The Reconfiguration of the Canadian Defence and Security Policy After September 11, 2001

7/31/2019 The Reconfiguration of the Canadian Defence and Security Policy After September 11, 2001

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The Reconfiguration of the Canadian Defence and SecurityPolicy after September 11, 2001

Nahm Fernando Hernndez GallegosUniversity of GuadalajaraBA International Studies

March 30th 2010

Derechos Reservados Guadalajara, Mxico, 2010


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The Reconfiguration of the Canadian Defence and Security Policy

after September 11, 2001

The world will never be the same again

-Jean Chrtien, ex Prime Minister of Canada (1993-2003)

On 11 September 2001, the famous terrorist group Al-Qaida breached the security of the United

States attacking New York City and Washington DC by atypical means: four planes were

hijacked (American Airlines flight 11; United Airlines flight 175, United Airlines flight 93, and

American Airlines flight 77) and crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon1. This

led the U.S. government to one conclusion: strengthening national security by stating an

international campaign against terrorism.

Therefore, the president of the United States at that time, George W. Bush, decided to call

his closest allies to forge a common offensive against the enemy, almost invisible. No matter

what the aims of the perpetrators of the September 11th terrorist acts were, the attacks led to the

diminution of the American sense of geostrategic security, which in turn obliged other

governments to develop new administrative and legal countermeasures2.

This essay will attempt to explain the changes that occurred pertaining to Canadas

agenda on national security and defence since 11 September 2001. It will highlight the changes in

the national security agenda of the United States and show how these modifications have

influenced both the domestic and foreign policies of Canada in the areas of security and national

1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 2002,

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (accessed March 15, 2010), 1.

2 Houchang Hassan-Yari and Abdelkrim Ousman, "Incremental Changes in Canadas Defence and Security Policy

Since September 11, 2001," inIn/Security: Canada in the Post-9/11 World, by Alexander Netherton, Allen Seager

and Karl Froschauer, (Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 2005), 41.


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defence. This paper will also emphasize the changes in Canadas domestic and foreign policies

by analyzing the countrys geopolitical and geostrategic relationship with the United States3.

The search for independence and sovereignty above the 49th parallel

Canada's domestic and foreign policy has been a subject of many studies in political science and

international relations due to the empirical observation that the country is geographically located

beside the United States. Canadas physical closeness to the United States has always had a major

influence on how Canada performs its policies internally and to the rest of the world. This idea

became recurrent during and after the attacks of September 11th. The history of Canadian

relations with the United States has been one of continual pushes towards continental integration

and pulls towards sovereign nationalism4.

In general, decision makers in Canada have traditionally focused on building a unique and

independent vision apart from the U.S. foreign policy. For that reason, former Prime Minister

Jean Chrtien launched a plan to base Canadas foreign policy on three pillars: 1) the promotion

of prosperity and employment, 2) the protection of Canadas security within a stable global

framework, and 3) the projection of Canadian values and culture to the world5. Other scholars

have suggested that [. . .] the three pillars of Canadas foreign policy are: peace, trade, and

culture6.

3 Hassan-Yari, "Incremental Changes in Canadas Defence and Security Policy Since September 11, 2001", 42.

4

Kent Roach, September 11. Consequences for Canada, (Quebec City: McGuill-Queens University Press, 2003),14.

5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World, February 17, 2003, http://www.dfait-

maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/summary-en.asp (accessed January 22, 2010).

6 Peter Karl Kresl, "The Impacts of the September 11 Events on Canadas Foreign Policy", inIn/Security: Canada in

the Post-9/11 World, by Alexander Netherton, Allen Seager and Karl Froschauer, (Burnaby: Simon Fraser

University, 2005), 430.


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Moreover, during the post-World War II period [. . .] Canada has generally been an

advocate of peacekeeping as an agent of the United Nations in various wartorn parts of the

world7. The promotion of multilateralism has been an important stronghold in defining

Canadian foreign policy that can maintain an independent view from Washington DC, even in the

fight against terrorism. Thus, decision makers in Ottawa have preferred closer cooperation in

multilateral mechanisms such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN)8.

However, we must not forget that 9/11 was an event that transcends all the traditional

paradigms of international relations; virtually all defence strategies, national security and military

cooperation were dramatically transformed in the United States and consequently, Canadas

vision for a unique foreign policy has been influenced heavily by its American counterpart. As

Peter Kresl mentioned, the September 11 induced transformations of the three pillars of

Canadian foreign policy from free to managed trade, from peace to order, and from national

distinctiveness to international conformity in culture are having an impact on the nature of the

Canada-U.S. relationship 9

Based on these arguments, we can establish that the independence of Canada in regards to

handling its own foreign policy is not completely true. What is true is that Canada's relations with

the United States have always held a come and go mentality between integration and

nationalism10. However, since September 11th, the bilateral relationship has leaned toward

7Ibid, 432.

8Ibid, 442.

9Ibid, 446.

10 Roach, September 11. Consequences for Canada, 14.


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Canadas dependence on the United States, but this has also been an excellent opportunity to

differentiate the Canadian foreign policy from the U.S.11

Each country has its own ways of approaching the issues of security and defence, but this

is directly influenced by the asymmetries between the two countries. This means that the U.S.

decisions regarding collective security, defence and combat terrorism are much more important

than Canadas decisions in these areas, and after 9/11, this premise has became stronger to affirm

that Canada is at risk to misplace its position as a major player in the international scenario 12.

Although much has been said that there is independence from Canada to manage its own

foreign affairs, questions on its priorities in foreign policy have also been raised: in recent

decades, Canada has had to take the U.S. into account in virtually all of its foreign policy

decisions. Since September 11 has upped the ante, so to speak, by making the U.S. less tolerant

of dissention within the ranks and less willing to make accommodations to national

distinctiveness13

.

Therefore, it is not surprising that many prominent figures in Canadian politics have

expressed their consternation about the change that 9/11 has done to Canada and the declining

importance of its ability to speak with an independent and considered voice on a range of

matters14. Moreover, Kent Roach says, there are legitimate fears that September 11 is driving

Canada towards Americanized criminal justice, immigration, and military and foreign policies

that depart from such Canadian values as multiculturalism, peacekeeping, and respect for

international laws and institutions15.

11Ibid.

12 Hassan-Yari, "Incremental Changes in Canadas Defence and Security Policy Since September 11, 2001," 52.

13Kresl, "The Impacts of the September 11 Events on Canadas Foreign Policy, 446.


15Ibid, 14.


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It also has to be stressed that Canada is influenced not only by American politics;

financial ties and bilateral trade is almost a decisive factor regarding an independent foreign

policy for Canada:

Canada is in the unfortunate position of having 80 percent of its trade with one partner and trade

amounting to over 40 percent of its GDP, while comparable figures for that partner are 25 and 10

percent. Thus, the bilateral trade flows account for 35 percent of Canadian GDP but only about 2.5

percent of that of the U.S. This imbalance means that Canada will always be the demandeurin

trade discussions, that the attention that the U.S. will devote to this issue will always be very

limited, and that Canada has little clout in the relationship16.

However, despite all these arguments Canada is still relevant in the post 9/11 international

relations and has certain independence from Washington. Furthermore, we must note that the

traditional paradigm of international relations, based on the relationship between sovereign states

is still valid. This becomes true when Canada accepts or rejects an agreement with the United

States, as it is discussed below.

Emerging security policies and defence mechanisms in Canada before and after 9/11

Several mutual security treaties have been signed between the U.S. and Canada, and have became

even stronger after the Second World War, 17 in the context of the Cold War. Since 1940 with the

implementation of the Ogdensburg agreements, Prime Minister Mackenzie King gave way to

16Kresl, "The Impacts of the September 11 Events on Canadas Foreign Policy, 442.

17 Christopher Sands, "An Independent Security Policy for Canada in the Age of Sacred Terror?", InAn Independent

Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future, by Brian Bow and Patrick Lennox, (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 2008), 104.


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cooperation in defence matters, establishing the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD), and

financial resources to implement security with the Hyde Park Agreement18

.

The PJBD was supplemented with the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC) to follow

a strategic plan of defence against the Soviet threat, and from it Canada and the United States

brokered over 80 treatieslevel defence agreements, 150 bilateral forums, and 250 memoranda of

understanding19. From all these agreements reached during the Cold War, the most important

and relevant to Canada was the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD). Since its

establishment in May 1958, NORAD has been led by and American commander-in-chief (CINC

NORAD) with a Canadian deputy20.

During the terrorist attacks, NORAD played an important role in relation to closer

cooperation and collaboration between the U.S. and Canada not seen since the Cold War

days. The mechanisms of the agreement were launched after several aircrafts bound for the

United States were diverted to Canada21

. Despite cooperation within NORAD, one of the tensest

issues has been the inclusion of a missile defence program in the airspace of North America,

including Canada airspace.

Although former Prime Minister Jean Chrtien decided not to participate in negotiations

on the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), [. . .] the ministers of national defence and foreign

affairs [under former Prime Minister Paul Martin] announced an amendment to the NORAD

agreement in August 2004, authorizing NORAD to make all missile-warning information

18 Stephen Clarkson,Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent after NAFTA and 9/11, (Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 2008), 395.

19Ibid, 396.

20Ibid.

21Ibid.


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available to those regional and functional commands conducting ballistic missile defence22,

which is a de facto acceptance of BDM in practice.

Another more controversial post-9/11 security mechanism is the U.S. Northern Command

(NORTHCOM), which was established as a division of the U.S. Navy to protect the perimeter of

North America (Canada, U.S. and Mexico) and areas of the Caribbean and Central America. This

is not a treaty signed by the countries involved, but that is a division of the U.S. military23.

NORTHCOM became operational on 1 October 2003.24

However, NORTHCOM presupposes a flagrant violation of Canadian sovereignty

because U.S. NORTHCOM protects the continent from missile attacks, defends American and

Canadian satellites, and engages the U.S. Navy off the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic coast of North

America, all without a Canadian voice in command decisions (although in some limited cases

consultations may be triggered under old NORAD protocols)25. In 2005, Ottawa decided to

create a Canadian Command in response to NORTHCOM, but without a shared jurisdiction with

the U.S. as it was established in NORAD26.

Another agreement reached between Canada and the U.S. was the Smart Border Action

Plan and the U.S.-Canada Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET), focused on border

security through a strategic risk management, information technology, information sharing and

intelligence, and the border resources management (personnel, equipment, and budget) 27 28. In

22Ibid.

23

Sands, "An Independent Security Policy for Canada in the Age of Sacred Terror?", 113.24 Clarkson,Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent after NAFTA and 9/11, 399.

25 Sands, "An Independent Security Policy for Canada in the Age of Sacred Terror?", 113.

26Ibid.

27Ibid, 110.

28 Michael Kergin, "Canada-United States Relations", in Canada Among Nations 2009-2010. As Others See Us, by

Fen Osler Hampson and Paul Heinbecker, (Quebec City: McGuill-Queens University Press, 2010), 55.


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addition, a December 2002 mechanism called the Binational Planning Group (BPG), (which was

established by former Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham and Secretary of State

Colin Powell) called for closer cooperation on security in both countries, especially in regards to

emergency management29

.

Canada's participation in the offensive against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in

December 2001 signified a drastic change in its traditional view of foreign policy based on

multilateralism, as was shown above. Immediately after the terrorist attacks, Canada recalled

3,000 men and women of the Canadian Forces to support the international coalition against

terrorism30.

Moreover, many argue that Ottawas military participation in Afghanistan is highly

controversial, because Canadian troops are under de facto U.S. control, suggesting a potential

danger to national sovereignty, and tarnishing its image as an advocate of peacekeeping and

international law31

. However, the Chrtien government's opposition to the invasion of Iraq in

2003 is a sign that Canada still maintains some distance from the decisions made in Washington.

Until the period of post-Cold War (from 1989-2001) there were no prominent changes in

the U.S.-Canada security relations, as well as necessary reforms to Canadian domestic politics

regarding security and defence. However, the 9/11 has represented a starting process of rapid

change for Canada, both in the nature of the agreements with the United States and over its own

national legislation.

Canada has made substantive reforms in the post-9/11 period in its domestic legislation on

security and defence, essentially embodied in Bill C-36 (Anti-terrorism Act) and the Public

29 Clarkson,Does North America Exist? Governing the Continent after NAFTA and 9/11, 402.




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Safety Act. The Canadian government made efforts on the home front to respond to the threat of

terrorism and to satisfy both American and United Nations expectations. A little more than a

month after September 11, it introduced a massive and hastily drafted Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-

36)32

.

Hassan-Yari and Ousman proposed that due to the proximity to the U.S., Ottawa reacted

to the threat of terrorism after 9/11 on reforming its domestic defence and security policy, but it

also led to verbal clashes between Canadian and U.S. officials and the alleged lack of a greater

commitment from the Canadian government to combat terrorism33. However, such claims are

absurd, because in December 2001 the [Canadian] federal government allocated almost $8

billion [Canadian dollars] in spending on security and it self-proclaimed security budget. The

new spending was devoted to policing, the military increased airport security, and border and

immigration controls [. . .]. The budget focused on more police officers, security officials,

immigration officials, and border guards34

.

Bill C-36 consisted of a legal reform implementing new concepts such as investigative

hearings, preventive arrest, broad motive-based crimes for participation in or support for terrorist

groups at home or abroad, as well as new powers to list terrorist groups, deprive them for

charitable status, and take their property35. This bill provoked criticisms from various groups,

especially Aboriginal Peoples, Muslims, refugee associations and the public opinion in general;

nonetheless, the bill became law in December 200136.

32Ibid, 8.



35Ibid, 8.

36Ibid.


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Meanwhile the Public Safety Act was even more controversial, since [. . .] the new

legislation meant to: [a] further define and limit the power of the Minister of National Defence to

establish Controlled Access Military Zones, and of other ministers to use interim orders in

emergency situations; [b] provide comprehensive parameters for the new terrorist hoax offences;

and [c] allow for measures to ensure accountability and transparency37.

According to the Public Safety Act, the legal question about how to define, pursue and

punish terrorism became more blurry, which would grant greater powers to the federal

government and could lead to direct violations of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 38. [. . .]

Canadas Public Safety Act is more preventive than coercive, and provides for targeted measures

rather than generally punitive provisions in relation to political, ethnic, or religious minorities

(activists, Muslims and Arabs in Canada)39.

The implementation of these reforms were the basis to amend 36 other Acts of

Parliament, which include the Explosives Act, Export and Import Permits Act, National Energy

Border Act, Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, and the

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Act, and also including the Criminal

Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canadian Evidence Act, and the Access to Information Act40

41.

Despite all the substantial domestic and foreign policy changes in Canada both internally

and externally described above, Ottawa is able to tilt the balance of power in its favour in the


38Ibid, 47.

39Ibid, 46.

40Ibid.

41 David Bercuson, Canada-US Defence Relations Post-11 September, (University of Calgary, 2003),

https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/44573/1/Bercuson_Coping.pdf (Accessed: 20 March 2010), 2.


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CanadaU.S. relationship. In other words, it is essential for the U.S. to keep a solid security

strategy and strong defence with Canada; Ottawa is aware of this, and for that reason, it is critical

that Canada use that position to take advantage of its relationship to the hegemony.

Final considerations

The Canadian case regarding the management of its own foreign policy is very special. Its

geopolitical position enormously affects its autonomy from decisions made in Washington, and

this was reflected in the events of 11 September 2001.

However, we should not conclude that Canada is completely dependent from the

American colossus; it means that the classic paradigm of international relations, involving

sovereign and independent state actors, has not yet collapsed after all. Consequently, bilateral

relations between Ottawa and Washington can be best understood in the parameters of close

cooperation rather than dependence and unilateralism.

As a result, the evidence presented in this essay leads us to conclude that after 9/11 there

were substantial changes in domestic legislation and foreign policy in Canada. However, these

changes do not necessarily alter the primary vision of an independent Canada from its southern

neighbour, based on the pillars of foreign policy of peacekeeping, multilateralism and global

prosperity. On the other hand, we must recognize that Ottawa has closed a cycle and has started a

new one that must take decisions that may be crucial for the future of Canada.

Canada should not resist sensible cooperation with the United States on common border and security issues,

but it should not rush towards measures that will adversely affect Canadas ability to devise its own


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independent policies. Since September 11, Canada has placed its enviable reputation for peacekeeping, a

generous refugee policy, and respect for international law and institutions in jeopardy42



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Kresl, Peter Karl. "The Impacts of the September 11 Events on Canadas Foreign Policy." InIn/Security:

Canada in the Post-9/11 World, by Alexander Netherton, Allen Seager and Karl Froschauer, 429-

450. Burnaby: Simon Fraser University, 2005.

Lipset, Seymour M. Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and Canada.

New York: Canadian American Committee, 1990.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canada in the World. February 17, 2003.

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/cnd-world/summary-en.asp (accessed January 22,

2010).

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report. 2002.

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf (accessed March 15, 2010).

Roach, Kent. September 11. Consequences for Canada. Quebec City: McGuill-Queens University Press,

2003.

Sands, Christopher. "An Independent Security Policy for Canada in the Age of Sacred Terror?" InAn

Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Challenges and Choices for the Future, by Brian Bow

and Patrick Lennox, 103-117. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008.

The Reconfiguration of the Canadian Defence and Security Policy After September 11, 2001

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