbour Rights: W&Z87 et PoB

The PoB is located on the last most expensive section of the Zeekanaal which is divided into 4 (5)

sections. As previously stated, the PoB falls under the Law Major which can increase work costs but

another threat for the shipper is dockage and pilotage costs. The actual costs of pilotage and dockage

depend on the vessel’s size LOA (Length Over All) and the destination. These costs are really high and

can represent up to 46.4% of the total cost of the journey88.

Due to its position as a terminal of the Zeekanaal, Brussel dockage and pilotage prices are the

highest. This can be considered to be a weakness in the development of maritime traffic within

Brussels sections (see table below). However, there are several exemptions existing regarding the

function of the lines’ frequencies and criteria that can be accorded to ships captains if they pass an

exam89, the PEC – “Pilote Exemption Certificate”. To maintain an eligible certificate, captains must

carry out X journeys within a year. The PEC allows for a reduction in pilotage costs.

An exception of pilotage also exists aside the PEC for frequent lines and can also reduce pilotage’s

costs by between 11% and 41% depending on distance, the number of journeys during a specific

period and time of the pilotage criteria90.

85 CHRONIQUE DU DROIT SOCIAL, Tribunal du Travail, 7ième chambre, arrêt prononcé le 11 janvier 2002, 2011, p.287. Note: the arrest of the Court became effective on 14th December 2010 and was published only in 2011 after the withdraw of the appeal to Court. 86 PORTS, NAVIGATION ET INTERMODALITE, Dockers: la loi espagnole contraire au droit européen, 18 décembre 2014. Online article: http://www.n-pi.fr/docker-espagne-major/ 87 Waterwegen en Zeekanaal. 88 P.BONNE, Inventaris van maatregelen ter bevordering van SSS, uGent, 2005, p.13 quote from PROMOTIE SHORTSEA SHIPPING VLAANDEREN, Nota: Zeerivier trafieken op het Albertkanaal en het Zeekanaal Brussel-Schelde, 2005, 8p. http://www.shortsea.be/html_nl/publicaties/documents/Paper%20havenbeheer%20over%20SSS.pdf 89 Ibidem. 90 Ibid., p.14.

28

Example of the percentage of pilotage and dockage cost in “vessel disbursement account (VDA)” in 200591

Example 1 Example 2

Total VDA euro 13612

Total VDA euro 5098

Draft in 7.7m / out 5.7 m

Draft in 2.8 m / out 3.1m

Pilotage (sea – river – Canal) 40.43%

Pilotage (sea – river – Canal) 33.3%

Tugs 22.4%

Tugs none

Dues (tonnage-berthing) 12.9%

Dues 23.8%

Shipping/Signalling not included

Shipping/Signalling not included

Waste disposal not included

Nevertheless, pilotage costs from the North Sea to the upper Schelde, to Antwerp and then to the

Zeekanaal are generating high costs for shippers, especially on the Zeekanaal where, for the

PUAVB92, it is not really necessary to welcome a pilot on board93. For the association, the Zeekanaal is

sufficiently easy to navigate to exempt navigation from piloting. This measure will allow the shippers

to reduce their costs and improve their competitiveness on the transport market. Furthermore, the

PUAVB explains that the cost of sea-rivers within Zeekanaal sections are more expensive on ABC axes

than others inland maritime axes94.

Concerning the navigation rights on Brussels’ part of the Zeekanaal, they are the same as in Flanders

and are really low, even cancelled for fluvial flows in the years 200095. In 1999, a new exemption was

put in place for “mooring/unmooring rights” which applied to all increasing and/or new, maritime or

fluvial, traffic. This had an immediate effect on the traffic volume with a jump of 5%96(including

fluvial and maritime traffic). In 1998, the PoB also launched negotiations with W&Z in order to

promote maritime traffic with more favourable conditions for the obtainment of “regular lines

status”.

Nevertheless, for the Users of the Zeekanaal, these negotiated agreements are not sufficient to

reduce the “approach fees” in Brussels, especially for charterers which do not have regular lines but

which have regular traffic with different ship-owners. For the President of the Port Users Association

of Vilvoorde and Brussels (PUAVB), obtaining a PEC for ship captains from Ukraine, Russia or Baltic

countries is too constraining and they don’t really see the benefits for a few journeys97. Due to

91 Promotie Shortsea Shipping Vlaanderen, Zeerivier trafieken op het Albertkanaal en het Zeekanaal Brussel-Schelde, 2005, p.3. Internet source : http://www.shortsea.be/html_nl/publicaties/documents/Zeerivier%20trafieken_juni05.pdf Note: It is really difficult to obtain information on journey cost from a shipper. This the reason why we took the mentioned example even if know that those prices are not actual. They only us give an example of the proportion pilotage and dockage cost for a sea-river transport. 92 Port Users Association of Vilvoorde and Brussels (PUAVB) 93 Interview : Michel Haesen, Vice-President of the CPB and President of the port users association of Brussels and Vilvoorde, 20 april 2015. 94 ABC : Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi. 95 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol.I, p.45. 96 G.ORIGER, op.cit., vol. II, p.55. 97 Interview : Michel Haesen, Vice-President of the CPB and President of the port users association of Brussels and Vilvoorde, 20 april 2015.

29

volatility in maritime traffic in Brussels, charterers usually opt for TRAMP transport because of the

difficulties in foreseeing structural traffic (liner).

Framework for pilotage and dockage for maritime navigation on the Zeekanaal98

Valid fees for the pilotage on the Zeekanaal - 2015 99

98 BRABO, Richtlijn voor Loods- en Bootmanvrijstelling voor zeevaartuigen op het zeekanaal Brussel, W&Z, 2015. 99 Ibidem. - VERGOEDING VOOR HET LOODSEN TOEPASSELIJK VANAF 01.01.2015 T.E.M. 31.12.2015.

30

6. International trade relations and international representation:

As an important regional economic actor, the PoB should be more involved in international trade

representation at regional level through Brussels Invest Export but also thanks to Belgian diplomatic

representation all over the world to promote itself. Each year, Brussels Invest & Export (BIE)

organises the “Contact days”100, an event which gathers per geographical zone the Economic and

Commercial Attachés and Companies interested in exporting or investing in the region and vice-

versa. Another option for the PoB would be to work with bilateral commerce chambers and bilateral

diplomatic representations in order to promote it and to bind links between our Region and sea

countries. The Consulates can also be seen as leverage to create opportunities.

The Brussels’ Commercial and Economic Attachés network should be used more often as leverage in

neighbouring countries or zones such as the Baltic Sea, Scandinavia or the UK with which exchanges

have existed in the past. Prospection and cooperation agreements have to be sought by the PoB in

these zone and countries if the PoB really wants to redeploy shortsea Shipping.

Several initiatives have been undertaken in that way since the creation of the PoB in 1993 but none

have led to a real creation of traffic.

Two economic missions were organised in 2007 in Saint-Petersburg101 and in 2008 to Morocco102 in

the presence of the Minister responsible for the Port, industry chambers, Brussels Port Community

(CPB) and PoB representative. The objective was to meet Port Authorities and economic players

active in import/export in both countries. With the help of Economic and Commercial Attachés and

the Belgian Embassies, several meetings and seminars gathering CPB, Brussels’ enterprises and

Moroccan companies were organised regarding potential maritime trade relations. The results of the

missions were interesting on paper and lots of contacts were made. The Moroccan mission led to the

signature of cooperation willingness agreements to cooperate for developing containerised flows

with barge transshipments in Antwerp and direct SSS lines to Brussels from Morocco. The targeted

goods flows were essentially related to textile and fruits and primers for Morocco. The results of the

Russian mission were a bit more tenuous and focused on steel goods in Russia. The outcomes were

essentially interesting for Brussels companies in terms of networking and relationship building.

Unfortunately, although agreements were put down on paper, they were not followed up.

Nevertheless, we truly think that there are opportunities for the Brussels Region and its Port to

participate or to organise such economic missions in order to promote its infrastructure and to build

trade relations with neighbouring countries. Participating in Princely Economic Missions should also

be further analysed by the port in terms of opportunities. Nonetheless, even if the PoB should be

better involved in international relations, it is also the duty of the Brussels Port Community to work

more closely with BIE and BECI103 in order to promote their companies and the PoB at international

level.

Last but not least, participating in fairs (e.g.: Transport and Logistics104 in Liège and Antwerpen or

LogiTrans105) with its Development and Commercial department is also a great opportunity for the

100 http://www.investinbrussels.com 101 Report of Mission to Port’s Board, Casablanca, 19th October 2007. 102 Report of Mission to Port’s Board, Saint-Pétersbourg, 30th January 2008. 103 Brussels’ Chamber for Commerce and Industry. 104 http://www.easyfairs.com/fr/events_216/transport-logistics-2015_53642/transport-logistics2015_53643/

31

PoB to make him known as an “inland maritime port”. A port which has the ability to host coaster,

shortsea and estuary ships up to the dimensions identified here above. Nevertheless, the PoB should

pay attention to its communication vis-à-vis charterers and shippers in order to promote its own

maritime infrastructure in providing up to date information.

7. SWOT Analysis and recommendations:

Thanks to the historical review, our desk research and the interviews which were carried out, we

have demonstrated and identified several tendencies present throughout the existence of the Port of

Brussels. This leads us to the final part of this paper, the SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses,

Opportunities and Threats).

Our aim for this paper is not to analyse in depth all the opportunities or threats for the PoB and the

development of short distance transport by sea and river transport, but instead to provide an

overview of all the tendencies in Brussels in order to formulate recommendations as to the potential

to redeploy or not maritime traffic to and from the Port of Brussels.

Before properly beginning our analysis, we have chosen to first point out the constraints we have

faced during this exercise. The first is the time we had to delve into the chosen topic and the

numerous factors which are involved in it, from policies to urban development passing by transport

competitiveness. We assume that such research within a paper of 30 pages could only lead to a

global picture of the challenges that the PoB is facing without being able to analyse all impacting

matters in depth.

A second limit in this paper is – due to companies’ confidentiality policies – the lack of data related to

the costs of a shipment from A to B. It was indeed especially difficult to gain access to companies’

data and their accounts. The topic could certainly be subject to a separate piece of research. Indeed,

it would be interesting for the PoB to develop a sampling grid with the different maritime tariffs to

reach its Zeekanaal section.

A third limit lies in the traffic categories and goods. Due to the numerous reasons for which maritime

traffic is stagnating in Brussels, we decided not to enter into an analysis of goods demands in

Brussels which could have led us to identify potential markets for redeploying maritime traffic in

Brussels. This point would be a particularly interesting topic to follow up to this paper. Such

prospection and analysis should of course be carried out in close cooperation with our Commercial

and Economic Attaché Network and the Ministry of Economy.

a. Strengths:

The first easily identifiable strengths for the PoB are of course its infrastructure in terms of maritime

quays and multimodal connections with its containers terminal (road/rail/waterway), customs

clearance services and its localisation in the heart of North West Europe (NEW). The PoB, as

previously explained, is the closest gateway to one of the biggest consumption centres considering

the metropolitan region and its neighbours. Its 24/7 navigation accessibility and the fact that it has a

greater gauge than other inland ports are also real strengths in comparison with other Belgian and

European inland ports.

105 http://www.transportlogistic.de

32

b. Opportunities:

In terms of opportunities, we have identified several points which could lead to better

competitiveness of the shortsea traffic and inland waterway traffic. The first lies in the European

framework for developing interconnections between core transport networks. Several programmes

are currently available to support such developments and should be further strengthened within the

PoB’s infrastructure development policies. For the PoB, participating in EU funding programmes is an

opportunity in terms of project funding and also a good manner to develop its network and to

prospect for new development in other EU Member States.

Another opportunity resides in the development of interconnections between major European sea

ports and inland ports through the development of regular estuary lines, especially for container

transport. A real opportunity exists for the PoB to position itself within the Hinterland of Zeebrugge

and Antwerp as a gateway to the Brussels Metropolitan area. The development of “double letter of

gauge” and PECs are also seen as an opportunity to reduce shipment costs and increase the

competitiveness of short distance sea-river shipping. In parallel, estuary ships are also seen as an

opportunity to further reinforce hinterland relations between great Flemish and neighbouring sea

ports and the PoB.

Furthermore, companies such as Brussels Shipping, filial of SMET and Duferco logistics, are currently

seeking to develop their sea river traffic in Brussels from Ireland, Russia, etc106. However, they are

facing a lack of land space to organise new liner traffic. Nevertheless, the willingness is there and the

PoB should pay more attention to economic actors.

The latter opportunity has to be seen in parallel with the future “trucks toll” foreseen in Belgium at

the horizon of 2016. The “trucks toll” aims to internalise the external costs for using roads and will

certainly lead to an increase in the potential competitiveness of SSS and inland waterway transport.

Specifically for Brussels, we have seen another opportunity in terms of further development and the

extension of the harbour domain at the horizon of 2025-2030 with the “extension” of the Schaerbeek

Formation. The opportunity for the PoB to grow and develop a multimodal logistics area is crucial for

its continuity, as all the Brussels’ surveys have stated. Furthermore, the PoB, because of its

localisation within the Brussels Metropolitan Region - a major consumption centre in NWE – should

certainly further develop its domain or even itself as a Distribution Centre at the service of the

regional area.

Last but not least, the PoB has to seize the opportunity to use Brussels’ external trade service and

Belgian diplomatic network to forge trade and cooperation agreements with other ports as well as

between Brussels and foreign companies.

c. Weaknesses:

The real weaknesses of the PoB in terms of absorption of new shortsea traffic reside in its lack of land

space and its localisation within a region where land is expensive and where borders are definitively

fixed without any current possibility to grow.

106 J.L.VANDEVOORDE, Port and Business, Smet repart de l’avant, n°4, avril-mai 2015, p.13.

33

A second identified weakness is the small amount of industrial activities still existing in Brussels for its

own exportations. This fact coupled with the low service density of the rail freight network

connected to the Brussels Hinterland decreases the positioning of Brussels as a multimodal hub for

SSS and estuary ships and for other types of transport. Importation by train to the PoB could have a

potential leverage in terms of counterbalancing the high percentage of importations in its external

trade balance (Cf. Zeekanaal Shortsea traffic 2014).

A third identified weakness is communication vis-à-vis shippers. As previously explained, the PoB has

focused on the development of fluvial traffic and should adapt its communication policy to shippers

in function of its infrastructure and accessibility. This means not only speaking about accessibility in

terms of tonnage but also in terms of size hosting capacities (vessel size instead of only tonnage).

Nevertheless, even if the infrastructure, accessibility and communication are theoretically suitable

for hosting shortsea vessels, the decision to use Zeekanaal infrastructure lies in the hands of the

shipper.

The shippers are also a weak link within the promotion of shortsea. Indeed, their decisions will

always be driven by transportation costs. It is the Port Authorities’ responsibility to adapt and

promote their infrastructure and to develop more affordable solutions for co- or multimodality in

their service range, in close collaboration with the shortsea private sector. Thus, the absence of an

EU programme for developing new shortsea service lines is a brake in terms of fostering such a

development for Port Authorities due to their finances.

We have not really analysed the land management policy of the PoB and the activities settled on its

domain in depth but have essentially focused on the transportation framework. Nevertheless, in

terms of land policy management, the PoB is actually including in its concessionary contract a

“Guaranteed Minimum Tonnage (GMT) per year” disposition in order to force the concessioner to

use the waterway. These GMT are much more focused on fluvial traffic. Indeed, there is no obligation

for concessions to have at disposal a maritime quay to generate a minimum maritime traffic. Such a

policy, i.e. putting in place a maritime GMT, could provide leverage for developing Shortsea.

A further weakness in term of communication is the space allowed for communicating with

politicians and the public in order to explain the role and importance of the PoB in terms of

externalities, congestion and emission reductions. We have seen throughout this paper that the

PoB’s objectives are too often in discordance with political agendas and priorities. A greater space for

communication should be dedicated to the PoB’s self-promotion.

The Belgian regulatory framework with the notion of harbour work is also seen by stakeholders as a

weakness. Although the framework can offer a competent and qualified work power, it remains a

brake in terms of cost for the development of maritime traffic. Always in terms of costs, the tariffs of

pilotage, dockage and harbour fees in general are also a constraint for charterers. It would certainly

be interesting for the PoB to start negotiations or discussions with its Flemish counterpart in order to

reduce costs and to promote the modal shift to a sea-river solution through a favourable framework.

The final weakness is the lack or the missing link in terms of interregional cooperation. Although a

cooperation agreement exists between Brussels Port Authority, W&Z and Flemish sea ports, the

relations are tenuous. They should be strengthened in order to share benefits and to develop closer

relations with northern colleagues. At the moment, participation agreements exist between board

34

members of the PoB and W&Z but there is no officer in charge of interregional relations. Fostering

better continuous relations between the PoB and Flemish Port and Waterways authorities would

certainly be an asset for better daily cooperation.

d. Threats:

Because of the lack of interregional relationships, it appears that the threat of competition from

Flemish maritime inland ports and sea ports is strong. If we consider the 2014 SSS volumes

transshipped in the Flemish part of the Zeekanaal and the volume in Brussels (1mio contra 30k tons),

we immediately see the disparity. Competition between ports is increasing but for stakeholders,

close interregional cooperation could solve a lot of common problems, ranging from issues with

congestion in Antwerp to setting up a common project on the ABC axe.

Aside from the cooperation problem, the major threat for the PoB, since its creation in the 16th

century, is the political indecision which has consistently led to misunderstanding and incertitude for

economic actors settled within the harbour domain. Political uncertainty is the enemy of the

economic development of companies and their investments. History shows us that companies will

always choose stability in their localisation choice instead of investing in areas where uncertainty

related to their own existence persists.

Furthermore, in close relation with uncertainty, real estate pressure and land speculation appear to

pose the most important threat for harbour economic activities and the PoB itself. Real estate

pressure also generates anxiety for companies and their future. Political decisions to yield the port’s

lands for building equipment and housing, amongst others, create de facto a lack of space for

economic activities. We have previously seen that available space is a key factor for redeploying sea-

river traffic. If the PoB misses its urban integration within the city, it will lead to the end of traditional

harbour activities and the places left will be dedicated to leisure and another urban functions but no

longer to the core business of a harbour domain: transport and good exchanges.

*

* *

Strengths:

- Infrastructure: waterway, maritime accessibility;

- Multimodal (Rail, Road, Water);

- 24/7 accessibility;

- Greater gauge than other inland ports;

- Custom clearance services;

- Central position close to great consumption centres.

Weaknesses:

- Lack of place to grow;

- Low industrial density;

- Communication vis-à-vis companies, the public and Public Authorities;

- Harbour work - Major Law + W&Z Tariffs' policy;

- Tenuous relationship with Flemish ports and Port Authorities;

- Rail Reliability ;

- Lack of commitment of shippers;

- co- or multimodality (Barge to rail; Barge to barge).

Opportunities:

- EU policy and EU funding programmes;

- Short distance sea shipping accessibility (SSS, Coaster and sea river);

- Estuary ships;

- Distribution centre;

- Double gauge letter,PECs;

- Trucks Toll;

- Domain extension (Schaerbeek Formation);

- International representation (Brussels invest-export);

- Direct transhipment.

- Guaranteed Minimum Tonnage (GMT)

Threats:

- Interregional competition;

- Political indecision;

- Unstable future for companies;

- Real estate pressure and speculation;

- Urban integration;

- Dredging costs and maintenance of Draught;

- Road costs;

- Bulk Breaking.

Figure 18 - SWOT MATRIX

8. Conclusion:

Throughout this paper we have tried to present the evolution of the Brussels port infrastructure and

the factors which might have an impact on the redeployment of shortsea shipping in the Port of

Brussels. Considering the elements identified in the SWOT analysis, we are able to say that in order

to effectively attract SSS and new traffic such as containerised estuary shipping, the PoB will have

tackle several challenges.

While the spatial localisation of the PoB is really exceptional - both in terms of the multimodal

infrastructure’s accessibility and its proximity to a great consumption market – the national

regulation and economic framework are a real brake to the development of Shortsea or Estuary

shipping. On the one hand, the lack of space to grow into regional borders and the lack of industries

coupled with elements having an important impact on shipping costs – such as harbour work and

costs related to Zeekanaal navigation – are the major weaknesses that the PoB has to tackle. On the

other hand, the PoB has to face another challenge to better communicate on opportunities in order

to attract Shortsea charterers and shippers and also to defend its current activities vis-à-vis the

public and public authorities.

Considering the political context, the PoB is threatened by controversies around its future, which is

generating uncertainty as to the long term prospects of the harbour’s economic activities and the

PoB itself. Indeed, due to the current demographic boom and to real estate speculation, harbour

lands are increasingly coveted by promotors and the Region to develop equipment and housing.

Those elements have led businesses to freeze their investments on their concession. Therefore they

also have an impact on traffic and on the localisation of the economic activities. Flanders and

Wallonia appear to be a possible “retreat” position for these activities and de facto create

interregional competition between the PoB and other logistics areas. Furthermore, the economic

context and the transport evolution have led to an “all road transportation scenario” due to its

flexibility (less bulk breaking), its lower costs and because of the current inexistence of rail transport

opportunities. Road is the most important competitor of Shortsea and also of other transport

alternatives. Hopefully, the foreseen 2016 truck toll will balance transport markets and offer a

competitive asset to waterway transport.

Nevertheless, while the PoB context appears uncertain, this does not mean that there is no hope on

the horizon. The EU framework and its funding programmes coupled with interregional or

international relations can play a greater role in developing infrastructure and promoting PoB

activities including redeploying shortsea. Fostering attendance of fairs or international transport

events and also profiting from our Economic and Commercial Attaché network for prospecting new

potentials are opportunities to be seized by the PoB.

The Schaerbeek-Formation area and the foreseen extension in the period leading up to 2025-2030

should further strengthen the position of the PoB as a major multimodal platform and distribution

centre for the Brussels Metropolitan area. Furthermore, this extension could partly solve the

problem of the lack of land space. The regulation framework with the adaptation of Law Major, the

pursuit of exemptions policy and the stimulation of estuary shipping are also points of attention

that can be adapted through better cooperation with others Port Authorities and Public Authorities

at all levels. Internally, the PoB should sit around the table with its economic actors in order to

37

promote its shortsea accessibility and to convince them to make use of its infrastructure by

developing incentives and constraints such as, for example, including GMT in concession contracts.

To conclude, we truly think that shortsea traffic has a real potential in Brussels. Nonetheless, the PoB

and the Regional Authorities need to find a common way of working in order to preserve and realise

this potential.

The challenges are numerous but the leverages also exist. Last but not least, if all PoB and external

stakeholders communicate better together with the aim of developing the harbour as a tool for the

city in terms of congestion, mobility and also as an added value generator and job provider, we think

that the weaknesses of the PoB’s current situation can be overcome but, as stated in the EU

Communication on shortsea, this should be done with a long term global development vision.

“He that will not sail till all dangers are over must never put to sea”

Thomas Fuller (1608 – 1661)

*

* *

38

9. Bibilography:

Interviews:

Charles Huygens, Former Director General of PoB, March 2015.

Alfons Moens, Director General - Port of Bruxelles, March 2015 and May 2015.

Luc Delprat Port of Brussels’ Harbour Master, 19.03.2015.

Michel Haesen, Vice-President of the CPB and President of the port users association of Brussels and Vilvoorde, 20 April 2015.

Geneviève Origer, Former Development director at PoB, 21 April 2015.

Willy De Decker, Short Sea Shipping Vlaanderen, 5 May 2015.

Valérie Tanghe, Development director at PoB, 7 May 2015.

Photos – Illustrations

All the pictures used in this paper come from the PoB’s archives.

Brussels Region and Port of Brussels documents:

HAVEN VAN BRUSSEL, Beheerscontract tussen Brussels Hoofstedelijk Gewest en de Haven van Brussel 2013-2018, hoofstuk 3, 7 mei 2013.

BRUXELLES MOBILITE, Plan Stratégique pour le Transport de Marchandise en RBC, GRBC 11 juillet 2013.

GRBC, Plan directeur pour la zone canal (« Plan Canal »), 2014.

ADT, DES OPPORTUNITÉS AU COEUR DE BRUXELLES, 2013.

PORT DE BRUXELLES, Communiqué de presse : trafics 2014, 30 janvier 2015.

PORT OF BRUSSELS, Masterplan du Port de Bruxelles à l’horizon 2015, 2006.

PORT OF BRUSSELS, Masterplan du Port de Bruxelles à l’horizon 2030, 2013.

PORT OF BRUSSELS, Report of Mission to Port’s Board, Casablanca, 19th October 2007.

PORT OF BRUSSELS, Report of Mission to Port’s Board, Saint-Pétersbourg, 30th January 2008.

PORT OF BRUSSELS, Statistics 1993-2014, Dep. Marketing and Development, 2015.

National, EU and International documents:

AR du 12 janvier 1973 ;

CEMT, Evolution des transports : 1970-2002, OCDE, Paris, 2004.

Chronique du Droit social, Tribunal du Travail, 7ième chamber, arrêt prononcé le 11 janvier 2002, 2011.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS, Strategic goals and recommendations for the EU’s maritime transport policy until 2018, COM(2009) 8 final, Brussels, 2009.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL,THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS on Short Sea Shipping, COM (2004) 453 final {SEC (2004) 875}, 2004.

OECD, COMPETITION IN PORTS AND PORT SERVICES, DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE, ref. DAF/COMP(2011)14, 2011.

P.QUIST,M.DE JONG, H.J.VEHEIJ, Staat van de scheepvaart en de binnenvaarwegen in Nederland 2011, TU Delft, 2011.

VLAAMS PARLEMENT, Verslag van Gedachtewisseling over de estuaire vaart, 1468 (2011-2012) – n°1, ingediend op 3 februari 2012.

WHITE PAPER, COM (2011) 144 final, Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system, 2011.

39

Studies:

E.HAEZENDONCK, M.DOOMS, A.VERBEKE, Sociaal-economische evaluatie van de haventrafieken te Brussel, ECSA, Port de Bruxelles, 9 januari 2015.

TECHNUM, Etude de l’impact socioéconomique d’une relocalisation potentielle des activités économiques des bassins Vergote et Biestebroeck vers l’avant-port, Port de Bruxelles, 2014.

N.SIMONS, Mémoire : Les avantages et les désavantages compétitifs des modes alternatifs de transport, Solvay Business School, Brussels, 2009.

Books:

P.BONNE, Inventaris van maatregelen ter bevordering van SSS, uGent, 2005.

T.DEMEY, Un canal dans Bruxelles – Bassin de vie et d’emploi, Guide Badeaux, 2008.

T. NOTTEBOOM, J.P.RODRIGUE, Inland Terminals, Regions and Supply Chains, Antwerp, 2009.

G.ORIGER, Vingt ans de politique portuaire à Bruxelles, vol.I, II et III, Cahier Hebdomadaire du CRISP, Bruxelles, 2013-2014.

M.STRALE, La logistique, localisation des activités et impacts territoriaux, dir. C.VANDERMOTTEN, Mars 2013.

J.STRUBBE, Les ports maritimes belges : un héritage pour demain, Lannoo, Tielt, 1989.

Illustrations:

Bruxelles, Port de Mer, AVB, Photothèque, M-2900

H.SOMERHAUSSEN, 1827 – J.-B. DE BOUGE – 1823 – Cartography: Michel Plaizier

Articles:

De STANDAARD, De Coninck wil modernisering van havenharbeid, 25 january 2012.

I.KATSEROVA, Liberalisation of EU port services: issues and consequences for dock workers, Library Briefing, European Parliament, 20 March 2013.

M.PLAISIER, Brussels tijdens het Verenigd Koninkrijk der Nederlanden : 1815 – 1830, Brussel deze Week, n°1468, donderdag 2 april 2015.

PROMOTIE SHORTSEA SHIPPING VLAANDEREN, Zeerivier trafieken op het Albertkanaal en het Zeekanaal Brussel-Schelde, Gent, mei 2005.

PROMOTIE SHORT SEA SHIPPING VLAANDEREN, Aboard nieuwsbrief, Shortsea in beweging, April 2015.

PORTS, NAVIGATION ET INTERMODALITE, Dockers: la loi espagnole contraire au droit européen, France, 18 décembre 2014.

J.L.VANDEVOORDE, Port and Business, Smet repart de l’avant, n°4, avril-mai 2015.

Documents:

BRABO, Richtlijn voor Loods- en Bootmanvrijstelling voor zeevaartuigen op het zeekanaal Brussel, W&Z, 2015.

Internet sites:

http://www.wenz.be/

http://www.portdebruxelles.be

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/sss

http://www.shortsea.info

http://www.shortsea.be

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com

http://denederlandenverenigd.nl

40

http://www.binnenvaart.eu

http://www.internationaltransportforum.org

http://www.imo.org

http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/regio/antwerpen/1.1797666

http://www.n-pi.fr

http://www.investinbrussels.com

10. Acronyms index:

Abbreviations Significations

ABC Canal axe : Antwerp - Brussels - Charleroi

ADT Brussels Agency for Urban Planning

BECI Brussels Chamber for Commerce and Industry

BIE Brussels Invest & Export

CD&V Democrat and Christian Flemish Party

CPB Brussels Port Community

CVP ex-Democrat and Christian Flemish Party

DWT Death Weight Ton

ERDF European Regional Development Fund

EU European Union

GMO Genetically Modified Organism

GMT Guaranteed Minimum Tonnage

GRBC Government of Brussels Capital Region

LOA Length Over All

NIMBY Not In My Back Yard

OECD Office for Economic and Cooperation Development

PEC Pilot Exemption Certificate

PoB Port of Brussels

PUAVB Port Users' Association of Vilvoorde and Brussels

SNCB/NMBS Belgian National Rail Company (FR/NL)

SSS Short Sea Shipping

SWOT Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat

TEN-T Trans-European Transport Network

TRAMP Opposite of a Liner Service (not scheduled transport)

TTB Terminal Trimodal Brussels

W&Z Waterweggen en Zeekanaal

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