THE QUIET GERMAN:� THE VIETNAM WAR�

AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY�

BY

HUBERT ZIMMERMANN

In his famous novel The Quiet American, Graham Greene portrays the character of an American undercover-agent in Vietnam in the mid­1950s. His activities evoke increasing anger and frustration in the nar­rator, a British journalist, who at one point sighs: 'I never knew a man who had better motives for all the trouble he caused!' This statement reflects quite well the feeling most West Germans had regarding the American engagement in Vietnam. While the D.S. objectives were gen­erally supported, the way in which these objectives were pursued was seen with increasing alarm since it caused a series of dilemmas for Bonn's foreign policy. In order to avoid becoming pulverised between a very critical public and an assertive ally, successive German govern­ments reverted to a strategy which, paraphrasing Graham Grecne, might be circumscribed as 'the Quiet German'.

This interpretation is somewhat different from the usual image of the German government's position vis-a-vis the Vietnam War. Most of the rather small body of scholarly literature on the impact of Vietnam on West Germany's foreign policy asserts that Bonn supported the war whole-heartedly until the late 1960s (1). However, the dilemmas cited

(I) The best and most nuanced treatment is a recent conference paper by Nuti LEOI'OI.DO, 'T"ansatlant,ic Relations in the Era of Vietnam: Western Europe and the escalation of the War, 1965-68', paper presented at the international conference NATO. Ihe Warsaw Pacl and the Rise aJ Detenle, 1965-72, Dobbiaco, September 2002. Wilfried MAUSIJArH is working on the impact of Vietnam on German self-perception: 'EuI'opean Perspectives on the war in Vietnam' in Bulletin oJ /he Gemwn Historical Institute, volume 30, (Spring 2002), Washing­ton. pp, 71-86. Most other publications on German-American rch,tions includc only passing references to the war with a general acknowledgement of negative effects. Joaehim AIIENTH'S beak Johnson, Vietnam und del' Westen. 'I'rans(Ltlantisc1lP Belastunyen, 1963-1969, Olzog Vel'iag, Miinchen, 1994 is useful as a compilation of paraphrased documents (most already available) and press reports. Tt suffers, however, from a disconnected structure with little consistence in the interpretation. More useful is his article on the Washington-Bonn special relationship: 'Die Bewiihrungs'(lrobe del' S'(lecial Relationship: Washington und Bonn (1061-69)' in Lanes KLALlS and Oppelland TOI~~1'~:N, eds., Deut8clllaoo und die USA int

50 LA GUERRE AMERICAINE LA GUERRE AMERICAINE 51

above were present from the beginning and this interpretation is there­fore exaggerated. The growing unease the war caused for German elites finally even led to a perceptible re-orientation of the basic outlook of German foreign policy.

THE DEBATE ABOUT A PHYSICAL COMMITMENT

When, in November 1963, the diplomats at the German foreign office (Auswdrtiges Amt, hereafter cited as AA) discussed the question of whether to recognise the new government in Vietnam after the over­throw of the Diem regime, they agreed that such an act would be a friendly gesture towards the U.S. which would not cost anything (apar from the continuation of modest development aid). Therefore, it should be quietly realised (2). This non-committal attitude, connected with economic diplomacy, set the tone of Germany's policy regarding the Vietnam problem for a long time.

In its early stage, the conflict was interpreted in the FRG within a general Cold War framework and the legitimacy of the US intervention was barely questioned. Even the rather Left-wing Spiegel, in its first cover story on Vietnam in 1963, called the insurgency against the Diem regime an infiltration carried out by 'communist partisans' supported by Soviet airpower (3). The use of heavily loaded analogies from the German past ('partisans' had a negative World War II connotation) was to shape German perceptions of and reactions to the conflict to quite a large extent. In the same aJ,ticlc, Diem's forces were termed 'S8­like special troops'. Thus, the article also made clear that the regime in South Vietnam was anything but legitimate, and that this was a major factor in the uprising (4). The exclusive interpretation of the Vietnam War as a major battle against communism was viewed from the begin­ning with a lot of scepticism in Germany. Very soon, the logic of the American involvement came to be seen as rather doubtful. Therefore,

iO. Jallrhunderl. Wissenschaft1icho Buchgesellschal't, Darmstadt, 1997, pp. 151-177, which focuses very much on Vietfll~m. A recent concise treatment on the impact of Vietnam on 1r8· FRG "elations is T. Michacl Ruddy's article which is hitherto only availahle in Germlln 'Grenzen dol' Solidaritiit : Die Bundesrepublik. die USA und del' Krieg in Vietnam', in Det,lel JUNKElt, cd., Die USA Ilnd Deatsellland im Zeilalterdes Kalten Krieges. 1968-1990, volume 2, Deutsche Vel'lags-Anstalt, MOnchen, 2001, 200-210.

(2) Akten zur Auswiirligen Polilik der B"",de,'''p"blik Deutschland 1963, ed. Institut Wr Zeitgeschichtc. Oldcnbourg, Miinchen 1994 [hereafter cited as AAPDj, 1963, Doc. 409, On 4 December 1963, the FRG extended a credit of DM 15 million to Vietnam (AAPD 1963, Doc.4H).

(3) Der Spiegel. volume 17, number 37, (11 September 1963), p.71. (4) Ibid.

Germany confined itself to non-committal statements and general expressions of support, hoping that the war would be terminated quickly and the American attention would turn back to the real issues of the Cold War.

Contrary to what is often asserted (5), Germany was never uncondi­tionally 'supportive' of American policy in Vietnam, although German politicians across the board pledged solidarity (much more outspokenly in conversations with US officials than in public). The FRG itself had no particular interests a.t stake in Vietnam and, in principle, shared the French assessment of the situation (6). The German position was there­fore shaped almost entirely by two indirect factors on which Vietnam had a major impact: AmeJ'ica's policy towards Europe and the hostile reaction of the German public towards any involvement in the war. Involvement meant not only diJ'ect participation on the spot. Even out­spoken 'moral' support of American policy had created difficulties. It led to heavy criticism by the Left and the Gaullist Right alike, as Ger­man politicians soon discovered. Successive German governments saw only onc way to avoid that the two objectives (satisfying the Americans and the domestic critics) openly clashed: to keep a very low public pro­file regarding the war, resist strong American pressure for a direct com­mitment, and to try and satisfy the increasingly frustrated Americans with 'quiet' economic help.

Official German silence in the early years of the war was also sug­gested by the precarious state of Franco-German relations after Ade­nauer left the scene. France's neutrality proposals of 1963-1964 were seen as a challenge to the US (though even the German ambassador in Saigon thought that neutralisation of Vietnam might be the ultimate result) (7). However, given the rather precarious American-Franco-Ger­man triangle at that time, it was not wise to disavow publicly De Gaulle and add to mutual irritation (8). At the same time, it did not cost any­thing to pledge support for the American cause at lower levels and in private meetings.

However, in 1963-1964, Vietnam was generally considered a distant theatre and a nuisance, and it took the German government and its public quite some time until they realised the seriousness of the Ameri­

(5) 'For example by MarcF,ui:Y in his recent Geschicllte des Vietnantkriegs, C. H. Beck, Mum'hen, 1999. p. 184.

(6) 'Mcmomndum by State Secretary Carstens'. 27 July 1964, p. 893, AAPD 1964. ll, Doc.210.

(7) 'Wend land to AA'. 16 December 1963, AAPD 1963, Ill. Doc. 474. (8) 'Schroder to Erhard'. 17 May 1964, AAPD 1964, 1, Doe. 130: lI1Au8BACH, 'European

Perspectives', p. 80.

52 LA G UERRI!; AMERICAIN.8 LA OUERRE AMERICA IN"'~ 53

can predicament in Southeast Asia. It has been often stated that Ger­man support for the US in Vietnam originated in the perception that t some degree Berlin WitS defended in Vietnam, as part of the general struggle against communism. This rests particular on Chancellor Erhard's repeated use of this analogy in conversations with Ameri­cans (9). The careless equalling of Berlin and Saigon set the pretext for a series of most unwelcome demands by the Americans as soon as they felt placed nationally and internationally in an increasingly defensive posi­tion. The rost of the German government was therefore careful to avoid the analogy. Hardly anybody bl'lieved that Berlin was really defended in Saigon (otherwise the Germans would have sent more than just a hOR pi tal ship to the help of their allies). A few years later, they had to try and dissuade the Americans from using this analogy, since it became a major argument in the transatlantic dispnte about German particip"­tion in the war effort (10).

Very early on, this dispute led to irritations. The American demands for a sizeable amount of support from the FRG have to be seen in the context of a long-term strategy by the US to get the allies to more bur­den-sharing. (l1) Vietnam wa.s an obvious additional al'gllment. Ini­tially, the US confined itself to asking for explicit and public political support against the proposals by De Gaulle and domestic critics such aR Senator Mansfteld for a neutralisation of South Vietnam. (12) In mid 1964, the Americam stepped up the pressure, drawing on some alto· gether familiar arguments which had been used since President Eisen­hower had seen the American economy endangered by the Cold Wa.r cost. When Secretary of Defence McNamara, in May 1964, travelled to Bonn, he made very clear what was expected of Germany regarding its share in the overall cost ofWestern defence. On Vietnam, he asked for 'a strong statement in support of the South Vietnamese effort t,o defea.t the Vietcong' and 'a direct contribution to Viet Nam' (13). He sug­gested, for example. a medical unit. Erhard's response was rather non­committal: '[ ... j we shall support within our given possibilities thE' United States in their efforts t,o maintain South Vietnam as a bulwark

(9) FOI' example. 8('(' '~!l',,,(),,,,n(J,lIn of l'onve"sation with LB•.!". 12 .June IY65. }I'HI'S It}64·G8, "ol",n(' XV, Due nO.

t 10) I"or cxumple: "~\('morandnm by Ambassador Schnippcnkottcl", 2 Novcmbel' lil07, pp. :378379, AAPJ) I06?, Ill.

(11) Sl'C. H ubcrt ZIMMh:IHI INN, ,l!"llcl/lltld SUllrity. Troops, Monetary Policy. and 11'". (JprmflllY·. RP/a/;nn. /I'illl t1lr Tl8 find Brit";ll, 195071, Camhridge. Cambridge LTni"e",it,v T' I'OSS, 2002.

(12)FRUH 19646H,XV.Doe. 15. (J310t'o"I!f'lown Librory,l\lcUh~cpnpc·)'s.1!)88Ildu .. Bonn ],510. Vielnam. IIAby 1\10-1·

of I, he Free World in South East Asia' (14). It turned out that these pos­sibilities were rather limited. A military contribution by Germany was rejected for legal and political reasons (15).

The US continued, however, to work for a commitment of some 'civil' unitl:l, such as a medical battalion (HI). The tonc became much stemer in the run-up to the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, although the American ambassador in Germany, McGhee, cautioned against too much pres­sure. (17) In J'une 1964, when Erhard visited Washington, the president himself stepped up the pressure on the German Chancellor (18). Bonn tried to defuse the issue by promising more aid to Vietnam and - against the apprehension of experts by new commitments in the offset issue. But since Erhard, on every occasion, pronounced his complete support for the American policy a position which was shared by almost no on rise in Germany he became a natural target for increased pressurv. Shortly afterwards, the ambassadors in the capitals of America's closest allies,innluding Bonn and Paris, were told in no uncertain terms what the US government expected ofthem in terms of support : 'Our interost is that this contribution should be as large and significant as possible in terms of men on the scene, in each case. With sixty thousand Americans in Vietnam, there is every reason to hope that our Allies, especially the 111I'ger ones, will think in terms of many hundreds of men each. not handfuls'. These men should not be necessarily combat soldiers, but they should be closely involved in the task at hand. The circular tele· gram, signed by Rusk, expressed the hope that the ambassadors came hack with tangible results in the very near future (19). However, the result was again negative.

(1-1) FRUS 64·8, XV. Doe. :36. undated (May 19(4). 'fhus. Erhal'Cl's support wns not unc·onditional. Strnuss' assertion ill his memoil'll (' I was completely shocked; Franz·Josef STIlAl'HH, J)if Er;llnerullYffl, Si~dler. lI-hilll·hclI. 1l189. 428429) that Erhard in 1063 had promi6NI LB.J a mllnpower commitment is possible, gi \'011 Erhard" ineptitude ill forei!!!1 1'01­

i,)' ,Ind his urgo to please the US president; however, it certainly was not government pO!il'y. (15) The following reasons were cited in a eabinel paper by the AA : the Bl/lldfW"I"

should not be implicated in a conniel which had nothing to do \\~th :NA'fO and whirh was controversially diseussed within :NATO; there was no other country mililarily present in Vietnam: and a political engagement in Southeast Asia might have had negative overall eon­Hf'4 I,enoc. for Germany's foreign policy. See: 'Cabinet Papu,' of27 May 1004'. 1940. AAPD 1965. TTT, DocA69, fn 13.

(16) 'Department of Rtate to the Embassy in Oerman.v', 21 May 1964, F'RUS 648. XV, Doe. -12; 'Conversation l\leNamam El'hard', 12 June 196-1, FRU8 (;4 R, Doe. 53.

(17) '1 would cito ou,' recent "pproaeh on South Vietnum lUI a e,"C in I,oinl. Prom whlll \I c hl\\'~ heMd, our handling of I.lie matter "t Bonn lInd The Ha!(uc Icft the Ger'mans witli the impression th.ll I,hey wCf'(' being pushed too openly. This ocel\llioncd some rcsentmenl in gov­ernment circles, and" "001. often e"ilieal, press reaction' f1c-e. ''fclel!ram from Embassy Ronn to Department of State' , I .Iune 1964, FH.llS 1964 68, XV. Do(·. ~,).

(Ill) 'Memcon I~r'hard - L.BJ' 12 .Tune 1964. FRUS XV. Doe. 50. (HI) 'Circub\( Telegram', 2 .July 196-1. box I, 1988 lldd .. MeCJhee Pupers.

54 LA OUF.HRE AMERICA1NE LA GUERRE AM ERlCA1NE 55

In 1965, the Amerioans made another pitch to get 'some Germans into the field'. In bis ,June L965 meeting with LBJ, Erhard used the Ber­lin-Saigon analogy once more, although in the meantime he should have realised that this would serve only as pretext for new American demands (20). Thus, a few months later, Secretary of State Rusk asked his German count,erpart that Germany should as a matter of utmost importance 'send considerable numbers of people to South Viet­nam' (21). Foreign Minister Schrodor informod him that no volunteers for even peaceful tasks, such as mcdical care, had turned up in Ger­many. The deployment of military personnel was legally impossible. In the samc month. Erhard, du ring onc of his many visits to Washington, remained also non-committal, although he was subjected to the John­son treatmcnt (22). LBJ made a very passionate appeal for a medical unit of 200 men and a constmction unit of 1,000 men (23). This new request, which was accompanied by similar demands from U.S. sena­tors, caused a. hectic search in the German government for un-contro­versial forms of support which might defuse the American pressure and at the same time avoid a domestic uproar. Most officials argued that Germany should continue to stay away from the conflict. and attempt a position of neutra.! distancE' (24). Any involvement of military person­nel, including medical units, was therefore once more categorica.lly excluded (25). In cal'ly January, the Cabinet. decided to send a hospital ship to Viet.nam. This provided the opportunij,y to remain at a physical distance from the war and a,t the same time reap some humanitarian points. The Americans judged this result as disappointing (26). Subse­quently, however, the American pressure calmed down. 'rhc continuin resistance of the Germans and the fact that rumours in the German press about American requesta had stirred up considerable unrest, led the US fina./ly to the realisation that a physical commitment was indeed out of the question.

(20) 'Meeting of.j. June J965', 1988 add., McGhec Papers; also in AAPD 1065, n, Doe. 233,9112. J do not share W. Mausbtwhs' ,"ssertion that t.hiR wu' a def'isive fRetar in bhuping Germany's response to the Vietnam W"r. !'lee MA LlSRArtt, 'Eu rope..n Per$peetives', p. 79.

(21) FRUS 1964-8. X V, Doc. 135.

(22) Cc-orge M('OIH~~;, AI till erN/lion DJ (l New Germany: An Amba8satlor',. Acro1lllt. Yale Unh'crsit.y Press, New Haven, 11)89, pp. 184·5; FRUS XV, Does. J38. 139,141, 143.

(23) 'Oc.prach zwischcn Erhard IJnd Johnson', 20 December IOn5, 1039, AAPD 1965,J I I. Doe. -l69.

(24) 'Mel11of'U.nr!um by Millist.ol·ialdirc,ktor Thicrfcldcr'. 19 Fcbrt",l'y 1966, 187.188,AAPD 1960. J, Doe. :30.

(25) 'Minist.eriuldirektol' Krapfta AmbUR$lIdoJ' Knllpp$t.ein, WU~hington·. IfJ ,January l!)(j6. 8, AAPD 1966. T, Doc. 2, fn. 6.

(26) ':'tfcNnmarl\ Johneon telephone conversntion', 17 ,Janul\l'Y 1966, ~'RUS 1964 68, II', Do~ 26 ('LBJ . The (:crmuns coming throUKh with anything 1 McNal11ura; Not 11 d""nn thing except till' hospital ship')

What were the reasons for the steadfast German refusal? The first reason was West Germany's international position and the way it was complicated by the country's past,. This had become vcry visible during the disaster of its Near East policy in 1964-1965. Urged by the Ameri­cans and motivated by its specific responsibility towards thc country, the FRG had in the late 1950s started to ship weapons to Israel. During his Washington visit in June 1964, Erhard agreed to augment these deliveries All this was done in absolute sccrecy to avoid damage to Ger­many's traditionally close relations with the Arab countries. However, soon the deal became known, and almost all Arab countries broke up their official relations with Bonn (27). The affair pffectively erased Ger­many's willingness to engage itself in yet another conflict area. Ther' was also thc danger of collateral damage to Germany's Eastern policy, German personnel working side-by-side with the Americans would have led immediately to a very vivid debate, not only in communist coun­tries. Every attempt. to pursue even the most t,imid detente would have been impossible. Domestically, the government would have come under st.rong attacks. Towards the Americans, the cautious position was explained wit.h the following arguments: the danger of a stepping-up of communist agitation against West Germany; the lacking capacity of the B7lndeswehr for out-of-area missions; and the danger of new moves against Berlin (28). Additionally, there were important legal problems. A memorandum by the legal division of the AA noted that the German :onstitution allowed only defensive actions by the Bundeswehr : 'The military activities of the Vietcong rebels or the North Vietnamese units do not constitute an attack on the FRG or one of her allies in Europe or North America. The argument that the free world, including Germany, is being defended in Vietnam is of a purely political nature and in this context of no relevance'. Since the NATO treaty obliga.tions were lim­ited to the geographical area of NATO, they were not applicable either (29). These arguments foreshadowed the fundamental debates in Germany during the late 1990s about German participation in the con­flicts in former Yugoslavia. A deep aversion against the settlement of conflicts by milita.ry means had developed as a lasting legacy of two lost World Wars. As long a-s the American involvement seemed to be one of helping a weak a.lly against a communist insurgency, it was more or less

(27) fi'or an account see: Schollgen GIU:UOR, Dip A"jJ'"]Jolilik dCT Ji1w.drdTfpubW· Vrllt­.rlll'm.d, C. H. Beck. Bonn 1999. pp. 81-83.

(28) 'Ministeriahlir(·ktor Kmpfto Ambassador Knappslein, Washington', 28 Janullry 1966, III 3, AAPD 1960, J. Doe. 24.

(29) 'Ministerialdil'Cklor \Yen to Embassy WMhingLon·. 18 April 1966, G06 l1./bicl .. Doe. 11ii.

56 LA .r:HRE AMERICAINE LA Elum AMEHlCAINE 57

acceptable. As soon as the US itself was officially engaged in the war, its character changed altogether.

Although most West Germans wished that the Americans would win the war, nobody really believed that a continued demonstration of American resolve had. any positive impact on the situation in Berlin. In the end, mORt argued exactly the contrary, pointing to the rising pres­sure on German financial and moral resources, and the weakening oftb American resolve in Europe. The thinning out of Amcriean military manpower in Germany during the Vietnam War was clear evidence of that. Since the mid-1950s, with only a few breaks, there had been a cho­rus of voices in the US that the European commitment should be reduced. Vietnam was a filrther factor lending credence to this debate which was sparked by traditions of non-entanglement, strategic consid­erations and, increasingly, financial concerns (30). The public opposition to a continuation of the troop commitment, focused in the resolutions by 1he Democratic Senator MansfieJd, took the lack ofhelp and the failure frset the troop foreign exchange cost in Europe as a pretext to demand a

step-by-step military disengagement (which was in accordance with the wishes ofthe civilian leadership of the Pentagon). One of Chancellor Erhard's major concerns was to avoid a reduction of American troops in Europe, lest this was construed as a weakening of deterrence and an indieation that the Americans placed the value of the German-Ameri­an relationship far lower than Erhard himself (who was under consid­

erable domestic attack on this precise issue). The Americans strongly denied that Vietnam bad a negative impact on troop deployments in 8:urope. However, the statements of the administration were clearly untrue. This is evidenced by the significant fall in number and quality of American troops (31). In January 1968, the US army in Europe was only 86% of its authorised strength, and Over 90% ofthese remaining troops were unable 'to conduct sustained combat operations for 90 days' (32).

All those factors caused the German government to see the war as an increasing challenge to their own international and domestic position. It would have been political suicide to support the war physically. How­ever. the paramount importance of the transatlantic alliance made it imperious that something had to be done to soothe the American hus­

(:10) Src my paper 'The I ,nprobable Prrmanence or a Com mitment . The Rattle about the H Military Presenre ill Europe in the Period of Detonte, 1965-75'. presented at ""onferon"e

in Dobbiaeo in October 2002. (31) RUDOY. (/rulZl'7I. 20620 •.

(32) 'Gin~bu"gh to Rostow'. 19 Mar"', 1968, Name File: Oinsburgh ~lerno;. NSF, LJl,j L.

tration. Thus, the 'quiet' instrument of economic diplomacy, the pre­ferred mcdium of West German foreign policy, was employed.

ECONOMIC SUllPORT

The role of economic diplomacy in Bonn's foreign policy is often underestimated and a systematic evaluation is as yet not available. However, as in so many other instances of German post-war foreign pol­icy, a comprehensive look at the German participation in the Vietnam War has to scrutinise this field above all. German activities covered var­ious fields: trade, a.id, and monetary diplomacy. I will allude briefly to all three fields, providing some exa.mples.

In 1963, Chinese officials approached Germany with the wish to establish regular economic contacts between the two countries. This held some obvious attractions for Germany, and not just auspicious business opportunities. The Chinese proposal also offered the possibility to expose the rift between Cbina and the Soviet Union (particularly if China was willing to accept Berlin as part of the FRG in the agreement) and to lure Beijing away from East Germany (:33). During his conversa­tions with Johnson in June 1964, however, El'hard retreated as soon as he heard that the Americans would disapprove of such an agree­ment (34). During a press conference, he said that the FRG would nei­ther establish a trade mission nor extend long-term credits to China (35). In a following conversation with Robert Kennedy, he con­firmed this statement: ·the FRG would make no efforts to institutional· ize its trade with China or to encourage any great expansion in tmde on the part of German business interests' (36). The talks broke down sinee China felt cheated and terminated the contact (37). However, German firms were not particularly pleased with this decision and. of course, the

(33) ':Memortlndum by Ministeriuldirektor Krapf, 19 Mr,y 1964,6-43-544. AAPD, J(J()J,

Doe. 131. (34) 'With N'garcJ t.o Red China, the ChancelloT' did not envisage diploffllitic recognition

on the pa,'t ofGermuny. Matters of this 80rt would bl' carefully coordinated with the United Htatcs. 'f'mdo rch.tions with Red ChinH were very limited No expansion would be under­taken without lld,'ance con~lIltation with the Unitt1d State". both a8 to timc l\fId substance. MOl·cover. Germany did !lot anticipate the establishment of any tT'['clc uommi~sions.' FR,US 190-i·tJ8, XV, Doe. 49. flee also 'Conversation betwecn Rusk and Sehroedor', 12 Junc J964, !/dd.. Do(' 51, which "",kes thc connection to Vietnon, very oIeal·.

(:l5) AAPD J!i6~, Doc. 206,812. n. 7. (:ltl) Oeorgelown Library, McGhce pupers, 1988 add .. Bonn 4309, 26 June J9M. (37) This is (·onfirmed by (l JTlomorandum of 21 Mar"h I971 on " possible T'l'-d(·finition of

.,ermany's relations wit h China. 1'he State Sceretary noted th8l the Chinese allegution that it was the Oel'man rault that the contacl was "ancelll'd was 'unfortunately true' Aufzdch· nun~ des Ministerialdirigenleo Oncken. 489. n. 5, AAPD 1970,1, Doe,. 123.

58 LA GUERRE AMERJCAINE LA GUERRE AMERICAINE 59

FRG had a fundamental interest, 'to sustain and enlarge its share of the China trade in order to avoid being Jocked out in the future from a market of 700 million people' (38). In 1966, the topic was again on the German­American agenda. This time the issue was a credit line ofDM 350m which the government had given China in connection with the construction of a gigantic steel plant. Despite heavy criticism in the Senate, the US gov­ernment's response was this time less outspoken, and the deal went a.head. However, the FRG refrained from an institutionalisation of these contacts out of concern for American sensibilities (39).

erman economic cooperation was not only confined to such diplo­matic concessions. From the start of the war, West Germany was the biggest aid donor to South Vietnam aftcr the United States. However, very care was taken that the various aid measureS would not be of a

political and military nature. Thus, the German help consisted of a whole series of humanitarian small scale measures (such as a hospital ship) and credits to the South Vietnamese government. Exact figures are difficult to find. The amount of foreign aid wa.g about DM 200m until 1973; credits and humanitarian help to the tune of about DM 25m were also extended (40). Given the lack of a comprehensive study of these issues, the impact of thcse sums is hard to assess. However, they certainly played an important role in the stabiJisation of various South Vietnamese regimes.

Much more valuable than these aid efforts was German support for the dollar. In the literature on the monetary crises of the 1960s and 1970s, it has become a IStock phrase to attribute to Vietnam a core role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. This is certainly not wrong, although the connections are not as straightforward as it appears (41). It is often said that by inflating the dollar the Americans actually madc their allies pay for the war. (42) Even Paul Volcker, Nixon's Undersecre­tary for Monetary Affairs stated, that Vietnam 'was the period when inflation really gained momentum in the United States and threatened

(38) 'Memorandum ofVorLragender Legationsrat Luedde Neun-I,h', 14 December 196,~.

AA PD 1965, TTT, Doo. 468.

(39) 'Conversatiou Brondt wiLh UK Foreign Rec'~tary Brown', 12 April 1967,571, AAPD 1967, IJ, Doe. 124.

(40) These figurcs oome from. Bcrrosheim VOI.KER. 35 '}aJlr~ Indochinl,politik der BRD. Hamburg, Imtil III fur Asionkunde, 1086, pp. 40, 55.

(41)1 dealt wiLl> Lhis issue ILt length in 'Who P"id for America·" War! Vietnam and tilt' InternaLional MOIlPt>try System, 1960-76' in Lloyd () GAllmO';'\, Androas D,'UM and Wil. fried MAll~'l;\G", cds , America'~ It'ar and Ihe World: Vietnam in I1lt,nwlional and Compar. Mivp. Perspcctillcd, Cambridge, Cambridge University P,x,ss, 2003. The following pumgraph, draw hea vily 011 this carlier work.

(42) Scc, for eXllmple, ('lIrole F1NK, Philipp (1AHSEJ<'r. Dellof ,J UIO(F.H. 'JnLroducLion', in Ibid.. 1968. Thf World Trl1l1sfomU'-c1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1908. p.8.

to spread to Europe too, and if we weren't willing to finance the war properly, then maybe Wf> shouldn't have fought it at all' (43).

In fact, the Vietnam War had a serious impact on the American bal­ance of payments. In 1968, the part of the deficit related to military activities amounted to 54.5 billion and outlays in Asia had risen from

825 million in 1960 to 52.491 million in 1968 (44). This hefty foreign exchange loss was a welcome target for those who were critical of the military campa.ign in Southeast Asia. Instead of djrectly targeting Johnson's Vietnam policy, however, Congressional critics turned their attention to the commitment in Europe and initiated a lasting debate ,bout force reductions in Europe. What was even more dangerous than

the cLi rect monetary impact, of the war was the decline of international confidence in the dollar's role as reserve currency associated with the erisis in Vietnam (45). The American administration was determined to avoid a devaluation of the dollar lest it could be construed as a major defeat and an indication that the US economy could not sustain a pro­longed war effort. It was also well aware of the fa.ct that an overvaluod dollar was helpful to finance military commitments worldwide and to shield the domestic economy from the inflationary impact of these expenditurcs. However, stabilising the dollar was not possible without the help of the allies. In this field, the Americans were looking mainly to Bonn. Secretary of Treasury Fowler had outlined the basic idea already

in 1966: I pro post' that W(~ give spriou8 consideration to asking the kcy dollar-hold­

ing nat,ions [... ] to pledge not to convert dollars/hey presently hold and 11.0110 con­l'prl any additional dollars [emphasis in original] that lUay accrue to them as long as the Vietnam struggle continues. To accomplish this, wo will have to state in thc strongest possible teI'IDS that, L We most emphatically do int·ond to bring our balanco of payments into oquilibrium. 2. The Vietnam War, with its attendant direet and indirect balance of payments costs. has made it diffi­cult for us to do this as soon as we hoped. But we will do it. 3. We are betuing virtually the entire burden of the Vietnam conflict. We view this as commit· mcnt on behalf of all free natioos. We do not ask othcr. to see it this way, but wc do ask that they not act in 6. ma.nner that will prevent us from meeting our

(43) Paul VOJ.('Kf;n and Toyoo CY(IOllTf:N, ('hanging forlllflf$. Times Book8. New York, 100~. p. 62. As SUBun Strunge write~: '[ ...] the United Stl\WS had used its oxorbitant privilege !IS the cent er-count ry of a gold-cxohllngc system to flIn a perpetual balance of payments deficit and Lo fiuanee a dishnL and cxpensive W;I'· in Yietnam by inOaLionary credit crcation rather than by a trnnsfer of resources from the civilians to the military by menns oftaXllLion' Susan ~'I''''\NC:E, 'lllturprctnt ions of" Docadc· in L\lc811 TsoukaliB, ed., Tlit Politico I gamomlj of Inur­nntional.l101lnj, London, Sllge Publications Ltd. 1085, p. 11

(44) FigureB come from ConI, R SHf;I'LRR and Leonllrd G. CAMI'BEI.L, 'United State" ])cf('nsc Rxpenditurc Abroad' in Su",ey of ('UTrrnt B1/8infR~, (Dco~mber WOO), p. 44.

(45) 'RobNI. M. Cfll.LJNS, ·'\'\'a Economic Crisis of 1968 and t he Waning of the 'Am~rican

(\'ntury', AmcriwlI Historical. Revifw, volume 101 (April 1996), pp. ~13-416.

60 LA GU~HRE A.MERICAINE

commitments and/or destroy the international finan~ifl,l institutions that IIrC'

such a vital part of the world wc /It·o attempting to defend (46).

This policy was pursued in the following years. In the framework of the offset agreements, Germany accepteu l~ commitment not to exchange any surplus dollars to gold and thus undermine the sys­tem (47) Already before this agreement, the FRG had indirectly subsi­d.ised the war by buying huge amounts of American weapons in order to offset the dollar cost of American tT·oops in Europe.

Nevertheless, the run out ofthe dollar continued. American liabilities abroad rose between 1968 and 1972 from $21 billion to $80 billion (48). West Germany alone, between January 1970 and March 1973, had an unprecedented foreign exchange inflow ofDM 71 billion, most of it from American sources, which threatened to infla,te the economy (49). The Germans who felt morally bound to Blessing's letter and who were still dependent on U.S. security coverage for their 08tpolitik" were helpless against the currency flood. Then, in August 1971, Nixon, in a spectacu­lar unilateral move, officially closed the gold window, a,nd, in d.isrespect to all post-war principles of U.S. foreign economic policy, imposed a 10% surtax on all imports to the United States. In the ensuing turmoil on the cU1'l'ency markets, the dollar lost approximately 40% of its value until 1973, and the reserves of America' s partners shrank, insofar as they consisted of dollars. by the st\,me percentage. This devaluation of the world's dollar rese/'ves was, because partly it can be attributed to the Vietnam War, an indirect Vietnam tax on America's allies.

All in all, monetary support was probably the most important part of Germany's support of the US war effort. It is well known that the gold crisis of 1968 in connection with the Tet-oHensive had been a major fac­tor in the turn-about of America's Vietnam policy (50). Had Germany not supportod the dollar, the monetary impact of Vietnam would hav been felt much earlier on the markets. The constraints and cost which came with this support led to inCl'easing frustration with the US man­aged international monetary system. It is no accident, that in the end of 1969, the FRG accepted for the first time the idea of a European cur­

(46) Memomndum by Fowlnr-to,lolil1son, lOMa)' HJ66, "'RUB 1904-68, VIII. pp. 274 27G.

(47)'I'hc whole story ofthc so-called Blessing lolt"r is reoount~d in deluil in 7.imlncr­mann, },fon,y and Security, ohllpter 9.

(48) Erie H(H·J'M~;YI'.H, 1'11, .I101ltl(lry 8y81,m, Amsler<.ltulI. ~olth-Hollnnd, 19l12, p. 89. (49) Emmingcr OT\lAI•. 'Dclllllche Geld- llnd Wahmngspolitik ill1 Spnnnlln~fcld zwischcn

innercrn untlliullor'rm OIcichgewicht, 1948-71)' in DC1l~cllr Bundr8/xl/lk, ed., Walt/"ll"!! und Wirl­.•ciwft'n DrulJlrltland 1876197,5. Frankfurt, Fritz Knapp, 1976 p. 1;32.

(50) Sec' COI.LI.'IS, ''T'hc p'('onomic Crisis of 1968'. pp. 396 ol22.

LA ERRE AMERICA/NE 61

rency and that the EEC made its first attempt towards this goal, in the form of the Werner plan

GERMAN POSTWAR FORElON POLICY

AND AltMED CONFLICT

It has been remarked that the Vietnam War had a major fall-out on the political climate and intellectual framework in which German for­ign policy was made. The impact of the war cannot, not be understood

if we lea.vc aside the fact that the Vietnam war touched a very sensitive nerve of a German society which, after World War 11, had devoloped a very deep-seated aversion to military means of solving conflicts (as is evidenced by the recent debates about German participation in the war in Iraq). Vietnam became a core issue in the German protest movement of the 1960s (51). But the general public, too, saw the war with incroas­ing scepticism; although most llupported the US in general, a majority was against a continuation ofthe Vietnam War. In January 1966,25% of the population advocated a continuation of the war, whereas 44% were against, it (with the rest being undecided). In February 1968, the answer to the same question was 19% 'yes' and 56% 'no' (52).

The debates within German parties rcfleeted very well the general dilemma of the Federal Republic's foreign policy regarding the Vietnam issue. At least those parties which had a chance to take over some responl:libilities in the government were careful to embarrass neither the U.s. with outspoken opposition to the war nor their electorate with too openly voiced t.lemonstrationll of solidarity. While all parties made clear that they were dead-set against any military involvement (53), they grappled with the question as to how exactly to formulate their position on Vietnam in public. In the CDUfCSU, Erhard's unanimously positive position was quite isolated. Many sha.red Adenauer's allegations that the Americans neglected Europe becauso of Vietnam and that they would try to find some kind of arrangement with the Soviet Union in Europe which was t.l.isadvantageous for the FRG (54). American hopes that the Soviet Union could restrain its North Vietna.mese ally had, in

(a I) On this is;,ut'. >PP thc arlidl' b) ,lost DUlffcl' inthiH volume. (5:1) Figures from 81aJisliJJelle Jl'lh,biirhrr dr, Runll'MI'I}lIblik. (5:1) SCl' for example the 1'coolution of the FDP PIl1'ty leadcrRhip from J:! Feb"uHr)' 1966 in

Ih, Libl'rllln, unLtr drlll Vorsi/. t'On R.Mrnde. Sil,u'oysprolokolle 19(;()-7 (Quelle1l ,ur 0,.­chirhte d,. Por/omm/ori"mlls und de, polilisclun Par/riet!. 711 JJ). Droate. Dtlsscldorf, 1993, pp. 661-662

(;')~) Gr8bbo HANS-,JnIUl~~N, Unio1lJl]Jq,rlrien. 8ozioldrmokrot-ie 1t1l.d Vrr"jnigtr 81(1"/'/1 T'on .1 ",nil'a. 194;) 1966, Drostc, nUs-'1eldorf. 1983, p. 45~.

62� LA GUERRE A~tER1CAlNE

faot, led t,o an interest in detente in Europe. An active reunifioation pol­icy could no longer count on general American support. The same is true for German measures which might be perceived as oriented against the status quo in Europe, such as a German finger on the nu<:lear trig­ger (55). The way the Non Proliferation Treaty was handled by the Amer'icans lent credence to this argument and was particularly resented by Conservatives. Public crit,icism of the Americans remained the xception, but lasting distrust was the result.

The Social Demo<:rats adopted a very similar position for different reasons. Since 1959, its leadership had tried to acquire pro-American credentials in order to become a serious contender for the government. Initially, some SPD politicians had even echoed Erhard's Saigon-Berlin analogy. However, soon Vietnam caused growing unrest within the party ranks. The best strategy for the leadership in this dilemma seemed to stick to a low profile and quietly hope that the US sooner or later' would inaugura.tc a peaceful solution to the conflict. Early voices within the parliamentary group to thl' effect that the SPD should join the moral critique of the American campaign, were admonished by Brandt and Schmidt that friendship with America was the cornerstone of Germany's foreign policy and that it was best to express cautious sol­idarity (56). However, the Berlin-Saigon comparison was dismissed by Brandt as simplifying (57). Only in 1968 was the first critical resolution towards the war passed at the annual SPD convention (and prompt.ly received very badly by Washington). At that time, a critical stance towards America permeated the party ranks. The new anti-militaristi<: opposition to the war by younger pa,rty members Jinked up with the tra­ditional anti-capitalist mindset of the older generation. The position of Brandt and others in the early 1960s which saw the transatlantic alli­ance as the central point of reference for Germany's foreign policy had become a minority position, and sooo Europe became the new nor tive core of Social Democratic foreign policy.

Wilfried Mausbach has argued that the Vietnam War changed the German framework for creating a post-national identity by undermin ing the notion of being part of the Free World camp (58). This was also due to the wide-spread identification of US foreign policy with Vietnam, and the latter with events in the German past. Auschwitz and Vietnam were often used as synonyms in heated domestic protests in Germany.

(G5) On Ihiti poinl, tieo: NUT!. ·'rrllntio.t1ILnlic Relations in tha Erll orVialnam'. p. 28. (56) Di" S/'D /i'mklion im 811nrlf~la(J. SilZll1l{JSpr%lwllf 1961-66 (QlIfUen %1Ir GfSC!liC!lt,

de.,� f'or'"mml(mR1llU~ /11/11 tlrr POTlri"n, 81T11 j, DI'OSlc, Diisseldorr, I!193. 782-784. (5i) GIUllllt-:, Ullion~paTltien. So:ialdtmokmlir. p. ,563. (5!!) lIIAURIlM'II, 'European PCr1lpeclil'cs'

LA GUERRE AMERICAJNE� 63

By drawing this comparison, the protestors not only distanced them­selves from the silence of their parents about Nazi crimes, which moved during the 1960s increasingly into the realm of public debate, for exam­ple during the Eichmann trial, the Auschwitz Process and the discus­sion about the Nazi past of Chancellor Kiesinger. They also expressed a need to achieve the moral high ground against the US which was por­traying itself as the gual'aotor of peace. The protest against, war linked with the protest against German elites which seemed to support the war and US post-war policy unconditionally. A resurgence of anti-Ameri­canism was the result (59). It linked up with the frustration of political elites about American policies in Europe and their incessant demands for German participation in the war. At that point. the strategy of remaining the 'Quiet German' had arrived at its cnd. The German gov­ernment was forced to take a public position and while they still refrained from too harsh oritieism of the US, the call for a peaceful solu­hOll became part of every official remark on this issue.

The do-legitimisation of the transatlantic pillar during the Vietnam conflict led to a renewed emphasis on the second pillar of German post­wur foreign policy: Europe. This framework had been regarded by many Germans with much ambiguity since it seemed to be a vehicle for French f'conomic and political goals and more a construction in the service of Franco-German reconciliation rather than a means to furt.her German objectives in other fields. The exclusion of Britain. which many saw as an integral part of Europe, had underlined that feeling. In 1969, this situation changed. De Gaulle left thc scene and talks with the

nited Kingdom about membership were under way. A multitude 0

other initiatives, for example in the technological and monetary field, were brought on their way. Europe suddenly became a real alternative; furthermore. the new Ostpolitik tended to lessen West Germany's dependence on NATO's security guarantee.

CONCLUSIONS

This article takes a broad view of the consequences of the Vietnam Wll,r for the international policy of the FRG. It recounts the American attempts to extract a sizeable contribution of German manpower to the war cffOI't and discusses the reasons for the American failure in this respect. The U.S. was more successful regarding other forms of support, notably finan<:ial help. Economic diplomacy had the advantage that it

(SO) Ml:I,LP.R, Emil-Peter. Anliamerilwnis11ltls in [)elll~r.il/ond : Zll';"chrn C'1l'" Pakrlll1l1l ('mist Missile. my. Koln 1986. pp. 103-104.

64 LA CUERRE AMERlCAINE

was a 'quiet' means of satiRfying the American demands. This squared well with the general strategy of silence which was pursued by the FRG. Thus it tried to bridge the contradiction between the attempt to main­tain an impression of neutrality in the conflict and the need to bolster the transatlantic alliance.

However, even this 'quiet' form of support led to increasing strains in German-American relations. This combined with disillusiomnent about

S willingness to support German objectives in Europe and increasing misgivings about the morality of US foreign policy in general (particu­larl.y, when the war effort in Vietnam became an important element in the unresolved debate about the German past). The core thesis of this article is t,hereforo that the Vietnam War was of particular importance in a process in which the ideological outlook of Bono's foreign policy slowly changed from a basically transatlantic framework towards an emphasis on European integra.tion as first priority.

THE ANGLO-US LINKAGE� BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE POUND:�

1964 AND 1968�

BY

SAKI DOCKRILL

When the Harold Wilson Labour Government replaced its Conserva­tive predecessor in the autumn of 1964, t,he United States began to con­sider stepping up its military pressure against North Vietnam. The President of 1,hp United States. Lyndon Johnson, told the Guardian edi­tor on 2 Decem ber 1964 that 'the United States did not want to be alone in a 'colonialist position'. '" We want your flag' (1). Between 1964 and January 1968, Britain's deliberatiollE over its global defence role and its determination to avoid the devaluation of t,he pound were intertwined with the United States' interest in keeping Britain's military presence East of Suez as well as in Europe. Washington also wanted Britain to continue to avoid the devaluation of the pound. Contemporaries sus­pected that Wilson ma,y have struck a deal with the Americans, whereby Britain was compelled to remain East of Suez and to support the Vietnam War, in return for America's financial support for keeping the pound solvent, a view which has been supported (to varyin degrees) by a number of scholars (2). This chapter seeks to clarify whether there existed such a deal, and if so, in what form.

Perhaps Harold Wilson and Lyndon Johnson were the most misun­derstood leaders of the time. Wilson was often described as devious, insecure. and manipulative, while we are told that Johnson was impul­

(I) 'John~on in Wasbington. DC'. 2 December 10M, 7/2, Ala8lair Hetherington Paper~

[h"renfter cited RI! AH PI. the British Library ofPolitioal and Social Soience, London. (2) Barbam CAS'I'J.B, The Castle Diaries 1964- 70. London, Weidenfcld & Nicolson, 1984.

p. 148; Richard CHO"'MAN, The1Jiaril'1l oJ Cl GaMnel Mini.ttr 1'01.1 (1964 19(6) ,London, Book ('Iub ASBociate~, 1976. p. 417, Clive PONl'INO, Brearh oj Promi<!e . LahO/lr i" Pallier /964-1970, LlJndon, Hamish Hamilton, 1989. jJp. 103-107; Oeoffrey PI('KEllINll, Britain.·s Wil/ldmwal Jro/ll ealll oJ Suez, London, Macmillan. 1998. p. 149; John Dl'MBI\EI.I,. 'The Johnson Adminis­\ ration and the British Labour CO\'crnmenL Vietnam, t he Pound and East of Suez', Joumal of Ilmericatl Studiu. volume 30, number 2, (August W96), pp. :!12-224; Diano KUNZ. "Some what Mixed Up together' : Anglo-American Dofenoe and Rinnneial Policy during t he 1960,', in Robert D. K I.NG &. Robin K1L~ON, cd;;, ThR. Slalecraf! oj British lmptriali~m : Essay. in FlolI.Q1LJ' r;j Wm. Ro(W l.ouis. London. FrunkC88ll, 1999, pp. 216 218