the Psychology of Social Conflict and Aggression Sydney Symposium in Social Psychology

THE PSYCHOLOGY OFSOCIAL CONFLICT

AND AGGRESSION

The Sydney Symposium of Social Psychology seriesThis book is Volume 13 in the Sydney Symposium of Social Psychology series. The aim of the Sydney Symposia of Social Psychology is to provide new, integrative insights into key areas of contemporary research. Held every year at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, each symposium deals with an important integrative theme in social psychology, and the invited participants are leading researchers in the field from around the world. Each contribution is extensively discussed during the symposium and is subsequently thoroughly revised into book chapters that are published in the volumes in this series. For further details see the website at www.sydneysymposium.unsw.edu.au

Previous Sydney Symposium of Social Psychology volumes:

SSSP 1. Feeling and Thinking: The Role oF aFFecT in Social cogniTion** ISBN 0-521-64223-X (Edited by J.P. Forgas). Contributors: Robert Zajonc, Jim Blascovich, Wendy Berry Mendes, Craig Smith, Leslie Kirby, Eric Eich, Dawn Macauley, Len Berkowitz, Sara Jaffee, EunKyung Jo, Bartholomeu Troccoli, Leonard Martin, Daniel Gilbert, Timothy Wilson, Herbert Bless, Klaus Fiedler, Joseph Forgas, Carolin Showers, Anthony Greenwald, Mahzarin Banaji, Laurie Rudman, Shelly Farnham, Brian Nosek, Marshall Rosier, Mark Leary, Paula Niedenthal, Jamin Halberstadt.

SSSP 2. The Social Mind: cogniTive and MoTivaTional aSPecTS oF inTeRPeRSonal BehavioR** ISBN 0-521-77092-0 (Edited by J.P. Forgas, K.D. Williams, & L. Wheeler). Contributors: William & Claire McGuire, Susan Andersen, Roy Baumeister, Joel Cooper, Bill Crano, Garth Fletcher, Joseph Forgas, Pascal Huguet, Mike Hogg, Martin Kaplan, Norb Kerr, John Nezlek, Fred Rhodewalt, Astrid Schuetz, Constantine Sedikides, Jeffry Simpson, Richard Sorrentino, Dianne Tice, Kip Williams, Ladd Wheeler.

SSSP 3. Social inFluence: diRecT and indiRecT PRoceSSeS* ISBN 1-84169-038-4 (Edited by J.P. Forgas & K.D. Williams). Contributors: Robert Cialdini, Eric Knowles, Shannon Butler, Jay Linn, Bibb Latane, Martin Bourgeois, Mark Schaller, Ap Dijksterhuis, James Tedeschi, Richard Petty, Joseph Forgas, Herbert Bless, Fritz Strack, Eva Walther, Sik Hung Ng, Thomas Mussweiler, Kipling Williams, Lara Dolnik, Charles Stangor, Gretchen Sechrist, John Jost, Deborah Terry, Michael Hogg, Stephen Harkins, Barbara David, John Turner, Robin Martin, Miles Hewstone, Russell Spears, Tom Postmes, Martin Lea, Susan Watt.

SSSP 4. The Social SelF: cogniTive, inTeRPeRSonal, and inTeRgRouP PeRSPecTiveS** ISBN 1-84169-062-7 (Edited by J.P. Forgas & K.D. Williams). Contributors: Eliot R. Smith, Thomas Gilovich, Monica Biernat,

Joseph P. Forgas, Stephanie J. Moylan, Edward R. Hirt, Sean M. McCrea, Frederick Rhodewalt, Michael Tragakis, Mark Leary, Roy F. Baumeister, Jean M. Twenge, Natalie Ciarocco, Dianne M. Tice, Jean M. Twenge, Brandon J. Schmeichel, Bertram F. Malle, William Ickes, Marianne LaFrance, Yoshihisa Kashima, Emiko Kashima, Anna Clark, Marilynn B. Brewer, Cynthia L. Pickett, Sabine Otten, Christian S. Crandall, Diane M. Mackie, Joel Cooper, Michael Hogg, Stephen C. Wright, Art Aron, Linda R. Tropp, Constantine Sedikides.

SSSP 5. Social JudgMenTS: iMPliciT and exPliciT PRoceSSeS** ISBN 0-521-82248-3. (Edited by J.P. Forgas, K.D. Williams, & W. Von Hippel). Contributors: Herbert Bless, Marilynn Brewer, David Buss, Tanya Chartrand, Klaus Fiedler, Joseph Forgas, David Funder, Adam Galinsky, Martie Haselton, Denis Hilton, Lucy Johnston, Arie Kruglanski, Matthew Lieberman, John McClure, Mario Mikulincer, Norbert Schwarz, Philip Shaver, Diederik Stapel, Jerry Suls, William von Hippel, Michaela Waenke, Ladd Wheeler, Kipling Williams, Michael Zarate.

SSSP 6. Social MoTivaTion: conSciouS and unconSciouS PRoceSSeS** ISBN 0-521-83254-3 (Edited by J.P. Forgas, K.D. Williams, & S.M. Laham). Contributors: Henk Aarts, Ran Hassin,Trish Devine, Joseph Forgas, Jens Forster, Nira Liberman, Judy Harackiewicz, Leanne Hing, Mark Zanna, Michael Kernis, Paul Lewicki, Steve Neuberg, Doug Kenrick, Mark Schaller, Tom Pyszczynski, Fred Rhodewalt, Jonathan Schooler, Steve Spencer, Fritz Strack, Roland Deutsch, Howard Weiss, Neal Ashkanasy, Kip Williams, Trevor Case, Wayne Warburton, Wendy Wood, Jeffrey Quinn, Rex Wright, Guido Gendolla.

SSSP 7. The Social ouTcaST: oSTRaciSM, Social excluSion, ReJecTion, and Bullying* ISBN 1-84169-424-X (Edited by K.D. Williams, J.P Forgas, & W. Von Hippel). Contributors: Kipling D. Williams, Joseph P. Forgas, William von Hippel, Lisa Zadro, Mark R. Leary, Roy F. Baumeister, and C. Nathan DeWall, Geoff MacDonald, Rachell Kingsbury, Stephanie Shaw, John T. Cacioppo, Louise C. Hawkley, Naomi I. Eisenberger Matthew D. Lieberman, Rainer Romero-Canyas, Geraldine Downey, Jaana Juvonen, Elisheva F. Gross, Kristin L. Sommer, Yonata Rubin, Susan T. Fiske, Mariko Yamamoto, Jean M. Twenge, Cynthia L. Pickett, Wendi L. Gardner, Megan Knowles, Michael A. Hogg, Julie Fitness, Jessica L. Lakin, Tanya L. Chartrand, Kathleen R. Catanese and Dianne M. Tice, Lowell Gaertner, Jonathan Iuzzini, Jaap W. Ouwerkerk, Norbert L. Kerr, Marcello Gallucci, Paul A. M. Van Lange, Marilynn B. Brewer.

SSSP 8. aFFecT in Social Thinking and BehavioR* ISBN 1-84169-454-2 (Edited by J.P. Forgas). Contributors: Joseph P. Forgas, Carrie Wyland, Simon M. Laham, Martie G. Haselton Timothy Ketelaar, Piotr Winkielman, John T. Cacioppo, Herbert Bless, Klaus Fiedler, Craig A. Smith, Bieke David, Leslie D. Kirby, Eric Eich, Dawn Macaulay, Gerald L. Clore, Justin Storbeck, Roy F. Baumeister, Kathleen D. Vohs, Dianne M. Tice, Dacher Keltner, E.J. Horberg, Christopher Oveis, Elizabeth W. Dunn, Simon M. Laham, Constantine Sedikides, Tim Wildschut, Jamie Arndt, Clay Routledge, Yaacov Trope, Eric R. Igou, Chris Burke, Felicia A. Huppert, Ralph Erber, Susan Markunas, Joseph P. Forgas, Joseph Ciarrochi, John T. Blackledge, Janice R. Kelly, Jennifer R.Spoor, John G. Holmes, Danu B. Anthony.

SSSP 9. evoluTion and The Social Mind* ISBN 1-84169-458-0 (Edited by J.P. Forgas, M.G. Haselton, & W. Von Hippel). Contributors: William von Hippel, Martie Haselton, Joseph P. Forgas, R.I.M. Dunbar, Steven W. Gangestad, Randy Thornhill, Douglas T. Kenrick, Andrew W. Delton, Theresa E. Robertson, D. Vaughn Becker, Steven L. Neuberg, Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Ross Buck, Joseph P. Forgas, Paul B.T. Badcock, Nicholas B. Allen, Peter M. Todd, Jeffry A. Simpson, Jonathon LaPaglia, Debra Lieberman, Garth J. O. Fletcher, Nickola C. Overall, Abraham P. Buunk, Karlijn Massar, Pieternel Dijkstra, Mark Van Vugt, Rob Kurzban, Jamin Halberstadt, Oscar Ybarra, Matthew C. Keller, Emily Chan, Andrew S. Baron, Jeffrey Hutsler, Stephen Garcia, Jeffrey Sanchez-Burks, Kimberly Rios Morrison, Jennifer R. Spoor, Kipling D. Williams, Mark Schaller, Lesley A. Duncan.

SSSP 10. Social RelaTionShiPS: cogniTive, aFFecTive, and MoTivaTional PRoceSSeS* ISBN 978-1-84169-715-4 (Edited by J.P. Forgas & J. Fitness). Contributors: Joseph P. Forgas, Julie Fitness, Elaine Hatfield, Richard L. Rapson, Gian C. Gonzaga, Martie G. Haselton, Phillip R. Shaver, Mario Mikulincer, David P. Schmitt, Garth J.O. Fletcher, Alice D. Boyes, Linda K. Acitelli, Margaret S. Clark, Steven M. Graham, Erin Williams, Edward P. Lemay, Christopher R. Agnew, Ximena B. Arriaga, Juan E. Wilson, Marilynn B. Brewer, Jeffry A. Simpson, W. Andrew Collins, SiSi Tran, Katherine C. Haydon, Shelly L. Gable, Patricia Noller, Susan Conway, Anita Blakeley-Smith, Julie Peterson, Eli J. Finkel, Sandra L. Murray, Lisa Zadro, Kipling D. Williams, Rowland S. Miller.

SSSP 11. PSychology oF SelF-RegulaTion: cogniTive, aFFecTive, and MoTivaTional PRoceSSeS* ISBN 978-1-84872-842-4 (Edited by J.P. Forgas, R. Baumeister, & D.M. Tice). Contributors: Joseph P. Forgas, Roy F. Baumeister, Dianne M. Tice, Jessica L. Alquist, Carol Sansone, Malte Friese, Michaela Wänke, Wilhelm Hofmann, Constantine Sedikides, Christian Unkelbach, Henning Plessner, Daniel Memmert, Charles S. Carver, Michael F. Scheier, Gabriele Oettingen, Peter M. Gollwitzer, Jens Förster, Nira Liberman, Ayelet Fishbach, Gráinne M. Fitzsimons, Justin Friesen, Edward Orehek, Arie W. Kruglanski, Sander L. Koole, Thomas F. Denson, Klaus Fiedler, Matthias Bluemke, Christian Unkelbach, Hart Blanton, Deborah L. Hall, Kathleen D. Vohs, Jannine D. Lasaleta, Bob Fennis, William von Hippel, Richard Ronay, Eli J. Finkel, Daniel C. Molden, Sarah E. Johnson, Paul W. Eastwick.

SSSP 12. PSychology oF aTTiTudeS and aTTiTude change* ISBN 978-1-84872-908-7 (Edited by J.P. Forgas, J. Cooper, & W.D. Crano). Contributors: William D. Crano, Joel Cooper, Joseph P. Forgas, Blair T. Johnson, Marcella H. Boynton, Alison Ledgerwood, Yaacov Trope, Eva Walther, Tina Langer, Klaus Fiedler, Steven J. Spencer, Jennifer Peach, Emiko Yoshida, Mark P. Zanna, Allyson L. Holbrook, Jon A. Krosnick, Eddie Harmon-Jones, David M. Amodio, Cindy Harmon-Jones, Michaela Wänke, Leonie Reutner, Kipling D. Williams, Zhansheng Chen, Duane Wegener, Radmila Prislin, Brenda Major, Sarah S. M. Townsend, Frederick Rhodewalt, Benjamin Peterson, Jim Blascovich, Cade McCall.

* Published by Psychology Press** Published by Cambridge University Press

Psychology Press

New York London

Edited by

Joseph P. ForgasUniversity of New South Wales

Arie W. KruglanskiUniversity of Maryland

Kipling D. Williams Purdue University

THE PSYCHOLOGY OFSOCIAL CONFLICT

AND AGGRESSION

Psychology PressTaylor & Francis Group711 Third AvenueNew York, NY 10017

Psychology PressTaylor & Francis Group27 Church RoadHove, East Sussex BN3 2FA

© 2011 by Taylor and Francis Group, LLC

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International Standard Book Number: 978-1-84872-932-2 (Hardback)

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vii

Contents

Preface xiListofContributors xv

Section i introduction and BaSic iSSueS

1 ThePsychologyofSocialConflictandAggression:Homo AggressivusRevisited 3

Joseph P. Forgas, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Kipling D. Williams

2 AnAttachmentPerspectiveonInterpersonalandIntergroupConflict 19

Mario Mikulincer and Phillip R. Shaver

3 TheLinkBetweenOstracismandAggression 37

Kipling D. Williams and Eric D. Wesselmann

4 IsItAggression?:PerceptionsofandMotivationsforPassiveandPsychologicalAggression 53

Deborah South Richardson and Georgina S. Hammock

5 PushingUptoaPoint:ThePsychologyofInterpersonalAssertiveness 65

Daniel Ames

Section ii cognitive and affective influenceS on conflict and aggreSSion

6 NonconsciousBattlesofWill:ImplicitReactionsAgainsttheGoalsandMotivesofOthers 83

N. Pontus Leander and Tanya L. Chartrand

contentSviii

7 UsingBothYourHeadandYourHeart:TheRoleofPerspectiveTakingandEmpathyinResolvingSocialConflict 103

Adam D. Galinsky, Debra Gilin, and William W. Maddux

8 AffectiveInfluencesonthePerception,Management,andResolutionofSocialConflicts 119

Joseph P. Forgas and Hui Bing Tan

9 TheEffectsofAngerandAngerRegulationonNegotiation 139

Thomas F. Denson and Emma C. Fabiansson

10 TheRoleoftheQuestforPersonalSignificanceinMotivatingTerrorism 153

Arie W. Kruglanski and Edward Orehek

Section iii conflict and aggreSSion in relationShipS

11 IntimatePartnerViolence:Cognitive,Affective,andRelationalFactors 167

Chris Eckhardt

12 InterdependentGoalsandRelationshipConflict 185

Gráinne M. Fitzsimons and Joanna E. Anderson

13 SilentRage:WhenBeingOstracizedLeadstoAggression 201

Lisa Zadro

14 TheDoormatEffect:OntheDangersofResolvingConflictviaUnilateralForgiveness 217

Laura B. Luchies and Eli J. Finkel

Section iv Social, cultural, and evolutionary factorS in Social conflict

and aggreSSion

15 TheMaleWarriorHypothesis 233

Mark Van Vugt

contentS ix

16 ImplicationsofGlobalClimateChangeforViolenceinDevelopedandDevelopingCountries 249

Craig A. Anderson and Matt DeLisi

17 TheMediaandAggression:FromTVtotheInternet 267

Ed Donnerstein

18 AreSupernaturalBeliefsCommitmentDevicesforIntergroupConflict? 285

Robert Kurzban and John Christner

19 TheEffectofReligiousParticipationonAggressionOverOne’sLifetimeandAcrossGenerations 301

L. Rowell Huesmann, Eric F. Dubow, and Paul Boxer

Index 323

xi

Preface

Thecollectionofchaptersinthisbookreviewssomeofthemostrecentadvancesinthestudyofsocialconflictandaggression,oneofthemostperennialandpuzzlingtopicsinallofpsychology.Thechaptersrepresentavarietyoftheoreticalorientations,rangingfromevolutionaryapproachesthroughcognitive,affective,neuropsychological,andclinicaltheoriesallthewaytosocialandculturalanalysesofthenatureandcharacteristicsofconflictandaggression.FewtopicsareasimportantyetaspoorlyunderstoodabouthumannatureasthequestionofwhyHomo sapienshappenstobesuchauniquelyconflictproneandaggressivespecies.

Thebookaimstoprovideanuptodateintegrationofsomeofthemostrecentdevelopmentsinsocialpsychologicalresearchonthisissue,offeringaninformative,scholarly,yetreadableoverviewofrecentadvancesinresearchonthenature,antecedents,management,andconsequencesofinterpersonalandintergroupconflictandaggression.Thechaptersincludedhereshareabroadintegrativeorientation andwill argue thathumanconflict isbest understood through the carefulanalysisof thecognitive,affective,andmotivationalprocessesof those involvedinconflictsituations,supplementedbyabroadlybasedunderstandingoftheevolutionary, biological, as well as social and cultural contexts within which socialconflictoccurs.

Thebookisdividedintofourparts.SectionIdealswithbasicquestionssuchasthefollowing:Whatroledoearlyattachmentexperiencesplayindetermininghowpeoplemanageanddealwithinterpersonalandintergroupconflict in laterlife?Why is social exclusionandostracism—being ignored and rejectedbyothers—suchanimportantsourceofconflictandaggression,andwhatdetermineswhetherthosewhoareostracizedrespondinprosocialratherthanantisocialwaystotheirpredicament? What are the psychological characteristics of those very commoneverydaybehaviors(e.g.,spitefulness,condescension,derogation)thatfallshortofseriousandintentionalharmdoingyetnecessarilyproduceaversiveconsequences?Whatdetermineshowhardandhowfarpeoplewillpushingettingtheirwaywithothers—inotherwords,whatdeterminesassertiveness?

Thesecondsectionaddressesthecognitive,affective,andmotivationalinfluences on how people perceive and manage social conflicts, seeking answers toquestionssuchasthefollowing:Whydopeoplesometimesreactinanadversarialwaytotheinferredgoalsandmotivesofothers?Whatroledoaffectivestatesandmoodsplayinthewaypeopleperceive,manage,andresolvesocialconflicts?Howcanonebestmanageangertoperformoptimallyinnegotiatingsituations?How

prefacexii

canweexplaintheapparently irrationalandselfsacrificialviolenceof terroristsandsuicidebombers—isthequestforpositivesocialidentityandpersonalsignificanceapossibleexplanation?

SectionIII looksat thewayconflictandaggressionoccur insocial relationships,perhapsthemostcommoneverydaysettingforreallifeconflictexperiences.Chaptersinthissectioninvestigateanumberofintriguingquestions.Forexample,whyisviolencebetweencouplessooftenexplainedandtreatedintermsoffeministexplanationsthatfocusonmaledominanceratherthanbeingbasedonthebestavailable psychological evidence thatdoesnot support feminist ideology? Whatistheroleoftheinterdependentversusconflictinggoalsofpartnersinproducingrelationshipconflict?Howdopeopleinrelationshipscopewiththeconsequencesofbeingignoredandostracized,oneofthemostcommonreallifeconflictstrategiesinrelationships?Whatroledoesforgivenessplayinconflictmanagementandresolution—coulditbethatforgivenessissometimescounterproductiveandmayresultinsuboptimaloutcomesforvictims?

SectionIVofthebookanalyzesconflictandaggressionintermsoflargescaleevolutionary,social,andculturalmechanismsandseeksanswerstoquestionssuchas the following:Howcanwebest explain thealmostuniversal tendency in allhuman societies for tribalism and intergroup violence? Are there evolutionarypressuresforadistinctive“malewarrior”culturetoemerge?Iftheglobalwarminghypothesisisindeedcorrect,whatarethelikelyimplicationsofthepredictedclimatechangeforinterpersonal,intergroup,andinterculturalconflictinthedecadestocome?WhataretheconsequencesofviolencepresentedinthemediaandespeciallyontheInternetfortheprevalenceofconflictandaggressioninoursocieties?Whatistheroleofapparentlyirrational,supernaturalbeliefsinfosteringingroupcohesionandintergroupconflict?Andfinally,howdoesareligiousupbringingandpracticehelptopreventaggressionandviolenceinlaterlife?

Oneneedstorecognize,ofcourse,thatnosinglebookcouldpossiblyincludeeverything that is interesting and exciting in current research on conflict andaggression.Inselectingandinvitingourcontributors,weaimedtoachieveabroadandvariedcoveragethatisneverthelessrepresentativeofthemajornewdevelopments in social psychological research on conflict andaggression. The chaptersincludedhererepresentsomeofthebestexamplesofcleartheorizingandcarefulresearchinthiscriticallyimportantarea.

the originS of thiS Book: the Sydney SympoSium of Social pSychology SerieS

ThisbookisthethirteenthvolumeintheSydneySymposiumofSocialPsychologyseries,heldeveryyear at theUniversityofNewSouthWales (UNSW),Sydney.PerhapsafewwordsareinorderabouttheoriginsofthisvolumeandtheSydneySymposium of Social Psychology series in general. First, we should emphasizethat this is not simply an edited book in the usual sense. The objective of theSydneySymposiaistoprovidenew,integrativeunderstandinginimportantareasofsocialpsychologybyinvitingleadingresearchersinaparticularfieldtoa3day

preface xiii

residentialsymposiuminSydney.Thissymposiumhasreceivedfinancialsupportfrom theUniversityofNewSouthWales and theAustralianResearchCouncil,allowingthecarefulselectionandfundingofasmallgroupofleadingresearchersascontributors.Draftpapersbyallcontributorsarepreparedandcirculatedwellinadvanceofthesymposiumandareplacedonourdedicatedwebsite.Thus,participantshadanopportunitytoreviewandrevisetheirpapersinlightofeverybodyelse’sdraftcontributionevenbeforetheyarrivedinSydney.

Avitalpartofthepreparationofthisbookhasbeentheintensive3dayfacetofacemeetingamongall invitedcontributors.SydneySymposiaarecharacterized by open, freeranging, and critical discussion among all participants, withtheobjectiveofexploringpointsofintegrationandcontrastamongtheproposedpapers.Afurtherrevisionofeachchapterispreparedsoonaftereachsymposium,incorporatingmanyofthesharedpointsthatemergedinourdiscussions.Thankstothesecollaborativeprocedures,thebookdoesnotsimplyconsistofasetofchapterspreparedbyresearchersinisolation.Rather,thisSydneySymposiumvolumerepresentsacollaborativeeffortbyaleadinggroupofinternationalresearchersintenton producing a wideranging and uptodate review of research on the nature,antecedents,andconsequencesofsocialconflictandaggression.

Wehopethatthepublishedpaperswillsucceedinconveyingsomeofthesenseoffunandexcitementweallsharedduringthesymposium.Formoreinformationon theSydneySymposiumseriesanddetailsofourpastand futureprojects (aswellasphotosthatshowourcontributorsinmoreorlessflatteringsituations,andother background information) please see our website (www.sydneysymposium.unsw.edu.au).TwelvepreviousvolumesoftheSydneySymposiumserieshavebeenpublished.AllSydneySymposiumbooksfeatureoriginalcontributionsfromleadinginternationalresearchersonkeyissuesinsocialpsychology.Detailedinformationaboutourearliervolumescanbefoundontheseriespageinthisbookandalsoonourwebsite.

Givenitsbreadthofcoverage,thepresentbookshouldbeusefulbothasabasicreference book and as an informative textbook tobe used in advanced coursesdealingwithsocialconflictandaggression.Themaintargetaudienceforthisbookcomprises researchers, students, and professionals in all areas of the social andbehavioralsciences,suchassocial,cognitive,clinical,counseling,personality,organizational,forensicandappliedpsychology,andsociology,communicationstudies,andsocialwork.Thebookiswritteninareadableyetscholarlystyle,andstudentsattheundergraduateandatthegraduatelevelshouldfinditanengagingoverviewof thefieldandthususefulasa textbook incoursesdealingwithsocial conflictand aggression. The book should also be of particular interest to people workinginappliedareaswheredealingwithandunderstandingtheprocessesinvolvedinpreventing,managing,andresolvingsocialconflictandaggressionareimportant,suchasorganizational,forensic,clinical,counseling,educational,sports,andhealthpsychology.

Wewant toexpressour thanks to thepeople andorganizations thathelpedtomaketheSydneySymposiumofSocialPsychologyseries,andthis thirteenthvolumeinparticular,areality.Producingacomplex,multiauthoredbooksuchasthisisalengthyandsometimeschallengingtask.Wehavebeenveryfortunateto

prefacexiv

workwithsuchanexcellentandcooperativegroupofcontributors.Ourfirstthanksmustgotothem.Becauseoftheirhelpandprofessionalism,wewereabletofinishthisproject inrecordtimeandaheadofschedule.Past friendshipshavenotbeenfrayed,andweareallstillonspeakingterms;indeed,wehopethatworkingtogetheronthisbookhasbeenaspositiveanexperienceforthemasithasbeenforus.

The ideaoforganizing theSydneySymposiaowesmuchtodiscussionswithandencouragementbyKevinMcConkey,PeterLovibond,andnumerousothersattheUNSW.OurpastandpresentcolleaguesattheSchoolofPsychologyatUNSWsuchasMarilynnBrewer,KipWilliams,BillvonHippel,andTomDensonandfriendsandcolleaguesfromfurtherafieldhavehelpedwithadvice,support,andsheerhardworktosharetheburdenofpreparingandorganizingthesymposiumandtheensuingbook.WeareespeciallygratefultoSuellenandBillCrano,whohelpedinmorewaysthanwecouldlisthere.WealsowishtoacknowledgefinancialsupportfromtheAustralianResearchCouncilandUNSW,supportthatwasofcourseessentialtogetthisprojectofftheground.Mostofall,wearegratefulfortheloveandsupportofourfamilieswhohaveputupwithusduringthemanymonthsofworkthatwentintoproducingthisbook.

JosephP.Forgas,ArieW.Kruglanski,andKiplingD.WilliamsSydney, Australia

xv

ListofContributorsDanielAmesColumbiaUniversityNewYork,NewYork,USA

CraigA.AndersonIowaStateUniversityAmes,Iowa,USA

JoannaE.AndersonUniversityofWaterlooWaterloo,Ontario,Canada

PaulBoxerRutgersUniversityNewark,NewJersey,USAandUniversityofMichiganAnnArbor,Michigan,USA

TanyaL.ChartrandDukeUniversityDurham,NorthCarolina,USA

JohnChristnerUniversityofPennsylvaniaPhiladelphia,Pennsylvania,USA

MattDeLisiIowaStateUniversityAmes,Iowa,USA

ThomasF.DensonUniversityofNewSouthWalesSydney,Australia

EdDonnersteinUniversityofArizonaTucson,Arizona,USA

EricF.DubowBowlingGreenStateUniversityBowlingGreen,Ohio,USAandUniversityofMichiganAnnArbor,Michigan,USA

ChrisEckhardtPurdueUniversityWestLafayette,Indiana,USA

EmmaC.FabianssonUniversityofNewSouthWalesSydney,Australia

EliJ.FinkelNorthwesternUniversityEvanston,Illinois,USA

GráinneM.FitzsimonsUniversityofWaterlooWaterloo,Ontario,Canada

JosephP.ForgasUniversityofNewSouthWalesSydney,Australia

AdamD.GalinskyNorthwesternUniversityEvanston,Illinois,USA

liSt of contriButorSxvi

DebraGilinSaintMary’sUniversityHalifax,NovaScotia,Canada

GeorginaS.HammockAugustaStateUniversityAugusta,Georgia,USA

L.RowellHuesmannUniversityofMichiganAnnArbor,Michigan,USA

ArieW.KruglanskiUniversityofMarylandCollegePark,Maryland,USA

RobertKurzbanUniversityofPennsylvaniaPhiladelphia,Pennsylvania,USA

N.PontusLeanderDukeUniversityDurham,NorthCarolina,USA

LauraB.LuchiesNorthwesternUniversityEvanston,Illinois,USA

WilliamW.MadduxINSEADFontainebleau,France

MarioMikulincerInterdisciplinaryCenter(IDC),

HerzlyiaHerzliya,Israel

EdwardOrehekUniversityofGroningenGroningen,theNetherlands

DeborahSouthRichardsonAugustaStateUniversityAugusta,Georgia,USA

PhillipR.ShaverUniversityofCalifornia,DavisDavis,California,USA

HuiBingTanUniversityofNewSouthWalesSydney,Australia

MarkVanVugtUniversityofAmsterdamAmsterdam,theNetherlands

EricD.WesselmannPurdueUniversityWestLafayette,Indiana,USA

KiplingD.WilliamsPurdueUniversityWestLafayette,Indiana,USA

LisaZadroUniversityofSydneySydney,Australia

Section IIntroduction and Basic Issues

3

1ThePsychologyofSocialConflictandAggression

Homo Aggressivus RevisitedJOSEPHP.FORGAS

University of New South Wales

ARIEW.KRUGLANSKIUniversity of Maryland

KIPLINGD.WILLIAMSPurdue University

C onflict andaggressionappear tobe oneof thedefining features ofourspecies.Humansfight,argue,andengageinintraspeciesviolenceataratethatseemstobeuniqueamongspecies.Humanhistoryseemssoreplete

withamazing featsof intraspeciesconflictandviolence that some theoreticianssuchasArthurKoestler(1972)evenbelievedthatkillingourownhasalwaysbeenand continues to be a defining feature of all human societies, from the distanthistoricalpast to thepresent.TheancientMaya thoughtnothingof rippingoutthelivingheartsoftensofthousandsofcaptivesinasingleday;thousandsofcivilianswerekilleda fewyearsago inBosniasimplybecause theybelonged to thewrongethnicgroup;Islamicterroristsseemtorejoiceinthemurderofthousandsofinnocentciviliansinthenameofideologiesthatmostofusbroughtupintheliberal,rational,Westerntraditionwouldconsiderbizarreandincomprehensibleatbest(seealsoKruglanski&Orehek;Kurzban&Christner;VanVugt,thisvolume).Explainingtheroots,features,andconsequencesofthewayhumanbeingsengageinconflictandaggressionhasthusbeenadefiningconcernforwritersand

JoSeph p. forgaS, arie kruglanSki, and kipling d. WilliamS4

philosopherssinceantiquity.Thisvolumeseekstopresentsomeofthemostrecentleadingedgepsychologicalresearchandthinkingonthisperennialtopicfromagroupofdistinguishedinternationalresearchers.

We should also note at the outset, however, that the apparently unlimitedhumancapacityforconflictandviolenceneedstobebalancedagainstourequallyimpressive ability for cooperation and altruism. Notwithstanding the ubiquityof conflict and aggression,humans are also capableof amazing featsof coordination, empathy, and even selfsacrifice, and our species is unique in its abilitytoorganize and integrateextremely large social groups andunits in a way thatlargelyprecludesthedangersofbeingcaughtupindailyconflictandaggression(Dunbar,2008).Mostofuswholiveinmodernindustrializedsocietiesliveuncommonlypeacefulandsafeliveswherephysicalconflictandaggressionrarelyifevertouchesus(seealsoRichardson&Hammock,thisvolume).Inacuriousway,theverysame impressivehumancapacity forsymbolic thoughtandabstractionthatdrivessomuchinterpersonalandsocialconflictandviolence(seealsoLeanderandChartrand;Fitzsimons&Anderson;Kruglanski&Orehek;VanVugt;Kurzban&Christner,thisvolume)alsoliesattheheartoftheimmensehumancapacityforcooperationandaltruism(seealsoHuesmannetal.,thisvolume).Themainobjectiveofthisbookistoreviewandintegratesomeofthemostrecentdevelopmentsinresearchonsocialconflictandaggression,presentingtheworkofaselectgroupofeminentinternationalscholarsinthisfield.

Despitecenturiesofdebate,thereremainfundamentalquestionsaboutthenatureandoriginsofhumanconflictandaggression.Howisconflictgenerated,howdopeoplemanage toresolveanddealwith their interpersonaland intergroupconflicts,andwhatisthemostappropriatepsychologicalandsocialstrategy for managing and limiting the destructive consequencesof social conflictandaggression?Whatroledoevolutionary,cultural,andsocialvariablesplayinthegenerationandresolutionofconflict?Whatare themost importantcognitive,affective,andmotivationalmechanismsthatinfluencethewayanindividualexperiencesandrespondstoconflict?Whatcontributioncanpsychologicalresearchonconflictandaggressionmaketounderstandinginterpersonal,relationship,andintergroupconflicts?Thesearejustsomeoftheissuesweintendtoexploreinthisvolume.

Toanswerquestionssuchasthese,thisvolumeissubdividedintofourbasicsections. The first part of the book, after this introductory chapter, addressessomeof thegeneral issuesandtheoriesrelevant toourunderstandingofsocialconflictandaggression(Chapters2–5).Inthesecondsectionofthebook,anumberofcontributorsconsiderthecognitiveandaffectiveprocessesinvolvedinthewaysocialconflictandaggressionisexperiencedandresolved(Chapters6–10).Thethirdpartofthebookpresentsresearchthatexploresthenatureandconsequencesofinterpersonalandrelationalconflictandaggression(Chapters11–14).Finally,inthefourthandfinalsectionofthebook,wefocusonthelargerevolutionary,social,andculturalvariablesthatinfluencethenatureandoccurrenceofsocialconflictandaggression(Chapters15–19).Wewillbegin,however,withabrieftheoreticalandhistoricalreviewofresearchonconflictandaggressioninsocialpsychology.

the pSychology of Social conflict and aggreSSion 5

Studying conflict and aggreSSionThestudyofhumanaggression,theviolenceofpeopleagainsttheirownkind,isalsooneofthemosttimehonoredandfundamentaltopicsofpsychologicalresearchand,beforethat,ofsocialphilosophy.Manyofthegreatthinkersoverthecenturieshaveaddressedthetopic,includingPlato,NiccoloMachiavelli,ThomasHobbes,GeorgSpinoza,andJonathanSwift.Inpsychology,alltheveneratedgrandtheoristsofourdisciplinecommentedonhumanaggressionincludingWilliamJames,SigmundFreud,WilliamMcDougall,andKonradLorenz.EvenAlbertEinsteinwasmovedtocommentonhumandestructivenessthatheexplainedintermsoftheinborn“lustforhatredanddestruction.”

Thecentralityofconflictandaggressionasakeytopicforunderstandinghumannatureisevidencedbythefactthatithasbeenstudiedfromanextremelybroadvarietyofpsychologicalperspectives, includingmotivational theoriesof instinct,behavioral theories of learning, cognitive approaches to information processingandattribution,evolutionarytheories,modelsofselfregulationandautomaticity,andbiologicalandneuroscientificvantagepoints.

Aggression and conflict are now also foundational topics in social psychology,astheywereinsociologyandanthropologybefore.Probablynosingletopicenjoysasmuchcrossdisciplinaryinterestasaggression.Majortheoriesandmuchempiricalresearchonthesetopicsemergedfrommanyfields,includingsociology,behavioral genetics, anthropology, ethology, philosophy, literature, and biology.Withinpsychology,everysubdisciplineisrepresented:developmental,clinicalandcounseling,cognitive,neuroscience,humanandanimallearning,motivation,andindustrialandorganizationalpsychology.Themajorgrandtheoriesinpsychologyallweighinonaggression:Freud’spsychoanalytictheory,B.F.Skinner’sbehaviorism,andCarlRogers’sandAbrahamMaslow’shumanismhaveallproposedexplanations for andmechanisms toguardagainst aggression.This allencompassinginterestisundoubtedlybecauseeventhoughaggressionandconflictareubiquitousamongnearlyallanimalstheyareespeciallysoamonghumans.Asthechaptersinthisbooksuggest,conflictandaggressioncanalternativelybeviewedasfunctionalordysfunctional,canbeanalyzedattheindividual,relational,andsocietallevel,andareoftendiscussedasaconstantsourceofconcernasalegal,political,andsocialproblem.

definitionS of conflict and aggreSSionGiventheubiquityofconflictandaggression,onemaythinkthatattheveryleastwedoknowwhatitisthatwearetalkingabout.Alas,thisisnotthecase.Arecentinternational symposiumonconflict (Kruk,2009) representingnearlyallof therelevantdisciplinesresultedinspiriteddiscussionaboutwhethertherewasevencommonagreement about thedefinitionof aggression.Whereas intent toharmwasacoredefinitionalpropertyusedinmanyofthedisciplines,othersrequiredadditional features such as overt actions, while some denied that intention toharmisevenrelevanttoadefinition(seealsoChapter4).Somefocusedsolelyondirectaggression,whereasothersconsideredindirectandsubtlerforms.So,toask


whetherconflictandaggressionarerelatedpresupposesthateveryonehasamutuallyagreedondefinitionforaggressionandforconflict.Ratherthanimposingconsensus,itisprobablybesttoacknowledgetheexistingdiversityofdefinitionsandfoci,aswedohere,so that furtherresearchcandetermine theextent towhichtheseconceptsarerelatedoroperatebydifferentprocesses.

Todeterminetheextentthatconflictandaggressionarerelated,onemustask,“Do factors that increase (or decrease) aggression—however we define it—alsosimilarlyincreaseconflict?”Ifthesamefactorshavesimilareffectsonourmeasuresofbothconstructs, thenwecanclaimadegreeof functionaloverlap.Ifafactorincreasesaggressionbutdecreasesconflict,thenwehaveevidencethatwearetalkingabouttwoverydifferentthings.Theresearchrepresentedinthisbookcertainlysuggeststhatconflictandaggressionareatleastrelated—conflictoften,butnotalways,leadstoaggression,andaggressionisaslikelyasnottoperpetuateandexacerbateconflict.Weshouldalsonote,however,thatwhereasconflictoftenhasfunctional,realworldoriginsandisthereforeoftenresolvablebynonaggressiveandrationalmeans,aggressionincontrastisoftenbasedondeeplyseated,universal,andsubconscioushumancharacteristicsthatoftendefyrationalexplanationandresolution(seeespeciallyChapters10,15,and18).

pSychological approacheS to conflict and aggreSSion: a hiStorical overvieW

Ingeneral,psychologicalresearchonconflictandaggressionaddressedthreefundamentalquestions:(1)Wheredoesconflictandaggressioncomefrom?(2)Whatelicitsit?and(3)Whatmodifiesit?

Where Do Conflict and Aggression Come From?

Severalearlytheoristsstressedtheuniversalandinstinctualnatureofconflictandaggression.Inthisvein,Jamesassumedthathuman“bellicosity”wasbiologicallyrootedandthatpeoplewerethemostformidableofallthebeastsofprey.Freud(1922), in reacting to thehugeatrocitiesofWorldWarI, assumed thathumanshaveaninnateaggressivedrive,thedeathinstinctorthanatos.Inanimaginative,ifnotpoetic(butalsoratherfarfetched)theoreticalmove,heassumedthat thethanatos stems frompeople’sbasicdrive toescapestimulationandto return tothepeaceandquietoftheinorganicworld.Why,then,dopeoplenotjustgoaheadandkillthemselves?Becauseofthecontraryforceembodiedinthelifeinstinct,oreros.Asaconsequence,thethanatosisdisplaced,andinsteadofkillingthemselvespeoplefindconflictwithandaggressagainstothers;inthiswaytheyfindanoutlettoinstinctualpressuresthatwouldhaveotherwiseledtotheirowndemise.

Inasomewhatsimilarvein,McDougall(1921)postulatedapugnacityinstinctinhisfamousIntroduction to Social Psychology.ForMcDougall,aninstinctwasageneralpropensitytopayattentiontoagivenclassofobjects,toexperienceagivenemotiontothoseobjects,andtoacttowardtheminaparticularmanner.McDougallalsobelievedthattheinstinctualdispositioncouldbemodifiedbylearning,sothat


initiallyneutralstimulirepeatedlyassociatedwithoriginalinstigatorscouldcometoexcitetheinstinctiveprocess.Ofcourse,suchinstinctbasedexplanationsreallyamountonlytoasemanticsleightofhand—bycallingaggressionaninstinctwearenoclosertounderstandingitsfundamentalnatureandorigins.

Lateron,KonradLorenz(1966),knownasthe“fatherofethology,”alsoembracedtheinstinctdoctrineintheexplanationofaggression.Ethologicallymindedresearchers,basingtheirtheoriesonthecarefulobservationofotherspecies,thussawaggressionasaspeciesspecificadaptationsystem,aninnatebehavioraltendencythat isultimatelyfunctionalbypromotingthesurvivalofthegroup(asdoalsosomerecentevolutionarymodelsofaggression;seeChapters15and18).Aggressionisreleasedinresponsetospecificstimuli.Lorenz’smodelusesahydraulicsystemmetaphor,wherepentuppressureisreleasedbytherightkindsofelicitingstimuli.

Lorenz,anavowedpessimistabouttheaggressivetendenciesofourspecies,suggestedthattoreducethelikelihoodofmajor“explosions”ofaggressionitisbeneficialtoengageinslowandcontrolledreleasesofaggressiveenergy,forexample,intheformofcompetitivegamesorsport.Notsurprisingly,suchgrandinsightsbasedongeneralizationsofobservationsofloweranimals,includingtheGreylaggoose,resultedinLorenzbeingmuchvilifiedandridiculed.HisnotionofinstinctwasmuchnarrowerthanthoseofMcDougallandFreud;whereastheytalkedofageneralbutflexibletendencywhoseexpressioncantakedifferentforms,Lorenzassumedthatinstinctsinvolverigidfixedactionpatternsthathavetheirownenergiesandthatarereleasedbyspecificstimuli.

Are instinctnotionsofaggressiondead?Notexactly.McDougall’s approach,thoughheavilycriticizedinhisownday,anticipatedLenBerkowitz’scontemporaryapproachinwhichthetendencytoaggressisseenasinnate,canbeelicitedsubconsciously,forexamplethroughexposuretoaweapon,butisalsoflexibleandmodifiablebylearning.Inthismodel,allmembersofthespeciesareassumedtopossesstheinnatecapacitytoaggress,justliketheyhavetheinnatecapacityforlanguage—what Steven Pinker (1994) labeled “the language instinct.” The waythisinnateproclivityforconflictandaggressionisexpressedmayvarydependingonavarietyoffactors.JustlikeyoumayexpressthelanguageinstinctbyspeakingFrench,Hungarian,orEnglish,onemayexpressone’saggressiveinstinctbyplayinghockeyorrugby,spreadingmaliciousrumors,writingnastyreviewsabouttheworkofothers,orengaginginterroristactivities.

What Elicits Conflict and Aggressive Behavior?

Thesituationalcuesandcircumstancesthatelicitconflictandaggressionrepresentthesecondfundamentalareaofinvestigationaddressedbyresearchers.Freud,inhisearlytheorizing,beforeintroducingtheconceptofthethanatos,believedthataggressionarosewhenpleasureseekingorpainavoidanceimpulseswerethwarted.McDougallargued(contrarytoLorenz)thatnospecificcategoryofstimulisetsofftheaggressiveprocess.Accordingtohim,theinstigationofaggressionhastodowiththeexperienceoffrustrationorinterferencewithactivitiesdictatedbyotherinstincts.Inthissense,McDougall’sviewisrathersimilartothatofferedbytheearlyworkofFreud.


Intriguingly, the notion that thwarting is at the root of aggression found apowerfulandinfluentialreformulationinthewellknownfrustration–aggressionhypothesisbyDollard,Doob,Miller,Mowrer,andSears(1939).Thefrustration–aggression link is also central to Berkowitz’s (1993) neoassociationist model ofaggressioninwhichaggressionisassumedtofollowfromanger(seealsoChapter9),andanger,inturn,isassumedtofollowfromsomeunpleasantexperience,suchashavingone’sfootsteppedon,havingsomeonerearendyourcar,orfindingoutthat theclassywineyou justordered in a restaurant tastes likevinegar. In thissense, Berkowitz’s view is related to the notion of thwarting: thwarting of yourwishes to have your foot free of pain, or your taste buds pleasantly stimulatedratherthanshockedandtraumatized.

What Modifies Conflict and Aggression?

IncontrasttotherigidmodelofconflictandaggressionpredictinginflexiblefixedactionpatternsasdescribedbyLorenz’sethologicalapproach,mostcontemporarytheoriesrecognizethatconflictandaggressioninhumansoccurinhighlyflexibleand contextually determined ways and can be modified by a variety of mentalandsituationalfactors.Muchresearchattentionhasbeenpaidtothequestionofwhatmodifiesaggression—indeed,mostofthechaptersfeaturedheredealwiththecognitive(Chapter7),affective(Chapters8and9),motivational(Chapters6and10), andculturalaswell as ideologicalmediatorsofconflictandaggression(Chapters 18 and 19). More specifically, a variety of psychological mechanismshavebeenshowntoinfluenceconflictandaggression.

modeling Albert Bandura’s theoretical work on modeling of aggression hasbeenextensivelyappliedtothequestionofwhetheraggressioninthemediamayormaynotincreasetheviewers’tendencytoaggress.Thescientificconsensusonthispointseemstobethatdepictionofviolenceintheentertainmentmedialegitimizesaggressionandincreasesthetendencytoaggress(seealsoChapter17).TheU.S.surgeongeneralcametothisconclusion,andsodidsixprofessionalsocietiesofphysiciansandpsychologists.Despite the impressive scientificconsensus andthestrengthoftheevidenceonwhichitisbased,theentertainmentindustryandthenewsmediaremainlargelyskepticalaboutthesuggestionthatviolenceinthemediahasanyadversesocialeffects.Depictionsofevermoreingeniousformsofconflictandviolenceinthemediacontinueunabated.

catharsis Thequestionofwhetheraggressionhasacatharticeffecthasbeenexaminedbyagreatdealofresearch,andthegeneralanswerseemstobeinthenegative.However,amorenuancedviewsuggeststhataggressionagainstaperpetratorofsomeoffense(whetheraloneorwithothers)canbesatisfyingandmayreduce one’s tendency to aggress against that person, and in this limited senseaggressioniscathartic.Ontheotherhand,suchsatisfactionmayonoccasionalsoactasareinforcerandmayincreasethetendencytoemployaggressivemeansinthefuture.


norms In thesameway thatmodelingandmediadepictionsmay legitimizeaggression, other social norms and regulations may have the opposite effects,reducinganddelegitimizingconflictandaggression.Forinstance,genderdifferencesinphysicalaggressionhavebeenpartiallyexplainedintermsofsocialnorms,aswerecrossculturaldifferencesinthedisplayofaggressivebehaviors,inparticularthenotionthatindividualisticculturesaremoreaggressivethancollectivisticcultures(seealsoChapters11and15).

hormones Thehormonalbasisofaggressionhasbeentiedtotestosterone,andthetentativeconclusionseemstobethataconnectionexistsbetweenthemale hormone and assaultive behavior. Intriguingly, the connection seems tobe bidirectional—high degrees of testosterone appear to augment aggressivebehavior,andsituations thatelicitaggression in turn increase the leveloftestosterone.

evolution Theevolutionaryapproachtoaggressionhasledtoseveralintriguingrecentlinesofresearchandtheorizing(seealsoChapters15and18).Amongothers,ithasbeenappliedtothefindingthatbloodrelativeskilleachotherrarelyaswellastogenderdifferencesinaggressionandthefindingthatspousebatteringandabusearemorelikelytooccuramonglower(vs.higher)socioeconomicclasses(seealsoChapter11).

Inanimpressivelyaudaciousanalysis,Koestler(1972)evenarguedthatthehumanspeciessuffersfromaseriousevolutionaryflaw,inthatourbrainevolvedinawaythatischaracterizedbythepoorneuralintegrationbetweenthelower,emotional and thehigher, symbolic and rational areas.Koestler, reviewinganimpressiverangeofpsychological,neurological,anatomical,aswellashistoricalandsociologicalevidence,wentsofarastosuggestthatourspeciesisdoomedtoextinctionbyourownuncheckedaggressivetendencies,unlesswefirstfindawaytocorrecttheflawedstructuralpropertiesofourcentralnervoussystem.Koestlerwroteatatimewhenthenuclearannihilationofallhumanswasadistinctpossibility,andhistheoriesreceivedtheirfairshareofcriticism;however,the idea that the unparalleled human capacity for intraspecies violence mayreflectaseriousevolutionarilyflawremainsandintriguingpossibility(seealsoChapter15).

Self-regulation Theselfregulationperspectiveonaggressiondeparts fromthe notion that the impulse to aggression is automatic or innate. Instead, selfregulationmodelssuggestthatconflictandaggressionareamenableselfregulatoryefforts.However,thesuccessfulapplicationofselfregulatorycontrolagainstaggressionrequiresscarcepsychologicalresources.Theselfregulatoryframeworksuggests thatdepletingone’s resourceswouldnecessarily reduceone’sability tocontrolaggression.

Thechaptersinthisbookofferabroadrangeofnewinsightsontheseissuesandfocusonhowconflictandaggressioncanbemodified,forexample,byintraindividual(seeChapters6,8,and12)aswellasbyinterpersonal(seeChapter14)andsocialandculturalvariables(seeChapters10,17,and19).


meaSuring and operationalizing conflict and aggreSSion

Perhaps more than in other areas of social psychology, conflict and aggressionresearchershaveemployedaningeniousvarietyofmeasuresinanefforttorendertheiroperationaldefinitionsisomorphicwiththeconceptofintendingharm.Fromtheearliestresearchonaggression,clevermethodshaveaboundedthatattempttobridgethegapbetweenmeasuringaggressionononehandandbeingethicalontheother.Thisisatoughrequirementthatmakesaggressionmeasuresdelightfullycleveryetalwaysabitshortofthemark.Thus,inadditiontothewellknownmeasuresofpunchingBobodolls(Bandura,Ross,&Ross,1961)andpressingleverstoshockanotherindividual(Buss,1961;Milgram,1974),researchershaveplacedparticipantsintoasituationinwhichtheyareaskedtosoundpainfulorunpleasantblastsofnoise,todeliverhotsaucetoindividualswhoareonrecordasdislikinghotsauce(Lieberman,Solomon,Greenberg,&McGregor,1999),tochooseaweaponwithwhichtoshootanotherparticipant(Russell,Arms,Loof,&Dwyer,1996),todrawgraffitionclassicworksofart(Norlander&Gustafson,1997),oreventokillpillbugsinagrinder(Martens,Kosloff,Greenberg,Landau,&Schmader,2007).Ofcourse,therearealsoselfreportmeasuresofwhatparticipantswouldliketodotoanotherindividual(i.e.,aggressivetemptationsanddesires)thatlistanynumberofmeanactsfrominsulttosevereinjury(seeRitter&Eslea,2005,forareviewofthesemethods;seealsoChapter9).

Yetoneissuethatremainsaconcerninallareasthatexamineaggressionandconflict is the external validity of the measures and their relevance to understandingrealworldaggressionandconflict.Inmuchlaboratorywork,concernforethicaltreatmentofparticipantsoutweighsdesiresforexternallyvalidmeasures.Thus,aggressionismeasuredsymbolically,indirectly,andalmostalways,withtheimplicitorexplicitapprovaloftheexperimenters.Presentingparticipantswiththeopportunitytoshockanotherperson,todeliverloudnoiseblasts,ortoservemassquantitiesofhotsaucethatanotherindividualmustconsumeallhaveincommonanintenttoharmanother,butwithinthecontextofexperimentalpermissionandtothatextentthesemeasureslackakeycharacteristicofreallifeaggression:thatitissociallyundesirableandoftensanctioned.

To claim, therefore, that these studies necessarily predict aggression in therealworldassumesthattheimpactofexternalpermissionisnegligible.Butthisassumptionisquestionable.Itwouldbelikesayingtohighschoolstudentsastheyenterthebuilding,“Herearesomeguns;youmayusethemifyouwish.”Clearly,intherealworld,peopleareawarethatbeingaggressiveisundesirable,unwanted,and often unlawful. Experimental paradigms should attempt to capture andmanipulate“nonpermissible,inappropriate”aggressionsothatwecanaccumulateevidenceastowhetherpermissionmattersforthebothpatternsandmagnitudesofaggression.

Similarly,theuseofgamesinconflictresearchhashadalonghistoryofcontroversy,yetsuchsimulatedandcontrolledconflictsituationsareclearlyusefulinsomecontexts(seealsoChapter8).However,manyconflictsintherealworldarenotsostructuredwithclearrulesandoutcomesandarenotconductedundertheeyeof


experimenters who have created and supervise the rules. Neighbors argue overpropertyandfencesandarefreetouseavarietyoftacticsbutarealsomindfulthatthetacticstheychoosemightbeusedagainsttheminacourtoflaw.Thesetypesofunstructured,freewheeling,yetnonpermissibleformsofconflictarealsoimportanttostudy,andexperimentalsocialpsychologistsshouldstrivetocreateparadigmsthatcreatesuchanatmospherewithinacontrolledcontext(seealsoChapters3,4,and13).Thesecontextsarenoteasytocreate;otherwise,wewouldhaveseenthembynow.Butsocialpsychologistsareacleverbunch,andundoubtedlysomeonewilldevisesuchaparadigminthefuture.Wehopethefutureissoon.

overvieW of the volume

Section I: Basic Issues and Theories

Thebookisorganizedintofourparts.Thefirstpart,afterthisintroductorychapter,isdevotedtodiscussingsomeofthebasicissuesandrecenttheoriesthatinformcontemporaryresearchonconflictandaggression.

Chapter2,byMarioMikulincerandPhillipShaver,offersanovel,attachmenttheoretical perspective on interpersonal and intergroup conflict. In particular,they suggest that attachment theory can help us to understand how (1) peopleexperienceandcopewithinterpersonalconflicts,(2)maladaptiveformsofresolvingrelationshipconflictsarise,and(3)intergrouphostilityandaggressioncanbeunderstoodwithinanattachmenttheoreticalframework.Attachmenttheoryoffersimportantnewinsightstohelpexplainindividualdifferencesinadaptiveandmaladaptive forms of conflicts and conflict resolution in relationships. The chapteralsosuggeststhatattachmenttheorycanbeausefulframeworktounderstandaperson’sattitudesandbehaviortowardoutgroupsandtheirpropensityforintergroupconflict.

InChapter3,KiplingWilliamsandEricWesselmannoutlineacomprehensivetheoryofostracism—beingignoredandexcluded.Ostracismisapainfulyetcommonexperience,andhumansseemtobeequippedwithanevolvedmechanismfor detecting and responding to cues of exclusion. Such an ostracism detectionsystemcanbetriggeredbyeventhemostminimalcues,andresponsestoostracismserve to fortify theneedsatisfaction threatenedbyostracism.Thechapterreviewsresearchonreactionstoostracism,particularlyonwhenandwhyindividualschooseaggressive responses rather thanprosocialoptions,andsuggests thatanimportantfactorinostracizedindividuals’responsesisthelikelihoodofbeingreincludeddependingontheirbehavioralresponses.

InChapter4,DeborahRichardsonandGeorginaHammocklookatavarietyof“everyday”formsofconflictandaggressionthatareoftenignoredinaggressionresearch:passiveandpsychologicalaggressionthatisnotmotivatedbytheintentiontocauseharm(e.g.,inducingguilt),althoughtheeffectisoftentoharmthetarget.Whereasdirectorphysicalaggressionisrelativelyrare indaytodaylife,indirect or psychological aggression such as snide remarks or hostile attitudesareverycommon.Indirectaggression is likely toaffect individuals’ relationshipexperienceandsuccessaswellastheirsenseofself.RichardsonandHammock’s


researchprogrambringstotheforefrontformsofeverydayharmdoingandmovesthefocusofaggressionfromtheintentoftheaggressortotheeffectonthevictim.Suchavictimcentereddefinitionisconsistentwithasimpledefinitionofaggressionasanybehaviorthatcausesharm.

InChapter5,DanielAmesdiscussesanothercommonanduniversalaspectofsocialconflictandaggression:whatdeterminestheextenttowhichpeoplewillseektobeassertiveandpushhardfortheirinterests?Indailyinteractions,wemustfrequentlychoosebetweengiving inor assertingourwishesoverothers.Whenshouldwepush?Canwepushtoohard?Amesexplorespeoples’informaltheoriesofassertivenessandtheirexpectanciesforsuccess.Whataretheshorttermgainsbutlongtermlossesinbeingassertive?Thechapterarguesthatweallhaveageneralbeliefastohowassertiveweshouldbeandhowlikelyitwillleadtosuccess.Further,peoplewilladjusttheseexpectationsdependingontheotherindividualswithwhomaconflictarises.

Section II: Cognitive and Affective Influences

Thesecondpartofthebookdealswithcognitiveandaffectiveinfluencesontheway conflict and aggression occurs. In Chapter 6, Pontus Leander and TanyaChartrand explore the cognitive and motivational mechanisms involved whenanindividual’sowngoalsconflictwiththegoalsandpreferencesheldbyothers.Suchgoal conflicts oftenemerge andescalate automatically in social situations.Insomecircumstancespeoplewillautomaticallyaccommodatetothegoalsandpreferences of the people around them. However, more recent studies indicatethatthemereknowledgeaboutothers’goalsisoftensufficienttoelicitadversarialresponses, especially when the individual is nonconsciously pursuing goals thatareorientedtowardsocialdivergenceorcompetition(e.g.,achievement,autonomy,selfenhancement).Thus, interpersonalconflictsmayoftenunfoldautomatically,asindividualsarenotalwaysconsciousoftheoriginsoftheirinterpersonalconflictsorknowthatsuchconflictshaveevenoccurred.

Chapter7explorestheroleofperspectivetakingandempathyinconflictstrategies.AdamGalinsky,DebraGilin,andWilliamMadduxsuggestthatthecognitiveskillandabilitytobecomeawareofothers’thoughtsandtheaffectivecapacityforempathy—feelingwhattheothersarefeeling—playavery importantrole inhow individuals dealwith and resolve conflicts. Their experiments point to thebenefits in termsofpayoffsofperspective takingoverempathy.Theyalsofind,however, that in certain circumstances in which shared feelings are importantempathymightresultinbetteroutcomesandmorepositivesocialbenefits.

Chapter 8 looks at affective influences on conflict behaviors. Joseph ForgasandHuiBingTanarguethatmoodstateshaveastrongandreliableeffectontheway people perceive, interpret, and respond to conflict. They report numerousexperiments showing thatpositiveaffectproducesamoreconfident,optimistic,andassertive response toconflicts, ashappypeoplenegotiatemoreconfidently,make interpersonaldemandsmoreassertively,and interpret theirownandothers’socialbehaviorsmoreoptimistically.Otherstudiesfindthatnegativemoodscan alsoproducedistinct benefits in conflict situations,whenclose attention to


externalinformationisrequired.Thus,thoseinnegativemoodarebetteratdetectingdeception,arelesslikelytocommitjudgmentalerrors,havebettereyewitnessmemories,andproducemoreeffectivepersuasivemessages.

AngerregulationandnegotiationisthetopicofChapter9byThomasDensonandEmmaFabiansson.Theyexaminetheeffectivenessofdifferentemotionregulation strategies suchas reappraisal, rumination,anddistraction incontrollinganger during negotiation. Denson and Fabiansson present the results from twoexperimentsexploringwhat impactdifferentangerregulationstrategieshaveonbehaviorinnegotiations.Theirresultssuggestthattheapplicationofreappraisalinnegotiationsettingsisusefulinreducinganger,aggressivebehavior,andconflictcomparedwithruminationordistraction.Thus,traininginreappraisalskillsmaybeparticularlybeneficialforindividualswhowouldotherwiseuseotheremotionregulationstrategies.

InChapter10,ArieKruglanskiandEdwardOreheklookattheroleofthequestforpersonalsignificanceandidentityinextremeformsofaggressionsuchasterrorismandsuicidebombers.Whatisthepsychologicalexplanationforthemotivationtobecomeasuicidebomber?Theysuggestthataquestforpersonalsignificancemaybeanunderlyingfactor.Ironically,theactofcarryingoutasuicidalmissiononbehalfofone’sgrouporreligioncanelevateone’ssenseofimportanceandmeaning.Inotherwords,deathensuresasenseofimmortality.Inaseriesofingeniousexperiments,KruglanskiandOrehekprovideinitialsupportfortheirprovocativetheory.

Section III: Conflict and Aggression in Relationships

Thissectionofthebookturnstoresearchonconflictandaggressionthatoccurwithintheframeworkofestablishedpersonalrelationships.

InathoughtfulChapter11,ChrisEckhardtdiscussesthedamagingrolethatentrenched feminist ideology has played in the way intimate couple violence isdefined, understood, and dealt with within the U.S. social and judicial system.Eckhardtreviewstheknownriskfactorsthatinfluenceinterpartnerviolencesuchascognitiveprocessing,emotionregulation,andrelationaldynamicsthateffectivelydiscriminatebetweenabusiveandnonabusiveindividuals.Hearguesthat,despitestrongandconsistentempiricalfindingsthatcouldinformeffectiveetiologicandinterventionmodelsof interpartnerviolence, there remainsa strong,dominant,andideologicallybasedreactionaryfeministviewthatseesinterpartnerviolenceasprimarilycausedbymaledominanceandmalecenteredsocialnormsandhierarchies.Thereislittleconvincingevidencesupportingthisideologicalposition,yetinterpartnerviolencecontinuestobedefinedandtreated,atleastintheUnitedStates,byinterventionsandmethodsthatareinformedbyfeministideologyratherthantheobjectiveevidence.Thischapterbringsveryvaluableinsightstotheissueofhowsometimesbiasedandprejudgedideologicalpositionsmaythwartthemosteffectivetreatmentofviolence.

InChapter12,GrainneFitzsimonsandJoannaAndersonlookattheroleofincompatiblegoals in thegenerationandmanagementof conflictbetweencouples.Coupleshavetomanagecoordinationandconflictonadailybasis,yetmostresearch on couples’ conflict focuses on negotiations and trust games. In their


chapter,FitzsimonsandAndersonsummarize their innovativeprogramofworkexamininghowcouplesthatsharedifferentgoalsarealsomorelikelytoexperienceconflict. Unlike traditional work on couple conflict, Fitzsimons and Anderson’sproject examines similar versus dissimilar goal pursuits and argues that goalsunderliemuchofhowpartnersvieweachotherandunderstandeachotherandtheirmotivationstocooperatewitheachother.Theyfindthatdissimilarpersonalgoalscanleadtoincreasedratesoffightingandincreasednegativityinresponsetocommondisagreements.

InChapter13LisaZadroexaminesthepossiblepsychological,contextual,andemotionalfactorsthatmaymotivatetargetsofrelationalostracismtoenactpunitiveandvengefulbehaviors.Factorsthatpotentiallymoderatetheconsequencesofexclusionarediscussedintermsofwhethertheyameliorateorexacerbateaggressive reactions. The chapter also introduces new experimental research using anovelostracismparadigm,O-Cam,asimulatedWebconferencethatspecificallyinvestigatestheformsofvengeancethattargetsofostracismarewillingtoimposeonsources.

Chapter14dealswiththepotentialdangersofunilateralforgivenessinresolvingconflicts in relationships.LauraLuchiesandEliFinkel lookatquestionsofforgivenessinconflictmanagementandsuggestthatunilateralforgiveness,whenithelpsvictimspreserveavaluablerelationship,isbeneficial,butwhenitpreservesarelationshipthatisunlikelytobevaluableitleadstonegativeoutcomes.Giventhatvictimsandperpetrators share jointcontrolovervictims’postconflictoutcomes,thedatasuggestthatconflictresolutionstrategiespromotingvictims’forgivenessshouldalsoheightenvictims’sensitivitytowhetherforgivenessisoffuturebenefittothem.Further,forgivenessshouldbesupplementedwithstrategiesdesignedtopromoteperpetrators’amendmaking.

Section IV: Social, Cultural, and Evolutionary Factors in Social Conflict and Aggression

Thefinalandfourthpartofthebookdiscussessomeofthelargerevolutionary,cultural,andsocialinfluencesthatinfluencethewaysocialconflictandaggressionoccurs.

InChapter15,MarkVanVugtoutlinesanevolutionary“malewarriorhypothesis” toexplainthemanyintriguingformsofevidenceforhumantribalism:thetendencytocategorizeindividualsonthebasisoftheirgroupmembershipandtotreat ingroup members benevolently and outgroup members malevolently. Hearguesthatthistribalinclinationisanevolvedresponsetothethreatofintergroupaggressionandviolencethatwasendemicinancestralhumanenvironments(andisstillcommontoday).VanVugtsuggeststhatintergroupconflicthasprofoundlyaffectedthepsychologyofmeninparticular—themalewarriorhypothesis—anddiscussestheimplicationsofthishypothesisformanagingintergrouprelationsinoursociety.

InChapter16CraigAndersonandMattDeLisipresentresearchandtheorythatspeculatesabouttheroleofenvironmentalvariablesassociatedwithglobalwarming on aggression. If experts are correct in their predictions of global


warming(andtherearemanyunansweredquestionsaboutthisissue),AndersonandDeLisicontendthataggressionwillincreasefortworeasons:(1)increasedtemperaturehasadirectimpactonincreasedaggression;and(2)increasedtemperaturehasanindirectimpactonsocietalfactorsthatarerelatedtoincreasedaggression, like displacement, poverty, and physically uncomfortable livingconditions.TheyrelyonAnderson’sGeneralAggressionModeltoderivetheseintriguingpredictions.

In Chapter 17, Ed Donnerstein reviews the literature on various forms ofmediaviolence(film,TV,games)aswellasviolenceontheInternet.Asnearlyallaggressivemoviesandgamescanbereadilyaccessedonline,exposuretoviolenceisbecomingmoreaccessiblethanever,includingtominors.Further,entirelynewandrealisticformsofaggressionareavailableonYouTubeandotherInternetsites,withtheattendantimplicitsuggestionthatthereexistsasocialconsensusabouttheappropriatenessandfrequencyofviolentacts.Itisawholenewworldoutthere,andmuchofitisviolent.Whateffectsshouldweexpecttosee?DonnersteinsuggeststhatInternetviolencehasseriousimplicationsforthewayhumanbeingswillcometoconceiveanddefineacceptableandunacceptableformsofaggression.

Chapter 18 by Robert Kurzban and John Christner applies an evolutionaryapproachtoanalyzingwhatrolesupernaturalbeliefsplayingeneratingandmaintaining intergroupconflict.Theyproposethat sharedsupernaturalbeliefs serveanadaptivepurpose,inthattheysignaltobothingroupandoutgroupmembersalike thatan individualcannoteasilychangegroups.Thus, supernaturalbeliefsfunction as commitmentdevices in the sameway thatbodilymarks, scars, andtattoosworkaspermanentsignalsofgroupidentification,precludinggroupswitching. Shared supernatural beliefs are thus “mental markers,” and the surprisingprevalenceofotherwiseclearlyirrationalsupernaturalbeliefsmaybeunderstoodinthoseterms.

In the final chapter, Chapter 19,Rowell Huesmann,Eric Dubow, and PaulBoxer suggest an intriguing and complementary view: that adherence to someforms of supernatural beliefs, especially traditional religious beliefs, may act tolimitandchannelsocialconflictandaggression.Inparticular,regularexposuretoreligiousactivitiesinchildhoodhasameliorativeeffectsonantisocialandaggressivebehavior.Itcouldbethatregularchurchattendanceisamarkerofgoodparenting,thatreligiousorganizationsprovidesocialsupportwhenproblemsoccur,orthatreligiousexposurehelpsbuildstrongselfregulatinginternalstandards.A40yearprospectivelongitudinalstudyfindsthatparentalreligiositymayactasalongtermprotectivefactoragainstadultaggression.Remarkably,highreligiosityseemstoexacerbatethetendenciesoflowaggressiveyouthtogrowuptobelowaggressive adults but also exacerbates the tendency of highaggressive youth togrowuptobemoreaggressive.Theseresultsarediscussedintermsofthepotentialsocialandpsychologicalprocessesthatcouldexplaintheeffects.

concluSionSUnderstandingthenatureandcausesofsocialconflictandaggressionisoneofthecorequestionsforpsychology.Asthisintroductoryreviewshows,despiteliterally


hundredsofyearsofphilosophicalandempiricalinterestinthistopic,acompleteunderstandingofthenature,characteristics,andconsequencesofhumanconflictandviolence remainas elusive as ever.Theories range frompessimisticpredictionsthatseeHomo sapiensasafundamentallyflawedandviolentevolutionaryfreakdoomedtoextinction(Koestler,1972)tooptimisticviewsthatseeconflictandaggressionasnecessaryandadaptiveresponsesystemsthatcanbeeffectivelymanagedusingsocialandculturalengineering(seealsoChapters15and19).Thechapterspresentedhererepresentsomeofthebestcontemporaryworkonsocialconflictandaggressionbysocialpsychologists.Wehavelearnedagreatdealaboutthecognitive,affective,andmotivationalmechanismsthatinfluencethegeneration,experience,andmanagementofsocialconflict.Thechaptersincludedhere,intheirvariousways,allconfirmthatthestudyofsocialconflictandaggressionisathrivingandproductivefieldtoday.Wehopethatreaderswillfindthisbookaninformativeandinterestingoverviewofthecurrentstatusofthisfascinatingareaofinquiry.

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Milgram,S.(1974).Obedience to authority: An experimental view.London:Tavistock.Norlander,T.,&Gustafson,R.(1997).Effectsofalcoholonpicturedrawingduringtheveri

ficationphaseofthecreativeprocess.Creativity Research Journal, 10,355–362.Pinker,S.(1994).The language instinct. NewYork:Harper.Ritter,D.,&Eslea,M.(2005).Hotsauce,toyguns,andgraffiti:Acriticalaccountofcurrent

laboratoryaggressionparadigms.Aggressive Behavior, 31,407–419.Russell,G.W.,Arms,R.L.,Loof,S.D.,&Dwyer,R.S.(1996).Men’saggressiontoward

womeninabungledprocedureparadigm. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 11, 729–738.

19

2AnAttachmentPerspectiveon

InterpersonalandIntergroupConflictMARIOMIKULINCER

Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya

PHILLIPR.SHAVERUniversity of California, Davis

I nrecentyears,attachmenttheory(Bowlby,1973,1980,1982,1988),whichwas originally formulated to describe and explain infant–parent emotionalbonding,hasbeenappliedfirsttothestudyofadolescentandadultromantic

relationships and then to the study of group dynamics and intergroup relationships.Inthepresentchapterweexpandthetheoryasitappliestoadultsbydiscussingattachmentrelatedprocessesinvolvedin(1)thewayspeoplethink,experience,and cope with interpersonal conflicts; (2) maladaptive forms of conflict resolution within romantic and marital relationships; and (3) intergroup hostility andaggression.Wewillbeginbypresentinganoverviewofattachmenttheoryandourtheoreticalmodeloftheactivationandpsychodynamicsoftheadultattachmentbehavioralsystem(Mikulincer&Shaver,2007a),alongwithanoverviewofsomeoftheintrapsychicandinterpersonalmanifestationsofthesensesofattachmentsecurityandinsecurity(attachmentanxietyandavoidance).Wewillthenfocusonattachmenttheory’scharacterizationofindividualdifferencesinadaptiveandmaladaptiveformsofexperiencinginterpersonalconflictsandcopingwiththem.Next,wewill reviewfindingsconcerningthewaysattachment securityandthemajorformsofinsecurityaffectvariousformsofconflictresolutionincloserelationships.Finally,wewillreviewrecentfindingsconcerningwaysthesensesofattachmentsecurity and insecurity (anxiety and avoidance) shape a person’s attitudes andbehaviortowardoutgroupsandreduceorintensifyintergroupconflict.

mario mikulincer and phillip r. Shaver20

overvieW of adult attachment theoryAccordingtoBowlby(1982),humanbeingsarebornwithaninnatepsychobiologicalsystem(theattachment behavioral system)thatmotivatesthemtoseekproximitytosupportiveothers(attachment figures)intimesofneed.Thissystem,whichemerged over the course of evolution, accomplishes basic regulatory functions(protectionfromthreatsandalleviationofdistress)andincreasesthelikelihoodofsurvivalofhumaninfants,whoarebornwithimmaturecapacitiesforlocomotion,feeding,anddefense.Althoughtheattachmentsystemismostcriticalduringtheearlyyearsoflife,Bowlby(1988)assumedthatitisactiveovertheentirelifespanandismanifestedinthoughtsandbehaviorsrelatedtosupportseeking.

Bowlby(1973)alsodescribedimportantindividualdifferencesinthefunctioningoftheattachmentsystem.Interactionswithattachmentfigureswhoareavailableintimesofneed,aresensitivetoone’sattachmentneeds,andareresponsivetoone’sbidsforproximityfacilitatetheoptimalfunctioningofthesystem.AccordingtoBowlby (1988), thesekindsofpositive interactionspromote the formation ofa senseof attachment security—a sense that theworld is safe, that attachmentfiguresarehelpfulwhencalledupon,andthatitispossibletoexploretheenvironmentcuriouslyandengageeffectivelyandenjoyablywithotherpeople.Moreover,positiveexpectationsaboutothers’availabilityandpositiveviewsoftheselfascompetentandvalued(whichBowlbycalledinternal working models)areformed,andaffectregulationstrategiesareorganizedaroundthesepositivebeliefs.However,whenattachmentfiguresarenotreliablyavailableandsupportive,asenseofsecurity is not attained, negative internal working models are formed (e.g., worriesaboutothers’intentionsanddoubtsaboutselfworth),andstrategiesofaffectregulationotherthanappropriateproximityseeking(secondary attachment strategies,conceptualizedintermsoftwodimensions, avoidance and anxiety)areadopted.

Instudiesofadolescentsandadults,testsofthesetheoreticalideashavegenerallyfocusedonaperson’sattachment orientation—thesystematicpatternofrelationalexpectations,emotions,andbehaviorthatresultsfromaparticularhistoryofattachmentexperiences(Fraley&Shaver,2000;Shaver&Mikulincer,2002).Initially,researchwasbasedonAinsworth,Blehar,Waters,andWall’s(1978)typologyofattachmentpatternsininfancy—secure,anxious,andavoidant—andHazanandShaver’s(1987)conceptualizationofparalleladultstylesinromanticrelationships.However,subsequentstudies(e.g.,Brennan,Clark,&Shaver,1998;Fraley& Waller, 1998) revealed that attachment orientations are best conceptualizedasregions ina twodimensionalspace.Thefirstdimension,attachmentanxiety,reflectsthedegreetowhichapersonworriesthatrelationshippartnerswillnotbeavailable in timesofneedandisafraidofbeingrejectedorabandoned.Thesecond dimension, attachmentrelated avoidance, reflects the extent to which apersondistrustsrelationshippartners’goodwillandstrivestomaintainbehavioralindependence and emotional distance from partners. People who score low onbothdimensionsaresaidtobesecure,ortohaveasecureattachmentstyle.Thetwodimensions canbemeasuredwithreliableandvalidselfreportscalesandareassociatedintheoreticallypredictablewayswithvariousaspectsofpersonaladjustmentandrelationshipquality(seeMikulincer&Shaver,2007a,forareview).

an attachment perSpective on interperSonal and intergroup conflict 21

Attachment orientations are initially formed in interactions with primarycaregivers during early childhood, as a large body of research has shown(Cassidy & Shaver, 2008), but Bowlby (1988) claimed that memorable interactions with others throughout life can alter a person’s working models andcanmovethepersonfromoneregionofthetwodimensionalspacetoanother.Moreover,althoughaperson’sattachmentorientation isoftenconceptualizedasasingleglobalorientationtowardcloserelationships,itisactuallyrootedinacomplexnetworkofcognitiveandaffectiveprocessesandmentalrepresentations,whichincludesmanyepisodic,contextrelated,andrelationshipspecificaswellasgeneralattachmentrepresentations(Mikulincer&Shaver,2003).Infact,manystudies indicate thataperson’sattachmentorientationcanchangedepending on context and recent experiences (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b).Thismakes itpossible to study theeffectsofexperimentallyprimed securityandinsecurity.

a model of attachment-SyStem functioning in adulthood

Insummarizingthehundredsofempiricalstudiesofadultattachmentprocesses,we(Mikulincer&Shaver,2003,2007a)createdaflowchartmodeloftheactivation and dynamics of the attachment system. The model includes three majorcomponents:(1)monitoringandappraisingthreateningevents;(2)monitoringandappraisingtheavailabilityofexternalorinternalizedattachmentfigures;and(3)monitoringandappraisingtheviabilityofseekingproximitytoan“attachmentfigure”asameansofcopingwithattachmentinsecurityanddistress.Italsoincludesexcitatory and inhibitory pathways that result from recurrent use of secondaryattachment strategies, and these feedback pathways affect the monitoring ofthreateningeventsandattachmentfigures’availability.

MikulincerandShaver(2007a)assumedthatthemonitoringofunfoldingeventsresultsinactivationoftheattachmentsystemwhenapotentialoractualthreatissensed(unconsciously)orperceived(consciously).Thatis,duringencounterswithphysicalorpsychologicalthreats—eitherintheenvironmentorintheflowofinternalfreeassociations—theattachmentsystemisactivated,andtheprimaryattachmentstrategyis set inmotion.Thisstrategyleadsadultstoturnto internalizedrepresentationsofattachmentfiguresortoactualsupportiveothersandtomaintainsymbolicoractualproximitytothesefigures.Recentstudieshaveshownthatthoughtsrelatedtoproximityseekingaswellasmentalrepresentationsofinternalizedattachmentfigurestendtobeactivatedeveninminimallythreateningsituations (Mikulincer,Birnbaum,Woddis,&Nachmias,2000;Mikulincer,Gillath,&Shaver,2002).However,althoughageanddevelopmentresultinanincreasedabilitytogaincomfortfromsymbolicrepresentationsofattachmentfigures,nooneofanyageiscompletelyfreeofrelianceonothers(Bowlby,1982,1988).

Activationoftheattachmentsystemforcesadecisionabouttheavailabilityofattachmentfigures(thesecondmoduleofourmodel).Anaffirmativeanswertotheimplicitorexplicitquestion“Isanattachmentfigureavailableandlikely


toberesponsivetomyneeds?”heightensthesenseofattachmentsecurityandfacilitatestheuseofconstructiveemotionregulationstrategies.Thesestrategiesareaimedatalleviatingdistress,maintainingsupportiveintimaterelationships,andbolsteringaperson’ssenseof loveworthinessandselfefficacy.Moreover,theysustainwhatShaverandMikulincer(2002),followingFredrickson(2001),calla“broadenandbuild”cycleofattachmentsecurity,whichexpandsaperson’sresourcesformaintainingcopingflexibilityandemotionalstabilityintimesofstress,broadenstheperson’sperspectivesandcapacities,andfacilitatestheincorporationofmental representationsof securityenhancingattachmentfigures into the self. This broadenandbuild process allows relatively secureindividualstomaintainanauthenticsenseofpersonalefficacy,resilience,andoptimism even when social support is temporarily unavailable (Mikulincer &Shaver,2007a).

Perceived unavailability of an attachment figure results in attachment insecurity,whichcompounds thedistress arousedby the appraisal of a situationasthreatening.Thisstateofinsecurityforcesadecisionabouttheviabilityoffurther(moreactive)proximityseekingasaprotectivestrategy(thethirdmoduleofthemodel).Theappraisalofproximityasfeasibleoressential—becauseofattachmenthistory,temperamentalfactors,orcontextualcues—resultsinenergetic,insistentattemptstoattainproximity,support,andlove.Theseattemptsarecalledhyper-activating strategies(Cassidy&Kobak,1988)becausetheyinvolveupregulationoftheattachmentsystem,includingconstantvigilanceandintenseconcernuntilanattachmentfigureisperceivedtobeavailableandsupportive.Hyperactivatingstrategies include attempts to elicit a partner’s involvement, care, and supportthrough clinging and controlling responses (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002), overdependenceonrelationshippartnersasasourceofprotection(Shaver&Hazan,1993),andperceptionofoneselfasrelativelyhelplesswithrespecttoemotionregulation(Mikulincer&Shaver,2003).Hyperactivatingstrategiesarecharacteristicofpeoplewhoscorerelativelyhighontheattachmentanxietydimension(Mikulincer&Shaver,2007a).

Theappraisalofproximityseekingasnonviablecanresultininhibitionofthequestforsupportandactiveattemptstohandledistressalone(whichBowlby,1988,labeledcompulsive self-reliance).Thesesecondarystrategiesofaffectregulationarecalledavoidant deactivating strategies(Cassidy&Kobak,1988),becausetheirprimary goal is to keep the attachment system deactivated to avoid frustrationand further distress caused by attachmentfigure unavailability. This goal leadstothedenialofattachmentneeds;avoidanceofcloseness, intimacy,anddependence inclose relationships;maximizationofcognitive, emotional, andphysicaldistancefromothers;andstrivings forautonomyand independence.Withpracticeandexperience,thesedeactivatingstrategiesoftenbroadentoincludeliteralandsymbolicdistancingofoneselffromdistresswhetheritisdirectlyattachmentrelated.Deactivatingstrategiesarecharacteristicofpeoplescoringrelativelyhighonavoidantattachment(Mikulincer&Shaver,2007a).

In short, each attachment strategy has a major regulatory goal (insisting onproximitytoanattachmentfigureoronselfreliance),whichgoesalongwithparticular cognitive and affective processes that facilitate goal attainment. These


strategiesaffecttheformationandmaintenanceofcloserelationshipsaswellastheexperience,regulation,andexpressionofnegativeemotions,suchasanxiety,anger,orsadness(Mikulincer&Shaver,2007a).Moreover,thestrategiesaffectthewaysapersonexperiencesandhandlesconflictualsituationswithotherindividuals(includingaromanticpartnerorspouse)orgroups.Thisisthemainfocusofthefollowingsectionsofthischapter.

attachment orientationS and interperSonal conflictS

Whenanalyzingthepossiblelinksbetweenthefunctioningoftheattachmentsystemandthewaysapersonexperiencesandregulatesconflictswithotherpeople,itisimportanttorememberthattheattachmentsystemwas“designed,”duringevolution,asaninterpersonalregulatorydevice.AccordingtoBowlby(1982),perceivedthreatsanddangersmakesalientthegoalofgainingproximitytoandsupportfromanattachmentfigure,andthisencouragespeopletolearn,organize,andimplementbehavioralplansaimedatattainingsafetyandsecurity.Importantly,Bowlbyalsoassumedthattheattachmentsystemoperatesina“goalcorrected”manner.Thatis,apersonevaluatestheprogressheorsheismakingtowardachievingsupportandcomfort fromapartnerandcorrects intendedactions ifnecessary toattainthesegoals.Therefore,effectivefunctioningoftheattachmentsystemincludestheuseofpartnertailoredproximityseekingstrategiesthattakeintoaccountapartner’sneedsandpreferences(creatingwhatBowlby,1973,calleda“goalcorrectedpartnership”).Thisfacilitatessatisfying,harmoniousinteractionsthatmightotherwisedevolveintointrusive,coercive,orconflictualexchangesrootedincoordination failuresandmismatchedneedsandgoals.Moreover, smooth functioningoftheattachmentsystemhelpspeoplerapidlyandeffectivelyrestorerelationshipharmonywhenevertheyandtheirpartnerhaveincompatibleneedsandgoalsthatcanresultinpainfulinterpersonalconflicts.

AccordingtoMikulincerandShaver(2007a),competentmanagementofinterpersonal conflicts is originally learned during interactions between infants andtheirprimarycaregivers,mainlywheninfantssearchforacaregiver’sprotectionor support. During such episodes, children must not only express their needsforproximityandsupporttogainasenseofsecuritybutalsomustlearntomanage occasional goal conflictsbetween themand their caregivers, because thesemay interferewithcontinuedsupport.Althoughthefoundationof thisability isassumedtobeaninnateaspectoftheattachmentsystem(giventhegoalcorrectednatureofthesystem’soperation),interactionswithsensitiveandresponsivecaregiverswhocanflexiblyadapt theirgoalsandresponsestochildren’sattempts todealwithgoalconflictsallowchildrentolearneffectiveconflictmanagementskillsandpracticeandrefinethem.Incontrast,interactionswitharejectingfigurewhorigidlymaintainshisorherowngoalsregardlessofchildren’sattempts to tailortheirbids forproximity to thisfigure’spreferences cast apalloverearly effortstoregulateinterpersonalconflicts.Unresponsiveattachmentfiguresforceachildtoacquirealternativeconflictmanagementskillsthatmayseemadaptiveintheir


originalcontext(e.g.,inhibitingexpressionofone’sneedswhenaparentrespondsbadlytoneedexpression)butcancausetroublelateron,whenapersonencountersnewrelationshippartnerswithdifferentsalientneedsandpreferences.

MikulincerandShaver(2007a)hypothesizedthatrelativelysecureadolescentsand adults are likely to emphasize the challenging rather than the threateningaspectsofinterpersonalconflictsandbelievetheycandealeffectivelywiththem.Thesepositivebeliefsaboutconflictandconflictmanagementarerootedinsecureindividuals’viewsofothersas“wellintentionedandkindhearted”(Hazan&Shaver,1987,pp.518–519)andtheirviewsthattheyarecapableofhandlinglife’sproblems(e.g.,Mikulincer&Florian,1998).Moreover,theirconstructiveapproachtoemotionregulation(Shaver&Mikulincer,2007)mayhelpthemcommunicateopenlybutnotthreateninglyduringconflict,negotiatewithothersinacollaborativemanner,andapplyeffectiveconflictresolution strategies, suchascompromisingandintegratingtheirownandtheirpartner’sneedsandbehaviors.Insodoing,secureindividualsarelikelytomovetheirrelationshipsbackfrominevitableconflictstostatesofharmony.

Insecurepeoplearelikelytoappraiseinterpersonalconflictsinmorethreateningtermsandapplylesseffectiveconflictresolutionstrategies.Foranxiouspeople,conflictsthreatentheirwishtogainapproval,support,andsecurity;theyarousefearofrejectionandtriggerhyperactivatingaffectregulationstrategies.Thepeopleare likely toappraiseconflict incatastrophic terms,display intensenegativeemotions,ruminateobsessively,andhencefailtoattendtoandunderstandwhattheirrelationshippartneristryingtotelltothem.Thisegocentric,fearfulstanceislikelytointerferewithcalm,opencommunication,negotiation,andtheuseofcompromisingandintegratingstrategiesthatdependonkeepingapartner’sneedsandperspectiveinmind.Anxiousindividualsarelikelyeithertotrytodominatetheinteraction(inanefforttogettheirownneedsmet)oraccedesubmissivelytoapartner’sdemandstoavoidrejection.

Avoidantindividualsarelikelytoviewconflictsasaversiveprimarilybecauseconflictsinterferewithautonomyandcallforexpressionsofloveandcareorneedandvulnerability.Avoidantpeoplearelikelytodownplaythesignificanceofconflictwhileminimizing the importanceof theirpartner’scomplaints, todistancethemselvescognitivelyoremotionallyfromtheconflict,ortotrytoavoidinteracting with their partner. When circumstances do not allow escape from conflict,avoidantindividualsare likelytoattempttodominatetheirpartner,inlinewiththeirneedforcontrol,negativemodelsofothers,andconfidenceintheirownviews.Thisdefensivestanceislikelytointerferewithnegotiationandcompromise.

The hypothesized links between attachment orientations and responses tointerpersonalconflicthavebeenexaminedinseveralcorrelationalstudies.Inthesestudies, participants completed selfreport scales measuring attachment orientations as well as scales assessing subjective appraisals of conflicts (e.g., Pistole &Arricale, 2003), conflictmanagement skills (e.g., TaubmanBenAri, Findler,& Mikulincer, 2002), the use of constructive conflictmanagement tactics (e.g.,Carnelley, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994), or the use of aggression and conflictescalationtactics(e.g.,Creasey&HessonMcInnis,2001).OtherstudieshaveusedRahim’sOrganizationConflictInventory(ROCI;Rahim,1983)toassessreliance


onintegrating,compromising,dominating,obliging,andavoidingstrategiesduringinterpersonalconflicts(e.g.,Corcoran&Mallinckrodt,2000;Levy&Davis,1988).

These studies indicate that people who score relatively high on attachmentanxietyoravoidanceappraiseconflictsinmorethreateningtermsandbelievetheyarelesscapableofdealingwithconflicts.Moreover,theyreporthavingrelativelypoorconflictmanagementskills(e.g.,understandingtheirpartner’sperspective),beingunlikelytorelyoncompromisingandintegrativestrategies,andbeingrelatively likely toescalateconflicts (usingcoercionoroutrightfighting)or to leavea conflictunresolved.Researchalso indicates thatattachment anxiety isassociatedwithconcernsaboutclosenessduringconflicts(Pistole&Arricale,2003)andstrongconflictrelateddistress (e.g.,Creasey&HessonMcInnis,2001). Inaddition,anxiouslyattachedindividualsreacttotheprimingofrejectionconcernswithlessflexibilityinconflictmanagementstrategies(BeinsteinMiller,1996),suggesting that their fearofrejection,whenheightenedexperimentally, interfereswithconstructiveapproachestoconflictresolution.

There are also many studies documenting the links between selfreports ofattachment insecurities and conflictmanagement problems within dating andmarital relationships (e.g., Feeney, 1994; Heene, Buysse, & Van Oost, 2005;Roberts&Noller, 1998). Specifically, attachment insecurities havebeen associatedwithreportsoflessexpressionofaffectionandempathyduringconflicts,lessfrequent relianceoncompromising strategies,more frequentuseof coerciveorwithdrawalstrategies,morefrequentengagement inverbalandphysicalaggression,andhigher levelsofpostconflictdistress.At thecouple level,SenchakandLeonard(1992)foundthatcouplesinwhichoneorbothpartnerswereinsecurelyattachedreportedmorewithdrawalandaggressionduringconflictsthancouplesinwhichbothpartnersweresecure.

Thereisalsoevidencethatinsecurepeople’sconflictmanagementdifficultiesareevident toobserversofcouplemembers’behaviorduring laboratorydiscussionsofunresolvedconflicts.Forexample,KobakandHazan(1991)usedaQsortmeasureofmaritalattachmentandfoundthathusbandsandwiveswhowerelesssecureintheirmarriageweremorelikelytodisplayfacialexpressionsofrejectionwhilediscussingadisagreement.Inaddition, insecurehusbandswereless likelytoprovidesupportduringthediscussion.Similarly,Simpson,Rholes,andPhillips(1996),Feeney(1998),andCampbell,Simpson,Boldry,andKashy(2005)foundthatselfreportsofattachmentinsecuritieswereassociatedwithexpressionsofdistressduringaconflictdiscussionwithadatingpartner.Feeneyalsofoundthatselfreportsofattachmentinsecuritieswereassociatedwithfewerdisplaysofwarmthandaffectionduringconflictdiscussions.

RelyingontheAdultAttachmentInterview(AAI;George,Kaplan,&Main,1985)toassessadultattachmentorientations,severalstudieshaveprovidedevidence for the expectedassociation between insecurities anddestructivebehaviorsduringconflictswitharomanticpartner(e.g.,Babcock,Jacobson,Gottman,&Yerington,2000;Creasey&Ladd,2005;Crowelletal.,2002).Specifically,individualscategorizedasinsecurebasedontheAAIhavebeencodedasdisplayinglesspositiveaffectthantheirsecurecounterpartsduringconflictdiscussionsandmorefrequentexpressionsofcontempt,withdrawal,andstonewalling.


There is also evidence linking selfreports of attachment insecurities withheightenedphysiologicalreactivitytorelationshipconflicts.Powers,Pietromonaco,Gunlicks,andSayer(2006)askedcouplestospend15minutesdiscussinganunresolvedconflict.Salivarycortisol levels (anindexofphysiologicalreactivity)wereassessedbefore,during,andafterthediscussion.Resultsindicatedthatattachmentinsecuritieswereassociatedwithgreaterphysiologicalreactivitytothediscussionandthatgendermoderatedtheeffectsofthespecifickindofattachmentinsecurity(anxietyoravoidance).Whereasavoidantbutnotanxiouswomenshowedheightenedcortisolreactivity,anxiousbutnotavoidantmenevincedthiskindofresponseinreactiontothediscussion.AccordingtoPowersetal.,thesegenderdifferencescanbeexplainedintermsofgenderrelatednormsconcerningconflicts.Previousstudieshaveindicatedthatwhereaswomenareexpectedtotakeanactive,leadingroleduringconflicts(e.g.,toarticulaterelationshipconcerns)menareassignedalessactiverole(e.g.,Christensen&Heavey,1990).Asaresult,thediscussionmaybeparticularly stressful for avoidantwomen,whoprefer todistance themselvesfromrelationshipproblems,andforanxiousmen,whotendtoexpressdistressandtakeacontrollingpositioninthediscussion.

Studieshavealsofoundthatselfreportsofattachmentanxietyareassociatedwithintensificationofthenegativeconsequencesofconflictdiscussions.Forexample,Simpsonetal.(1996)foundthatanxiouslyattachedpeoplereportedastrongerdeclinethansecurepeopleinloveandcommitmentafterdiscussingamajorrelationshipproblemwithadatingpartner.GalloandSmith(2001)alsofoundthatanxiouswives,comparedwithsecurewives,reactedtoadiscussionaboutarelationshipdisagreementwithmorenegativeappraisalsoftheirhusbands.InCampbelletal.’s(2005)diarystudyofdailyconflictsbetweendatingpartners,moreanxiousparticipantsreportedmoreconflictualinteractionsacross14consecutivedaysandreactedtodaysofintenseconflictwithasharperdeclineinrelationshipsatisfactionandamorepessimisticviewoftherelationship’sfuture.

Insecurepeople’sdeficienciesinhandlinginterpersonalconflictsarealsoevidentinstudiesassessingattachmentrelatedvariationsindomesticviolence.Thiskindofviolenceoftenresultsfromrepeatedfailurestosolveinterpersonalconflictsandtopreventconflictescalation—deficienciesweexpect tobeassociatedwithattachmentinsecurity.However,despitebothanxiousandavoidantpeople’sproblems in handling interpersonal conflicts, studies have revealed that attachmentanxietyismorestronglyassociatedwithdomesticviolencethanisavoidantattachment (e.g., Dutton, Saunders, Starzomski, & Bartholomew, 1994; Henderson,Bartholomew,Trinke,&Kwong,2005).Forexample,Duttonet al. studied160courtmandated men convicted of wife assault and found that selfreports ofattachmentanxietywereassociatedwithmorefrequentandsevereactsofcoercionandpartnerabuseduringcoupleconflicts.Secureattachmentwasnegativelyassociatedwithmostfeaturesofdomesticviolenceeveninthisselfselected,courtmandatedpopulation.

Thelinkbetweenattachmentanxietyanddomesticviolenceisevidentintwootherkindsofstudies.First,studiescomparingattachmentorientationsofviolentandnonviolentsampleshavefoundthatpartnerswhoengageindomesticviolencearemoreanxiouslyattached,onaverage,thanpartnerswhodonotresorttoviolence


(e.g.,Bookwala&Zdaniuk,1998).Second,studiesinunrestrictedsamplesofadolescentsandyoungadultshaveconsistentlyfoundthatyoungmenandwomenwhoscorehigheronattachmentanxietyarelikelytoreportmoreengagementincoupleviolence(e.g.,Roberts&Noller,1998).Importantly,theseassociationscannotbeexplainedbyotherrelationshiporpersonalityvariablesandseemtobemediatedbyrelianceonineffectiveconflictmanagementstrategies.

With regard to avoidant attachment, some researchers have suggested thatavoidantindividualswithdrawfromconflictratherthanbecomesoemotionalthattheyattackarelationshippartner(e.g.,Mikulincer&Shaver,2007a).BartholomewandAllison(2006)found,however,thatavoidantpeoplesometimesbecameviolentwheninvolvedinanescalatingseriesofconflicts,especiallywithananxiouslyattached partner who demanded involvement. Similarly, HoltzworthMunroe,Stuart,andHutchinson(1997)foundthatavoidancewasassociatedwithwifebattering,andRankin,Saunders,andWilliams (2000) foundthat itwasassociatedwithmorefrequentandsevereactsofdomesticviolenceonthepartofasampleofAfricanAmericanmenarrestedforpartnerabuse.Inaddition,Collins,Cooper,Albino,andAllard(2002)reportedthatavoidancemeasuredduringadolescencepredictedrelationshipviolence6yearslater.

attachment orientationS and intergroup conflict

Thelinkbetweenattachmentinsecuritiesanddestructiveresponsestoconflictisalsoevidentinthefieldofintergrouprelations.Inthiscontext,tensions,frictions,andconflictsbetweengroupsareaconstantandpervasivesourceof intergrouphostility,whichisdirectlymanifestedinoutgroupderogation(i.e.,thetendencytoperceivemembersofotherculturalorethnicgroupsinlessfavorabletermsthanmembersofone’sowngroup;seeBrewer&Brown,1998,forareview),prejudice,anddiscriminationagainstoutgroupmembers.Whenintergrouprelationsbecometenseandconflictive,thesehostilitiescanresult inviolence,rape,andkillingofoutgroup members—even genocide (Staub & BarTal, 2003). Although severaleconomicandpoliticalfactorsareinvolvedintheescalationofintergroupviolence(e.g., economic instability, totalitarian regimes), theways individuals experienceandhandleintergrouptensionsandconflictscanexplainindividualdifferencesinintergrouphostilityandaggression.Withthisinmind,we(Mikulincer&Shaver,2001)hypothesizedthatattachmentinsecurities,whicharecharacterizedbyconflictmanagementdeficiencies,wouldbeassociatedwithdestructiveresponsestointergroup conflict and thereby with more hostility and aggression toward outgroupmembers.

Socialidentitytheory(Tajfel&Turner,1986)assumesthatoutgroupderogationservesaselfprotectivefunction:maintenanceofselfesteem(“We,”includingI,arebetterthan“them”).Thisdefensivetendencyseemslikelytobeespeciallycharacteristic of insecurely attached people. Securely attached individuals canmaintainastableandauthenticsenseofselfworthbyvirtueoffeelinglovedandacceptedbyothersandpossessing special andvaluablequalities (Mikulincer&


Shaver,2005).Theyshouldhavelessneedtofearanddisparageoutgroupmembers.Inhisaccountofhumanbehavioralsystems,Bowlby(1982)statedthatactivationoftheattachmentsystemiscloselyrelatedtoinnatefearofstrangersandthatsecureattachmentsmitigatethisinnatereactionandfosteramoretolerantattitudetowardunfamiliarityandnovelty.

Inaseriesoffivestudies,we(Mikulincer&Shaver,2001)foundstrongevidenceforthesetheoreticalideas.First,higherscoresonaselfreportmeasureofattachmentanxietywereassociatedwithmorehostileresponsestoavarietyofoutgroups(asdefinedbysecularIsraeliJewishstudents):IsraeliArabs,UltraorthodoxJews, Russian immigrants, and homosexuals. Second, experimental heighteningof the sense of attachment security (subliminal presentation of securityrelatedwords suchas love andproximity, evocationvia guided imageryof the components of securityenhancing interpersonal interactions, and visualization of thefacesofsecurityenhancingattachmentfigures)eliminatednegativeresponsestooutgroups.Theseeffectsweremediatedbythreatappraisalsandwerefoundevenwhenparticipants’senseofpersonalvaluewasthreatenedortheiringrouphadbeeninsultedbyanoutgroupmember.Thatis,experimentallyaugmentedattachmentsecurityreducedthesenseofthreatcreatedbyencounterswithoutgroupmembersandseemedtoeliminatehostileresponsestooutgroupmembers.

Buildingonthesestudies,MikulincerandShaver(2007b)foundthatincreasing people’s sense of attachment security reduced actual aggression betweencontendingorwarring social groups.Specifically, Israeli Jewish undergraduatesparticipatedinastudytogetherwithanotherIsraeliJeworanIsraeliArab(ineachcase,thesameconfederateoftheexperimenter)andweresubliminallyandrepeatedlyexposed(for20millisecondsoneachtrial)tothenameoftheirownsecurityenhancingattachmentfigure,thenameofafamiliarpersonwhowasnotviewedasanattachmentfigure,orthenameofanacquaintance.Followingtheprimingprocedure, participants were informed that they would evaluate a food sampleand that theyhadbeenrandomly selected togive the confederatehot sauce toevaluate.Theyalsolearnedindirectlythattheconfederatestronglydislikedspicyfoods.(Thisprocedurehasbeenusedinotherstudiesofinterpersonalaggression;e.g.,McGregoretal.,1998).Thedependentvariablewastheamountofhotsauceallocatedtotheconfederate.

Whenparticipantshadbeensubliminallyprimedwiththenameofsomeonewhowasnotanattachmentfigure,theydeliveredalargeramountofhotsaucetotheArabconfederatethantotheJewishconfederate,asignofintergroupaggression.Butsecurityprimingeliminatedthisdifference:participantswhosesenseofsecurityhadbeenenhanceddeliveredequal(relativelylow)amountsofhotsaucetoboththeArabandtheJewishconfederate.Inaddition,participantsscoringhigheronattachmentanxietygavemorehotsaucetotheoutgroupmember(IsraeliArab)than to the ingroup member (Israeli Jew). Thus, it seems that people who areeitherdispositionallysecureorinducedtofeelmoresecureinaparticularsettingarebetterablethantheirinsecurecounterpartstotolerateintergroupdifferencesandtorefrainfromintergroupaggression.

Althoughthesestudiesindicatethatattachmentinsecuritiesareassociatedwithstrongerintergroupderogationandaggression,theydidnotincludeassessmentsof


thecognitiveprocessesthatunderliesuchconflictescalationresponses.AccordingtoBarTal,Kruglanski,andKlar(1989),thesedestructiveresponsesaredrivenbywhattheycalledconflictschemasormentalsets.Intheirview,peoplewhoholda cooperation set anticipate constructive interactions with outgroup membersand cooperative and satisfactory conflictresolution discussions, which, in turn,movesthemawayfromhostileandaggressiveresponsestooutgroups.Incontrast,peoplewhoholdaconflictsetanticipatehostileandcompetitiveinteractionswithoutgroupmembers andunpleasantandantagonisticconflict resolutions,which,in turn,promote intergrouphostility andaggression.Thesemental setsmaybebrought about by either person factors (e.g., prosocial orientation, Carnevale &Probst,1998)orsituationalfactors(e.g.,DeDreu&Nijstad,2008).Basedonfindingsreviewedearlier,attachmentorientationsmaybeoneof these factors,withattachmentinsecurities,eitherdispositionalorcontextuallyenhanced,increasingthelikelihoodofadoptingaconflictmentalsetandsecureattachmentincreasingendorsementofacooperationset.

Toexaminethisissue,wefolloweduparecentseriesofstudiesbyDeDreuandNijstad(2008)onmentalsetsandcreativethought.Inoneofthesestudies,participantswereaskedtoindicatetheextenttowhichaparticularobjectvaryinginitsdegreeofprototypicality(e.g.,car,elevator)isanexampleofaparticularcategory(e.g.,vehicle).Inthistask,inclusionratherthanexclusionoftheweakprototypicalobjects(e.g.,elevator)reflectsbroadcognitivecategoriesandflexiblecognitiveprocessing(Rosch,1975),whichareassumedtofostercreativethought(e.g.,Amabile,1983).DeDreuandNijstadhypothesizedthataconflictsetleads individualstofocus their attentiononconflictrelated issues and todismissor ignoreconflictirrelevantissues.Asaresult,aconflictsetwillinvolvebroaderandmoreinclusivethinkingaboutconflictbutwillresultinnarrowminded,blackandwhitethinkingaboutconflictirrelevantissues.Indeed,thefindingsindicatedthataconflictmentalsetwasassociatedwithmoreinclusionofweakprototypicalexemplarsofconflictrelatedcategoriesbutlessinclusionofweakprototypicalexemplarsofneutralcategories.

Based on this finding, we conducted an exploratory twosession laboratorystudy,reportedhere for thefirsttime,that involved80Israeli Jewishuniversitystudents(53womenand27men).Wehypothesizedthatthepatternofcategoryinclusionresponsesreflectingaconflictmentalsetwouldbemorecharacteristicofinsecurelythanofsecurelyattachedpeopleandwouldbemitigatedbysecuritypriming(subliminallypresentingthenameofasecurityenhancingattachmentfigure).Thefirstsessionwasdesignedtoassessparticipants’attachmentorientationsandacquirespecificnamesofsecurityenhancingfiguresandotherclosepersonstobeusedlaterasprimesinthesecondsession.Inthatfirstsession,participantscompleted the ECR inventory (Brennan et al., 1998), a measure of attachmentanxietyandavoidance,plustwocomputerizedmeasuresofthenamesofattachmentfiguresandotherclosepersonswhowerenotattachmentfigures.ThefirstofthesetwocomputerizedmeasureswasaHebrewversionoftheWHOTOscale(Fraley&Davis,1997), inwhichparticipantswereaskedtotypeinaMicrosoftExcelworksheet thenamesof theirsecurityenhancingattachmentfigures.Thescaleincludedsixitems(e.g.,Whoisthepersonyouwouldcountonforadvice?


Whoisthepersonyoucanalwayscounton?),and,foreachitem,participantswrotethenameofthepersonwhobestservedthetargetedattachmentrelatedfunction.Inthesecondmeasure,participantswereaskedtowritethenamesoftheirfather,mother,brothers,sisters,bestfriend,currentromanticpartner,grandfathers,andgrandmotherswithoutmakinganyreferencetotheattachmentfunctionstheydidordidnot serve.Weassumed thatbecause someof thesepeople’snameswerenotprovidedasprimaryattachmentfigurestheyprobablydidnotmeetthestrictrequirementsforthatrole.

Inthesecondsession,conducted2weekslaterbyadifferentexperimenter,participants(allofthemIsraeliJews)wereinvitedtohaveaconversationwithanIsraeliArabstudentabout theMiddleEastconflict.However,before theconversation,participantswereaskedtoperformtwocognitivetasks.Inthefirsttask—a30trialcomputerizedwordrelationtask—participantswererandomlyassignedtooneoftwoconditions:securityorneutralpriming.Inthesecurityprimingcondition(n=40),participantsweresubliminallyexposed(for20milliseconds)tothenameoftheirmostsecurityenhancingattachmentfigure(basedonthefirstsessionofthestudy).Intheneutralprimingcondition(n=40),theyweresubliminallyexposedtothenameofafamiliarpersonwhowasnotselectedasanattachmentfigure.

Followingtheprimingprocedure,participantsinbothprimingconditionsperformedthesecondcognitivetask:acategoryinclusiontask.ThistaskwasidenticaltotheoneusedbyDeDreuandNijstad(2008).Specifically,participantsreceivedfourneutralcategoriesandthreeconflictrelatedcategories (randomlyordered),and for each category they rated three objects in terms of their prototypicalityusinga10pointscalerangingfrom1(not at all)to10(very prototypical).Thefourneutralcategories (withstrong, intermediate,andweakexemplars)werevehicle(bus,airplane,camel),vegetable(carrot,potato,garlic),clothes(skirt,shoes,handbag),andfurniture(couch,lamp,telephone).Thethreeconflictrelatedcategories(with strong, intermediate, and weak exemplars) were weapon (gun, jet fighter,screwdriver),army(Cavalry,AlQaida,hooligans),andammunition(bullet,dynamite, paving stones). Statistical analyses were performed on the prototypicalityratingsofweakexemplars.Nosignificanteffectswerefoundforratingsofstrongandintermediateexemplars.Foreachparticipant,wecomputedtwototalscores:(1) inclusivenessofneutralcategories(averageofratingsfortheweakexemplarsof the four neutral categories, Cronbach’s alpha = .71); and (2) inclusiveness ofconflictcategories(averageofratingsfortheweakexemplarsofthethreeconflictcategories,alpha=.74).

Totestourpredictions,weconductedtwostephierarchicalregressionanalyseswithparticipants’scoresontheECRattachmentanxietyandavoidancescalesand security priming (a contrast variable contrasting security priming, 1, withneutralpriming,–1)astheindependentvariables.Inthefirststepoftheseanalyses,weenteredattachmentanxietyandavoidance(Zscores)andsecurityprimingasablocktoexaminetheuniquemaineffectsofthesepredictors.Inthesecondstep, the twoway interactionsbetweensecurityprimingandeachof theECRscoreswereenteredasadditionalpredictors.Theseregressionswereperformedseparatelyforinclusivenessofconflictrelatedcategoriesandinclusivenessofneutralcategories.


Forinclusivenessofconflictrelatedcategories,theregressionanalysisrevealedsignificantmaineffectsofattachmentanxiety(β=.35,p <.01),avoidantattachment(β=.24,p <.05),andsecuritypriming(β=–.27,p <.05).Asexpected,thehighertheattachmentanxietyandavoidance,thehighertheprototypicalityratingsofweakexemplarsofconflictrelatedcategories.Moreover,comparedwithneutralpriming,securityprimingreducedtheprototypicalityratingsofweakexemplarsofconflictrelatedcategories.Theinteractioneffectswerenotsignificant.Thatis,whereas attachment insecurities seemed to involve broader and more inclusivethinking about conflict, securitypriming seemed to reduce the inclusivenessofconflictrelatedcategories.

Forinclusivenessofneutralcategories,theregressionanalysisrevealedsignificantmaineffectsofattachmentanxiety(β=–.28,p <.01)andsecuritypriming(β=.36,p <.01).Asexpected,thehighertheattachmentanxiety,thelowertheprototypicalityratingsofweakexemplarsofneutralcategories.Moreover,comparedwith neutral priming, security priming increased the prototypicality ratings ofweakexemplarsofneutralcategories.Also,theinteractionbetweensecurityprimingandattachmentanxietywassignificant(β=.31,p <.01).Examinationofthesignificantinteractions(usingtheprocedurefromAiken&West,1991)revealedthatattachmentanxietywasassociatedwithlowerinclusivenessofneutralcategoriesintheneutralprimingcondition(–1)(β=–.59,p<.01)butnotinthesecurityprimingcondition(+1)(β=.03).Theseslopesindicatethatsecurityprimingwasabletomitigateanxiouslyattachedparticipants’tendencytothinkaboutneutralcategories in lessbroadand inclusive terms—atendencyMikulincer andSheffi(2000)observedpreviouslyusingotherneutralcategoriesandothertasksassessingcreativethoughts.

Theseresultsprovideencouragingpreliminaryevidencethatattachmentinsecuritiesareassociatedwithaconflictmentalsetandthatevenatemporarysenseofattachmentsecurityreducesthelikelihoodofadoptingsuchmentalsetsduringencounterswithoutgroupmembers.Furtherresearchisneededtodetermine(1)whetherinsecurelyattachedindividuals’conflictmentalsetsareactivatedduringencounterswithoutgroupmembersortendtobechronicallyactivatedduringevenneutralinterpersonalinteractionsand(2)whetherthesementalsetsunderlieinsecurelyattachedindividuals’hostileandaggressivereactionstooutgroupmembers.

concluding remarkSAttachment theory, which was originally developed to explain infant–caregiverattachment and different attachment patterns in infant–caregiver relationshipsthatseemtoresultfromdifferentkindsofcaregiving,hasbeenextendedfirsttotherealmofadultcouplerelationshipsandnowtorelationshipsinorganizations(e.g.,Shaver&Mikulincer,2008)andtointergrouprelations.Bothcorrelationalandexperimentalstudiesindicatethatinterpersonalconflictsarehandledworsebypeoplewithaninsecureattachmentstyle,whetheranxiousoravoidant,andarehandledbetterbypeoplewithasecurestyle.Weconsiderithighlysignificantthatintergroupconflictsmightbereducedbyhelpingconflictingpartiestofeelmoresecure,notjustintheintergrouprelationshipswheretheconflictsareoccurring


butalsointheircloserelationships,whichattachmenttheoryviewsasthesourceofsecurityandinsecurity.Ourexperiments,whilefairlysimple,suggestthatthisisacausalprocess—thatis,thatsecurityenhancementprecedesamovementtowardmoreprosocialattitudesandbehaviors(Mikulincer&Shaver,2007b).Theeffectsofsuchsecuritymostlikelystemfromfairlydeep,insomecasesnotverballyaccessible,feelings.Theythusaddtoalloftheworkinsocialpsychologythatfocusesmoreintentlyonformsofverbalnegotiation,rationallyinducedchangesincognitions,andvariousformsofexposuretomembersofoutgroups.Ourstudiessuggestthattheremaybemanycontributionstoconstructiveconflictresolution,includingonesthatdependonevolvedbehavioralsystemsthatmayatfirstseemtohavelittletodowithinterpersonalconflicts.

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37

3TheLinkBetweenOstracism

andAggressionKIPLINGD.WILLIAMSandERICD.WESSELMANN1

Purdue University

“Socially,Mackandtheboyswerebeyondthepale.SamMalloydidn’tspeaktothemastheywentbytheboiler.Theydrewintothemselvesandnoonecouldforeseehowtheywouldcomeoutofthecloud.Fortherearetwopossiblereactionstosocialostracism—eitheramanemergesdeterminedtobebetter, purer, andkindlierorhegoes bad, challenges theworld and doesevenworsethings.Thislastisbyfarthecommonestreaction…”

JohnSteinbeck,CanneryRow(1987,pp.250–251)

O stracism2—being ignoredandexcluded—isapainful situation that themajorityofindividualshaveexperiencedatleastonceintheirlivesandsometimesisadailyoccurrence(Nezlek,Wheeler,Williams,&Govan,

2004;Williams,2009).Theseexperiencescanbepsychologicallyandemotionallydamagingtothetarget:theycanleadtoselfdefeatingbehavior(Twenge,Catanese,& Baumeister, 2002), impaired selfregulation (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco,& Twenge, 2005; Oaten, Williams, Jones, & Zadro, 2008), and selfperceptionsofdehumanization(Bastian&Haslam,2010).Furthermore,ostracismhasbeenshown to activate the same regions of the brain associated with physical pain

1 Bothauthorscontributedequallytothepreparationofthismanuscript.ThismaterialisbasedonworksupportedbytheNationalScienceFoundationunderGrantNo.0519209.

2 Research isunclearon the specificdifferencesamongostracism, rejection, and social exclusion;oftentimesthesethreetermsareusedinterchangeably.Weacknowledgetherearedebatesabouttherelationsamongtheseterms(seeLearyetal.,2006;Williams,2009),butforthesakeofsimplicitywewillusethetermostracismthroughoutthischapter.

kipling d. WilliamS and eric d. WeSSelmann38

(Eisenberger,Lieberman,&Williams,2003)andtolowersignificantlythetargets’perceptionsoffourbasichumanneeds:belonging,control,meaningfulexistence,andselfesteem(Williams,2001,2009;Williams,Cheung,&Choi,2000;Zadro,Williams,&Richardson,2004;seealsoChapter13inthisvolume).

Why oStraciSm hurtS the individualSocial psychologists have theorized that humans are equipped with an evolvedmechanism for detecting and responding to cues of ostracism (Kerr & Levine,2008;Leary,Tambor,Terdal,&Downs,1995;Spoor&Williams,2007;seeotherevolutionarylinkstoconflictinChapters15and18inthisvolume).Thesesystemsareadaptivebecauseatonetimeinourevolutionaryhistorybeingostracizedfromasocialgroupcouldharmanindividual’schancesatsurvival—aformof“socialdeath” (see Williams 2007; also Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Williams (2009)arguesthatthesesystemsshouldbequickandcrude,reactingattheslightestcueofostracism,sothattheindividualcanpreemptivelyforestalloravoidpermanentexpulsion.Williamsposits these cues setoff thedetection system,whichelicitsthe experience ofpain in the target individual (seeChen, Williams, Fitness,&Newton, 2008, for a discussion of social and physical pain; also MacDonald &Leary,2005),andperceptionsofthreatenedbasicneedssatisfaction.

Recent Evidence for the Ostracism Detection System

Severalrecentstudieshaveexaminedthesensitivityoftheostracismdetectionsystembyexaminingtheminimalcuesandboundaryconditionsthatexistforindividualstofeelthestingofostracism.Previousresearchhadfocusedonstudyingostracisminvarioustypesoffacetoface(Williams&Sommer,1997)orelectronicsocialinteractions(Smith&Williams,2004;Williamsetal.,2000;Williamsetal.,2002).Wirthandcolleagues(Wirth,Sacco,Hugenberg,&Williams,2010)decidedtofocusonhowsimplenonverbalcuesofostracism(e.g.,lackofeyecontact)influencedthedetectionsystem.Theseresearchersfoundparticipantswhoreceivedlesseyecontactfromavirtualconfederateweremorelikelytofeelignoredandexcluded,exhibitingthetypicalostracismeffectsofthreatenedneedsatisfactionandworsenedmoods.

Kassner,Wirth,Law,andWilliams(2010)arguethateventhemostminimalcuescantriggerthedetectionsystemaslongassocialinformationisinherentinthesecues.TheyusedavirtualrealitybasedparadigmcalledMinimalWorldtoostracizeparticipantsinasituationwheretherewasnosocialinformationpresent.MinimalWorldplacedparticipantsinavirtualenvironmentwheretheysawtwosquaresandasphereinfrontofthem(nonsocialversionsoftheplayeravatarsandtheballintheCyberballparadigm;Williamsetal.,2000).Thespheremovedbackand forthbetween the two squares andoccasionallymoved toward theparticipant’spointofviewanddisappeared.Participantswereinstructedtopressoneoftwobuttonswhenthespheredisappeared—onebuttonsentthespherebacktotheleftsquare,andtheotherbuttonsentthespheretotherightsquare.Participantswereassignedrandomlytooneoffourconditionsina2(ostracism–inclusion)×2(socialinformation–noinformation)design.Intheinclusionconditions,theywere

the link BetWeen oStraciSm and aggreSSion 39

giventheopportunitytocontrolthesphere33%ofthetime(similartoinclusionmanipulationsinotherostracismparadigms).Participantsintheostracismconditionshadcontroloverthesphereonlytwiceatthebeginningandthenneveragainforthedurationofthestudy.Theresearchersmanipulatedthesocial informationbyinstructinghalfoftheparticipantstomentallyvisualizea“coherentstory”aboutthemovementoftheshapes;theotherparticipantswerenotgiventheseinstructions.Resultsdemonstratedthatparticipantswhowereostracizedandgiventhesocial information experienced distress akin to ostracism in other paradigms,whereasparticipantswhowerenotgiventhesocialinformationdidnothavedifferentexperiencesfromtheinclusionconditions.Theseresearchersconcludedthataslongasthereissocialinformationpresent,cuesofostracismshouldactivatethedetectionsystemandthwartindividuals’needsatisfaction.

Otherresearchsuggestscuesofostracismdonothavetobedirectedspecificallyat the individual toactivate theirdetectionsystem.Wesselmannandcolleagues(Wesselmann,Bagg,&Williams,2009)investigatedhowindividualsrespondedtowitnessingastrangerbeingostracized(i.e.,notthrowntoduringavirtualballtossgame).Notonlydidparticipants recognize theostracized individualwould feeltheeffectsofostracism(i.e.,thwartedneedsatisfactionandworsenedmood),buttheseparticipantsdemonstrateddistresssimilartowhattheywouldfeelasiftheywerepersonallyexperiencingtheostracism.These results, takenwith theotherresearchonboundaryconditionsforostracism,lendcredencetotheargumentthattheostracismdetectionsystemshouldcrudelyandquicklyreacttoeventhemostminimalcuesofostracism(Williams,2009).

Why the oStracized individual hurtS otherSWilliams(2009)arguedthatbehavioralresponsestoostracismserveafortificationfunctionfortheneedsatisfactionthreatenedbyostracism(seealsoLeary,Twenge,&Quinlivan,2006;Warburton,Williams,&Cairns,2006;Williams&Govan,2005).Asubstantialamountofresearchhasbeendedicatedtoexaminingtheeffectsofostracismonindividuals’subsequentbehavior,specificallyaggressivebehavior.Individualsappeartobemorelikelytobehaveaggressivelytowardanotherpersonafterbeingostracized,regardlessofwhetherthepersonwasinvolvedoruninvolvedinthetargets’ostracism(Buckley,Winkel,&Leary,2004;CarterSowell,VanBeest,vanDijk,&Williams,2010;Chow,Tiedens,&Govan,2008;Twenge,Baumeister,Tice,&Stucke,2001;Twenge&Campbell,2003;Warburtonetal.,2006;Williams,2001).Archivalresearchevensuggests longtermostracismwasapotentialimpetusfortheviolentbehaviorofmanyoftheschoolshootersoverthelastdecade(Leary,Kowalski,Smith,&Phillips,2003).Theostracism→aggressionlinkisnotlimitedtocurrentostracismexperiences—evenrecallingapreviousexperienceofsocialpainisenoughtoincreaseindividuals’temptationsforaggressivebehavior(Riva,Wirth,&Williams,2010).

Restored Control Reduces Aggression After Ostracism

Someresearchershavebeguntoexplore thepotential thataggressiveresponsesto ostracism may serve to fortify control. Preliminary evidence suggests that


individuals strive to exert control after being ostracized (Lawson Williams &Williams,1998).Intwostudies,theyfoundthatostracizedmalestoldaconfederate to turn his head (supposedly to better “read” his nonverbal facial expressions)moreoftenthanincludedmalesandthatostracizedfemalesreportedhigherdesireforcontrolthanincludedfemales.Furthermore,aggressionallowstheindividualtoassertcontrol(Tedeschi,2001).Asanexample,researchhasfoundthatindividualswho feltnocontrolover their elevation tonewmajority status (theywere previously in the minority) were more likely to exert abusive control overthenewminoritymemberscomparedwithindividualswhoserisetonewmajoritystatusappearedtobetheresultoftheirownefforts(Prislin,Williams,&Sawiki,2010).Thus,wereasonedthatwhencontrolwassufficientlythwartedostracizedindividualsmight resort toaggression.Warburton,Williams,andCairns (2006)arguedthatifaggressiveresponsestoostracismservedtofortifythreatenedneeds(e.g.,need forcontrol), aggressiveresponsesshoulddecrease if individualsweregivenanonaggressiveoptiontofortifythemselvesafterostracism.Theresearchersmanipulatedthisnonaggressiveoptionbyhavingparticipantslistentoaseriesofaversivenoiseblasts.Halfoftheparticipantsweregivencontrolovertheonsetoftheblasts;theotherhalfhadnocontroloverblastonset.Warburtonandcolleaguesfoundthatostracizedparticipantswhowerenotgiventhechancetofortifythemselvesbyhavingcontroloverthenoisetaskrespondedmostaggressivelytoostracism.Ostracizedparticipantsgivencontroloverthenoisetaskwerenomorelikelytoaggressthannonostracizedpeople.Theresearchersconcludedthatgivingostracizedparticipantscontroloveranaspectoftheirenvironmentfortifiedtheirthreatenedneedsandreducedtheirrelianceonaggressionasameansoffortifyingtheseneeds.

Predictive Control, Ostracism, and Increased Aggression

Wesselmann and colleagues (Wesselmann, Butler, Williams, & Pickett, 2010)extended the argument that control needs have an important function in theostracism→aggression relation. These researchers argued that unpredictableostracism(typicallythetypeexperiencedinlaboratorystudies;seeTwengeetal.,2001) provides adouble threat for targets: not only does this typeof ostracismthreatenneedsatisfaction,butitalsoshakestheirconfidenceintheirsociometer.Sociometertheory(Learyetal.,1995)isoneofthesocialpsychologicaltheoriesthatproposetheexistenceofapsychologicalmechanism(i.e.,asociometer)thatenablesindividualstodetectcuesofpotentialostracismduringsocialinteractions;a properly working sociometer affords an individual predictive control over aninteraction.

Wesselmannand colleagues (2010) hypothesized the lack ofpredictive control inherent inunpredictableostracismshould increaseparticipants’ aggressiveresponses;participantswhocanpredictostracismshouldstillperceivesomepredictive control and be less inclined to respond aggressively. They manipulatedpredictivecontrolbyvaryingconfederatebehaviortowardparticipantsbeforeanostracismmanipulation.Confederatesweretrainedtotreateachparticipanteitherinafriendlyorunfriendlymannerduringagroupdiscussion.Afterthediscussion,


participantswereinformedthateithereveryone(inclusion)ornoone(ostracism)wantedtoworkwiththeminanupcomingactivity.Ineitheroftheseconditions,participantswereinformedthatthetaskwouldnotaccommodatethatoutcomesotheywouldbeworkingwithanewparticipantwhoarrivedlateforadifferentstudy(thusnotpartoftheparticipants’groupdiscussion).Participantswereinstructedtoprepareasampleofhotsaucefortheirpartnertoconsume(theaggressionmeasure).Participantsweretoldthattheirpartnerdidnotlikespicyfoodsandthattheirpartnerwouldhavetoconsumehowevermuchtheparticipantallocated.Resultsindicatedthatparticipantswhoweretreatedfriendlybutsubsequentlyostracized(unpredictable ostracism)perceivedthattheywerelesscapableofpredictingothers’behavior(i.e.,hadabrokensociometer)andsubsequentlyallocatedmoregramsofhotsaucethanparticipantswhoweretreatedunfriendlybeforebeingostracized(predictable ostracism).Wesselmannandcolleaguesinterpretedthesefindingsasfurtherevidencefortheimportanceofcontrolneedsinhowaggressivelyindividualsmayrespondtoostracism.

are oStracized individual alWayS antiSocial?Antisocialoraggressivereactionsarenottheonlywayindividualsrespondtoostracism.Severalstudieshavefoundthatostracizedindividualsmayrespondtotheirtreatment in prosocialways, perhaps striving tobecome reincluded. Ostracizedindividualshavebeenfoundtoworkharderonacollectivegrouptask(Williams&Sommer,1997),toconform(Williamsetal.,2000),tocomply(CarterSowell,Chen,&Williams,2008),toobey(Torstrick,2010),tolikeorshowinterestinnewgroups (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Predmore & Williams,1983),andtoattempttogainsocialreassurancebyremainingamemberofagroup(Snoek, 1962) than included individuals. Research also finds these individualsmorelikelytoemulateacooperativegroupmember(Ouwerkerk,Kerr,Gallucci,&VanLange,2005)andtoengageinnonconsciousmimicry(Lakin&Chartrand,2005;Lakin,Chartrand,&Arkin,2008).Finally,ostracizedindividualsaremoresocially attentive (Bernstein, Young, Brown, Sacco, & Claypool, 2008; DeWall,Maner,&Rouby,2009;Gardner,Pickett,&Brewer,2000;Pickett,Gardner,&Knowles,2004).

Howdowemakesenseoftheseseeminglycontradictorybehavioralresponsepatterns?RecallthatWilliams(2009)arguedthatbehavioralresponsestoostracismarefocusedonfortifyingtheirbasicneedsthathavebeenthreatened.Williamsarguedfurtherthatspecificbehavioralresponsestoostracismshoulddependonthetypesofneedsindividualsaremotivatedtofortify.Prosocialresponseslikelyfocusonfortifyingneedsforbelongingandselfesteem—werefertotheseastheinclu-sionary needscluster—andaggressiveresponseslikelyfocusonfortifyingneedsformeaningfulexistenceandcontrol(thepower–provocation needscluster).

This premise has yet to be tested directly in an experimental setting, butthereareseveralstudiesthatcouldbereinterpretedwithinthisframework.First,Warburton and colleagues (2006) found that ostracized participants who hadtheircontrolneedsrestoredbeforetheaggressionmeasurewerenomorelikelytoaggressthanincludedparticipants;ostracizedparticipantswhowerenotafforded


this restoration replicated the typical ostracism→aggression relation.AccordingtoWilliams(2009),ostracizedparticipantswhowerefortifiedsubsequentlywouldnotneedtorespondaggressivelybecausetheyhadalreadyrecoveredtheirneedsatisfaction.TheresearchbyWesselmannandcolleagues(2010)alsosupportsthisidea—becausepredictedostracismis lessofa threattoneedsthanunpredictedostracism,lessaggressionwouldbenecessarytorecover.Additionally,theLawson,Williams,andWilliamsstudydemonstratedincreasedordesiredcontrolfollowingostracismwasmost likely tooccurwhen individualswereostracizedby twootherswhowerefriendswitheachother(butnotwiththeparticipant).Followupresearch demonstrated that people feel the most control threat when they arestrangersamongotherswhoarefriends,soweonceagainseeincreasedcontrolexertionascontrolthreatincreases(Lawson,Williams,&Williams,1998).

OtherresearchofferssupportforWilliams’s(2009)needfortificationargumentfromadifferentperspective.Twengeandcolleagues(Twengeetal.,2007)found that ostracized participants who were either reminded of a positivesocial relationshiporhadapleasant interactionwithanexperimenterbeforean aggression measure were subsequently less likely to respond aggressively.Finally,Bernsteinandcolleagues(Bernstein,Sacco,Brown,Young,&Claypool,2010)demonstratedthatparticipants’needsforbelongingandselfesteemhadanimportantimpactontheirprosocialresponsestoostracism.Theseresearchersfoundthathigherneedthreatstobelongingandselfesteemmediatedtherelationbetweenostracismandparticipants’preferences for interactingwithpotentialsourcesofaffiliation.

What factorS determine Which needS are Salient?

Williams (2009) argues that attributions based on situational context and individualdifferences are likely to to be an importantpredictor in how individualschoosetofortifytheirthreatenedneedsbehaviorally.Theseattributionswilldictatewhichclusterofneeds(inclusionaryorpower–provocation)ismostsalientandthus theprimary focus for fortification.Forexample, if the inclusionary clusterismostsalient,ostracizedindividualsshouldchoosetobehaveinprosocialways,whichelevatetheirchanceforsatisfyingbelongingandselfesteem.Alternatively,whenthepower–provocationclusterismostsalient,ostracizedindividualsshouldchooseantisocial(e.g.,aggressive)behaviorstoelevatetheirchanceforsatisfyingcontrolandmeaningfulexistence.

Severaldifferent situational and individualdifference factors can influcenceattributionsforostracismandultimatelythebehavioralreponsesfromindividuals(seeWilliams,2009,fordiscussion).Weproposethatanimportantfactorinostracizedindividuals’attributionprocessesistheirlikelihoodofbeingreincludedbythetargetoftheirsubsequentbehavioralresponses(seealsoTwenge,2005).Thepotentialforreinclusionbyanotherindividualorgroupshouldmaketheinclusionaryclustermostsalient; if there is littlechance forreinclusion, then theclusterthatismostlikelytobefocusedonispower–provocation.Wewillnowrevieweach


of the paradigms used in studying the ostracism→aggression relation and thendiscusshowthepotentialforreinclusion(orlackthereof)mayhavefacilitatedantisocialresponsestoostracismduetomakingthepower–provocationclustermostsalientineachoftheseparadigms.

General Descriptions of the Typical Ostracism Paradigms

Severalparadigmsareusedtoinvestigatetheostracism→aggressionrelationinexperimental settings. We will now describe the general elements of each oftheseparadigms.Oneisthelife-aloneparadigm(Twengeetal.,2001),inwhichparticipantsfilloutapersonalityinventoryandarefirstgivenaccuratefeedbackabouttheirintroversion–extraversion.Followingthis,theyarerandomlyassignedtoreceiveaprognosisabouttheirfuturelives:theyaretoldtheywillhavealifecharacterized by strong close relationships or that they will live a life alone,devoidofstrongcontinuousrelationships.Forparticipantsinthelifealonecondition,thefeedbackinformsthemthattheyarepowerlesstodoanythingabouttheirlackofinclusion.

Anotherparadigmistheget-acquaintedparadigm(Buckleyetal.,2004;Chowetal.,2008;Twengeetal.,2001;Twenge&Campbell,2003;Wesselmannetal.,2010). Researchers who use this type of paradigm typically ask participants toengageinagroupactivitydesignedtoallowmembersofthegrouptogettoknoweachother.Following this interaction,participantsare told that theyeitherhadbeenrejectedbymembersofthisgrouporhadbeenacceptedbythem.

Thethirdcommonparadigminostracismresearchistheball-tossing paradigm(CarterSowell et al., 2010;Chow et al., 2008; Warburtonet al., 2006). Studiesusing this paradigm engage participants in a balltossing game with other confederates,eitherinafacetofaceformat(originallyusedinWilliams&Sommer,1997)or via anelectronicbasedcomputerprogramcalledCyberball (originallyusedinWilliamsetal.,2000;seealsothe“OCam”inChapter13ofthisvolume).Regardlessoftheformatforballtossing,participantsareeitherincludedbytheconfederates(i.e.,tossedtheball33%ofthetime)orostracizedbyconfederates(i.e.,tossedtheballtwiceatthebeginningofthegameandthenneveragain).Atypicalgamelastsbetween3and5minutes.

Each of these paradigms has been adapted in various studies, manipulating different situational factors to elucidate the processes and nuances of theostracism→aggressionrelation.Wewillnowdiscussthesestudiesindetail,focusing on how these different situational factors may have influenced participants’perceptionsofnopotentialforreinclusion,makingthepower–provocationclustermoresalientthantheinclusionarycluster.

Aggression Toward the Source of Ostracism

Themajorityofresearchontheostracism→aggressionlinkhasexaminedaggressive behavior toward the sources of ostracism. These studies have used variations on both the getacquainted paradigm (Buckley et al., 2004; Chow et al.,2009,Study2;Twenge&Campbell,2003,Study3)andtheCyberballparadigm


(CarterSowelletal.,2010;Chowetal.,2008,Study1).Inallof thesestudies,participantsweregiven theopportunity to aggressagainst the individualswhowereresponsiblefortheirpreviousostracism.Participantsalsowerenotgivenareasonorexplanationfortheirostracism.Inthesesituations,thepower–provocationcluster shouldbemost salientbecauseparticipants likelydidnotexpecttheopportunityforreinclusionbythesourcesofostracism.Chowandcolleagues(2009,Study2)manipulated informationabout the sources’perceptionsof theparticipantandfoundthatparticipantswhothoughttheywereostracizedduetothesources’misinformationwerelesslikelytoaggressbecausetheparticipantscould make an external attribution for the ostracism. These participants knewthattheywouldnothavetheabilitytobereincludedbythesourcesofostracism,buttheyalsothoughtthattheostracismwasduetomisinformationratherthansomethinginherentaboutthemselves.

Anecdotally,therearealsoindicationsthattargetsofthedyadicandinterpersonalformofostracism,thesilenttreatment,oftenresorttoaggressiontowardthesourceofthesilenttreatmentasawaytoprovokearesponse(Zadro,Arriaga,&Williams,2008;forotherexamplesofinterpersonalassertivenessandviolenceinthisvolume,seeChapters2,5,11,12,and13).

Aggression Toward a Stranger

Therehavealsobeenprogramsofresearchexaminingparticipants’aggressiveresponsestowardstrangers.Thesestudieshavealsousedvariationsonthegetacquainted(Twengeetal.,2007,Studies4and5;Twenge&Campbell,2003,Study4)andballtossparadigms(Warburtonetal.,2006),aswellasthelifealoneparadigm(Twengeetal.,2001,Studies1–3).Wearguethatthepower–provocationclusterwasmostsalient ineachof thesestudies, similar to thestudieswhere the targets of aggression were responsible for participants’ ostracism.Thestudiesthatusedthelifealoneparadigm(alsoTwengeetal.,2001,Study4) gave ostracized participants the opportunity to aggress against a strangerwhoprovokedthem.Participantslikelydidnotexpecttobeincludedbythesestrangers, even though they were not the source of participants’ ostracism—provocationisnotatypicalresponsefromasourceofinclusionoracceptance(seeLearyetal.,1995).Thestudiesusingtheballtossingandgetacquaintedparadigmsareabitmoreperplexingwhenconsideringhowthepower–provocationclusterwasmostsalient.Noneofthesestudiesofferedparticipantstheopportunitytointeractwiththestrangerotherthanviatheaggressionmeasure,effectivelyremovingthisstrangerasapotentialsourceofreinclusionforparticipants.Wesselmannandcolleagues(2010)offerusanadditionalexplanationforwhythegetacquaintedparadigmmaymakethepower–provocationclustermoresalientthantheinclusionarycluster.Thetraditionalgetacquaintedparadigmconfrontsparticipantswithunexpectedostracism,thusthreateningtheirperceptionsoftheirabilitytopredictandforestallostracism.Theseindividualswouldbelesslikelytofocusonstrivingforreinclusion(i.e.inclusionarycluster)and instead should focus moreon fortifyingpower–provocationcluster (typicallyviaaggression).


the influence of attriButionS and expectationS in the reSignation Stage

Williams(2009)arguesthatifostracismpersistsoveranextendedperiodoftimeindividuals will progress to a third stage—resignation. Extended ostracism canbefromthesame individualorgrouporbyanynumberofdifferentsources.Ifindividualsfind that theirbehavioral responses toostracismfail to restore theirneedsatisfaction,theylearnthatanyattempttorecoverfromostracismis likelyfutile. These individuals should then develop feelings of alienation, depression,helplessness,andunworthiness.It is likelythateachofthesenegativeoutcomesfrom chronic ostracism will influence attributions for ostracism and ultimatelyexpectationsforreinclusion.

Theresignationstageofostracismhasbeenlargelyignoredinscientificresearch,particularlyinexperimentalparadigmsduetotheethicalandpracticalconcernsofmanipulatingchronicostracisminalaboratory.Severalstudieslendsupporttoapotentiallinkamongchronicostracism,expectationsforreinclusion,andaggression.Manerandcolleagues(2007)foundthatindividualswhowerehighinFearofNegativeEvaluation(whoexpectgenerallyunpleasantsocialinteractions)perceived potential sources for reinclusion as hostile after experiencing ostracism,whereasindividualslowinthistraitrespondedfavorablytothesesources.Zadro(2004;Chapter13inthisvolume;seealsoWilliams,2001)conductedqualitativeinterviewswithover50individualswhoreportedexperiencingchronicostracismfromcoworkers,friends,orfamilymembers.Severaloftheseindividualsreportedengaging inaggressivebehaviors inanattempt tobenoticed,particularlywhenotherattemptsatreinclusionprovedfutile.Finally,researchusingthelifealoneparadigm(Twengeetal.,2001)mayalsobereinterpretedinthisframework.Recallthatindividualsinthelifealoneconditionaretoldthattheywillfaceostracismfortherestoftheirlives,regardlessofhowmuchefforttheydedicatetoreinclusion.Participantsinthisconditiontypicallyrespondtopotentialsourcesofreinclusionwithaggression.Thislifealoneconditionistheclosestexperimentalmanipulationof chronic ostracismcurrently in the literature, even though it is limited by itsprospectivenature.

reSignation Stage, need Salience, and extreme aggreSSion

Perhapsonereasonforthecurrentfascinationwiththeostracism→aggressionrelationisthatwearesearchingforexplanationsforarecentsurgeinseeminglyirrational and socially intolerablebehaviors thathave appearedworldwide: randomactsofmonstrousviolence.Innewsreportsthatweconsideralmostroutinenow,wearebombardedwithstoriesofcountlessincidencesinwhichindividuals,oftenstudents inhighschoolorcollege,havewieldedweaponsand,withoutapparentconcernfortheirownsurvival,haveshotandkilledmanyoftheirpeersandteachers.Wehavewitnessedpeople’swillingnesstoconductterroristactsagainstcountlessandunknownothers,againwithplausiblecertaintythatincarryingouttheseactstheywillperishwiththevictims.


School Violence

Since1994,inU.S.schoolsalonetherehavebeenmorethan220separateshootingincidentsinwhichatleastonepersonwaskilledand18episodesthatinvolvedmultiplekillings(Andersonetal.,2001).Massshootingsatschoolsandotherpublicplacesareoccurringwithincreasingfrequencyandinagrowingnumberofothercountries.Reasonsforthisupsurgeinviolencearestillnotclear,butarecentlineof investigationhas linkedsuchincidentswithgrowingsocial isolation(Twenge,2000), and furtherevidence isbeginning toemerge thatprolongedexperiencesofostracismmayhaveplayedasignificantmotivatingroleintheactionsofmanyperpetrators.Intheircaseanalysisof15post1995U.S.schoolshootings,Learyetal.(2003)suggestthatchronicostracismwasamajorcontributingfactorin87%ofcases.StudiesofMartinBryant,who,in1996,killed35peopleatapopulartouristattractionatPortArthurinTasmania,suggestthathefeltlonelyandisolated(Bingham,2000;Crook,1997),andRobertSteinhauser,whokilled16peopleathisformerhighschoolinErfurt,Germany, in2002,thoughnotasocialoutcast(Lemonick,2002),hadbeengreatlyupsetbyasignificantactofostracism—expulsionfromhisschool.Veryrecently,atValparaisoHighSchoolinIndiana,a15yearoldboyheldhostageandslashedwithtwosharpedgedblades—onedescribedasamachete—sevenofhisclassmates.Whenpeerswereaskedaboutthisboy,itwasreported, “He was so invisible atValparaiso HighSchool this fall that studentswhosatnexttohiminSpanishclassdidn’tknowhisname”(“7ValparaisoHighStudentsHurtinStabbingRampage,”Indianapolis Star,November25,2004).Theconsequencesofbeingostracized,eitherintentionallyorunintentionally,seemtobeathreadthatweavesthroughcaseaftercaseofschoolviolence.

Weproposethattheseeventscanbereinterpretedassituationswherethepower–provocationclusterwaslikelymoresalientthaninclusionaryneeds.Individualswhofacechronicostracismshouldnotexpectopportunitiesforreinclusion,havinganypreviousattemptstofortifytheinclusionaryclusterproveineffective.Ifanindividualhasbeencontinuallythwartedinattemptstobereincluded,thenheorshehasnoreasontoexpecttobeincludedinfutureinteractions.Thus,thepower–provocationclustershouldbethemostsalientoptionforneedfortification,andaggressivebehaviorisaneffectivemethodforsatisfyingthisgoal(Williams,2009).

Extremist Groups

Many instancesof school violence involve lone perpetrators, or atmost a smallgroupofperpetrators(e.g.,theperpetratorsoftheColumbineHighSchoolmassacre).Thereareotheractsofviolenceperpetratedbylargergroupsofdisaffectedindividualsindifferentsocialsettingsthatmayberelevanttoourdiscussionofhowextendedexposuretoostracismcanfacilitateviolence.WesselmannandWilliams(2010) argued that individualswhoareconsistentlyostracizedby individualsorgroupsmaybecomepotentialcandidatesforrecruitmentbydubiousgroups,suchascults,gangs,andeventerroristorganizations.Ingeneral,ostracizedindividualsaremorelikelytocomplywithsocialinfluencetactics(CarterSowelletal.,2008)ortoconformtogroupnormsandexpectations(Ouwerkerketal.,2005;Williams&


Sommer,1997).Thisstrivingforacceptanceextendsbeyondcontrolledbehaviors;ostracizedindividualsaremorelikelytomimicotherindividualsinanonconsciousmanner (Lakin&Chartrand,2005;Lakin,Chartrand,&Arkin,2008).What ifostracizedindividualsstrivetobereincludedsomuchthattheydonotrationallyappraisethemotivesbehindorconsequencesofbeingwillinglyinfluencedbythepotentialsourcesofreinclusion?Chapter10inthisvolumeshedsfurtherlightonthispossibility.

We propose that longterm ostracism can cause such a strong desire tobelong, to be liked, by someone—perhaps anyone—that individuals’ abilitytodiscriminategood frombadandright fromwrongmaybe impaired to thepointthattheymaybecomeattractedtocultsandextremistgroupsthatcouldultimately influence them to acts of violence. Political scientists Tom NairnandPaulJames(2005)suggest that theprofileofAustraliancitizenswhohadrecentlyjoinedterroristgroupslikeAlQaedaisofindividualswhofeelisolated,marginalized,orostracizedwithin their society andwhoare attracted to theintense facetoface connectedness that these extremist groups have to offer.Joiningandfollowingthedictatesofextremistgroupsfulfillneedsnotonlyforbelonging and selfesteembut also for control and recognition because thesegroupspromiseretribution,worldwideattention,andpersonalsignificance(seeKruglanski,Chen,Dechesne,Fishman,&Orehek,2009;seealsoChapter10inthisvolume).

concluSionS and future directionS for reSearch

Ostracismisapainfuleventthatmanyindividualsexperience,sometimesonadailybasis(Nezleketal.,2004).Researchhasdemonstratedthataggressionisacommonresponsetoostracismandislikelyfocusedonrecoveringthwartedneedsatisfaction(Williams,2009).Thischapterreviewedresearchonindividuals’reactionstoostracismovertime,particularlyonwhenandwhyindividualschooseaggressiveresponsesratherthanprosocialoptions.WeproposedanextensiontoWilliams’sneed–recoveryhypothesisonhowtopredictwhetherindividualswillrespondwithproorantisocialbehaviorsinresponsetoostracism.Wearguethatanimportantfactor inostracizedindividuals’attributionprocesses istheir likelihoodofbeingreincludedbythetargetof theirsubsequentbehavioral responses.Wereviewedtheexperimentalresearchdocumentingtheostracism→aggressionlink,highlightingtheelementsofthosestudiesthatareconsistentwiththisinterpretation.

Thethirdstageofostracism—theresignationstage—isparticularlyrelevanttoourdiscussionofexpectationsforreinclusion.Individualswhoexperiencechronicostracismhavehad theirneedsatisfactionconsistently thwartedand likelyhaveresignedthemselvestotheirlackofopportunitiesforinclusion.Theseindividualsfindthemselvesinasituationwherepower–provocationneedsaretheirlastbastion for fortification. This argument is consistent with the literature documentingthelinkbetweenchronicostracismandextremeviolence(Learyetal.,2003;Williams,2001).However,muchofthisresearchiscorrelationalandoftenbased


onqualitativeinterviewsoranecdotes.Futureresearchneedstofocusoninvestigatingtheresignationstageinrigorousexperimentalsettings,particularlyhowperceptionsforreinclusionmaymakeaggressiveresponsesmorelikelythanprosocial responses to ostracism. When we achieve a sophisticated understanding ofchronicostracism,wewillhavebetterinsightintowhenandwhyindividualsmayengageinantisocialanddestructiveresponses.

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53

4IsItAggression?

Perceptions of and Motivations for Passive and Psychological Aggression

DEBORAHSOUTHRICHARDSONandGEORGINAS.HAMMOCK

Augusta State University

T his chapter reviews programs of research on correlates and perceptionsof “everyday” formsofaggression thatoftenarenotconsidered in traditionalaggressionresearch.Thesestudiesrevealthateverydaypassiveand

psychologicalaggressionareoftenmotivatedbyintentionsotherthantheintention tocauseharm(e.g., inducingguilt), although theeffect is toharmthe target.Similarly,comparisonofperceptionsofpsychologicalandphysicalaggressionrevealthatpsychologicalaggression,whichisdefinedintermsofharminganindividual’sselfregard,maybeperceivedaslessdamagingthanphysicalaggression,althoughthepotentialforlongtermharmisgreater(e.g.,Follingstad,Rutledge,Berg,Hause,&Polek,1990).

introductionAggressionistypicallydefinedasbehaviorintendedtoharmanotherperson(Baron& Richardson, 1994). Although there has been some argument about whetherintentionshouldbecentraltothedefinitionofaggression(i.e.,aggressionisbehaviorthatharms,regardlessofintentionoftheaggressor),mostcurrentdefinitionsofaggressioninvolvetheconceptofintentiontoharm.Suchdefinitionsthusrequire

deBorah South richardSon and georgina S. hammock54

thatweconsidertheobserver’sinferenceaboutanactor’sgoals(Tedeschi&Felson,1994)andthatweconsideravarietyoftypesofharm.

The harm of direct aggression is readily apparent, and intention seems tobeeasilydetermined.Apersonwhodeliversablowora facetoface insult toanotherpersonisclearlyintendingtocauseharm.Mosttheoreticaltreatmentsand empirical findings regarding human aggressive behavior have focused onsuch obvious aggressive acts. However, some types of harm are more elusive,moreopentoalternativeinterpretations.Forexample,Imightcommentonanacquaintance’sunusualformofattireoutofcuriosityortomakehimfeelselfconscious;mycuriositywouldnotbeharmful,butanattempttomakehimselfconsciouswouldbe.Similarly,forgettingtopickupthewineonthewayhomewhenwearehavingadinnerpartymightbeanhonestmistake,oritmightbeanattempttomakemypartnerlookbadtocompany(thatIdidn’twanttohaveanyway).Theselessdirectformsofaggressiondoindeedcauseharm,buttheyareeasiertodenyandmoredifficulttointerpret;inaddition,theaggressorcandeny the intent to harm. These forms of aggressive behavior may have othergoalsinadditiontoorinsteadofharmtothetarget.Forexample,psychologicalaggressionmayharmthetargetbyhumiliatingordemeaninghimorher;passiveaggressionmayharmatargetbyobstructingagoal;indirectaggressionmayharmatargetbydisruptingrelationships.

We argue that it is important to consider the various forms of aggressionbecausedirectorphysicalaggressionisnotwhatpeoplearelikelytoexperiencemost frequently in theirdaytoday lives.Theyaremore likely tobe victimsofsnideremarksorhostileattitudesthantheyaretobevictimsofcriminalviolence.Individuals aremore likely togossip about someone than to slaporkick them.Themore subtle, lessdirect kindsof aggressionare likely to affect individuals’relationshipexperienceandsuccessaswellastheirsenseofself.Thus,wehavefocusedontheseformsofaggressioninanattempttocapturetheexperienceofeverydaypeopleexperiencingeverydayaggression.Ofcourse,avarietyofformsof everyday aggression are not addressed in this chapter—experiences such asroadrage,racialorsexualdiscrimination—butinmanycasesthosespecificformsofeverydayaggressionmightalsobeconsideredexpressionsofeitherpassiveorpsychologicalaggression.

paSSive aggreSSionPassive aggression isbehavior that is intended toharm another living being bynotdoingsomething,byobstructingthetarget’sgoals.Thisisincontrasttootherformsofaggressionsuchasdirectorindirectverbalorphysicalaggression.Directaggressioninvolvesdirectconfrontationwiththetarget(e.g.,physicalblows,verbalinsults),whereas indirectaggression isnonconfrontive,deliveringharmthroughanother person or object (e.g., spreading rumors, damaging target’s property).Indirectaggression(sometimescalledrelationalorsocialaggression)hasreceivedconsiderableattentionfromresearchers inrecentyears(Archer&Coyne,2005;Björkqvist,Osterman,&Lagerspetz,1994;Crick&Grotpeter,1995;Richardson&Green,2006).Chapter17inthisvolumenotesthatindirectaggressionmaytake

iS it aggreSSion? 55

avarietyofforms,includingcyberaggressionandusingsocialnetworkingtodeliverharmtoanother.Passiveaggression,however,hasreceivedlittleattention.

Passive aggression has been defined, conceptually and operationally, in awidevarietyofways in the research literature. Ina studyofdrivercharacteristicsassociatedwithaggressivedriving androadrage,passiveaggressionwasdefinedas“impedingtraffic”(Dukes,Clayton,Jenkins,Miller,&Rodgers,2001,p.323).Kingery’s(1998)AdolescentViolenceSurveyincludesapassiveaggressionsubscaleconsistingofitemssuchas“Talkedaboutsomeone’sfaultstootherpeoplesootherswouldn’tlikethem”and“Preventedsomeonefromgoingwherehe/shewantedtogobygettingintheway.”Inastudyinwhichparticipantsjudgedavarietyofaggressionactions,passiveaggressionwasdefinedas“withholdingavailableandneededresources”(Berkowitz,Mueller,Schnell,&Padberg,1986,p.887).

Although direct reference to passive aggression is relatively rare in theresearch literature, several lines of research are closely related. For example,Williamsandcolleagues’workonsocialostracismhassomeclearconnectionstoourconceptofpassiveaggression(Sommer,Williams,Ciarocco,&Baumeister,2001;Williams,1997;Williams,Shore,&Grahe,1998;seealsoChapters3and13inthisvolume).Theseresearchersdefinesocialostracismas“thesilenttreatment.”Bothperpetratorsandtargetsofsuchsocialostracismreportthattheprimarymotiveispunitive,“topunishorcorrectthetarget;tohurtorseekrevenge”(Sommeretal.,p.229), and theprimaryemotionreported inboth targetandsourcenarrativesisanger.Thus,suchsocialostracismmightbereasonablyconsideredaformofpassiveaggression,behaviorthatisintendedtopunishorhurt,thatinvolvesanger,andthatinvolvesnotdoingsomething(i.e.,notattendingtothetarget).

Passiveaggressionislikelytobeanespeciallyattractivestrategyinsomecontexts.Likeothernondirectformsofaggression(whichmayincludebothindirector social aggression as well as passive aggression), passive aggression may be adesirablealternativewhenanindividualwantstoavoiddetectionorretaliation.Itprovidestheaggressoraneasyopportunityfordenial(i.e.,“Ididn’tdoanything”)as ifbynotdoingheorsheisblameless.Thus,thepassiveaggressordeniestheharmthatmaycomefromsuchbehavior.

Wehaveconductedtwolinesofresearchaimedatprovidingaclearerunderstandingofthenatureofpassiveaggression.Thefirstwasdesignedtodeterminewhetherpassiveaggressioncanbeconsideredaunique formof aggression,differentiated fromother formsofnondirectaggression (e.g., indirector relationalaggression).Thesecond,whichwasdesignedtodeterminehowthedifferentformsofaggressionareperceivedbyaggressorsandtargets,ismostdirectlyrelevanttothetopicofthischapter;asweconsiderthequestionoftheextenttowhicheachformofaggressionisperceivedtobeharmfulormightbeperceivedasmeetingothergoals,weare,inessence,asking,“Isitaggression?”

Anunderstandingofthedistinctiveness(orlackthereof)ofpassiveaggressionisanimportantstartingpoint.Thus,wewillsummarizetheresultsofthefirstlineofresearchbeforefocusingontheresearchthatexaminesmotivationsandeffectsofthedifferentformsofaggression.


Distinctiveness of Passive Aggression

Threestudiesexaminedwhetherpassiveaggressioncouldbedistinguishedfromdirectandindirectaggression.TheRichardsonConflictResponseQuestionnaire(RCRQ),whichhasbeenusedinavarietyofinvestigationsofdirectandindirect aggression (Richardson & Green, 2003), was modified to include itemsmeasuringpassiveaggression(e.g.,“Didnotdowhattheotherpersonwantedmetodo,”“Gavethepersonthe ‘silent treatment,’”“Failedtoreturncallsorrespondtomessages”).Inthefirststudy,onconflictintheworkplace,participantsreportedhowtheyrespondedwhenangrywithasupervisor,acoworker,orasubordinate.Thesecondstudyexaminedresponses“ingeneral.”Thethirdstudy inquired about responses when angry with romantic partners, siblings,coworkers,orfriends.

Ifpassiveaggressionisadistinctformofaggressionitshouldalsobedifferentiallycorrelatedwithothermeasures.Thesecondtwostudiesinthisseriesexaminedtherelationshipofthethreeformsofaggressionwithothermeasuresofangerand aggression: Spielberger’s (1999) StateTrait Anger Expression Inventory–2(STAXI2) andtheBuss–PerryAggressionQuestionnaire(AQ;1992).TheSTAXI measurestrait(i.e.,dispositional)angeraswellasangerexpression(angerin,angerout,angercontrol).Angerininvolvesthefrequencywithwhichanindividualexperiencesangerbutholdsitin(e.g.,“ItendtoharborgrudgesthatIdon’ttellanyoneabout”).Angeroutinvolvesthefrequencywithwhichapersonexperiencesangerandopenlyexpressesit(e.g.,“Ilosemytemper”).Angercontrolconsidersthefrequencywithwhichanindividualexperiencesangerbutcontrolsit(e.g.,“Icontrolmytemper”).

Theresultsofthetwostudieswereconsistent.Theprimarydistinctionamongtheformsofaggressionwasthatpassiveandindirectaggressionweremorehighlycorrelatedwithangerinthanwasdirectaggressionandthatdirectaggressionwasmorehighlycorrelatedwithtraitanger,angerout,andangercontrol.CorrelationswithsubscalesoftheAQrevealedsimilarfindings.RCRQdirectaggressionwasmorehighlyassociatedwithangeranddirectverbalandphysicalaggressionsubscalesoftheAQthanwerepassiveor indirectaggression.Replicatingresultsofpreviousresearch(Richardson&Green,2003),thesefindingssuggestthatpassiveandindirectaggressionarelikelytobeemployedbyindividualswhoexperience,butmayhavedifficultydirectlyexpressing,theiranger.Directaggression,ontheotherhand,maybeusedbyindividualswhoexpresstheirangermore(i.e.,angerout), who are generally more angry (i.e., trait anger), and find controlling theirangertobeachallenge.

Basedonanecdotalevidence fromeverydayexperiencesofmembersofourresearchteam(whocouldgivemultipleexamplesofpassiveaggressivebehaviorfromtheirromanticpartners)aswellasliteratureondynamicsofdifferenttypesofrelationships,weexpectedthatpassiveaggressionwouldbeafrequentstrategyinromanticrelationships.Forexample,Gottman(1994)reportsthatonecommonresponseofindividualsinunhappyrelationshipsis”stonewalling,”whichinvolveswithdrawingfrominteractionandrefusingtoaddressthepartner’scomplaints,abehaviorthatourmodelwouldclearlyclassifyaspassiveaggression.


Wewerecorrectinthisprediction.Participantsreportedusingmorepassivethanindirectordirectaggressionwhenangrywitharomanticpartner.However,wefoundthatrespondentsreportedmorepassiveaggressionwhenangrywithany-one (i.e., coworkers, friends, and siblings as well as romantic partners).So, is itaggression?

Motivators and Effects of Different Forms of Aggression

Thecommon correlatesofpassive and indirect aggression suggest that the twoformsofaggressionmaynotbeclearlydistinguishable—thattheybothbelongtoa general category of nondirect aggression.On the other hand,wehave distinguishedthemconceptually(i.e.,circuitousharmversusharmbynotdoing),andthoseconceptualdefinitionssuggestthataggressorsmightbemotivatedbydifferentfactorswhentheyareusingpassiveaggressionthanwhentheyareusingindirectaggression.Forexample,passiveaggression,whichinvolvesharminganotherpersonbynot doingsomething,maybeintendedtoannoythetargetasmuchastoharmandmaynotbeperceivedbyeitheraggressorortargetasparticularlyaggressive.Thus,weconductedtwostudiestodeterminewhetherpeoplemightperceivetheaggressor’smotivesandtheeffectsonthevictimtovaryasafunctionoftypeofaggression.

Weaskedparticipants toevaluatea seriesofbehaviors fromtheperspectiveeitheroftheaggressororofthetarget.Directaggressivebehaviorsincluded“yellorscream,”“threatentohitorthrowsomething,”and“push,grab,shove.”Indirectaggressivebehaviorsincluded“makenegativecommentsaboutappearance,”“callnamesbehindback,”and“gatherotherpeopletomyside.”Passiveaggressivebehaviorsincluded“givesilenttreatment,”“avoidinteracting,”and“failtoreturncalls.”

Participantsrespondingfromtheperspectiveoftheaggressorwereaskedwhytheywouldengageinthebehaviorandtoimaginehowthetargetwouldfeel.Forexample,“Whywouldyouyellorscreamatsomeone?”and“Imaginethatyouyellor screamat someone.Howdoyou think thatpersonwould feel?”Participantsresponding from the perspective of the target were asked why someone wouldbehavethatwaytowardthemandhowtheywouldfeelinresponse.Forexample,“Whywouldsomeoneyellorscreamatyou?”and”Howwouldyoufeelifsomeoneyelledorscreamedatyou?”Theaggressormotivationsandtargeteffectswereasfollows: toharm–feltharmed, togainpower–feltpowerless, to control–felt controlled, to cause distress–felt distressed, to humiliate–felt humiliated, to causeguilt–feltguilty.

Thefirststudyinthisseriesaskedforresponses“ingeneral”;thesecondstudyasked for responses in specific relationships. In both studies, responses for thespecificformsofeachtypeofaggression(e.g.,fordirectaggression,yelling,pushing,threatening)werehighlyconsistent,sowecreatedsummaryscoresfordirect,indirect,andpassiveaggression.

BecausethedifferentmotivationsandeffectswerehighlycorrelatedinStudy1,wealsocreatedindicesofgeneralmotivation(i.e.,averageresponsetoallmotivations)andgeneraleffects(i.e.,averageresponseacrossalleffects).Thus,inStudy1wewere actually assessing theextent towhichaggressorswouldbegenerally


motivated to perform the aggressive behaviors and the extent to which targetswouldbegenerally affectedbytheaggressivebehaviors.

Participantsperceivedthattheperpetratorofpassiveaggressionwouldbegenerallylessmotivatedthantheperpetratorofeitherdirectorindirectaggression.Participantsalsoperceivedthatpassiveaggressionwouldhavelesseffectonthetarget thaneitherdirector indirectaggression.Sinceallofthemotivationsandeffects involved a negative experience for the victim, we can infer that passiveaggressionwasperceivedtobeintendedtoproducealessnegativeexperienceforthevictim,and itwasperceived tobe lessmotivatedby thedesire fornegativeoutcomesforthevictim.Soisitaggression?

The second study in this series involved the samebasicprocedures as thefirst,butparticipantswereaskedtorespondwithreferencetoeitherasamesexfriendoraromanticpartner.Thatis,fromtheperspectiveoftheaggressor,participantswereaskedtheextenttowhichtheywouldbemotivatedbythevariousfactors(e.g.,control,harm,humiliate)iftheyweretoaimthepassive,indirect,anddirectaggressiveactstowardasamesexfriendortowardaromanticpartnerandtheextenttowhichthetargetwouldexperiencethedifferenteffects.Whenrespondingfromtheperspectiveofthetarget,participantswereaskedtheextenttowhichtheywouldexperiencethevariouseffectsandtheextenttowhichtheywouldperceivetheaggressortobemotivatedbythevariousfactors.

Participantsrespondingfromtheperspectiveofanaggressorperceivedharmtobeassociatedmorewithdirectandindirectaggressionthanwithpassiveaggression.Controlwasassociatedwithdirectaggression;humiliationandlowlevelsof distress with indirect aggression; guilt with passive aggression. Passive aggressionwasperceivedasbeinglessmotivatedby thedesiretocauseharmtoortohumiliatethevictimandmoremotivatedbythedesiretoinduceguiltthandirector indirect aggression. Nevertheless, passive aggression was perceived as beingintended to cause asmuchdistress asdirect aggressionand more distress thanindirectaggression.

Theperceivedeffectsonvictimofeachtypeofaggressivebehaviorarenotablyconsistentwithperceptionsofaggressormotivation.Fromtheperspectiveofthetargetoftheaggressiveacts,powerwasassociatedwithdirectaggression;humiliationanddistresswithindirectaggression;guiltwithpassiveaggression.Passiveaggressionwasperceivedtoproducelesshumiliation,distress,orharmthaneitheroftheotherformsofaggression.Again,harmwasassociatedprimarilywithdirectandindirectaggression.

Passiveaggressionwasthemostfrequentlyendorsedangerresponseinallthreestudies;ingeneral,participantsreportedmorefrequentuseofpassiveaggressionthaneitherdirectorindirectaggression.Thus,itappearsthataggressionresearchersmaybeignoringaformofaggressionthatpeoplereporttheyengageinquitefrequently.

Insum,ourexaminationofaggressorandvictimperspectivesonthemotivationsandeffectsofdirect,indirect,andpassiveaggressionprovidesafurtherunderstanding of the distinctiveness (or lack thereof) ofpassive aggression.Everydayindirect aggression,which is seenascausingharm,humiliation,anddistress, isconsistentwithourdefinitionofaggression.Everydaypassiveaggressionisseenascausingdistressandguiltbutascausingrelativelylittleharm;soisitaggression?


Conclusion: Is Passive Aggression Aggressive?

Ourseriesofstudiesonpassiveaggressionrevealthatitisan“attractive”responsewhenangrywithsomeone;itisthebehaviorthatrespondentsindicatedtheyperformedmostfrequentlyingeneralandacrossavarietyofrelationshipswhentheywereangry.Thecorrelationsofselfreportsofaggressionwithmeasuresofangersuggestthatnondirectformsofaggression,includingindirectandpassiveaggression,areendorsedespeciallybyindividualswhoreportdifficultyexpressingtheiranger.Thenondirectnatureoftheseformsofaggressionallowstheindividualtorespondwhenangrybuttoavoiddirectconfrontationwiththevictim.

Accordingtocurrentdefinitionsofaggression,abehaviormustbeintendedtocauseharmtobeconsideredasaggressive.Ourresearchsuggeststhatthenatureof that harm may vary with type of aggression. For example, although passiveaggressionwasperceivedtobelessharmfulthanindirectordirectaggression,itwasperceivedasamechanismforinducingguiltandforcausingdistresstothevictim.Aninterestingcorollaryofthisaspectofpassiveaggressionisthattheultimateeffectofthebehavioronthevictimmaydependtoaconsiderableextentonthevictim’schosenresponsetotheaggression.Forexample,ifIintendtoinduceguilt by passive aggressively noting how much hard work I have done for you,butyourefusetoexperienceguilt,thenmypassiveaggressivestrategywillhavefailed.Whenoneadministersdirectverbalorphysicalblowstoavictim—orevenindirectverbalorphysicalblows—itisdifficultforthevictimtoavoidordenytheharm;thevictimhaslittlecontrolovertheadministrationoftheharm.However,in the case of passive aggression, the victim can, in effect, choose whether toacknowledgeorexperiencetheharm.Thismightbeaninterestingquestionforfutureresearchthatwouldfocusondifferentialvictimresponsetopassiveaggressiveattempts.

Insum,theseexaminationsofpassiveaggressionsuggestthatsuchbehaviorisdeservingoftheattentionofaggressionresearchers.Itisabehaviorthatcancauseharm;itisapreferredresponsetoanger;thenatureanddegreeofharmissubjecttointerpretationbythevictim.

pSychological aggreSSionAggressionresearchershavepaidmoreattentiontoeverydayharmthatisreferredtoaspsychologicalaggression,especiallyinthecontextofresearchonintimatepartnerviolence.Althoughtheresearchliteraturerevealsnoconsistentdefinitionofpsychologicalaggression,thedefinitionstypicallyrefertoemotionalharmortheuseoftacticssuchasdegradation,ridicule,andsocialandfinancialisolation.Weconceptualizepsychologicalaggressionasharmfulbehaviorsthatdamagetheselfconceptoftheindividual.The“everyday”natureofthistypeofaggressioncanbeseeninitsprevalenceinintimaterelationships:CapaldiandCrosby(1997)reportedthat80%ofintimatepartnersengagedinatleastoneactofpsychologicalaggressionwhilebeingobserveddiscussingaproblemwithapartner;O’LearyandWilliams(2006)reportedprevalenceratesofapproximately90%inacommunitysample.


Psychologicalaggressionisperceivedbytargetsasmoreharmfulthanphysical aggression (Follingstad, Rutledge,Berg, Hause, &Polek, 1990; Katz, Arias,& Beach, 2000). Studies of the correlates of psychological and physical aggression reveal common predictors (e.g., Hammock, 2003; Hammock & O’Hearn,2002),andthetwoformsofaggressioncommonlycooccur(e.g.,Follingstadetal.;Hamby&Sugarman,1999;Hammock&O’Hearn;Murphy&O’Leary,1989).Someresearchers(e.g.,Murphy&Cascardi,1999;Stets,1991)havesuggestedthattheprimarymotivationforbothformsofaggressioninthecontextofintimatepartnerrelationshipsmaybecontrolofthepartnerandtherelationship.Asisthecasewithpassiveaggression,these“other”motivationsdonotdirectlysuggestintenttoharm,butharmmayneverthelessbetheeffectonthevictim.

Weconductedtwostudiestodeterminehowthirdpartiesperceivethemotivationorintentionsbehindpsychologicallyandphysicallyaggressiveactsinaconflictbetweenahusbandandwife.Thefirststudyexaminedtheeffectsoftypeofaggression(physicalvs.psychological)aswellasgenderofaggressor.Thesecondstudyalsoconsideredtheeffectoftheperceiver’sownexperienceasvictimorperpetratorofaggressioninintimaterelationships.

Participants were asked to imagine that they were observing their marriedneighborshavingafight.Thescenariodepictedacoupleengagedinaheateddiscussionaboutmoney.Someparticipantsreadascenarioabouttheperpetratorusingphysicallyaggressiveactssuchasthrowingbooksatthevictim,slappingthevictim,andslammingthevictimagainstthewall;othersreadabouttheperpetratorusingpsychologicallyaggressiveactssuchasbelittlingthevictimandthevictim’sfamily,ridiculingthevictim,threateningtofinanciallyisolatethevictim,andinsultingthevictim.Wealsomanipulatedgendercompositionoftheperpetrator–victimdyad,withsomeparticipantsreadingabouthusbandtowifeaggressionandothersaboutwifetohusbandaggression.

Participantsrespondedtoquestionsabout their judgmentoftheactionsandactorsinthescenario,suchaswhetherthebehaviordisplayedwouldbeconsideredabusive,whethertheperpetratorshouldbepunishedforhisorheractions,andwhetherthevictimsufferedanyharm.Respondentsalsoreportedtheextenttowhichtheaggressorwasmotivatedtomakethevictimfeelbad,tocontroltherelationship,toinjurethevictim,tohurtthevictim,togainpowerintherelationship,andtocontrolthevictim.

Physical aggression was generally perceived to have more negative outcomesthan psychological aggression. Participants reported that perpetrators of physicalaggressionshouldbepunishedmoreandhadengagedinmoreabusiveactionsthanperpetratorsofpsychologicalaggression.Theyalsoconsideredthevictimofphysicalaggressiontohavesufferedmoreharmthanthevictimofpsychologicalaggression.Nevertheless,thehighratingsforbothformsofaggression(wellabovemidpointofscale)suggestthatpsychologicallyaggressiveactionswereconsideredtobeharmful,abusive,anddeservingofpunishment—justnotasmuchsoasphysicalaggression.

Psychologicallyaggressiveperpetratorswereperceivedtobemoremotivatedto control the relationship or partner, togainpower in the relationship, and tomakethevictimfeelbadthanwerephysicallyaggressiveperpetrators.However,psychologicalandphysicalaggressionwerenotratedasdifferentiallymotivatedto


causeinjuryorhurtthevictim.Thus,itappearsthatthirdpartiesrecognizethattheintentoftheperpetratorofpsychologicalaggressionmaybenegativeinavarietyofways,especiallywithregardtocontrolandpower.

In terms of an overall comparison of psychological and physical aggression,participantsconsideredphysicalaggressiontoleadtomorenegativeoutcomes(e.g.,abuse,harm),buttheydidnotseeitasbeingmoremotivatedtohurtorinjurethevictim.And,assuggestedearlier,psychologicalaggressionwasconsideredtobemoremotivatedtocontrolorgainpowerintherelationships.Intermsofdefiningaggression, perceivers certainly recognize that harm derives from attempts tocausepsychologicaldamagetoapartner.

As mentioned earlier, those who have experienced psychological and physicalaggressionreportthatpsychologicalaggressionismoreharmfulanddamagingthanphysicalaggression(Follingstadetal.,1990;Katzetal.,2000).Therefore,wereasonedthatindividualswhohavebeenvictimsofpsychologicalaggressionmaybemore likely torecognize thepainandharmofsuchactionswhenservingasthirdpartyperceivers.InStudy2wehypothesizedthatthosewhohadbeenvictimsofphysicalorpsychologicalaggressionwouldperceivethoseactionsasmoredamagingthanthosewhohadnotexperiencedsuchvictimization.WemeasuredexperiencewithpsychologicalandphysicalaggressionwiththeAbusiveBehaviorInventory(Shepard&Campbell,1992).

Experiencewithphysicalandpsychologicalaggressiondidnotrelatetoparticipants’judgmentsoftheoutcomesofpsychologicalandphysicalaggression.Again,participants believed the physically aggressive actions of the perpetrator weremoredeservingofpunishmentandmoreabusivethanpsychologicallyaggressiveactions.Theyalsoperceivedthephysicallyaggressiveactsasmorewrongthanthepsychologicallyaggressiveacts.Nevertheless,participantsconsistentlyjudgedthepsychologically aggressive actions quite negatively—though not as negatively asthoseassociatedwithphysicalaggression.

Participantexperienceasvictimsofphysicalaggressiondidnotrelatetoperceptionsofaggressormotivations.However,respondentswhohadmoreexperienceasvictimsofpsychologicalaggressionperceivedthepsychologicallyaggressiveperpetratorasbeingmoremotivatedtomakethevictimfeelbadabouthimselforherselfandmoremotivatedtocontrolthevictimthanthosewhohadlessexperienceasvictimsofpsychologicalaggression.Experiencewithpsychologicalaggressionwasnotrelatedtotheperceptionofphysicalaggression.

Thesestudiestakentogethersuggestthatpeopleperceivepsychologicalaggressionasharmfultothetargetofsuchactions—althoughthereisconsiderablevariabilityinthenatureoftheharmtheyperceivetobeinflicted.Ratherthanharmingthephysicalperson,theharmmaybeintheformofpsychologicaldistress(makingthevictimfeelbadabouthimselforherself)orintermsofmanipulationofthevictim(controllingthe relationshipor victim,gainingpower in the relationship).These typesofharmmaynotcomeimmediatelytomindwhenconsideringtheimpactofaggressiveacts.Nevertheless,thedistressandpowerlessnessexperiencedbythevictimofpsychologicalaggressionarelikelytohaveastrongnegativeimpactontherecipientandontherelationshipbetweenthevictimandtheaggressor,andthesebruisestothepsychearemorefrequentoccurrencesthanthemoresalient,morevisiblebruisestothebody.


concluSionTheprogramsofresearchreviewedinthischapterbringtotheforefrontformsofharmdoingbehaviorthatarefrequentlyignoredbyaggressionresearchers.Thisresearchsuggestsamoreinclusivedefinitionofaggressionthatconsidersaggressiontohaveoccurredifatargethasbeenharmed,thusmovingthefocusfromtheintentoftheaggressortotheeffectonthevictimandrecognizingthatavarietyofaggressormotivationsmayleadtoavarietyofharmfuloutcomesforthevictim.Suchavictimcentereddefinitionwouldmoveustowardnewacceptanceofthesimpledefinitionofaggressionasabehaviorthatcausesharm.

Orwemaywanttoconsiderarevolutionarysocialpsychologicaldefinitionofaggressionthatwouldincorporatetheintentionoftheaggressortoproducenegativeoutcomesforatargetwhoexperiencesharm.Suchanapproach,whichwoulddefineaggressionasaninteraction,wouldbetrulysocialpsychological.

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appendix a. paSSive aggreSSion itemS for reviSed rcrQ

1.Didnotdowhatthepersonwantedmetodo. 2.Mademistakesthatappearedtobeaccidental. 3.Seemeduninterestedinthingsthatwereimportanttotheperson. 4.Gavethepersonthe“silenttreatment.” 5.Ignoredtheperson’scontributions. 6.Excludedthepersonfromimportantactivities. 7.Avoidedinteractingwiththeperson. 8.Failedtodenyfalserumorsabouttheperson. 9.Failedtoreturncallsorrespondtomessages. 10.Showeduplateforplannedactivities. 11.Sloweddownontasks.

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5PushingUptoaPoint

The Psychology of Interpersonal Assertiveness

DANIELAMESColumbia University

O nmostdays,itdoesnottakeagreatdealofsocial interactionforustorememberthatotherpeoples’goalsandinterestsarenotperfectlyalignedwithourown.Wewanttosleepinlate,andourspouseorchildwantsto

getupearly.Wewantacleansidewalk,butourneighborforgetstopickupafterhisdog.Wewantourworkcolleaguestomeetthedeadlinestheyhavegivenus,butapparentlytheyhaveotherplans.Wishingitwereotherwise—thateveryonewouldwantexactlythesamethingswedo—isfolly.Besides,itwouldnotmakeforaveryinterestingworld;varietyisthespiceoflife.Sodealingwiththis“spice”isasignificantpartofthehumancondition.Howdowecopewiththeeverpresentfactthatotherssurrounduswhoseinterestsandgoalsdivergefrom,andsometimesoppose,ourown?Dowepresshardforourgoalstobesatisfied—and,ifso,why?Doweyieldtoothers’claims—and,ifso,when?

Inthischapter,Iwanttoarguethatthesequestionsofhowhardwepushpervadeandtosomeextentdefineourlives.Accordingly,thematterofwhenandwhypeoplepushhardorrelentininterpersonalconflictslargeandsmalldeservesconsiderableattentionandcare.Indeed,fordecadesithasbeenatopicofacademicscrutinyintheliteraturesoninterpersonalconflict,negotiation,andsocialdilemmas.There,awellestablishedthemeintheaccountofwhopusheshardandwhyisthatmotivationsplayacentralrole.Somepeoplecaremoreaboutwinning;othersjustwanttogetalong.Thisseemsirrefutable.Onegoalofthepresentchapteristodescribepastandrecentworkthattakesacomplimentaryapproachtomotivationfocusedaccounts,highlightingtheroleofexpectanciesininterpersonalassertiveness.Pushinghardisnotsolelyafunctionofwhatpeoplewantbutalsoofwhattheybelievewillhappen

daniel ameS66

whentheymakeforcefuldemandsorcapitulatetoothers’requests.Icontendthatacompleteaccountofinterpersonalassertivenessneedsbothofthesepieces—expectanciesandmotivations.Andbecauseourliveshavesomuchspiceinthem,withthequestionof“howhardshouldIpush”shapingourbehaviorfromsunrisetosleep,weneedacompleteaccountofinterpersonalassertiveness.

aSSertiveneSS definedIbeginbyclarifyingwhat Imeanby the termassertiveness,whichcomesnotsomuchfromanapriori scholarlymodelbut frommy interpretationofeveryday perceptions of interpersonal behavior. This could be seen as a folk modelof interpersonal assertiveness: a continuousdimensioncharacterizing howpersonsbehaveorrespondinasituationinwhichtheirpositionsorinterestsare,orcouldbe,inconflictwithothers’positionsorinterests.Inotherwords,whengoalsdiverge,howharddopeoplepushfortheirowninterests?Inconsideringthesetofanactor’spossibleresponsesinanygivensocialconflict,Ibelievebothactorsandobserverscanandoftendoarraybehaviorsalongaroughdimensionofassertivenessrangingfrompassivityandcapitulationatoneextremetoaggressionandhostilityattheother.LaterinthischapterIdiscusshowthisunidimensionalmodeloffolkperceptionsfitswithpasttheoreticaldistinctions(e.g.,betweenassertionandaggression).

Someconcreteexampleshelptoillustrateassertivenessasitisapproachedinthis chapter. Imagine that members of a newly formedacademic research centermeettodiscussaseniorhire.Onememberadvocatesaparticularchoice,butanother believes this would be a disastrous move. Does the skeptical memberunequivocallydisparagetheproposedchoiceandchampionherownideas?Doesshemakeamoremeasuredobservationaboutexpandingthesetofoptions?Ordoessheholdbackentirely,hopingsomeoneelsewillbreakthesilence?

Imagine directors of two nonprofit organizations who share a building areplanningformuchneededrenovations.Onedirectorbeginsbytellingtheotherheexpectshisorganization’sspacetobeentirelyrefurbishedeventhoughheintendstopayonlyasmallshareofthecost.Doestheotherdirectorforcefullyrejecttheproposalanddemandgreatercostsharing?Doessheprobeforflexibility,andproposerevisionstotheplan?Ordoessheaccepttheofferasgiven?

Last,consideramanagerconcernedwithhersubordinate’stimemanagementskills.Doessheconfronthimdirectly,stressingnegativerepercussionsifhefailstoimprove?Doessheraisequestionsandoffersuggestionsforchange?Ordoessheavoidtheissuealtogether,hopingitwillcorrectitselfintime?

Thesecaseshighlightthekindsofdailychoicesindividualsmakeintheirinterpersonal assertiveness toward others. These situations and behaviors may seemdisparate,butIbelievethattheyhavecommonunderlyingpsychologicalprocessesthatshapeactors’choicesaboutbehaviorandobservers’interpretationsofacts.Idefineassertiveness as adimension ineverydayperceptions reflecting individuals’ interpersonal willingness to stand up and speak out for their own interestsandideas,pursuingtheirobjectivesandresistingothers’impositions.AsshowninFigure 5.1,oneendofthisfolkspectrumentailspassivityandyielding,whereas

puShing up to a point 67

theotherendfeaturesaggressionandhostility.Inbetweenaregradationsrangingfromengagementandinitiationtocollaborationandresistance.

Thisunidimensionalapproachmayseemtoconfounddimensionsthatdeservetobeseparated(e.g.,howmuchoneasksforvs.howoneasksforit)andtomakeneighbors out of constructs that are qualitatively foreign to one another (e.g.,aggressionandassertion).AfirstpointtonoteisthatIusethetermassertivenessheretodescribethewidespectrumthatgradespossibleresponsesinsocialconflict(i.e.,someactsareseenasmoreorlessassertivethanothers)ratherthanaparticularpointorsubrangeofresponsesonthespectrum(i.e.,“assertivebehaviors”asthosethatfallbetweenpassivityandaggression).Asecondpointtostressisthatthisspectrumreflectseveryday perceptionsofpossibleresponsesinasocialconflict.Whenpeoplethinkabouthowhardtheymightpushinasocialconflict,Isuggesttheyoftenconsidergradationsofresponsesrangingfrom“givingin”to“askingforwhatIwant”to“demandingthatIgetmyway.”Scholarshaveunderstandablytakenpainstodistinguishbetweenconstructssuchasassertiveness,oftendefinedasexpressingone’sowninterests,andaggression,usuallyseenasinvolvingcoercionoranintenttoharm(e.g.,DeGiovanni&Epstein,1978;seealsoChapter4inthisvolume).Myargumentdoesnotdenytheimportanceofsuchscholarlydistinctionsbutratherreflectsthefactthattheseboundariesmaybeblurredorgradualinfolkjudgments(whichisexactlywhyscholarshaveworkedsohardtobeprecise

Conflict Avoidant,trivializing

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figure 5.1 Theeverydayperceptionofassertiveness.

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intheirowndiscussions).Thepresentmodelsimplysuggeststhatpeoplemayconsider the implications of different, perhaps qualitatively disparate, responses insocialconflict,decidingthatsomegotoofarwhereasothersdon’tgofarenough.Whetherthisapproachhasmeritshouldbejudged,Ithink,byhowwellitfaresinpredictingbehaviorinsocialconflict.

aSSertiveneSS and outcomeSIeventuallywanttopresentanaccountofchoicesofassertivebehaviors(howdopeopledecidehowhardtopush?),butIfirstturntosomeevidenceofhowassertiveness relates to actual interpersonal outcomes (what happens when someonepushes hard?). This step lays important groundwork for the nature and role ofassertivenessexpectanciesbecauseitseemsentirelylikelythatpeoples’folktheoriesofassertivenesswillatleastpartlyreflecthowactualassertivenessplaysout.Putanotherway,peopledecidehowhardtopush inpartbecause theypredict,flawlesslyornot,whathappenswhentheypushhardorrelentinaparticularsituation.Sowhathappenswhenpeoplepushhardorgivein?

MyanswertothisquestioncomesfromresearchI’vedonewithFrankFlynninthedomainoforganizationalleadership(Ames&Flynn,2007;seeAmes,2008a;Ames,2009forreviews).Webeganbyreviewingthousandsofopenendedanonymous comments professionals, including working managers and MBA students,gathered from coworkers on their behavioral strengths (e.g., what makes themeffective)andweaknesses(e.g.,whatbehaviorscouldbedevelopedorimproved).Assertivenesswasnotmuchofafactorincommentsaboutstrengths,whichtendedtorevolvearoundintelligenceandconscientiousness.However,referencestoassertivenessdominatedweaknesscomments.Importantly,theydidsoinbothdirections,withsomecommentsreferringtotoomuchassertivenessandothersreferringtotoolittle.Whatmanyprofessionalsandleadersstrugglewith,atleastintheeyesofonlookers,isstrikingtherightbalancewithassertiveness,pushinghardenoughtogetthingsdonebutnotsohardthattheyfailtogetalong.

Thisstandsincontrasttoalongtraditionofworkonindividualdifferencesaslinearpredictorsofleadershipeffectiveness—thoughthereareimportantexceptions, such as Fleishman (1995) and Simonton (1985). Past work has tended tohypothesizeaboutandtestforqualitiesthatarepositivelyandlinearlyassociatedwith leadership—that is, more of a given attribute (e.g., intelligence, ambition,extraversion)meansmoreeffectiveleadership.However,ourworkonqualitativecommentsfromcoworkerssuggestedacurvilinear,invertedUshapedrelationshipbetweenassertivenessandleadershipeffectiveness.Indeed,severalfollowupstudieswithmanagersusingcontinuousratingmeasureshaveshownthatbothcomparativelylowandcomparativelyhighassertiveleaderswereratedaslesseffectivebycoworkersthanthoseinthemiddlerange(Ames&Flynn,2007).

To unpack why this happens, we decomposed outcomes into two domains:instrumentalandrelationaloutcomes.Inbrief,wefoundthateachdomainseemedtoaccountfortheeffectatoneendofthespectrum.Instrumentaloutcomes(getting one’s way, getting things done) seem to improve noticeably as actors movefromlowtomoderateassertiveness,withfewergainsbeyondthatpoint.Relational


outcomes(gettingalongwithothers)seemtoimproveconsiderablyasactorsmovefromhightomoderateassertiveness,withfewgainsbeyondthatpoint.Thus,highassertiveleaderstendedtobeineffectivelargelybecausetheyfailedtogetalong,whereaslowassertiveleaderstendedtobeineffectivelargelybecausetheyfailedtogettheirwayorgetthingsdone.

Ibelievethelessonsfromthisworkonorganizationalleadershipholdmoregenerally,characterizingtheconsequencesofinterpersonalassertivenessasacurvilineareffectwithinstrumentalandrelationalcomponents.Whathappenswhenpeoplepush very hard? They may undermine their relationships without gaining muchinstrumentally.Whathappenswhenpeoplegivein?Theymayloseinstrumentallywithoutgainingmuchrelationally.Whilesituationaldifferencessurelydictatedifferentappropriate levelsofassertiveness inagivensituation(seeAmes,2009), itseemsthattheremaybesomemiddlerangeofassertivenessthattendstooptimizeoutcomes.Thisideaisthestartingpointforanexpectancybasedaccountofassertivebehavioralchoices:whatdoesanindividualactorbelieveistheoptimallevelofassertiveness?Doindividualsvaryinwheretheybelievethisoptimalpointlies—anddoessuchvariancepredicttheirbehavioralchoices?Thenotionthatexpectancies suchas thesegovernbehavior iscertainlynotnewandsobeforezeroing inspecificallyonassertivenessexpectancies,itisworthrecognizingthiscontext.

expectancieSFrom its earliest days, psychology has portrayed people as having expectationsaboutothersaroundthemandsuggestedthatthesebeliefshaveafunctioninregulatingbehavior(seeRoese&Sherman,2007forareview).Muchofthescholarshipon interpersonal expectancies has focusedonexpectations about other people’scharacteristicsandbehavior,asinworkonstereotypingandselffulfillingprophecies(e.g.,Miller&Turnbull,1986).Another importantandrelevant traditionofwork,addressedinChapter2inthisvolume,examinesthenatureanddevelopmentofpeople’sinternalworkingmodelsofothersandtheirinterpersonalattachmentstyles(seealsoCampbell,Simpson,Boldry,&Kashy,2005;Pietromonaco&Barrett,2000).Numerousresearchershavehighlightedtheroleofcompetitiveexpectationsaboutothers,linkingconflictbehaviorstoapredictionthatone’sconflictpartnermay beaggressive, hostile, or untrustworthy (e.g., Crick& Dodge,1994; Diekmann,Tenbrunsel, & Galinsky, 2003; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; VanLange,1992).

Suchbasicexpectationsaboutothers—whetherintheformofastereotype,anattachmentstyle,orsomeotherkindofrepresentation—arecertainlyimportantin shapingbehavior.However, theassertivenessexpectancyaccountpresentedheredepartsfromthistraditionbyemphasizingexpectedreactionsbyanothertoone’sownassertivebehavior.Rather thanbasicornoncontingentexpectancies,thisaccountdealswithcontingentones:IfIdoX,thisotherpersonwilldo,think,orfeelY.Buildingonsocialcognitivemodelsofbehavior(e.g.,Bandura,1986;Mischel&Shoda,1995),severalnoteworthytraditionsofworkhaveexamined suchcontingentexpectancies.Onebodyof researchdealswith relationalschemasorscriptsandtheirimpactonrelationshipbehaviorandselfconstrual

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(seeBaldwin&Dandeneau,2005forareview).Researchinthisveinhasshown,forinstance,thattheamountofangerdisplayedinacloserelationshipdependsonanticipatedpartnerresponse(Fehr,Baldwin,Collins,Patterson,&Benditt,1999).Arelatedareaofinquiryhasexaminedrejectionsensitivity,whichrevolvesaround“anxiousexpectations”ofinterpersonalrejectionandtheassociatedactivationofdefensiveresponsesthatcanhavenegativeorevenselffulfillingeffects(e.g., Downey & Feldman, 1996). Elsewhere, researchers examining genderdynamicsinnegotiationhavelinkedwomen’sassertivebehaviorsto“anticipatedbacklash,”namely,women’s expectationsofhow theirbehavior willbe viewedandderogatedbyothers(Amanatullah&Morris,2010;Bowles,Babcock,&Lai,2007).

Inalloftheseprogramsofwork,peopleareportrayedashavingdifferentinternalmodelsofhowotherswill reactto themor theirbehavior.Persontopersonvarianceinthesemodelshasbeenlinkedtoavarietyofinterpersonalbehaviorsand outcomes, such as psychological adjustment. Together, this body of worksuggeststhatthereissubstantialpromiseinexploringhowgeneralassertivenessexpectanciesmightshapebehavior—howhardpeoplepush—acrossavarietyofcontexts.Thosewhopessimisticallyexpectthathighlevelsofassertivenesswillbecostlywilltendtoshowlowerlevelsofassertivenessthanthosewhooptimisticallybelievethathighlevelsofassertivenessbringbenefits.However,toharnessassertivenessexpectanciesinourconceptualmodelsandtousetheminourresearch,wefirstneedtoestablishtheformtheseexpectanciestypicallytakeandhowtheycanbestbemeasured,amattertowhichIturnnext.

the nature of aSSertiveneSS expectancieSBasedonthepriorworkshowingthatinterpersonalassertivenessoftenhasacurvilinear,invertedUshapedeffectoninterpersonalrelations(Ames&Flynn,2007),Iexpectthatmanypeoplewillhavecurvilinearexpectancies,assumingthattheycanpushuptoapointbutnofurtherwithoutincurringdamagetotheiroutcomesor relationships. For instance, in a negotiation, people may feel that making amoderatelyassertiveopeningofferingcouldbeeffectivebutthatatsomepointofheightenedassertivenessanopeningcouldbackfire,underminingbothresultsandrelationships.Whilepeopleingeneralmayshowthisformofexpectancy,individualswillvaryinwhatpointtheythinktheycanpushupto.Somemaybeveryoptimistic,assumingtheycandisplayveryhigh levelsof interpersonalassertivenessbeforeincurringcosts.Othersmaybemuchmorepessimistic,assumingthatevenmodestlevelsofassertivenesscouldspelltrouble.Ifthischaracterizationiscorrect,itwouldinvitearesearchapproachthatattemptsto identifyanindividual’sperceived“optimal”levelofassertivenessorsomekindofproxyforthisexpectancy.

Itestedthisideabyaskingresearchparticipantstoliterallydrawtheirexpectancies(Ames,2008,Study1).Participantsreceivedablankchart,withanxaxisindicatingdegreesofassertivenessandayaxisindicatingeithersocialorinstrumentaloutcomes;theywerethenaskedtodrawalinerepresentingtheoutcomestheywouldgenerallyexpectforeachlevelofassertiveness.Pilotworkshowedthatpeoplefoundthistasktobeanintuitivewayofexpressingtheirexpectationsthat


weresometimeshardtoputintowords.Asexpected,themajorityofparticipants(some60to70%)drewlinesthathadaclearinvertedUshape,withamidpointanddownturnedends,forbothsocialandinstrumentaloutcomes.Responsesfromundergraduate students and MBA students were nearly identical. This suggeststhatassertivenessexpectanciesoftentaketheformofimplyinganidealoroptimallevelofassertivenessthatvariesfromonepersontothenextandcouldbetakenasameasureofexpectancies.Thedrawingresultsalsoshowedgreatestvarianceattheextremes:mosteveryoneagreedthatsomemiddlelevelofassertivenessledtogoodoutcomes;peoplevariedmoreconsiderablyontheoutcomestheythoughtwouldbeassociatedwithextremelevelsofassertiveness.Thiswasespeciallytruefor expected instrumental outcomesathighassertiveness: somepeople thoughthigh assertiveness would bring instrumental gains, and others thought it wouldbackfire(seeFigure 5.2).Thissuggeststhatexpectedoutcomesforveryhighlevelsofassertivenesswouldbeanotherwayofmeasuringexpectancies.

aSSertiveneSS expectancieS and BehaviorHavingcharacterizedassertivenessexpectanciesasoftentakingacurvilinearformandvaryingfrompersontopersonatextremelevelsofassertiveness,Isoughtevidencelinkingtheseexpectanciestobehavior.Initialevidencecomesfromthepreviouslynotedlinedrawingstudy(Ames,2008),wheremeasuresofbothoptimalassertiveness(thelevelofassertivenessforeachparticipantthatyieldedthegreatestsocialorinstrumentaloutcomes)andextremeassertiveness(theexpectedsocialor instrumental outcomes for the lowestorhighest levelsof assertiveness)wereassociatedwithselfreportedassertiveness.However,nonselfreportmeasuresofassertivenesswouldarguablymakeamorecompellingcase.

In subsequent studies (Ames, 2008, Studies 3 and 4), I pursued and foundsuch evidence. For the independent measure of expectancies, participants predictedsocialandinstrumentaloutcomesforarangeofspecificbehaviorsspanningfromlowassertivenesstohighassertiveness.Forinstance,participantsreviewedascenarioinvolvingamanager’slowballofferinasalarynegotiation.Participantswentontoconsideranumberofresponses,rangingfromacceptingthelowball

Social outcomes

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figure 5.2 Plotsofexpectancydrawingmeansandvariance.

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offertorespondingwithanaggressivecounteroffer,andthenratedtheoutcomestheyexpectedwould result, suchasfinalnegotiated salary and liking and trustforthenewemployeeonbehalfofthemanager.Inanotherscenario,participantsimaginedtheywereinateammeetingwithafellowmanagerwhorecommendedastrategicinitiativetheyknewwouldnotbesuccessful.Participantsratedoutcomesforresponsesrangingfromsayingnothingtovociferouslyandforcefullyobjecting.Ineffect,acrossthesescenarios,participantsmadeaforecastofwhattheythoughtwouldhappeniftheyyieldedgroundorfoughthard.Towhatextentwouldtheygettheirway?Andtowhatextentwouldtheygetalong?Theseexpectanciesservedasanindependentvariable,tappingintoparticipants’moregeneralviewsofwhathappenswhentheypushhardorgivein.

Asexpected,participants’selfreportedexpectancymeasuresbasedonaseriesofspecificbuthypotheticalsituationspredictedindicesofparticipants’assertivebehaviorbasedonreportsfromnegotiationcounterpartsandreallifecoworkers.Thosewhoexpectedrelativelyminimalcostsforhighlevelsofinterpersonalassertiveness (e.g., they thought a manager would find an aggressive counteroffer inthesalarynegotiationacceptable)wereseenbypartnersinanunrelateddyadic,fixedsumnegotiationexerciseasconsiderablymoreassertive.Expectanciesalsopredictedthevalueclaimedinnegotiationsettlements:thosewhoweremoreoptimisticaboutthepayoffsofhighlyassertivebehaviorachievedmorefavorabledealterms.Inanotherstudy,participantswereratedbyworkcolleaguesfortheirtypicallevelofassertivenessintheactualworkplace(e.g.,standingtheirgroundinaconflict).Aspredicted,workcolleaguessawthosewhoweremoreoptimisticaboutthepayoffsofhighlyassertivebehaviorinthescenariosasconsiderablymoreassertiveintheworkplace.

TheevidenceIhavegatheredsuggeststhatindividuals’assertivenessexpectancieshaveaplaceinpredictingtheirbehavior.Whilemyworktodatehasgaugedonly certain kinds of assertive behavior, I suspect assertiveness expectanciesshape other behaviors as well, including those addressed elsewhere in this volume.Forinstance,Chapter11addressesintimatepartnerviolence,notingmodels(e.g.,HoltzworthMunroe,1992)thatdescribehowindividualschoosebehavioralresponses, ranging frompassivityor acquiescence to violence,based inpartontheir expectations of the behavior’s consequences. Chapters 3 and 13 addressaggressioninthewakeofostracism.Expectanciesaboutwhatdifferentbehaviorswillachieve(e.g.,renewedacceptancebytheostracizers,punishingoutcomesfortheostracizers,experiencedremorseonbehalfoftheostracizers)mayplayaroleinresponsestobeingostracized.Chapter9notesworkonthedisplayofangerinconflictandnegotiations.Somedisplaysarecertainlyspontaneousanduncontrolled,whereasotherdisplaysmaybecalculated.Behindthesecalculateddisplayslikelylieexpectancies,whetherrightorwrong,aboutwhatdisplaysofangerwillachieve(e.g., intimidation).Chapter10presentsacompellingmotivationalmodelofterroristbehaviorrevolvingaroundthequestforsignificance.Expectanciesmayhelpdelineatetheseprocesses:chartinganindividual’sexpectanciesaboutwhichactswillleadtowhatkindsofsignificance(e.g.,“IfIdieinanattackIwillbemartyred”vs.“Only ifIbothdieandkillotherswillIbemartyred”)couldhelpusbetterunderstandandpossiblycurtailactsofdramaticviolenceandharm.


Insum,peoplevaryinwhattheyexpecthappenswhentheypushhardorgivein,andtheseidiosyncraticexpectanciesarepredictiveofatleastsomeassertivebehaviors.Butaretheseeffectsdistinctfromtheeffectsofmotivations,suchasadesireto win or a concern for maintaining relationships?Areexpectancies themselvesmerelyreflectionsofmotivations?Thenextsectiontakesupthesequestions.

aSSertiveneSS expectancieS and motiveSOverthelasthalfcentury,scholarsofconflict,negotiation,andsocialdilemmashaverepeatedlylinkedinterpersonalconflictbehaviortounderlyingmotivations—variously identifiedaspreferences,concerns,priorities, orientations, andvalues.While interactionspecific objectives surelymatter (e.g., “Iwantmymanager togivemea10%raise today”),considerableattentionhasbeenpaidtomoregeneralsocialmotives(e.g.,“Idon’tcarewhathappenstoothersaslongasIgetwhatI want”). One of the most active traditions of such work revolves around dualconcerntheory(e.g.,Carnevale&Pruitt,1992)andmotivationalorientations(e.g.,Messick&McClintock,1968),whichpositthatpeoplevaryintheirattitudesabouttheir own and their conflict partners’ outcomes. Combinations of these dimensions yield different orientations that are often labeled proself or competitive(concernedwithmaximizingthepositivedifferencebetweenselfandother),individualist(concernedsolelywithone’sownoutcome),andprosocialorcooperative(concernedwithmaximizingjointoutcomes).Anabundanceofresearchhaslinkedthesesocialvalueorientationstoassertivebehaviorsinsocialdilemmasandgames(e.g.,McClintock&Liebrand,1988;VanLange,1999)andinconflictandnegotiation (e.g.,DeDreu&VanLange,1995;DeDreu,Weingart,&Kwon,2000;Olekalns&Smith,2003).

While thesesocialorientationsseemtoaccount for thebulkofmotivationalworkonconflictbehavior,otherinterpersonalmotiveshavebeeninvokedaswell,suchascommunalvalues(e.g.,Amanatullah,Morris,&Curhan,2008),agreeableness(e.g.,Barry&Friedman,1998;Graziano,JensenCampbell,&Hair,1996),andneedtobelong(e.g.,Baumeister&Leary,1995;DeCremer&Leonardelli,2003).Inaddition,thereisevidencetosuggestthatidentitymotivations,suchastheneedtosavefaceormaintainanimageoftoughness,canaffectconflictbehavior(e.g.,White,Tynan,Galinsky,&Thompson,2004).Inshort,ampleevidenceshowsthatwhatpeoplecareaboutaffectstheirassertivenessinconflictandnegotiation.Putsimply,motivesmatter.

Theresultsaboutexpectanciesreviewedaboveraisethequestionabouthowmotivesandexpectanciesrelate.Willthelinkbetweenexpectanciesandbehaviorremainaftercontrollingformotivations,orwillitbeovershadowed?Areexpectanciessimplyderivativesofmotives?Iexpectthatwhereasassertivenessexpectanciesmightberelatedtosocialmotivations,anindependentexpectancy–behaviorlinkwillgenerallyremainaftercontrollingformotivations.Thelogiccanbeillustratedbyworkinthedomainofriskychoicethatdistinguishesbetweenriskpreferencesandriskperceptions(e.g.,Weber&Milliman,1997).Riskpreferences,analogoustomotivations,concernaperson’sappetiteforrisk.Riskperceptions,analogoustoexpectanciesinthecurrentaccount,concernaperson’sassessmentofhowrisky

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a given option is.Empirically, these preference andperceptionconstructs haveproventobedistinctandbothappeartoexhibitindependenteffectsonriskychoice(e.g.,Weber&Hsee,1998).Twopeoplecouldhaveidenticalriskpreferencesbutdifferintheirchoicesbecauseoneperceivestheoptionasriskyandtheotherdoesnot.Inthedomainofconflict,twopeoplecouldhaveidenticalmotives—thesameconcernsformaintainingrelationships,forinstance—butdifferintheirassertivenesssimplybecauseoneexpectsabehaviorwoulddamagearelationshipandtheotherdoesnot.

Inbrief,therecentworkIhavedoneonassertivenessexpectanciesisconsistentwith this idea.Across the studies (Ames,2008), I foundweakornonsignificantlinksbetweenexpectancies andmeasuresofmotivations, including social valueorientations, conflict styles,unmitigated communion, and basic questions aboutconcernsforwinningandmaintainingrelationships.Inotherwords,expectanciesarenotmerereflectionsofmotivations.Further,acrossthestudies,bothexpectanciesandmotivationsappearedtobesimultaneouslyandseparatelypredictiveofbehavior,suggestingthattheyeachhaveadistinctroletoplay.Assertivebehaviorappearstobeaproductofbothwhatpeoplecareaboutandwhattheybelievewillhappenwhentheygiveinorpushhard.

I have not yet found evidence for an interaction between expectancies andmotivations.However,thelogicforsuchinteractionsseemsclear.Imagineateamleader advocating on her team’s behalf to an organizational leader. She mightexpectthatthehardershepushesthemorecostlyitwillbeintermsofherrelationshipwithher leaderbutthebettershewilldointermsofresourcesforherteam.Alongwiththesetwoexpectancieswouldbetwomotivations:concernforherrelationshipwiththeleaderandconcernwiththeresourcesforherteam.Itstandstoreasonthatifshecaresvastlymoreabout,say,herteam’sresources,theresourceexpectancywouldbemorepredictiveofherbehaviorthantherelationshipexpectancy.Alternately,ifshecaresverylittleabouttheteam’sresources,itseemsunlikelythattheresourceexpectancywouldbeapowerfulpredictorofherbehavior.Inshort,theexpectanciesthatmattermostinpredictingourbehaviorarelikelythoseaboutoutcomesthatmeanthemosttous.Afullaccountofinterpersonalassertivenessandbehavioralchoicewould likelyneedtohaveroles forbothmotivationsandexpectanciesaswellasaninteractionbetweenthetwo.

SourceS of expectancieSEvidencethatexpectanciesareanimportantpredictorofassertivebehaviornaturally raises another question: where do expectancies come from? The fact thatexpectancies seem to carry across domains implies an underlying core, such asbasicworkingmodelsfortheself,others,andrelationshipsthatarebuiltupoverthecourseof a lifetime (Chapter2 in this volume).Selfesteemmaybepartofthiscore.BaldwinandKeelan(1999)arguedthatindividualshigherintraitselfesteem had morepositive interpersonal expectancies about theirownability tosecureaffiliationfromothers.Indeed,therewassomeevidenceofamodestpositivelinkbetweenselfesteemandoptimalassertivenessinthelinedrawingstudydiscussed earlier (Ames, 2008, Study1).Those lower in selfesteemwere more


pessimisticabouttheirabilitytopursuetheirinterestswithoutsufferingrelationalcosts.Futureworkmightfurtherexplorethelinksbetweenassertivenessexpectanciesandrelevantworkingmodelsorschema,suchasselfesteem,rejectionsensitivity,andattachmentstyles.

Whileexpectanciesmaybepartlyrootedinlongheldmodelsthataccumulateoveralifetime,theymayalsobeshapedandreinforced—validlyornot—bymoreimmediateevidence.Partof theprocessnodoubt reflects the fact thatpeopleonly experience the outcomes of behaviors they choose, not of behaviors theyforego.Suchisthecasewithanxietydisorders,wheresomeoneafraidofdrivingoverbridges for fearofcollapse, for example,neverdoes soand thusdoesnotexperience theoutcomeofdriving safelyoverabridge, left instead to imaginethattheworstmighthavehappenedifshehaddoneso.Someonewhoispessimisticaboutassertinghisownopinioninagroupsettingsystematicallyholdsback,neverexperiencingthepositiveeffectsofspeakingupandthusneveroverturninghisoverlypessimisticexpectancy.Confirmationbiasesandselective interpretation no doubt also play a role. Someone who is optimistic about her ability topush hard without damaging relationships may see what she expects to see inthewakeofaconflict.Shemaytakesuperficialsignsofacceptanceasasignalofhercounterpart’scontentmenteventhoughthecounterpart’sampleresentmentislingeringbelowthesurface.

Another typeofevidence forexpectancies is“vicariousexperience” throughvariousmediasources.Peopleofallagesarefrequentlyexposedtomediaportraitsof assertion–outcome contingencies, as when characters in movies or televisionshowaggressionandexperiencepositiveornegativeoutcomes (e.g.,Huesmann,MoiseTitus, Podolski, & Eron, 2003). As Chapter 17 in this volume notes, theInternetisincreasinglyubiquitousasasourceofinformation,givingviewersnewwaystowatchactualactsofaggression(e.g.,videosof“happyslapping”aggression)ortoassertthemselvesorwatchothersassertthemselvesinnovelways(e.g.,flaminginachatroomorpostingdisparagingremarkstoaFacebookpage).Elsewhere,workonvideogameviolenceexaminestheimpactofgameplayingandexposureonbehavior(e.g.,Andersonetal.,2004).Together,thesetraditionsofworkhighlightthatthedevelopmentofassertivenessexpectanciesislikelynotsimplyaproductof one’s own direct experience with assertion and outcomes but partly a productofthecontingenciespresentedinthemediaenvironment.Totheextentthatpeoplearechronicallyexposedtooverlyoptimisticassertivenesscontingenciesinthemedia(e.g.,thataggressionreliablybringsdesirableoutcomes),theymaycometoholdexpectanciesthatreflectsuchcontingenciesandbehaveaccordingly.Oneimplicationisthatthelinkbetweenmediaexposureorconsumptionandaggressivebehaviormaybepartiallymediatedbyexpectancies.

Situational influences could also affect expectancies in “nonevidentiary”ways (i.e., throughprocesses other than apparentevidencewhathappens whenonepusheshardorgivesin).Forinstance,whileattachmentstylesmayreflectasomewhatstableinterpersonalschema,evidencesuggeststhatattachmentmotivationscanalsobeprimedandmanipulated,suchasthroughfocusingindividualsonvariousattachmentfigures(seeChapter2inthisvolume).Researchonmoodalsosuggeststhatthoseinhappycomparedwithsadmoodsarelesspoliteintheir

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interpersonalrequestsfromothers(Forgas,1999).Itcouldbethathappymoodsengendermoreoptimisticassertivenessexpectancieswhereassadmoodsengendermorepessimisticones.Situations thatpromote or inhibit empathicor cognitiveperspective takingcouldalsoaffectexpectationsabouthowotherswill react toone’sownassertiveoracquiescentbehavior(seeChapter7inthisvolume).

Foravarietyofreasons—suchasdevelopmentalhistory,distortedormisinterpretedevidence,andsituationalfactors—peoplemayoftenhavemisguidedexpectanciesandmaynoteffectivelybringtheminlinewithreality.Theimplicationmayseemdisconcerting:lefttotheirowndevices,peoplewithmisguidedexpectanciesmightpersistinbehavingonthebasisofdistortedforecasts.However,Ibelievethefactsthatexpectanciesshapebehaviorandthatexpectanciescanberevisedin the face of evidence and feedback is a rather hopeful one. Although peoplemaynotnaturallyorspontaneouslyconfronttherightkindsofevidence,individuals,organizations,andtrainerscanfindwaystohelpthemdoso,potentiallyleadingtomoreeffectiveassertivenessandconstructiveinterpersonalconflict.Withinorganizations,multiraterfeedbackhasthepotentialtodeliverusefulinformation;inbusinessschools,negotiations trainingwithroleplayexercisesanddebriefingoftenhelpsindividualcalibratetheirsenseofwhathappenswhentheypushhardorgivein.

expectancieS and other experienceSOthercontributionsinthisvolumehaveencouragedmetothinkbeyondthefocalquestionofthischapter(whenandwhydopeoplepushmoreorlessininterpersonal conflicts?)and toconsiderhowexpectanciesmight relate tootherexperiences.Chapter12inthisvolumedescribesaresearchprogramchartinghowgoalsimilaritypredictsconflictinromanticrelationships:partnerswhohavelessgoalsimilarityreportmoreconflictintheirrelationships.Itispossiblethatsimilarityanddivergencebetweeninstrumentalandrelationalexpectanciescouldshedlightonconflictinromanticrelationships.WhileIhavegenerallyfocusedoninstrumentalandrelationalexpectancieshavingacommoncore(e.g.,peoplewhoareoptimisticaboutinstrumentaloutcomesforpushinghardtendtobemoreoptimisticaboutrelationaloutcomes,too),theycanalsodiverge.Takethecaseofapersonwithveryoptimisticinstrumentalexpectanciesaboutherpersonalgoals(e.g.,“IfIresistmyspouse’sdemandsonmytime,Icandevotemoretomyworkandachievegreaterprofessionalsuccess”)butverypessimisticrelationalexpectancies(e.g.,“IfIresistmyspouse’sdemandsonmytime,hewillresentmeandourrelationshipwillsuffer”).Suchapatterncouldbeastressfulone,regardlessoftheactor’sbehavioralchoices.Contrastthiswithapersonwhohasoptimisticrelationalexpectanciesinadditiontoinstrumentalones(e.g.,“IfIresistmyspouse’sdemandsonmytime,hewillunderstandandourrelationshipwillremainsecure”).Thispersonmaynotfeelabindortradeoff,thoughitispossiblethattheseoptimisticexpectanciescouldleadtobehavioralchoicesthatwouldcreaterelationshipstress.

Chapter14inthisvolumedescribeshowtheimpactofavictim’sforgivenessinthewakeofatransgressiondependsontheextentandqualityoftheharmdoer’samendmaking.Victimswhoshowedforgivenesstowardaharmdoerwhofailedto


makeamendshadlowersubsequentselfrespectthanthosewhoforgaveaharmdoerwhomadeamends.Itseemslikelythatsomepeoplearesimplyhabitual“forgivers”whomaysufferwhentheirforgivenessisunrequited.Inothercases,thiseffectmayrepresentafailedpredictionsuchthat theforgiverhadacontingentexpectancyaboutwhatwouldhappen(e.g.,“IfIforgivehim,hewillapologize,makeamends,andchangehisways”)thatwasnotborneout.Totheextentthatsomecasesentailsuchpredictionfailures,itcouldbeusefultoexplorewhatleadstothiskindofmisplacedoptimism.Theoppositeeffectwouldbeinterestingaswell:whenanoverlypessimisticexpectancy(e.g.,“IfIforgivehim,itwon’tmatterbecausehe’llneverchangehisways”)leadssomeonetoavoidforgivenessthatcould have been beneficial to both parties involved (cf. Kammrath & Dweck,2006).

concluSion

Our lives are, inmanyways, enrichedby interactingwithotherswhoaspire tothingsthatwedonot.Butthefactthatwearesurroundedbypeoplewithdifferentobjectivesandinterestsmeansthatweareinaconstantseriesofconflicts,mostlylowgradeones,throughoutourdays,confrontingagainandagainthesamequestions:HowhardshouldIpush?ShouldIresistmyspouseorchild?ShouldIdefymyneighbororboss?ShouldIgivein?Allofuswhointeractwithotherpeopleansweranongoingbarrageofsuchquestions,oftenarrivingatouranswersseamlessly,perhapsevenunconsciously.Asscholars,wealreadyknowsomeabouthowpeopleanswerthesequestions,butwecan,should,andnodoubtwillknowmore.Ibelieve assertivenessexpectancies have the potential tohelp usbetterunderstandhowpeoplechoosehowhardtopushandthatcompletemodelsofassertivebehaviorshouldaffordaplaceforexpectancies.Yetvarietyisthespiceoflife,andIwouldbedisappointedifotherscholarsdidnotseethematterdifferently.Ilookforwardtothempushingback,butmaybenottoohard.

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Section IICognitive and Affective

Influences on Conflict and Aggression

83

6NonconsciousBattlesofWill

Implicit Reactions Against the Goals and Motives of Others

N.PONTUSLEANDERandTANYAL.CHARTRANDDuke University

S omeofthemostcomplexandconsumingrelationshipsweexperienceinvolvepeoplewithwhomwe donot always agree—relationshippartnerswhosewants,demands,andneedsare incompatiblewithourown.Whenin the

realorimaginedpresenceofthoserelationships,wemaynotbesoreadilyinclinedtoacquiescetotheirinterests,andresearchinrecentyearssuggeststhat—muchincontrasttoourapparentassimilativetendencies(e.g.,Aarts,Gollwitzer,&Hassin,2004;Shah,2003)—wewilloftenautomaticallyreactagainstothersandtheirgoals.Althoughitmaybeimportantforpeopletogetalongwithandbeacceptedbyothers(Baumeister&Leary,1995),so,too,isitimportantforthemtoregulatetheiraffiliative tendenciesandneedsvisàvis theirotherdesires—forpersonalautonomy,achievement, and positiveself regard—needs that may often be well served byignoringorevenopposingthewillsandwantsofothers.Managingsuchconflictingmotivationsisafundamentalissueinselfregulation(Cantor&Blanton,1996),andalthoughpsychologyhasexaminedseveralwayssuchconflictsplayoutwithintheindividuals’ownminds(Shah,Friedman,&Kruglanski,2002;Shah&Kruglanski,2002),itisnotentirelyclearhowthoseconflictsplayoutintheirinteractionswithothers.Nevertheless,researchinrecentyearssuggeststhatreactingagainstothers’goalscanoftenfacilitateselfregulationinsubtlebutimportantways—evenifitendsuppushingpeopleapartandunderminingtheirrelationships.

In thepresent chapterwe consider three basic routes throughwhich activegoalscannonconsciouslyfomentinterpersonalconflictsand,toatleastsomeextent,sociallyaggressivebehavior.First,individuals’nonconsciousandchronicgoalscaninfluencetheirsocialperceptions inwaysthatputanegativeorhostiletingeon

n. pontuS leander and tanya l. chartrand84

their evaluations of others and their goals. Second, individuals may often reactagainsttheperceivedgoalsandmotivesofothersbyeithermovingtocounteracttheirinfluenceorbyadoptingcontrastinggoalsinstead.Third,nonconsciousgoalsoftenactasbehavioral juggernauts in that theycanoperateand triggeraggressiveness towardothersover thenatural courseof theirpursuit.Taken together,weintendtodemonstratethatactivegoalscannonconsciouslyencourageconflictandaggressionbyinfluencinghowtheirpursuersperceive,reactto,andgenerallybehavetowardothers.

nonconSciouS, goal-directed Social BehaviorResearch in the last few decades has increasingly found that much of humanbehavior andgoal pursuit is automatic, in that it occurs spontaneously,uncontrollably, and with little to no conscious intent or awareness (Bargh, 1994; seeBargh&Chartrand,1999, for review).Thismeans thatmanyof thegoals thatindividualspursuemaynotbeassubjecttothetypesofconscious,deliberativeprocessing that helps individuals behave in socially appropriate or acceptableways(seealsoChapter4inthisvolumeonotherkindsofpassiveandunconsciousformsofaggression).Indeed,whereaspursuersofaconsciouslyheldgoalmightattend to interpersonal conflicts that arise by carefully reappraising their owngoalandadjustingtheirgoaldirectedbehavior,pursuersofanonconsciouslyheldgoalmaynot. Ifonewereconsciouslypursuingahighlycompetitivegoal—say,towinamarathon—onemightpursueitonlyasfarasitisn’thurtingothersordisruptingone’srelationshipstothoseothers.Asnegativefeedbackfromothersincreased,particularlyregardingone’sbehavioralpursuitofthegoal,onemightrespondbyscalingbackthatpursuitorbyfindingotherwaystoameliorateanyriftsthatwerecreated(Carver&Scheier,1998).Withnonconsciousgoaldirectedbehavior,however,individualsmaynotbeassensitivetosuchfeedbackbecausetheirgoaldirectedactionsareoccurring largelyoutside theirconsciousawareness or control; therefore, any negative feedback they receive from their environmentmaynotbeaseasilyattributedtothegoal(Chartrand,Cheng,Dalton,&Tesser,inpress).Indeed,obnoxiouspeopleoftendonotbelievethattheyarebeingobnoxious(Cunningham,Barbee,&Druen,1997;Davis&Schmidt,1977),andthismaybeinpartbecausetheydonotconsciouslyrealizehowtheirbehaviorisinfluencingandaffectingothers.

Theautomaticityof sociallyaggressivebehaviorhasbeenexamined inpastworkbyconsideringtheassociationsthatmayforminmemorybetweenparticular situations and certain behavioral responses (Todorov & Bargh, 2002), suchthat mere exposure to such situations in the future automatically invokes (or“primes”)ahostileoraversivebehavioralreaction(Anderson&Carnagey,2004;Ratelle,Baldwin,&Vallerand,2005).Inthischapterwewillexaminerecentworksuggestingthatgoals, too,maybecomelinkedinmemorytosituationalcuestobetriggeredtoactivationautomatically(Bargh,1990).Insomecasesthiscouldinvolvethedirectactivationofasociallyaggressivegoal(e.g.,competition),whileatothertimesthiscouldinvolvetheactivationofconceptsinmemorythatindirectlyincreasetheaggressivenessofone’sbehavioralpursuitofagivengoal.As

nonconSciouS BattleS of Will 85

a classic example of this latter form of indirect influence, participants in onestudywhoweresubtlyexposedtoaseriesofrudenessrelatedwordswere latermorelikelytointerrupttheexperimentertomoveontothenextpartofthestudy(Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Similarly, study participants have also beenfound to play more greedily in an “ultimatum game” by keeping more moneyforthemselveswhenacorporatestylebriefcasewassubtlypresent intheroom(Kay,Wheeler,Bargh,&Ross,2004).Evensubliminalexposuretoimagesofgunsandotherweapons—stimulithatrepresentphysicallyviolentmeansofattainingone’sgoals—canincreasetheaggressivenessofindividuals’thoughts(Anderson,Benjamin,&Bartholow,1998).Exposuretocuesrepresentingotherpeoplewhomindividualsregardasthreateningmayautomaticallyinvokecorrespondinggoalsinmemory(Gillathetal.,2006),evenifthosecuesareonlyincidentallyrelatedtotheirinteractionpartners.

Nonconscious, socially aggressive behavior may also have selfreinforcingqualitiestothemthatmightmakeitdifficultfor individualsto justifybehavingin other ways. As classically demonstrated by Chen and Bargh (1997), participantswhohadbeensubliminallyprimedwithBlackfacessubsequentlydemonstrated more hostility toward another White participant than participants whohadbeenprimedwithWhitefaces.Interestingly,theotherparticipantrespondedmoreaggressively inturn,effectivelyconfirmingtheBlackprimedparticipants’initiallyhostileexpectancies.Thissuggeststhatindividualsstorehostilescriptsinmemorythatmaybetriggeredincidentallybysocialcuestoaffectnotjusttheirownbehaviorbutalsothecorrespondingbehaviorsofthosewithwhomtheyinteract.Itisperhapsnotsurprising,then,thatindividualswhobehaveinaggressiveorconfrontationalwaysoftenregardtheirownactionsasmorejustifiedthanwhentheyseeothersbehavinginthesameway(Baumeister,Stillwell,&Wotman,1990;Gilbert&Malone,1995).

Ineffect,mereexposuretocertainsocialcues—betheyobjectsorpeople,behaviorsorsituations—cansufficetoactivateconceptsinmemorythatsetindividuals againstothersandengenderconflictwith them(see alsoChapter8 inthisvolumeonmoodeffectsonspontaneousaggressiontowardMuslims).Inthenextseveralsections,wewillexamineresearchthatconsidershowindividuals’nonconscious goals both instigate and are instigated by interpersonal conflictandaggression.Wewillexaminehownonconsciouslyactivatedgoalsandchronicmotives tinge and distort individuals’ perceptions of others in ways that leadthemto“see”thoseothersinmorehostileways.Wewillthenconsiderhowcuestoothers’goalsseemtoinherentlypressureindividualstorespondinkind,sometimesleadingthemtoemulatetheaggressivepursuitsofthosearoundthemandatother times leading themto reactagainstothersand theirgoals.Ina thirdsectionwewillexaminehowgoalsmay,ontheirown,nonconsciouslyfacilitatebehavioralaggressionoverthenaturalcourseoftheirpursuit.Thelargerbodyofthisworkwillfocusonthewaysnonconsciousgoalsmayengenderconflictsofinterestandinterpersonalaggression,butwewillconcludebyreviewingimportantevidence suggesting thatnonconsciousgoalsalsooften serve toattenuateconflictsaswell.


part 1: coming into conflict: the polarizing nature of goalS

Research in the last decade has identified at least two broad ways active goalscan nonconsciously influence social perception: via evaluation and inference.Evaluations are the subjective assessments perceivers make of a target’s favorablenessorunfavorableness, and inferences are the assumptions thatperceiversmakeregardingthetraits,preferences,andgoalsthatotherspossess.Evaluationsandinferencescanbehighlyautomaticprocesses(Duckworth,Bargh,Garcia,&Chaiken,2002;Hassin,Aarts,&Ferguson,2005),andbothhavebeenfoundtooperate in serviceof (andbe skewedby) theperceivers’ activegoals (Ferguson,2005;Kawada,Oettingen,Gollwitzer,&Bargh,2004).

Weexamineinthissectionresearchsuggestingthatactivegoalsmaynonconsciouslyinfluencehowindividualsevaluatetheirrelationshipstoothersandinterprettheactionsofthosearoundthem.Inparticular,wefocusonthewaysactivegoals can facilitatedevaluationof relationships anddisliking forpeoplewhodonot facilitategoalpursuit.Wewillpresentevidencesuggestingthatactivegoalscannonconsciously lead individuals to regard others inmorenegative andhostileways,potentiallysetting those individualsagainstothers inways thatcreatediscordandunderminethesocialrelationship.Indeed,thehostilitythatindividualsnonconsciouslybringintotheirsocialinteractionscanbeselfreinforcing,forinteractionpartnerswho feel that theyarebeingdevaluedandrejected tendtorespondwithgreaterangerandhostilitythemselves(Leary,Twenge,&Quinlivan,2006). At the earliest stages of perception, then, active goals may be operatingtononconsciouslypolarize individualsagainstothersand, thus, set thestageforinterpersonalconflict.

Goal-Tinged Interpersonal Evaluations

Goalshavelongbeenregardedasafilterforperceivingtheworld,leadingindividualstoevaluatestimuliaseitherpositiveornegativebasedontherelevanceofthosestimuli to the individuals’ current needs and goals (Lewin, 1935). Importantly,such goaltinged evaluations occur spontaneously and without much consciousintent,awareness,orcontrol(Ferguson&Bargh,2004).Thismeansthatindividualsmightautomaticallydismissordevalue stimuli thatare seenas irrelevantorinterferingwiththeirgoals(Brendl,Markman,&Messner,2003),evenwhensuch“stimuli”areotherpeople. Indeed, recentworkbyFitzsimonsandShah (2008)foundthatparticipantswhowereprimedinadvancewithanonconsciousachievementgoal(asopposedtonotbeingprimedwithanygoalinparticular)reportedlowerrelationshipclosenessandplacedlessimportanceontheirrelationshipstoothers who were not instrumental to their pursuit of achievement. These goalprimedstudyparticipantswerealsomoremotivatedtoavoidnoninstrumentalothers—indicatinganimplicitaversiontothoserelationships—whileinactivepursuitoftheirnonconsciousgoal.

Suchgoaldependencyinrelationshipevaluationoccursnot justwithincloserelationshipswheresuchevaluationsmaybetargetedtowardaspecificotherbut


mayalso extend to their evaluations ofothers whom theyonly see peripherallyor incidentally. In one recent study by Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Green, &Fitzsimons,2008),participantsweregiventhegoaltoevaluateavideotapedpersonforwhattheythoughtwaseitherareporterjob(onewhererudenessandassertivenessisapositiveattribute)orawaiterjob(whererudenessisanegativeattribute).Assuch,thegoalparticipantsweregiveninadvancewouldfavoreitherrudenessorpoliteness—treatingoneaspositiveandoneasnegativedependingonwhichjobthevideotapedinterviewwaspresumablyfor.Partwaythroughthevideotapedinterview,a“colleague”oftheinterviewerenteredtheroomandinterruptedtheinterview,doingsoeitherverypolitely(apologizingprofusely)orveryrudely(actingannoyedandaggressive).Importantly,althoughparticipantsinitiallyexpectedtoevaluatetheinterviewee,theywereactuallytaskedwithratingthe“colleague”who interrupted—an incidental other who was not the focal target of the participant’sgoal.Nevertheless,consistentwiththeperspectivethatactivegoalscanaffectevenone’sevaluationsofincidentalothers,resultsindicatedthatparticipantswhohadthefocalgoalofevaluatingforthewaiterpositiontendedtoshowlesslikingfortherudeinterrupterthanthepoliteone;incontrast,participantswhohadthefocalgoalofevaluatingforthereporterpositiontendedtoshowlesslikingforthepolite interrupter thantherudeone.Subsequentdebriefingfoundthatparticipantswerenotconsciouslyawareoftheinfluencethattheirfocalgoalhadontheirsubsequent,unrelatedevaluation,whichsuggeststhatactivegoalsmayoftennonconsciouslysetpeopleagainstnotjustthefocaltargetoftheirevaluationsbutalsoanyonewhoentersthepursuer’sfieldofperceptionalongtheway.

Thus, individualsmayoftennonconsciouslydevaluerelationshipsanddislikeothers who do not meet the criteria for their active goals, even if those othersarenot the focal targetsof their evaluations. Thismightpromote interpersonalconflictsinacoupleways.First,individualsmaywithdrawfromorreactwithaversiontononinstrumentalothers,whichmayinturnelicitmoreangerandhostilityfromthoseothers (Learyetal.,2006).Second,and intriguingly, italsosuggeststhatindividualswhoarethemselvespursuingmoresociallyaggressivegoalsmayactuallydrawclosertootherswhopossessappropriatelyaggressivetraits—attributesthatmaybedesirableinthemomentbutmayquicklylosetheirappealandbecome toxic to their relationshiponce their focal goal is satiatedand they arenowentangledwiththisaggressiveother(Barghetal.,2008;Forster,Liberman,&Higgins,2005).Indeed,pastworkon“fatalattractions”hasshownthattheveryfeaturesthatinitiallydrawindividualstowardotherscanoftenbethesamefeaturesthatendupfomentingrelationshipconflictandnegativitylateron(Felmlee,1995).Goaldependentevaluations,then,maynonconsciouslypolarizeindividualsandsetthemagainstothersbyeitherpushingthemawayfromthosewhoarenotusefulinthemomentordrawingthemtowardthosewhoareusefulinthemomentbutmaybedifficulttoputupwithlateron.

Goal-Biased Inferences

Thebroad influence of activegoals—suchas their tendency to distort andbiassocialperception—canaffectnotjustindividuals’evaluationsofothersbutalsohow


thoseindividualsinterprettheactionsofothers.Indeed,perceiverstendtoratherautomaticallyassumethattheactionsofothersoperateinserviceofsomecorrespondinggoal(Hassinetal.,2005),meaningthattheyinfergoalsinothersautomaticallyandbasedonwhateverbehavioralcuesarereadilyperceptible.However,individualstypicallyrelyonverylittleinformationtomaketheirautomaticinferences(Winter&Uleman,1984):notonlyaresocialsituationsoftenhighlyambiguous,butalsoperceivers’ownactivegoalsandchronicmotives tendto influencewhatbehavioralcuestheyaresensitivetoandwhatgoalstheyaremostlikelyto“see”inothers.AsperhapsbestdescribedbyKelly(1955),perceivers’ownmotivationalorientations(e.g.,aggressivenessvs.gentleness)seemtooperateaspersonalscanningpatternsprojectedontotheenvironmenttodetectblipsofmeaning.Forexample,chronicallyaggressiveindividualstendtoratherautomaticallyinterpretthe actions of others in more aggressive terms, something not observed amongnonaggressiveindividuals(Zelli,Huesmann,&Cervone,1995).Relatedly,activatingaselfprotectiongoalledonesampleofWhitestudyparticipantstoreport“seeing”greaterangerinthephotographedfacesofBlackmen—moreangerthantheyreportedseeinginthephotographedfacesofWhitemen(orwomenofanyrace;Maneretal.,2005).Thissuggeststhatindividuals’ownactivegoalsnonconsciouslyinfluencehowmuchaggressionandhostilitytheyinferinothers.

Thetendencyforindividualstoprojecttheirownmotivationsontotheenvironmentalsoextendstogoalsthatareactivatednonconsciously.InastudybyKawadaandcolleagues(2004),participantswerefirstprimedeitherwithanonconsciousgoaltocompetewithothersorwithnogoalinparticular.Participantsthenreadafictionalscenarioinwhichtwomenwereabouttoengageinaprisoner’sdilemmagameinwhichcooperationbybothpartieswouldyieldmildlypositiveoutcomesforbothmenbutcompetitionbyoneofthemwouldyieldgreatergainsforhimattheexpenseofhispartner.Althoughparticipantswerenotgivenanyconcretecuesregardinghowthetwomenwouldbehave,itwasmadeclearthatifeitherpartnerdecidedtoplaythisgameaggressivelyhewouldhandilybeathispartnerintermsoftotalgains.Toassessthekindofinferenceparticipantsmadeasafunctionoftheirnonconsciousgoalprimingcondition,participantswereinstructedtoguesshow aggressively they thought the men would play. Results indicated that participantsprimedwithanonconsciousgoaltocompeteguessedthatthetwomenwouldplaymoreaggressivelyagainsteachotherthanparticipantsnotprimedwithagoal, suggesting that theirownnonconscious competitivenessgoalhadbiasedthemtoinfergreatercompetitivenessinothers.

Itmayalsobethecasethatindividuals’goaltingedevaluationsofothersinteractwith theirgoalbiased inferences, resulting inperceptionsofothers thatareboth negatively tinged and hostilely interpreted. For instance, individuals’ ownmotivational orientations can interact in important ways to influence the kindsof motivationsbrought to mindbyothers. Inone recent study (Brazy,Shah, &Devine, 2005), White participants initially completed an implicit measure oftheir own chronic prevention and promotion motivational orientations and alsoa measure of their prejudicial attitudes toward Blacks. Participants were thensubliminally primed with concept words relating to African Americans, duringwhich their response latencies tomotivationalwords linked toeitherpromotion


(e.g., lazy, outgoing)orprevention(e.g.,threatening, considerate)wereassessed.Theresearchers foundthathighlyprejudicedparticipantswhopossessedstrongpromotionrelatedmotivationalorientationsdemonstratedgreatercognitiveaccessibility of the stereotyped promotionrelated words (e.g., lazy), whereas highlyprejudiced participants who possessed strong preventionrelated motivationalorientationsdemonstratedgreatercognitiveaccessibilityofthestereotypedpreventionwords (e.g., threatening). Ineffect, theseparticipants’ownmotivationalorientationsinteractedwiththeirprejudicestoshowdifferenttypesofnegativelytingedmotivationalinferences.Thisstudyindicatesthatindividuals’ownmotivations may nonconsciously influence both their evaluations and inferences to bemorenegativeandhostile.

Inthissectionwereviewedtworoutesthroughwhichgoalscannonconsciouslysetpeopleagainstothers:bydevaluingthemduetotheirlackofgoalinstrumentalityorbynonconsciouslyprojectingtheirowngoalsontothem.Thus,evenattheearliestmomentofexposuretocertainothers,individualsmayalreadybeevaluatingthemnegativelyorperceivingthemaspotentialthreats,obstacles,orcompetitorstogoalpursuit.Importantly,theseinitialandimmediateimpressionsofothersmightinformtheperceivers’laterbehavior;ifthoseinitialimpressionsareaversiveorhostile,thentheperceiversmayreactbytakingonoppositionalgoalsorbypursuingtheirgoalsmoreaggressivelyinthosesituations.Whereasthissectionwasaboutthewaysactivegoalsmightnonconsciouslyinfluencesocialperception,wenowmoveontothewaysthatindividualsreacttoothersandtheirperceivedgoalsandmotives.

part 2: counteracting and contraSting againSt otherS’ goalS

A growing part of the work on implicit motivational influences has examinedhowindividualsautomaticallyadoptandpursuethegoalstheyperceiveinothers(Aartsetal.,2004);somegoalsareevenlinkedinmemorytocertainrelationshippartners, such that subliminal exposure to cues reminding individuals of thoserelationships(e.g.,primingconceptwordsrelatedtofather)cansufficetotriggeractivationofagoalassociatedwiththatrelationship(e.g.,toachieveacademically;Shah,2003).Indeed,mereexposuretocertaincuescannonconsciouslytriggerthepursuitofgoalsthatothersholdforus,thatwetypicallypursueinthoseothers’company,oreventhatthoseotherspursueforthemselves(Fitzsimons&Bargh,2003;Leander,Shah,&Chartrand,2009;Shah).Moreover,suchinfluencesarefrequentlyenhancedwhenthetriggeringcuerepresentsacloserelationshippartneroringroupmember,suggestingthatimplicitmotivationalinfluencesarefeltmorestronglywhentheycomefromotherswithwhomwemaybeentangledinotherways(Leanderetal.;Loersch,Aarts,Payne,&Jefferis,2008;Shah).However,notall motivational influences are desired, and, as is often the case, the perceivedinfluenceofothersandtheirgoalscanbeexperiencedasaversiveorunwanted,oftentriggeringanimplicitreactionagainstsuchinfluence.

Thismaybeespecially true inone’scloserelationships,wherethe influenceof others may be more frequent, harder to escape, and potentially recurring if


theindividualallowsittohappen(Brehm,1989).Researchonsocialallergens,forexample, has found that individuals’ relationship partners often unintentionallyexhibitarangeofodiouspersonalhabitsthatgrateontheindividualsovertimeandfomentincreasinglyhostilereactions(Cunninghametal.,1997;Cunningham,Shamblen,Barbee,&Ault,2005).Weproposethatasimilarprocessmayoccurfortheperceivedgoalsofothers:peoplemayautomaticallyreactagainstthegoalsheldorpursuedbyotherswhensuchinfluencesare,insomeway,perceivedasintrusive,aversive,orunwanted.

Thelureexertedbygoaltriggeringenvironmentalcuescanbeverydifficultto ignore;suchcuespullat individuals’attentionalandselfregulatoryresourcesrather automatically (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002). This potentially suggests that,whenthemotivationalinfluenceofanotherpersonisperceivedasinterferingwithone’sownpursuitsorongoingsenseofself,individualswillfeelcompelledtoreactinoppositionalwayswithoutknowingwhy,orevenrealizingthattheyarereactingagainstanythingatall.Suchreactionsagainstothers’goalscouldleadpeopletononconsciouslycounteractothersbymovingtoopposeorcompetewiththoseothers’goalsor tosimplycontrastthemselvesagainst thoseothers’goals.Eitherway,despite theinfluenceofothersoftenonlyoccurringwithintheindividuals’ownminds,theymayneverthelessreacttosuchperceivedinfluencebyengaginginproverbialbattlesofwillbeforetheyor their interactionpartnersconsciouslyrealizethataconflictofinterestsexistsbetweenthem.Inthepresentsection,then,weexaminehowgoalcounteractionandcontrastmightoccurnonconsciously ineverydaysocialsituationstofomentinterpersonalconflictandaggressioninsubtlebutimportantways.

Counteraction

Sometimes theperceived influenceof others’ goals and the potential impact oftheirpursuitscanbe regardedas imposing, interfering,orviolating individuals’selfregulatorypriorities.Whenthisoccurs,individualsmightrespondbymovingtocounteract the impactoftheotherperson’smotivational influence.Suchgoalcounteraction—reacting against the implicit motivational influence of others—hasbeenobservedmostreadilyinresearchinwhichothers’goalsareperceivedto interferewith individuals’ fundamentalselfrelatedneeds—forautonomyandselfdirectedness,positiveselfregard,andoptimaldistinctiveness(Brehm,1966;Brewer, 1991; Tesser, 1988).Counteractionmight involve adopting anopposinggoal—thatis,onethatisincompatiblewiththeotherperson’sgoal(amotivational“counterforce”;Brehm)—tosupersedetheimpactoftheotherperson’sinfluence;however,itmayalsoofteninvolveadoptingaverysimilargoaltoeffectivelycompetewiththeoffendingother.

Perhapsthebestwellknownformofcounteractionisreactanceagainsttheperceived controlling influenceofothers. Indeed, a longhistoryof psychological research indicates that when individuals feel like their behavioral freedomisbeing threatenedby someoneorby some social institution those individualswill often reactbydirectlyopposing theperceivedmotivesof the targetother(Brehm,1966). Inrecentyears, studieshavedemonstratedthat suchreactance


against thegoalsheldbyothersmightoftenplayoutnonconsciously andautomatically. In one such study (Chartrand, Dalton, & Fitzsimons, 2007), chronicallyreactantparticipants(andtheirchronicallynonreactantcounterparts)firstprovided the names ofothers who had a goal for them to eitherwork hard orrelax.Participants were then subliminally primedwithoneof thosenames (orwithanonsenseword in the control condition), afterwhich theirperformanceonananagramtaskwasassessed.Resultsindicatedthatnonreactantindividualsprimedwiththe“workhard”significantotherperformedbetterontheanagramtest than thoseprimedwith the “relax” significantother.However, chronicallyreactantindividualsshowedtheoppositepattern—theyperformedworse(better)ontheanagramtaskwhensubliminallyprimedwiththenameofsomeonewhowantedthemtoworkhard(relax).Thissuggestsnonconsciousreactanceagainstthegoalsheldbyothers.

Beyondreactingagainstthegoalsthatotherswantindividualstopursue,thereisalsoevidencetosuggestthatreactantindividualswillimplicitlycounteractthegoals that others are pursuing for themselves. Although past research suggeststhat individuals automatically “catch” the goals they see others pursuing (“goalcontagion”; Aarts et al., 2004), so too might they counteract the goals they seeotherspursuing. Ina studyconductedshortlyafter the2005hurricaneKatrina(Leander,Shah,&Chartrand,2010),participantsimaginedthattheirroommatewas planning a trip to the Southern Coast and were shown one of two sets ofimagesimplyingwhattheirfriendhadpackedforit(and,therefore,theirgoalforthetrip).Inthe“volunteer”goalinferencecondition,thefriendhadpackedmaterialsimplyingagoaltoworkforhurricanerelief(imagesshowing,e.g.,workboots,cleaningsupplies),andintheotherconditiontheroommatehadpackedmaterialssuggestingagoalunrelatedtowork.SimilartoresultsobservedbyChartrandetal.(2007),chronicallyreactantparticipantswerelessmotivatedtovolunteerafterinferringthattheirroommatepossessedagoaltovolunteer,suggestingcounteractionagainsttheroommate’sgoal.

Otherresearchsuggeststhat,ratherthanadoptinganoppositionalmotivationalstate,individualsmaymovetocounteractothersbynonconsciouslyadoptingandpursuingarelatedgoalthemselves,whicheffectivelysuggestsamovetocompetewith thoseothers.Onerecent seriesofstudiesdemonstrated that seeingothersengaginginblameattributionstoprotecttheirselfimagesoftenledparticipantstononconsciouslyadoptasimilarselfimageprotectiongoalandsubsequentlytoengageinmoreblamebehaviorsthemselves(Fast&Tiedens,2010).Thisindicatesthat individuals will oftennonconsciously adopt the samegoals they seeotherspursuinginordertocounteractthoseothers.

Takentogether,thepreviouslydescribedstudiessuggestthatmereexposuretoothersandtheirgoalscanelicitcounteractiveresponses.Inallofthesestudies,debriefingprocedureswereusedtoensurethatparticipantswerenotawareoftheinfluencethattheirexposuretothegoalsofothershadontheirownsubsequentmotivations,supportingthenotionthatcounteractionmayoccurwithlittletonoconsciousintentorawarenessandthatpeoplemayoftensettheirowngoalsagainstthegoalsofothersaftermerelyassumingthatthoseothersareactingagainsttheirinterestsinsomeway.


Contrast

Sometimestheimpactofothers’goalsandmotivesdoesnotelicitacounteractivereactionsomuchasadifferentiatingone.Whenindividualsregardthemselvesortheirvaluesasdifferentfromothers,theymightautomaticallyinferfromcuestothoseothers’goalsthattheyshouldbedoingtheopposite.Whereascounteractionimpliesamotivationalcounteroffensive,contrast ismoreaboutdifferentiation—distinguishingtheirownmotivationalstatefromatargetotherthattheyregardas“unlike”themselves.

The implicitnatureof individuals’ tendencies towardcontrasting themselvesawayfrom“different”otherswasfirstdemonstratedinDijksterhuisetal.’s(1998)work on assimilation and contrast to social stereotypes. In their research, participantswerefirstprimedwitheitheranintellectuallystereotypedgroup(“professors”vs. “supermodels”)orwithanexemplar fromoneof those intellectuallystereotyped groups (“Albert Einstein” vs. “Claudia Schiffer”). Participants thencompletedanintellectualtask,anddemonstratedopposingeffects:Whereasthestereotyped group prime (e.g., “professors”) facilitated assimilation to the stereotype(betterperformanceontheintellectualtask), theexemplarprimes(e.g.,“Einstein”)facilitatedcontrastagainstthestereotype(worseperformanceontheintellectual task). Similar contrast effects have been observed following subtleexposuretomembersofoutgroupswhenone’santagonismtowardthemishigh(Spears,Gordijn,Dijksterhuis,&Stapel,2004),againstotherswhenone’smotivationtoaffiliatewiththemislow(Sinclair,Huntsinger,Skorinko,&Hardin,2005),andagainstotherswhenone’scompetitivenessmotivationorcontrolmotivationishigh(Stapel&Koomen,2005;Tiedens&Jimenez,2003).Aswereviewinthissection,suchcontrasteffectsmayalsoapplytothewaysthatindividualsreacttoothers’goalsandmotivationalstates.Forinstance,individualswillimplicitlydevaluegoalsthattheyregardasbeingtooordinaryortypicaltopursue—adirectresultoftheirtendenciestocontrastthemselvesmotivationallyfromotherswhenseekingtodifferentiatethemselves(Leander,Shah,&Chartrand,2010).

Aclassicexampleofmotivationalcontrastinvolvesindividualsdistancingthemselvesfromgoaldomainsinwhichtheyarebeingoutperformed.Althoughthesuccessesofcloseotherscanoftenbeinspiring,sotoocantheybedeflatingwhentheyremindindividualsoftheirownshortcomings(Lockwood&Kunda,1997).Suchinfluencescanleadindividualstoadoptcontrastinggoalsandmotivationalstateswheninthecompanyofcloseotherswhoareoutperformingthem(Tesser,1988).Recent work has examined the implicit nature of this contrast effect (Leander,Shah,&Chartrand,2010).Participantsinonestudyfirstimaginedthattheywereeitherbeingoutperformedacademicallybyafriendornot,afterwhichtheywereledtoinferthatthefriendwaseitherstillactivelypursuinganachievementgoalornot.Participantswhohadfirstimaginedbeingoutperformedacademicallyandwere then led to infer that their friend was currently in pursuit of an achievementgoalsubsequentlyshowedreducedsalienceofanacademicachievementgoalthemselvesonawordjudgmenttask,suggestingthattheycontrastedthemselvesagainsttheachievementgoaloftheiroutperformingfriend.Importantly,participantsindicatednoconsciousawarenessofhowtheimaginedscenariomighthave


affectedtheirsubsequentbehavioronthegoalsaliencetask,suggestingtheimplicitnatureoftheircontrast.

Individualsmayalsocontrastthemselvestothegoalsofotherswhenthosegoalsconflictwiththeirownvaluesorchronictendencies.Forinstance,Aartsandcolleagues(2004)demonstratedthatexposuretocuessuggestingthatatargetotherwasinpursuitofagoaltohavecasualsexactuallyreducedthedesirabilityofasexgoalinparticipantswhoalsolearnedthatthetargetotherwasinacommittedrelationshipalready(andwasthuscheating).Inanotherstudyinvolvingsubliminalpriming,weassessedparticipants’historyofmarijuanauseandalsoobtainedthefirstnamesofrelationshippartnerswhomtheyassumedintendedtoeitherusemarijuanaornotintheupcomingmonth.Participantswerethensubliminallyprimedwithoneofthosetwonames(theprodrugtempterorsomeoneelse),afterwhichtheyweregivenadrugpreventionmanualtoreadandtheamountoftimetheyspentreadingitwasrecorded.Interestingly,thoseparticipantswhotendedtoabstainfrommarijuanausewhoweresubliminallyprimedwiththenameofaprodrugtempterspentrelativelymore timereading thedrugpreventionmanual (Leanderetal.,2009),suggestingimplicitcontrastagainstthetempter’sgoaltousedrugs.

Sometimesindividualsmaycontrastthemselvestootherssimplybecausetheyseethoseothersasunmotivatedtowardagoaltowhichtheyarethemselveshighlycommitted. Inonerecent setof experimentsexamining the impact thatothers’indifferencehasonindividuals’ownmotivationandbehavior(Leander&Shah,2010),participantswereeithersubliminallyprimedwithimagesofothersexpressingapathyandalackofmotivationtowardacademicachievementorprimedwithotherimagesbeforetheyworkedonananagramtaskassessingtheirownpursuitofacademicachievement.Priortothis,however,halftheparticipantsineachsubliminalprimingconditionwereprimedinadvancewithanonconsciousachievementgoal,withtheotherhalfnotprimedwithanygoal.Theresultsthatfollowedsupportnonconsciousmotivationalcontrast:participantswhohadbeenprimedinadvancewithanonconsciousachievementgoalsubsequentlydemonstratedheightened anagram task performance when primed with the indifference of others.Thatis,individualswithanactivatedachievementgoalcontrastedthemselvestotheabsenceofmotivationtheysawinothersbyworkinghardertowardtheirnonconsciouslyheldacademicachievementgoal.

Individualsmightalsocontrasttothegoalsofinteractionpartnerswhosenonverbalmannerismssubtlyindicatesocialasynchrony.Recentworkonbehavioralmimicryhasfoundthatindividualstendtoassimilatetothegoalsperceivedtobeheldbythosewhomimicthem,buttheymightignoreorevencontrasttothegoalsofthosewhodonotmimicthem.Intworecentstudies(Leander&Chartrand,2010), participants who indicated high sensitivity to behavioral cues to others’internal states—a form of empathy—showed a significant loss of achievementmotivation themselveswhen interactingwith a confederatewhoexpressedhighachievementmotivationoverthecourseoftheinteractionbutdidnotmimicthem.Importantly, participants indicated no conscious awareness of the confederate’snonverbalbehaviororhowitmighthaveinfluencedthem,suggestingthatindividualswhoarehighlysensitivetobehavioralcuestoothers’internalstatesmightusesuchcuestodeterminewhethertoassimilatetoorcontrastagainstthoseothers’


goals.Thissuggeststhatthesubtlestbehavioralcuesmaynonconsciouslytriggercontrastagainst thegoalsassumedtobeheldbyan interactionpartner,evenatzeroacquaintancewiththatperson.

Itmayalsobethatindividualsnonconsciouslyassimilatetoothers’goalstocontrasttothegoalsassumedofbroadersocialinstitutions—assimilatingtoafriend’sgoal to rebelagainstabroadersocietal lawornorm.Asdiscussedearlier,manyindividualscanbeimplicitlytemptedtoindulgeinillegalsubstances(Leanderetal.,2009),butrecentstudiesgoasfarastosuggestthatreactancemotivation—whichisusuallyassociatedwithreactingagainstthegoalsofothers—canactuallyfacilitateassimilationtoothers’pursuitsofsuchthingsasunderagealcoholconsumption(Leander,Shah,Chartrand,&Fitzsimons,2010).Thus,evenwhenindividualsarenotcontrastingagainstthegoalsofothers,theymayoftenassimilatetootherstocontrastagainstbroadersocialinfluences,whichmayfomentotherformsofconflictthatextendbeyondtheimmediateinterpersonalsituation.

Whetherby counteracting the impositionsofothers’ goalsorby contrastingtodissimilarordislikedothers,individualsreadilyandnonconsciouslyadoptandpursuegoalsthatgoagainsttheperceivedwillandpreferencesofthosearoundthem.Importantly,suchgoalconflictbetweenindividualsmaybeabasicsourceofrelationshipstrifeanddissatisfaction—historyiscertainlyrifewithexamplesofhowcompetingor incompatiblegoalscanpreclude theopportunity toestablishfunctionalrelationships.What’sinterestingaboutthesestudiesisthattheseconflictsofinterestoccurnotjustnonconsciouslybutalsowhollywithinthemindsofstudyparticipantswhoaresimplybeingpresentedwithsocialcuesinalaboratorysetting. This suggests that individuals are quite susceptible to cues that triggertheiroppositionaltendencies,cuesthatleadthemtospontaneouslyreactagainstandopposetheperceivedgoalsofothersbeforetheyoranypotentialinteractionpartnerisconsciouslyawarethatsuchaconflictexists.

part 3: goal-directed aggreSSionIntheprevioussectionsweconsideredwaysinterpersonalconflictandaggressionmay stem from responding to or reacting against others and their goals. Yet tobeexamined,however, ishowactivegoalsmightfomentaggressivebehaviorontheirown,overthenaturalcourseoftheirpursuit.Giventherelativelyreflexivenatureanduncontrollabilityofnonconsciousgoals,theymaynotbeasburdenedbytherulesofpolitesocietyinthesamewaythatconsciouslyheldgoalsare.Inthisthirdandfinalsection, then,weexamineevidencesuggesting thatdispositionalandsituationalfactorsmightoftenleadindividualstononconsciouslypursuetheirgoalswithgreater impunity andheightenedbehavioral aggression.Examplesofthisfrompastworkhaveconsideredhowindividuals’ownchronicpredispositionsmightleadthemtononconsciouslypursuetheirgoalswithgreateraggressionwhenthe situation warrants. Children with more aggressive tendencies, for instance,ratherautomaticallygeneratemorehostilesolutionstosocialproblemscomparedwithchildrenwithlessaggressivetendencies(Bloomquist,August,Cohen,Doyle,&Everhart,1997),suggestinganimplicittendencytowardaggressioninpursuingtheirsocialgoals.


Researchonnonconsciouslycuedsocialpoweralsosupports thenotionthatindividuals with certain chronic tendencies may automatically respond to suchcuesbypursuingtheirgoalsinmoreaggressiveorselfcenteredways.Forinstance,participantsinonestudywhohadarelativelystrongexchangeorientationtotheirsocialrelationships(titfortat,asopposedtoamorecommunalorientation)whowerenonconsciouslyprimedwithsocialpowersubsequentlybehavedmoreselfishlyonatasksharingexercisebyoverloadingtheirpartnerwiththemoreoneroustasksandassigningtheeasiertaskstothemselves(Chen,LeeChai,&Bargh,2001).Theeffectsofprimingsocialpowercanalsononconsciouslyenhancethepursuitofsexgoalsamongmenwithhighpower–sexassociations inmemoryandamongmenwithstrongerpredispositionstowardsexualharassment(Bargh,Raymond,Pryor,& Strack, 1995). Thus, situational cues that implicitly invoke concepts of socialpowercanoftenenhanceindividuals’ownbehaviorallyaggressivetendencies.

Recent work suggests that failing at a nonconscious goal may also instigatesocially aggressivebehavior.Psychologyhas longacknowledged that failing at agoalcansometimestriggermorehostileandaggressiveresponses in individuals(Berkowitz,1989;Dill&Anderson,1995),andonerecentseriesofstudiesdemonstratesthatsuchaggressioncanoccuramongindividualswhofailatnonconsciousgoals(Jefferis&Chartrand,2010).Inthesestudies,participantswerefirstprimedwithanimpressionformationgoalandthenledtofailatthatgoalpriortocompletingvarioustasksmeanttoassesstheirsubsequentaggressiveness.Inoneofthesestudies,participantswhowereledtofailattheirnonconsciouslyactivatedimpression–formationgoalsubsequentlypouredmorehotsauceintoacontainerthatwasgoingtobeconsumedbysomeonewhomtheyknewhatedspicyfoods.

Thus, individuals’chronictendenciesandgoaloutcomesmaynonconsciouslyinfluence theaggressivenessof theirsocialbehaviors, suggesting thatgoalsmayoften instigateconflictsand interpersonalaggressionontheirownandover thenaturalcourseoftheirpursuit.

concluSionInthisworkweexaminedthreebroadwaysgoalscannonconsciouslyfomentinterpersonalconflictandaggression.First,activegoalscanshapesocialperceptionsinways thatpromotedevaluingof relationshipsandset individuals againstotherswhomtheyassumearepotentialcompetitorsfortheirgoals.Second,individualsmightoftencounteractorcontrastthemselvesagainstothers’goals,either inreactiontotheperceivedimpositionofothers’influenceortosimplydifferentiatethemselvesfromthoseothers.Third,nonconsciousgoalsmayoftenemploysociallyaggressivebehavioralstrategiestofacilitategoalpursuitorcopewithafailedpursuit. Evidence from these three routes suggests that interpersonal conflict andaggressionmayoftenbeinherentinthepursuitofgoalsandbeacontributortothegoalsthatindividualstakeon,value,andoppose.Giventhatmanyoftheseinfluencesareoccurringentirelywithinthemindsoftheindividualsthemselves,their“reactions”totheperceivedaffrontsofothersmayactuallybewhatinitiatesconflictinaninteractionorrelationship.Indeed,intheresearchweexamined,itwasalwaystheparticipants’owngoals,needs,andchronictendenciesthatshapedtheir


perceptions and reactions to others. This potentially suggests that it is throughtheirownsubsequentbehaviorthattheyelicittheverykindsofhostilitythattheyautomaticallyexpectedfromtheirinteractionpartners,effectivelyreinforcingtheirinitialreactions(Chen&Bargh,1997).

One may generally conclude that individuals are most likely to oppose oraggressagainstothers’goalsandpreferenceswhentheirownneedsarenotbeingmet.Somegoalsthatindividualsbringintoasituationareinherentlyaggressive(seeParts1and3), andsomepeople inherentlyelicitmotivationallyaggressive reactions(Part2).However, suchreactionsdonotnecessarily implya failed interaction. Whether goals—even competitive or aggressive ones—interfere with one’srelationships likely depends on how those goals interact with the goals of one’sinteractionpartner.Inanysocialsituation—beitacompetitivesportorcommunalgettogether—bothinteractionpartnersbringwiththemcertaingoalsandexpectationsthat,ifmet,couldresultinanoverallpositiveexperienceforthatinteraction.Ifbothinteractionpartnerswantandexpectcompetition,thensomelevelofoppositionandaggressionwillonlyfacilitate the interactionandthusenablethegoal’spursuit(tocompeteyouhavetohavesomeonetocompetewith).Wesuggestthatinteractionpartnerslikelybegintoperceiveaggressionandinterpersonalconflictwhenthereisamismatchofgoalsandexpectations,suchaswhenonepersonwishestobecompetitiveandtheotherdoesnot—orevenwhenonepersonwantstopursue(orisoverzealouslypursuing)anaffiliativegoal(e.g.,helping,romance)thattheotherdoesnotwanttobeapartof.Indeed,themotivationalfitbetweentwoindividualsmaydeterminehowoppositionalandaggressivebehaviorsaresubjectivelyexperienced.

Giventhatthepresentchapterfocusedoninterpersonalconflictandaggression,itmaybeeasytoconcludethatgoalsoperatewithahighdegreeofimpunity,ifnotdisdain,forothers’needs.Thismaycertainlybetrueinmanycases,butawealthofevidencealso suggests thatgoalsoftenoperate tononconsciouslyreduceandminimizesuchconflicts.Themostpowerfulexampleofthisstemsfromresearchonthenonconsciouspursuitofprosocialgoals:whereaspossessingstrongprejudicialattitudescanenhancestereotypedmotivationalattributions,sotoodoespossessingchronicegalitariangoalshelp automatically inhibit stereotypeactivation(Moskowitz,Gollwitzer,Wasel,&Schaal,1999).Furthermore,whereasexchangeorientedindividualswhoareprimedwithpowermaybehavemoreselfishly,communallyorientedindividualsprimedwithpowerbehavemoreresponsibly(Chenetal.,2001).Evenwhen incompetitionwithan interactionpartner, individualswho are concurrently pursuing a prosocial goal will often nonconsciously scalebacktheirowneffortswhenoutperformingtheircompetitor(Bargh&Gollwitzer,1994).Furthermore, researchonnonverbalbehaviorhas foundawealthofevidencesuggestingthatsubtlecuesintheformofbehavioralmimicryreadilyelicitassimilation toan interactionpartner’sgoalsandvalues (Leander&Chartrand,2010;Leander,Chartrand,&Wood,2010;Maddux,Mullen,&Galinsky,2008).Therefore,despitethemanywaysgoalsfacilitateconflictandaggressioninrelationships, so too might individuals nonconsciously move to maintain a relativesenseofpeaceandharmonytoprotecttheirrelationships.


It is important that we also note that many socially aggressive goals aredependentonothersandcannotbeeffectivelypursuedinthoseothers’absence(e.g., competition, rebellion, sexuality; Baron & Boudreau, 1987). Despite thepotential problems of goal influences on social inferences and reactions, individualsmayoftenbecompelledtoperceiveothersascompetitorsorasviabletargets to react against in order to satiate their chronic and recurring needs.Afterall,rebelsneedasocialinstitutiontorebelagainst,andpartisanpoliticiansneedopponents todecry—adoptingopposinggoalsmay represent thepursuitoftheirownunconsciousgoaltorebel.Thus,activegoalsmightoftenneedtononconsciouslymanufactureinterpersonalconflicts(realorimagined)tofacilitatetheirownattainment.Theveryactofaggressingagainstothersandreactingagainsttheirgoals,then,mayhaveitsownfunctionalqualitiesthathaveyettobebeenfullyconsidered.

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103

7UsingBothYourHead

andYourHeartThe Role of Perspective Taking and

Empathy in Resolving Social ConflictADAMD.GALINSKY

Northwestern University

DEBRAGILINSaint Mary’s University

WILLIAMW.MADDUXINSEAD

Ifyouknowtheenemyandknowyourself,youneednotfeartheresultofahundredbattles.Ifyouknowyourselfbutnottheenemy,foreveryvictorygainedyouwillalsosufferadefeat.

SunTzu

S uccessinstrategicconflictsituationsoftennecessitatesaclearunderstandingoftheunderlyingmotivesandlikelybehaviorsofone’sopponent.InTomClancy’sThe Hunt for Red October, for example, the captainof aSoviet

nuclear submarine enters U.S. waters and engages a new technology to avoiddetection.AlthoughU.S.militarycommanderssuspectheispreparingtoattacktheUnitedStates,aCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA)analystnamedJackRyan

adam d. galinSky, deBra gilin, and William W. maddux104

isconvincedthat thecaptain isactually tryingtodefect.Theresultingstandoffmirrors a classic prisoner’s dilemma: Should the United States preventively useforce,ensuringashorttermvictory,ortrytheriskierbutpotentiallymorerewardingrouteofmutualcooperation?Intheend,Ryanisprovedright:theU.S.militarydelaystheattack,theSovietcommanderdoesswitchallegiance,andAmericagainsastalwartallyintheColdWar.

Ryan’sdeductioncameaboutbecausehehadthoroughlyresearchedhisopponent’spersonalandmilitarybackgroundand thusclearlyunderstood theSovietcaptain’sdistastefortheSovietUnionandlikelydesiretodefect.Intherealworld,thesuccessfulresolutionoftheCubanmissilecrisishasbeencreditedtoPresidentJohn F. Kennedy’s ability to take the perspective of his Soviet counterpart. Byactively appreciating Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s core interests of saving face and retaining power, Kennedy was able to devise a strategic plan thatsteeredthetwopowersawayfromtheprecipiceofnuclearwar,withoutsacrificingthe longterm interests of theUnited States. Whilepublicly refusing to removeanyofAmerica’smissilesplacedneartheSoviets(i.e.,noquidproquoonmissileremoval),KennedyofferedthatifallnuclearweaponswereremovedfromCubatheUnitedStateswouldpledgenottoinvadeCubainthefuture,termsthatsatisfiedU.S. interestswhilealsoallowingKhrushchevtodeclare thathehadsavedCubafromattack.

Theseexamples,fromfictionandfact,illustratethepowerfuladvantageofhavingadeepunderstandingofone’sopponentinconflictsituationsthatcansometimes prevent escalation of the conflict to outright aggression. In disparate butrelateddomainssuchaschess,poker,andbusiness,knowingthemotivesandlikelybehaviorsofanadversarycanilluminatestrategiesthatwillbringaboutpersonalgain,thedownfallofone’snemesis(Findler,1990;Lopes,1976;Thagard,1992),andevenlongtermpeace(Axelrod,1987).Similarly,instrategicinteractionssuchasnegotiations,whichinvolveconflictinginterests,negotiatorsmustoftenunderstandandsatisfytheotherparty’sinterestsandneedstoobtainthebestoutcomeforthemselves(Thompson,1990;Thompson&Hastie,1990;Fisher,Ury,&Patton,1991). In contrast, closemindedness is often the foundation for aggression andimpulsiveretaliation(Chapter10inthisvolume).Byunderstandinganadversary’sexplicitandimplicit interests,anticipatingtheirwordsandactions,andthinkingthroughways to structure solutions that satisfy their ownand theotherparty’sinterests,individualscandevelopcreativesolutionsthatreaptherewards—bothcompetitiveandcooperative—ofstrategicsocialinteractions.

Becauseunderstandinginterestsandmotivesisvaluableforcompetitivesuccess,itseemslikelythatindividualcharacteristicsassociatedwithunderstandingofandappreciationforotherindividualsmayproveadvantageousinstrategic,mixedmotives situations, suchasnegotiationsandconflictmanagement. Inparticular,tworelatedbutdistinctinterpersonalsocialcompetences—perspectivetakingandempathy—havebeenshowntomotivatesocialunderstandingacrossavarietyofcontexts.Althoughthetermsperspective takingandempathyareoftenusedinterchangeably,thereisclearevidenceoftheirdifferences(Coke,Batson,&McDavis,1978;Davis,1980,1983;Deutsch&Madle,1975;Hoffman,1977;Oswald,1996).Ontheonehand,perspectivetakingisacognitivecapacitytoconsidertheworld

uSing Both your head and your heart 105

fromotherviewpoints.It“allowsanindividualtoanticipatethebehaviorandreactionsofothers,thereforefacilitatingsmootherandmorerewardinginterpersonalrelationships” (Davis, 1983, p. 115). Empathy, in contrast, is an otherfocusedemotional response that allows one person to affectively connect with another.Sometimeslabeledsympathyorcompassion,empathyisacongruentemotionofconcernexperiencedwhenwitnessinganotherperson’ssuffering(Batson,Fultz,&Schoenrade,1987).

Davis(1983,p.113)eloquentlydescribedthehistoricalrootsofthedistinctionbetweenperspectivetakingandempathy:“Smith(1759)andSpencer(1870),writing centuries ago and a century apart, drew a nearly identical distinctionbetweentwobroadclassesofresponse:acognitive, intellectualreactionontheone hand (an ability simply to understand the other person’s perspective), andamorevisceral,emotionalreactiontotheother.”Althoughbothcharacteristicsare basic building blocks of social competence early in life (Piaget, 1932) andhavebroadsocialbenefitslaterinlife(Bengtsson&Johnson,1992;Davis,1983;Johnson,1975),wereviewtheextenttowhichitismorebeneficialtogetinsidethehead(perspectivetaking)versustheheart(empathy)ofone’spartnerinstrategic,mixedmotiveinteractions.

Inthecurrentchapter,weexaminethesetwoconstructsinmixedmotivesettingsthathaveexplicitimplicationsforourunderstandingofconflict.Wedescriberesearch examining the differential effects of perspective taking and empathyinnegotiationcontexts(Galinsky,Maddux,Gilin,&White,2008)aswellastheeffectsofperspectivetakingandempathyindifferenttypesofmixedmotivestrategicinteractions,suchaswargamesandsocialcoalitiongames(Gilin,Maddux,&Galinsky,2010).Allofthesestrategictasksinvolveanunderlyingconflictofinterestbetweenselfandother,creatingopportunitiesformutualgainononehand,andforimpasse,conflictescalation,orlostopportunitiesontheotherhand.Eachthereforemirrorskeydynamicsofinterpersonalandintergroupconflict.

perSpective takingResearchonperspective takingsuggests it is avaluable social skill in threekeyways:socialcoordination,cognitiveflexibility,andassertiveness.First,perspectivetakingincreasesbehavioralmatchingandfacilitatessocialcoordination(Chartrand&Bargh,1999;Galinsky,Ku,&Wang,2005;Galinsky,Wang,&Ku,2008).Asearlyas1934,GeorgeMeadspeculatedthatconsideringothers’viewpointsallowsindividuals to anticipate others’ behavior and reactions, increasing their socialmaturity.Recentresearchhasdirectlysupportedthisidea,showingthatindividualshigheronperspectivetakingabilityaremorelikelytomimicothers’nonverbalbehavior(Chartrand&Bargh,1999),whichinturnengendersliking(Chartrand&Bargh),goodwill(VanBaaren,Holland,Kawakami,&VanKnippenberg,2004),andassistance(VanBaarenetal.).Thus,asimultaneousgiveandtakeofgoodwillinsocialinteractionshelpsperspectivetakerscoordinatewithothers(Galinskyetal.,2005,2008).

Second, perspective taking involves cognitive flexibility. Perspective takersareabletostepoutsidetheconstraintsoftheirownimmediatebiasedframesof


referenceandstepintoalternatemindsets.Perspectivetakinginstructions(comparedwithcontrolconditions)havereducedavarietyofbiases,includingthemyopictendencytobelieveoneismorehinderedbysituationalconstraintsthanothers(Moore,2005),toactuallyignoreothers’situationalconstraints(Regan&Totten,1975; Vescio, Sechrist, &Paolucci, 2003), and to rely on stereotypic and prejudicialassumptionsaboutoutgroupmembers(Galinsky&Ku,2004;Galinsky&Moskowitz,2000;Galinskyetal.,2006;Vescioetal.).Thisincreaseincognitiveflexibility leads togreater problem solving by perspective takers—the ability tocognitivelyswitchbetweendivergentviewpoints,eventhosewithwhichtheperspectivetakerdisagrees(Richardson,Hammock,Smith,Gardner,&Signo,1994;Tetlock,Skitka,&Boettger,1989).Perspectivetakingseemstopromptanexternalvantagepoint,allowinganescapefromone’sownlimitingmentalsets.

Finally,perspective takersareassertive.Themostcommon laydefinitionofassertivenessis“standingupforlegitimatepersonalrights”(Wilson&Gallois,1993,p.48).Here,weadoptasimilardefinitionofassertivenessespousedbyTwenge(2001,p.134):atargeteduseoffirmnesstoprotectselfinterestinresponsetoothers’aggressivetactics(seealsoChapter5inthisvolumeforadifferentdefinitionandperspective).Thus,perspectivetakersstrivetosatisfytheirownandothers’interestswithoutbeingoverlyconcessionary.Overall,dispositionallyhighperspective takers are lower in their use of dominating conflict behaviors and chronicaggressionthanothers,relyingheavilyonjointproblemsolvinganddiscussioninthefaceofconflict(Richardsonetal.,1994).Theysuccessfullymaintain“mindovermatter”whenmildlyormoderatelyprovoked,resistingretaliationwhenitisunnecessaryandcounterproductive(Richardson,Green,&Lago,1998;seeChapter4inthis volume).However,when facedwith an immediate threat to their interests,perspective takerswillaggressandretaliate. Inan intergroupcompetitiontask,perspectivetaking,bygaininganunderstandingthatthetwosides’positionsaretrulyincompatible,increasesappropriatelycompetitivebehavior(Johnson,1967).Similarly,perspectivetakersretaliateinresponsetoanunambiguous,strongprovocation (Richardsonetal.).We interpret these results tomean thatperspectivetakersavoidinitiatingaggressivebehavior(Richardsonetal.)andstrivetosatisfytheirownandothers’interestsbutwillnotbackdowninthefaceofclearcompetitivecontingenciesorastrongattack.Thispatternofresponsesindicatesastrategysimilartothatofreciprocalaltruism(Trivers,1971),ahighlysuccessfulstrategyinmixedmotiveenvironments(Axelrod,1984)inwhichapreferenceforcooperationisbalancedwithamechanismforretaliationfollowingexploitation.

Adaptiveflexibilityandassertivenessembedded incoordinated social interaction shouldhelpperspective takers achievegreatergains at thebargaining table.Perspectivetakinghasbeenlinkedtogreateruseofjointproblemsolvinganddiscussionduringinterpersonalconflict(Richardsonetal.,1994),behaviorsthathaveindependentlybeenshowntobeassociatedwithpositivenegotiationsoutcomes.Sinceappreciatingdifferent interests is essential forfindingwin–winsolutions innegotiations (Thompson&Hastie,1990),negotiators’perspectivetakingabilitieshaveproventoprovidesomebenefitincraftingintegrativedeals(Kemp&Smith,1994).

Inadditiontojointandintegrativegains,perspectivetakingshouldenhancedistributivegainsinnegotiation.Forexample,waitresseswhomimictheircustomers


receivebiggertips(VanBaaren,Holland,Steenaert,&VanKnippenberg,2003).Notsurprisinglythen,perspectivetakerselicitgreaterconcessionsfromanopposing negotiator (Neale &Bazerman,1982) and can protect themselves from theanchoringeffectsofanopponent’sfirstoffer(Galinsky&Mussweiler,2001).

Thus, perspective taking allows advantages in adapting to others, and weproposethishelpsperspectivetakersdiscoverunderlyingcommoninterestswithan adversary when they are not obvious. Yet perspective takers also seem toprotecttheirownturf,beingassertiveindefendingtheirowninterestsandturning aggressive when necessary and improving others’ outcomes only so far astheirown interests arenot sacrificed.We thereforeexpected thatperspectivetakingwould improve individualand jointoutcomes inmixedmotivestrategicinteractions.

empathyWhereasperspectivetakingisprimarilyacognitiveability,empathyisprimarilyanaffectivestateofconcernforothers(Davis,1983)andincludes“feelingsthataremoreotherfocusedthanselffocused”(Batsonetal.,1987,p.2).Empathydoesnotcorrelatewiththesameconstellationofpersonalitycharacteristicsasperspectivetaking.Empathypredictsmoreintenseexperienceofemotions(Davis;Eisenberget al., 1994; Okun, Shepard, & Eisenberg, 2000), greater sensitivity to others(Davis),andhelpingothersevenatone’sownexpense(seereviewsinBatson,1991;Batson & Oleson, 1991). Empathy benefits others by prompting prosocial helping(Archer,DiazLoving,Gollwitzer,Davis,&Foushee,1981;Batson,O’Quinn,Fultz,Vanderplas,&Isen,1983;Batsonetal.,1987;Cokeetal.,1978).Forinstance,empathizersvolunteermoretimetohelpotherscomparedwithperspectivetakers(Oswald,1996),andempathyresultsinparticipantsassigninganunknownpartneramoredesirabletaskwhileacceptingalessdesirabletaskforthemselves(Batsonetal.,2003).Assuch,empathyisahighlyeffectivemeansof inducingconsiderationandhelpingofothers.However,empathyinducedhelpingisoftendoneattheexpenseofone’sownconcerns.Allocationdecisionsbyempathizerscanbesootherservingastoharmone’sselfinterest(Batsonetal.).

Instrategicinteractions,empathycansimilarlyresultinanoverconsiderationofanadversary.Forexample,empathizerstendtocooperateinprisoner’sdilemmagames(Batson&Moran,1999),eveniftheyknowthattheiropponenthaspreviouslydefectedand therefore cooperation is likely to be to theirown detriment(Batson&Ahmad,2001).Lendingsupporttotheideathatempathymaynotbeanassetbutaliabilityinnegotiationsisevidenceshowingthatagreeablenessisassociatedwithworsedistributiveoutcomes(Barry&Friedman,1998).Empathyisassociatedwithincreasedperceivedclosenessormentalmergingwithothers(Cialdini,Brown,Lewis,Luce,&Neuberg,1997).Althoughthis“oneness”mayexpandtheboundaries of the self to include the other, a healthy appreciation of differentpriorities necessary to create win–win outcomes may not result from empathicconcern. In addition, close personal relationships increase attention to others’outcomes (Sally, 2000) but reduce concentration on economicgain (Ligthart&Lindenberg,1994).Asaresult,romanticpartners,comparedwithstrangers,arrive


atlessintegrativeoutcomesbecausetheysetloweraspirations,makefeweroffers,andengageinlessassertivebehavior(Fry,Firestone,&Williams,1983).Similarly,friendsareoftenlessassertivebecauseofagreaterconcernwithmaintainingtherelationship(Peterson&Thompson,1997).

Becauseempathycreatessuchastrongotherfocus,empathizersmaybeunabletoenlargethenegotiationpieortoclaimashareofthepieforthemselves.Becauseempathymotivatesalowfocusonprotectingone’sowninterestsandproducesapassivestance,weexpectedempathytoleadtolessefficientintegrationofinterestsandafailuretoclaimafairshareofindividualgainsatthenegotiationtable.

the dual concern model: predicting the effectS of perSpective taking and empathy

TheDualConcernModelofnegotiationsprovidesausefulframeworkformakingclearpredictionsabout the relativeadvantagesofperspective takingandempathyinstrategic,mixedmotiveinteractions.AccordingtotheDualConcernModel(Pruitt&Rubin,1986),negotiatorscanchoosetodividetheirattentionbetweenthemselvesandtheotherside:Negotiatorscanbeattentiveonlytotheirownconcerns,onlywiththeconcernsoftheotherside,orhaveamixofattentionfocusedonselfandotherconcerns.Whenattentionisfocusedonlyonselfinterests,negotiators tend to be overly aggressive, displaying obstinate behavior designed toincreaseindividualordistributivegainsattheother’sexpense.However,focusingonlyontheinterestsofothersencouragesselfdestructiveandspinelessconcessionmaking.Instead,abalanceofattentiontobothselfinterestsandtheinterestsofothersandconcernsfacilitatescreativeproblemsolving.Assuch,effectivenegotiatorsmustfindatenuousbalancebetweenfacilitatingpositiveandcooperativeinteractionswithinacompetitiveandoftendistrustfulenvironment; thisnecessarybalancingofcompetitionandcooperationhasbeendubbedthe“negotiator’sdilemma”(Lax&Sebenius,1986).

Extrapolatingfromthismodel,empathycouldtipthebalanceofattentiontoofartowardcooperationandtheotherside’sconcerns,leadingnegotiatorstosacrificeselfinterestand,bynotpushingone’sowninterests,evenpreventingnegotiatorsfromdiscoveringinsightsthatcouldbenefitbothsides.Incontrast,perspectivetakingmayleadtoamorebalancedfocusonappreciatingothers’interestswithoutforfeiting one’s own claims and therefore produce beneficial outcomes for boththe self and other. Indeed,AdamSmith (1759) suggested inhisworkon moralsentimentsthatperspectivetakingwasmoreessentialthanempathyinachievingefficientoutcomes,thatlookingatthingsfromanoutsideperspectiveallowsindividualstooverridepassionssuchasexcessivesympathythatcanimpairinsightandcreativity.Overall,wepredictthatperspectivetakingwillenhancebothjointandindividualoutcomesinnegotiations,whereasempathymayleadtodisadvantagesonboththesefronts.

However, we believe there are important mixedmotive situations in whichempathizersshouldhaveamarkedadvantage,suchascoalitionbuilding,inwhichthereisabenefittorecognizingsubtleemotionalreactionsthatarediagnosticof


other’semotionalconnectionswithoneself.Thatis,weexpectthatempathicindividualswillreadothers’interpersonalcuesmoreaccurately.Asaresult, intaskswheresuchunderstandingconfersastrategicadvantage,affectiveaccuracymightleadtoaperformanceadvantageofempathyoverperspectivetaking.

perSpective takerS are Better negotiatorSGalinsky et al. (2008) both measured and manipulated perspective taking andempathytoexploretheirinfluenceintwonegotiationtasksthatrepresentcommonandchallengingbarrierstounderstanding:(1)compatibilityofunderlyinginterestsinthefaceofconflictingpositions(Studies1and2);and(2)differingpreferencesand priorities (Study3). Indeed, perceivingone hasdissimilarpersonal goals isoftenthefoundationofincreasedratesoffightingincloserelationships(Chapter12 in this volume). These twobarriers to mutualunderstanding areunderlyingcontributorstomostinterpersonalconflicts.Theysoughttoanswerthefollowingquestion:Forindividualsinvolvedinsuchmixedmotivesituations,isitmoreeffectivetoempathizewithanopponent(havetheminsideyourheart)ortounderstandtheirthoughtsandperspective(getinsidetheirhead)?

Twoof theirstudiesusedanegotiationoverthesaleofthe“Texoil”gasstation (Goldberg, 2008), where a deal based solely on sale price was impossible.Specifically,thebuyer’sreservationprice(themaximumheorshewasauthorizedtopay)waslowerthantheseller’sreservationprice(theminimumheorshewaswillingtoaccept),resultinginanegativebargainingzoneforsaleprice.However,bothparties’underlyinginterestswerecompatible:Thebuyerwantedtohiremanagerstorunthestation,andthesellerneededhelpfinancingasailboattripandtoobtainemploymentafterreturning.Thus,partiescouldagreetoasalepricebelowtheseller’sreservationprice,butwithastipulationoffutureemployment.Toreachasuccessfuldeal,participantshadtodiscoverthisalternativesolutionthemselvesduringthecourseofthenegotiation.

Inthisstudy,dyadiclevelsofperspectivetakingandempathy(controllingforthe Big Five traits, and gender) predicted the likelihood of negotiating a deal.However,onlydyads’perspectivetakingtendenciesactedasasignificantpositivepredictorofwhetherasuccessfuldealwasreached.Incontrasttherewasanegativerelationshipbetweenempathyanddealdiscovery.Followupanalysesattheindividuallevelfoundthatonlythebuyer’schronicperspectivetakingsignificantlypredictedwhetheradealwasreached,whereasforsellersonlytheiropennesstoexperiencesignificantlypredictedwhetheradealwasreached.

Inotherwords,perspectivetakingtendencies(particularlyinthebuyer)helpednegotiatorsovercometheirapparentlyconflictingpositionsandgenerateacreativeresolutiontoamutualproblemthatmetbothparties’needs.Empathy,incontrast,proveddetrimentaltodiscoveringasolution.Importantly,theadvantagesofperspectivetakingwereindependentoftheBigFivepersonalityvariables,providingdiscriminatevalidityforitsroleinnegotiations.

Inthisresearchonlythebuyer’sperspectivetakingtendencymadeadifferenceinproducinga deal.However, this reasoning is consistentwith recent researchshowing the importance of the buyer’s role in soliciting information in this gas


stationnegotiation(Maddux,Mullen,&Galinsky,2008).Althoughthesellerneedsto reveal personal information (not surprisingly, the seller’s openness toexperiencematteredinthecurrentnegotiation),adealcannotbeachievedunlessthebuyerplays anactive role in soliciting andappreciating thevalueof the seller’sdisclosuresincraftingasolution.Thus,onlythebuyer’sperspectivetakingabilitypredictedcreativeproblemresolution.

AsecondstudymanipulatedtheperspectivetakingandempathyofthebuyerinthesameTexoilnegotiation.Buyersintheempathyconditionweregiventhefollowinginstructions:“Inpreparingforthenegotiationandduringthenegotiation,taketheperspectiveoftheservicestationowner.Try tounderstandwhatheorsheisfeeling,whatemotionsheorshemaybeexperiencinginsellingthestation.Trytoimaginewhatyouwouldbefeeling inthatrole.”Buyersintheperspectivetaking condition were told the following: “In preparing for the negotiation andduringthenegotiation,taketheperspectiveoftheservicestationowner.Trytounderstandwhatheorsheisthinking,whathisorherinterests andpurposesareinsellingthestation.Trytoimaginewhatyouwouldbethinking inthatrole.”Theresultsreplicatedtheoverallpatternfromthecorrelationalstudy:perspectivetakers achieved significantly moredeals thanempathizers andcontrolparticipants(whodidnotdifferfromeachother),overcomingseeminglyconflictinginterests.

Thisstudyalsomeasuredanotheroutcomewithimplicationsforconflictresolution:theseller’ssatisfactionwithhowheorshefelttreatedduringthenegotiation.Hereempathyprovedadvantageous;beingempathizedwithledtothehighestlevelofinterpersonalsatisfaction.Althoughperspectivetakersinspiredsignificantlylesssatisfactionthandidempathizers,theystillproducedsignificantlymoresatisfactionthancontrolparticipants.Thus,althoughempathyhadimmediateaffectivebenefitsfortheotherside,empathizersdidnothaveanadvantageovercontrolparticipantsinproducingmoredeals,whichwouldprovidelongtermvalueforthemselvesandtheiropponentandresolvetheirconflictofinterest.Incontrast,perspectivetakerssecuredthemostagreementswithsufficientopponentsatisfaction.

Galinskyetal. (2008)nextexaminedwhetherperspective takingandempathywouldhelpnegotiatorsnavigatemultiissuenegotiations.Wheneveranegotiationinvolvesmultipleissues,negotiatorscanhavedifferentpriorities;negotiatorscanimprovetheiroutcomesbyconcedingonlowpriority issues inexchangefortheirhighpriorityones,a techniquecalled logrolling (Froman&Cohen,1970).Logrollingisanexcellentconflictresolutiontool,evenincloseandongoingrelationships,becauseitallowsthepartiestotradeoff“wins”onissuesonwhichtheywantopposite things for the sakeof theoverall dealor relationship (Sheppard,1999).Merecompromise,orsimply“splitting”all issuesdownthemiddle, isanimpediment to reaching efficient agreements compared with making mutuallybeneficialtradeoffs(Thompson,1990;2001;Tripp&Sondak,1992).Multiissuenegotiationsalsohighlightadilemmanegotiatorsface:findingabalancebetweencapturingvalueforoneself(valueclaiming)andmaximizingtheavailableresourcesforbothparties(valuecreating;Lax&Sebenius,1986).Tobemosteffective,negotiatorsmustbothcreateaslargeapieofresourcesaspossible(toproducethemosteconomicallyefficientagreements)andalsoclaimasmuchofthatpieaspossible(to satisfy their selfinterest). In the context of ongoing business and personal


relationships, soundnegotiationdeals thatcreatea lotofvalueanddistribute itfairlyshouldalsohelppreventfuturedisputes(Sheppard,1999).

InamultiissuenegotiationGalinskyetal.(2008)foundthattakingtheperspectiveofone’sopponentproducedboththegreatestamountofjointgainsandmoreprofitableindividualoutcomes.Perspectivetakersachievedthehighestlevelofeconomicefficiencywithout sacrificing theirownmaterialgains. In contrast,empathizersreceivedthelowestindividualoutcomes,withincreasesinjointgainsgoingmostlytotheempathizer’sopponent(seealsoChapter14inthisvolumeforwhenforgivenesscanerodeselfrespect).Interestingly,itappearsintheirstudiesthat the negotiator who would achieve the best individual outcome is one whotakestheperspectiveofanempathizingopponent,suggestingthatnegotiationoutcomesmaybedrivenbytheinteractionbetweenthesetwosocialcompetencies.

Overall,theinitialstudiesbyGalinskyetal.(2008)suggestthatitisbetterto“thinklike”ratherthanto“feelfor”one’sadversaries.Inotherwords,itismorebeneficialtogetinsidetheirheadthanhavetheminsideone’sownheart.

perSpective takerS navigate mixed-motive SituationS BecauSe they are more accurate

in predicting their opponent’S moveSTheprevious studies focused on negotiations and not conflictper se. However,theresultsarehighlysuggestiveofperformanceinconflictrelatedsettings.TheTexoilexerciseinparticularpresentsaclassicdilemmainresolvinginterpersonalconflicts.Whenanobvioussolutionisnotpossible(inthiscase,amutuallybeneficialprice),partiesoftenbecomeangryandfrustrated.Thekeytoasolutionandtopreventillwillistodiscovermutuallycompatibleunderlyinginterests.Indeed,researchershaverepeatedlyshownthatidentifyingoverlappinginterestsiscriticalinsolvinginterpersonalconflictsaswellasnegotiations(Brett,2007;Ury,Brett,&Goldberg,1988).Thus,theextenttowhichperspectivetakingandempathypredicttheabilitytoidentifybothparties’underlyinginterestsshouldlikelyapplyacrossanarrayofmixedmotivecontexts,includingsituationsinvolvingbargainingaswellasthoseinvolvinginterpersonalorstrategicdisputes.

Toseeiftheirfindingsgeneralizedtosettingsinvolvingamoreexplicitdegreeof conflict, Gilin, Maddux, & Galinsky (2010) followed up these initial studiesbyexploring thedifferentialeffectsofperspective takingandempathy inothertypesofmixedmotivesettings.Theypredicted thatperspective taking(butnotempathy)wouldprovideanaccurateunderstandingoftheopponents’strategyandinterestsincognitivelybasedcompetitiveinteractions.Incontrast,theypredictedthatempathywouldaidperformanceincompetitivetasksrequiringanemotionalappreciationofandconnectionwiththeotherside.

Theirfirststudyusedasimulated“wargame”thatinvolvedmultipleroundsofapotentialarmsracewithan“enemy”country.Thistasktendstogeneraterealisticemotionalconflictresponses, suchasanger, frustration,andadesireforretaliationinthefaceofattack,eventhoughitoccursoverarelativelybriefinteractionperiod.Participantshadtomakerepeateddecisionsaboutwhethertodisarmone’s


bombsortousethemtobombtheopponent.Gamesendedassoonasoneoftwooutcomesoccurred:either(1)attack:oneopponentbombedtheother;or(2)peace:10bombfree(peaceful)roundswereconcluded.Also,atvariouspoints,facetofacenegotiationsweremandatorysoeachplayerwasabletocommunicatedirectlywithhisorheropponent.Therearetworoadstosuccessinthisgame.First,onepotentiallywinningstrategyistodisarmfewerweaponsthanone’sadversaryandthenattack.Second,ifneitherplayerattackedinthe10roundsofagame,“peace”was declared, and payments were paid out by a neutral third party, the WorldBank.Partieswerethenrewardedaccordingtotheextenttowhichtheymetorsurpassedthegoalof50%disarmament.Successatthisgameinvolvesusingcomplexcognitivestrategy,anticipatingthestrategyoftheopponent,persuadingtheopponenttomakemutuallybeneficialmoves,andavoidinggratuitousretaliationthatwillescalatedistrust,valuedestruction,andstalematewithapartner.Inotherwords,thetaskmodelsrealworldstrategicconflictsituationsinwhichonemustkeepone’sangerandfrustrationinchecktoavoidacycleofincreasingprovocationandaggression.

Gilin et al. (2010) tested how individual differences in perspective takingandempathypredictedindividualprofit,jointgainprovidedbytheWorldBank,andthepercentoftotalgamesinwhichthedyadachievedpeace(bothpartiescooperatedthroughall10roundswithoutattack).Withregardtojointgainandattainmentofpeace, thepatternor resultswerevery similar to those found inthepreviouslydescribedTexoilstudy.Dyadiclevelperspectivetakingwasassociatedwithdyadsreachingpeacemorefrequently(i.e.,moreoftheirgamesendedwithouta“bombattack”),butdyadicempathyactuallypredictedasignificantlylowerpercentageofpeacefulsolutions.Inaddition,theamountofjointintegrative gains resulting from peaceful resolutions (reward money from the “WorldBank”),indicatingtheextentofcooperationinpeacefulgames,waspositivelyandsignificantlyrelatedtodyadicperspectivetakingbutnegativelyandsignificantlyrelatedtodyadicempathy.

This pattern of results suggests that, perhaps surprisingly, there was moreretaliationwhenthecollectiveempathyamongtheadversarieswashigh.Researchshows that regulating anger is a key factor in successfully navigating conflicts(Chapter9inthisvolume).Gamebygameanalysesprovidesomeinsightintohowperspectivetakerswereabletosucceed:Thosehigheronperspectivetakingnotonlydisarmedtheirownarsenalstoagreaterextentbutalsowereabletoconvincetheiropponentstodothesameandtherebycreate jointgain.Incontrast,highempathyindividualsanddyadshadmoreaggressiveattacksandfewersuccessfullycooperativeinteractions.Highempathydyadsseemedtogetlockedinspiralsofescalatingconflictinvolvingattackandcounterattack.Wespeculatethatthismaybeafunctionofthegreateremotionalityofempathicindividuals.Perhapsunderdirectthreatandattack,thisemotionalitycanleadtobeing“carriedaway”byangerorspite, leadingtocounterproductiveconflictescalation(Pillutla&Murnighan,1996).With regard to individual gains,higher levelsofperspective takingwererelatedtosignificantlygreaterprofit,whereasempathypredictedfewerindividualprofits.Thus,perspectivetakersnotonlyachievedpeacebutalsosecuredhigherprofitsforthemselves.


AsecondstudybyGilinetal. (2010) testedwhetherperspective takingandempathywouldpredictperformanceinasimpleultimatumbargaininggameandwhetheraccurate inferencesabout theopponent’sstrategywouldmediate theseeffects.Anultimatumbargaininggameinvolvestworoles:a“Proposer,”whoseroleistomakeasingleofferofapoolofresources(e.g.,$10)toaResponder,whomustsimplyacceptorrejecttheoffer(Pillutla&Murnighan,1995).AcceptancemeanspartieskeepthedistributionofmoneyofferedbytheProposer;rejectionmeansthatneitherpartyreceivesanyamountoftheresource.

Theultimatum task thereforemodelsa simpleconflict inwhichoneopponenthasdecisionpowerwhile theotherhasthepowertorespondtoandprotectagainstpotentiallyunfairdecisions.Itprovidesanidealcontextfortestingwhethercognitive understanding of thepartner’sperspectivedrives successfuloutcomesbecausetheProposer’soutcomelargelydependsonparticipants’perceptions of the likely responses of the other person. For example, a Proposerwhocompletelydisregardswhattheopponentmightviewasafavorableorfairoutcome(i.e.,bytakingmostofthemoneyforhimself)islikelytohavetheofferrejectedandwindupwithnomoneyatall.Ontheotherhand,choosinganofferthat the responder perceives as fair will result in an accepted agreement andmoney for both sides. But this is a classic mixedmotive situation because thesender wants to send as little money as possible that will still be accepted tomaximizehisorherowngain.

Intheirstudy,onlytheperspectivetakingbutnottheempathyoftheProposerpredictedbothwhetheraResponderacceptedanofferandtheamountofmoneysecured.Inaddition,theProposerswhowerehigheronperspectivetakingweremoreaccurateindeterminingwhethertheiropponentwouldaccepttheirultimatumoffersandthisaccuracymediatedtheirabilitytosecureacceptances.

empathizerS are more effective in predicting emotional connectionS

Allofthestudiesdescribedinthischaptersuggestthatperspectivetakingissuperior to empathy in mixedmotive settings: perspective takers can get inside theheadofopponentsandunderstandtheir interestsandprioritiesandcanpredictand influence their likelybehavior.However, in some strategic interactions andcoalition–formationsituations,thekeyisdeterminingwithwhomonehasemotionallyoraffectivelyconnected.Totestthishypothesis,Gilinetal.(2010)designedathreepersonsocialcoalitiongameinwhichparticipantscouldwinacashprizebutonlyiftheyselectedastheircoalitionpartnersomeonewhoalsosimultaneouslychosethem(ratherthanathirdperson).However,participantswerenottoldtheywereplayingastrategiccoalitiongameuntilafteranintroductorysessioninwhichtheygottoknowthetwootherparticipants.Thegamewasthereforenotprimarilyacognitivetask,butratheramoreintuitiveandaffectivetaskinwhichparticipantsneededtoretroactivelyassesstheirsocialconnectionswithothersduringthepreviousinteraction;successdependedonhavinggatheredthecorrectsenseoftheirpreviousemotionalconnectionwithothers.


Inthisgame,empathywasabenefittobothwinningthegameandaccuracyabout the other players’ game choices. In contrast, perspective taking was notassociatedwitheitherwinningoraccuracy,althoughperspectivetakingwasneverdetrimental toeitheroutcome. In this study, empathic tendencies conferred anadvantage, predicting successful coalition building. These results indicate thatempathy can be an asset when conflicts are fundamentally based on affective,interpersonal connections, suchas interpersonal disputes with spouses, friends,family,andcolleagues.

concluSionSWehave reviewedanumberof studiesexploring the roleof twosocial competencies—perspectivetakingandempathy—inpredictingsuccessinmixedmotivesituations that model key underlying characteristics of conflict. In negotiations,wargames,andultimatumgames,wheresuccessistypicallyachievedbyunderstanding the likelystrategicmovesofone’sopponent,perspective takingprovesadvantageous.Perspectivetakersarebetterabletouncoverunderlyingintereststogeneratecreativesolutionsandtocraftmoreefficientdealsinmultiissuenegotiations.Theyarealsobetterabletoanticipateandsteerlikelybehaviorinwarlikeclashes, leadingthemtoachievehigherlevelsofpeace.Notonlydoperspectivetakersreachagreementsandpeacewhilemaximizingthesizeofthebargainingpie, but they also take nice big pieces of that pie, garnering the highest levelsof individualprofit.TheyseemtotakeSunTzu’sexhortationthattoknowone’senemyistheroadtosuccessonthebattlefield.

However,whensuccessinastrategicinteractionrequiresdeterminingifyoupsychologicallyconnectwithanotherperson,empathizersweremorelikelytowininacoalitionformationgame.Theseresultssuggestthatempathycanpromotenotjustclosenesstoothersbutalsoanaccurateassessmentofinterpersonalconnection,leadingtosuccessinstrategictasksthatrequireaffectiveunderstanding.

Overall,thesestudiessuggestthatperspectivetakingandempathycaneachpromotesuccessfulresolutionofcompetitiveinteractionsdependingonthetypeofconflict.Ingeneral,theidentificationofmutuallycompatibleunderlyinginterests,akeyconflictresolutionstrategy,seemstobeattheheartofperspectivetakingability,andwefoundanadvantageforperspectivetakerswheninteractions(e.g.,negotiations, war games) required an appreciation of counterparts’ underlyinginterests.Ontheotherhand,conflictsinvolvingmoreaffective,interpersonaldisputesmaybebestapproachedwithanempatheticmindset.

At thesametime,however,weacknowledge thatmanyrealworldconflictsinvolvebothaffectiveandcognitiveelements,andwebelievethathavingbothskills is likelyuseful: empathy for appreciating anddiffusing the affectiveelements that aredefining featuresof conflict; andperspective taking fordeducingcompatibleinterestsandpossiblesolutionstoachieveanenduringresolution.Indeed, in our opening examples, both Jack Ryan and President Kennedy notonly identifiedkeyunderlying interestsof theirSovietcounterparts that ledtowin–win outcomes but were also able to diffuse heated interpersonal tensionsamongtheirowndecisionmakingteams(inbothcases,governmentandmilitary


officialswhopushedforamilitaryresponse)togettheirproposed,peacefulsolutionsimplemented.Thus,althoughfutureresearchisneededforempiricalconfirmation,webelievethereislikelyanidealbalancebetweenbothmindsetsinmanyconflictsituations,suggestingperhapsthattheidealistostriveforsomethinglikeAristotle’s“goldenmean.”Indecidingwhenandhowbesttouseone’sheadandone’sheartinconflictsituationsalittleofbothmaygoalongway.LikethefamouscharactersfromThe Wizard of Oz,successfulresolutionofconflictsrequiresbrains,aheart,andalittlecourage.

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119

8AffectiveInfluencesonthe

Perception,Management,andResolutionofSocialConflicts1

JOSEPHP.FORGASandHUIBINGTANUniversity of New South Wales

introduction

I maginethatyouarehearingamarchingbandperformingacheerful,upbeattunewhileyouarethinkingaboutaseriousconflictyouneedtoresolvewithyourpartner.Wouldthemoodinducedbythemusicinfluenceyourthoughts,

plans,andeventualconflictmanagementstrategies?Thischapterwillexplorethepsychologicalmechanismsresponsibleforsucheffects,describingaseriesofexperimentsdemonstratingtheinfluenceofmoodonvariousconflictbehaviors.Itiswellknownthataffectisanintegralcomponentofmostsocialconflictsandalsoplaysacrucialrole inmanyaggressiveencounters (Forgas,2002,2007;Zajonc,2000;seealsoChapter9inthisvolume).Affectivestatesarelikelytoinfluenceavarietyofstrategicconflictrelatedbehaviors,suchasassertiveness(seeChapter5inthisvolume),forgiveness(seeChapter14inthisvolume),goalsetting(Chapters6and12 in thisvolume),perspective taking(Chapter7 in thisvolume),andreactionstoostracism (Chapters3 and13 in this volume).Returning toour introductoryexample,militarymusichasbeenusedeversinceantiquitytoinfluencesoldiers’moodstates,inthehopethatupbeat,energeticmusiccreatesamoreassertiveandconfident mindset that can influence behavior in conflict situations. In another

1 ThisworkwassupportedbyaProfessorialFellowshipfromtheAustralianResearchCouncilandtheResearchPrizebytheAlexandervonHumboldtFoundationtoJosephP.Forgas.Forfurtherinformationonthisresearchproject,seealsowww.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/jforgas.htm.

JoSeph p. forgaS and hui Bing tan120

literaryexample,ThomasManninashortstorydescribeshowchessplayers’decisionswhethertouseadefensiveoraggressivestrategyismarkedlyinfluencedbytheupbeatordownbeatmoodofthebackgroundmusicplayedbyanorchestrainthebackground.

Althoughthelasttwodecadessawsomethinglikean“affectiverevolution”inpsychologicalresearch(seealsoForgas,2002,2006),wearestillalongwayfromfullyunderstandingtheageoldpuzzleaboutthelinksbetweenaffectandcognition,feelingandthinkingasthetwocomplementaryfacultiesofthehumanmind (Hilgard, 1980). There is compelling recent evidence from evolutionarysocialpsychology,neuropsychology,andpsychophysiologysuggestingthataffectis an essential component ofmotivated social thinkingand behavior (Adolphs&Damasio,2001;Blascovich&Mendes,2000).However,wedonotyet fullyunderstandwhen,how,andwhytheseeffectsoccur.Thischapterwilldescribeaseriesofrecentstudiesshowinghowpositiveandnegativemoodstatescaninfluenceboththecontentandtheprocessofhowpeoplethinkaboutconflictsituations, resulting in significantconsequences forconflictbehaviorsandconflictresolutionstrategies.

Wewillbeginwithabriefoverviewofearlyresearchonaffectandsocialconflictandwillsurveyrecentcognitivetheoriesrelevanttounderstandingthislink.Next, two converging lines of research will be described demonstrating affective influenceson thecontentandprocessof thinkingandbehavior in conflictsituations.First,experimentsdemonstratingaffectcongruencewillbedescribed,showing that affective states may color the way people interpret and evaluateconflictsituations,influencingtheirnegotiatingstrategiesandthewayinterpersonaldemandsare formulatedandrespondedto.Asecondlineofexperimentsexplores affective influences in informationprocessing strategies, showing thataffectimpactsonhowpeopleprocessconflictrelevantinformation.Inparticular,mildnegativemoodsoftentriggeramoresystematic,accommodativeinformationprocessingstylethatresultsinmoreeffectiveandmoresuccessfuljudgmentsandbehaviorsinconflictsituationsandgreatersensitivitytosocialnorms.

affect, mood, and emotionThereisasyetlittlegeneralagreementintheliteratureabouthowbesttodefinetermssuchasaffect, feelings, emotions,ormood(Fiedler&Forgas,1988;Forgas,1992,1995,2002).Wehavearguedelsewherethataffectmaybeusedasagenericlabel to refer to both moods and emotions. Moods in turn could be describedas“lowintensity,diffuseandrelativelyenduringaffectivestateswithoutasalientantecedentcauseandthereforelittlecognitivecontent(e.g.,feelinggoodorfeeling bad),” whereas emotions “are more intense, shortlived and usually have adefinitecauseandclearcognitivecontent” (e.g.,angerorfear) (Forgas,1992,p.230).Thisdistinctionishighlyrelevanttounderstandingthefunctionsofaffectinconflictbehaviors.Thereismuchevidencefortheinfluenceofspecificemotionssuchasanger,shame,guilt,andprideinconflictbehaviors(seeChapter9inthisvolume).Inaddition,subtle,nonspecificmoodsmayoftenhaveapotentiallymoreenduringandinsidiousmotivationalinfluenceonsocialcognitionandbehaviorsin

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conflictsituations(Fiedler,1991;Forgas,1992,1995,2002;Sedikides,1992,1995).Accordingly,ourprimaryconcernhereiswiththeeffectsoflowintensitymoodsratherthandistinctemotions.

affect and Social conflictSThekeyroleofaffectinthewaypeoplethinkaboutandrespondtosocialconflictshasbeensuggestedinanumberofearlystudies.Psychoanalytictheoriesassumed that affecthas adynamic, invasivequality andcan “takeover” judgments unless adequate psychological resources are deployed to control theseimpulses (Feshbach & Singer, 1957). Conditioning and associationist theoriesprovided an alternative account, suggesting thatpreviously “neutral” conceptscanbecomeaffectivelyloadedasaresultofincidentalassociationswithaffectelicitingstimuli.AccordingtoradicalbehavioristssuchasJohnWatson,allaffective reactions acquired throughout life are the product of such a cumulativepatternofassociations.

More recent work showed that implicit representations of common socialencounters, including conflict situations, are largely determined by the feelingsarousedbytheseevents,ratherthantheirobjectivefeatures(Forgas,1979,1982).Feelings of anxiety, confidence, intimacy, pleasure, or discomfort are critical indefiningimplicitrepresentationsofsocialencounters.Severaldecadesago,Pervin(1976)notedthatwhat is striking is theextent towhich interpersonalsituationsare“describedintermsofaffects(e.g.,threatening,warm,interesting,dull,tense,calm,rejecting)andorganizedintermsofsimilarityofaffectsarousedbythem”(p.471).Morerecently,NiedenthalandHalberstadt(2000)showedthatsuchemotionalcategorizationisextremelycommon.Manysocialstimuliandeventsareperceived,categorized,andrespondedtonotbasedontheirobjectivecharacteristicsbutintermsoftheemotionalreactionstheyelicit.

Affect also has a dynamic influence on how social information—includinginformationaboutconflictsituations—isinterpreted,processed,andremembered(Bower,1981;Forgas,1995a,2001,2002).Contemporarycognitivetheoriesfocusontheinformationprocessingmechanismsthatallowaffectivestatestoinfluenceboththecontentandtheprocessesofthinkingandjudgments.

cognitive mechaniSmS of affect congruenceAffectivestatescanhavetwokindsofeffectsonsocialthinkingandbehavior.Theymayinfluence(1)thecontentofthinkingbyselectivelyprimingaffectcongruentthoughtsandresponses,andtheymayalsoinfluence(2)theprocessofthinking,that is, thewaypeopleprocess social information.We shall consider these twokindsofeffectsinturn.

Content Effects

TheassociativenetworkmodelbyBower(1981)proposedthataffectandcognitionareintegrallylinkedwithinanassociativenetworkofmentalrepresentations.


Selectively primed affectcongruent constructs are more likely to be used inconstructivecognitive tasks—forexample,whenperceiving, interpreting,andconstructing responses to a conflict situation. In several experiments, Bowerfound that happy or sad people were likely to selectively remember positive(ornegative)detailsoftheirchildhoodandoftheirsocialactivitiesduringthepreceding weeks, consistent with the predicted selective recall of affectcongruent information.Betteraccess toaffectcongruent informationshouldalsobiasperceptionsandbehaviorsinconflictsituations,andsuchmoodeffectsaremostreliablyfoundwhenthesituationiscomplexanddemandingasistypicallythecasewithconflictscenarios(Forgas,1994,1999a,1999b,2002;Sedikides,1995).

An alternative theory of content effects was proposed by Schwarz andClore(1983)whoarguedthat“insteadofcomputingajudgmentonthebasisofrecalledfeaturesofatarget,individualsmaysimplyjustaskthemselves:“Howdo I feel about it?” and when doing so, they may mistake feelings due to apreexistingmoodstateasindicativeoftheirreactiontothetarget”(Schwarz,1990, p. 529). This simplistic “howdoIfeelaboutit” heuristic suggests thatpeopleoftenmisreadtheirmoodasinformativeoftheirreactionstoanunrelatedsituation.AsearlierconditioningtheoriesbyCloreandByrne(1974),thismodelalsopositsanincidentalandsubconsciouslinkbetweenaffectandunrelatedstimuliandresponses.Researchnowsuggeststhatpeopleseemtorelyonaffectasaheuristiccueonlywhentheyareunfamiliarwiththetask,whentheyhave no priorevaluations to fallbackon, when theirpersonal involvement islow,andwhentheyhaveinsufficientcognitiveresourcesormotivationtocomputeamorethoroughresponse(Forgas,2006).Althoughaffectasinformationmay influencequick, superficial judgments (Forgas&Moylan,1987;Schwarz&Clore),itisunlikelythatmorecomplexanddemandingreactionsinconflictsituationswouldbebasedonsuchasuperficialandtruncatedstrategy.

Processing Effects

Affectcanalsoinfluencetheprocessofcognition,thatis,howpeoplethink(Clark& Isen, 1982; Schwarz, 1990). According to the moodmaintenance hypothesis(Clark&Isen),people in apositivemoodshould try toavoideffortful thinkingtomaintainthispleasantstate.Incontrast,thoseinnegativemoodmightengagein vigilant, effortful processing as an adaptive response to improve an aversivestate.OtherssuchasSchwarz,andWegenerandPetty(1994),offeredafunctionalist“cognitivetuning”account,suggestingthatpositiveandnegativeaffecthavea signaling–tuning function, informing the person of whether a relaxed, effortminimizing(inpositiveaffect)oravigilant,effortful(negativeaffect)processingstyleisappropriate.

Morerecent integrative theories suggestamore subtlepattern (Bless,2001;Bless&Fiedler,2006;Fiedler,2001),arguingthattheevolutionarysignificanceofaffectivestatesisnotsimplytoinfluenceprocessingeffortbuttotriggerqualitativelydifferentprocessingstylesaswell.Thus,positiveaffectrecruitsamoreassimilative,schemabased,topdownprocessingstyle,whenpreexistingknowledgeguides


informationprocessing.Incontrast,negativeaffectproducesamoreaccommodative,bottomup,andexternallyfocusedprocessingstrategywhereattentiontosituationalinformationdrivesthinking(Bless;Fiedler).Theseprocessingstylescanbeequallyeffortfulyetproducequalitativelydifferentoutcomesinconflictsituations(Tan&Forgas,2010).Interestingly,themorevigilantprocessingmoodpromotedbynegativeaffectcanproducesomesurprisingprocessingadvantages,improvingperformanceontasksthatrequiredetailedattentiontonewinformationandleadingtomoresuccessfulandadaptiveconflictbehaviors.

Toward an Integration: The Affect Infusion Model

An integrative theory, the Affect Infusion Model (AIM; Forgas, 1995a, 2002)predictsthataffectinfusionshouldoccuronlyincircumstancesthatpromoteanopen,constructiveprocessingstyle(Fiedler,1991;Forgas,1995b).TheAIMthusassumesthat(1)affectinfusionshoulddependonthekindofprocessingstrategypeopleuse,and(2)all thingsbeingequal,peopleshouldusetheleasteffortfulandsimplestprocessingstrategy.Themodelidentifiesfouralternativeprocessingstrategies:(1)directaccess;(2)motivated; (3)heuristic;and(4)substantiveprocessing.Thesestrategiesdifferintermsoftwobasicdimensions:(1)thedegreeofeffort;and(2)thedegreeofopennessandconstructivenessoftheinformationsearchstrategy.

The combination of these two processing features—quantity (effort) andquality (openness)—produces fourdistinctprocessingstyles (Fiedler,2001): (1)substantiveprocessing(higheffort/open,constructive);(2)motivatedprocessing(higheffort/closed);(3)heuristicprocessing(loweffort/open,constructive);and(4)directaccessprocessing(loweffort/closed).Directaccessandmotivatedprocessinginvolvehighlytargetedandpredeterminedpatternsofinformationsearchandselection,strategiesthatlimitthescopeforincidentalaffectinfusion.Moodcongruence and affect infusion are likely only when constructive processing isused, suchassubstantiveorheuristicprocessing(seealsoFiedler,1991,2001).TheAIMalso specifies a range of contextual variables related to the task, theperson,andthesituation thatjointlyinfluenceprocessingchoices.AnimportantfeatureoftheAIMisthatitrecognizesthataffectitselfcanalsoinfluenceprocessing choices. The implications of this model have now been supported in anumberofstudies.

affect congruence in dealing With conflictSAccordingtotheAIM,affectivestatesshouldhaveamoodcongruent influenceondealingwithconflictsituationsthatrecruitconstructive,substantiveprocessing(Forgas,1995a,2001;Sedikides,1995).Onthemostbasiclevel,theremaybeaffectcongruentdistortionsonthewaypeopleinterpretobservedsocialbehaviors(Forgas,Bower,&Krantz,1984).Happysubjectstendtoseemorepositiveskilledbehaviors,whereassadmoodproducesmorecritical,negativebehaviorinterpretationsevenwhenobjective,videotapedevidenceisreadilyavailablewithobviousimplicationsforconflictsituations.


Affective Bias in Explaining Relationship Conflicts

Affectmay also influence theway peopleevaluate their partners and reallifesocialconflicts(Forgas,2002;Forgas,Levinger,&Moylan,1994).Moodeffectsondealingwithrelationshipconflictscanhaveparticularlyimportantconsequencesforthesuccessandlongevityoftherelationship.Inaseriesofexperiments,weaskedhappyorsadparticipantstomakecausalattributionsforrecenthappyandsadconflictsintheircurrentrelationships(Forgas,1994,Experiment1).Therewassignificantmoodcongruence,withmoreselfblamingandpessimisticattributionsbysadsubjectsthanbyhappysubjects.Inafurtherstudyexplanationsforsimpleversuscomplexrelationshipconflictswerecompared(Experiment2).Again,sadmoodproducedmorenegative,pessimisticattributions.Moodeffectsweregreaterwhenexplanationsweregivenforseriousratherthansimpleconflictsasseriousconflictsrequiredmoresubstantiveprocessing,andwereassociatedwithlongerprocessinglatencies(Experiment3).ConsistentwiththeAIM,theseresultsconfirmthatparadoxically,extendedprocessingrecruitedbyseriousconflictsincreasedmoodeffects(Forgas).

Affective Influences on Negotiating Strategies

Oneofthemostcommonmethodsfordealingwithconflictisnegotiation.Effectivenegotiationisacriticalskillinresolvingpersonalandrelationshipproblemsandisalsoroutinelyusedinorganizations.Inseveralexperiments(Forgas,1998a),positive,control,ornegativemoodwasinducedbygivingparticipantspositive,negative,orneutralfeedbackabouttheirperformanceonapriorverbaltest.Next,theyengagedineither(a)aninformalinterpersonal,or(b)aformal,intergroupnegotiatingtask.Participantsinapositivemoodsetthemselvesmoreambitiousgoals,formulatedmoreoptimistic action plans, andengaged inmore cooperative andintegrativenegotiationthandidcontrol,ornegativemoodparticipants.Theywerealsomorewillingtomakeandreciprocatedeals(Figure 8.1)andactuallyachievedbetteroutcomes.Theseresultsprovideclearevidencethatevenslightchangesin

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figure 8.1 Moodcongruent influences on negotiation: happy persons plan, use morecooperativeand lesscompetitivebargainingstrategies,andaremore likely tomakeandhonordealsthandonegotiatorsexperiencingnegativeaffect.(DatabasedonForgas,J.P.,Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,74,565–577,1998.Withpermission.)


moodcan significantly influencepeople’sperceptions,plans,andbehaviors inanegotiatingtask.

IntermsoftheAIM,thesemoodeffectsonconflictresolutioncanbeexplainedin terms of affectpriming mechanisms. Positive mood should selectively primemorepositivethoughtsandassociations,leadingtotheformulationanduseofmoreoptimistic,cooperative,andintegrativebargainingstrategies.Incontrast,negativemoodshouldprimemorepessimistic,negativethoughtsandassociations,leadingtolessambitiousgoalsandlesscooperative,morecompetitive,andultimatelylesssuccessfulbargainingstrategies.

Interestingly, further experiments in this series showed that mood effectswerereducedforindividualswhoscoredhighonmeasuressuchasMachiavellismandtheneedforapproval.Theseindividualsmayhaveapproachedthebargaining task from a strongly predetermined, motivated perspective, reducing open,constructiveprocessingandthuslimitingtheextentofaffectinfusion.Individualdifferences intendencytouseopen,constructiveversusguided,motivatedprocessingmaysignificantlymediateaffectinfusionintobehaviorinconflictsituations(Rusting,2001).

Mood Effects on Making Requests and Demands

Inseveralexperimentsweexploredtheeffectsofmoodonthewaypeopleformulateandrespondtodemandsandrequests.Requestingisanintrinsicallycomplexbehaviorcharacterizedbypotentialinterpersonalconflictandpsychologicalambiguity.Requestsmustbeformulatedwithjusttherightdegreeofassertiveness versuspoliteness to maximize compliance without risking giving offense.Weexpectedhappypeopletoadoptamoreconfident,assertiverequestingstyle,due to thegreateravailabilityofpositively valenced thoughts andassociations(Forgas,1998b,1999a,1999b).Further,intermsoftheAIM,thesemoodeffectsshouldbeparticularly strongwhen theconflict situation ismorecomplex anddemandingandrequiresmoresubstantiveandelaborateprocessing.Moodwasinducedbyaskingpeopletorecallandthinkabouthappyorsadautobiographicalepisodes(Forgas,1999a,Experiment1).Next,participantsselectedamoreorlesspoliterequestformulationthattheywoulduseinaneasyandadifficultrequestsituation.

Happy participants preferred more direct, assertive requests, whereas sadpersons used indirect, polite requests, and these effects were greatest in themoredifficult,demandingrequestsituation.Inafollowupexperiment,similareffectswerefoundwhenparticipantsproducedtheirownopenendedrequests,whichweresubsequentlyratedforpolitenessandelaborationby two independent raters (Forgas, 1999a, Experiment 2). This pattern was confirmed in athirdstudy,whereparticipantswereaskedtoproducemoreorlesspoliteversusassertiverequestalternativesinavarietyofdifferentrealisticsituations(Forgas,1999b,Experiment1)followinganaudiovisualmoodinduction(watchinghappyorsadfilms).

Afurtherunobtrusivefieldexperimentlookedatnaturallyproducedrequests(Forgas, 1999b, Experiment 2). After an audiovisual mood induction, the


experimentercasuallyaskedparticipants togetafile fromaneighboringoffice.Theactualwordsinrequestingthefilewererecordedbyaconcealedtaperecorderandweresubsequentlyanalyzedforpolitenessandassertiveness.Sadpeopleusedmore polite, friendly, and more elaborate request forms, whereas happypeopleusedmoreassertiveandlesspoliteforms(Figure 8.2).Ananalysisofrecalldataconfirmed that unconventional requests were also recalled significantly better,indicatingtheirmoreelaborate,constructiveprocessing.

Mood Effects on Responding to Interpersonal Demands

Wehavesofarseenthatmoodstatescanhaveaprofoundinfluenceonhowpeopleapproachcomplexconflictsituations.Moodsmayalsoinfluencerespondingtomoreorlessassertivedemands,suchasbeingconfrontedbyanunexpectedrequestfromastranger(Forgas,1998b).Studentsenteringalibraryfoundpicturesortextplacedontheirdesksdesignedtoinducegoodorbadmoods.Afewminuteslater,they were approached by another student (in fact, a confederate) and receivedanunexpectedpoliteorassertive,impolitedemandforseveralsheetsofpaper.Ashorttimeaftertheincidentasecondconfederateaskedthemtocompleteabriefquestionnaire evaluating their perceptions, recall, and reactions to the demandandtherequester.

Peopleinanegativemoodreactedmorenegatively,formedmorecritical,negativeviewsofrequests,andwerelessinclinedtocomplythanwerepositivemoodparticipants. In aparticularly interesting result (Figure 8.3),moodeffectsweregreaterwhentherequestwasassertiveandimpoliteandsorequiredmoresubstantiveprocessing,asalsoconfirmedbybetterrecallmemoryforthesemessageslateron.Itseemsthatassertive,unconventionaldemandswereprocessedmoresubstantivelyandresultedinstrongermoodeffects.AsimpliedbytheAIM,affectinfusionintoconflictbehaviorsseemenhancedwhencomplex,unusualtasksrequiremoreelaborateprocessing.

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figure 8.2 Moodeffectsonnaturallyproducedrequests:positivemoodincreasesandnegativemooddecreases thedegreeofpoliteness, elaboration, andhedging in strategiccommunications.(AfterForgas,J.P.,Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25,850–863,1999.Withpermission.)


the information-proceSSing conSeQuenceS of affect in conflict SituationS

In addition to producing affect congruence, affect can also influence the wayinformation is processed. Although it is commonly claimed that feeling goodpromotesbetterthinkingintermsofcreativity,flexibility,andintegrativethinking (Ciarrochi, Forgas, & Mayer, 2006; Forgas, 1994, 2002), this is only partofthestory.Inthissectionwepresentseveralexperimentsshowingthatnegativeaffectmayalsoproducedesirableandbeneficialcognitiveconsequences.Infunctional terms, negative affect may operate as an adaptive signal recruitingmoreattentiveandaccommodativethinkingthatmayhelppeopletocopewiththe requirements of demanding social situations (Forgas, 2007). For example,negativeaffectproducesathinkingstyle thathelpsreducecertain judgmentalbiases(Forgas,1998c)andpromotesmoresuccessfulsocialinfluencestrategies(Forgas,2007).

Negative Affect Reduces the Fundamental Attribution Error

Interpretingthebehaviorofpartnersandadversariesinaconflictisoftensubjectto the fundamental attribution error (FAE) when people see intentionality andinternalcausationdespiteevidencefortheinfluenceofsituationalforces(Gilbert&Malone,1995).TheFAEoccursbecausepeoplefocusonsalientandconspicuous information—the actor—and fail to process information about situational

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figure 8.3 Moodeffectsonreactionstoanunexpecteddemandinapublicplace(thelibrary): those inapositivemoodrespondmorepositivelyandthose inanegativemoodrespond more negatively (higher values indicate more positive reactions). These moodeffectsweregreaterwhentherequestwasimpoliteandatypicalandthusrequiredmoresubstantive processing. (Data based on Forgas, J.P., Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24,173–185,1998.Withpermission.)


constraints(Gilbert,1991).Ifnegativemoodpromotesthemoredetailedprocessing of situational information, the incidence of the FAE and other judgmentalbiasesmaybereduced(Forgas,1998c).Inoneexperiment,happyorsadparticipantsreadandmadeattributionsaboutthewriterofanessayadvocatingapopular or unpopular position (for or against nuclear testing), which they were toldwaseitherassignedorfreelychosen,usingtheprocedurepioneeredbyJonesandHarris(1967).HappymoodincreasedandsadmoodreducedtheincidenceoftheFAE,consistentwiththemoreattentivethinkingstylerecruitedbynegativeaffect.Similareffectscanalsooccurinreallife.

Inafield study,happyor sadparticipantsmadeattributionsabout thewritersofpopularandunpopularessaysarguing fororagainst recycling (cf.Forgas&Moylan,1987).Onceagain,negativemoodreducedtheFAE.Recallmemorydata confirmed that these effects were due to the more attentive processing ofsituational information in negative mood (Forgas, 1998c, Experiment 3). Theseeffectsareconsistentwiththesuggestedevolutionarybenefitsofnegativeaffectinrecruitingmoreaccommodativeprocessingstyles.

Negative Affect Increases Skepticism and Interpersonal Accuracy

Believingor notbelieving apartneror an adversary is another crucialdecisionpeopleoften face inconflict situations.Howdoweknow if the informationwereceivefromothersisaccurate?Acceptinginvalidinformationastrue(falsepositives,excessivegullibility)canbejustasdangerousasrejectinginformationthatisvalid(falsenegatives,excessiveskepticism).Negativemoodsmightproducemorecriticalandskepticaljudgments,whereashappypeoplemayacceptinterpersonalmessagesat“facevalue,”asgenuineandtrustworthyduetotheinformationprocessingconsequencesofaffectwediscussedpreviously.Toexplorethis,weaskedhappyandsadparticipantstojudgethegenuinenessofpeopledisplayingpositive,neutral,andnegativefacialexpressions.

Aspredicted,thoseinanegativemoodweresignificantlylesslikelytoacceptfacialexpressionsasgenuinethanwerethoseintheneutralorhappycondition.Curiously,happyparticipantswerealsomoreconfident in their judgments thanwereothergroups.Inanotherstudynegativemoodreducedandpositivemoodincreasedpeople’stendencytoacceptothers’facialdisplaysasgenuine,consistentwiththemoreattentiveandaccommodativeprocessingstyleassociatedwithnegativemoods.

Negative mood may also improve perception accuracy and the detection ofdeception.Inonestudyhappyorsadparticipantshadtodeterminethetruthfulnessofvideotapedstatementsbypeoplewhowereinterrogatedafterastagedtheftandwereeitherguiltyornotguilty(East&Forgas,2008).Thoseinapositivemoodweremore likely toacceptdeceptivestatementsas truthful.Sadparticipants inturnformedsignificantlymoreguilty judgmentsandweresignificantlybetteratcorrectlydetectingdeception(Figure 8.4).Asignaldetectionanalysisconfirmedthatsadjudgesweremoreaccurateindetectingdeception(identifyingguiltytargetsasguilty) thanwereneutralorhappy judges,consistentwith thepredictedmoodinducedprocessingdifferences.


Negative Affect Improves the Efficacy of Persuasive Messages

Accommodativeprocessingpromotedbynegativeaffectmayalsoresult inmoreconcreteandfactualthinkingandresultintheproductionofmoreeffectivepowerstrategiesandpersuasivemessages.Weexploredthis(Forgas,2007,Experiment1)byaskinghappyorsadparticipantstoproducepersuasiveargumentsfororagainstan increase in student fees and for or against Aboriginal land rights. Negativemoodresultedinargumentsthatwereofsignificantlyhigherquality,weremoreconcrete,andweremorepersuasivethanthoseproducedbyhappyparticipants.A mediational analysis established that moodinduced variations in argumentconcreteness improvedargumentquality.Ina furtherexperiment,happyorsadparticipantsproducedpersuasiveargumentsfororagainstAustraliabecomingarepublicandfororagainstaradicalrightwingparty.Sadmoodagainresultedinhigherqualityandmorepersuasivearguments,consistentwiththepredictionthatnegativemoodshouldpromoteamorecareful,systematic,bottomupprocessingstyle(Bless,2001;Bless&Fiedler,2006;Fiedler,2001;Forgas,2002;Figure 8.5).

To further test the actual effectiveness of negative mood arguments, inExperiment3 the argumentsproduced by happy or sad participants were presentedtoanaïveaudienceofundergraduatestudents.Argumentswrittenbynegativemoodparticipants inExperiments1and2wereactuallysignificantlymoresuccessfulinproducingarealchangeinattitudesthanwereargumentsproducedby happy participants. Finally, in Experiment 4 persuasive attempts by happyandsadpeopleweredirectedata“partner”tovolunteerforaboringexperimentusingemailexchanges(Forgas,2007).Themotivationtobepersuasivewasalsomanipulatedbyofferingsomeof themasignificantreward if successful (moviepasses).Peopleinanegativemoodproducedhigherqualitypersuasivearguments.However,theofferofarewardreducedmoodeffects,confirmingakeyprediction of the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995a, 2002): that mood effects on

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figure 8.4 Theeffectsofmoodandthetarget’sveracity(truthful,deceptive)onjudgmentsofguiltoftargetsaccusedofcommittingatheft(averagepercentageoftargetsjudgedguilty in each condition). (After East, R. & Forgas, J.P., Manuscript, University of NewSouthWales,2008.Withpermission.)


informationprocessing—andsubsequentsocialinfluencestrategies—arereducedby motivated processing. Mediational analyses confirmed that negative moodinduced longerandmoreaccommodative thinkingandmoreconcreteandspecificarguments.

Theseexperimentsconfirmthatpersuasiveargumentsproduced innegativemoodarenotonlyofhigherqualityasjudgedbyratersbutarealsosignificantlymoreeffective inproducinggenuineattitudechange inpeople.However,whenmotivation is already high, mood effects tend to diminish, as predicted by theAffectInfusionModel(Forgas,2002).Thisfindingmayhaveinterestingappliedimplicationsformanagingpersonalandorganizationalconflictsthatalsoinvolveagreatdealofpersuasivecommunication.Itisanintriguingpossibilitythatmildnegativeaffectmayactuallypromoteamoreconcrete,accommodative,andultimatelymoresuccessfulcommunicationstyleinsomeconflictsituations.

When Positive Affect Increases Aggressive Tendencies

After the London bomb attacks, in a tragic mistake British police shot deada Brazilian man who looked like a Muslim. Could it be that merely appearingMuslimmay functionasasubliminalcuefacilitatingaggressiveresponses?Inarecentexperimentweinvestigatedtheinfluenceofpositiveandnegativemoodsonaggressiveresponsesintheshoot–don’tshootparadigmwithtargetswhodidordidnotappeartobeMuslim.Usingthistechnique(Correll,Park,Judd,&Wittenbrink,2002),U.S.participantsrevealedastrongbiastoshootmoreatBlackratherthan

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figure 8.5 Moodeffectsonthequalityandconcretenessofthepersuasivemessagesproduced:negativeaffectimprovesthequalityandthedegreeofconcretenessofpersuasivearguments.(AfterForgas,J.P.,Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43,513–528,2007,Experiment2.Withpermission.)


Whitetargets.Inourstudy,weexpectedMuslimtargets toelicitasimilarbias.Inessence,theshooter’sbiastaskisanunobtrusivebehavioralmeasureassessingaggressivereactionstonegativestereotypes(Forgas,1976,2003).

Partipantswereinstructedtoshootattargetsonacomputerscreenonlywhentheywerecarryingagun.WeusedmorphingsoftwaretocreatetargetsthatdidordidnotappearMuslimbywearingaturbanorthehijab(seeFigure 8.6).WeexpectedandfoundthatpeopletendedtoshootmoreattargetswithMuslimheadgear,andthiseffectwasgreaterafterapositivemoodinduction(Figure 8.7).Thisresultconfirmsthatpositiveaffectfacilitatedanaggressivebehavioralresponsetoanegativestereotype,eveninagroupofotherwiseliberalandtolerantAustralianundergraduates.AsAustraliahasnotbeensubjecttoMuslimterroristattacksonitsterritory,othercountriesintheforefrontofMuslimterrorismsuchastheUnitedStates and Britain may showaneven stronger “turbaneffect” than the onewedemonstratedhere.Themost intriguingfindinghere is thatpositiveaffect triggeredasignificantselectivebiasagainstMuslims,consistentwithrecenttheoriessuggesting that positive affect promotes topdown, assimilative processing thatfacilitates the influenceof stereotypesonautomatic responses (Bless&Fiedler,2006;Forgas,1998,2007).

Affective Influences on Interpersonal Strategies in the Dictator Game

Ifsomebodygaveyou$50todividebetweenyourselfandanotherpersonanywayyoulike,howmuchwouldyoukeepforyourself?Doesbeinginagoodorabadmoodinfluencesuchconflictdecisions?Peoplefaceaconflictbetweenbeingselfishandbeingfairinmanyeverydaysituations,andthedilemmainherentinthesechoiceshasbeenamajortopicforphilosophersandwritersfordecades.Recentresearch in evolutionary psychology suggests that humans and other primates

figure 8.6 Theturbaneffect:stimulusfiguresusedtoassesstheeffectsofmoodandwearingornotwearinga turbanonautomatic aggressiveresponses.Participantshad tomakerapidshoot–don’tshootdecisionsinresponsetotargetswhodidordidnotholdagunanddidornotwearaMuslimheaddress(aturban).


evolveda senseof justiceand fairnessasanadaptive strategy to constrain selfishness and to maintain social cohesionandharmony (Forgas, Haselton, & vonHippel,2007).Doesmoodinfluencehowassertiveandselfishweareininterpersonal situations?Weexplored thepossibility that a positivemood may increaseassertivenessandselfishnesswhereasasadmoodmayproducegreaterfairnessinthedictatorgame.Thisquestionhadnotbeeninvestigatedpreviously.Unlikepriorresearchonaltruism,thedictatorgameallowstheexplorationofmoodeffectsonpureselfishnessinasimpleallocationtask.

Traditionaleconomictheoriespredictthatarationalallocatorinthedictatorgameshouldmaximizeearningsandkeepmostoftheresources.Actualresearchsuggestsafarmorecomplexpattern.Infact,allocatorsoftengive30%,andeven50%,toothers(Bolton,Katok,&Zwick,1998;Forsythe,Horowitz,Savin,&Sefton,1994),suggestingthatbehaviorisgovernedbyasubtlecombinationoftheconflictingdemandsofselfinterestandthenormoffairness(Haselhuhn&Mellers,2005;PillutlaandMurninghan,1995).Inthissituation,moodsmayinfluencebehaviorbysubtlyshiftingthewayallocatorsfocusonandinterpret internal(selfish)andexternal(fairnessnorm)information.Aswehaveseen,positivemoodsmaypromoteamoreinternallyoriented,selfishprocessingstyle(Bless&Fiedler,2006).Incontrast,negativemoodseemstopromoteamoreexternallyfocused,accommodativeprocessingstyle,withgreaterattentiontotheexternalnormsoffairness.

In the first experiment, volunteer students approached on campus receiveda falsefeedback mood induction, and then they played the dictator game andmadeallocationseithertoaningroupmember(studentintheirownfaculty)oranunknownperson.Moodwasinducedbygivingparticipantsabogussixitem“test

0.200

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figure 8.7 Theeffectsofpositiveandnegativemoodonpeople’srelianceonstereotypesintheshooters’biastask:thoseinapositivemoodweremorelikelyandthoseinanegativemoodwere lesslikelytoselectivelyshootat targetswearingaturban.(AfterUnkelbach,Forgas&Denson,2008.Withpermission.)


ofcognitivespatialabilities,”estimatingthesurfaceareaofrandomlysizedgeometricfiguresandprovidingpositiveornegativemanipulatedfeedbackdescribing their performance as “outstanding” or “poor” to induce good or bad mood(e.g., Forgas, 2007). They were thenasked to allocate 10 raffle tickets betweenthemselvesandanotherperson,witha$20voucherastheultimateprize.Resultsshowed thathappy studentskeptmore raffle tickets thandid sad students, andtherewasalsoanonsignificanttrendforgreaterselfishnesstowardastrangerwheninapositivemood(Figure 8.8).Theseresultsconfirmthattransientmoodhadasignificantlyinfluenceonassertivenessandselfishness.

Experiment2replicatedthiseffectusingadifferentmoodinduction(affectinducing films) and a more realistic allocation task in the laboratory, with thenamesandphotosofpartnersalsodisplayedforeachtasktoincreaserealism.Afterviewingfilmsdesignedto inducehappyorsadmoods,participantsperformedaseriesofallocationtasksdescribedasan“interpersonalgame”witheightrandomlyassignedothers,eachinvolvingtheallocationof10points.Happyindividualswereagainmoreselfishandkeptmorepointstothemselves thandidsad individuals,andtherewasalsoasignificantinteractionbetweenmoodandtheeighttrials.Asthetrialsprogressed,happyindividualsbecamemoreselfish,andsadindividualsbecamemorefair(Figure 8.9).

Inafurtherexperimentweexplicitlymanipulatedfairnessnormsbyprovidingallocatorswithinformationaboutthefairorunfairbehaviorsofpreviousplayerstoreinforceorunderminethesocialnormof fairness.Informationaboutunfairallocations should weaken the social norm and should increase the latitude forindividualdeliberations,thusincreasingthescopeformoodeffectstooccur.Afterviewingaffectinducingfilms,participantsplayedtheallocationtask,afterbeingexposedtoinformationaboutfairorunfairoffersof“pastproposers”toemphasize

In-group member Stranger

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loca

tion

76.86.66.46.2

65.85.65.45.2

54.84.64.44.2

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Positive moodNegative mood

figure 8.8 The effects of mood (good, bad) and relationship (ingroup member vs.stranger)onthefairnessofallocations inadictatorgame,showingthemeannumberoftickets,outof10,individualskepttothemselvesineachcondition.


ordeemphasizethefairnessnorm.Happyallocatorsweresignificantlymoreselfishthanthesadgroup,andmoodeffectsonselfishnessaregreatestwhenfairnessnormwasundermined,allowinggreater scope forallocators toengage inopen,constructiveprocessingabouttheirchoices.

These experiments consistently show that happy mood increased assertiveness and selfishness when allocating resources in the dictator game, an almostpuremeasureof selfishness.Moodeffectsweregreaterwhen thenormof fairnesswasdeemphasized,asallocatorsweremorelikelytoprocess thetask inanopen,constructivemanner.Thesefindingsareconceptuallyconsistentwithpriorevidenceshowingthatpositiveaffectproducesmoreassertive,confident,andoptimisticinterpersonalstrategies,whereasnegativemoodtriggersmorepessimistic,cautiousresponsessensitivetoexternaldemands(Bless&Fiedler,2006;Fiedler,2001;Forgas,1999,2002).

This account is also broadly consistentwith functionalist evolutionary theoriessuggestingthataffecthasasignalingfunctionaboutsituationalrequirements(Clore&Storbeck,2006;Forgasetal.,2007;Schwarz,1990),withnegativeaffectrecruitingamoreexternallyfocused,accommodativeorientation(Bless&Fiedler,2006).Positiveaffectinturnpromotesmoreassimilative,internallyfocusedstrategies,furtherenhancingthetendencyforselfishness(Bless,2001;Bless&Fiedler;Fiedler, 2001). Many conflict situations in our private as well as working livesinvolve decisions between acting assertively and selfishly and acting fairly. Thekindofmoodeffectsonassertivenessandselfishnessdemonstratedheremayhaveimportant implications for reallife conflict behaviors in personal relationships,organizationaldecisions,andmanyothereverydaysituationswheredecisionsbyonepersonhaveincontestableconsequencesforothers.

Summary and concluSionSThereislittledoubtthataffectivestatesplayanimportantroleininfluencinghowpeopleperceive,interpret,andrespondtoconflictsituations—aconnectionthat

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Number of Trials

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figure 8.9 Theeffectsofmoodonselfishnessversusfairness:happypersonskeepmorepointstothemselvesthandosadpeople,andtheseeffectsaremorepronouncedasallocationtrialsprogress.


has been intuitively recognized since time immemorial. Theories suchas AIM(Forgas,1992,1995)offerasimpleandparsimoniousexplanationofwhenandhowaffectivestatesmayinfuseconflictrelatedthoughtsandbehaviorssuchasnegotiation and making and responding to demands (Forgas, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a,1999b).Dealingwithsocialconflictrequirescomplexandelaborateinformationprocessingstrategies.Itistheveryrichnessandelaboratenessofconflictsituationsthatmakesmoodeffectsparticularlylikely,asevenaminorselectiveprimingofpositiveandnegativememorybasedinformationmayhavelargeconsequencesforwhatisperceived,howitisinterpreted,andthekindofresponsesthatareconstructed.Criticaldecisionsandjudgmentsaboutconflictepisodesaremorelikelytobeassertive,confident,andoptimisticwhenapersonisinapositivemoodstateandaremorelikelytobeaccommodating,negative,orcriticalwhenthepersonisinadysphoricmood.

Inaddition,morerecentresearchalsoshowsthataffectivestatesalsoinfluencehowpeopledealwith social information.It turnsout thatmildnegativemoodscanhaveabeneficialeffectbyrecruitingmoreaccommodativeprocessingstyles,byreducingjudgmentalerrors,byimprovingthequalityofpersuasivearguments,byprovidingtheabilitytodetectdeception,andalsobyleadingtomoresensitiveandfairerallocationstrategies.Theprocessingeffectsofnegativemooddescribedhereseemparticularlyintriguing,sincethesestudiessuggestthatmilddysphoriacouldactuallyimprovecognitivestrategiesandevenresultinsuperioroutcomes(Forgas,2007).

Interestingly, these results also challenge the common assumption in muchof applied, organizational, clinical, and health psychology that positive affecthasuniversallydesirablesocialandcognitiveconsequences.Togetherwithotherrecentexperimentalstudies,ourfindingsconfirmthatnegativeaffectoftenproducesadaptiveandmoresociallysensitiveoutcomes.Forexample,negativemoodscanreduce judgmentalerrors (Forgas,1988c),canimproveeyewitnessaccuracy(Forgas,Vargas,&Laham,2005),andcanimproveinterpersonalcommunicationstrategies(Forgas,2007),anditseems,asthepresentexperimentsshow,alsocanincrease fairness andsensitivity to theneedsofothers.There ismuch scope infuture work to explore mood effects on other kinds of strategic conflictrelatedbehaviors,suchasforgiveness(Chapter14inthisvolume),assertiveness(Chapter5inthisvolume),goalpreferences(Chapter6inthisvolume),perspectivetaking(Chapter7inthisvolume),andreactionstoostracism(Chapters3and13inthisvolume).

Although much has been discovered about the informationprocessing andrepresentationalfunctionsofaffectivestates,notenoughofthisevidencehassofarcomefromresearchdirectlyconcernedwithstudyingsocialconflicts.Thisisallthemoresurprisingasaffectandconflictarecloselyintertwined,andconflictbehaviorspresentaparticularlypromisingandecologicallyvalidresearchdomaintostudyaffectiveinfluencesonthoughtandbehavior.Giventhegrowingsophisticationofthetheoriesandmethodsnowemployedinresearchlookingattheinterfaceofaffectandcognition,thetimeseemsripetoapplythesestrategiestotheinvestigationoftheroleofaffectinthewayreallifeconflictisperceived,managed,andresolved.


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139

9TheEffectsofAngerandAnger

RegulationonNegotiationTHOMASF.DENSONandEMMAC.FABIANSSON

University of New South Wales

N egotiation is a means of resolving social and economic conflict, whichsometimes evokes negative emotions. Recent theoretical approachesacknowledge the consequences that emotions and mood can have on

negotiations(Bazerman,Curhan,Moore,&Valley,2000;Morris&Keltner,2000;Shapiro,2002;seealsoChapter8inthisvolume).Thisreviewfocusesontherolethat anger plays in negotiations. Anger is important to regulate because it canleadtoanescalationofconflict(Allred,Mallozzi,Matsui,&Raia,1997).Wefirstexplorewhyangerregulationisimportantdespitethesometimespositiveeffectsofexpressingangerduringnegotiation.Nextweexaminetheeffectivenessofdifferentemotionregulationstrategiessuchasreappraisal,rumination,anddistractionanddiscusshowthesecanbeappliedtothenegotiationcontext.Wethenpresenttheresultsfromtwoexperimentsusingemotionregulationtoexplorewhatimpacttheseangerregulationstrategieshaveonselfreportedemotionandonaggressivebehaviorinnegotiations.

expreSSing anger iS a limited But at timeS effective Strategy

Whetheranegotiatorsimplyexpressesorexperiencesangercanresultinverydifferentnegotiationoutcomes.Angercanbeexaminedfromanintrapersonalperspective(i.e.,feltanger)oraninterpersonalperspective(i.e.,theeffectsofangerexpressiononothers;VanKleef,VanDijk,Steinel,Harinck,&VanBeest,2008).Generally,intrapersonalangerinnegotiationsisthoughttoresultinpoorernegotiationoutcomesthaninterpersonalanger(VanKleefetal.).Forexample,intrapersonalangercanproducestalemates,conflict,andeconomicallyirrationalbehavior

thomaS f. denSon and emma c. faBianSSon140

(Allredetal.,1997;Liu,2009;Pillutla&Murnighan,1996).Bycontrast,expressingangercanresultinfinancialgainbyencouragingopponentstomakeconcessions.Forexample,asalespersonmaybelikelytogiveintoanangrycustomerdemandingadiscounttoavoidfurtherescalationofconflictandtominimizedisruptiontoothercustomers.

Despite these sometimes positive benefits, strategically using anger toobtaindemandsisa limitedshorttermstrategy.Forexample,angercannegatively impact relationship quality and make people less willing to negotiateagaininthefuture(Allredetal.,1997).Overtimenegotiatingcounterpartsmayhabituate toangerexpressionsandtheymayno longerbeeffective (Tiedens,2001). For example, an angry outburst may be effective the first time; however,thesecondtimeonetriesthisstrategy,theothernegotiatormayresistthedemands.Furthermore,over timeanangrynegotiatormaydevelopanargumentativereputation thatcouldnegatively influencesubsequentnegotiations.Therefore,expressingangerisdoubtfulasaneffectivelongtermstrategyandmaybeeffectiveonlyinsingleinstancesofnegotiation.Moreover,evenduringonetimenegotiationsamongstrangers,researchsuggeststhatexpressingangerrequiresveryspecificconditionstobeeffective.Thesevariables includehow,when,who,andwheretheangerisexpressed.ToquoteAristotle,“Anyonecanbecomeangry.Thatiseasy.Buttobeangrywiththerightperson,totherightdegree,at theright time, for therightpurposeand in therightway—that isnoteasy.”

How Anger Is Expressed

Angercanbeexpressedinanumberofdifferentways.Gibson,Schweitzer,Callister,andGray(2009)examinedwhichcharacteristicsareneededforexpressingangerto result in constructive negotiation outcomes in organizational settings. Angerepisodesfromavarietyoforganizationswereanalyzed,andtheconsequencesoftheseepisodeswereexaminedbyanalyzingtherespondent’sperceivedimpactoftheepisodeonoutcomesatthe individualandorganizational level.Theauthorsalsoexaminedtheeffectofangerexpressionontherelationshipbetweenthepartiesinvolvedintheevent.Positiveoutcomesweremorelikelyiftheangerepisodeswerelowinintensity,wereexpressedverballyratherthanphysically,andweredisplayedinorganizationswhereexpressingangerisconsideredthenorm.However,expressinglowintensityangerisdifficult,requirescontrol,andifdisplayedincorrectlymayresultinconflictescalationorstalemate(Gibsonetal.).Therefore,bothhow anger is expressed and the context in which it is expressed are importantdeterminantsofitseffectiveness.

When Anger Is Expressed

Theeffectivenessofexpressingangermayalsodependonwhen in thenegotiationangerisexpressed(e.g.,atthebeginningofthenegotiation,duringthepositioning phase,during problem solving,or at theend of thenegotiation; Morris&Keltner,2000).Thepositioningstageiswhenoneorbothnegotiatorsexpress

the effectS of anger and anger regulation on negotiation 141

theirnegotiationstancetotheirpartner—forexample,whatpointstheywouldbewillingtoconcedeandrefusetocompromise.Angerexpressedduringthepositioningstagemayresultingaininganupperhandthroughcoercivepressure.Angerexpressedduringthebargainingstagemaysignaldissatisfactionwiththeofferandencouragetheircounterparttoofferamoresatisfactoryoffer.However,negativeeffectsmayoccurwhenangerisexpressedduringotherstages.Forexample,angerexpressedduringtheinitialstagesofthenegotiationmayproduceastalemateorunwillingnesstonegotiateinthefirstplace.

Who Expresses Anger

Whether anger is an effective strategy for claiming value also depends on whoexpressestheangerandtheirbargainingposition.Themoderatingeffectsofgender, status, and the number of alternative offers have been investigated in thisregard. Individuals in a highpower position (operationalized as the number ofavailablealternatives)aremorelikelytogainfromexpressingangerwhentheyarepairedwithalowpoweropponentwhopossesseslimitedalternatives(Friedmanetal.,2004;Sinaceur&Tiedens,2006;VanKleef&Côté,2007).Forexample,participantswithfewormanyclientstochoosefromreadvignettesandratedhowmuchtheywouldconcedetoaclientthatexpressedangerordidnotexpressanger.Whereasparticipantswithgoodalternativesconcededsimilaramountstononangry and angry clients, when participants had poor alternatives they were morelikelytoconcedetoanangryclientthananonangryclient(Sinaceur&Tiedens).

Similarly,VanKleefandCôté(2007)observedthatwhenparticipantshadfewalternatives to choose from and their fictitious opponent expressed anger usingwrittenstatementssuchas“Thisoffermakesmereallyangry;Iexpectabetteroffer,” participants demanded less from angry opponents than a nonemotionalnegotiator. Participants tend to concede more to angry opponents because theexpressed anger is thought to signal that opponents have higher demands (VanKleef,DeDreu,&Manstead,2004;VanDijk,VanKleef,Steinel,&VanBeest,2008).

Expressingangercanalsobeusedtoexertanillusionofpowerandcompetence.Inaseriesofexperiments,Tiedens(2001)illustratedthatangerexpressionsinfluencetheextenttowhichpeopleconferorbestowstatustoothers.Coworkerswhoratedtheircolleaguesashighlylikelytodisplayangeralsotendedtoconferthesecolleagueswithhigherstatus(i.e.,highersalariesandgreaterlikelihoodofpromotion).However,additionalresearchrevealsthattheassociationbetweenangerandstatusisdifferentformenandwomen(Brescoll&Uhlmann,2008).Incontrasttoanangryprofessionalman,professionalwomenwhoexpressedangerwere conferredlowerstatusregardlessoftheiroccupationalstatus(chiefexecutiveofficerorassistanttrainee).Womenwhoexpressedangerwereallocatedlowerwages,status,andperceivedaslesscompetentthanunemotionalwomenorangrymen.Inaddition, theextent towhich womenwere conferred lower status depended onwhethertheangerwasattributedasduetointernalcharacteristics(e.g.,personality)orexternalcharacteristics(e.g.,thesituation).Whenexternalattributionswereprovidedforexpressionsofangerinprofessionalwomentheywereawardedhigher


statusthanwomenwithoutanexternalattributionbutnothigherstatusthannonemotionalwomen.Therefore,theadvantagesassociatedwithexpressingangerdonotextendtoeveryone,andtheeffectivenessofexpressingangerisconstrainedbyvariablesincludinggenderandpower.

Where Anger Is Expressed

Theeffectivenessofexpressingangeralsodependsonwhereitisexpressed.Displayrules dictate how acceptable expressing anger in the workplace is, and organizationalculturepartiallydetermineswhichemotionsareconsidereddesirabletodisplay(Barsade&Gibson,2007;Gibsonetal.,2009;Morris&Feldman,1996).Forexample, incustomer service–basedoccupationssuchasairlines, telephoneservices, and health care, expressing anger is discouraged (Barsade & Gibson;Morris&Feldman),suggestingthatindividualsintheseoccupationsaretypicallyeffective at regulating anger displays. By contrast, some occupations encouragethe expression of anger (e.g., ice hockey player, lobbyist, opposition politician,radioshockjock).Thus,organizationalnormsforexpressingangercandeterminewhetherexpressingangerhasbeneficialordetrimentalconsequences(Gibsonetal.). Collectively, the limitations associated with expressing anger illustrate thatexpressingangertocreategainsisconstrainedbynumerousboundaryconditions,suggestingthatmoreoftenthannotexpressingangerislikelytobeineffectiveorevendetrimentalinmanycontexts.

hoW can anger Be regulated?Studiesexaminingtheexpressionofangerhavetypicallyinvestigatedthephenomenonfromtheperspectiveofthereceiverratherthanexaminingthebidirectionaleffectsofthesenderandreceiveronangerexperience.Computersimulationsofnegotiationsareoftenusedtoexaminethesevariables,whichmanipulateangerthroughtheuseofwrittencommentsusedtocommunicateangertotheparticipantduringthedealmakingstagesofthenegotiation(VanKleef&Côté,2007;VanDijketal.,2008).Althoughmanyof thesestudies illustrate thatexpressingangerresultsinbetterindividualnegotiationoutcomes,theydonottakeintoconsiderationtheimpactthatexpressingangermayhaveonthesender.Forexample,theperipheralfeedbackeffect(alsoknownasthefacialfeedbackhypothesis)suggests that expressing emotions can lead to experiencing those emotions (Laird,1984).Ifexpressingangerresultsinexperiencinganger,thentheimpactofexpressingangermayhavethesamedetrimentalconsequencesassociatedwithstudiesofintrapersonalangerinnegotiations.Experiencingangermayinterfereinnegotiationsbecauseangercanleadtogreatercompetitivenessanddesireforretaliation(Allredetal.,1997;Pillutla&Murnighan,1996).Negotiatorswhoseekretaliationtendtobenarrowmindedandmorefocusedontheirowninterestswhilebeinglessawareofalternativesolutionsorjointgains(Liu,2009;seealsoChapter10inthisvolume).

Together, the literature reviewedherein suggests that regulating angerduringnegotiationsmightproveefficacious.Previousrecommendationsforreducing


angerhaveincludedstrategiessuchasremovingoneselffromtheconflictorventing anger (Fisher&Ury,1991). However, avoidingor leaving the situationmaybe impractical and does nothing to resolve the issue. Methods such as ventinganger tend to increase rather than decrease aggression (Brown, Westbrook, &Challagalla,2005;Bushman,2002;Bushman,Baumeister,&Stack,1999).Instead,anumberofemotionregulationstrategiesareavailable,andthesedifferintermsoftheireffectiveness.Emotionregulationcanbedefinedas“theprocessesbywhichindividualsinfluencewhichemotionstheyhave,whentheyhavethem,andhowtheyexperienceandexpresstheseemotions”(Gross,1998b,p.275).Therearetwogeneralclassesofemotionregulationstrategies:antecedentfocusedandresponsefocused.

Cognitive reappraisal is a widely studied example of an antecedentfocusedstrategy.Reappraisalinvolvesinterpretinganangerelicitingeventbyadoptinganeutralorobjectiveperspectivetoreducetheemotionalimpactoftheevent(Ray,Wilhelm,&Gross,2008).Forexample,insteadoffixatingonwhatwentwronginanegotiation,reappraisalmayinvolvefocusingonfuturechangesthatcanbemadetoimprovesubsequentnegotiations.Asreappraisaliseffortfulandinvolvescognitivechange,reappraisalhasalsobeenlabeleda“deepactingstrategy”(Grandey,2000).Reappraisalworksbestwhenit isappliedbeforethefullonsetoftheemotionalresponse(Gross,1998a)andshouldthereforebemosteffectivewhenengagedinpriortonegotiation.

Oneresponsefocusedstrategythathasbeeninvestigatedwithinthecontextofangerisrumination.Ruminationinvolvesfocusingonone’semotionsandfeelingswithoutconstructiveproblemsolving(NolenHoeksema,1991).Forinstance,thismayincludedwellingontheinflexibilityofone’snegotiationpartnerandtheirreluctancetoyieldinanegotiationratherthanfocusingonalternativewaysofcreatingvalue.Ruminationalsomaintainsangerandincreasesaggression(Bushman,Bonacci,Pedersen,Vasquez,&Miller,2005;Rusting&NolenHoeksema,1998).There are several different types of rumination. Analytical rumination involvesthinkingaboutwhyanangerprovocationoccurredandtheconsequencesofthisevent(Wimalaweera&Moulds,2008).Experientialruminationisatypeofprocessingthat focusesoncurrentandconcreteexperiences, forexample,howyoucurrentlyfeel(Watkins&Teasdale,2008).

Otherexamplesofresponsefocusedstrategies includefakingandsuppressingemotions.Thesestrategiestendnottoproducecognitivechangebutinsteadfocusonmaskingfeltemotions(Grandey,2000).Usingacallcentersimulationwithahostilecustomer,Goldberg andGrandey (2007) found thatmoreerrorsoccurredwhenplacingorderswhenresponsefocusedstrategieswereusedthanwhenantecedentfocusedstrategieswereused.Emotionregulationnotonlyinfluences how we experience emotions but can also negatively impact job performance.Responsefocusedstrategiessuchasruminationtendtobelesseffectiveinreducingangerandaggressivebehaviorbecausetheyareoftenassociatedwiththedepletionofselfregulatoryresourceswhereasantecedentfocusedstrategiessuch as reappraisal tend not to result in depletion when initiated prior to thefullemotionalresponse(Denson,2009;Goldberg&Grandey;Grandey,Fisk,&Steiner,2005).


In emotion regulation studies, mental distraction is often used as a controlcondition.However,distractioncanbeconceptualizedasanemotionregulationstrategyinitsownright.Insteadoffocusingonfeelings,distractioninvolvesdrawingattentiontoneutralorpositivestimuliunrelatedtotheangerinducingevent(NolenHoeksema,1991).Distractionismoreeffectivethanruminationinreducingangerandaggression(Bushman,2002;Bushmanetal.,2005;Denson,White,& Warburton, 2009; Rusting & NolenHoeksema, 1998). For instance, RustingandNolenHoeksemaexperimentallymanipulatedruminationanddistractionandfoundthatcomparedwithruminationdistractiondecreasedanger(Experiment3)orhadnoimpactonselfreportedanger(Experiment1).Furthermore,participantswhoengagedindistractionwrotelessangrystoriesincontrasttoparticipantsintheruminationcondition.

Anumberofadditionalvariables influencewhatemotionregulationstrategyis used. For example, how stress is appraised can impact whether one engagesin adaptive or maladaptive emotion regulation strategies (Grandey, Dickter, &Sin,2004).Grandeyetal.examinedhowcallcenteremployeesappraisedangrycustomers and what emotion regulation strategies individuals used. Employeesrecalledarecenteventinwhichacustomerwasaggressiveandratedthelevelofstress and the emotion regulation strategy theyused.Ventingor surface actingstrategiesweremorelikelytobeusedwhenemployeesappraisedthecustomerasthreatening.Engagingincognitivereframingordeepactingstrategiessuchasperspectivetakingwasmorelikelywhenthecustomerwasinterpretedasnotthreatening(seeChapter7 in thisvolume).Anotherfactorthat influencesthetypeofemotionregulationstrategyusedisthelevelofcontrolindividualspossesswithintheiroccupation(Grandeyetal.).

Onlyafewstudieshavespecificallyexaminedtheeffectivenessofreappraisalasanangerregulationstrategy(Denson,Moulds,&Grisham,2009;Mauss,Cook,Cheng,&Gross,2007;Rayetal.,2008).Maussetal.examinedwhetherindividualdifferencesinreappraisalwererelatedtoselfreportedangerandcardiovascularresponses.TheEmotionRegulationQuestionnaire(Gross&John,2003)wasusedtoclassifyhighandlowreappraisers.Participantswereprovokedusingabackwardcountingtaskwithfalsefeedback.Highreappraisersdisplayedmoreadaptivecardiovascular responses and less selfreported anger in contrast to low reappraisers.However,thisexperimentreliedonpreexistingdifferencesinreappraisalandcouldnotdetermineifgenerallyinducingreappraisalwouldbeassociatedwiththesamebenefitsorwhetherreappraisal trainingwouldbeeffective for individualswhotendnottonaturallyreappraise.

By contrast, Ray et al. (2008) induced reappraisal and rumination by usingguided instructions. For example, when participants in the reappraisal conditionrecalledanangryepisodetheywere instructedtothinkabouttheeventasif they were an objective observer. Reappraisal was associated with less angeranddecreased physiological respondingcomparedwith rumination (Ray et al.).Collectivelytheseresultsillustratethebenefitsofreappraisalcomparedwithotheremotionregulationstrategies.

Densonetal.(2009)examinedtheeffectivenessofdifferentangerregulationstrategiesinresponsetorecallinganangrymemory.Participantswereallocated


tooneoffourconditions:(1)cognitivereappraisal;(2)analyticalrumination;(3)distraction;and(4)anoinstructioncontrolconditioninwhichtheywroteaboutanangerinducingautobiographicalevent for20minutes.Aspredicted,ruminationwasassociatedwithmaintenanceof selfreportedanger,whereas theotherconditionsdecreasedanger.Reappraisalwasthemosteffectiveofthefourstrategiesforreducingangeramongindividualshighinangerrelatedtraits.Tofurtherexamine thecognitiveprocessesunderlyingtheemotionregulation strategies, aquantitativecontentanalysisofthewrittenresponsesfromthewritingtaskwereanalyzedusingtheLinguisticInquiryWordCountprogram(Pennebaker,Chung,Ireland,Gonzales,&Booth,2007).Participantswhoreappraisedusedincreasedfuture tense and positive words, whereas participants in the rumination conditionusedincreasedpasttenseandgreaternegativeemotionwords.Theseresultsconvergewithotherstudiesexaminingangerregulation(Maussetal.,2007;Rayetal.,2008).

neural evidence for emotion regulation during negotiation

Thereisevidencetosuggestthatangerregulationmaybeespeciallybeneficialinsituationswhereacceptingapooroffer isobjectivelybetterthanrejectingapooroffer.However,acceptingapooroffer isparticularlydifficult todowhenangryasangerproducesadesiretopunishunfairnegotiationpartners(Pillutla&Murnighan,1996).PillutlaandMurnighanfoundthattherejectionoflowoffersinaneconomicbargaininggamewasnotstrictlyduetounfairnessoftheofferbutrathertotheinsultingconnotationsassociatedwithacceptingthepooroffersuchas the threat toparticipants’ selfworth.Effectiveanger regulationmighthelpreducethenegativeemotionalexperienceandbehavioralconsequencesassociatedwithexperiencingangerwhennegotiating.Toourknowledgeemotionregulationstrategieshavenotyetbeensystematicallyinvestigatedwithinthecontextofnegotiations.

Evidencefortheeconomicbenefitofregulatingangercomesfromtworecentfunctional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using the UltimatumGame(Sanfey,Rilling,Aronson,Nystrom,&Cohen,2003;Tabibnia,Satpute,&Lieberman,2008).IntheUltimatumGame,oneplayerchooseshowtodivideamonetaryamount(typically$10)betweenhimselforherselfandanotherplayer.The second player chooses whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer isaccepted,themoneyisdividedbetweenthetwoparticipants.However,iftheproposalisrejectedthenbothparticipantsreceivenothing(Güth,Schmittberger,&Schwarze,1982).Therefore,thelatterplayerhasthepossibilityofpunishinghisorheropponentforchoosingtodividethemoneyunfairlybutatthesametimesuffersacost.Thistypeofbehaviorisknownasaltruistic punishmentbecauseonechoosestopunishatapersonalcost(Fehr&Gächter,2002).InthecontextoftheUltimatumGame,itismoreeconomicallyrationaltoacceptanofferregardlessofhowlowtheofferis.Thisisbecauseacceptingasmallamountisobjectivelybetterthanrejectingtheofferandreceivingnothing.


Sanfeyetal.(2003)andTabibniaetal.(2008)illustratethatreceivingunfairofferssuchas$1and$2(outofapossible$10)isassociatedwithincreasedactivity in theanterior insula,aregion implicated innegativeemotionalexperiencesincludingangerandrumination(Denson,Pedersen,Ronquillo,&Nandy,2009).Accepting unfair offers requires the ability to regulate negative emotions. Theventrolateralprefrontalcortex(VLPFC)hasbeenimplicatedinemotionregulation(Lieberman,2007).Accordingly,acceptingmoreunfairofferswasassociatedwith increasedactivity in the right VLPFC and decreased activity in the anterior insula. Similarly, adults with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex(VMPFC),whichisassociatedwithemotionregulationandsocialfunctioning,aremorelikelytorejectunfairoffersintheUltimatumGamethanmatchedcontrolswithoutVMPFCdamage(Koenigs&Tranel,2007).Thesefindingsconvergeonthenotionthatemotionregulationisimportantinpromotingrationalthinkingandtheavoidanceofaggressiveretaliationduringbargaining.

emotion regulation in negotiationSFabiansson and Denson (2010) examined whether regulating anger using reappraisalwouldnotonlydecreaseselfreportedangerbutalsoimprovenegotiationperformance.Participantsinthereappraisalconditionweretoldpriortothespeechtaskthattheirpartnerwasinabitofabadmoodandnottotakeitpersonallyiftheydoappeartobeinabadmood.Thistimingwasimportantastheoreticallyreappraisalshouldoccurbeforethefullonsetofanemotionalresponsetochangethe experience of the emotion (Gross, 1998a). Indeed, late reappraisal is moreeffortfulthanearlyreappraisal,andlatereappraisalwaslesseffectiveinreducingasadmoodinducedbyafilmthanlatedistraction(Sheppes&Meiran,2007).

Participantsengagedinaspeechtaskcalled“unilink”withaconfederateviawebcamandspokeaboutpersonaltopicssuchastheirlifegoals.Followingthis,participantswereprovokedwithinsultingfeedbackstatingthattheirspeechwasofpoorqualityforauniversitystudentandthatlisteningtotheirspeechwasawasteoftime.Participantswereledtobelievethatthiswassentfromtheirspeechpartner.Followingthis,participantsreappraised,ruminated,orengagedindistractionfor 20 minutes. Participants who reappraised were given the following instructions:“Describeyourexperienceoftheunilinktaskinawaythatmakesyouadoptaneutralattitude.”Participantsintheruminationconditionwereaskedto“writeaboutthefeelingsyouhaveabouttheotherpeopleyouhaveencounteredinthestudy.”Instructions inthedistractionconditionconsistedofemotionallyneutralitemssimilartoRustingandNolenHoeksema(1998;e.g.,“Writeaboutthelayoutoftheaislesatyourlocalsupermarket”).

Followingtheemotionregulationinduction,participantsplayedtheUltimatumGamewiththreebogusparticipants.Thesenegotiationcounterpartsconsistedoftheprovocativeparticipantfromthepriorspeechtaskandtwootherparticipantsnotpreviouslyencountered.First,participantsproposedanoffertoallthreecounterpartspriortobeginningthegame.Second,participantsplayedtheroleoftheresponderandreceivedmultipleoffersfromtheseparticipants.Halfoftheofferswerefair (e.g.,$5,$4),andtheotherhalfwereunfair (e.g.,$1,$2).Participants


decidedwhethertoacceptorrejecttheseoffers.Oneachtrialparticipantssawapictureoftheircounterpart(asinSanfeyetal.,2003).Thetwoplayersnotencounteredbeforeandtheinsultingopponentgaveexactlythesameoffers inrandomorderssothatthesecouldbecompared.Nextparticipantsratedtheirmoodatthebeginningofthestudy,postfeedback,duringthewritingandnegotiationtask,andattheconclusionoftheexperiment.Participantsalsoratedtheiropponentsonavarietyofnegotiationrelevanttraits(e.g.,trustworthy,competitive).

As expected, there were no significant differences in selfreported anger atbaseline among the three conditions. Manipulationchecks showed that participants in the ruminationcondition felt emotional more often and more stronglyduring the writing task than participants in the other conditions. In addition,participantsinthereappraisalconditionreportedreflectingmoreonthepositivefeaturesof the speech taskand thinkingabout it fromanobjectiveperspectivecomparedwiththeremainingconditions.

Importantly,reappraisalwasassociatedwiththemostadaptiveemotionalresponse.Earlyreappraisalwasusedinthisexperiment,andtheresultsshowedthatparticipantswhoreappraisedwerelessimpactedbytheinitialinsultandsustainedlowerlevelsofangerthroughouttheexperiment.Specifically, followingtheinsultingfeedback,allconditions reported increasedanger;however, reappraisal was associatedwith thesmallestincreaseinanger.Duringthewritingtask,bothreappraisalanddistractionwereassociatedwithadecreaseinanger.Interestingly,duringthenegotiationtask,participantsinthedistractionconditionreportedincreasedangertoalevelequivalenttothoseintheruminationcondition.Reappraisalwasassociatedwithlessangercomparedwiththedistractionandruminationconditionsduringthenegotiationphase.Similarly,attheconclusionoftheexperiment,reappraisalwasassociatedwithsignificantlylessangercomparedwiththedistractionandruminationconditions.

These findings illustrate the effectiveness of reappraisal and distraction forreducing anger within a negotiation context. Furthermore, our results suggestthatdistractionmightserveasa“quickfix”forreducinganger,butitseffectsdonot last. Once the negotiation began, participants in the distraction conditionbecame angry again. This is presumably because distraction does not facilitateeffectiveprocessingoftheangerinducingeventasreappraisalispresumedtodo.Presumably, participants in the reappraisal and rumination conditions thoughtabouttheirspeechtaskopponentandtheprovocationduringthewritingtaskinadaptiveandmaladaptivemanners,respectively.Bycontrast,participants inthedistraction conditionwere asked to think about topics entirelyunrelated to thespeech task. Thus, when participants in the distraction condition encounteredtheir speechcounterpartagain in thenegotiation task, thismayhave remindedthemoftheinitialprovocationandtherebyresultedinanincreasedsenseofangeratseeingtheircounterpart’spicture.

Participants proposed offers before playing the role of the responder. Asexpected, participants who reappraised proposed more generous offers to theperson that insulted them than either the ruminationordistraction conditions.Theruminationconditionproposedoffers thatwere inbetweenthe reappraisalanddistraction conditions.Whenparticipants played the roleof the responder,theemotionregulationstrategythatparticipantsengagedindidnotsignificantly


influencethenumberofoffersaccepted.Ascanbeexpected,participantsproposedfaireroffersandacceptedagreaternumberofoffersfromthetwoopponentsnotencounteredbeforeregardlessofemotionregulationcondition.Thisisnotsurprisinggiventhatthesetwoopponentsdidnotinsulttheparticipantpreviously.Forthepositivenegotiationrelevanttraits(e.g.,cooperative),participantsinthedistractionconditionratedtheirspeechtaskopponentmorenegativelythanboththeruminationandreappraisalconditions.Collectivelythesefindingssuggestwhichformsofemotionregulationmaybemostbeneficialinnegotiations;however,theeffectofdifferentemotionregulationstrategiesonthenumberofoffersacceptedremainslessclear.

concluding remarkSResearchsuggeststhatexpressingangerasanegotiationstrategyhaslimitedeffectiveness.Theprimarypurposeofthischapterwastopresentemotionregulationstrategiesasameans tomanagethedetrimentaleffectsofangeronnegotiationoutcomes.Specifically,workbyourselvesandotherssuggeststhattheapplicationofreappraisaltonegotiationsettingsmightproveusefulinreducinganger,aggressivebehavior,andconflictinnegotiations.Thefirsttwostudiesweconductedconvergedwithpriorwork in that reappraisalwas associatedwithdecreasedangerrelative toruminationordistraction(Fabiansson&Denson,2010;Maussetal.,2007;Rayetal.,2008).

Althoughthesestudiesillustratedthatreappraisaliseffectiveinreducingexperiencedanger,furtherresearchisnecessarytoinvestigatetheabilityofreappraisalto curb retaliatory negotiation behavior. For example, we found that differentforms of emotion regulation influenced how much participants proposed; however,participantsacceptedasimilarnumberofoffersregardlessoftheemotionregulationstrategytheyengagedin(Fabiansson&Denson,2010).Applyingemotionregulationstrategiessuchasreappraisaldoeshavebenefits;however,thefullextentofthesestrategiesinimprovingnegotiationbehaviorremainstobefurtherinvestigated.Reappraisal isaneffortfulemotionregulationstrategyandmaybedifficult touse for individualswhodonotnaturally tendtoreappraise.Itmightbepossibletotrainnegotiatorsineffectivereappraisaloverseveralsessions.Suchtrainingcouldmakereappraisallesseffortfulandmaybeparticularlybeneficialforindividualswhotendtouseotheremotionregulationstrategies.Byimprovingtheabilitytoreappraise,thisnotonlymaychangeselfreportedemotionbutalsomayinfluencenegotiationbehavior.

Anotherwayreappraisalmayinfluencenegotiationbehaviorisbyusinginvolvednegotiationtaskssimilartothatcommonlyencounteredinreallife.Forinstance,intheUltimatumGameitisclearwhatisconsideredanunfairandfairofferandparticipantscanautomaticallychoosewhethertoacceptorrejectoffersbasedonfairnessratherthanallowingforemotionregulationstrategiestoinfluencetheirdecisionmaking.Usingmoreeffortfulnegotiationtaskssuchasnegotiationscenariosthatrequireproblemsolvingmaybemoreamenable toemotionregulationstrategies.Usingproblemsthataremoreabstractandlessconcretemaymeanthatparticipantsarelesslikelytosimplyapplyafairnessbaseddecisionrulewhennegotiating.Future


researchmightalsofurther investigatethepsychologicalmechanismsresponsibleforanger’sadverseeffectsinnegotiationsettings.Topicsdiscussedinthisvolumesuchasclosemindednessandlackofperspectivetakingabilitysuggestpromisingavenuestoexplore(seeChapters7and10inthisvolume).

Theabilitytoeffectivelyregulateemotionsinnegotiationshasseveralimportantpracticalimplications.Regulatingangerisimportantforhealth.Angerisassociatedwithdecreasedwellbeingandproblemsincludinghypertension(Diamond,1982). Regulating anger can reduce conflict and prevent aggression and mayreduceworkplaceviolence.Effectivelyregulatingangercanhelpimproverelationshipsbetweennegotiatorsandfacilitate futurenegotiationsandmayreducethelikelihoodofstalemates.

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10TheRoleoftheQuestforPersonal

SignificanceinMotivatingTerrorismARIEW.KRUGLANSKI

University of Maryland

EDWARDOREHEKUniversity of Groningen

Thesecretofhappinessis:findsomethingmoreimportantthanyouareanddedicateyourlifetoit.

DanielDennett,Philosopher

O ne particularly striking form of aggression is the attacking of civiliansto reachpoliticalobjectives, labeled terrorism.Theuseof terrorism isanextreme formof aggressionbecause it targets individuals tradition

allyviewedas innocentbystanders.Thus,psychologists studying terrorismhavefocused theiraimatunderstanding the reasonsapersonbecomesa terroristorsupportsterroristactivity.Inshort,researchersandtheoristshavebeenconcernedwiththefactorsthatdriveapersontoattackcivilians.Threegeneralcategoriesofexplanationshavebeenoffered:(1)ideologicalreasons;(2)personalcauses;and(3)socialpressures.

Ideologies constitute belief systems in which some ideal is envisioned andcompared with the current status. When a discrepancy between the ideal andtheactualstatusofaffairs isperceived,theindividual ismotivatedtoreduceit.Terroristideologiesmustidentifyaculpritbelievedtoberesponsibleforthediscrepancy.Inadditiontoidentifyingaculprit,theideologymustbelievethatengaginginviolenceagainsttheculpritwouldreducethediscrepancybetweentheactualandidealconditions.Finally,tocarryoutterrorism,theideologymustprovidea

arie W. kruglanSki and edWard orehek154

justification for theattackingofcivilians.Oneexampleof suchan ideologywasoutlinedbyPape(2005),whonotedthatterroristsoftenviewforeignoccupationoftheirlandasthestateofaffairstobecorrected,theoccupierastheculprit,andterroristactionasthemeansofremedyingthesituation,ultimatelyhopingtoforcetheoccupiertoleavetheland.

Personalcausesincludeanyexperiencesthatmaymotivateapersontoacceptthe previously outlined type of ideology. Researchers have proposed a plethoraof such experiences, including social rejection and exclusion (Sageman, 2004;Stern,2003;Chapter3inthisvolume),personallossandtrauma(SpeckhardandAkhmedova,2005),humiliationand injustice(Bloom,2005;Stern),andpoverty(Stern).Eachofthese,alongwithmanyotherpersonalexperiences,maypredisposeandmotivateapersontoperceiveaninjusticeandtojustifytheuseofviolenceagainstciviliansasanappropriatemeansofretaliation.

Socialpressuresintheformofdutyandobligationtothegroupaswellastheacceptanceof terrorismasa socialnormmotivateandallow theviolence tobecarriedout.Thesesocialpressurescanbeinternalizedorinducedbypeerpressure.Evidence for sucha roleof suchsocialpressurescanbe found indataonJapaneseKamikazepilots(e.g.,OhnukiTierney,2006)andalsoappliestopresentdayterrorism(Bloom,2005;Gambetta,2005;Stern,2003).Consistentwiththis,TomFriedman(2010)arguedthatthelackofoutrageamongMuslimpopulationsregardingtheuseofterrorismbymembersoftheircommunityhasplayedacriticalroleinallowingterroristactivitytocontinue.Forterrorismtobeused,itmustbeviewedasnormativelyacceptableamongapopulationofpeopleforwhomtheterroristsbelievetheyarefighting.Withoutsuchacceptance,theterroristactivitywouldbeatoddswiththosewhomtheyclaimtobehelping.

Althoughthesethreecomponentsofterroristmotivationsneatlyorganizetheabundanceofexplanationsforterrorism,theyfallshortofexplicatingthepsychologicalmechanismsforviolence.TheQuest forSignificanceTheoryattempts todojustthatbyoutliningafundamentalhumanmotivationthatleadsonetoattachoneself toagroupandtofighton itsbehalf.Inthischapter,wewill reviewtheQuestforSignificanceTheoryandpresentrecentdatainsupportofthetheorythatwasnotavailableatthetimeitwasoriginallyproposed.

the QueSt for Significance aS the underlying motivation for terroriSm

Thequestforsignificancehasbeenidentifiedasafundamentalhumanmotivationbymanypsychologicaltheorists(Becker,1962;Frankl,2000;Maslow,1943,1967).Maslowplacedselfactualizationconcernsattheapexofhismotivationalhierarchy.AccordingtoFrankl,suchselfactualizationisencapsulatedinandattainedthroughattemptstoserveacausehigherthantheself.Suchselftranscendencecan be attained only through attachment to the social group. The recent burgeoningfieldofpositivepsychologyhasalsoarguedthatthequestformeaningis central toauthentichappiness andcanbeattainedbyattachingoneself to alargercause(Seligman,2002).AsnotedbyBecker(1973)andTerrorManagement

the QueSt for perSonal Significance in motivating terroriSm 155

theorists(Greenberg,Koole,&Pyszczynski,2004),theultimatethreattopersonalsignificanceisone’sownimminentmortality.Towardoffthethreatofpersonalinsignificance,individualsaremotivatedtoattachthemselvestosocialgroups,todefendthegroup’sworldview,andtoworkinservicetothegroup.

Oneimportantprincipleofthecurrentframeworkisthatperceptionsofinjusticeandpersonalsignificancearebasedonrelativedeprivation.Accordingtothisview,theinjusticeorlackofpersonalsignificanceisnotnecessarilyrealorobjective.Indeed,poverty,pooreducation,andpoliticaloppressiondonotconstituterootcauses ofterrorism(Atran,2003;Berrebi,2003;Krueger&Maleckova,2002).Moreover,knownperpetratorsofterrorismsuchasMuhammadAttaandhis9/11coconspiratorswereneitherlivinginpovertynorlackingeducation.Yetitseemslikelythattheyperceivedthattheyhadlessthantheydeserved,perhapsbecausetheywerelackingthefinancial,religious,orsocialopportunitiesgrantedtotheirpeers.Suchaperceiveddiscrepancyshouldthreatenone’ssenseofpersonalsignificance,motivatingsignificancerestoration.

Becausegroupmemberships functionasan importantaspectof individuals’social identity, a perceived loss of significance to the groups to which a personbelongsmaymotivateasimilarquestforsignificancerestoration.Theperceivedrelative deprivation of a social class, sector, or group has been identified as anunderlying factor in largescale socialmovements, including those thatuse violence suchas riots and terrorism (Gurr, 1970).Wewouldexpect,basedon thisaccount,thatindividualswhodefinethemselvesaccordingtotheirgroupmembershipswouldbemoresupportiveofaggressionagainstoutgroups,includingtheuseofterrorism.

Collectivism and Support for Terrorism

Theforegoinganalysissuggeststhatindividualsidentifystronglywithgroups,valuegroupmemberships,andactonbehalfofthegrouptogainpersonalsignificance.Individualsforwhomgroupidentificationsarecentraltotheirworldviewaremorelikely to perceive the boundaries between groups as rigid and clearly defined.Whenlinesaredrawnbetweengroups,membersoftheoutgrouparederogated,andaggressionagainstoutgroupsismorelikelytobeviewedasjustifiable(Staub,2002).Assuch,acollectivistorientationcanleadtoaggressionandviolencetowardoutgroupsperceivedtobeinconflictwiththeingroup(Triandis,2003).

Ifcollectivismisgenerallyrelatedtosupportforviolenceagainstoutgroups,then it should also be related to support for terrorism. To test this notion, twosurveystudieswereconductedinMuslimnations(Orehek,Fishman,Kruglanski,Dechesne,&Chen,2010).Thefirstsurveywasconductedin12Arabcountries,Pakistan,andIndonesiaviatheInternet.Respondentswereaskedwhethertheyprimarilyidentifyasbeing(1)amemberoftheirreligion,(2)amemberoftheirnation,or(3)anindividual.Participantswhoidentifyprimarilywiththeirnationorreligionhavecollectivegoals,whereasparticipantswhoidentifyasanindividualhavepersonalgoals.Hence,weexpectedthosewhoidentifiedwith theirnationor religion would be more supportive of terrorism against the West than thosewho identifiedprimarily as an individual.Toassess their support for terrorism,


theywereaskedfourquestionstappingtheirsupportforviolenceagainstciviliancitizensfromtheUnitedStatesandEurope.Participantswhoprimarilyidentifiedwiththeirnationorreligionweresignificantlymoresupportiveofterrorismthanwereparticipantswhoprimarilyidentifiedasanindividual.Thesedifferenceswerefoundevenwhencontrollingforage,gender,andlevelofeducation.Therewerenosignificantdifferencesbetweenthosewhoidentifiedwiththeirnationandthosewhoidentifiedwiththeirreligion.

Whilethefirststudywassupportiveofthehypothesisthatcollectivisticidentificationswouldbeassociatedwithgreatersupportforterrorism,wecollecteddataaspartofasecondsurveytoreplicatethefindingsusingaslightlydifferent methodology. Because the first survey sample was limited to individualswithInternetaccess,thesecondstudyusedrepresentativesamplesfromEgypt,Indonesia,andPakistantoensurethattheresultswouldgeneralizetotherestofthepopulation.Second,wemeasuredcollectiveidentificationsusingadifferentquestion,moredirectlytappingthegoalsoftherespondents.Inthissurvey,respondentswereaskedtochoosewhichofthreestatementstheyagreedwithmost: (1) “aparent’s major goal should be ensuring that their children have agoodeducationandachancetosucceedinlife”;(2)“aparent’smajorgoalshouldbeensuringthattheirchildrenservetheirnation”;or(3)“aparent’smajorgoalshouldbeensuringthattheirchildrenservetheirreligion.”Replicatingthefindingsfromthefirststudy,wefoundthatthosewhoidentifiedprimarilywiththeirnationorreligionweremoresupportiveofterrorismagainsttheWestthanwererespondentswho identifiedprimarilywiththeirnation.Again,wefoundthesedifferencesevenwhencontrollingforage,gender,andlevelofeducation.Therewasnodifferencebetweenthosewhoidentifiedwiththeirnationandthosewhoidentifiedwiththeirreligion.

Wecanseethenthatcollectivismisassociatedwithgreatersupportforterrorism.Theredoesnotseemtobeanydifferencebetweenthecollectiveofanationand the collective of a religion in supporting violence. Both groups representpotentialsourcesofsocialidentity.Whenindividualsviewthemselvesaccordingtosuchgroupmemberships,itincreasesthelikelihoodthattheywillbesupportiveoftheuseofviolence,includingwhentheviolenceisaimedatciviliantargets.

Suicidal Terrorism and the Quest for Significance

Perhapsanevenmorestrikingformofterrorisminvolvestheintentionaltakingofone’sownlifeintheprocess.Becausesuicidalterrorismisanextrememeansandtheperpetratorsarehailedasgivingtheultimatesacrifice,ithasthepotentialofbestowinggreatersignificanceupontheactor.Oneimportantimplicationoftheimportanceplacedonthesocialgroupingainingpersonalsignificanceisthat “thewillingnesstodieinanactofsuicidalterrorismmaybemotivatedbythedesiretoliveforever”(Kruglanskietal.,2009,p.335).Thatis,thesignificancegainedbykillingoneselfforthesakeofthegroupmayleadthepersontoacquiremorepersonalsignificancethroughgainingprestige,andthepotentialtoberememberedbythegroupmembersforalongtimemaymakeitpossiblefortheindividualtogainmorepersonalsignificanceindeaththanheorshecouldduringanextended


life.ConsistentwiththisideaisthepropositionofferedbythephilosopherDanielDennett(2002),whostatesthathumansarewillingtoengagein“thesubordinationofourgeneticintereststootherinterests.Nootherspeciesdoesanythinglikeit.”Onepossibleimplicationoftheseobservationsisthathumansarenotactingintheirowngeneticinterestandinsteadthatideasandcultureareevolvingratherthangeneticmaterial(seeChapter15inthisvolume).

Yet analternative account could suggest that ideas are the fabricof a sharedsocial reality that defines the group. This notion is posited by the Quest forSignificanceTheoryandisacceptedinpsychologicaltheorymoregenerally(Hardin&Higgins,1996;Kruglanski,Pierro,Mannetti,&DeGrada,2006).Accordingtosuchanaccount,evolutionthencanoccuratthegrouplevel,meaningthatanactof suicide terrorismmay in factbestowanevolutionary advantageonto theclosegeneticrelativesofthemartyr.Indeed,recentadvancesinevolutionarytheoryhavesuggestedthatevolutioncanoccuratthegrouplevel,andspecificmechanismsforsuchevolutionhavebeenproposed(Wilson&Wilson,2008;seealsoChapter15inthisvolume).Thisspecifictheoreticaladvancementhasbeenappliedtothestudyof suicide terrorism, suggesting that it may bestowanevolutionary advantage ontheirkin(Victoroff,2009).Accordingtosuchanaccount,suicidalterrorismmaybeoneexampleofaltruisticsuicide(Durkheim,2007;Pedahzur,Perliger,&Weinberg,2003).EarlyresearchsuggeststhatPalestiniansuicidebombersdidindeedproduceevolutionarybenefitsfortheirkin(Blackwell,2005).Futureresearchcouldprofitablyexploresuchclaims,investigatingwhetherthegeneticrelativesofsuicideterroristsarereallybetteroffthantheywouldhavebeenhadthepersonremainedalive.

teStaBle tenetS of the QueSt for Significance theory

TheoriginalformulationoftheQuestforSignificanceTheorypositedseveraltestable tenets thathave sincemotivated research in anattempt to test theclaims.Herewewill reviewevidence in supportof threeprimary implicationsderivedfromthequestforsignificanceargument.Thefirstsuchimplicationhasbeenthoroughlytestedinresearchontheeffectsofmortalitysalience.Thesecondandthirdimplicationshaveonlyrecentlybeenempiricallytested,andthedatainsupportofthemwerenotavailablewhentheoriginaltheorywaspresented.

Mortality Salience as a Threat to Personal Significance

ThefirsttestabletenetoftheQuestforSignificanceTheorystatesthat“ifremindersofone’sownmortalityconveyone’spotentialinsignificancethensuchremindersshouldaugmentthequestforsignificanceasdefinedbyone’sculturalnormsand accepted ideological frames” (Kruglanski et al., 2009, p. 338). Indeed,research in support of Terror Management Theory has consistently found thatremindersofone’smortality lead todefenseofone’sworldview, includingmorefavorable attitudes toward those who follow group norms (Greenberg, Porteus,Simon,&Pyszczynski,1995),andsupportforharshertreatmentofdeviants(e.g.,


Greenberg et al., 1990;Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Soloman, Pyszczynski, & Lyon,1989).Particularlyrelevanttothestudyofterrorism,IraniansremindedoftheirownmortalityratedapersonwhosupportedmartyrdomattacksagainsttheUnitedStatesmorefavorablythanapersonwhodidnotsupportsuchattacks(Pyszczynskietal.,2006).Yetparticipantswhowerenotremindedoftheirownmortalityratedthepersonwhodidnotsupportmartyrdomattacksmorefavorablythanthepersonwhodid.Wecansee,then,thatthethreattopersonalsignificanceintheformofremindingpeoplethattheirexistenceistemporaryleadsthemtoattempttoregainsignificancethroughdefenseoftheirsocialgroup,includingtheuseofterrorism.

The Collectivistic Shift Hypothesis

ThesecondtestableimplicationoftheQuestforSignificanceTheory,asstatedbyKruglanskietal. (2009,p.338) is thata“perceived lossofsignificancethrougheventsotherthanmortalityremindersshouldfueleffortsatsignificancerestora-tion.”Specifically,thetheoryproposedanovel“collectivisticshifthypothesis”inwhichalossofpersonalsignificancewouldleadtoashifttowardamorecollectivisticorientation.Whenindividualsarefacedwithnegativefeedbackthreateningtheirpersonalsignificance,theycanrestoretheirlostsignificancebyviewingtheselfasinterdependentwithothers.

Fourstudieshavebeenconductedthatdirectlytestthishypothesis.Inthefirststudy, representative samples fromEgypt, Indonesia, andPakistancompletedasurveyinwhichtheywereaskedtheextenttowhichtheyhadexperiencedpersonalsuccessandwereaskedtoselectwhethertheyidentifiedprimarilyasamemberoftheirnation,amemberoftheirreligion,orasanindividual(Orehek,Kruglanski,etal.,2010).Theseitemswereembeddedinalarger,unrelatedsurvey.Aspredictedbythecollectivisticshifthypothesis,participantswhoidentifiedwiththeirnationorreligion(eachrepresentingcollectiveidentities)reportedlowerpersonalsuccessthanparticipantswhoidentifiedprimarilyasanindividual.

Althoughthepreviousstudyisconsistentwiththecollectivisticshifthypothesis,theresultsaresubjecttoanumberofalternativeinterpretationsbecauseofthecorrelationalnatureofthestudy,includingthedirectionofcausalityissue.Toaddressthisspecifically,wedesignedthreelaboratoryexperimentstofurthertestthehypothesis(Orehek,Belcher,Fishman,Goldman,&Kruglanski,2010).Inthefirststudy,participantscompletedalanguagetest,whichtheyweretoldwasagoodpredictoroftheirfutureacademicandcareersuccess.Participantswererandomlyassignedto receive false feedback indicating that theyeither succeededor failed the test.Participantsthencompletedaselfreportmeasureofinterdependentselfconstrual(Singelis,1995).Participantsinthefailureconditionscoredsignificantlyhigherontheinterdependencescalethandidparticipantsinthesuccesscondition.Itseemsthatthethreattopersonalsignificanceengenderedbythefailureonanimportantlifeskillsdomainledparticipantstoincreasetheirinterdependentorientation.

Asecondstudywasdesignedtotesttheadditionalpredictionthatparticipantswhoexperiencefailurewouldnotonlyincreasetheirlevelofinterdependencebutwould also show decreased independence. Participants in this study were randomlyassigned toeitherwriteabouta time in thepast that theysucceededon


animportantpersonalgoaloratimeinthepastwhentheyfailedatanimportantpersonal goal.Participants thencompleted selfreportmeasuresof independentandinterdependentselfconstrual(Singelis,1995).Consistentwiththeresultsofthefirststudy,participantsinthefailureconditionscoredsignificantlyhigherontheinterdependencescaleandsignificantlylowerontheindependencescalethanparticipants in the successcondition.These results suggesta true shiftingawayfromanindependentorientationtowardaninterdependentorientationinthefaceoffailure.

Toextendtheresultsfromthefirsttwostudies,ourthirdstudyinvestigatedthepossibilitythatafterfailureparticipantswouldelecttoworkinagroupratherthanalone.Totestthisprediction,participantsfirstengagedinavideogameonthecomputer.Participantsweretoldthattheirperformanceonthistaskhasbeendemonstratedtobeareliablepredictoroftheirintelligenceandfuturelifesuccess.Thevideogamewasriggedsothatparticipantswererandomlyassignedtoeithersucceedor fail at the task.Following this task,participantswere told that theywouldengageinanothertaskwiththechancetowinareward(achocolatebar).Theyweretoldthattheyhadtheoptionofworkingaloneonthistaskorworkinginagroup.Participantsinthesuccessconditionweresignificantlylesslikelytoelecttoworkinagroupthanwereparticipantsinthefailurecondition.Thisstudydemonstratesthatfailurenotonlyshiftstheindividuals’mindsetfromanindependentwayofthinkingtoaninterdependentwayofthinkingbutalsoleadstoeffortstoengageincollectiveaction.

Theresultsfromthesefourstudiesprovidetheempiricalevidenceforthecollectivisticshifthypothesis.Individualswhoexperienceadeclineintheirpersonalsignificanceasaresultofpersonalfailureseemtoattempttorestoretheirpersonalsignificanceby shifting toacollectivisticorientationandbyengaging in collectiveaction.Inthisway,individualsareattachingthemselvestoasocialgrouptoattemptsignificancerestoration.

Thisinitialsetofdataonthecollectivisticshiftispromising.Yetmanyquestionsremaintobeanswered.Forexample,dataareneededmeasuringthedeclineinpersonal significance followingthefailureandsubsequent restoration inpersonalsignificancefollowingtheshift.Wecouldalsotestwhetherthecollectivisticshiftisespeciallylikelywhenone’sgroupmembershipismadesalient.Inaddition,itispossiblethatthetypeofgrouptowhichonebelongsmoderatesthetendencytoshifttocollectivisticgoals.Forinstance,itmightbethecasethatgroupscharacterizedbycohesionmightbemorelikelytopromptacollectivisticshiftthangroupscharacterizedbyinternalconflict.Finally,onecouldinquirewhetherthecollectivisticshiftmaybemorelikelyforindividualsunderaheightenedneedforcognitiveclosure,knownfortheirproclivityforgroupcentrism(Kruglanskietal.,2006).

Extending the Self Through Time: Interdependent Self-Construals

ThethirdtestableimplicationoftheQuestforSignificanceTheory,asstatedbyKruglanskietal.(2009,p.338),isthatthe“adoptionofculturalcausesthatlendoneasenseofpersonalsignificanceshouldreducedeathanxiety.”Inotherwords,a person who views the self as interdependent with others in the social group


shouldexperiencelessdeathanxietythanshouldapersonwhoviewstheselfindependently.Byviewingtheselfinterdependently,thepersonisabletoextendtheselfthroughtime(Castano&Dechesne,2005).Thinkingaboutoneselfaspartofagroup reduces the threatofdeathbecause, although the individual’s lifemaybe temporary, thegroupcan liveon.Themore important the interdependencegleaned from group membership becomes relative to the independent self, themoreimportantthegroup’sexistenceshouldbecomeandthelessimportanttheindividual’sexistenceshouldbecome.Therefore,priminganinterdependent(vs.independent)wayofthinkingshouldreducetheaversiontowarddeathoftheindividual.Wetestedthispredictioninthreelaboratoryexperiments(Orehek,Sasota,Ridgeway,Dechesne,&Kruglanski,2010).

Inourfirstexperiment,participantswererandomlyassignedtooneoftwoexperimentalconditions,designedtomanipulateindependentversusinterdependentselfconstrual.Inbothconditions,participantswereinstructedtocircleallthepronounsinanessay.Participantsintheindependentconditioncircledpersonalpronouns(e.g.,I, me, my),andparticipantsintheinterdependentconditioncircledinterpersonalpronouns(e.g.,we, us, our).Thismanipulationhasbeenshowntoincreaseindependentversusinterdependentselfconstrualsintheappropriatecondition(Brewer&Gardner,1996).Participantsthencompletedaselfreportscaleofdeathanxiety(Templer,1970).Participantsintheinterdependentconditionscoredsignificantlyloweronthedeathanxietyscalethanparticipantsintheindependentcondition.Thisfindingsupportsourpredictionregardingthelinkbetweenselfconstrualanddeathanxiety.

Inoursecondstudy,wemeasureddeathanxietyusingameasuredesignedtotap implicitbehavioraldispositions (Fishbach&Shah,2006) following thesameexperimentalmanipulationofselfconstrualasinthefirststudy.Inonecondition,participantswereaskedtopushmeaningfulwords(e.g.,pint)awayfromthemandtopullmeaninglesswords(e.g.,pind)towardthem.Inanothercondition,participantswereaskedtopullmeaningfulwordstowardthemandtopushmeaninglesswordsawayfromthem.Inbothconditions,wordsrelatedtodeath(e.g.,coffin)wereembeddedintothetask.Basedonpreviousresearch(Fishbach&Shah),weassumedthatfasterpullingofdeathrelatedwordstowardtheparticipantreflectedgreaterwillingnesstoapproachdeath,andfasterpushingofdeathrelatedwordsawayfromtheparticipantreflectedgreateravoidanceofdeath.Wefoundthatparticipantsintheinterdependentconditionpulleddeathrelatedwordstowardthemselvesfasterandpusheddeathrelatedwordsawayslower(controllingforspeedonneutraltrials)thandidparticipantsintheindependentcondition.Thus,itseemsthatwhenpeopleareinaninterdependentmindsettheyavoiddeathtoalesserextentandapproachdeathtoagreaterextentthandopeoplewithanindependentmindset.

Ourthirdstudywasdesignedtoextendthesefindingstoanadditionalmanipulationofselfconstrual.Inthisstudy,participantsintheindependentselfconstrualconditionwereaskedtothinkaboutthewaystheyweredifferentfromtheirfriendsand family. In the interdependent selfconstrual condition, they were asked tothinkaboutthethingsthattheyhadincommonwiththeirfriendsandfamily.Asinthesecondstudy,participantsintheinterdependentconditionwerefastertopulldeathrelatedwordstowardthemselvesandslowertopushthemaway(controllingforspeedofrespondingtoneutralwords).


Acrossfourstudies,wefoundaconsistentpatternofresultsattestingtotheabilityofaninterdependentselfconstrualtomitigatethefeartowarddeath.Futureresearchcouldfurtherextendtheseresultsinimportantways.Forexample,wedonothavedatademonstratingthataninterdependentselfconstrualshiftsthefocustothegroup’slifeovertheindividual’slife.Inaddition,ouranalysiswouldsuggestthereversepatternforanxietyregardingthegroup’sexistence,yetthesedatahavenotyetbeencollected.

Summary of Empirical Support

WehaveoutlinedthreeresearchprogramsinsupportofthemajortenetsoftheQuestforSignificanceTheory.Ithasbeenshownthat(1)collectivistssupportterrorismtoagreaterextentthandoindividualists,(2)remindersofone’sownmortalityaugmenttheadherencetoone’sculturalnormsandacceptedideologicalframes,(3)threatstopersonalsignificanceintheformofpersonalfailureleadstoacollectivisticshift,and(4)acollectivistorientationreducesdeathanxietycomparedwithanindividualistorientation.Takentogether,thesedataprovideinitialsupportfortheQuestforSignificanceTheory.Threatstoone’ssignificance,whetherfromimpendingdeathorpersonalfailure,leadtoattemptstorestorepersonalsignificance. Individuals who attach themselves to a social group are more willing toattackoutgroupcivilians.Finally,construingtheselfininterdependentwaysleadstodecreasedanxietyaboutdeath,whichmayserveasacriticalwayofovercominginhibitionsrelatedtomartyrdomaction.

concluSionWehavesummarizedthetheoryrelatedtothequestforpersonalsignificancetoterroristactivityandtheempiricalsupportforitsmajorimplications.Inshort,wehavearguedthatindividualswhoexperienceathreattotheirpersonalsignificanceattempttorestorelostsignificancethroughtheirattachmenttoasocialgroupanddefenseof thatgroup.Thesignificancemotiveimprovedonprevioustheorizingon terroristmotivations by tying the categoriesof ideological reasons,personal causes,andsocial pressures togetherandexplicating theunderlyingpsychologicalmotivationforterroristactivity.Inthischapterwehavealsooutlinedhowthistheoryfitsmoregenerallywithevolutionarytheoryandmayexplainsuicidalterrorismasaformofaggressivealtruism.

Thequestforsignificancehasbeenpostulatedasafundamentalhumanmotivation,presentinallpeopleanduniversalacrosscultures.Yetonlyaminorityofpeopleintheworldsupportterrorism,eveninregionsfromwhichterrorismmorecommonlyoriginates.Personalsignificancecanbegainedfromavarietyofaccomplishmentsandgroupmemberships.Yetwhenpersonalgoalsandgroupidentitiesareperceivedasrelativelydeprived,effortstorestorepersonalsignificanceshouldbeenacted.Whenthedeprivationisperceivedtobeunjust,aculpritcanbeidentified,andviolencecanbejustified;onlythenarewelikelytoseeterrorismpursuedasameansofrestoringsignificance.


Thisframeworksuggestspotentialwaystoreducetheincidenceofterrorismintheworld.Ifterrorismismotivatedbythequestforsignificance,thenopeningalternativeopportunitiesforsignificancerestorationthatdonotincludeviolenceshouldreducetheuseofterrorismjustifyingideologies.Thiscanoccuronboththeindividualandgrouplevels.Onanindividuallevel,providingsupportforanindividual’spersonalaspirationsandsocialmobilityshouldprovidealternativeavenuesforthegainingofpersonalsignificance.Onagrouplevel,reducingperceivedinjusticesthroughdiplomacyandnegotiationshouldreducetheneedforviolenceasameansofachievingone’sobjectives.

While the early results of studies in support of the Quest for SignificanceTheoryareconsistentwithitstenets,futureresearchisneeded.Wehavealreadyoutlinedmultiplewaystheclaimscouldbefurthertested.OneimportantlimitationofthedatasofaristhatmuchofthemhavebeencollectedoncollegestudentsamplesinlaboratorieslocatedintheUnitedStates.Futuretestsofthepredictionswillneedtotesttheclaimsinotherculturesamongdiversesamples.Becausethetheoryispurportedtoexplainterroristbehavior,testingeachtenetamongterroristsampleswouldsignificantlybolsterthecredibilityoftheclaims.Forthetheorytobeconfidentlyappliedtocounterterrorismefforts,empiricaltestsofinterventionsrelevanttothetheoryareneeded.

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Section IIIConflict and Aggression

in Relationships

167

11IntimatePartnerViolenceCognitive, Affective, and

Relational FactorsCHRISECKHARDT

Purdue University

I ntimatepartnerviolence(IPV)isacriticalpublichealthproblem,asrecentresearchhasdocumentedalarminglyhighprevalenceandincidencerates.IntheUnitedStates,populationbasedsurveysindicatethatasmanyas20%of

womenarephysicallyassaultedbytheirintimatepartnerinagivenyear(Schafer,Caetano,&Clark,1998;Straus&Gelles,1990;Tjaden&Thoennes,1998).Relativetowomenwhohavenotbeenvictimized,abusedwomenareatsubstantiallyhigherrisk fordepression,suicide,posttraumatic stressdisorder,alcoholordrugabuseordependence,andpoorphysicalhealth(Golding,1999),andthefinancialcostsof intimate partner violence exceed $5.8billioneach year (Centers for DiseaseControlandPrevention,2003).ThesedatastronglyindicatetheneedtodevelopclearandtestablemodelsofIPVetiologyandmaintenanceandtoelucidateallpossiblemechanismsthroughwhichIPVperpetratorscanbeidentified,prosecuted,andrehabilitated.

Researchers from a variety of professional backgrounds, including socialpsychology (Finkel,2007; seealsoChapter4 in thisvolume),haveexplored theindividualandrelationalriskfactorsthatdistinguishIPVperpetratorsfromnonperpetrators (Hotaling & Sugarman, 1986) and established theoretical contextsthat have fostered the development of causal models of IPV (O’Leary, Slep, &O’Leary,2007)andapproachesforIPVperpetrators (e.g.,Murphy&Eckhardt,2005). Together, these research efforts have provided critical information thatcouldpotentiallybeputtogreatusebycriminaljusticeprofessionals,treatmentproviders,advocatesatthegrassrootslevelworkingonbehalfofIPVvictims,andlegislatorsseekingtosetempiricallyinformedpoliciesdesignedtoreduceratesof

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IPV.Inthischapter,Iwill reviewresearchfindings,primarilyrelyingonNorthAmerican samples, regarding three broad IPVperpetration risk factors of relevancetotheseoutcomes:(1)distortionsinsocialinformationprocessing;(2)affectivedysregulation;and(3)disturbancesinrelationaldynamics.Iwillsuggestthatbecause of longstanding ideological biases among advocacy groups against theroleofindividualandrelationalvariablesasriskfactorsforIPV,researchfindingsregardingpredictorsofIPVarenotactuallyhavinganysubstantiveinfluenceinthefieldasawhole,especiallythosethatruncountertotraditionalIPV ideologies.Asaresult,theseresearchfindinghavefailedtoinfluencethoseonthe“frontlines,”includingvictims’advocacygroups,counselorsworkinginagenciesthatdealwithIPVperpetrators,criminaljusticeprofessionals(e.g.,police,judges,attorneys)whoworkwithIPVoffendersdaily,andlegislatorstaskedwithsettingIPVfocusedsocialpolicies.Becauseofthisdivide,IwillarguethatIPVvictimsarebeingputatgreaterriskinpartbytheveryorganizationsdedicatedtoassistthem.

ipv: the ideological BackdropResearchershaveinvestigatedadiverserangeofdeterminantsofaggressionandviolence; indeed, it is the very diversity of perspectives that makes the field ofaggression research so dynamic and broadly influential (Anderson & Bushman,2002;Baron&Richardson,1994;Daly&Wilson,1988; seealsoChapter16 inthisvolume).However,unlikeotherareasofaggressionresearch,theIPVfieldisunusuallyinfluencedbyideologicalfactorsconcerningthepresumed“appropriate”causesofspousalabuse.ThedominantperspectivethatguidescurrentIPVpolicyandinterventionprogrammingisbasedonearlyprofeministtheoriesofdomesticviolencethatarosefollowingthecreationofsheltersforabusedwomenintheearly1970sinDuluth,Minnesota,andfromresultingprogramsformaleIPVperpetratorsdevelopedasoffshootsofshelterstorehabilitatemaleabusersinearly1980s(Pence&Paymar,1993).

This“DuluthModel”positsthatWesternsocietyisbuiltonpatriarchy,definedas“asystemofsocialorganizationthatcreatesandmaintainsmaledominationoverwomen”(Sugarman&Frankel,1996,p.14).Malesarethereforesocializedfromanearlyagebyotherpowerfulmalestoholdattitudesthatjustifyorsupportthepatriarchalsystem(seealsoChapter15inthisvolumeonthe“malewarrior”hypothesis).Theseattitudesresultinovertandcovertdesiresformentodominateandcontrolwomenand,whencombinedwithpatriarchalpracticesinthelegalsystem,religiousinstitutions,andothersocialsystems,resultinthecollectivemaintenanceof male power structures to dominate women across social domains, includingcloserelationships.Thisnotionissimilartofeministanalysesofrape,whichalsoviewsuchviolenceaspowerorcontrolbasedenforcementofmaleprivilege(forareview,seeBaumeister,Catanese,&Wallace,2002).Notsurprisinglygiventhisgenderfocusedanalysis,proponentsofthismodelmaintainthat thispowerandcontrolpatternisexclusivetomalesandthatfemales’useofviolenceinrelationshipsisrestrictedtoselfdefensivepreemptivestrikes(Walker,1984).ThisclaimpersistsdespitemetaanalyticfindingsshowingthatratesofIPVperpetrationarehigheramongfemalesrelativetomales,evenwhentakingintoaccountviolence

intimate partner violence 169

initiation (Archer, 2000,2002).Mentalhealthproviders andproponentsofpsychologicalorinteractionalmodelsofIPV,inturn,havebeencriticizedbyfeministscholars andvictims’advocates for their theoriesand interventionsdisempowerwomenandblamevictimsfortheirexperiencesofabuse(Adams,1988;Bograd,1984;Gondolf,2007).

Asanintellectualstartingpoint,thepatriarchalideologyperspectivefollowslogically given historically relevant cultural shifts regarding the role of gendersocializationinunderstandingvariousculturalphenomena(e.g.,Dobash&Dobash,1979),and,fromamorepracticalperspective,illustratesthefactthatsociologistsandsocialworkerswerethedrivingforcesbehindtheearliesteffortstounderstandIPVandintervenewithvictimsofabuse.However,itisproblematicthatsome35yearslaterthis“powerandcontrolmodel”hasremainedthedominantperspectiveinmany,ifnotmost,areasoftheIPVfield,despitevastamountsofdisconfirmingdata(forreviews,seeDutton&Corvo,2006;Dutton&Nicholls,2005).

Thismodelhasexpandedfromausefultheorythatprovidedsomeearlystructuretoanascentfieldofstudytoanoverarchingideologythatwieldsenormouspolitical influenceintermsofsocialpolicyandcriminaljusticepractice(Stuart,2005).InterventionsassociatedwiththeDuluthModel(Pence&Paymar,1993)focus exclusively on male power and control dynamics caused by faulty genderrolesocialization;littletonofocusisdirectedtowardpsychologicalfactors,negativeemotions,orrelationalprocessesthatresearchershaveempiricallylinkedwithIPVperpetration(forareview,seeStith,Smith,Penn,Ward,&Tritt,2004).Intheirmetaanalyticreviewofinterventionprogramsforabusers,Babcock,Green,andRobie (2004)noted that theDuluthModel is the “unchallenged treatmentof choice formostcommunities” (p.1026).Of the45 states that currentlyhavestandardsoutliningthestructureofinterventionprogramsforIPVoffenders,themajorityincludestatementsofetiologyorprinciplesofpracticethatreferencethepatriarchalideologymodel(Dutton&Corvo,2006).Suchassumptionsservenotonlytoguideinterventionprogrammingbutalsotorestrictthenarrativeofwhatmightbeconsideredallowableetiologicfactors.However,itisalsoworthnotingthatdespitethesepronouncements,comprehensivemetaanalyticreviewsindicatethatDuluthModelprogramsareassociatedwithonlynegligiblesuccessinreducingIPV(Babcocketal.,2004;Feder&Wilson,2006),witheffectsizesinverselyrelatedtothelevelofmethodologicalrigorofeachstudy.

With this brief, and somewhat distressing, backdrop, the remainder of thischapterwillreviewselectedareasassociatedwithIPVperpetrationthathighlightthecognitive,affective,andrelationalriskfactorsforIPV.

cognitive, affective, and relational riSk factorS for ipv

Cognitive Factors

DiversemodelsofIPVetiologyhaveconsistentlysuggestedthatcertainattitudes,beliefs,andcognitivedistortionsareimplicatedatsomelevelintheonsetandmaintenanceofabusivebehavior.Asaresult,manytheoreticalmodelsandintervention

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programs that focus on IPVrelated cognitive factors claim to be “cognitive” or“cognitivebehavioral” in their orientation (Gondolf, 2004). As noted already, initialresearchontheroleofcognitivefactors inIPVgrewoutofprofeministtheoriesofdomesticviolence(e.g.,Dobash&Dobash,1979),suggestingthatlongtermexposuretopatriarchalcommunitiesinstilledadeeplyheldbeliefinmaleprivilegeandsuperioritythatcovertlyandovertlycondonesanymeansnecessarytomaintainthisunequalpowerarrangement,includingtheuseofcoercionandaggressiveforce(Pence,1983).EarlyfindingsusinginterviewswithfemaleIPVvictimssupportedthenotionthatabusewasdrivenbypowerandcontroldynamics(Straus,1976).

AnalternativetothepatriarchalideologymodelasastartingpointforestablishingcognitivevariablesasriskfactorsforIPVemergedfromtheapplicationofsocial learningtheoryto interpersonalviolence,whichfocusesonprocesslevelinteractionsof theindividualwith thebroadersocialand interpersonalcontext(Bandura,1973).Thesociallearningapproachsuggeststhataggressivebehaviorsareacquiredthroughbasicprinciplesoflearning,andasaresultofthesedirectandvicariouslearningexperiencesviolentindividuals’processingofsocialinformation is systematically biased toward negative assumptions of others’ behaviorandpositiveassociationsregardingtheacceptabilityandvalueofaggressivebehaviors (Dodge, 1991). Longstanding cognitive distortions further degradeindividuals’ ability to selfregulate their emotional responses to interpersonalconflictandimpairthedevelopmentofsecureattachmentswithromanticpartners(Dutton,Saunders,Starzomski,&Bartholomew,1994;seealsoChapter9inthisvolume,onaselfregulatoryapproachtoaggression).Togetherthesedeficitsresultinadeficientsetofbasicrelationshipskillsthatfavortheuseofcontrollingandabusivebehaviors,includingbelligerentandcoercivecommunicationpatterns(Jacobson,Gottman,Waltz,Rushe,Babcock,&HoltzworthMonroe,1994).Thus,a centraldifference between the social learning and feminist accountsofhowcognitivevariablesrelatetoIPVisthatthesociallearningmodeladdressesbothcognitivecontentandcognitiveprocessespresumedtoberelatedtoIPV,whereasthefeministaccountfocusesalmostentirelyonbiasedcognitivecontent.

evidence The profeminist patriarchal ideology model’s conceptualization ofgenderfocusedcognitive–attitudinaldisturbancesastheyrelatetoIPVisincompleteforanumberofreasons.First,thereislittleevidencetosupportthenotionthat patriarchal attitudes and powerrelated beliefs represent specific proximal contributorstotheenactmentofIPV(Malik&Lindahl,1998;Stithetal.,2004;Sugarman&Frankel,1996).Second,partnerabuseisquiteprevalentin lesbianandgayrelationships(e.g.,Lie,Schilit,Bush,Montague,&Reyes,1991),afactthatisdifficulttoexplainifabuseisapurelygenderbasedsystemofoppression(Burke&Follingstad,1999).Third,literaturereviewsindicatethatmenintreatmentfordomesticabusearenomorelikelythannonabusivementoendorsesexistbeliefsinmaleprivilegeorregardingwomen’srolesandrights,asindicatedbyoveradozencasecontrolstudies(Dutton&Corvo,2006;Eckhardt&Dye,2000;Sugarman&Frankel).Thus,whilemisogynisticbeliefsarecharacteristicofagreatmanymenacrossmanysocieties,theydonotappeartobeconsistentorspecificriskfactorsforIPVperpetration.


Overthelast20years,researchershaverefinedthesociallearningapproachintermsofunderstandingandassessingcognitivemechanismsthatmaybeinvolvedinIPV,againwithaneyetowardabroaderunderstandingofbothcognitivecontentandprocessthatmaytranslateintointerventionadvancements.Researchershavedeveloped social information processing models of IPV that have hypothesizeddecoding,decisionmaking,andenactmentdeficienciesassociatedwithIPVperpetration(e.g.,HoltzworthMunroe,1992).Ampleevidencesupportspredictionsfromthismodel(Eckhardt&Dye,2000;HoltzworthMunroe,2000;Murphy&Eckhardt,2005;Stithetal.,2004). Relativetononviolentmales,IPVperpetratorsexhibit(1)decoding,interpretation,andhostileattributionbiasesonquestionnairemeasures(Fincham,Bradbury,Arias,Byrne,&Karney,1997) andduringimaginedconflictscenarios(Eckhardt,Barbour,&Davison,1998;Eckhardt&Jamison,2002;HoltzworthMunroe&Hutchinson,1993);(2)lesscompetentdecisionmaking (i.e., greater generation of aggressive response options) on questionnaires(Field,Caetano,&Nelson,2004;Sugarman&Frankel,1996)andduringconflictsimulations(Anglin&HoltzworthMunroe,1997;Barbour,Eckhardt,Davison,&Kassinove,1998;Jacobsonetal.,1994) ;and(3)positiveevaluationsofviolenceincloserelationships(KaufmanKantor&Straus,1990).

Importantly, thesefindings involvetheuseofmethodsthatgobeyondmereselfreportsofcognitivevariablesandhaveusedmethodsofcognitiveassessmentinformedbydevelopments ingeneralsocial cognition theoryandresearch (e.g.,Abelson,1981;Nisbett&Wilson,1977)aswellasinotherareasofinterpersonalviolence(Baumeister,Catanese,&Wallace,2002;Huesmann,1988).Forexample,ourownworkhassuggestedthatcognitionsrelatedtoIPVare“hot”cognitionsthattendtoaccompanyintenseaffectivestatessuchasangerratherthan“cold”cognitionsthatcanbecalmlydiscussedduringafacetofaceintervieworendorsedonapaperandpencilmeasure.Wehaveusedauniquecognitiveassessmentmethodtoassessabuserelatedcognitiveprocessing,thearticulatedthoughtsinsimulatedsituationsparadigm(ATSS;Davison,Robins,&Johnson,1983).IntheATSSparadigm,participants are asked to imaginea seriesof audiorecorded interpersonalscenariosinvolvingtheirwivesorgirlfriends,toimaginethatthescenestheyarehearingarehappening“rightnow,”thattheyareinvolvedineach,andto“talkoutloud”abouttheirthoughts,feelings,andanythingthey’dliketodowhenpromptedbyatoneevery30seconds.Wehaveusedseveraldifferentscenariostoserveascontextsforthoughtarticulation,includingajealousythemedscriptinwhichthesubject imagines that he has come home early to find his wife having a ratherromanticdinnerandmoviewithamaleacquaintanceandaninsultscriptinwhichthe subject imagines that he is overhearing a conversation between his wife orgirlfriendandherfemalefriendwhereinthetwowomenproceedtodenigratehisprofessional aspirations, intelligence, and sexualprowess. Articulations are latercodedbytrainedratersforthepresenceofcognitivedistortions linkedtoangerarousalandaggression(Beck,1999).

Ourresults(e.g.,Eckhardtetal.,1998;Eckhardt&Jamison,2002;Eckhardt&Kassinove,1998)haveconsistentlyfoundthatwhileabusivemendidnottypicallydifferfromnonabusivemenonpaperandpencil, selfreportmeasuresofcognitive distortions, IPV perpetrators articulated more cognitive distortions during

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ATSS than nonviolent men. Specifically, IPV perpetrators exhibited cognitionsthat demeaned their partners’ worth, placed absolutistic demands that peopleact appropriately (demandingness), magnified the importance of situations, categorizedtheimaginedscenariosintopolarextremes(dichotomousthinking),andestablished conclusions in the absence of confirming evidence (arbitrary inference).Inaddition,severelyviolentmenweremorelikelythanmildlyviolentmentoarticulatecognitionsreflectiveofdemandingnessandawfulizing(characterizinganeventastheworstpossibleoutcome).

Otherresearchfromourlabsuggeststhatdecodingrelatedbiasesfavoringanangryandaggressiveresponsemayoccurquiteearlyinsocialinformationprocessing. Using a paradigm borrowed from social psychological researchers (Nisbett,1993),wehaveshownthathightraitangercollegestudentsperforminganemotionalStrooplike taskexhibitautomaticattentionalbiases favoringangerrelatedstimulibutonlyduringconcurrentmoodinduction(Eckhardt&Cohen,1997).Inasubsequentstudyusingavisualsearchtask,wefoundthatthisbiasamonghighanger individuals diminished with repeated exposure to anger stimuli, suggestingasensitization–habituationprocessuniquetodispositionallyangryindividuals(Cohen,Eckhardt,&Schagat,1998).Morerecently,weexaminedautomaticprocessingbiasesamongIPVperpetratorsusingthreeimplicitassociationtests(IATs)designedtoexaminepreferences forgender,violence,andthelinkbetweenviolenceandgender(Eckhardt,Samper,HoltzworthMunroe,&Suhr,2010).Resultsindicated that IPV perpetrators were faster than nonabusive men to categorizewordpairsinvolvingpositivewordswithviolencewords,andviolencewordswithfemalenames.NogroupdifferenceswerefoundontheIATassessingpreferencesformaleorfemalegender.Thesefindingsindicatethatindividualswhopositivelyendorse the use of aggressive conflict resolution strategies in close relationshipsmaybemorelikelytousesuchstrategiestomanagetheirownrelationshipconflicts(Archer&GrahamKevan,2003)andtoautomaticallylinkthepresenceofafemale(butnotamale)withaggressionrelatedbehavioralintentions.

Nevertheless, thesedatahavehad little influenceonhowcounselorson thefrontlinesofIPVtreatmentconceptualizetheoffendersintheirprogramsordesigntreatmentstoreducetheIPVthatbroughtthemthereinthefirstplace.Why?TheydonotlendthemselveswelltoagenderthemedapproachtounderstandingIPV(Dutton&Corvo,2006).Traditionally, DuluthModelproponentshave focusedonthenotionofaccountabilityandpersonalresponsibilityascausesofviolence(Adams,1988)andhavebeenideologicallyopposedtothenotionthataffective,personality, or psychopathological variables can also be proximal causes of IPVperpetration(Gondolf,2004;Healey,Smith,&O’Sullivan,1998).Thus,ourassertionthatcognitivefactorsrelateonlytoviolenceinthecontextofangerarousalisnotparticularlycompellingfromthestandpointofthepatriarchalideologymodel,giventheapparentinvolvementofanger(seethenextsectionforreasonsunderlyingantiangersentimentsamongDuluthModelproponents).Likewise,suggestingthatcertainbiasesmayoperateatanautomaticleveltoaffectIPVisnotlikelytobeawarmlyreceivedfinding,sinceitsuggestsatacitorimplicitprocessthatisnotunder theconsciouscontrolof theperpetrator.Promotingblameaccountabilityandpersonalresponsibilityisthemostcommonthemeamongstatestandardsfor


IPVinterventionprograms(Maiuro,Hagar,Lin,&Olson,2001),andIPVperpetratorsarecommonlyassumedtoengageinahighlevelofdenialandminimizationoftheiractions(Pence&Paymar,1993);offenderscouldpresumablyblametheirabuseonprocessesoutsidetheircontrolratherthanacknowledgethattheirviolenceistheproductofmaleprivilege(i.e.,“accountability”).However,theselargelyautomaticandoverlearnedassociationsareexactlythekindsofprocessesknowntounderliepropensitytowardgeneralaggression(e.g.,Berkowitz,1993)andthushaveenormouspotentialtoinformetiologicconceptualizationsofIPVandinfluencethedevelopmentofIPVinterventions.

Regulation of Negative Emotions

Whiledecadesoftheoretical(Ellis,1962)andempirical(Haagaetal.,1991)worksupportthegeneralpropositionthatcognitivedisturbancesintensifytheexperienceofnegativeemotionsanddisrupthowtheseemotionsareexpressedinterpersonally(seealsoChapter9inthisvolume),muchcontroversyexistswithinelementsoftheIPVfieldconcerningtherelevanceofemotionalvariablesinexplainingandtreatingIPV(e.g.,Gondolf,2002).Indeed,whilegivingarecenttalktoagroupofbatteredwomen’sadvocatesandinterventionprogramworkersaboutriskfactors for maletofemale IPV, I was met with a chorus of boos and rather nastycomments from theaudience the moment I concluded that thedata supportedangerdisturbances andpsychopathology as important risk factors for IPV.Whythenegativereaction?Generally,thereappearstobeaconcernamongmanybatteredwomen’sadvocatesandprogramstaffthatinvokinginternalconstructssuchaspsychopathologyoremotionalproblemswillleadtoa“medicalmodel”approachtoIPVthatmayleadtoafocusawayfromwhattraditionallyhavebeenviewedastherootcausesofviolence(e.g.,communitysupportsthatovertlyorcovertlycondoneabusivebehaviorandmen’slackofaccountabilityandresponsibility).WhileitwouldindeedbecounterproductivetoseethecausesofIPVasrestingsolelywiththepsychologicaldisturbancesofthemaleperpetrator,itseemssimilarlyunproductivetoblithelydismisssuchfactorswhenampleempiricalevidenceexiststosubstantiatethesevariablesaslegitimateriskfactors.

InthecontextofIPV,thenegativeemotionthathasgarneredthemostattention (favorable and not) is anger. The role of anger arousal in intimate partnerviolenceseemsobvious,foritisoftenassumedthatangerandaggressionare“inextricably, biologically linked” (Tavris, 1989, p. 24), andone can easily imagine ascenariowhereinanabusivemalebecomesintenselyangryandassaultshisfemalepartner.Indeed,dataarelargelysupportiveoftheassociationbetweenangerproblemsandIPVperpetration(Norlander&Eckhardt,2005).However,therearefewareasmorecontroversialwithinareasofdomesticviolenceresearchandadvocacyareas than the issue of anger and IPV. Part of this resistance reflects concernsabouttheextensionofamedicalmodelapproachintointerventionprogramsandwhatthismayimplyaboutetiology.Thatis,ifangercontrolinterventionsworkforIPVperpetrators,thenthismightsuggestthatangerrelatedfactorsmayindeedbeinvolvedintheetiologyofIPV;asnotedalready,suchaconclusionisunpopularamongalargesectorofthegrassroots,feministadvocacycommunity.

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Echoingthesesuspicions,Gondolf(Gondolf,2002;Gondolf&Russell,1986)suggestedthat“angermanagement”interventions(1)implythatthevictimistoblame,(2)donotaccountforabusemeanttoexertpowerandcontrol,(3)perpetuatethebatterer’sdenial,(4)mayputthefemalepartneratfurtherriskforviolence,(5)givecommunitiesareasontoshuncollectiveresponsibilityforIPV,and(6)giveperpetratorsnewtoolstocoerceandcontrolwomen.Thesesentiments are reflectedbymanyadvocates forbatteredwomenand statedomesticviolencecoalitions(seeHealeyetal.,1998),whichhavelobbiedeffectivelyagainsttheuseofangercontroltreatmentsformenmandatedtoattendbattererinterventionprograms(BIPs).However,asnotedbyMaiuroetal.(2001),statestandards governing BIP content typically lack any empirically justification,callingintoquestionthebasisforthebanonangercontrolinterventions.Thenet result of these assumptions hasnot only been a resistance toward angerbased interventions but also a steadfast dismissal of anger as a potential riskfactor for IPV. Ultimately, however, all of these concerns must be answeredempiricallyratherthanideologically.So,istherearelationshipbetweenangerarousalandIPV?

evidence Theanswerisyes,althoughtherelationshipismoderateinstrength.Fromanempiricalstandpoint,recentquantitativereviews(Norlander&Eckhardt,2005;Schumacher,FeldbauKohn,Slep,&Heyman,2001)haveindicatedthatdisturbancesinangerexperienceandexpressiondistinguishbetweenpartnerviolentandnonviolentmen(effectsize:d=.50).Studiesusingselfreportquestionnairesconsistentlyindicatethatpartnerviolentmalesshowelevatedtraitanger,hostility,increasedtendencytoexpressangeroutwardly,anddecreasedangercontrol(Eckhardt,Barbour,&Stuart,1997;Norlander&Eckhardt).Inaddition,angerproblemsare directly related tomore severe and frequentperpetrationof IPV(Holtzworthetal.,2000).Inobservationalresearchexaminingsequentialpatternsofcoupleinteraction,violentcouplesdemonstrateincreasedusageof“destructive”formsofanger,involvingexpressionsofcontempt,disgust,andbelligerence(e.g.,Jacobsonetal.,1994).Priorresearchonangerinsubtypesofpartnerviolentmensuggests that some, although not all, partnerabusive men exhibit symptoms ofexcessiveanddysregulatedanger(e.g.,Chase,O’Leary,&Heyman,2001;Dutton,1988; Hershorn & Rosenbaum, 1991; Saunders, 1992; HoltzworthMunroe &Stuart,1994;Waltz,Babcock,Jacobson,&Gottman,2000). HoltzworthMunroeandcolleagues(2000)foundthatthetwomostseveresubtypesofpartnerviolentmen (labeled Generally Violent and Borderline/Dysregulated) had significantlyhigherangerlevelsthanlessseveresubtypes.OtherresearchsuggeststhatangerinteractswithalcoholintoxicationtoincreasethelikelihoodofIPVduringrelationshipconflicts(Eckhardt,2007).Finally,recentfindingsusingforensicsamplesofIPVperpetratorssuggestthatapproximately20–25%ofpartnerabusivemenjudiciallymandatedtoattendbattererinterventionprogramshaveclinicallysignificant problems with anger experience and expression (Eckhardt, Samper, &Murphy,2008) and that abuserswithproblematic anger are less likely to completesuchprogramsandmorelikelytoreassaultfemalepartners(Murphy,Taft,&Eckhardt,2007).


Butthereareinconsistenciesaswell.Severalstudiesusingselfreportquestionnairesofangerandhostilityhavenotfounddifferencesbetweenpartnerviolentandnonviolentmales(seeNorlander&Eckhardt,2005).Inaddition,researchersusingobservationalmethodshavetypicallyfoundthatdirectstatementsofanger(e.g.,“I’mreallymadatyou”)donotreliablydifferentiateviolentfromnonviolentcouples(Barbouretal.,1998;Gottmanetal.,1995).Thus,whiletheaccumulateddataindicatethatIPVperpetratorsshowdysfunctionallevelsoftraitangerandangercontrolrelativetononviolentmales,evenaftercontrollingforrelationshipdistress,andthatangerproblemsportendriskfortreatmentattritionandcriminalrecidivism,itisunlikelythatpartnerviolentmalescanbedifferentiatedfromtheirnonviolentcounterpartssolelyonthebasisofangerproblems;indeed,IPVperpetrators constitute aheterogeneous group of individuals (e.g., HoltzworthMunroe & Stuart, 1994) who act abusively as a function of a diverse array ofcausesandsituations.Thus,ratherthanassumingthatangeris“always”or“never”involvedinIPV,itismoreimportanttoconsiderwhetherandforwhomspecificpatternsofangerproblemsmaybefactorsdeservingofclinicalattention(Murphyetal.,2007).

However,onceagain,thesefindingshaveseenonlyverylimitedacceptanceintheIPVfield.Oneofthemoredistressingaspectsofhowthepatriarchalideologymodelhaslimitedscientificinquiryisthatcurrentlythereisnoevidenceregardingwhether changingperpetrators’ negative emotions (e.g., anger) in IPV interventionprogramsspecificallypredictnonviolentoutcomes.Suchastudywouldfaceintenseideologicalresistancefromcriminaljusticefundingagenciesandwouldbepractically impossibletoconductusingcriminal justicesamplesgivenprevailingideologicallybasedopinionsthatopposeangerthemedresearchandtreatmentinthosesettings.GiventhatnorelevantstudiesexistconcerningwhetherangeroremotionfocusedtechniquesspecificallyreduceIPVrisk,itissurprisinganddisappointingtoseesuchvehementpronouncementsagainsttheusageofangerfocusedinterventionsforIPVperpetrators(Adams,1988;Gondolf,2002),foronewouldassumethatsuchstronglynegativeevaluationswouldbebasedonactualevidence.Important research needs tobe conducted to investigate whether interventionsthathaveanemotionregulationcomponentaremoreeffectiverelativetostandardinterventionswithoutsuchacomponentorwhether interventionswithanangerfocuscouldbecometheinterventionofchoiceforperpetratorswithspecificemotionregulationdifficulties(Eckhardtetal.,2008;Murphyetal.,2007).

Relational Factors

One of the hallmark assumptions of feministinformed models of IPV etiologyandinterventionisthatrelationshipdisturbancesareaconsequence,ratherthanacause,ofIPV(Gondolf,2002).Asnotedpreviously,thecentralthemeofthesemodels is that the patriarchal society in which we live provides an enormouslyinfluential and reinforcing context for men to use power and control tactics tosubjugatetheirfemalepartnersandpromotemaleprivilege.Thus,popularmodelsofIPVsuggestthataggressivemanifestationsofabusearebutoneexampleofpowerandcontroltactics,asmenmayalsousepsychologicaloremotionalabuse,

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economic coercion, and restriction of social contacts to intimidate, isolate, andcontroltheirpartners.

IsthereevidencethatrelationshippowerdynamicsarerelatedtoIPV?Surveyssuggest that couples wherein both partners acknowledge that the male is thedominantpartnercompriseaverysmallnumber(9.6%)ofU.S.couples(Coleman&Straus,1985).Inaddition,researchhasnotbeenconsistentlysupportiveofthespecificlinksbetweenrelationshippowerandIPV(Malik&Lindahl,1998).Forexample,Babcocketal.(1993) foundnorelationshipsbetweenpowerbases(i.e.,education,income,socioeconomicstatus[SES])andIPVandonlyamodestrelationamongpowerrelatedoutcomes(i.e.,controloverdecisionmaking)andIPV.However,violenthusbandsreportedgreaterpursuitanddemandtacticsduringconflictdiscussions,whereaswivesreportedwithdrawingorshuttingdown(seealsoHoltzworthMunroe,Smutzler,&Stuart,1998).Thus,whilethepowerandcontrolmodelprovidesanimportantdistalcontextfromwhichtoexplorepartnerabuse,theproximalmotivationsunderlyingviolentactsareusuallycomplexandmultideterminedratherthanstraightforwardexpressionsofdominanceandcontrol.

Priorreviewsof the literatureregardingriskfactorsforIPVhaveconcludedthat thecontextof IPV is indeed the relationship—violent couples also tend tobedistressedandunhappycouples(Dobash&Dobash,1979;Schumacheretal.,2001).Overall,thedatasuggestthatproblematiccouplecommunicationpatternsarestrongdeterminantsofrelationshipdistressandthatlowerlevelsofrelationshipsatisfactiondifferentiateviolentfromnonviolentcouples(O’Learyetal.,1989;Rogge&Bradbury,1999).IPVtendstoaccompanyrelationaldistressandverbalarguments(O’Leary,1999)andisitselfastrongpredictorofrelationshiptermination.Itfollows,then,thatthemanyexistingstrategiesforthetreatmentofrelationshipdysfunctioncanbeusefullyappliedtothispopulation.

Researchon themutualnatureof IPV further illustrates the importanceof contextual factors in relationship conflict and abusive behavior (see alsoChapter12inthisvolume). Whenonepartnerhasbeenphysicallyaggressiveinarelationship, it ishighly likelythattheotherpartnerhasbeenphysicallyaggressiveaswell(Archer,2000).Therefore,itbecomescriticaltounderstandtheusualwaysthatcoupleswithaviolentpartnerinteractaboutmattersbothmundaneandseriousandto integrate this information intoeffectiveclinicalinterventions. An important area of research in this regard is based on theanalysis of the sequential behavioral interaction patterns of violent couples.Researchers have found that, relative to nonviolent couples, violent couplesexhibit more offensive negative behaviors during conflict discussions as wellas more reciprocal patterns of negative communication (Berns, Jacobson, &Gottman,1999; Burmanetal.,1993; Cordova,Jacobson,Gottman,Rushe,&Cox,1993;Jacobsonetal.,1994;Margolin,John,&Gleberman,1988).Inparticular,violentcouplesseemtobelockedinapatternofreciprocatedbelligerence,contempt,disgust,andoverthostility,withbothpartnersrespondingtotheother’snegativebehaviorwithsimilarlynegativereactions(Gottman,1994).IncontrasttoDuluthModelassumptions,fewdifferenceshavebeenobservedonthesevariablesbetweenhusbandsandwiveswithinviolentcouples.These


data suggestwhathas longbeenobserved in clinical settings: amongviolentcouples,bothpartnersarelikelytobenegative,reactive,andlockedinacompetitivebattletodefeattheother.Thiscontextualrealityneitherabsolvestheperpetratorfromhisorherdecisiontoactabusivelynorblamesthevictimforhis or her victimization. But it seems reasonable to suggest that a completeunderstandingofIPVrequiresknowledgeofthecontextinwhichitoccursandthatthiscontextalsoincludesthebehaviorofbothpartners(Jacobson,1994;Murphy&Eckhardt,2005).

There isnotopicmorecontentiousamongproponentsoftheDuluthModelthanthenotionofrelationalriskfactorsforIPV.Giventhatthemodelemergedasaconsequenceofintensiveadvocacyeffortstoimprovethelivesofabusedwomen,itfollowsthattherewouldbelittleinterestamongDuluthModelproponentstoexamine how behaviors from both partners, including female victims, providethecontextforIPV.Advocacygroupsthatcreateandenforcestandardsforabuseintervention programs do not include relational risk factors in lists of variablesthat predict IPV, since doing so, from the standpoint of the Duluth Model, istantamounttoblamingthevictim.Indeed,almostallstateswithsuchstandardscautionagainstorexplicitlyprohibit interventionstrategiesthat involvecouples’basedtreatment.

But is there evidence that modifying interpersonal and communicationskills in partner violence interventions is associated with nonviolent change?Yes. Recent research indicates that interventions based on improving couplecommunicationandrelationshipskillsareatleastaseffectiveatpreventingnewIPVepisodesasstandardinterventionprogramsorothercomparisoninterventions(foramoredetailedreviewseeMurphy&Eckhardt,2005).Forexample,Dunford(2000)examinedtheeffectsofa26weekcognitivebehavioralgroupBIP,a26weekcouples’ therapygroup,arigorousmonitoringgroup,oranotreatmentcontrolgroupforIPVperpetratorsinthemilitary.Followupreportsfromfemalepartnersofmaleparticipantsgathered6and12monthsposttreatmentindicatedthatindividualsassignedtoalltreatmentsexhibitedreductionsin IPV; no differences in recidivism were found in maletofemale physicalaggressionacross the fourgroups. Inaddition,usingcouplesvolunteering fortreatmentatauniversitymaritaldistressclinic,O’Leary,Heyman,andNeidig(1999)foundnodifferenceinrecidivismbetweenmenassignedtoeithercouples’treatmentversusagroupDuluthModelintervention.SimilarresultsusingacourtreferredsamplewerereportedbyBrannenandRubin(1996).Thus,onecaneitherconcludethattreatmentthatfocusesonimprovingrelationshipskillsisunwarrantedsinceitdoesnobetterthanmoretraditionalgrouptreatments,oronecanperhapsseecouples’treatmentasausefulalternativeforsomeviolentcouples(especiallythosewhoareclearlyplanningonstayingtogether)sinceitappearstoworkjustaswellastraditionalinterventions.However,theclinicianinterestedinimplementingcouples’treatmentmusttakeextremecaretomake sure thecouple is indeedappropriate for the interventionand that theinterventiondoesnotexacerbateexistingproblemsinwaysthatincreaserisksoffutureIPVvictimization(formore,seeLaTaillade,Epstein,&Werlinich,2006;Murphy&Eckhardt,2005).

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concluSionSSubstantialprogresshasbeenmadeinthedevelopmentofetiologicmodelsofIPVandinterventionsforindividualswhoassaulttheirrelationshippartners.Despitethedominatingpresenceof thepatriarchalsocialization (“Duluth”)model, researchershavedevelopedtheoriesofIPVthathavebroadenedthefactorsthataccountforabusivebehaviorincouples,withlessideologicallybasedandmoreempiricallybasedfindingsconcerningrisk factors for IPV(e.g.,Finkel,2007;O’Learyetal.,2007),withaneyetowardtranslatingthisworkintomorefocusedinterventionsforperpetrators(e.g.,Murphy&Eckhardt,2005).Usingmethodsheavily influencedbysocialpsychologicalresearchers,thecurrentstateofIPVresearchisrobustandinformative.Relativetononperpetrators,partnerviolentindividualsexhibitavarietyofsocialinformationprocessingdisturbancesandshowmorefavorableattitudestowardviolenceasanacceptableconflictresolutionstrategy.Intermsofemotionregulation,thelimitedresearchavailableindicatesthatIPVperpetratorsshowmoredisturbancesinangerexperienceandexpressionrelativetononviolentcomparisonsamplesandthatproblemsrelatingtoangercontrolarelinearlyrelatedtotheseverityandfrequencyofIPVperpetration.LaboratorystudiesindicatethatrelativetononviolentmalesIPVperpetratorsinducedtofeelangryaremorelikelytorespondtorelationshipconflictsituationswithexpressionsofverbalaggression,belligerence,and hostile conflict strategies. Data also clearly indicate the relational nature ofviolentconflicttactics:abusivebehavior,whilealwaystheresponsibilityoftheindividualperpetrator,emergesinparticularrelationshipcontextsandfollowsasometimespredictablepatternofreciprocatedandescalatinginterpersonalprocesses.

Together, thesefindingsmake for a compelling frameworkaroundwhich tostructureinterventionprogramsfornonviolentchangeandtoinformpolicymakerstaskedwithpreventingtheoccurrenceofsuchviolence.However,despitetheproductivityofIPVresearchersandtheincreasingsophisticationofthemethodsusedtoexamineIPVdynamics,thegulfbetweenresearchersandpractitioners–policymakersremainsenormous.Asdiscussedinthisreview,acentralreasonfortheeverwideningnatureofthisdivideistheideologicalresistanceonthepartofprofeministgroupsadoptingtheDuluth“powerandcontrol”ModelofIPVtowardthetypesofvariablesandthespecificconclusionsofferedbybehavioralscienceresearchconcerningtheetiologyofIPV.AsnotedinacritiqueofthismodelbyDuttonandCorvo(2006),researchthatcouldotherwiseimproveourunderstandingofthecausesofpartnerabuseandinformtreatmenteffortsisderided,reinterpreted,orignored:

Againstanationalmovementtowardevidencebasedandbestpracticecriteriaforassessingprogramcontinuance,interventionswithperpetratorsofdomestic violence remain immune to those evaluative criteria. The strangleholdon theoryandpolicydevelopment that theDuluthmodelexerts confoundseffortstoimprovetreatment.Thereisnorationalreasonfordomesticviolenceto be viewed outside of the broad theoretical and professional frameworksusedtoanalyzeandrespondtomostcontemporarybehavioralandpsychologicalproblems.Onthecontrary,thisisolationofdomesticviolencehasresultedinabackwateroftautologicalpseudotheoryandfailedinterventionprograms.


No other area of established social welfare, criminal justice, public health,or behavioral intervention has such weak evidence in support of mandatedpractice.(p.478)

Thus,thereisstillquiteadistancelefttotravel ifthesocialandbehavioralsciences are to make the paradigm shift toward an approach to understandingIPVthattakesadvantageofthemostthatoursciencehastooffer.Oneadvantageof an approach informed by science, asopposed to ideology, is anopenness tonovelfindings,tonewconstructs,andtonewcollaborationsthatmayeventuallyproveuseful (ornot) toourunderstandingof a givenphenomenon. “Givenourawarenessofthelimitationsofcurrentapproaches…,itisourobligationtoapplywhatweknowabout thecomplexityofpartner abuse to improve theprogramsintendedtoendit”(Stuart,2005,p.262).Forattheendoftheday,nomatterhowmuchideologicalresistanceoneexperiences,ourallegiancetoanopen,scientificallydrivenapproachtoknowledgediscoveryprovidesthebesthopetosolvetheonegoalthateveryoneassociatedwiththeIPVfieldcanagreeon:toreducethelikelihoodthatinvolvementinaromanticrelationshipmeansanincreasedriskforviolentvictimization.

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12InterdependentGoalsand

RelationshipConflictGRáINNEM.FITZSIMONSandJOANNAE.ANDERSON

University of Waterloo

I ncloserelationships,partners’outcomesaremutuallydependent.Thisextensive everyday interdependence is what brings much of what people desirefromrelationships(e.g.,intimacy,understanding,support,andstability)but

is also what bringsmuchof what people fear (e.g., hurt, pain, obstruction, andstrife; see Chapters 3, 11, 13, and 14 in this volume). From its very inception,InterdependenceTheoryhasexplicitlyconnectedinterdependenceandthelikelyoccurrenceof interpersonal conflict (Braiker&Kelley, 1979;Kelley&Thibaut,1978),notingthatwithgreaterinterdependencecomesgreateropportunitiesforpartnerstobothfacilitateandobstructeachother’sgoals.Becausegoalobstructionisacommontriggerofconflictandaggression(seeChapter10inthisvolume),thegreateropportunitiesforobstructionthataccompanyinterdependencecaninturngeneratemoreoccurrencesofstrifeinrelationships.

Ifindividualgoalpursuitsareenmeshedintheeverydayinterdependenceofromanticrelationships(seeChapters2and6inthisvolume),thenitmaybefruitfulfortheunderstandingofbothselfregulatoryandrelationshipprocessestoelucidatetherelationsofonepartner’sgoalstotheother’s.Inthecurrentresearch,wesuggestthatthesimilarityofthepartners’personalgoalssuchascareergoals,financialgoals,andhealthandfitnessgoalsmaybeanimportantfactorinpredictingbothindividuals’progressontheirgoalsaswellasrelationshipcoordination,compatibility,andconflict.

Inthischapter,wepresentrecentfindingsexaminingthelinksbetweengoalsimilarityandrelationshipconflict,testingthehypothesisthatromanticpartnerswhopursuedissimilarpersonalgoalsexperiencemoreconflictintheirrelationship.Dissimilarpersonalgoalsarelikeliertobeincompatiblegoals,interferingwitheachother’sprogress,andwethussuggestthatdissimilarpersonalpursuitswillleadto

gráinne m. fitzSimonS and Joanna e. anderSon186

moreconflictintherelationshipoverall,viaadirecteffectofgoalobstructiononconflict.Dissimilargoalsarealsolikelytocreateconflictviamoreindirectroutes,suchasperceptionsthatone’spartnerisnotresponsivetoone’sneeds(Reis,Clark,&Holmes,2004)andfeelingsofbeingunsupported(Brunstein,Dangelmayer,&Schultheiss,1996).

Background: Similarity and likingAccordingtothesimilarity–attractionhypothesis,individualsevaluateotherswhosharetheirattitudesmorepositivelythantheyevaluateotherswhopossessdissimilarattitudes(Byrne,1971;Byrne,Clore,&Worchel,1966).Inaclassicprogramofresearch,Byrnedemonstratedthatindividualsevaluatedabogusstrangermorepositivelyafterreadingthatthestrangerpossessedattitudes(aboutissuessuchasGodandpremarital sex)thatweresimilar tothosereportedbytheparticipantsthemselves (Byrne, 1961). Byrne theorized that similarity produced its positiveeffectsbyvalidatingindividuals’ownviewsandattitudesabouttheworld,whichisinherentlyrewarding.Becauseindividualsassociatetherewardofvalidationwiththestranger,theylikehimorhermore(Byrne,1961).Thisfindinganditsinterpretationhavebeenchallenged(e.g.,Rosenbaum,1986),butthepositivelinkbetweenattraction and similarity is largely viewed as abasic principle underlying initialattraction(e.g.,Berscheid&Walster,1978).

Althoughthelinkbetweensimilarityandinitialattractionamongstrangersiswidelyaccepted,thelinkbetweensimilarityandsatisfactionwithexistingrelationshippartners is lessclear.Findingshavebeenmixed (Buunk&Bosman,1986;Montoya,Horton,&Kirchner,2008;Morry,2005,2007),andmanystudieshavesuffered from dataanalytic weaknesses that limit their interpretability (Griffin,Murray, & Gonzalez, 1999; see also the review in Karney & Bradbury, 1995).Despitetheseconcerns,themostoftenreportedfindingisstillthatsimilarpartnersaremoresatisfiedpartners(e.g.,Gaunt,2006;Luo&Klohnen,2005).Lessworkhasdirectlyexaminedconflictasanoutcome;however,somefindingshavesuggestedthatsimilarityalsoreducestheoccurrenceofeverydayconflict(Surra&Longstreth,1990),andmanyauthorshavepositedthatreducedconflictisoneroutethroughwhichthesimilarity–satisfactioneffectmayoccur(e.g.,Esterberg,Moen,&DempsterMcCain,1994).

Mostoftheresearchtodateonsimilarityhasexaminedpersonalitytraitsandattitudes,withnostudiesonsimilarpersonalgoalpursuitsperse.However,severalstudieshaveexaminedsimilarityincharacteristicsrelatedtopersonalgoals,findingthatsimilaractivitypreferences,atleastinsomedomains,predictreducedconflictandincreasedrelationshipsatisfaction(Surra&Longstreth,1990)andthatsimilarneedsforautonomyandaffiliationpredicthigherreportsofmaritaladjustment(Meyer&Pepper,1977).

current reSearchThus,buildingonpriorwork,weexploredtheinfluenceofsimilarpersonalgoalson the frequency and intensity of relationship conflict. Because this chapter is

interdependent goalS and relationShip conflict 187

inspiredbyInterdependenceTheoryandtheideasaredrivenbyour interestinlinkinginterdependencetheorizingaboutrelationshipswithworkonselfregulation,ouremphasisdiffersfrompriorworkonsimilarity.Whereaspastworkhasfocused on links between similarity of personality traits, attitudes, values, anddemographic characteristics, this chapter focuses on similarity in personal goalpursuits.Personalgoalshavenothingtodowithrelationships—theyaretheindividual’sownquests—andthusaretheidealcharacteristictostudytotestinterdependencetheory’spredictionsaboutsimilarityandconflict.Inoneofourstudies,we test theroleofotherkindsofsimilaritywithin relationships todetermine iftheseinterdependentgoalsproduceanyuniqueeffectsonconflict.

Similarly,whereaspastworkhasexaminedtheimpactofsimilarityonattraction, liking, or satisfaction, weemphasize the moredirect outcome that shouldstem from interdependencecosts—conflict.Finally,while themostwellknownfindingsonsimilarityhavestudiedattractiontostrangers,wefocusonsimilaritywithinestablishedlongtermromanticrelationships.Becauseoftheinherentinterdependenceincloserelationships,wespeculatethattheprocessesthatpromoteanypositiveeffectsof similarityon reduced conflict are probably not the samesimplepositivereinforcementprinciplesthoughttodrivetheeffectsofsimilarityoninitialattractionamongstrangers.Itsurelyfeelsgoodtoknowthatone’sromanticpartneragreeswithone’sopinionsbutthatsenseofselfvalidationisonlyoneofmanypossibleprocessesthatcouldexplainasimilarity–conflictlinkwithinthismorecomplicatedinterpersonalcontext.

Forexample,HolmesandMurray(1996),intheirreviewofresearchonconflictinrelationships,suggestthatonemajorcauseofrelationshipconflictisthatpartners lack understanding of each other’s “untransformed” preferences—thatis,thepreferencestheywouldpossessintheabsenceofexternalinfluence.Beforepartnerscandecidehowtoact inagivensituation, theymustunderstandtheirpartner’s preferences in the situation (Kelley, 1979; Messick & Brewer, 1983).Indeed,accurateperspectivetakinghasbeenshowntobecrucialtonegotiatingandresolvingconflicts(seeChapter7inthisvolume).Unfortunately,partnersareknown to be quite inaccuratewhen it comes to perspective taking—they oftenmisreadeachother’spreferences(Kenny,1994).Inaccuraciesarethoughttostemboth frompeople’s tendencies toproject theirown preferencesonto their partners(a tendencythat isevenlikelier tohappenwithcloserelationshipsbecausepeopleassumemoresimilarity)andfrompeople’soverrelianceonpartners’pastovertbehaviorsascuesfortheirpreferences.Overtbehaviorscanoftenbemisleading reflections of people’s real motivations, both because people behave inlinewith“transformed”motivations(i.e.,theyaltertheirpreferencestobettersuittheirpartner’s;Holmes&Murray,1996)andbecausepeopleoftenfailtobehaveinlinewiththeirgoals,duetoselfcontrolfailures(Baumeister,1998).Ifpartnersbasetheirbeliefsabouteachother’spreferencesonwhattheyseeintheirpartner’sbehaviors,thentheymaywellmissthemarkwhenitcomestounderstandingwhattheirpartnersreallywant.

Wesuggestthatbothofthesetypesofmisunderstandingsarelikeliertohappen when partners hold dissimilar personal goals. Partners who pursue similargoalsmayhavenobetterknowledgeoftheirpartner’spreferences;however,their


assumptionofsimilaritywillbewellfounded,andthustheywillprojectaccuratepreferencesontotheirpartners.Similarly,whenpartnershavesimilargoals,pastbehaviorislesslikelytoreflecttransformedmotivationsandmorelikelytoreflecteachpartner’sactualuntransformed interests, simplybecausethere is lessneedfortransformationwhenbothpartnerssharethesamegoals.Incontrast,partnerswithdissimilarpersonalgoalswillbelikeliertomakeparticularlyinaccurateprojectionsandtohavebehavedinwaysthatdon’treflecttheiruntransformedinterests,outofdesiretocompromiseorgetalongwitheachother.

Theseperspectivetakingissuesareonepossibleroutethroughwhichdissimilarpersonalgoalscouldgeneraterelationshipconflict.Itisalsopossiblethatpartnerswhoholddissimilarpersonalgoalsmayobstructeachother’sgoalprogress,whichmaydirectlyleadtonegativeemotionsandconflict(Berscheid,1983,1991;Berscheid & Ammazzalorso, 2001; Fehr & Harasymchuk, 2005; Fitzsimons &Shah,2008).Whengoalsareobstructed,peopletendtofeelfrustratedwitheachother(Berscheid&Ammazzalorso,2001),andmayavoideachotherandseekmoreindependence (Fitzsimons & Shah, 2008), all of which would promote conflict.Incontrast,partnerswhoholdsimilarpersonalgoalsmay(whetherintentionallyor incidentally) facilitate each other’s goal progress,which in turn may directlyleadtopositiveemotions,closeness,andcooperation(Berscheid&Ammazzalorso;Fehr&Harasymchuk;Fitzsimons&Shah).Finally,anotherroutethroughwhichgoalsimilaritymayimpactconflictisthroughthenatureofeverydayinteractionswithinrelationships.Ifpartnersarepursuingsimilargoals,theirinteractionsmaybesmootherandmoreefficientthaninteractionsbetweenpartnerswhoarepursuingdissimilargoals.Ifso,theymayexperiencemoreharmonyandsynchrony,whichagainmaypromotepositive,cooperativeresponses(Dalton,Chartrand,&Finkel,2010;Wiltermuth&Heath,2008). Incontrast, ifpartners arepursuingdissimilargoals,theirinteractionsmaybediscordantandinefficient,whichmayleadtomoreconflict.

Inthischapter,wedescribeseveralstudies—correlational, longitudinal,andexperimental—thatprovidepreliminary support for the importanceofpersonalgoal similarity for the experience of effortless, harmonious interactions withininterpersonal interactionsandforreducedconflict.Thefirst twostudies lookatperceptionsofgoalsimilarityandcompatibility,andtheremainingstudiescompareresponsesfrombothpartnerstogetamore“objective”measureofgoalsimilarity.

hoW doeS goal Similarity affect conflict and goal progreSS over time?

Inaninitialexplorationoftheroleofsimilarpersonalgoalsinconflict,weconductedalongitudinalsurveystudyamongNewYorkUniversityundergraduatestudents.Wesoughttoexaminewhetherparticipantswhoperceivedtheycaredaboutanimportantgoaltothesamedegreeastheirpartnersreportedlowerfrequencyofconflictsoverthenextmonth.Becauseourparticipantswerecollegestudents,weexaminedperceivedsimilarityinthegoalofacademicachievement,whichisthemostcommonlynotedgoalinthissample.


AtTime1,aspartofabroadersurvey,participantsansweredquestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheyandtheirbestfriendorromanticpartnervaluedacademicachievement to the same degree. Specifically, they rated their agreement withthreedirectstatementslike,“Mypartner/friendandIcareequallyaboutacademicachievement.”Participantsalso rated theiragreementwith the item, “Academicachievementisveryimportanttomerightnow,”whichweusedasameasureoftheirowngoalcommitment.Asameasureofconflict,participantsreportedhowmanyfights,arguments,orconflictstheyhadhadwiththeirpartnerorfriendoverthepastmonth.Theyalsoratedtheirrelationshipsatisfactionusingtheitem,“Iamfullysatisfiedwithmyrelationship/friendship,”andtheirgoalprogressusingtheitem,“IfeelImadegoodprogressonmyacademicachievementgoalsthismonth.”AtTime2,1monthlater,participantsonceagainindicatedhowmanyfights,arguments,orconflictstheyandtheirpartnerorfriendhadhadoverthepastmonth,ratedtheirrelationshipsatisfactionandgoalprogressusingthesameitems,andprovidedthegradestheyhadreceivedontheirmidtermexaminations.

Aspredicted,perceivedgoalsimilaritypredictedlowerreportsofconflictoverthefollowingmonth,arelationthatheldwhencontrollingforinitialratingsofconflictandrelationshipsatisfactionandparticipants’ownratingsofgoalimportance.Ideally,wewouldalsohaveassessedparticipants’perceptionsoftheother’sgoalcommitmentasanadditionalcontrol: it isconceivablethatconflictisnotnecessarilyrelatedtodyads’similarityonthisgoalbuttosomethingabouttheother’sowngoalpursuit.Becauseofthewaythegoalsimilarityitemswereworded,itisunclearwhethertheratedsimilarityresultsfromthepartnerorfriendvaluingthegoalmoreorlessthantheparticipant.Thatis,theitemsmayhaveunintentionallycaptureddissatisfactionwithaparticularlyambitiousorunambitiouspartner.Insubsequentstudies,wewerecarefultoincludeallsuchvariables,whichallowsustobemoreconfidentaboutthepreciserolethatdissimilargoalsmayplayingeneratingconflictwithinrelationships.

Nonetheless,becauseofthelongitudinalnatureofthecurrentstudy,inwhichperceivedsimilaritypredicted changeinconflictfromTime1toTime2,wecantentatively report evidence that (the perception of) similarity reduces conflict.Thatis,althoughtheavailabledatacannotruleoutthirdvariableinfluenceswiththisstudy,theydosuggestthedirectionalityofthelinkbetweensimilargoalsandconflict.Findingswereidenticalforthefrienddyadsandromanticpartnerdyads;accordingtoInterdependenceTheory,theprocessesshouldworkinthesamewayforallestablished,longterm,closerelationships.Thatis,thereisnothingqualitativelydifferentaboutromanticrelationships.However,ifromanticrelationshipswerehigherininterdependence,astheywouldbeinmostadultsamples,wewouldexpecttoseestrongereffectsofsimilarityonconflict.Becauseoftheheightenedopportunityforobstructedgoalsthatemergesincloserrelationshipswithgreaterinterdependence,similarityshouldbemorepredictive.Withinacollegesample,though,closesamesexfriendshipsarenotnecessarilylesscloseorinterdependentthanromanticrelationships,withmanystudentslivingwiththeirbestfriends.

Turning to examine goal progress, we found that perceived goal similaritypositivelypredictedperceptionsofprogress1monthlateraswellasbetterperformanceonmidtermexaminations,effectsthatheldwhilecontrollingforinitialgoal


progress.Therearemanyreasonsgoalsimilaritycouldleadtobettergoalprogress.Forexample,ifbothpartnerssharethesamegoals,thiscouldpromotetheconstructionofagoalencouragingenvironment.Asanotherexample,friendsandpartnerswhoalsovalueacademicachievementmayactuallybemoreinstrumentaltogoalpursuit,throughprovidingeitherpracticalhelporemotionalsupport.

However,itisalsopossiblethatgoalsimilaritycouldaffectprogressbydecreasingconflictorincreasingcoordination.Indeed,theseresultsalsoindicatethattherelationshipbetweengoal similarity andgoalprogress is significantly (partially)mediatedbyconflict.Wehavesuggestedthatwhenpartnersarepursuingsimilarpersonalgoalstheireverydayinteractionsshouldbesmootherandmoreharmonious.Forexample,theyshouldunderstandeachother’sperspectivesbetter,shouldhavesimilarexpectationsaboutthoseinteractions,andshouldbemorerespectfulofeachother’sgoalpursuits.Iftheireverydayinteractionsareindeedsmoother,theyarelikelyalsomoreefficientorlessdepleting.Incontrast,whenpartnersarepursuing dissimilar personal goals, they may have misunderstandings, differentexpectations,andlessrespectforeachother’sgoals,whichmaymaketheirinteractionslessefficientandmoreresourceconsuming(Finkeletal.,2006).Ifso,thesesubtleclashescoulddrainselfregulatoryresources,leavinglessenergyandfocusforgoalpursuit, and thusnegativelyaffectinggoalprogress.Thenext studywedescribeincludesadditionalmeasuresthatallowustoexaminethislinkbetweenhighmaintenanceinteractions(Finkeletal.)andgoalsimilarity.

What mechaniSmS drive the goal Similarity–conflict link?

Inthisnextstudy, wesoughttoreplicatethelinkbetweenperceivedgoalsimilarityandconflictwhileincludingsomeadditionalmeasurestoincreaseclarityabouthowgoalsimilaritymayaffectthefrequencyandintensityofrelationalconflict.Inparticular,weexaminedthepotentialroleof(1)highmaintenanceinteractionsand (2)partner instrumentality.First, asexplainedalready,partner interactionsthatarerifewithmisunderstandingsandinefficienciesmaybeoneresultofhavingdissimilarpersonalgoals;ifso,thesedraininginteractionsmayproducemoreconflict.Second,pastresearchhasdemonstratedthatpeoplefeelclosertopartnerswhoarehelpfulorinstrumentalforongoinggoals(Fitzsimons&Shah,2008),andwewonderedwhetherinstrumentalitycouldplayamediatingroleintheeffectsofsimilarityonrelationshipsatisfactionandconflict.That is, itmaybethecasethatgoalsimilarityproducespositiveoutcomesbecauseofastronglinkbetweengoalsimilarityandinstrumentality.Partnerswithsimilargoalsmaybemorelikelytobehelpfultoeachotherthanpartnerswithdissimilargoals.However,itisalsopossible that instrumentality may reduce conflict—people may be more agreeableandaccommodatingtohelpfulothers—butthatitmaynotactasamediatingmechanismfortherelationbetweengoalsimilarityandconflict.

MarriedanddatingcouplesattheUniversityofWaterlootookpartinalargerinvestigation consistingof multiple sessions and spanning a 4monthperiod. Inthesessionrelevanttothecurrentstudy,allparticipantscompletedanhourlong


seriesofonlinequestionnairesduringwhichtheyansweredquestionsabouttheirpersonalgoalpursuits, individualdifferences inmotivationalandselfregulatoryvariables,andfeaturesoftheirrelationships,includingqualityandoutcomes.

One of the measures was a new scale created to assess perceptions of personalgoalsimilarity.Thisscale,modifiedfromanearliermeasure(Bohnsetal.,2010),consistedof14itemsdesignedtobefacevalidmeasuresofgoalsimilarity.Participantsratedtheiragreementwithitemslike,“MypartnerandIhaveverysimilarpersonalgoals”and,“Wehavealotincommonwhenitcomestowhatpersonalgoalswecareaboutrightnow.”Thisnewscalewaspositivelycorrelatedwithmeasuresofclosenessandsatisfaction;alleffectswedescribeherecontrolforthepotentialeffectsofthosevariablesonconflict.

Participantsalsoscoredtheamountofconflictintheirrelationship,ratingtheiragreementwithaoneitemmeasurethatread,“MypartnerandIdisagreeaboutalotofthingsdaytoday.”Amongtheothermeasures,participantscompletedcommitmentandsatisfactionsubscalesoftheInvestmentModelScale(Rusbult,Martz,&Agnew,1998).

Inaddition,wewantedtoexaminetheextenttowhicheverydayinteractionswithin the relationship were depleting or inefficient in nature, to determine ifhavinghighmaintenanceinteractionsmaybeoneroutethroughwhichdissimilargoalsarerelatedtoconflict.Todoso,weincludedafouritemmeasuretakenfromFinkeletal.(2006)thatasksparticipantstoratetheiragreementwithstatementslike,“Maintainingefficient,wellcoordinatedinteractionwithmypartnerrequiresalotofenergy”and,“Interactionswithmypartnergenerallygosmoothly.”

Finally,wewere interested in the roleofperceivedpartner instrumentality,or the perception that one’s partner is helpful or useful for one’s goal progress(Fitzsimons&Shah,2008,2009).Wemeasured instrumentalitywitha13itemscaleaskingparticipantstoratetheiragreementwithstatementslike,“Ingeneral,Ifindmypartnertobeveryhelpfulwithmygoalpursuits”and,“Ingeneral,mypartnerisarealsourceofstrengthformeinpursuingmygoals.”

Replicatingthepatternestablishedinthelongitudinalstudy,thenewmeasureofperceivedgoalsimilaritywasnegativelyrelatedtoconflictratings,arelationthatheldwhenwecontrolledforrelationshipsatisfactionandcommitment.

Next,welookedattheroleofinstrumentality.Wefoundthatperceptionsofpartnerinstrumentalitydidpredictconflict,evencontrollingforsatisfaction,suchthatindividualswhosawtheirpartnersasmorehelpfulfortheirpersonalgoalpursuitsreportedfewerincidencesofconflict.Thedirectionalityofthiseffectremainsunclear:itisconceivableeitherthatpartnerswhohavelowerratesofconflictmayseetheirpartnersasmoreinstrumentalfortheirgoalsorthatindividualsfightlessoftenwithinstrumentalpartners.Instrumentalitywasalsorelatedtogoalsimilarity,aswepredicted, suchthat similarpartnerswere seenasmore instrumentalforgoalprogress.Whenbothinstrumentalityandsimilaritywereenteredintoaregressionpredictingconflict,however,wefoundnoevidenceofamediatingrolefor instrumentality. Instead,bothvariables significantlypredictedconflict,evenwhencontrollingforrelationshipsatisfaction.Thus,itseemsthatinstrumentality,thoughrelatedtobothgoalsimilarityandtoconflict,doesnotaccountforthelinkbetweenthesetwovariables.


However,thisstudyalsofoundsignificant(albeitpartial)mediationofthelinkbetweengoalsimilarityandconflictbythehighmaintenanceinteractionmeasure.Thispatternsupportsthepossibilitythatpartnerswhopursuedissimilarpersonalgoalsmayfindtheireverydayinteractionsdraininganddifficult,whichmaycauseconflicttoarise.Becausethereversemediationalpathwayisalsosignificant(i.e.,similaritynegativelypredictsdepletion,withconflictasasignificantpartialmediator),itmayalsobethecasethatpartnerswhopursuedissimilarpersonalgoalsmayhavemorefrequentconflicts,whichmayleadthemtofindtheireverydayinteractionsmoredraininganddifficult.

doeS oBJective goal Similarity affect conflict?

Thus,thefirsttwostudiesfoundevidencethatpartnerswhobelievetheysharesimilarpersonalgoalsreportlessconflict.Ofcourse,giventhecorrelationalnatureofthesestudies,itwouldbeprematuretodrawconclusionsaboutthedirectionalityoftherelationship.Indeed,itseemsquiteplausiblethatparticipantswhoareengagedinfrequentconflictwiththeirpartnersmayinferfromthatconflictthattheymusthavedifferentorincompatiblegoalsthantheirpartners.Althoughthenexttwostudieswedescribearealsocorrelational(thelaststudywedescribeisexperimental),webelieveweminimizetheplausibilityofthisalternativeaccountbymeasuringactualgoalsimilarityratherthanperceivedgoalsimilarity.Thatis,welookatbothtargetandpartnerratingsoftheirowngoalsandusecomparisonsofthosegoalsaspredictorsoftargetratingsofconflict.Becauseparticipantsarenotprivytotheresponsesoftheirpartnerstothesegoalquestionnaires,thereversecausaldirection—thatconflictleadstogoaldissimilarity—isunlikely.Itremainspossiblethatfrequentconflictcouldcausepartnerstobegintopursuedifferent personal goals, but we believe that such an explanation is lessparsimonious than our suggestion that pursuing different personal goals generatesfrequentconflict.

DalCin,Anderson,Holmes,andYoung(2010)collectedselfreportdatafrombothpartnersofdatingcouplesattheUniversityofWaterloo.Participantsratedthe importanceofa seriesofgoals,which rangedfromspecificandconcrete togeneralandabstractandwerediverse incontent, includingpersonalgoals (academicachievement,finances,health,leisure)andrelationalgoals(communication,sex).Goalsimilaritywasmeasuredbycomputinganaverageoftheabsolutedifferencebetweenpartnergoalimportanceratingsandselfgoalimportanceratings.ParticipantsalsoratedthedegreeofconflictintheirrelationshipsusingitemstakenfromBraikerandKelley(1979).Thescalemeasuredparticipants’perceptionsofthefrequencyandseriousnessofconflictsintheirrelationshipaswellasthefrequencyandintensityofnegativeaffect(anger,frustration)ineverydayinteractions.Itemsincluded,“MypartnerandIfrequentlyarguewitheachother”and,“WhenmypartnerandIargue, theargumentsorproblemswehavearequiteserious.”Finally,participantsratedtheirrelationshipsatisfactionusingfourstraightforwarditems(e.g.,“Iamextremelyhappywithmycurrentromanticrelationship”).


Aspredicted,resultsshowedthatcouplesthatreportedsimilargoalsreportedless conflict in the relationship and more relationship satisfaction. Because wemeasuredbothpartners’goals,insteadofonepartner’sperceptions,wecanruleouttheroleofperceptualillusionsandbiasesinproducingthelinkbetweengoalsimilarityandconflict.

iS there anything uniQue aBout goalS? goal Similarity verSuS other typeS of compatiBility

Wenext returned toexamineanother component from the larger longitudinalstudyofdatingandmarriedcouplesdescribedearlier,whichincludedmeasuresofpersonalityandattitudesandallowedustocomparetheeffectsofgoalsimilaritywithotherkindsofsimilarity.Twoweeksaftercompletingtheonlinepremeasure,couplesattendeda laboratorysession inwhichthey individuallyreportedon the frequency of disagreements in their relationships and provided ratingsoftheircommitmenttoandidentificationwithacademicachievementgoalsandhealth and fitness goals, goals that undergraduate students commonly pursue.Thegoalmeasurewasanaverageoffouritemsassessingthecommitmenttoandimportanceofthegoal.Forexample,participantsindicatedtheiragreementwithstatementslike,“Thisgoalisveryimportanttome.”Toconstructameasureofgoalsimilarity,wecalculatedanabsolutedifferencescoretorepresentthemagnitudeofthedifferencebetweenbothpartners’ratingsoftheircommitmenttoacademic achievement and to fitness and health goals and averaged those twomeasures.Participantsalsoprovidedmeasuresofotherkindsofpersonalvariables,suchasinpersonality,religiousbeliefs,andattitudes.Itisverylikelythatpartnerswithdifferenttypesofpersonalitieswouldhavegreaterconflict(imagineanextravertandanintrovertmakingsocialplans)andthatpartnerswithdifferentsocialattitudeswouldalsohavemoredisagreements(imagineasocialistandalibertariandiscussingcurrenteventsoverdinner).Indeed,asbrieflydiscussedintheintroduction,thereisevidencefortheeffectsofsimilarityinpersonalityandattitudesonrelationshipsatisfaction(Gaunt,2006).Includingthesemeasuresin our analyses allowed us to determine whether similarities in personal goalpursuitshaveanyremainingpredictivepowerwhenaccountingfortheseotherimportantfactors.

Overall, our results supported the importance of goal similarity in conflict.Aspredicted,andreplicatingtheeffectfromthelastdescribedstudy,usingthisnew(moreobjective)measureofgoalsimilaritydidnotchangetheresults.Whenpartners reported similar levels of commitment to and identification with theirimportantpersonalgoals,theyalsoreportedlowerincidenceofconflictwiththeirpartner.This relationheldwhenwecontrolled for relationship satisfactionand,mostimportantly,whenwecontrolledfortheabsolutelevelsofgoalcommitmentofbothpartners.Because theeffectholdsevenwhencontrolling for individualreportsofgoalcommitment,wecanbemoreconfidentthatitisindeedthediscrepancy between the partners’ goals, rather than something about one of thepartners’goalpursuitsitself,thatpredictsconflict(seeKenny&Acitelli,1994).


Next,wewereinterestedinexaminingwhetherthereisauniqueroleforgoalsimilarityor compatibility inparticularorwhetherwhatwe are capturingwithourgoalsimilaritymeasuresisanothertypeofsimilarity,suchassimilarattitudes,values,orpersonalitytypes.Toexaminethisidea,weanalyzedthelinkbetweenourdifferencescoremeasureofgoalsimilarityandconflictwhilecontrollingforanumberofotherpotentiallyusefulpredictors.Goalsimilarityturnedouttobeastrongandrobustpredictorofconflict,evenwhencomparedwithconsequentialvariablessuchassimilarityinpoliticalandsocialattitudes,religiousbeliefs,values,andBigFivepersonality traits.That is, itcontinuedtobeasignificantnegativepredictorofconflict.

hoW doeS manipulating goal incompatiBility affect conflict?

Inthefinalstudythatwedescribe,weaimedtofindexperimentalevidencetosupporttheideathatdissimilarpersonalgoalscouldaffectinterpersonalconflicts.Weactivatedthementalrepresentationofahealthandfitnessgoalandexamineditsinfluenceonparticipants’responsestohypotheticalrelationshipscenariosinwhichtherewaspotentialforconflict.Toactivatethegoal,wereliedonadvancesin the understanding of nonconscious goal pursuit (Chapter 6 in this volume),using a subtle priming technique. We were interested in whether participantswouldindicatethattheywouldbemoreorlessaccommodatingandcooperativeinthesehypotheticalscenariosdependingon(1)whethertheywereprimedwiththehealthandfitnessgoaland(2)whethertheyhadindicated(earlierinthesession)thattheyandtheirpartnerweresimilarordissimilarinthisgoaldomain.Wepredictedthatparticipantswhoreporteddissimilaritieswiththeirpartnerintheimportanceofhealthandfitnessgoalswouldrespondtotheprimedgoalbybeinglesscooperativeandaccommodatinginthehypotheticalscenarios.

Participants were adultU.S. women whowere currently in a romantic relationship.Theybeganbyansweringquestionsabouttheirpersonalgoalpursuits.Onesuchquestionaskedparticipantstoindicatewhethertheyandtheirpartnervaluedseveralgoalsequally,includingcareergoals,familygoals,andhealthandfitnessgoals.Thisitemread,“Whenitcomestohealthandfitnessgoals…,”andparticipantscouldchooseoneofthreeitems:“MypartnercaresmuchlessthanIdo”;“MypartnerandIcareequally”;and“MypartnercaresmuchmorethanIdo.”Approximately40%ofparticipantsindicatedthattheycaredmoreaboutthegoalthantheirpartner;another40%indicatedtheyandtheirpartnervaluedthegoalequally;andthefinal20%indicatedthattheirpartnercaredmoreaboutthegoal.Wecombinedparticipantswhosaidtheirpartnercaredeithermoreorlessaboutthegoalintoonegroupwetermthe“dissimilar”group.Participantswhoreportedequalgoalimportanceweretermedthe“similar”group.(Resultsforthetwodifferent“dissimilar”groupsdidnotdiffer.)

Participantsalsocompletedashortscrambledsentencetask(Srull&Wyer,1979),inwhichtheywererandomlyassignedtobeexposedtowordsrelatedtoeitherhealthandfitnessgoalrelevantwords(e.g.,fit, healthy)orcontrolwords


matchedforvalence(e.g.,book, artistic)embeddedinlargerstringsofneutralwords.Theyalsocompletedascaledesignedtoassesstheirdesiretobecooperativeandaccommodatingtotheirpartners’preferences.Theitemsweremodeledafterpriorresearchonaccommodativebehaviorsinrelationships(Arriaga&Rusbult,1998;Rusbult,Verette,Whitney,Slovik,&Lipkus,1991)butwereshortenedtomeettherequirementsforonlinedatacollection.Participantsreada scenario thatpresented themwithadecision toeithercooperatewith theirpartners’interestsortorefusetodoso(i.e.,tobeotherversusselfinterested)andthenchoseoneoffourresponseoptionsthatvariedintheextenttowhichtheywerepositiveandconstructive.Forexample,onescenarioread,“Imaginethatyourpartnerinsistedoninvitingafriendovertodinner,eventhoughyoudon’tlikethisfriend.Howlikelywouldyoubetoengageineachofthefollowingactions?”Participantschosefromthefollowingoptions:“Iwouldrefuse”;“Iwouldprotestbutgivein”;“Iwouldgrudginglyagree”;and“Iwouldcheerfullyagree.”Theotherscenariosaskedaboutparticipants’responseswhentheirpartnersrentedamovietheydidn’twanttosee,forgottorunanimportanterrand,and made a big mess at home. The scenarios were designed to be mundaneexamplesofdecisionsmembersofcouplesmakeeachdayabouthowtorespondwhentheirinterestsdonotcoincidewiththeirpartners’interests.

Aspredicted,wefoundthatforparticipantswhoreportedthattheyandtheypartnerhelddissimilarvaluestowardhealthandfitnessgoals,thegoalprimeledtolessaccommodatingresponsestothehypotheticalscenarios.Forparticipantswhoreportedsimilarlevelsofcaringabouthealthandfitnessgoals,thegoalprimedidnotaffecttheirresponses.Statedanotherway,withinthecontrolcondition,therewasnoeffectofsimilarityonaccommodating responses;within thehealthgoalprimecondition,therewasaneffectofsimilarity,suchthatparticipantswhoperceivedgoalsimilaritywiththeirpartnersreportedmoreaccommodatingresponsesthandidpartnerswhoperceivedgoaldissimilarity.

Thisstudyprovidesexperimentalsupportfortheroleofpersonalgoalsimilarity ineverydayrelationship interactionsandsuggestsonepossibleexplanationofthelinkbetweensimilarityandconflictinthefirstfourstudies.Whenparticipantswereremindedofapersonalgoal—inthiscase,healthandfitness—theywerelessaccommodatingtothepreferencesofdissimilar(vs.similar)partners,indecisionscompletelyunrelatedtothehealthandfitnessdomain.Theywerelesslikelytoagreetodecisionsthatwereintheirpartners’butnotintheirowninterests,andtheyweremorelikelytosaytheywouldfeelangryandgetinafightwiththeirpartnerswhenthosepartnersengagedinmundanenegativeacts.Bydemonstratingthattheeffectofsimilargoalsisstrongerwhenthepersonalgoalitselfisactivated,and,relyingonpriorreportsofthegoalsimilarity,thisstudyprovidesevidenceforthecausalroleofpersonalgoalsintheseeffects—whenthegoalwasnotcurrentlyactive,participantswereequallyaccommodatingtopartnerswhosharedanddidn’tsharethegoal.

future directionS and concluSionSThus, the current research provides support for the interdependence theorynotionthatdissimilargoalpursuitscanpredictdailyconflictwithininterpersonal


relationships.Fivestudiesusingvariedmeasuresandmethodologiesdemonstratedthatwhenpartnersdonotvaluepersonalgoalstothesamedegreetheytendtoreport more occurrences of conflict within the relationship and more negativeresponsestopotentialconflictsanddisagreements.Althoughthesefindingsdemonstratethatgoalsimilarity,apreviouslyneglectedtopicwithinresearchonrelationshipconflicts,isrelatedtotheoccurrenceofconflict,theyleavemanyquestionsunanswered.Most importantly, thefindingspresentedhereoffer intriguingevidenceofsomeofthepotentialmechanismsunderlyingthislink,likethedepletingnatureofinteractingwithsomeonewhopursuesdifferentgoals,butitisclearthattheremaybemanyotherprocessesatwork.Futureresearchthatexperimentallymanipulatessomeofthepositedmechanismswouldbeparticularlyvaluable.

Oneinterestingextensionofthecurrentfindingswouldbetoexaminehowgoalsimilarity and conflict relate across thedurationof close relationships. Becausepersonal goals are likely to change over the lifespan of an average relationship,itmaybeparticularlyenlighteningtoexaminethelinksbetweengoalsandrelationshipsasgoalschange(Fitzsimons&Fishbach,2010).Forexample,itislikelythatsomecoupleswhooncesharedsimilargoalswillencounterconflictsthathavearisenduetochangesinoneorbothpartners’goalsacrosstime.AsHolmesandMurray(1996)note,“Thecompatibilityofimportantgoalsisbestthoughtofasamovingwindowratherthanafixedqualityofarelationship.”Asanotherexample,couples that start out their relationship with dissimilar goals may well grow topossess more similar goals over time, either because both partners’ goals growtogetherorbecauseonepartneradoptstheother’sgoals.

Anotherimportantdirectionforfutureresearchistoexaminetheroleofdissimilarrelationshipgoals,likegoalsforincreasedintimacyversusindependence,and dissimilar joint goals, like goals to buy a bigger house versus save money.Becauseoutcomesarelikelytobeevenmoreinterdependentforsuchgoalsandbecause relationshiplevel factors have been shown to have an importanteffectonconflictbehaviors(Simpson,Rholes,&Phillips,1996)theeffectsofdissimilarrelationshipgoalsmaybebothpervasiveandpowerful.

Finally,althoughwepresentedthehypothesisthatsimilarpersonalgoalswillreduceconflict,itisalsoquiteconceivablethatsharedgoalscouldpromoteconflictundersomecircumstances.Iftwopartnerssharethesamegoal,thereisanincreasedopportunity for social comparisonandcompetition. Imaginethat twopartnersbothvolunteerforthesamecharityandthatbothhavegoalstobecomeleaderswithinthecharity.Help,understanding,andsupportmayincrease,butsotoomightcompetition,resentment,andstrife.Onemoderatingvariablethatwoulddeterminethepresenceofthesenegativeoutcomesforsimilarityinpersonalgoalswouldbethelinkbetweenthepartners’personalgoals—whethersuccessbyonepartnerwouldimplyfailurebyanother.Suchalinkcouldbetheresultofobjectivecharacteristicsofthesituation(e.g.,therecanbeonlyonecharitypresident)orsubjectivecharacteristicsbroughtbythepartners(e.g.,competitiveorinsecurepartnersmaybelikeliertofeelnegativelyabouttheirpartner’ssuccesses).Futureresearchexaminingthesepotentialmoderatorswouldbeparticularlyvaluable.

Theseareonlyafewofthemanyavenuesavailableforfutureresearchinthisarea.Theeffectsofpersonalgoalpursuitsoninterpersonalrelationships,and,in


turn,theeffectsofrelationshipsonpersonalgoalpursuits,areonlybeginningtobeunderstood(Finkel&Fitzsimons,forthcoming;Fitzsimons&Finkel,inpress;seealsoChapters2and6inthisvolume).However,thecurrentresearchpresentsanimportantstepforwardinourresearchonthisinterplayofselfregulatoryandrelationalprocesses.Inallofourpriorwork(e.g.,Fitzsimons&Bargh,2003;Fitzsimons&Shah,2008),wehavefocusedononlyonepartner’sgoalpursuitsandfeelingsabouttherelationshipwhileacknowledgingthatsuchanapproachisseriouslylimited,asrealinteractionsinvolvetwoindividuals’goalpursuits(seeRusbult,Finkel,&Kumashiro,2009).Inthecurrentresearch,wetryforthefirsttimeinourlabtoexaminethedyadiclinksbetweenbothpartners’goals,afirststeptowardbuildingarichunderstandingofhowtheseeffectsplayoutinrealrelationships.

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13SilentRage

When Being Ostracized Leads to Aggression

LISAZADROUniversity of Sydney

Paincanbealleviatedbymorphinebutthepainofsocialostracismcannotbetakenaway.

DerekJarman(1994,p.113)

introductionOverthepastdecade,therehasbeenconsiderabledebateastowhetherbeingostracized(beingexcludedandignored;Williams,2007)leadstargetstobehaveineitheraprosocialorantisocialmannertowardothers.Whereassomeresearchershavefoundthatbeingexplicitlyrejectedleadstargetstobehaveinanaggressivemannertowardeitherthesourceofostracismorinnocentbystanders(e.g.,Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007), others have foundevidence suggesting that being excluded prompts targets to respond in waysthatincreasetheiropportunitiesforreinclusion(e.g.,conforming;seeWilliams,Cheung,&Choi,2000). Unravelingthesecontradictoryfindingshasbeenthefocusofrecentresearch.

Thischapterexamines thepossiblepsychological (i.e.,primaryneed threat),contextual(i.e.,relationshiptypeandstatus),andemotional(i.e.,negativeaffectandfeelingsofanger)factorsthatmaymotivatetargetstoenactpunitiveandvengefulbehaviorsasaconsequenceofbeingexcludedandignored.Factorsthatpotentiallymoderatetheconsequencesofexclusionarediscussedin termsofwhether they

liSa zadro202

ameliorateorexacerbateaggressivereactions.Finally,thechapterintroducesnewexperimental researchusinganovelostracismparadigm, “OCam,”a simulatedWebconferencethatspecificallyinvestigatestheformsofvengeancethattargetsofostracismarewillingtoimposeonsources.

the functionS of oStraciSmOstracismisoftendescribedasoneofthemostinnocuousformsofinterpersonalconflictandapreferablealternativetoverbalorphysicalabuse(Williams,2007;seealsoChapters4and6inthisvolume).Thevirtuesofsilencearepreachedinproverbs,informingusthat“silenceisgolden”andthat“ifyouhavenothingnicetosay,saynothingatall.”Theveryactofostracizinganotherindividual(i.e.,thetargetofostracism)simplyinvolvesnotspeakingtothemoracknowledgingtheirpresence—therearenoraisedvoicesorphysicalblows.Infact,ostracismcanbeusedinthepresenceofotherswithonlookersbeingnonethewiser.The“benign”appearanceofthistacticiswhymanyinstitutionsuseformsofostracismaspunishmentinpreferencetoothermethodsofinterpersonalconflict.Forinstance,schoolstypicallyadvocateusingtimeout(i.e.,physicallyremovingthestudentfromtheirpeers)todisciplinestudentsasopposedtocorporalpunishment.Similarly,solitaryconfinement—aformofphysicalostracism—isusedasameansofpunishingprisonersforinfractionscommittedbehindbars.

Ifweexaminethewaysthatostracismisusedacrossdifferentagegroups,cultures,andspecies,itisapparentthatallformsofostracismhavetwobroadgoals.Thefirstgoalistoremoveundesirablemembersfromthegroup,particularlythosewhomayharmor jeopardizethesafetyandwellbeingoftherestofthegroup.TheverytermostracismcomesfromtheancientAthenian(488–487B.C.)practiceof exiling citizenswhosedictatorial ambitionsposeda threat to thedemocraticnatureofthestate(Zippelius,1986).Inmoderntimes,westillremovemembersofsocietywhoharmothersthroughimprisonment,whichisaninstitutionalizedformofexile.Abeneficialconsequenceofremovingundesirablesisthattheremainingmembersofthegroupoftenbecomemorecohesive—theyfunctionasastrongerunitthatbenefitsthegroupasawhole(Gruter&Masters,1986;Williams,2001).Thus,removingundesirablemembersensuresthatthegroup(andindeeditsvalues)remainssafeandintact.

Thesecondpotentialgoalofostracismiscorrective,seekingtoensurethatthetargetofostracismchangestheirthoughts,feelings,orbehaviorstobecomealignedwiththoseoftherestofthegroup.Inthisregard,ostracismisusedasaformofdisciplineorpunishment;itgivesrecalcitrantmembersaglimpseofwhatitwouldbelikewithoutthesupportofthesourcesandhencewhatisinstoreforthemiftheydonotcomplywiththegroup.Therearemanyexamplesofostracismbeingusedasmeansofdiscipliningwaywardgroupmembers.Forinstance,withinromantic(orindeedothercloseinterpersonal)relationships,individualsmayuse“thesilenttreatment”ontheirpartnertopunishthemforactualorperceivedwrongdoing,therebydiscouragingthepartnerfrombehavinginthesamewayinfuture.

However, regardless of the reason, ostracism can have devastating consequencesforthetarget.Foranimals,beingostracizedbythegroup—andthusbeing

Silent rage 203

removedfromtheprotectionofothermembers—willoftenleadtostarvationanddeath (Goodall, 1986). Forhumans, the results ofbeing ostracized by a source(individualorgroup)maynothavesuchgraveconsequencesonsurvivalbutmaystillhaveotherdevastatingeffects.Forinstance,thereisconsiderableevidencetosuggestthatalossofsocialsupportcanhaveanadverseimpactonhealthandwellbeingcomparabletodamaginghealthfactorssuchasobesity,smoking,andhighblood pressure (KiecoltGlaser, Cacioppo, Malarkey, & Glaser, 1992). A lack ofsocialsupportcanalsodelayrecoveryfromillnessesandsurgeryandevenhindercompliancewithprescribedmedicalregimens(seeCobb,1976).

Given the negative ramifications of losing group membership or social support—particularly if thesourceofostracismisapartneror lovedone—it isnotsurprisingthattargetstendtorespondbychangingtheirbehaviortoregainfavorwiththesources.Inaseriesofinterviewswithtargetsandsourcesoflongtermostracism,Zadro(2004,2009)foundthattargetsoftenbehavedinaprosocialandconciliatory fashion toward the sources of ostracism. Prosocial and conciliatoryresponsesaredesignedtorectifyorrelievetheostracismsituation.Suchresponsesincludeforgivenessseeking(i.e.,apologizingtothesourceforanyactionthatmayhavewarrantedtheostracism;foradiscussiononwhysuchtacticsmayhavenegativeeffectsontargets,seeChapter14inthisvolume),discussion(i.e.,tryingtoelicitaresponsefromsourcesbyspeakingtotheminanonconfrontationalmanner),andingratiation(i.e.,attemptstoelicitaconversationthroughflattery,panderingtothesource’sneedsorwants,orpurchasingitemssuchasflowersorgifts).Bycarryingoutprosocialandconciliatorystrategies,thetargetaimstorepairtherelationshipwiththesourcesandtherebytoputanendtoanyemotionalorphysiologicalpaintheymayhaveexperiencedduringtheostracismepisode.

Yet, despite the potentially adverse consequences to the target’s health andwellbeingthatmayresultfrombeingostracized,Zadro(2004,2009)foundthatseveraltargetsoflongtermostracismrespondedinanantisocialandreactionarymannertobeingexcludedandignored.Specifically,thesetargetsreportedactinginavengefulmannertowardthesourcesofostracismandevenrecountedinstanceswheretheyhadrespondedinanantisocialmannertowardinnocentbystanders.

Thus,thereisanecdotalevidencethatostracismcanleadtoprosocialorantisocialresponsesindifferentsituations.Yetwhydoesostracismleadtosuchdiversebehavioralresponses?Whydosometargetstrytoappeasethesourcewhereasothersretaliateandevenattackinnocentothers?Toanswerthesequestions,itisfirstnecessarytoexaminethepotentialpsychologicalandemotionalresponsestoostracism;afterall,itistheseresponsesthatprovideaninvaluablepieceofthepuzzlewhentryingtodeterminewhethertargetswillrespondinaproorantisocialmannerwhentheyarerejectedandignored(seealsoChapter3inthisvolume).

pSychological effectS of Being oStracized: the effectS of oStraciSm on primary needS

Williams’s(1997,2001)modelofostracismpredictsthatostracism(comparedwithotherformsofinterpersonalconflict)hasthepotentialtothreatenfourfundamental

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human needs: belonging, control, selfesteem, and meaningful existence—anassertionthathasbeensupportedbyoveradecadeofempiricalinvestigation(seeWilliams,2007forreview).Targetsaremotivated(behaviorally,emotionally,andcognitively)torefortifytheselostorthreatenedneeds.However,iftheostracismepisode is prolonged or if the target is repeatedlyexcluded and ignored by thesources,thethreatenedneedsbecomeinternalizedleadingtodetrimentalpsychologicalandhealthrelatedconsequences(seeZadro,2004).

Thedesiretoregaintheprimaryneedsthreatenedduringostracismplaysanimportantmotivatingforceindeterminingwhethertargetsrespondinaprosocial/conciliatoryor an antisocial/reactionarymanner. Regaininga sense ofbelongingness,forinstance,wouldfirstentailtryingtoregainone’smembershipinthegroup(or,ifthetargetisbeingostracizedbyapartnerorlovedone,toregainone’splaceinthepartnership).Tobestpursuethisgoal,targetsmayfirsttrytobehaveinanaffiliativemannertowardsources(i.e.,byenactingtacticssuchasingratiation,discussion,andforgivenessseeking).Iftheseattemptstorepairtherelationshipareunsuccessful,thetargetcouldalsotrytoaffiliatewithnewindividualsorgroupstoregainasenseofbelongingness.Incontrast,attemptstoregaintheremainingneeds(i.e.,control,selfesteem,andmeaningfulexistence)couldeasilylendthemselvestomoreantisocialandreactionaryactions.Forinstance,targetsmaylashoutverballyorphysicallytoregaincontroloverothersortheirenvironment;targetswhoseselfesteemhasbeenadverselyaffectedbybeingignoredmaytry tobolster theirown feelingsof selfworthbydenigratingothers; if a targetfeels invisible,as isoftenthecasewhenone’s senseofmeaningfulexistence isthreatened,actinginanaggressivefashion—pickingafight,yellingan insult—willensurethatthepersonwill receiveattention,eventhoughthisattentionisessentiallynegative.

Severalfactorsmaydeterminewhethertargetsregaintheirneedsusingantisocial methods. Although all four primary needs are threatened, there may beindividual differences in the way that targets prioritize the reestablishment oftheseneeds.Forinstance,pictureanostracismsituationwherebyatargetisbeingexcludedandignoredattheirworkplacebyafellowemployee.Althoughtheostracismepisodemaythreatenallfourofthetarget’sprimaryneeds,thetarget’sdesiretoregaincontrolofthesituation—andhenceregainsocialstandingamongothersin the office—may actually be a greater priority to the target than regaining asenseofbelonging(i.e.,byrepairingtherelationshipwiththesource),particularlyiftherelationshipwiththesourceisfairlysuperficialandthetargethasastrongsupportnetworkoutsideoftheoffice.Thisdesiretoregaincontrolmaypossiblylenditselftobehavingantisociallytowardthesource.

Theprioritizationofneedsmayalsobeaproductofpreexisting traitdifferencesamongtargets.Forinstance,thosewithpreexistinglowlevelsofoneormoreoftheprimaryneeds(e.g.,lowselfesteem)maytryhardertoregainthatneedonceithasbeenfurtherthreatenedbyostracism.Otherindividualdifferences,suchasattachmentstyle,mayalsocausesometargetstoprioritizetheregainingofcertainneedsafterbeingostracized;thismaybeparticularlythecasewithanxiouslyattachedindividualswhohaveaparticularfearofrejection(seeChapter2inthisvolume).

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Gendermayalsoplayaroleintheextenttowhethertargetsregaintheirneedsin an antisocial fashion. For instance, Williams and Sommer (1997) found thatostracizedfemalesworkedcomparativelyharderonacollectivetaskpostostracismratherthanacoactivetaskwhereasostracizedmalestendedtosociallyloafmoreduring the collective task thanduring the coactive task.Williams andSommerconcludedthatbeingostracizedmotivatedtargetstotryandregaintheirthreatenedneeds;however,ostracizedfemalesattemptedtoregainasenseofbelongingwhereasmalesinsteadgaveprioritytoregainingselfesteemorpossiblyasenseofcontrolovertheirenvironment.Indoingso,malesrespondedinalessthanprosocialfashiontowardthegroup(i.e.,socialloafing).

Giventhegenderdifferences,andpossiblyalsotraitdifferences,thatinfluencetheways inwhichtargetsprioritizeregainingtheirthreatenedprimaryneeds, itisnotsurprisingthattherearearangeofpossibleantiandprosocialreactionstoostracism.

the role of emotionS in determining proSocial or antiSocial reSponSeS to oStraciSm

JeanJacquesRousseau(1712–1778)wasoncequotedassaying,“Absolutesilenceleadstosadness.Itistheimageofdeath.”Thissentimentisechoedbytargetsoflongtermostracismwhoreportpowerfulemotionalresponsestobeingostracized(Zadro,2004,2009).Inadditiontofeelingsadnesswhilebeingsociallyexcluded,targetsoflongtermostracismreportedfeelingarangeofnegativeemotionsincluding despair, loneliness, horror, anguish, helplessness, pain, shame, and anxiety.Almostalltargetsreportedfeelingangryafterostracism.Forinstance,onetargetwhowasrepeatedlyignoredbyherdaughteralmostresortedtoviolenceduringafamilyholidayduringwhichthedaughterrefusedtospeakorparticipate inanyactivities.Shestated:

I’mnotviolent.Well,Iavoidviolence liketheplague.Igrabbedherbythewaist,andIthought,“GeewhatamIdoing?”Iwasactuallygoingtothrowheracrosstherestaurant—Iwasthatangry.That’showIwasthewholetime—Iwasangrythewholetime.

The anecdotal findings suggesting a link between ostracism and negativeaffecthavereceivedsomeempiricalsupport,includingevidencethatsocialexclusionleadstofeelingsofsadnessandhurtfeelings(e.g.,Buckley,Winkel,&Leary,2004; Chow, Tiedens, & Govan, 2008; however, for an exception, see Twenge,Cantanese,&Baumeister,2002).

Thereisgrowingevidencethatnegativeaffectivestatesoftentriggeradaptivecognitive,motivational,andbehavioralreactions(seeChapter8 inthisvolume).Yethowdoesnegativeaffectfuelantisocialbehaviorspostostracism?AccordingtoBerkowitz(1990),negativeaffecthasaprimaryroleintheactivationofthoughtsandmemoriesassociatedwithangeraswell as “rudimentary” feelingsofanger.Indeed, targets in experimental studies of ostracism often reported feeling significantlyangrierthanthosewhowereincludedintheostracismparadigm(e.g.,

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Chowetal.,2008;Zadro,Williams,&Richardson,2004).Recently, researchershavebeguntoexaminethelinkbetweenangerandaggressionpostostracism.Forinstance,Chowetal. foundthatparticipantswhoreportedfeelingangrierafterbeingostracizedduringanInternetballtossinggame(Cyberball;seeWilliamsetal.,2000)weremorelikelytobehaveinanantisocialmannertowardthesourcesofostracismthanthosewhoreportedfeelingsad.Thusitseemsthatangermaypromoteantisocialreactionswhereassadnessseemstoproducemorevigilant,attentive,andadaptivestylesofresponding.

Giventhepsychologicalandemotionaltraumathattargetssufferwhilebeingostracized,itisnotsurprisingthattheymayexpresstheirfrustration,anger,andpainbybehavinginanantisocialfashion.Thequestionthenbecomes—whomdotargetschoosetobethefocusoftheirantisocialactions?

“all are puniShed”?: Who iS the focuS of poStoStraciSm aggreSSion?

Whentargetsrespondtoostracisminanantisocialandreactionaryfashion,theycanpotentiallydirecttheiractionstowardthreeparties:(1)thesourceofostracism(i.e.,revengeorretaliation);(2)innocentbystanders(i.e.,physicalorverbalaggression);or(3)themselves(i.e.,selfharmorselfdefeatingbehaviors).

Aggressing Against Sources of Ostracism

Antisocial andreactionaryacts that targetscommit against sourcesofostracismcouldbe construedas actsof revengeor retaliation forbeingostracized.Thereareseveralreasonstargetsmaybemotivatedtoseekoutvengeanceagainstthosewhohaveostracizedthem.Walster,Walster,andBerscheid(1978)statethatactsof revengewithin interpersonalrelationshipsmaybemotivatedby thedesire torestoreequityintherelationship.Inanostracismsituation,thetargetisatthecompletemercyofthesource;thesourcechooseswhentoostracizethetargetandiforwhenheorshewillstoptheepisode.Bychoosingtoostracizethetarget,thesourcehas achieved complete power over the target and the relationship. Acts of vengeancemaybeoneoftheonlywaysthetargetcouldtopplethesourcefromhisorherpositionofpower,therebyredressingtheequityimbalanceintherelationship.

Revenge may also assist targets to regain lost or threatened primary needs.Specifically,revengemayallowtargetstoregaintheirsenseofcontrolbythrowingofftheirroleof“passivevictim”(seeFrijda,2007)andinstrumentallyengaging in behaviors that increase control over the situation and over other people.Retaliatoryactionmayalsogivethetargetsomelevelofcontroloverthefutureoftheirrelationshipwiththesources,inthesensethatactinginaretaliatoryfashionmayhelptodiscouragesourcesfromostracizingthetargetinsubsequentconflictsituations(seePinker,1997).Vengefulactsaredesignedtoattracttheattentionofthesource,whichinturnwillmakethetargetfeellessinvisibleandhencehelprestoreasenseofmeaningfulexistence(seeYoshimura,2007).Revengeresearchershavealsofoundthatvengeanceisoftenmotivatedbyadesiretoregainself

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worth, whichwouldbe attractive to targets ofostracismwhose selfesteem hasbeen thwartedbybeing socially excluded (e.g.,McCullough,Bellah,Kilpatrick,&Johnson,2001).However,whilerevengemayallowthetargettoregainasenseof control, selfesteem, and meaningful existence, depending on the nature ofthevengefulact,itmayfurthererodethetarget’srelationshipwiththesource—therebyfurtherthwartingthetarget’ssenseofbelonging—andmayevenleadtofurtherretaliationonbehalfofthesource.

Interviews with targets of longterm ostracism revealed that targets oftenengagedinantisocialorvengefulacts,usuallyasameansofelicitingaresponsefrom the source or as a way of venting their frustrations (Zadro, 2004, 2009).Althoughseveraltargetsreportedusingverbalabuseonsources,actsofphysicalabusewere(thankfully)rare;however,targetsmayhavebeenreluctanttoadmitbeingviolentevenifithadoccurred.Targetswhodidadmittousingphysicalabuseresortedtothistacticafterothertactics(suchasforgivenessseekingordiscussion)hadfailed.

The interviewsprovideda few,mildexamplesofphysicalaggression towardsources,but themediaoftenhighlightsepisodesofostracism thathave serious,andeven lethal,consequences.Schoolyard shootings, suchas thatconductedatColumbineHighSchool,areoftenretaliatorystrikesbystudentswhohavebeenwidelyrejectedbytheirpeers.InacasestudyofschoolshootingsintheUnitedStatesbetween1995and2001,Leary,Kowalski,Smith,andPhillips(2003)foundthat individualswhohad rejected the shooterwere typically targetedandwereoftenamongthevictims.

Althoughfewtargetsoflongtermostracismadmittedtorespondinginaphysicallyaggressivemanner,itbecameapparentthattargetsrarelyjustsatbackandallowedthemselves toberepeatedlyrejectedand ignoredwithoutretaliating insomefashion.Sometargetsactivelyspokeabout“gettingrevenge”forbeingsubjectedtolengthyepisodesofsilence,particularlywhentheyperceivedtheepisodestobeunwarranted.Forsome,gettingrevengeamountedtosimpleactsofreputation defamation (i.e., they spoke badly about the source to others). In contrast,othertargetsdetailedelaborateandpotentiallyharmful,revengescenarios.Zadro(2009)conductedafocusgroupwithfourgenerationsofSicilianwomentodiscusstheirexperiencesastargetsofrelationalostracism(i.e.,ostracismbytheirrelationshippartner).TherewerecleardifferencesbetweenthewaysyoungerandolderSicilianwomencopedwiththesilenttreatment.YoungerSicilianwomentendedtoquicklycurtailanyostracismattemptsonthepartoftheirspouse,usuallythroughstronglanguageandanexplicitthreattoleavetherelationshipifthesilenttreatmentcontinued.However,fortworeasons,thesetacticswerenotavailabletomostoftheolderwomen.First,theywereinpatriarchalrelationshipswheretheirhusbands held all power; in many cases, these women experienced physical abusefromtheirspouseandhencedidnotwanttoactinawaythatwouldincitefurtherabuse.Second,leavingtherelationshipwasnotanoption;therewerestrongsocialsanctions against divorce, and the “shame” of such an act would then lead thewomentobeadditionallyostracizedbytheirfriendsandfamily.

Instead, older Sicilian women pursued active and very creative campaignsofrevengethatoperatedunderthesources’radar(whichcouldbeconstruedas

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campaignsofpassiveaggression;seeChapter4inthisvolume).Inmanyinstances,these campaigns continued for years—well after the ostracism episode. Forinstance, one target—an Italian woman in her late 50s—said that her husbandhadrejectedhersexually20yearsearlierandhadinstigatedabriefaffairwithawoman inhisworkplace.Inreturn, the targetpunishedherhusbandbyaddingmoreandmorebuttertohismealsinthehopesofslowlyelevatinghischolesteroltopainful(andpossiblylethal?)levels.Anotherwomanreportedmovingherhusband’spossessionsaroundthehome—keys,watch,tools—tothepointwherehestartedtowonderabouthissanity.OlderSicilianwomenalsospokeofacting“lesspositively”(ratherthannegatively)asameansofactingoutagainstostracism.Suchactsincludedgivingtheirhusbandasmallerpieceofdessertthanthosereceivedbytherestofthefamilyratherthansimplydeprivinghimofdessertentirelyorfailingtoinvitehisfamilyaroundtovisitasoftenasexpected—acardinalsininanItalianhouseholdwherefamilymeanseverything.Theseactswerenotconductedtogainthenoticeofthesource;rather,theywereperformedsothatthetargetwouldhavethe satisfactionof regaining their senseof control, andpossiblyeven their selfesteem,aftermultipleactsofongoingneglectandexclusion.

Forsometargets,“fightingfirewithfire”becomes thebest typeofdefense.Thesetargetschoosetosimplyostracizethesources:eithertogivethesourceatasteoftheemotionalpainthatthetargethasexperienced(“[thesilenttreatment]isnotsomethingthatIwouldusuallydo,butif[thesource]isgoingtoactlikethattowardyou,wellIcangiveasgoodasaIget”)ortosimplygetthesource’sattention.Othertargetsresortedtoretaliatoryostracismwhentheynolongercaredtopursuearelationshipwiththesource.

Therehasbeenconsiderableexperimentalresearchexaminingthewaysthattargetsperceivesourcesofostracism.Typically,sourcesofostracismwereviewedas less likeable (Pepitone & Wilpizeski, 1960) and generally rated unfavorably(Geller,Goodstein,Silver,&Sternberg,1974)andwere rarely rewardedby thetargetinsubsequenttasks(Gelleretal.).

Recentstudieshavefocusedonexaminingwhetherbeingostracizedleadstoantisocialresponsestowardostracizers.Forinstance,BourgeoisandLeary(2001)found that participants who were rejected tended to derogate their ostracizers,which supports anecdotal evidenceof reputationdefamationpostostracism.AccordingtoBourgeoisandLeary,derogationofostracizerscanserveanadaptivefunctionbecauseitdiminishesthedesiretobeacceptedbythesourceandhencereducesthepotentialimpactofostracismonthetarget’spsychologicalwellbeing.

Aggressing Against Bystanders and Observers

Targets of ostracism do not always take out their anger and frustration on thesourceofostracism.Instead,thereisanecdotalevidencesuggestingthattargetswilloftenlashoutatinnocentbystanders.Thismayseemcounterproductive;afterall,affiliatingwithanewpersonprovidestargetswiththeopportunitytoregainprimaryneeds,particularly theirsenseofbelonging.However,accordingtotheinterviewswithlongtermtargetsandsourcesofostracism(Zadro,2004),targetsoftendirecttheiriretowardnonsources.Behavinginanantisocialmannertoward

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othersratherthanthesourcemayoccurforavarietyofreasons.Forinstance,iftargetsdonotwanttofurtherjeopardizetheirrelationshipwiththesource,thentheymaytakeouttheirfrustrationonothers.Similarly,targetsmayabuseinnocentthirdpartiesifthereisapowerdisparitybetweenthetargetandthesourceandthe cost of direct retaliation is far too high. For instance, one longterm targetreportedthathisemployerhadignoredhimforseveralweeks,refusingtospeaktohimdirectlyandexcludinghimfrommemosandinterofficeemails.Althoughthetargetwasangryandfrustratedbyhisemployer’sbehavior,hecouldnotactonhisfeelingsbecausehewasterrifiedthathewouldlosehisjob.Instead,hisfamilyborethebruntofhisanger;hewasverballyabusiveandshorttemperedtohiswifeandchildren(Zadro,2009).

Behavinginanantisocialandreactionarymannertowardthirdpartiesmayallowatargetnotonlytoventnegativeemotionssuchasangerbutalsotoregainthwarted primary needs. For instance, targets may regain a sense of controloverothersandtheirenvironmentby takingout theirangeron thosearoundthem. They may also increase their feelings of selfworth by focusing on theshortcomingsofothers.Aswellasbeingcathartic,suchbehaviortowardotherswillalsogetthemattention,whichwillhelpthemtoregaintheirsenseofmeaningfulexistence.

Despitethepossibilityofregainingprimaryneeds,thereareevidentlydrawbackstolashingoutagainstathirdparty.Ifwereturntotheexampleofthebusinessmanwhotookouthisfrustrationandhelplessnessoverbeingostracizedonhiswifeandfamily,it isclearthatthetargetisjeopardizinghisrelationshipwithhiswifeandchildrenbymistreatingthem.Heisalsofurtherweakeninghissenseofbelongingandhissocialsupportnetworkingeneralbyerodinghistiestohislovedones.

Several experimental studies have examined the ways that targets respondtostrangerspostostracism.Forthemostpart,thesestudies indicatethattargetsofostracismtendtoexhibitprosocialorcooperativebehaviorstowardneutralornovelindividuals(e.g.,conformingtoincorrectgroupjudgmentstobetterfitwiththegroup;Williams&Sommer,1997;Williamsetal.,2000),suggestingthattheyarebehavinginamannerthatwillpromoteinclusionandsubsequentsocialconnection (see Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2006). However, in thesestudies,targetswerenotgiventheopportunitytoactinanaggressivefashion.

Muchrecentostracismresearchexamineswhethertargetswillactinanantisocial and reactionary manner toward innocent bystanders (e.g., Twenge et al.,2001;Warburton,Williams,&Cairns,2006.Typically,thesestudieshaverevealedthat the link between ostracism and aggression is not clearcut. For instance,Warburtonetal.(2006)foundthattargetsofostracismonlyaggressedtowardaninnocentthirdpartywhenthetargets’senseofcontrolhadbeenfurtherthwartedinaprevioustask.Targetswhosesenseofcontrolhadbeenrestoredwerenotmorelikelytoaggress.Thesefindingssuggestthatostracismpersemaynotbesufficienttocausetargetstoaggress,particularlyagainstsomeonewhoisnotthesourceofostracism.Instead,atriggerisneeded—inthisinstance,afurtherlossofcontrol—toelicitanantisocialandreactionaryresponse.

In other studies assessing antisocial behavior postostracism, the “innocentbystander”isnotallthatinnocent—thatis,thebystanderoftenprovokesthetarget

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insomewaythatinturnelicitsanantisocialandreactionaryresponse.Inaseriesofstudies,Twenge,Baumeister,Tice,andStucke(2001)examinedwhethersocialexclusionleadstoformsofaggressivebehavior.Theyfoundthatparticipantswhohadbeenrejectedactedaggressivelytowardanotherparticipantwhohadinsultedorprovokedthem.Inonlyonestudydidtheresearchersfindthatthetargetsalsoacted aggressively toward an innocent bystander. Yet, tellingly, targets of socialexclusionwerenotmoreaggressivetoabystanderwhopraisedthem.

Whenexaminingreallifeinstancesofviolenceprecipitatedbyrejection,bothbystanders and sources may be subjected to antisocial acts. For instance, thejournalentriesoftheColumbineHighSchoolmassacregunmenEricHarrisandDylanKleboldrevealedthatbeingcontinuallyostracizedandrejectedbyfellowclassmateswasakeycausalfactor intheirdecisiontoopenfireonstudentsandstaff.Althoughsourceswouldhavebeen involved in theostracism,someof thepeopleshotwereprobablyinnocentofanywrongdoing(seeLearyetal.,2003).

Recentstudieshaveaimedtocomparetheresponseoftargetstowardbothsourcesandinnocentbystanders.Forinstance,inastudybyZadroetal.(2010),participantswereostracized,included,orostracizedthenreincludedduringagameofCyberball.TheythenparticipatedinaResourceDilemmatask(seeHardy&vanVugt,2006;seealsoChapter15inthisvolume),wherebyparticipantswereaskedtoindicatehowmuchofa100centresourcetheywouldallocatetotheotherplayersandtothemselves.Thistaskallowedparticipantstobehaveingratiatingly,cooperatively,orantisociallytowardeithertheindividualstheyhadjustplayedCyberball withortwonewplayers.WhencomparedwithincludedparticipantsintheCyberballtask,ostracizedparticipantsbehavedmoreantisociallywhenplayingwiththesourcesofostracism(i.e.,theyallocatedalmosttwothirdsoftheresourcetothemselves,leavinglittleintheresourcetosplitamongthesources)butinaningratiatingmannerwhenplayingwithnewplayers(i.e.,theytooklessthanathirdoftheresourceforthemselves,leavingalotmoreoftheresourcetosplitamongthenewplayers).Neitherofthesebehaviorswasobservedinreincludedtargets,astheirthwartedneedsweresomewhatrefortifiedwhensourcesreacceptedthemintothegame.

Aggression Against the Target: Self-Harm Postostracism

Theliteratureoftenfailstoacknowledgethattargetsofostracismcanturntheirnegativefeelings,theirfrustrations,andtheirthwartedneedsinward,internalizingthecauseofostracismandeffectivelypunishingthemselvesfortheostracismincident.Thisreactioniscommonamongtargetswhohaveexperiencedprolongedperiods of ostracism or who have been repeatedly ignored by multiple sources(Zadro, 2004, 2009). These threatened needs often manifest in selfdestructivethoughts(“Ioftenthinktomyself,‘Whenisthisgoingtoend?’”;“I’vethoughtofsuicide”).Unfortunately,manytargetsoftenactontheseselfdestructivethoughts,leadingtoahostofselfharmbehaviorsincludingpromiscuity,alcoholismanddrugaddiction,selfmutilation,andevensuicideattempts(Zadro,2004).

The negative, selfdefeating behaviors demonstrated by longterm targets ofostracismarealsoevident—inlesserform—inlaboratorymanipulationsofostracismandrejection.Forinstance,inaseriesofstudies,Twengeetal.(2002)found

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thatparticipantswhoweretoldthattheywouldhaveafuturedevoidofsocialbondsweremorelikelytoengage invariousformsofselfdefeatingbehavior includingincreasedrisktaking(e.g.,bettingonalongshotratherthanasaferoption)andengaging in fewerhealthenhancingbehaviors (e.g., choosing toeatacandybarratherthanamueslibar).Thus,thethreatofsocialexclusionledtothepursuitofactivities that have pleasurable shortterm effects but, ultimately, aversive longtermconsequences.

the moderatorS of oStraciSm: factorS that may precipitate or curtail the

deSire to act aggreSSivelyThere is considerable evidence suggesting that being ostracized has an adverseeffectonprimaryneedsandaffect.AccordingtoBerkowitz(1990),oncenegativeaffecthasactivatedthecognitiveconstructsassociatedwithangerandaggression,individualsbegin to thinkaboutpossible“attributions,appraisals, andschematicconceptionsthatcanthenintensify,suppress,enrich,ordifferentiatetheinitialreaction”(p.494).Thissecondphase—wherebytargetsgothroughthe“suppression”or“enrichment”of thenegativeoraggressiveaffect thathasarisenfromtheostracismincident—isessentialforunderstandingwhysometargetschoosetoactinanantisocialandreactionarymannerpostostracism;specifically,itisatthisstagethatvariousmoderatingfactorscomeintoplay,whethersingularlyorincombination.

Numerous factors may, either singularly or in combination, moderate theeffectsofostracism.First,specificaspectsoftheostracismepisodemaydeterminewhetheratargetrespondsinanantisocialandreactionaryfashion.Forinstance,thephysicallocationoftheepisodemayfacilitateorinhibitantisocialresponses.Unlikephysicalorverbalabuse,ostracismcanbeusedbysourcesinpublic,oftenwithoutobserversevennoticingthatitisoccurring.Ifanostracismepisodeoccursinpublic,however,itwouldbedifficultforatargettorespondinanantisocialfashion(particularlyinaphysicallyaggressivefashion)withoutattractingtheattentionof onlookers—unless the target is so desperate for attention that even negativeattentionisconsideredpreferabletobeingignored.

Second,theidentityofthesourcemayalsobeanimportantmoderatingvariable.Manytargetsstatedthatitwas“easier,”andfarlessaversive,tobeignoredbyastrangerthana lovedone (Zadro,2004).Whenostracizedbya lovedone, targets typicallyexpressedadesiretopreservetheirrelationshipwiththesource.Hence,theytypicallytriedtoactinanaffiliativemannertoensurethattheepisodeendedasquicklyaspossibleandtherelationshipremainedintact.Targetsweretypicallylessmindfuloftheirrelationshipwithanostracizingstrangeroracquaintance;thus,ifgivenasufficienttrigger,targetsmaybemorelikelytoactinanantisocialfashionwhenostracizedbystrangersratherthanbylovedones.Laboratorystudieshavefoundthattheidentityofthesourcetypicallydoesnotmoderatetheimmediateconsequencesofostracism;thatis,beingignoredbyacomputerversusahuman(Zadro,Williams,&Richardson,2004)orbyadespisedoutgroup(i.e.,theKKK;Gonsalkorale&Williams,2007)doesnotmoderatethedeleteriouseffectsofostracismonthefourprimaryneeds.

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Thereis,however,someevidencethattheidentityofthesourcemaymoderateaffectiveresponses.Forinstance,Zadroetal.(2004)foundthattargetswhowereostracizedduringCyberballbyacomputergeneratedplayerreportedfeelingsignificantlyangrierthanthosewhohadbeenostracizedbyahumanplayer.Iftargetsfeelangrierwhenostracizedbyspecificsources,thenitispossiblethatthisangermaymanifestinantisocialreactions,particularlyiftherearefurtherenvironmentaltriggers.

Third,thenumberofsourcesmayalsobeamoderatingfactor.Whenostracizedbyasinglesource,targetshavetheopportunitytoregainthreatenedneedsbyaffiliatingwithothersintheirsocialsupportnetwork.Whenostracizedbymultiplesources,orsources indifferentenvironments(e.g., if targetsaregiventhesilenttreatmentbytheirpartnerathomeaswellasbytheircolleaguesatwork),theremaybefeweropportunitiestoregainthwartedneedsand,hence,agreaterriskthatlostneedswillbeinternalized.Longtermtargetswhowereostracizedbymultipletargetsweremorelikelytomakeinternalattributionsfortheostracismepisodes(“It’sallmyfault!”;Zadro,2004).Thispromptedsometargetstorespondinanantisocialanddestructivefashion;thatis,theyattemptedtorestorelost social bonds by aligning themselveswith unsavory or unscrupulous others(e.g.,joininggangs).Insomeinstances,targetsofmultiplesourcesfeelsufficientlyangryanddisenfranchisedtoretaliateaggressivelyagainsttheirostracizers(e.g.,inthecaseofthevariousU.S.schoolyardshootingswhereshootersfeltrejectedandexcludedbytheirpeers;seeLearyetal.,2003).Targetsmayalsoturntheiraggressioninwardandcommitactsofselfharm—forinstance,engaginginpromiscuousbehaviorasameansoffeelingwantedandlovedorindulginginalcoholandrecreationaldrugsasameansofescapingtheproblem.Thedevastationofbeingignoredbysomanyisclearlyevidentinthefollowinglettersentbyayoungwomaninher20swhowasignoredbyherschoolpeers(Zadro,2004):

Inhighschool,theotherstudentsthoughtmeweirdandneverspoketome.Itellyouinallhonestythatatonestagetheyrefusedtospeaktomefor153days,notonewordatall….Thatwasaverylowpointformeinmylifeandonthe153rdday,Iswallowed29Valiumpills.(p.61)

Fourth, the causal clarity of the ostracism episode may also fuel antisocialresponses.Forinstance,iftargetsknowwhytheyarebeingignored,theycanfocustheirattentiononpursuingtacticsthatrectifythesituationandthataremorelikelytoleadtoreacceptance(e.g.,ingratiationordiscussionthatfocusesonapologizing).However,iftargetsareunawareofwhytheyarebeingignored,thenthehelplessnessandfrustrationfeltinsuchasituationmayfuelanaggressiveresponse,particularlyifthereisafurthertriggertoelicitaggressivebehaviortowardthesourcesorinnocentbystanders(e.g.,theyexperienceafurtherlossofcontrol).

Finally,thelengthoftheostracismepisodemayalsocontributetoantisocialresponsespostostracism.Accordingtothesocialreconnectionhypothesis,exclusionmotivatestargetstoforgesocialbondswithothersonlytotheextentthattheycanrealisticallyprovidesocialreconnection(Maneretal.,2006).Attheonsetofostracism,targetstypicallyusestrategiesthattheybelievewillappeasethesource

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(i.e.,discussionor ingratiation).Iftheseareunsuccessfulandtheostracismepisodestretchesindefinitely,targetsmayviewtheprospectoffutureinteractionasincreasinglyhopelessandmaythusactinavengefulfashioninadesperateattempttohavetheirexistenceacknowledged.

Just as ahostof situational factorsmaymoderate antisocial and reactionaryresponsestoostracism,individualdifferencesaresuretoplayaroleinpostostracismresponses.Althoughlittleresearchtodatehasspecificallyexaminedtheroleof individualdifferences inmoderatingantisocial responses toostracism(foranexception,seeBuckleyetal.,2004),researchershavefoundthatindividualdifferencessuchassocialanxiety(e.g.,Oaten,Jones,Williams,&Zadro,2008;Zadro,Boland, & Richardson, 2006), and selfesteem (e.g., Nezlek, Kowalski, Leary,Blevins,&Holgate,1997),domoderatetargets’responsestobeingsociallyexcludedandrejected.Futureresearchneedstoexploretheextentandwaysindividualdifferences,coupledwithsituationalchanges,moderateresponsestoostracism.Byunderstanding the roleofmoderating factors (singularlyand incombination) indeterminingpostostracismaggression,wecanbegintodevelopstrategiesthatwillnotonlycurtailtheeffectsofostracismbutpotentiallywillveertargetsawayfromrespondingantisocially.

oStraciSm and revenge: a neW program of reSearch

Recently,wehavebegun to conduct a series of studies that examine the rangeof vengeful and retaliatorybehaviors that targets arewilling to conductagainstsourcesofostracism(seeGoodacre,2007;Goodacre&Zadro,2010).Unlikepreviousstudies,wedonotfocussolelyonphysicalaggressionbutratherseeitasonlyone aspect of the possible arsenal of antisocial and retaliatory behaviors at thetarget’sdisposal.

Toassesstheeffectsofostracismonrevengeandretaliation,wecreatedanewparadigm—OCam—a simulated Webcam conference that takes place betweenthetargetandtwostudentsfromalocaluniversity.DuringthisWebconference,thetargetisinformedthateachstudentwillgiveabrief,prewrittenspeechaboutuniversitylife.AlthoughtheparadigmhastheappearanceofarealWebbasedinteraction,the“students”areactuallyactorswhoseactionshavebeenprerecorded.TwoOCam conditionsareprerecorded:onewherethestudentsappeartolistentothetargetasthetargetmakesaspeech(theinclusioncondition);andanotherwherethestudentsappeartolistentothetarget’sspeechfor30secondsandthenturntoeachotherandbeginhavingaconversation,completelyignoringthetarget(theostracismcondition).Ademonstrationoftheparadigmcanbeseenathttp://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/research/ostracism/(Username:guest;Password:Bach).Unlikeothersocialexclusionandostracismparadigms,OCamallowsparticipantstobeostracizedinthephysicalpresenceofthesourcesofostracismyetrequiresnoconfederatestoparticipateduringthetask.Wehypothesizedthatbeingabletowatchthesourcesofostracismastheyinteracttogetherduringtheostracismepisode(all thewhileignoringthetarget)wouldelicitstrong,emotionalresponsesinthetarget.

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Unlike previous studies, which typically use a single indicator of antisocialbehavior(e.g.,the“hotsauceallocation”measureofphysicalaggressionusedbyWarburtonetal., 2006), thecurrent studyexamined several aspectsof revengeandretaliation.TheconstructofrevengeandretaliationwasassessedusinganewmeasurebasedonresearchbyYoshimura(2007)onthedifferentcategoriesofvengeancebehaviors.Specifically,thequestionnaireexaminedparticipants’desiretoengageinfourcommonrevengeandretaliationtypebehaviors:(1)activedistancing(i.e.,removingoneselffromthephysicalpresenceofthesources);(2)reputationdefamation(i.e.,attemptstoreducethetarget’spositivepublicimage);(3)physicalaggressiveness(i.e.,attemptstocausethetargetphysicaldiscomfort,emotionaldistressorpain);and(4)resourceremoval(i.e.,withholdingrewardsfromthesources;forpsychometricpropertiesofthequestionnaire,seeGoodacre,2007).

Overall, the findings suggest that ostracized participants endorsed acts ofactivedistancing,reputationdefamation,andresourceremovalsignificantlymorethantheirincludedcounterparts.Yettheydidnotwishtobehaveinamorephysicallyaggressivemannertowardthosewhoexcludedthem.Thissupportspreviousresearch that has found that ostracism alone is not sufficient to elicit physicalaggression;rather,itrequiresafurthertrigger,suchasafurtherlossofcontrol,toelicitresponsesthatinduceadesiretocausebodilyharm(e.g.,Warburtonetal.,2006).

Overall,thesefindingsindicatedthatevenasinglebriefexposuretoostracism,instigatedbypreviouslyunknownpeersacrossanelectronicmedium, ispowerfulenough toelicit antisocialbehaviorwithoutprovocation. It shouldbenoted,however,thatalthoughostracizedtargetssoughttodistancethemselvesfromthesourcesoftheirrejectiontheyalsoexpressedaninterestinconnectingwithanewgroupofpeople,indicatingthatostracizedtargetsarerespondinginamorecomplexfashionthanpreviouslyexpected,simultaneouslyactinginaproandantisocialmannerasameansofattainingshorttermbenefits(i.e.,vengefulactsthatmaygivethemasenseoftemporarysatisfaction)andlongtermgains(i.e.,seekingoutnewaffiliativeties).

Our future studies will continue the search for triggers and moderators ofaggressionpostostracism.Moreover,wehopetorefineourbehavioralmeasures;oftentheaggressionmeasuresusedinsocialexclusionstudiescouldbeviewedasmeasures of condonedaggression—that is, participants are given permission toaggressbybeingtoldthattheycangiveasmuchhotsauceorasmanynoiseblasts(atwhatevervolume)thattheywish.Thetargetcanrationalizethatiftheexperimenter is allowing them toperform theseactions thennorealharmcancometothetarget.Theaimistofindnewwaysofassessingantisocialandaggressiveresponsesthatarelesscontrivedandparallelrealworldtoattainaricherunderstandingofthemotivationsbehindpostostracismaggression.

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217

14TheDoormatEffect

On the Dangers of Resolving Conflict via Unilateral Forgiveness

LAURAB.LUCHIESNorthwestern University

ELIJ.FINKELNorthwestern University

G ivenenough time, close relationship partners arebound to experienceconflicts in which one person hurts, angers, or upsets the other. Howcan they resolve such conflicts? Scholars and clinicians have designed

and implemented several interventions to bolster victims’ forgiveness of interpersonal transgressions (e.g., Hebl & Enright, 1993; Rye & Pargament, 2002;Worthington,Kurusu,Collins,Berry,Ripley,&Baier,2000;forareview,seeWade&Worthington,2005).Theseinterventionssharetheassumptionthatbolsteringvictims’forgivenesswillbenefitthevictims.Inotherwords,forgivenessinterventionsassumethatvictimshavecontrolovertheirownoutcomes: if theyforgive,theywillexperiencebetteroutcomesthaniftheydonotforgive.

Pastresearchshowssomesupportforthisassumption.Forgivenesshasbeenlinkedtoimprovedpsychologicalhealth,physicalhealth,andrelationalwellbeing.Forexample,thosewhoforgivetendtoexperiencepsychologicalhealthbenefitssuchasgreaterlifesatisfactionandfewerpsychologicaldistresssymptoms(Bono,McCullough,&Root,2008;Orcutt, 2006).Theyalso tend toexperiencephysicalhealthbenefitssuchasbettercardiacfunctioningandlessphysiologicalstress(McCullough,Orsulak,Brandon,&Akers,2007;Waltman,Russell,Coyle,Enright,Holter,&Swoboda,2009).Finally,theytendtoexperiencerelationalbenefitssuchasgreater closeness andcommitment to theirperpetrators aswell as enhanced

laura B. luchieS and eli J. finkel218

conflict resolution, which predicts subsequent relationship quality (Hannon,Rusbult,Finkel,&Kumashiro,2010;Tsang,McCullough,&Fincham,2006).

However,mightperpetratorsalsohavecontrolovervictims’outcomes?Thatis,mightperpetrators’behavior,intandemwithvictims’behavior,affectthequalityofvictims’outcomesfollowingbetrayalssuchasostracism(seeChapters3and13inthisvolume),harmtowardalovedone(seeChapter10inthisvolume),ornastyfeedback(seeChapter10inthisvolume)?McCullough(2008)recentlyarguedthatforgivenessevolvedtohelppeoplepreservetheirvaluablerelationships.Wepositthat,whenforgivenesshelpsvictimspreservearelationshipthatislikelytobevaluabletotheminthefuture,itleadstopositiveoutcomesforthevictim,butwhenitpreservesarelationshipthatisunlikelytobevaluableitleadstonegativeoutcomes.

Whatdetermineswhetheracontinuedrelationshipbetweenthevictimandtheperpetratorislikelytobevaluable?Theperpetrator’sbehavior.Atadispositionallevel,perpetratorscanindicatethatacontinuedrelationshipislikelytobevaluablefortheirvictimsbybehavinginanagreeablemanner.Ataconflictspecificlevel,onewayperpetratorscanindicatethatacontinuedrelationshipislikelytobevaluablefortheirvictimsisby“makingupfor”theiroffenses.Indeed,pastresearchhasshownthatagreeablenesspredictsperpetrators’amendmakingbehavior:highlyagreeableindividualsactinaprosocial,constructivemannerduringinterpersonalconflicts(JensenCampbell&Graziano,2001)andaremorelikelythantheirlessagreeablecounterpartstoacceptresponsibilityandmakereparationaftercommittingabetrayal(Chiaramello,Sastre,&Mullet,2008).Accordingtothisanalysis,scholarsandpractitionerswhohave,explicitlyorimplicitly,suggestedthatforgiveness is uniformly good for victims might have oversimplified the story becausevictimsdonothavecompletecontrolovertheirownoutcomes.Rather,theconsequencesofvictims’forgivenesshingeontheirperpetrators’behavior.

interdependence theory: three typeS of control over outcomeS

InterdependenceTheory(Kelley&Thibaut,1978;Kelleyetal.,2003;Thibaut&Kelley,1959)providesaframeworkforunderstandingthecontroltwoindividualshaveovertheirownandeachothers’outcomes,andthisframeworkcanbeappliedto the control victims and perpetrators have over victims’ outcomes. Followingabetrayal,perpetratorsmayormaynotmakeamends andvictimsmayormaynotforgive.Victims’outcomesforeachcombinationoftheirownandtheirperpetrators’behaviorcanbeplotted ina2×2table,as illustratedinFigure 14.1.(Perpetrators’outcomescanbe includedin thetableaswell,althoughwefocusonlyonvictims’outcomesbecauseweseektoaddresstheextantliterature’sfocusonvictims’outcomes.)

In interdependenceterminology(Kelleyetal.,2003),actor control (formerlycalled“reflexivecontrol”)istheamountofcontrolonehasoverone’sownoutcomes.Theamountofactorcontrolvictimshaveovertheirownoutcomescanbederivedbycalculatingtheaveragedifferencebetweenthevictims’outcomesinthe“Forgive”columnandthevictims’outcomesinthe“DoNotForgive”column—thatis,((A+

the doormat effect 219

C)−(B+D))/2.Actorcontrolisanalogoustothemaineffectvictimforgivenesshas on victims’ outcomes. Partner control (formerly called “fate control”) is theamountofcontrolone’spartnerhasoverone’soutcomes.Theamountofpartnercontrolperpetratorshaveovervictims’outcomescanbederivedbycalculatingtheaveragedifferencebetweenthevictims’outcomesinthe“MakeAmends”rowandthevictims’outcomesinthe“DoNotMakeAmends”row—thatis,((A+B)−(C+D))/2.Partnercontrolisanalogoustothemaineffectperpetratoramendshasonvictims’outcomes.Joint control (formerlycalled“behaviorcontrol”)istheamountofcontrolone’sselfandone’spartnerjointlyhaveoverone’soutcomes.Theamountofjointcontrolvictimsandperpetratorshaveovervictims’outcomescanbederivedbycalculatingtheaveragedifferencebetweenthevictims’outcomesintheupperleftandlowerrightcellsandthevictims’outcomesintheupperrightandlowerleftcells—thatis,((A+D)−(B+C))/2.Jointcontrolisanalogoustotheinteractioneffectbetweenvictimforgivenessandperpetratoramendsonvictims’outcomes.Thisframeworkcanbeusedtodeterminetheamountofactor,partner,andjointcontrolvictimsandperpetratorshaveovervictims’outcomesandcantherebyshedlight on the potential dangers of unilateral forgiveness interventions, which frequentlyassumethatvictims’outcomesaredeterminedprimarilybyactorcontrol.

a revieW of recent evidence of Joint control over victimS’ poStconflict outcomeS

A series of four recent studies investigated the interactive effects of victims’and perpetrators’ behavior on victims’ outcomes (Luchies, Finkel, McNulty, &Kumashiro,2010);allfourstudiesexaminedtheseconflictdynamicsbetweenpartnersinclose,attachmentbondedrelationships(seeChapters2,6,and12inthisvolume)ratherthaninnegotiationsbetweennoncloseinteractants(seeChapters5and7inthisvolume).Wereviewthisprogramofresearch,whichincludestwo

Actor Control = ((A + C) – (B + D)) / 2Partner Control = ((A + B) – (C + D)) / 2Joint Control = ((A + D) – (B + C)) / 2

Forgive

MakeAmends

Do NotMake

Amends

Do Not ForgiveVictim

Perpetrator

A B

C D

figure 14.1 Howtocalculateactorcontrol,partnercontrol,andjointcontrolovervictims’postconflictoutcomes.


longitudinal studies (the first and fourth studies) and two experimental studies(thesecondandthirdstudies)thatexaminetheeffectsofvictimforgivenessandperpetratoramendsonvictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Asexplainedalready,forgivenessinterventionsassumethatvictims’outcomesareprimarilysubjecttoactorcontrol.Incontrast,weexpectthatvictimsandperpetratorssharejointcontrolovervictims’outcomes.Thatis,wehypothesizethattheeffect of forgiving on one’s selfrespect and selfconcept clarity dependson theperpetrator’s behavior:when theperpetratorhasmadeamends,weexpect thatforgivenesswillbolsterone’s selfrespect and selfconcept clarity.Butwhen theperpetratorhasnotmadeamends,weexpectthatforgivenesswilldiminishone’sselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

forgiveneSS tendencieS and partner agreeaBleneSS Jointly predict traJectorieS of Self-reSpect

The first study was a longitudinal investigation in which both members of 72recentlymarriedcouplescompleteduptoninequestionnairesoverthefirst5yearsofmarriage.Atthebeginningofthestudy,participantsreported(1)theirtendencytoforgivetheirspousebyimaginingthemselves infivesituationsthatdescribedtheir spouse transgressingagainst them(e.g., snappingatand insulting the self,lyingaboutinappropriatebehaviorswithsomeoneoftheoppositesex)andindicatedtheextenttowhichtheywouldfeelandexpressforgivenessineachsituation;(2)theiragreeableness(e.g.,“Itaketimeoutforothers,”“Ifeellittleconcernforothers”[reversed]);and(3) theirselfrespect (“IwishIcouldhavemorerespectformyself” [reversed]).Every6–8months following the initial assessment,participantscompletedadditionalreportsoftheirselfrespect.Althoughtheextenttowhichperpetratorsactinanagreeablemannerisnotourfocalmeasureofperpetratorbehavior,agreeablenesshasbeenlinkedwithactinginaprosocial,constructivemannerduring interpersonalconflicts (JensenCampbell&Graziano,2001)and with seeking forgiveness (Chiaramello et al., 2008), which includes accepting responsibility and making reparation after committing a betrayal (Sandage,Worthington,Hight,&Berry,2000).Becauseagreeableindividualstendtomakeamends,weuseagreeablenessasaproxyforamendsinthisstudy.

Weconductedgrowthcurveanalyses(cf.Singer&Willett,2003)toassesstheassociationsofforgivenessandpartneragreeablenesswithlinearselfrespecttrajectories.Specifically,wepredictedchangesinparticipants’selfrespectovertimefromtheirtendencytoforgivetheirspouse,theirspouse’sagreeableness,time,andtheinteractiontermsamongthesevariables.Lookingfirstatthemaineffectsofvictims’andperpetrators’behavior,inturn,onvictims’outcomes,therewerenosignificantmaineffectsofforgivenessorspouseagreeablenessontrajectoriesofvictims’selfrespect.Thus,therewasnoevidencethatvictimshaveactorcontrolorthatperpetratorshavepartnercontroloverchangesinvictims’selfrespectovertime.

Turningtotheinteractioneffectofvictims’behaviorandperpetrators’behavioronvictims’outcomes,thetrajectoryofselfrespectforparticipantswhoreporteda


strongtendencytoforgivetheirspousedependedontheirspouse’sagreeableness.Highlyforgivingparticipantswhosespousereportedhighlevelsofagreeablenessexperiencedincreasesinselfrespectovertime.Incontrast,highlyforgivingparticipantswhosespousereportedlowlevelsofagreeablenessexperienceddecreasesinselfrespectovertime.Thus,victimsandperpetratorssharedjointcontroloverchangesinvictims’selfrespectovertime.

Althoughthesefindingsareconsistentwiththeideathatvictimsandperpetrators share jointcontrolovervictims’ selfrespect, this studydidnotprovide theexperimental evidence necessary to conclude that forgiveness and perpetratorbehaviorcausedtheobservedchangesinselfrespectovertime.Inaddition,itdidnotexaminewhethervictims’selfconceptclarityfollowsthesamepatternastheirselfrespect.Finally,itusedanindirectmeasureofamends.Wedesignedthenextstudytoaddresstheselimitations.

experimentally manipulated perceptionS of forgiveneSS and amendS Jointly affect

Self-reSpect and Self-concept clarityThesecondstudywasanexperimentinwhich49undergraduatesreceivedfalsefeedback(usingaprocedureweadaptedfromKarremans,VanLange,Ouwerkerk,&Kluwer,2003)regardingtheextenttowhichtheyhaveforgivenandtheextentto which their perpetrator has made amends for a specific, reallife betrayal.Participants were asked to recall a recent incident in which a close other hurt,angered,orupsetthem.Afterprovidingadescriptionoftheincident,participantstypedinthefirstnameoftheperpetratorandansweredquestionsabouttheextenttowhichtheperpetratorhadmadeamends.

Then,participants readabout thebogus “forgiveness test,”which theyweretoldwouldassesstheextenttowhichtheyhadforgiventheirperpetrator.TheforgivenesstestcapitalizedontheexperientialvalidityoftheImplicitAssociationTest(IAT;Greenwald,McGhee,&Schwartz,1998),whichwasoriginallydevelopedtoassesspeople’simplicitassociationsbetweencategoriesbycomparingtheirreactiontimeswhencategorizingwordsorimagesfromtargetcategoriesindifferentblocksoftrials.Thecategoriesusedintheforgivenesstestwere(1)theperpetrator’sfirstnameandotherfirstnamesand(2)wordswithpositivevalence(e.g.,love, accep-tance)andwordswithnegativevalence(e.g.,hate, rejection).Inoneblockoftrials,participantswereinstructedtopressthesamekeywhenpresentedwithpositivewordsandtheperpetrator’sname.Inanotherblock,theywereinstructedtopressthesamekeywhenpresentedwithnegativewordsandtheperpetrator’sname.

After completing this bogus forgiveness test, participants read that, when aperson has forgiven a perpetrator, associations between positive words and thenameof theperpetrator are stronger thanassociationsbetweennegativewordsandthenameoftheperpetrator.Butwhenapersonhasnotcompletelyforgiventheperpetrator, associationsbetweennegativewords and thenameof theperpetrator are stronger. Then, they read that these associations can be measuredthroughreactiontimes.Next,ratherthanscoringparticipants’actualperformance


on the forgiveness test, we instead gave them false feedback regarding theirreactiontimes.Participants in thelowforgivenessconditionweretold that theyrespondedfasterintheblockoftrialsinwhichtheyrespondedwiththesamekeytonegativewordsandthenameoftheperpetratorthanintheblockoftrialsinwhichtheyrespondedwiththesamekeytopositivewordsandthenameoftheperpetrator,whichindicatesthattheyhavenotcompletelyforgiventheperpetrator.Participantsinthehighforgivenesscondition weretoldthattheyrespondedfasterintheblockoftrialsinwhichtheyrespondedwiththesamekeytopositivewordsandthenameoftheperpetratorthanintheblockoftrialsinwhichtheyrespondedwiththesamekeytonegativewordsandthenameoftheperpetrator,whichindicatesthattheyhavelargelyforgiventheperpetrator.

Next, participants received false feedback regarding their responses to thequestionstheyhadansweredearlierinthestudyabouttheextenttowhichtheirperpetratorhadmadeamends.Participants intheweakamendscondition weretoldthat,comparedwithotherswhohadpreviouslyparticipatedinthestudy,theirresponsesindicatedthattheextenttowhichtheirperpetratorhadmadeamendswasinthe17thpercentile,whichmeansthattheirperpetratorhasmadeonlyweakamends.Participantsinthestrongamendscondition weretoldthattheirresponsesindicatedthattheextenttowhichtheirperpetratorhadmadeamendswasinthe83rdpercentile,whichmeansthattheirperpetratorhasmadestrongamends.

Followingthesemanipulations,participantscompletedmeasuresofselfrespectandselfconceptclarity(“Ihavealotofrespectformyself”and“IhaveaclearsenseofwhoIamandwhatIam,”respectively).Next,participantscompletedmanipulationchecksassessingtheextenttowhich(1)theyhadforgiventheperpetratorand(2)theperpetratorhadmadeamends.Finally,theywereprobedforsuspicionand debriefed. The manipulation checks indicated that the manipulations weresuccessful:participantsinthehighforgivenessconditionreportedhavingofferedgreaterforgivenessthanthoseinthelowforgivenesscondition,andparticipantsinthestrongamendsconditionreportedhavingreceivedgreateramendsthanthoseintheweakamendscondition.

We conducted two analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with forgiveness andamendsfeedbackconditionsasthebetweensubjectsfactorsandwithselfrespectandselfconceptclarity, inturn,asthedependentvariable.Lookingfirstat themaineffectsofvictims’andperpetrators’behavior,inturn,onvictims’outcomes,therewerenosignificantmaineffectsofforgivenessoramendsonselfrespectorselfconceptclarity.Thus,therewasnoevidencethatvictimshaveactorcontrolorthatperpetratorshavepartnercontrolovervictims’postconflictselfrespectorselfconceptclarity.

Turningtotheinteractioneffectofvictims’behaviorandperpetrators’behavioronvictims’outcomes,althoughthedescriptivepatternsofselfrespectwereinthepredicteddirections,theforgiveness×amendsinteractioneffectonselfrespectdidnotreachconventionallevelsofsignificance.However,theeffectofforgivenessonselfconceptclaritydiddependonwhethertheperpetratormadeamends.Descriptivelyspeaking,participantswhowereledtobelievetheyhadforgiven a perpetrator who made strong amends reported higher selfconceptclaritythanthosewhowereledtobelievetheyhadnotforgivenaperpetrator


whomadestrongamends.Incontrast,participantswhowereledtobelievetheyhadforgivenaperpetratorwhomadeweakamendsreportedlowerselfconceptclarity than those who were led to believe they had not forgiven a perpetratorwhomadeweakamends.Thus,totheextentthattheeffectofparticipants’experimentallymanipulatedperceptionsofforgivenessandamendsontheirselfrespectandselfconceptclarityparallelstheeffectofactuallevelsofforgivenessandamends,victimsandperpetratorssharedjointcontrolovervictims’postconflictselfconceptclarity.

Thisstudyextendedthefirststudybyexaminingtheeffectsofexperimentallymanipulatingparticipants’perceptionsoftheirownforgivenessofandperpetratoramendsmadeforactualbetrayalsonbothselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Wedesignedthefollowingstudytoprovideanadditionaltestofthecausaleffectsofforgivenessandamendsonselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

Well-controlled levelS of forgiveneSS and amendS Jointly affect anticipated Self-reSpect and Self-concept clarity

Thethirdstudywasanexperimentinwhich247undergraduatesimaginedthemselvesasthevictimofapartnerbetrayal.Specifically,participantswereaskedtoimaginethemselvesinascenario(whichweadaptedfromBoon&Sulsky,1997)inwhichtheirromanticpartnerbetrayedtheirtrustbytellingamutualfriendveryprivatedetailsabouttheparticipant’spast.Participantsinthestrongamendsconditionreadthattheirpartneradmittedhisorhermistake,apologized,andtriedveryhard tomakeup for it,whereas those in theweakamends condition readthattheirpartnerdidnotadmithisorhermistake,didnotapologize,anddidnottryat all tomakeup for it.Next,participants in thehigh forgivenessconditionreadthattheydecidedtoforgivetheirpartner,whereasthoseinthelowforgivenessconditionreadthattheydecidednottoforgivetheirpartner.Afterimaginingthemselvesinthescenario,participantscompletedmeasuresassessingthelevelsofselfrespectandselfconceptclaritytheyanticipatedtheywouldhaveiftheyhadjustgonethroughthedescribedsituation(“Iwouldhavealotofrespectformyself”and“IwouldhaveaclearsenseofwhoIamandwhatIam,”respectively).

Weconducted twoANOVAswith forgivenessandamendsconditions as thebetweensubjects factors and with selfrespect and selfconcept clarity, in turn,asthedependentvariable.Lookingfirstatthemaineffectsofvictims’andperpetrators’behavior,inturn,onvictims’outcomes,thereweremarginallysignificantmaineffectsofforgiveness,suchthatgreaterforgivenesscausedloweranticipatedselfrespect and selfconcept clarity. There were also significantmaineffectsofamends,suchthatgreateramendscausedhigheranticipatedselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Thus,therewassomeevidencethatvictimshaveactorcontrolovertheiranticipatedpostconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclaritybutthatforgivingmayhaveanegativeeffectonvictims’outcomes.Andtherewasevidencethatperpetrators havepartner control over victims’ anticipated postconflict selfrespectandselfconceptclarity.


Turning to the interaction effect of victims’ behavior and perpetrators’behavior on victims’ outcomes, the effect of forgiveness on both selfrespectand selfconcept clarity depended on whether the perpetrator made amends.Descriptively speaking, participants who imagined offering forgiveness whentheirpartnermadeamendsreportedtheywouldexperiencehigherselfrespectandselfconceptclaritythanthosewhoimaginedwithholdingforgivenesswhentheir partner made amends. In contrast, participants who imagined offering forgivenesswhen theirpartnerdidnotmakeamends reported theywouldexperiencelowerselfrespectandselfconceptclaritythanthosewhoimaginedwithholdingforgivenesswhentheirpartnerdidnotmakeamends.Thus,victimsandperpetratorssharedjointcontrolovervictims’anticipatedpostconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

Although these results established that forgiveness and amends caused theobserveddifferencesinanticipatedlevelsofselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,hypotheticalscenariosmayseemartificial,andparticipants’anticipatedselfrespectandselfconceptclarityscoresmayreflecttheirtheoriesofhowtheyshouldviewthemselves in thedescribed situation rather thanhow they actuallywouldviewthemselves.Therefore,itremainsimportanttoexamineassociationsamongforgiveness,amends,selfrespect,andselfconceptclarityastheynaturallyoccurfollowingactualbetrayals.Wedesignedthefinalstudytoexaminetheseassociations.

actual levelS of forgiveneSS and amendS Jointly predict Self-reSpect

and Self-concept clarityThe fourth study was a longitudinal investigation in which 69 undergraduatesinvolvedindatingrelationshipscompleted14biweeklyonlinequestionnairesover6months.Oneachquestionnaire,participantsreportedtheirselfrespectandselfconceptclarity(“Irespectmyself”and“Ingeneral,IhaveaclearsenseofwhoIamandwhatIam,”respectively).Later inthequestionnaire,participantsansweredyesornotothefollowingquestion:“Hasyourpartnerdoneanythingoverthepast2weeksthatwasupsettingtoyou?”Participantswhoanswerednomovedontoanunrelatedsetofquestions.Thosewhoansweredyescompletedmeasuresassessingforgiveness(“Ihaveforgivenmypartnerforthisbehavior”),amends(“Mypartnertried tomakeamends tomefor thisupsettingbehavior”), andbetrayal severity(“Thisbehaviorwashighlydistressingtome”).

Weconductedtwosetsofmultilevelregressionanalysespredictingselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,inturn,fromforgiveness,amends,andbetrayalseverity.Lookingfirstatthemaineffectsofvictims’andperpetrators’behavior,inturn,onvictims’outcomesafterseverebetrayals,therewerenosignificantmaineffectsofforgiveness.Butthereweremarginallysignificantmaineffectsofamends,suchthatgreateramendspredictedhigherselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Thus,therewasnoevidencethatvictimshaveactorcontrolovertheirpostconflictselfrespectorselfconceptclarity.However,therewassomeevidencethatperpetratorshavepartnercontrolovervictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.


Turningtotheinteractioneffectofvictims’behaviorandperpetrators’behavioronvictims’outcomesafterseverebetrayals,theassociationofforgivenesswithbothselfrespectandselfconceptclaritydependedontheextenttowhichtheperpetratormadeamends.Increasinglevelsofforgivenesspredictedmoreselfrespectandselfconceptclaritywhenthepartnermadestrongamendsforhighlydistressingbetrayals.Incontrast,descriptivelyspeaking,increasinglevelsofforgivenesspredictedlessselfrespectandselfconceptclaritywhenthepartnermadeweakamendsforseverebetrayals.Thus,victimsandperpetratorssharedjointcontrolovervictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

This study complemented the previous studies by examining prospectivereports of forgiveness, amends, selfrespect, and selfconcept clarity followingactualbetrayalsinongoingrelationships,andtheseresultsshowedthattheassociationsofforgivenesswithselfrespectandselfconceptclaritydependontheextenttowhichtheperpetratorhasmadeamends.Acrossthefourstudies,ourhypothesisthatvictim’sbehaviorandperpetrators’behaviorwieldjointcontrolovervictims’selfrespectandselfconceptclaritywassupportedstronglyandconsistently.Thefirststudydemonstratedthattheassociationofmaritalforgivenesswithtrajectoriesofselfrespectdependsonspouseagreeableness,whichisassociatedwithmakingamends.Thethreesubsequentstudiesdemonstratedthattheeffectofforgivenessonselfrespectandselfconceptclaritydependsonperpetratoramends.Inaddition,ourtwosubhypothesesweresupported:forgivingbolstersone’sselfrespectand selfconcept clarity if the perpetrator tends to act in a generally agreeablemannerormakesamends,butdiminishesone’sselfrespectandselfconceptclarityiftheperpetratortendstoactinagenerallydisagreeablemannerordoesnotmakeamends.All14simpleeffectswereinthepredicteddirections,butnotallofthemachievedstatisticalsignificance.Weconductedametaanalysistoformallytest whether the simple effects garnered reliable support across studies in thisresearchprogram.(Thefirststudywasnotincludedinthemetaanalysisbecausechangeinselfrespectovertime,ratherthanabsolutelevelsofselfrespect,wastheprimaryunitofanalysis.)

meta-analySiSWe calculated metaanalytic (1) main effects of forgiveness on selfrespect andselfconcept clarity, (2)main effectsof amendson selfrespect and selfconceptclarity,(3)interactioneffectsofforgivenessandamendsonselfrespectandselfconceptclarity, (4)simpleeffectsof forgivenessonselfrespectandselfconceptclaritywhentheperpetratormadestrongamends,and(5)simpleeffectsofforgivenessonselfrespectandselfconceptclaritywhentheperpetratormadeweakamends.Because themetaanalytic effectscombine the resultsof studiesusingexperimentallymanipulatedperceptionsof,hypotheticallevelsof,andactuallevelsofforgivenessandamends,andbecausetheseeffectsmaydifferfromoneanother,theyshouldbeinterpretedwithcaution.Butbecausethepatternofresultswassimilarforallthreestudies,themetaanalyticresultslikelyreflecttheeffectsofactual levels of forgiveness and amendson selfrespect and selfconcept clarity.Lookingfirstatthemaineffectsofvictims’andperpetrators’behavior,inturn,on


victims’outcomes,themetaanalysisrevealedthat,acrossstudies,therewerenosignificantmaineffectsofforgivenessonselfrespectorselfconceptclarity.Thus,across studies, therewasnoevidence that victimshaveactor controlover theirpostconflictselfrespectorselfconceptclarity.Thisnullresultcontrastswiththeliteraturelinkingforgivenesstoavarietyofpositiveoutcomesandfailstosupportthenotionthatforgivenessisapanacea.Butthereweresignificantmaineffectsofamends,suchthatgreateramendscausedhigherselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Thus,acrossstudies,therewasevidencethatperpetratorshavepartnercontrolovervictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

Turningtotheinteractioneffectofvictims’behaviorandperpetrators’behavioronvictims’outcomes,themetaanalysisrevealedthatthereweresignificantforgiveness×amendsinteractioneffectsforbothselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Themetaanalysisalsoprovidedstrongsupportforbothsimpleeffects.AcrossStudies2–4,forgivenesssignificantlybolsteredselfrespectandselfconceptclaritywhentheperpetratormadestrongamends,butforgivenesssignificantlydiminishedselfrespect and selfconcept claritywhen theperpetratormadeonlyweakamends.Thus,victimsandperpetratorssharedjointcontrolovervictims’postconflictoutcomes,suchthatiftheperpetratorhasmadeamendsthenforgivingincreasesone’sselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,butiftheperpetratorhasnotmadeamendsthenforgivingdecreasesone’sselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.

Thepredictedmeansfromthemetaanalysisforvictims’selfrespectandselfconceptclarityarepresentedinFigures 14.2and14.3,respectively.Calculatingtheamountofactorcontrol,partnercontrol,andjointcontrolusingtheformulaspresentedintheIntroductionconfirmsthatvictimsdonothavecompletecontrolovertheirownoutcomes.Rather,victimshaveasmallandnonsignificantamountof actor control (−.21 and −.20 for selfrespect and selfconcept clarity, respectively);collapsingacrosslevelsofperpetratoramends,victimswhoforgivereport

Actor Control = ((4.63 + 3.53) – (4.23 + 4.34)) / 2 = –.21Partner Control = ((4.63 + 4.23) – (3.53 + 4.34)) / 2 = .49Joint Control = ((4.63 + 4.34) – (4.23 + 3.53)) / 2 = .60

Forgive

MakeAmends

Do NotMake

Amends


Perpetrator

4.63(0.25)

4.23(0.03)

3.53(–0.37)

4.34(0.09)

figure 14.2 Actorcontrol,partnercontrol,andjointcontrolovervictims’metaanalyzedpostconflictselfrespect.Tablevaluesinboldarerawscoresona1–7scale.Tablevaluesinparenthesisarestandardizedscores.


anaverageoftwotenthsofascalepointlessselfrespectandselfconceptclaritythanthosewhodonotforgive.Incontrast,perpetratorshaveasignificantamountof partner control (.49 and .46 for selfrespect and selfconcept clarity, respectively); collapsing across levelsof victim forgiveness, victimswho receive strongamendsreportanaverageoffourtofivetenthsofascalepointmoreselfrespectandselfconceptclaritythanthosewhoreceiveonlyweakamends.Importantly,victimsandperpetratorsalsoshareasignificantamountofjointcontrol(.60and.65forselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,respectively);victimswhoeitherforgiveaperpetratorwhomadestrongamendsordonotforgiveaperpetratorwhomadeonlyweakamendsreportanaverageofsixtosevententhsofascalepointmoreselfrespectandselfconceptclaritythanthosewhoeitherforgiveaperpetratorwhomadeonlyweakamendsordonotforgiveaperpetratorwhomadestrongamends.

additional evidence of Joint control over victimS’ poStconflict outcomeS

Twoexperimentsandtwolongitudinalstudiesprovidedconsistentevidencethatvictimsandperpetratorssharejointcontrolovervictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity.Isthereevidencethatvictimsandperpetratorssharejointcontrolnotonlyovervictims’psychologicalhealthoutcomes,suchasselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,butalsoovervictims’relationalwellbeingandphysicalhealthoutcomes?Theanswerappearstobeyes.Inalongitudinalstudyofmarriedcouples, McNulty (2008) found that, although individuals whose spouses rarelybehavednegativelyexperienced more stablemarital satisfactionover thefirst 2yearsofmarriagetotheextenttheyweremoreforgiving,individualswhosespousesfrequentlybehavednegativelyexperiencedsteeperdeclinesinmaritalsatisfaction

Actor Control = ((4.86 + 3.74) – (4.40 + 4.59)) / 2 = –.20Partner Control = ((4.86 + 4.40) – (3.74 + 4.59)) / 2 = .46Joint Control = ((4.86 + 4.59) – (4.40 + 3.74)) / 2 = .65

Forgive

MakeAmends

Do NotMake

Amends


Perpetrator

4.86(0.29)

4.40(0.00)

3.74(–0.42)

4.59(0.12)

figure 14.3 Actorcontrol,partnercontrol,andjointcontrolovervictims’metaanalyzedpostconflictselfconceptclarity.Tablevaluesinboldarerawscoresona1–7scale.Tablevaluesinparenthesisarestandardizedscores.


totheextenttheyweremoreforgiving.Thatis,whethergreatermaritalforgivenesspredictedgreaterstabilityorsteeperdeclinesinmaritalsatisfactiondependedonhowfrequentlyone’sspousebehavedbadly,indicatingthatperpetratorsandvictimssharejointcontrolovervictims’relationalwellbeing.

Anotherstudyindicatedthatperpetratorsandvictimsalsomaysharejointcontrol over victims’ physical health outcomes. In a study of women at a domesticviolenceshelter,Gordon,Burton,andPorter(2004)foundthatthosewhoreportedthe greatest forgiveness of their abusive partner were the most likely to reporttheyintendedtoreturntotheirpartner.Returningtoanabusivepartnermaywellheightentheriskofbeingabusedagain,butwhetherornotreturningtoapreviouslyabusivepartnerleadstofurtherabusedependsontheperpetrator’sbehavior.

Thefindingsofthepreviouslyreviewedstudies,togetherwiththefindingsofMcNulty(2008)andGordonetal.(2004),suggestthatvictimsandperpetratorssharejointcontroloveranarrayofvictims’outcomes,includingtheirselfrespect,selfconceptclarity,maritalsatisfaction,andriskofbeingphysicallyabused.Yetanotherbodyofresearchsuggeststhatvictimshaveactorcontroloverotheroutcomes, including their life satisfaction (Bonoetal.,2008),commitment to theirperpetrators(Tsangetal.,2006)andphysiologicalstress(McCulloughetal.,2007).Itmaybethatsomeoutcomesaresubjectprimarilytojointcontrolwhereasotheroutcomesaresubjectprimarilytoactorcontrol.Forinstance,avictimwhoforgivesaperpetratorwhohasnotmadeamendsmightexperiencedecreasedselfrespectandselfconceptclarityatthesametimeasincreasedcommitmenttotheperpetrator.Byexaminingmultipleoutcomesof forgiveness inthesamestudy, futureworkcouldexplorewhetherthecostsofforgivingintheabsenceofamendsoutweighthebenefitsofdoingso.

concluding remarkSGiventhatvictimsandperpetratorssharejointcontrolovervictims’postconflictoutcomes,ourdatasuggestthatconflictresolutionstrategiesdesignedtopromotevictims’forgivenessshouldaimtoheightenvictims’sensitivitytowhetherforgivenessislikelytobebeneficialintheirparticularsituation.Furthermore,forgivenessinterventionsshouldbesupplementedwithstrategiesdesignedtopromoteperpetrators’amendmaking(e.g.,theVictimOffenderReconciliationProgram;see,e.g.,Green, 1984; Ristovski & Wertheim, 2005). Such “amends interventions” couldadaptmanyof themethodsused in forgiveness interventions, includinghelpingperpetratorsdevelopempathyfortheirvictims,havingperpetratorsrecall timestheywerehurtbyothers,andencouragingperpetratorstomakeacommitmenttomakeamendsfortheirmisdeeds.

Moreover,becausereceivingamendsfacilitatesforgiveness(e.g.,McCullough,Worthington,&Rachal,1997),interventionsthatsuccessfullyincreasetheextenttowhichperpetratorsmakeamendsmayalsoincreasetheextenttowhichvictimsforgive.Pastresearchhasshownthat,whenperpetratorsnotonlyapologizebutalsooffertocompensatetheirvictimsfortheiroffenses,victimsareespeciallylikelytoforgive(Bottom,Gibson,Daniels,&Murnighan,2002;Darby&Schlenker,1982).Moreover, in ananalysisof videotapedconflictdiscussions,perpetratoramends


expressed during one 2minute segment were positively associated with victimforgiveness expressed during the following segment, controlling for forgivenessexpressedintheinitialsegment(Hannonetal.,2010).

Conflict resolution strategies that successfully promote both perpetratoramends and victim forgiveness are optimal because they are likely to yield themostfavorableoutcomes.Inallfourstudiesexaminingvictims’postconflictselfrespectandselfconceptclarity,victims’selfviewswerethemostpositivewhentheyforgaveperpetratorswhohadmadeamends.Byrecognizingthat,justastwopeopleareinvolvedwhenarelationshipruptures,so,too,aretwopeopleinvolvedinmendingthoseruptures,individualswhoseektohealtheirownorothers’brokenrelationshipsmightdosomoresuccessfully.

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Section IVSocial, Cultural, and Evolutionary Factors

in Social Conflict and Aggression

233

15TheMaleWarriorHypothesis

MARKVANVUGTVU University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

A lienbiologistscollectingdataaboutdifferent life formsonPlanetEarthwouldnodoubtcomeupwithcontradictoryclaimsabouthumannature.They would witness the human capacity to help complete strangers in

sometimes largegroups,yettheywouldalsoobservemanyincidentsofextremeviolence,especiallybetweengroupsofmales.Tomakesenseofthedata,thealienresearcherswouldprobablyconcludethathumansareafiercelytribalsocialspecies.Sometimeago,CharlesDarwinspeculatedabouttheoriginsofhumantribalnature:“Atribeincludingmanymemberswho,frompossessinginahighdegreethespiritofpatriotism,fidelity,obedience,courage,andsympathy,werealwaysreadytoaidoneanother,andtosacrificethemselvesforthecommongood,wouldbevictoriousovermostothertribes;andthiswouldbenaturalselection”(1871,p.132).UnfortunatelyDarwin’sbrilliantinsightwasignoredformorethanacenturybyfellowscientists,yetitisnowgainingimpact.HereIofferanevolutionaryperspectiveonthesocialpsychologyofintergroupconflict,offeringnewinsightsand evidence about the origins and manifestation of coalitional and intergroupaggression.1

Socialscientistsareincreasinglyadoptinganevolutionaryapproachtodevelopnovelhypothesesandtointegratedataonvariousaspectsofhumansocialbehavior(Buss,2005;VanVugt&Schaller,2008).Theevolutionaryapproachisbasedonthepremisethatthehumanbrainisaproductofevolutionthroughnaturalselectioninthesamewayourbodiesaretheproductsofnaturalselection.Evolutionarymindedpsychologistsfurtherproposethatthehumanbrainisessentiallysocial,comprisingmanyfunctionalizedmechanisms—oradaptations—tocopewiththe

1 Iwillusethetermscoalitionalandintergroup aggressioninterchangeablythroughoutthischapter.Althoughthereisadifferenceinscale,bothtypesofaggressioninvolveindividualswhoasmembersofgroupscommitactsofaggressionagainstmembersofothergroups(Brewer&Brown,1998).

mark van vugt234

variouschallengesofgroupliving(VanVugt&Schaller,2008).Onesuchspecializedmechanismiscoalitionformation.Formingallianceswithotherindividualsconfers considerable advantages inprocuring andprotecting reproductively relevant resources (e.g., food, territories, mates, offspring) especially in large anddiversesocialgroups.Coalitionalpressuresmayhaveledinhumanevolutiontotheemergenceofsomeratheruniquehumantraitssuchaslanguage,theoryofmind,culture, andwarfare. Ithasbeenargued thatultimately the need to formeverlargercoalitionsspurredtheincreaseinhumansocialnetworksizeandledtoaconcomitantbrainsizetoholdthesenetworkstogetherandtodealeffectivelywithanintensifiedcompetitionforresources—thishasbeendubbedtheMachiavellianIntelligencehypothesis,theSocialBrainhypothesis,ortheSocialGluehypothesis(Byrne & Whiten, 1988; Dunbar; Van Vugt & Hart, 2004). According to thesehypotheses,oursocialbrainisthereforeessentiallyatribalbrain.

Insearchingfortheoriginsofthehumantribalbrainitisusefultomakeadistinctionbetweenproximateandultimatecauses.Anactofintergroupaggressionsuchaswar,terrorism,gangrelatedviolenceorhooliganismcouldbeexplainedattwodifferentlevelsatleast.First,whydidthisparticulargroupdecidetoattacktheother?Thisproximatequestioninterestsmostsociologists,politicalscientists,historians,andsocialpsychologistsstudyingsocialconflict.Second,onecouldaskwhyhumanshaveevolved thecapacity toengage in intergroupaggression—thisultimatequestioninterestsmostlyevolutionarymindedpsychologistsandanthropologists.Addressingquestionsatdifferentlevelsproducesamorecompletepicture,buttheselevelsshouldnotbeconfused(Buss,2005;VanVugt&VanLange,2006).

Intermsofultimatecausesofintergroupaggression,threeclassesofexplanationsaregenerallyinvoked(Kurzban&Neuberg,2005;VanVugt,2009;seealsoChapters10and18inthisvolume).Thefirsttreatsitasabyproductofanadaptiveingrouppsychology.Beingahighlysocialandcooperativespecies,humanslikelypossesstendenciestofavorhelpingmembersof ingroups(Brewer,1979;Brewer&Caporael,2006;Tajfel& Turner, 1986). As a result of this ingroup favoritism, people showeitherindifferenceor(perhapsworse)adislikeformembersofoutgroups.Analternativebyproducthypothesisviewsintergroupaggressionasanextensionofinterpersonalaggression.Theargumentisthathumanshaveevolvedspecializedmechanismstoengageinaggressionagainstconspecificsandthatthesemechanismshavebeencoopted to cope with a relatively novel evolutionary threat, namely, aggressionbetweengroups(Buss,2005).Thethirdclassfocusesexplicitlyonanadaptiveintergrouppsychology.Theargumentisthathumanslikelyevolvedspecificpsychologicalmechanismstointeractwithmembersofoutgroupsbecausesuchsituationsposeda significant reproductive challenge for ancestral humans. This latter hypothesisaccountsforthehighlytexturedsocialpsychologyofintergrouprelationsandisthereforemorepersuasive.Forinstance,peopledonothavesomehazynegativefeelingtowardanoutgroup;insomeinstancesoutgroupsmotivateadesiretoapproachoravoidandinotherinstancestofight,dominate,exploit,orexterminate.

Recent work on prejudice and intergroup relations recognizes this texturednatureofintergrouppsychologyandhasgeneratedmanynewinsightsandempiricalfindingsconsistentwiththisview(Cottrell&Neuberg,2005;Kurzban&Leary,2001; Schaller, Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Van Vugt, De

the male Warrior hypotheSiS 235

Cremer, & Janssen, 2007; Van Vugt, 2009). Given the complexity of intergrouprelations,thereareprobablymanydifferentadaptiveresponsespertainingtothenature and type of intergroup challenge. From an evolutionary perspective, itbecomesclearthatnotallintergroupsituationsareequalbecausenotalloutgroupsareequal.Forinstance,notalloutgroupsconsistofcoalitionsofindividualswhoengageincoordinatedaction—thinkofthehomeless, theelderly,orpeoplewithblue eyes. Humans are likely to have evolved coalitiondetection mechanismsthatareresponsive tovarious indicatorsof tribalalliances (Kurzban,Tooby,andCosmides,2001).AsKurzbanandLearynote,“Membershipinapotentiallycooperativegroupshouldactivateapsychologyofconflictandexploitationofoutgroupmembers—afeaturethatdistinguishesadaptationsforcoalitionalpsychologyfromothercognitivesystems”(p.195).Inmodernenvironments,heuristiccuessuchasskincolor,speechpatterns,andlinguisticlabels—regardlessofwhethertheyactuallysignaltribalalliances—mayengagethesemechanisms(Kurzbanetal.;Schalleretal.).Perhapsequallyimportant,manyothersalientcuessuchasgender,age,oreyecolormaybefarlesslikelytoengagethistribalpsychology.Weshouldnotethatalthoughthistribalpsychologylikelyevolvedintheevolutionarycontextofcompetitionforresources(e.g.,territories,food,andmates),thisdoesnotimplythatitiscontemporarilyactivatedonlywithincontextsinvolvingactualintergroupconflictasproposed,forinstance,byrealisticconflicttheory(Campbell,1999).

The specific psychological reactions of individuals in intergroup contextsshouldfurtherdependonwhetherone’sgroupistheaggressor.Fortheaggressors,desires todominateandexploit—and theassociatedpsychological tendencies—wouldbefunctional.Forthedefendingparty,desirestoyield,toavoid,ortomakepeace,alongwiththeassociatedpsychologicaltendencies,wouldbefunctional.Ofcourse,inmanysituations,agroup’spositionasbeingthedominantorsubordinatepartyistransientorambiguoussoitislikelythatthetwopsychologicaltendenciesareactivatedinsimilarsituationsbysimilarcuesandmoderatedbysimilarvariables(socialdominancetheory;Sidanius&Pratto,1999).

the male Warrior hypotheSiSAnimportantimplicationofthisevolutionarytribalbrainhypothesisisthatintergroupconflictmayhaveaffectedthepsychologiesofmenandwomendifferently.Intergroupconflicthashistoricallyinvolvedrivalcoalitionsofmalesfightingoverscarcereproductiveresources,andthisistrueforearlyhumansaswellaschimpanzees,ourclosestgeneticrelative(Chagnon,1988;DeWaal,2006;Goodall,1986).Menarebyfarthemostlikelyperpetratorsandvictimsofintergroupaggression,nowandinthepast.Asaconsequence,thisaspectofcoalitionalpsychologyislikelytobemorepronouncedamongmen,whichwedubbedthemale warrior hypothesis(MWH,seeTable15.1;VanVugtetal.,2007;VanVugt,2009).Thishypothesispositsthatduetoalonghistoryofmaletomalecoalitionalconflictmenhaveevolvedspecializedcognitivemechanisms thatenable themto formallianceswithothermentoplan,toinitiate,toexecute,andtoemergevictoriousinintergroupconflictswiththeaimofacquiringorprotectingreproductivelyrelevantresources.

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Evolutionary Models

TheMWHfitsintoatraditionofevolutionaryhypothesesaboutgenderdifferencesinsocialbehavior.Thereisalreadyconsiderableevidenceforgenderdifferencesinmorphology,psychology,andbehaviorthatarefunctionallyrelatedtodifferentselectionpressuresoperatingonmenandwomenthroughouthuman,primate,andmammalevolution(Campbell,1999;Eagly&Wood,1999;Geary,1998;Tayloretal.,2000).Duetoacombinationofdifferencesinparentalinvestmentandparentalcertaintymenandwomenpursuesomewhatdifferentmatingstrategies(Buss&Schmitt,1993;Trivers,1972).Inhumans—asinmostothermammals—mothersinvestmoreheavilyintheiroffspring;consequently,itwillbephysiologicallyandgeneticallycostlierforwomentobeopenlyaggressive(Archer,2000;Campbell,1999;Tayloretal.,2000).Yet,asthelessinvestingsexandundertherightconditions, it canbeattractive formen to formaggressivecoalitionswith theaimofacquiringandprotectingvaluablereproductiveresources.

Tooby and Cosmides’s (1988) risk contract hypothesis specifies four conditionsfortheevolutionofcoalitionalaggression,whichunderscorestheevolutionarylogicofthehypothesizedgenderdifferencesinwarriorpsychology.First,the

taBle 15.1 the male Warrior hypothesis: domains of evidence, hypothesized mechanisms, predictions, and Support for gender differences

Domain of Evidence

HypothesizedMechanism

Prediction About Gender Difference Supported

1.Intergroupaggression

Propensitytoengageinintergroupaggression

Menaremorelikelytomakeunprovokedoutgroupattacks

Yes

Menreporthavingmore(competitive)intergroupexperiences

Yes

2.Intergroupprejudice

Infrahumanizationordehumanizationofmembersofantagonisticoutgroups

Menaremorelikelytoinfrahumanizemembersofoutgroups

Yes

3.Intragroupdynamics

Ingroupcooperationinresponsetooutgroupthreat

Mencontributemoretogroupduringintergroupcompetition

Yes

Ingrouployaltyduringintergroupconflict

Menshowmoreingrouployaltyduringintergroupconflict

Maleleadershipbiasinintergroupconflict

Groupsshowstrongerpreferenceformaleleadersduringintergroupcompetition

4.Tribalpolitics Politicalsupportforintergroupaggression

Menshowstrongerpoliticalsupportforwarfareinopinionpolls

Yes

Preferencesforsocialdominancehierarchies

Menscorehigheronsocialdominanceorientationscale

Yes

5.Tribalsocialidentity

Affiliationtotribalgroups Menaremorelikelytomakespontaneoustribalassociationswhendefiningthemselves

Yes


averagelongtermgainsinreproductivesuccess(i.e.,matingopportunities)mustbesufficientlylargetooutweightheaveragecosts(i.e.,injuryordeath).Second,membersofwarfarecoalitionsmustbelieve that theirgroup is likely toemergevictoriousinbattle.Third,theriskthateachmembertakesandtheimportanceofeachmember’scontributiontovictorymusttranslateintoacorrespondingshareof benefits (cf. the freerider problem). Fourth, when individuals go into battletheymustbecloakedina“veilofignorance”aboutwhowillliveordie.Thus,ifanintergroupvictoryproduces,onaverage,a20%increaseinreproductivesuccess,thenaslongastheriskofdeathforanyindividualcoalitionmemberislessthan20%(e.g.,1in10die)suchwarriortraitscouldbeselectedfor.Thismodelassumesthatthespoilsofanintergroupvictoryarepaidoutinextramatingopportunitiesfortheindividualmalesinvolved,andthusitisessentiallyanindividualselectionmodelbasedonsexualselection.

Alternatively,aspecificmalewarriorpsychologycouldhaveevolvedviagrouplevelselection.Multilevelselectiontheoryholds that if there is substantialvariance inthereproductivesuccessamonggroups thengroupselectionbecomesagenuine possibility (Wilson, Van Vugt, & O’Gorman, 2008). As Darwin (1871)noted,groupsofselfless individualsdobetter thangroupsofselfishindividuals.Althoughparticipatinginintergroupconflictispersonallycostly—becauseoftheriskofdeathor injury—genesunderlyingpropensity to serve thegroupcanbepropagatedifgroupservingactscontributetogroupsurvival.Inarecentempiricaltestofthismodel,ChoiandBowles(2007)showedviacomputersimulationsthataltruistictraitscanspreadinpopulationsaslongasthereiscompetitionbetweengroupsandaltruisticactsbenefitingroupmembersandharmoutgroupmembers(parochialaltruism).

Oneconditionconducivetogrouplevelselectionoccurswhenthegeneticinterestsofgroupmembersarealigned,suchas inkingroups.Inkinbondedgroups, individuals benefit not just from their own reproductive success butalso from the success of their family members (inclusive fitness; Hamilton,1964).Ancestralhumangroupsarelikelytohavebeenbasedaroundmalekinmembers,withfemalesmovingbetweengroupstoavoidinbreeding(socalledpatrilocal groups). This offers a complementary reason for the evolution ofmalecoalitionalaggression:becausethemenaremoreheavilyinvestedintheirgroup,theyhavemoretolosewhenthegroupceasestoexist.Inaddition,thecollectiveactionproblemunderlyingcoalitionalaggressionis lesspronouncedwhengroupmembers’genetic interestsarealigned.Incidentally (butperhapsnotcoincidentally),thesamepatrilocalstructureisfoundinchimpanzees:malechimpanzeesalsoengageincoalitionalaggression(Goodall,1986;Wrangham&Peterson,1996).

Theseevolutionarymodelsdonotprecludethepossibilityofculturalprocessesatworkthatcouldexacerbateorunderminemalewarriorinstincts(Richerson&Boyd,2005).Infact,manyoftheevolvedpropensitiesforcoalitionalaggressionarelikelytobetranslatedintoactualpsychologicalandbehavioraltendenciesbysocializationpracticesandculturalnorms.Thus,itisentirelypossiblethatincertainenvironmentsitcouldbeadvantageousforsocietiestosuppressmalewarriortendencies(socalledpeacefulsocieties)ortoturnfemalesintodedicatedwarriors.

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Amoderndayexampleof the latter is thestateofIsrael,whichis involvedinacontinuouswarwith itsArabneighbors.To increase itsmilitary strength,Israelhasaconscriptionarmyofbothmenandwomenandcurrentlyhasthemostliberalrulesregardingtheparticipationoffemales inactualwarfare(Goldstein,2003).WewouldexpectthesocializationpracticesamongIsraeligirlstomatchthoseofboys,potentiallyattenuatinganyinnatepsychologicaldifferences.

Evidence for the MWH From Across the Behavioral Sciences

Evidence for various aspects of this male warrior phenomenon can be foundthroughout the behavioral science literature, for instance, in anthropology, history,sociology,politicalscience,biology,psychology,andprimatology.Asstated,acrossallcultures,almostanyactofintergroupaggressionisperpetratedbycoalitionsofmales,forinstance,insituationsofwarfare,genocide,rebellion,terrorism,streetgangs,andhooliganviolence (Goldstein,2003;LivingstoneSmith,2007).Evidenceofmaletomalecoalitionalaggressiongoesbackasfaras200,000years(e.g.,massgravescontainingmostlymaleskeletonswithevidenceofforce;Keeley,1996).Menarealsothemostlikelyvictimsofintergroupaggression.Onaverage,maledeath ratesdue towarfareamonghuntergatherersare13%(according toarchaeologicaldata)and15%(accordingtoethnographicdata;Bowles,2006),suggestingarelativelystrongselectionpressureonmalewarriortraits.Thefigureissometimesevenhigher.AmongtheYanomamöintheAmazonBasin,anestimated20–30% of adult malesdie through tribal violence (Chagnon, 1988), comparedwithlessthan1%oftheU.S.andEuropeanpopulationsinthetwentiethcentury.Finally,theprimateliteraturerevealsthat,amongchimpanzees,adultmalesformcoalitionstoengageinviolenceagainstmembersofneighboringtroops.Thissuggeststhatthereisphylogeneticconsistencybetweenhumansandoneofourmostcloselyrelatedspecies(Wilson&Wrangham,2003).

Male warriors in traditional societies have higher status, more sexual partners,andmorechildren(Chagnon,1988),suggestingadirectreproductivebenefit;RichardDawkins(1976)labeledthisthe“DukeofMarlborough”effect.Thesexualattractivenessofthemalewarriormightstillbeoperativeinmodernsociety.AU.S.studyrevealedthatmaleyouthstreetgangmembershavemoresexualpartnersthanordinaryyoungmales(Palmer&Tilley,1995).Werecentlyfoundthatmilitarymenhavegreatersexappeal,especiallyiftheyhaveshownbraveryincombat(Leunissen&VanVugt,2010).Thus,theremaybereputationalbenefitsassociatedwith“warrior”behaviorsinmen(cf.competitivealtruism;Hardy&VanVugt,2006).

InlightofthesupportfortheMWH,itisnoteworthythatmanypublishedintergroupstudiesinsocialpsychologydonotreporttheresultsformenandwomenseparatelyandthatsomeuseonlymalesamples.Oneoftheclassicsocialpsychologicalstudies,theStanfordprisonexperiment(Zimbardo,1971),whichhighlightedsomedisturbingaspectsofhumancoalitionalaggression,usedanallmalesample.Teamgameexperimentsalsooftenuseallmalegroups(e.g.,Bornstein,2003).Inapersonalcommunication,oneoftheauthorsofthisstudy(Bornstein,2006)suggestedthatpilotresearchshowedthatfemalegroupswerelesscompetitive.


pSychological mechaniSmS underlying male Warrior phenomenon

TheMWHoffersanintegrative,conceptualframeworkinwhichfindingsfromdiverseliteraturescanbewovenintoacoherentstory.However,thisapproachruns theriskofbeinga“justso”storyabout the roleofcoalitionalaggressioninhumanevolution.Itwouldbemuchbetterifwecouldmakespecificpredictionsaboutgenderdifferencesinthepsychologicalmechanismsunderlyingthiswarriorpsychologyandcouldtestthesepredictionsincarefullycontrolledstudies.Ifmenhaveamorepronouncedwarriorpsychology,weshouldexpectthemtothinkandfeeldifferentlyabout intergroupconflictandtobemorelikelytoplan, support, and commit acts of intergroup aggression (Van Vugt, 2009). Inaddition,meningroupsshouldmakeadaptiveintergroupchoicesdependingoninformationaboutthesex,size,andformidabilityoftheoutgroup.Forinstance,they should respond with anger and aggression toward a numerically weakeroutgroupandwithfearandavoidancetoastrongeroutgroup(especiallyanallmalegroup).Finally,thesereactionsarelikelytobeproducedautomaticallyandspontaneously.

To test various aspectsof themalewarriorhypothesis and tofindevidenceforgenderdifferencesinevolvedpsychologicalmechanisms,Iwillpresentsomeresearchfindingspertainingtovariousdomainssuchas(1)frequencyandlikelihoodofaggressiontowardoutgroups;(2)protectionofingroupsagainstexternalthreats;(3)likelihoodofpoliticalsupportforintergroupaggression;and(4)tribalsocialidentifications.Byandlarge,thesestudiesprovidepreliminarysupportforthemalewarriorhypothesis,yetmuchworkstillremainstobedone.

Propensity for Intergroup Aggression

Afirstprediction fromtheMWHis thatmenshould,onaverage,havea lowerthresholdtoengageinactsofintergroupaggressionwhengiventheopportunity.Wetestedthisinvariousways.First,weexaminehowmenandwomenmakedecisionsinwargamessimulatedinthelaboratory.AstudybyJohnsonetal.(2006)foundthat,onbeingtoldthattheyaretheleaderofafictitiouscountryinteractingwithleadersofothercountries,menaresignificantlymorelikelytoattackanothercountrywithoutprovocation(i.e.,“preemptivestrike”).Moreover,warfareismostintensewhenmenareplayingagainstothermendespitenotknowingthesexoftheirrivals.Thelowerthresholdforintergroupaggressionmaybeduetoexpectationsofsuccess.Indeed,menheldmorepositiveillusionsaboutwinningthesesimulatedintergroupconflicts,abeliefthatincreasedtheprobabilitythattheywouldattacktheiropponent(Johnsonetal.).Anotherstudyanalyzingthesamedatasetfoundthatmoremaletypical2D:4Ddigitratios,whicharethoughttoindexprenatal testosterone exposure, predicted aggression in the wargame experimentsoverandabovesex.Thesegenderdifferencesalsoemergewhenindividualsplayeconomic games between groups: allmale groups tend to be more competitivethanallfemalegroupsormixedsexgroups (Wildschut,Pinter,Vevea, Insko,&Schopler,2003).

mark van vugt240

Second,thereisampleevidencethatmenandwomendifferintheirinvolvement inactsof intergroupaggressionoutside the laboratory (Pemberton,Insko,&Schopler,1996).Whenaskedtoindicatethefrequencyofvariouscategoriesofsocialinteractionsoverthepastmonth,menreportedmoregrouptogroupinteractions (mean [M]=18.47, standarddeviation [SD]=73.48) thanwomen(M=12.77,SD=59.68).Furthermore,menratedtheseinteractionsasmorecompetitive(Mformalevs.female=3.17vs.2.31,SD=2.50formalevs.2.22forfemale;scaleis1=verycooperative,5=verycompetitive).

Thus,consistentwiththeMWH,menexperienceintergroupcompetitionmoreoften,havealowerthresholdtostartanintergroupconflict,andaremoreoptimisticaboutwinningsuchconflicts.

Intergroup Prejudice and Stereotyping

The MWH further predicts that men are more likely to be prejudiced and toopenlydiscriminateagainstmembersofoutgroups,especiallythosethatcanbeviewedascoalitionalthreats.Onemanifestationofoutgroupprejudiceisinfrahumanization,thetendencytoconsidermembersofoutgroupssubhumanoranimallike,whichisoftenaprecursorofintergroupviolence(Haslam,2006;Leyensetal.,2001).Theevolutionarylogicisthatbyconsideringoutgroupsaspsychologicallyinferioritwillbepsychologicallyeasiertotreatthembadly.Inarecentstudy(VanVugt,2009),menandwomen—allChristians—wereaskedtodescribeaChristianor Muslim target using either humantypical (e.g., civil) or animaltypical (e.g.,feral) words. Christian men were more likely to describe the Muslim target inanimaltypicalways,thusshowingevidenceofinfrahumanization.TheMWHalsopredicts that infrahumanizationstrategiesaremost likely inmaletomaleintergroupcontests,butthisremainstobetested.

Menalsoshowother intergroupbiasessuchasracismandxenophobiamorereadilyandespeciallyinthreateningsituationsSeveralexperimentsyieldagreatersensitivityofoutgroupstereotypesforingroupmen,especiallyunderconditionsofintergroupconflict(Gerard&Hoyt,1974;Sidanius,Cling,&Pratto,1991).Schaller,Park,andMueller(2003)showedthatmenusedangerrelevantstereotypestowardoutgroupmembersmorewheninfluencedbycuesofambientdarkness.Finally,thenotoriousoutgrouphomogeneityeffectdisappearswhen ingroupmembersareshownangryfacesofoutgroupmalesbutnotfemales(Ackermanetal.,2006),whichisconsistentwiththeideathatoutgroupmalesposeaheightenedthreat.

ThesefindingssupporttheMWHinthatmenaremorelikelytobeprejudicedagainst members of outgroups, especially when these constitute a coalitionalthreat;inaddition,outgroupmenaremorelikelytobediscriminatedagainst.

Protecting the Group Against External Threats

TheMWHalsoexpectsthepresenceofpsychologicalmechanismsthatenablementoprotect their ingroupagainstexternal threats.Todefend thegrouprequirespeople tobondtogetherand tohelp the ingroup (Brewer&Brown,1998;VanVugtet al., 2007).Basedon theMWH,wehypothesize thatduring intergroup


conflictparticularlymenwillstepuptheireffortstohelptheingroup.Consistentwiththisprediction,inpublicgoodgameswefoundthatmenraisedtheirgroupcontributionsbutonlywhenweactivatedcompetitionbetweengroups(VanVugtetal.).InExperiment1,VanVugtetal.foundthatduringintergroupcompetition92%ofmen(butonly53%ofwomen)contributedtothepublicgood.Inaddition,menshowedgreateringrouployaltybystickingwiththegroupevenifitwasmore(financially) attractive to leave (Van Vugt et al., 2007). As a proxy for ingroupcohesion,menwerealsomorelikelytoincreasetheiridentificationwiththegroupunderconditionsofintergroupconflict.Itremainstobeseenwhethermenarealsomorelikelyaltruisticpunishersoffreeridinggroupmembersduringintergroupconflict,astheMWHwouldpredict.

Malesarealsomorelikelytobechosenasgroupleadersduringintergroupconflict.VanVugtandSpisak(2008)foundthatwhentwoequallysuitablecandidatesofdifferentsexes,SarahandJohn,viedforthepositionofgroupleaderinanintergroupconflictgroupspreferredthemaleleader(78%).Themaleleaderwasalsomoreeffectiveinelicitingfollowers’groupcontributionsduringintergroupthreat.(Interestingly,whentheproblemshiftedtowardconflictwithintheingroupvirtuallyallgroupspreferredthefemaleleader.)

Preference for Hierarchies

There is some evidence that male groups have different group dynamics thatmake them more suitable to engage in coalitional aggression. Whereas femalegroupsaremoreegalitarian,groupsofmalesformmorehierarchicalgroups,andthesehierarchiestendtobemorestableovertime.Thedifferenceingroupstructurecorrespondswithgenderdifferences in leadershipstyle(Eagly&Johnson,1990; Van Vugt, 2006). Military specialists assume that hierarchy formation isaneffectiveresponseindealingwithintergroupconflictthatrequiresanurgent,coordinatedresponse.

Researchondevelopmentaldifferencesinsocialplayreflectsthemalewarriortendencies.Boysplayinlargergroupsthangirlsandmoreoftenplaycomplexcompetitiveteamgames,whichsometimesinvolvetheuseofweaponssuchastoygunsandswords(Geary,1998).Boysalsoputgreatersocialpressureonteammemberstoconformtogroupnormsduringplayactivities(Sherifetal.,1961),andtheyhavemoretransientfriendshipswithalargernumberofpeersthangirls(Geary).Thus,consistentwiththeMWH,menhavepsychologicalmechanismsthatenablethemtoworkinandfunctionbetterinlargerandmorehierarchicallystructuredgroupsandtheprimaryfunctionofsuchgroupstructuresistocompetewithothergroups.

Support for Tribal Politics

TheMWHfurtherpredictsgenderdifferencesinpoliticalattitudestowardintergroup conflict. We hypothesize that men would show relatively stronger political support forwarfareasa solution to internationalconflictbecause theyhavemoretogainpotentially(atleastinancestraltimes)fromintergroupconflict.Wetestedthispredictionusingdatafromarandomselectionof10recentnationaland

mark van vugt242

internationalopinionpollsthatwewereabletofindontheInternetandfoundconsistentgenderdifferences(sometimeslarge,othertimessmall,butalwaysinthesamedirection).Forinstance,aWashington Postpollin2003(N=1,030)askedthequestion,“DoyousupporttheUShavinggonetowarinIraq?”,towhich82%ofmenagreedversus72%ofwomen.Asanotherexample,arecentpollbyGallup News(N=7,074)foundthat46%ofmen(vs.37%ofwomen)disagreedwiththestatement,“DoyouthinktheIraqwarwasamistake?”

TheMWHalsoexpectsmentohaveastrongerpreferenceforbetweengroupdominance hierarchies, the inevitable outcome of intergroup conflict. To testthisprediction,weaskedaninternationalsurveyofpeopletocompletetheshort10itemsocialdominanceorientationscale(Pratto,Sidanius,Stallworth,&Malle,1994).Thissevenpointscalecontainsitemssuchas,“Somegroupsofpeoplearesimplyinferiortoothers”;“Weshoulddowhatwecantoequalizeconditionsfordifferentgroups”;and“Togetaheadinlife,itissometimesnecessarytosteponothergroups.”Consistentwithotherdata(Prattoetal.)wefoundthatmenweresignificantlymoresociallydominant(M=2.56,SD=1.13)thanwomen(M=2.28,SD=1.0).

Thus, in agreement with the MWH, men are generally more belligerent intheirtribalpolitics.

Tribal Social identity

AfinalpredictionfromtheMWHisthatmen’spersonalselfconceptshouldbeaffectedmorestronglybytheiraffiliationstotribalgroups.Incontrast,women’sselfconcept should be influenced primarily by having meaningful connectionswithcloseothers.Menhave indeedamorecollectivesenseofself that ismorestrongly derived from their group memberships and affiliations (Baumeister &Sommer,1997).GabrielandGardner(1999)askedstudentstodescribethemselvesbycompletingthestatement,“Iam….”Theyfoundthatmalestudentsweretwiceaslikelytomakestatementsreferringtoatribalassociation(e.g.,“Iamamemberofafraternity”).

In a recent study (Van Vugt et al., 2007) we asked 100 people around theUniversityofKentcampustoindicatetheirfavoritecolorandtoexplainwhytheypickedthisparticularcolor.Amongmen,almost30%mentionedatribalassociation(e.g.,theirfavoritefootballteam,thecolorsoftheflagoftheircountryoforigin);noneofthewomendidso.

Thus, men’s social identity seems to be more strongly based on their tribalaffiliationsthanwomen’s,whichisconsistentwiththeMWH.

implicationS for intergroup relationSThis chapter presented a framework for studying the psychology of intergroupaggression from an evolutionary perspective. This analysis suggests that not allintergrouprelationsarealikebecausenotalloutgroupsarealike.Howgroupsinteractwitheachotherisdeterminedbythespecificcontextualthreatsandopportunities.Whensuchchallengescorrespondtoevolutionarilyrelevantthreats—threats


thatweresignificantenoughinancestralsocialenvironments thathumanshaveevolvedtodealwiththem—theyactivateaspecifictribalpsychology.HereIhavearguedthatahistoryofcoalitionalaggressionhasproducedadistincthumantribalbrainincludinganinterrelatedsetoffunctionalcognitiveandbehavioralreactionstoattackanddefendagainstmembersofoutgroups.Furthermore, as themostlikelyperpetratorsandvictims,Ihavehypothesizedthatthemalepsychologyhasbeenparticularlyaffectedbyintergroupconflictepisodesandhavedubbedthisthemalewarriorhypothesis. I reviewed the literatureongenderdifferences inintergrouppsychologyinlightofpredictionsfromthemalewarriorhypothesisandfoundthemtobegenerallysupportive.Furthertestsareneeded.

In addition to intergroup conflict there might be a host of other significantancestralchallengesinvolvingothergroups,whicharenotdiscussedhere.Disease avoidance is one such threat, and we would expect a different set offunctionalresponsestoacontagionthreatratherthanaphysicalthreatfromanoutgroup; for instance, behavioral avoidance rather than aggression. When adiseasethreatissalient,perhapswomenrespondmorestrongly.Thereissomeevidencethatwomenaremoreprejudicedtowardstrangerswhenintheirmostfertilemenstrualphase(Navarette,Fessler,&Eng,2007).Ingeneral,weknowvery littleabout the intergrouppsychologyof females.Inaddition, theneuroscienceunderpinninggenderdifferences in intergrouppsychologyought tobeexamined—forinstance,whichhormonaldifferencesdrivethesegenderdifferencesintribalpsychology?

Theevolutionaryframeworkmakesvarioussuggestionsforinterventionstoimproveintergrouprelations.Whenoutgroupsposeacoalitionalthreat,interventions might be targeted specifically at maletomale interactions becausetheyarethemost likelyperpetratorsandvictimsof intergroupaggression.Interms of their objectives, interventions will be particularly successful whentheyeliminatethesenseofthreatassociatedwithaparticularoutgroupaltogether.Attemptsmustbemadetoindividuatemembersofsuchoutgroups,forinstance,byaccentuatingtheirpersonalachievementsratherthantheachievementsoftheirgroup.Asecondaimof interventions istoaltertheperceptualcuesthatelicitthreatresponsestowardparticularoutgroupssuchasnewimmigrantgroups.Forinstance,language,dresscode,andparticularritualsorcustomsserveas tribalmarkers,and the lessnoticeable theyare themoretheseoutgroupswillreceivepositivetreatment.Thus,forthesakeofattenuatingtheeffectsofcoalitionalpsychology, it is importantforsocietiestomake iteasierfornewimmigrantgroupstoadoptthelanguageandcustomsoftheingroup.Third, interventionsmightbefocusedonchangingthe specificcognitiveandaffectiveresponsestowardoutgroups.However,ifitistruethattheseresponsesare evolved, then the link between threat and response might be difficult toinhibitorextinguish(cf. fearofsnakesandspiders;Ohman&Mineka,2001).Nevertheless,wesuspect that frequentpositive interactionswithmembersofoutgroupswill,overtime,reduceinitialaversionorhostility.Forinstance,theJigsawclassroomexperiments(Aronson&Bridgeman,1979)demonstratethatcooperativerelationsbetweenmembersofdifferentethnicgroupsareagoodmeansofreducingprejudice.

mark van vugt244

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249

16ImplicationsofGlobalClimate

ChangeforViolenceinDevelopedandDevelopingCountries

CRAIGA.ANDERSONandMATTDELISIIowa State University

R apidglobalclimatechange,takingplaceoverdecadesratherthanmillennia, is a fact of twentyfirstcentury life. Human activity, especially thereleaseofgreenhousegases,has initiatedageneralwarmingtrend.The

10warmestyearsonrecordbetween1880and2008werethelast10.Thistrendisexpectedtocontinueuntiltheatmosphericcompositionreturnstoapreindustrialeranorm.

Climate change effects on specific regions are expected to vary considerably.Thoughmostpartsoftheglobearewarming,afewplacesmayexperiencecooler climates asoceanandwindcurrents shift.Some regions areexperiencing increased rainfall,whereasmanyothers arehavingprolonged droughts. In2007,theIntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange(IPCC)releasedareportthat includednumerousprojectionsof likelyeffectsby theendof thiscentury,under varying assumptions of how world governments, industries, and peoplerespond.Thebestcasescenarioassumeshugereductionsinnetgreenhousegasproduction,beginningalmostimmediately.Inthisscenario,climatemodelspredict an average global temperature increase of 1.8°C (3.24°F) and an averagesealevelincreaseof28cm(11inches).Theworstcasescenario,whichassumesabusinessasusualapproach,predictsincreasesof4.0°C(7.2°F)and43cm(17inches).Otherprojections,someofwhichhavealreadybecomeapparent,includeincreases in heat waves and heavy precipitation; decreases in precipitation insubtropical areas; and increases in tropical cyclones. More specific projectionsinclude(1)5–8%increaseintheproportionofAfricathatisaridandsemiarid;(2)majorfloodingofheavilypopulatedareasofAsia fromrisingsea levelsand

craig a. anderSon and matt deliSi250

storms;(3)inundationoflowlyingislands;(4)severewatershortagesinAustraliaandNewZealand;(5)drought insouthernEurope; (6)decreasedsoilmoistureandfoodcropsinLatinAmerica;and(7)increasedwinterfloodingandsummerheatwavesinNorthAmerica.MorerecentresearchbeingpreparedforthenextIPCCreportsuggeststhatthenewbestcasescenariowillbeworsethantheoldworstcasescenario,withsealevelsrisingaleast1meter(Vermeer&Rahmstorf,2009).Because13%oftheworld’spopulation—hundredsofmillionsofpeople—live in lowlying coastal areas (Engelman,2009,p.41), this latterprojection isparticularlydisturbing.Indonesiamayloseasmanyas2,000smallislandsinthenext20yearstorisingsealevels(Engelman,p.3).

In addition to the changes in average temperature and rainfall, climatemodelsalsopredictanincreaseinextremeweatherevents.Recentdatasuggestthat this increase has already begun, with dramatic increases in floods, windstorms,anddroughtdisastersinthelast20years(Engelman,2009,pp.16,30).Hurricanes,cyclones,andothertropicalstormsalsoareincreasinginintensity.Theproblemwithrisingsealevelsconcernsnotjusttheheightofhightidesbutalso stormsurge.Aonceacentury storm inNewYorkCity, for example,willoccuraboutonceevery3years(Rahmstorf,2009)ifaveragesealevelincreasesby1meter.

Researchfrompsychology,sociology,politicalscience,economics,history,andgeographysuggestthatrapidglobalwarmingcanincreasetheincidenceofviolentbehaviorinatleastthreeways.Oneinvolvesdirecteffectsofuncomfortablywarmtemperatureson irritability,aggression,andviolence.Asecondinvolves indirecteffectsofglobalwarmingonfactorsthatputchildrenandadolescentsatriskfordevelopingintoviolenceproneadults.Thethirdinvolvesindirecteffectsofrapidclimate change on populations whose livelihoods and survival are suddenly atrisk,effectsthatinfluenceeconomicandpoliticalstability,migration,andviolentintergroupconflict.Forexample,variousgovernmentalandscientificreportshavenotedthatclimatechangehasexacerbatedexistingtensionsandconflictscenteredintheDarfurregionofSudanandinBangladesh.

Heat and Aggression

Much research has established that uncomfortably warm temperatures canincreasethelikelihoodofphysicalaggressionandviolence(Anderson&Anderson,1998;Anderson,Anderson,Dorr,DeNeve,&Flanagan,2000;foraconcisereviewseeAnderson,2001).Threetypesofstudieshavetestedandfoundconsiderablesupportforthisheathypothesis:experimentalstudies,geographicregionstudies,andtimeperiodstudies.

experimental Studies of the heat effect Earlyexperimentalstudiesofheateffectsyieldedconsiderable inconsistency inoutcomes,perhapsbecauseofparticipantsuspicionandmeasurementissues.Laterstudiesprovidedbettertestsandcleanerresults.Forexample,Vrij,vanderSteen,andKoppelaar(1994)conductedafieldexperimentinwhichDutchpoliceofficerswererandomlyassignedtoperformatrainingsessioninvolvingasimulatedburglaryunderhotorcomfortable

implicationS of gloBal climate change 251

conditions.Officersinthehotconditionreportedmoreaggressiveandthreateningimpressionsofthesuspectandweremorelikelytodrawtheirweaponandtoshootthesimulatedsuspect.

Anderson et al. (2000) reported a series of laboratory experiments on bothhotandcoldtemperatureeffects.Inseparateexperiments,uncomfortablywarmtemperatures(relativetocomfortabletemperature)increasedparticipants’feelingsof anger and hostility, their perceptions of hostility in observed dyadic interactions,andtheirinitialretaliatoryaggressivebehavioragainstapersonwhosepriorharmfulbehaviorwasofanambiguousnature.RecentexperimentsbyWilkowski,Meier,Robinson,Carter,&Feltman(2009)linkedheatrelatedimagerytoahostofangerandaggressionrelatedperceptionsandjudgments.

Geographic Region Studies of the Heat Effect

Studiesdatingbacktothenineteenthcenturysuggestthathotterregionshavehigherviolentcrimeratesthancoolerregions(Anderson,1989).However,evenwithinthesamecountryregionsdifferinmanywaysotherthanclimate.Someoftheseotherdifferences(e.g.,poverty,unemployment,agedistribution,culture)areriskfactorsforviolence.Thebestgeographicregionstudiesincludestatisticalcontrolsforsuchfactors.Evenwhensuchfactorsarecontrolled,temperaturepredictsviolentcrimerates.Forexample,hotterU.S.citieshavehigherviolenceratesthancoolercities,evenafterstatisticallycontrollingfor14riskfactorsincludingage,education,race,economic, and culture of violence factors (Anderson & Anderson, 1996). RecentworkbyVandeVliert(2009;inpress;underreview)furthersuggeststhatclimateandeconomicconditionsjointlyinfluencecultureinwaysthatencourageordiscourageaggressionandviolence.Particularlyvulnerablearepopulationsthatliveinregionsthatarebothclimaticallychallenging(hot,cold,orboth)andimpoverished.

time period Studies of the heat effect “Timeperiod”studiescompareaggressionrateswithinthesameregionbutacrosstimeperiodsthatdifferintemperature.Studiesvaryconsiderablyintermsofthetimeperiodsforwhichviolenceandtemperatureareassessed.Overall,resultsareremarkablyconsistent.Hottertimeperiods (e.g.,days, seasons,years) areassociatedwithhigher levelsof violence.Forexample,riotsintheUnitedStatesarerelativelymorelikelyonhotterthancoolerdays(Carlsmith&Anderson,1979).Similarly,violentcrimesacrossawiderangeofcountriesandmeasuresoccurmorefrequentlyduringhotterseasonsthancoolerones(Anderson,1989).

Ofcourse,otherviolencerelatedfactorsmaydifferbetweenhotterversuscoolertimeperiods,evenwithinthesameregion.Forexample,intheUnitedStateslargenumbersofyouthareoutofschoolduringthesummermonths,soonecouldarguethattheroutineactivitiesofthepopulationmightaccountforseasonaldifferencesinviolence.Severalstudieshaveaddressedthisandotheralternativeexplanationsofheatrelatedtimeperiodeffects.Althoughit isclearthatroutineactivitiesdoinfluenceaggressivebehavior,itisalsoclearthatsuchalternativeexplanationsdonotparsimoniouslyaccountformanyobservedeffects.Forexample,intwostudiesAndersonandAnderson(1984)foundsignificantdayofweekeffectsondaily


violentcrimerates,inadditiontoheateffects.Othertimerelatedroutineactivities,suchasyouthbeingoutofschoolinthesummer,cannotaccountfortheheateffectfoundinStudy1(Chicago),becausethatstudyincludedonlythesummermonths.Similarly,routineactivitytheorycannotaccountforthefindingthatMajorLeagueBaseballpitchersaremorelikelytohitbatterswithapitchedballonhotdaysthanoncooldays,evenafterstatisticallycontrollingforthepossibilityofsweatinfluencingthepitcher’scontrol(Reifman,Larrick,&Fein,1991).

Differences in violent crime rates for hotter versus cooler days have beenfoundwithincitiesasvariedasHouston,Chicago,andMinneapolis(Anderson&Anderson,1984,1998).Evenaftercontrollingforroutineactivityeffectsoftimeofdayanddayofweek,violentcrimesarerelativelymorefrequentinhotterweather(e.g.,Anderson&Anderson,1998;Bushman,Wang,&Anderson,2005a,2005b).Interestingly, nonviolent crime (burglary, motor vehicle theft) rates are largelyunrelatedtoheat.

Whenthetimeperiodisyears(insteadofdaysorseasons),thekindsofpotentiallyconfoundedvariableschange.Forexample,U.S.youthareoutofschoolinthesummerregardlessofwhethertheyearisslightlywarmerorcooler.Whenconsideringyearbasedstudiesandglobalwarmingeffects,onemightbeconcernedaboutwhetheraggressionrelatedfactorssuchasagedistribution(e.g.,proportionofthepopulationthatisinthehighcrimeagerange)andincomeinequality(e.g.,LaFree&Drass,1996)mightbeconfoundedwithtimeorsystematictemperaturechanges.Weconductedtwonewstudiestoexaminetheeffectsofyearlychangesin temperatureonviolentandnonviolentcrime in theUnitedStates,beginningwith1950.

Study 1: Hot Years and Violent Crime

method

Data ThisstudyextendsAnderson,Bushman,andGroom’s(1997)Study1.Majoradditionsare13yearsofnewdataandseveralaggressionrelatedcontrolvariables.Datafortheyears1950–2008wereobtainedfromU.S.governmentsources.FromtheFBI’sUniformCrimeReportswecreatedtwocrimemeasures.Violent crimewasdefinedasthesumofthehomicideandassaultratesper100,000population.Nonviolent crimewasdefinedasthesumoftheburglaryandmotorvehicletheftratesper100,000population.1

Theprimarypredictor variable, annual average temperature,was computedfromdata fromtheNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration.Controlvariableswere year, age (proportionof the population in the 15–29 highcrimeagerange),prison(numberofincarceratedstateandfederalinmatesper100,000population),poverty (percentof families livingbelow thepoverty line), and theGiniindexofincomedistributioninequality(perfectlyequaldistributionyieldsa

1 Asinpriorstudies,robberyandrapewereexcludedfortheoreticalreasons.Bothappeartohaveagreatermixtureofaggressivemotives(intenttoharm)andnonaggressivemotives.SeeAndersonetal.,1997.


Giniindexof0,perfectinequality=1.0).Yeareffectsmightreflectahostofculturalandpopulationchanges,suchasincreasedreportingofassaultsandimprovementsintraumacare.Theothercontrolvariableshaveobvioustheoreticallinkstoviolence.

Correlated Residuals Timeseriesdataoftenhaveaprobleminwhichtheresidualsarecorrelatedwithtime.Themostcommonversioniswhentheresidualsatanygiventimeperiod(T)arecorrelatedwiththeresidualsatthesubsequenttimeperiod(T+1).Such“autocorrelations”makeordinaryleastsquares(OLS)proceduresinappropriateforestimatingregressionparameters.Withasufficientlylargesample of time periods, autoregression (AR) techniques can be used to reduceoreliminateautocorrelationsamongresidualsandcanthusyieldmoreaccurateresults.Inallregressionanalyses,chisquaretests(Ljung&Box,1978)wereusedto assess goodness of model fit regarding the presence of correlated residuals.Whenthechisquarestatisticsuggestedthatthemodelprovidedapoorfittothedata,autoregressiveparameterswereadded.Thisprocesswasiterativelyrepeateduntilthechisquareteststatisticindicatednonsignificantautocorrelations inthenewresiduals.

Thepresentstudyaddressesfivealternativeexplanationsforheatrelatedtimeperiodeffectsonviolentbehavior:(1)seasonalfluctuations;(2)correlatedresiduals;(3)coincidentalcrime,year,andglobalwarmingtrends;(4)coincidentalagedistributionshifts;and(5)coincidentalincomeandpovertyshifts.Thefirstalternativeexplanation isdealtwithbyusing the year as theunit of analysis.The remainingalternativesarehandledbystatisticalcontrols.Nonviolentcrimeanalysesareincludedasapointofcomparison.

results Table 16.1 presents descriptive statistics and zeroorder correlationsamongthevariables.Averageannualtemperaturehasincreasedduringthis59yearperiod(r =.54).Notethesubstantialzeroordercorrelationsamongviolentcrime,temperature,andyear.Thissuggeststhatinadditiontocheckingforautocorrelatedresidualsaconservativestatisticalprocedurewouldalsocontrol foryeareffects.Finally,notethatnonviolentcrimewasnotstronglycorrelatedwithtemperature.

Table 16.2presentstheresultsofOLSandARanalysesonviolentcrime(topsection)andnonviolentcrime(bottomsection).OLSregressionrevealeda largeeffectoftemperatureonviolentcrime;each1°Fincreaseinaverageannualtemperaturewasassociatedwith79moreseriousanddeadlyassaultsper100,000people.However,theARtestrevealedsignificantautocorrelationsamongtheresiduals(χ2

(6)=196,p<.05).WeaddedARparameterstothemodeluntiltheautocorrelationtestbecamenonsignificant(threeparameterswereneeded).Thisgreatlyreducedthesloperelatingtemperaturetoviolentcrime,butthisheateffectremainedstatisticallyandpracticallysignificant.Inthenextstepwecontrolledforyear.Thetemperature effect on violent crime remained essentially unchanged. The yeareffectalsowassignificant;eachyearadded4.90violentcrimesper100,000people.Weexaminedahostofmodelswiththeothercontrolvariables(age,prisonrate,poverty,Gini).Onlyprisonrateyieldedasignificanteffect.Withthreeautoregressiveparameters—temperature,year,andprison—in themodel thetemperature


taBle 16.2 destructive testing results using auto-regressive parameters and competitor variables, Study 1, 1950–2008

Violenta AR Test Temperature Effect

Model χ2 df b SE t

OLS 196* 6 79 19.1 4.15* Year Effect

AR3 3.80 3 4.11 1.25 3.30* b SE t Prison Effect

AR3 4.07 3 4.16 1.25 3.33* 4.90 1.68 2.91* b SE t

AR3 3.27 3 4.19 1.21 3.47* 8.34 1.88 4.43* .42 .203 2.07*

NonViob AR Test Age EffectModel χ2 df b SE t

OLS 186* 6 16,646 1778 9.37*

AR3 4.85 3 9645 3321 2.90*

Temp,annualaveragetemperature.Age,proportionofU.S.population in the15–29agerange.AR,autoregression.OLS,ordinaryleastsquares.

a Seriousanddeadlyassault:Assault+homicide.b Nonviolentcrime:Burglary+motorvehicletheft.* p<.05.+p<.10ift>1.67.

taBle 16.1 correlations among the predictor and outcome variables, Study 1, 1950–2008

Year Temp Age Prison Pov Gini Vio NVio

Year 1.00 0.54 0.04 0.90 –0.75 0.88 0.87 0.52Temp 0.54 1.00 –0.19 0.61 –0.18 0.61 0.48 0.11Age 0.04 –0.19 1.00 –0.36 –0.44 –0.30 0.25 0.78Prison 0.90 0.61 –0.36 1.00 –0.43 0.97 0.69 0.13Pov –0.75 –0.18 –0.44 –0.43 1.00 –0.36 –0.71 –0.79Gini 0.88 0.61 –0.30 0.97 –0.36 1.00 0.72 0.16Vio 0.87 0.48 0.25 0.69 –0.71 0.72 1.00 0.75Nvio 0.52 0.11 0.78 0.13 –0.79 0.16 0.75 1.00

Descriptive StatisticsMean 1979 57.85 0.227 231 16.1 0.382 239.1 1300St.Dev. 17.2 0.78 0.025 153 5.6 0.027 127.7 544Min. 1950 56.60 0.195 93 11.1 0.348 55.7 385Max. 2008 59.70 0.272 512 32.5 0.432 451.3 2163

Notes:N=59.Ifr>.25thenp<.05.Temp,annualaveragetemperature.Age,proportionofU.S.population in the 15–29 age range. Prison, number of incarcerated state and federalinmatesper 100,000population.Pov,percent of families livingbelow thepoverty line.Gini,indexofincomedistributionequality(perfectlyequaldistributionyieldsaGiniindexof0;perfectinequality=1.0).Vi,seriousanddeadlyassaultsper100,000population.Nvio,burglariesandmotorvehicletheftsper100,000population.


effect remainedsignificant (b=4.19).Finally, thegreater theproportionof theU.S.populationthatwasimprisoned,thesmallertheviolentcrimerate.

AhostofOLSandARmodelsonnonviolentcrimedidnotyieldasinglesignificanttemperatureeffect.Indeed,afterappropriateARparameterswereinthemodel,onlyagewasasignificantpredictorofnonviolentcrimerates.Forevery1%increaseintheproportionofhighcrimeageindividualsinthepopulation,therewasanincreaseof96nonviolentcrimesper100,000people.

Study 2: Hot Summers and Violent Crime

method

Data This study extends Anderson et al.’s (1997) Study 2. It examines violentcrimeinthesummermonthsintheUnitedStatesrelativetononsummermonths.Majoradditionsare9yearsofnewdataandseveralaggressionrelatedcontrolvariables.Datafortheyears1950–2004werecollectedfromnumerousgovernmentalsources.Seasonaldatawereunavailableafter2004.

Basically,thedatasetisthesameasforthepriorstudy,withtwomajorexceptions. First, the outcome variable is the difference between the percent of theyear’scrimesthatwerecommittedduringthesummermonths(June,July,August)andtheaverageoftheotherthreeseasons,adjustedfornumberofdaysineachseason.Ifviolentcrimeswereequallylikelytooccurregardlessofseason,thenthesummermonthswouldaccountforexactly25%ofthem,andthesummereffectscoreusedinthisstudywouldbezero.Ifviolentcrimeswererelativelymore(less)likelyinthesummermonths,thesummereffectwouldbegreater(less)thanzero.Asimilarsummereffectwascomputedfornonviolentcrimes.

The second major difference from Study 1 was the temperature measure.Acrossasampleofcities,werecordedthenumberofhotdays(maximumtemperaturewas≥90°F)peryear.ThevastmajorityofhotdaysinthecontinentalUnitedStatesoccurduringthesummermonths,sothismeasureisagoodindicatorofthehotnessofeachofthe55summers.

Predictions Weexpectedthesummereffectonviolentcrimetobesignificantlygreaterthanzero,whenaveragedacrossyears.Furthermore,weexpectedyearswithmorehotdaystoyieldlargersummereffectsonviolentcrimethanyearswithfewerhotdays.

results Asexpected,theaveragesummereffectonviolentcrimewassignificantly greater than zero (M = 2.57, t(54) = 18.52, p < .05). Violent crimes areoverrepresentedinthesummermonths.Infact,inonly2ofthe55yearswasthesummereffectnegative.

Concerningthesecondhypothesis,therewasnoevidenceofautocorrelationsamongtheresidualsinanyoftheanalysesofviolentcrime,soOLSanalyseswereappropriate.Theonlyvariablethatsignificantlypredictedthesizeofthesummereffectonviolentcrimewasthenumberofhotdays(b=.068,t(53)=3.07,p <.05).Noneofthecontrolvariables(includingyear)hadasignificanteffect,nordidthey


substantially reducethesizeof thehotdayseffect.Nonviolentcrimewasunaffectedbynumberofhotdays.

General Discussion of the Heat Effect on Aggression

Insum,theheathypothesishasbeenrepeatedlyconfirmed.Laboratorystudiessuggestthatthisislargelytheresultofheatinducedincreasesinirritabilityandinhostileinterpersonalperceptionbiases.Thereisadditionalevidencethattheseeffectscanbefurthertracedtothermoregulationandemotionregulationareasof thebrain (Anderson, 1989; Boyanowsky,1999, 2008;Boyanowsky,CalvertBoyanowsky,Young,&Brideau,1981).Theimplicationforglobalwarmingisthatat the level of the individualperson increasedexposure to uncomfortably hottemperatureswillincreasethelikelihoodofinterpersonalconflictandviolence.Itisdifficulttoestimatewithconfidencehowbiganimpactglobalwarmingwillhaveonviolentcrimeinmodernsocieties,butFigure 16.1providessomeroughestimatesbasedontheresultsofStudy1.IfaverageannualtemperatureintheUnitedStates increasesby8°F (4.4°C), thebest estimate of the effecton thetotalmurderandassaultrateisanincreaseofabout34per100,000people,orover100,000moresuchseriousanddeadlyassaultsperyearinapopulationof305million.

Oneresponsetohighheat in industrializedcountries is increaseduseofairconditioning in buildings, cars, buses, and trains. Although such actions mightmitigate heatinduced increases in aggression, they increase the production ofgreenhousegases.

Therearenocomparabledaily,seasonal,orannualdataontheheateffectonviolentcrimein lessdevelopedcountries.However,thefindingssummarizedinprevioussectionssuggest thatuncomfortablyhot temperaturescanhavea fairlydirecteffectonaggressiveandviolenttendencies,perhapsthroughneuroandhormonalpathwaysthatarecommontothermoregulationandemotion(seeChapter9inthisvolume).

84.4

°F°C

63.3

b =5.40 +1 S.E.b =4.19 Best Estimateb =2.98 +1 S.E.

42.2

21.1

0

Incr

ease

in M

urde

r/A

ssau

lt Ra

te

Increase in Average Annual Temperature

Increase in # of Murder/A

ssaults

50

40

30

20

10

0

140,000

120,000

100,000

80,000

60,000

40,000

20,000

0

figure 16.1 HeateffectonviolentcrimeintheUnitedStates,1950–2008.


development of violence-prone individualSGlobalclimatechangewill likely increase theproportionofchildrenandyouthexposedtoriskfactorsknowntoincreasethelikelihoodofbecomingaviolenceprone individual—someonewho frequentlyusesphysicalaggressionor violencetodealwithconflict,togetdesiredresources,andtoimpulsivelyandshortsightedlysatisfyone’swants(Gottfredson&Hirschi,1990;Moffitt,1993).Studiesofviolent youth and criminals reveal a host of psychological, neuropsychological,genetic,andenvironmentalriskfactorsthatplayamajorroleindeterminingwhobecomesaviolenceproneperson.Theseinterrelatedriskfactorsincludemalegender;stronglyheritableantisocialtraitsincludingimpulsivity,sensationseeking,lowintelligence,andpoorselfregulation;poverty;poorprenatalandchildhoodnutrition;familialdysfunction;growingupinviolentneighborhoods;psychopathy;loweducation;anddisorganizedandunstableneighborhoods(DeLisi,2005).

Food, Violence, and Antisocial Behavior

Potentiallyoneof themostcatastrophiceffectsof rapid climatechangecentersonfoodavailability.Today,oneineightU.S.householdswithinfantsisfoodinsecure—the family has limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally adequateandsafefoods.Inmanypartsoftheworld,foodinsecurityisamuchlargerproblem.Thismeansthatarobustproportionofimpoverishedchildren(notwithstanding themultifaceted independenteffectsofpovertyonantisocialbehavior) facethespecterofpoornutritionormalnutrition—conditionswithsevere longtermconsequencesforcrimeandviolence.Arecentstudyisillustrative.JianghongLiuandcolleaguesexaminedthelongitudinalrelationshipbetweenmalnutritionandsubsequentexternalizingandantisocialbehaviorsusingabirthcohortofchildrenfromtheislandofMauritius,offthecoastofAfrica.Childrenwhoweremalnourishedatage3weresignificantlymoreaggressiveandhyperactiveatage8,moreaggressiveandpronetoexternalizing(actingout)behaviorsatage11,andmorehyperactiveandmorelikelytoexhibitsymptomsofconductdisorderatage17(Liu,Raine,Venables,&Mednick,2004).

It isnotmerely armchair conjecture to assert that foodscarcitywill result inincreased violenceprone individuals; history has already told such a story. FromOctober1944toMay1945,residentsofthewesternNetherlandsexperiencedmoderate to severe food scarcity caused by a German army blockade. Over 100,000Dutchmenbornbetween1944and1946were studied toexamine theeffectsofgestationalnutritionaldeficiencyonsubsequentpronenesstoviolence(Neugebauer,Hoek,&Susser,1999).Menexposedtoseverematernalnutritionaldeficiencyduringthefirstandsecondtrimesterswere2.5timesmorelikelythanmennotexposedtoseverematernalnutritionaldeficiencytodevelopantisocialpersonalitydisorder,apsychiatricdiagnosischaracterizedbyrecurrentuseofviolenceandotherantisocialbehaviors.Otherstudies linkingpovertytopoordevelopmentaloutcomesarereviewedbyHustonandBentley(2010).Similarly,recentworkbyChen,Cohen,andMiller(2010)revealsthatpovertyeffectsonchildren’sstresslevels(assessedbycortisol)isexacerbatedbyperceivedthreatandbychaosintheirdailylivingconditions.


Environmental–Genetic Interplay

Childreninregionsoffamine,prolongeddroughts,civilunrest,andwars(seenextsection)areexposedtomanyknownriskfactorsforthedevelopmentofviolenceprone adolescents and adults. Longitudinal studies have shown that even fairlybriefexposures(e.g.,afewmonths)tosomeoftheseriskfactorscanputtheindividualchild(orfetus)onahighriskdevelopmentaltrajectory.

Caspiandcolleagues(2002)examinedtheinteractionbetweenmonoamineoxidaseA(MAOA)—anenzymaticdegraderthatmodulatesneurotransmitters—andchildhoodmaltreatmentonlaterantisocialoutcomes.Forallantisocialoutcomes,theassociationbetweenmaltreatmentandantisocialbehaviorwasconditionalontheMAOAgenotype.Just12%ofthesamplehadboththegeneticrisk(lowactivityMAOAlevels)andmaltreatment;theyaccountedfor44%ofthetotalconvictionsfor violent crime.Moreover, 85%of thosewhohadboth risk factorsdevelopedsomeformofantisocialbehavior.Intheabsenceofmaltreatment,thegenotypicriskfactordidnotmanifestitselfbehaviorally.Similargene–environmentinteractionshavebeenfoundforearlylife,environmentaladversity,andpsychiatricoutcomes(Caspietal.,2003;Uher&McGuffin,2010).

If global warming brings about a world of dramatically increased environmentalriskandanunknownnumberofenvironmentalpathogens,thenitislikelythataproportionalproliferationofbehavioralriskswillresultasthesepathogenicenvironmentsmoderategeneticandneuropsychological riskswithinindividuals.Recalltheperniciousandlongtermeffectsofmalnutritionandviolentandantisocial behavior. Malnutrition, particularly when it is endured during gestation,causesahostofneuropsychologicaldeficitsrelatingtoneuronalreduction,braintoxicity,alteredneurotransmission,andotherphysiologicaleffects.Theseneuropsychological deficits also interact with genes to predict antisocial behavior. Forexample,Beaver,DeLisi,Vaughn,andWright(2010)foundthatneuropsychologicaldeficits(suchasthoseimplicatedbyprenatalnutritionaldeficiency)interactedwiththelowactivitypolymorphismintheMAOAgenetopredictviolentbehavior,delinquency,andlowselfcontrolacrosstwotimeperiods.

Terrorism Susceptibility

Recentresearchintoterrorismandsuicidebombershasledtoabetterunderstandingofthesocialandenvironmentalconditionsthatareconducivetothedevelopment of individuals willing to use such extreme tactics (Kruglanski,Chen,Dechesne,Fishman,&Orehek,2009;seealsoChapter10 in thisvolume).Briefly,theseresearchershaveshownthatsuchextremelyviolenttacticscan emerge from a “quest for personal significance,” triggered by failure tosatisfybasichumanmotivestobelongtoasignificantgroupandtocontributetoitswelfare.Avarietyofeventscanleadtofeelingsoffailureandexclusion,events such as personal trauma, loss of family through violence, and socialhumiliation.Undertheright(orwrong)circumstances,including(1)anavailableideologytojustifyviolenceagainsttheperceivedperpetratorsoftrauma,humiliation, and violent loss; and (2) social pressures to engage in violence


againsttheperpetratorsasameansofgainingorrestoringone’sownsignificance toone’sgroup,evensuicidal terrorismbecomesa viableoption to theindividual(seeChapter3inthisvolumeforarelateddiscussionofaggressionandostracism).

civil unreSt, ecomigration, genocide, and WarBoththeheateffectandthedevelopmentofviolenceproneindividualsfocusonviolenceattheindividuallevel.Thisthirdlinkbetweenclimatechangeandviolencefocusesonlargergroupsofpeople—communities,tribesorclans,societies,andcountries.Thisisaparticularlycomplexsetofphenomena.Emergingresearchfromseveralfieldssuggests thatrapidclimatechange(heatingorcooling)oftenleadstoincreasesinviolence.Thereareseveralwaysthiscanhappen.Forexample,insubsistenceeconomiesrapidchangesinclimateleadtoadecreasedavailabilityof food,water, and shelter.Dependingon the levelof social–political organization,suchshortagescanleadtocivilunrestandcivilwar,tomigrationtoadjacentregions and conflict with the people who already live in that region, and eventogenocideandwar.AlthoughitwouldbeoverlysimplistictoblamethebloodyconflictsinAfricaandAsiaduringthelattertwentiethandthisfirstdecadeofthetwentyfirstcenturyonclimatechangeandenvironmentaldisasters,italsowouldbeincorrecttoignoretheroleplayedbytheeconomichardships(includingstarvation)wroughtby theprolongeddroughtsandresultingresourceshortages.Civilunrest,revolutions,andwarsrequirerecruitsandleaderswhoarewillingtoriskmuchtogainvaluableresources.

Case Studies

Historicalresearchshowsthatenvironmentaldisasters,manylinkedtorelativelyrapidclimatechanges,canleadtoincreasesingrouplevelviolence.Ofcourse,not all environmental disasters are caused by climate change. For example,earthquakes,tsunamis,andvolcanoescananddocauseenvironmentaldisastersbut are not directly related to climate change. However, floods due to excessiverainfallormeltingglaciers,droughts,hurricanes,andcyclonesareclimatechangerelated.

Thissectionconcernswhetherenvironmentaldisastersincreaseviolenceratesandseverity,regardlessofwhethertheenvironmentaldisasterwasthedirectresultofclimatechange.

Intherecentpast,evidenceofsucheffectscomesfromtheU.S.DustBowlofthe1930s,clashesinBangladeshandIndiasincethe1950s,andHurricaneKatrinaintheUnitedStatesin2005(Reuveny,2008).Thecasesdifferinmanyways,includingpoliticalorganizationandstrength.Butineachcase,thereisevidencethatenvironmentaldisasterledtoincreasedinterpersonalviolence,aresultofecomigration(migrationofalargenumberofpeopleasaresultofecologicaldisaster).

hurricane katrina WhenKatrinahitLouisianaandMississippiinfall2005,itfloodedabout80%ofNewOrleansanddestroyedmuchoftheBiloxi–Gulfport


area.Morethanamillionpeopleleftthearea.Thisecomigrationwastoatleast30differentstates,withTexas(especiallyHouston)absorbingthemost,atleastinitially.Texasofficialsran20,000criminalchecksandfoundminimalcriminaldataontheirKatrinaimmigrants.Nonetheless,Houstonrecordedhugeincreasesinhomicides in thefollowingmonths,relative tothesamemonths in theyearprior to Katrina (Reuveny, 2008). There were other indicators (e.g., polls) oftension between the longtime residents and the newcomers. However, therewasnooutbreakofcivilwarandnoevidenceofarmedintergroupconflict.Thisseemstobegenerallytrueofecomigrationsinwellorganizedhighlyindustrializedcountries.

u.S. dust Bowl Inthe1930s,poorfarmingpracticescombinedwithaprolongeddroughtandstrongwindstoproduceanenvironmentaldisasterintheGreatPlains,particularlyOklahoma.About2.5millionpeopleleftthearea,primarilyforadjacentstates,butabout300,000wenttoCalifornia.Therearenumerousreportsof hostility and violence between the residents and the ecomigrants, includingpoliceeffortstoblockthemigrantsortoscatterthemfromtheirsettlements,beatings,andshackburnings(Reuveny,2008).

Bangladesh Population pressures from a very high fertility rate combinedwithunsustainablefarmingpracticesandenvironmentaldisasters(possiblyrelatedtoclimatechange)ledtolargescalemigrationstoadjacentregionsinBangladeshandacrossthebordertoIndia.From1976to2000about25millionpeoplewereaffectedbydroughts,270millionbyfloods,andanother41millionbyrainandwindstorms.Makingmattersworse, in1975theIndianFarakkaBarragebegandiverting water from the Ganges River to other parts of India, decreasing theamountflowingintoitshistorictributariesinBangladesh.TheresultingsaltwaterintrusionfromtheIndianOceanandincreasedsiltingoftheriverbedresultedinadditionalfloods,erosion,andenvironmentaldegradation.

Anestimated12to17millionBangladeshishavemigratedtoadjacentstatesin India since the1950s.Clashesbetween the residents and themigrantshaveoccurredalong socioeconomic, religious, ethnic, and national lines, resulting inthousandsofdeaths,especiallyafter the1983elections. Indeed,1,700Bengaliswerekilledina5hourrampagein1983.

1967 arab–israeli War There is historical evidence of water issues contributingtoconflict in theMiddleEastat leastasearlyas theseventhcenturyB.C.(Gleick,1993).SincetheestablishmentofIsraelin1948theregionhasperiodically been at war, for a variety of political and religious reasons. But waterissuesalsoplayanimportantroleintheconflicts,especiallyissuesconcerningtheJordanRiverbasin.Thisbasin is sharedbyIsrael, Jordan,Lebanon,andSyria.AccordingtoGleick(p.85),“oneofthefactorsdirectlycontributingtothe1967WarwastheattemptbymembersoftheArabLeagueintheearly1960stodiverttheheadwatersoftheJordanRiverawayfromIsrael.”(Foradditionalexamplesofimportantwaterconflicts,historicalaswellascontemporary,seeGleick,1993;Postel&Wolf,2001).


Time-Period Studies

little ice age effects FollowingtheMedievalWarmPeriod,theLittleIceAge(roughly1300–1850)usheredincoolertemperatures,shortergrowingseasons,andahostofotherclimaterelatedchanges.Scholarsfromavarietyofdisciplineshavebegunexamining the relationshipsamongrelatively rapid shifts inclimateandahostofhumanpopulationevents,includingwar.Fagan(2000)weavesacarefulstoryofclimateshiftsandtheirimpactonEuropeans,linkingfarmingpracticesandoutcomes,socialandculturalchanges,civilunrest,andwar.Thoughcarefultoavoidextremeclaimsofenvironmentaldeterminism,hemakesa strongcaseforviewingrapidclimatechange(inthiscase,cooling)ascontributingtowarandotherformsofviolence.Briefly,rapidclimatechangedisruptedfoodproduction,leadingtofoodshortages,famines,civilunrest,andwar.Thisprocessseemsparticularlyimportantinagrariansocietiesthatdonothavethepoliticalandeconomicresourcestoeffectivelydealwithfoodshortagesandfamine.Indeed,accordingtoFagantheFrenchRevolutionwasfueledinpartbyfoodshortagesthatwerelargelytheresultofthefailureoffarmingpracticestoadapttothechangedclimate.

Zhangandcolleagues(Zhang,Brecke,Lee,He,&Zhang,2007;Zhang,Zhang,Lee,&He,2007)tookamorestatisticalapproachtoexaminingthequestionofwhetherrapidshiftsinclimatefrom1000to1900werelinkedtowars.UsingdatafromtheNorthernHemisphereandfromChina,theyfoundstatisticalsupportfortheirmodel,whichisverysimilartoFagan’s(2000).

It might seem strange to include studies of rapid cooling in a work that isfocusedonglobalwarmingandviolence.However, thebasicmodel is thesameregardlessofwhetherarapidshift inclimateiswarmingorcooling,floodingordrought.Asystematicchangeinclimatethatthreatensbasichumanresourcesputsstressoneconomicandsocialsystems.Thatstresscanleadtoecomigrationandconflictordirectlytowaroverresources.

civil War in africa Burke,Miguel,Satyanath,Dykema,andLobell(2009)recentlyanalyzedcivilwarsinAfricafrom1981to2002.Somemodelsincludedper capita incomeand formofgovernment aswell as temperature andprecipitation. Overall, the results showed a strong positive relation between temperatureincreasesandcivilwar.Fora1°Cincreaseintemperature,therewasa5.9%increaseincivilwar.Giventhebaserateofcivilwarinthisdataset(11%),thisrepresentsa54%relativeincreaseinthelikelihoodofcivilwarforeach1°Cincreaseintemperature.Theauthorsnotedthata1°Cincreaseisprojectedby2030andthatiffuturewarsareasdeadlyaspastonesanadditional393,000battledeathscanbeexpectedinthisregion.

Additional Ecomigration and War-Related Forms of Violence

Arecent reportby theUnitedNations (Engelman,2009)highlightedanumberofadditionalwaysglobalclimatechangecanleadtoincreasedviolence.Perhapsthemostnotableisthelikelyincreaseinviolentcrimescommittedagainstwomenand children as a consequence of their increased vulnerability in subsistence


economiesthatsufferanecologicaldisaster.Withthebreakdownofsocietalnormsandincreasedeconomicstresscomeincreasesinrape,assault,andhomicide.Asfarasweknow,therearenostudiesdirectlylinkingglobalwarmingtosucheffects,butsuchoutcomeshavebeendocumentedintheaftermathofseverefloods,foodshortages,andwar(“civil”orotherwise).

implicationSCollectively, these three ways global climate change increases human violencesuggest a rather dire future. We prefer to end on a more positive note. Actioncanbetaken,byindividuals,groups,andgovernments.Oneobviousactionistoreducegreenhousegasemissions,therebyreducingthemagnitudeandspeedofclimate change. Many individuals, groups, and governments are taking actions,albeitsomewhatbelatedly.

Inadditiontothetechnologicalandlifestylechangesbeingactivelydeveloped,discussed,andimplemented,italsoseemsworthwhiletoconsideraninfrequentlydiscussedoption,thepotentialbenefitsofbetterpopulationcontrol.Onethousandyearsagotheworldpopulationwasabout300million.Currentlyitisabout7billion.Somehaveestimatedthattheworldpopulationwillpeakataround10billion.Mostofthatincreasewilltakeplaceindevelopingcountries,withhugeincreasesingreenhousegasemissionsasaresultofcarbonintensiveindustrializationandincreasingconsumption.Generallyspeaking,asacountrybecomesmore industrializedandwealthy,thecarbonfootprintperpersonincreasesdramatically,andpopulationgrowtheventuallyslows.Theconundrumwefaceishowtoreducetotalgreenhousegasemissionswhileimprovingthequalityoflifeofthelargeproportionofpeoplecurrentlylivinginpoverty.Onerecentstudyfoundthat,“dollarfordollar,investmentsinvoluntaryfamilyplanningandgirls’educationwouldalsointhelongrunreducegreenhousegasemissionsatleastasmuchasthesameinvestmentsinnuclearorwindenergy”(Engelman,2009,p.26).

Developed and developing countries will be affected differently by globalwarming.Insomeways,developedcountrieswillbelessaffected,inpartbecauseof their locations but more importantly because they have more resources percapitatodealwiththechanges.Itisunlikelythatfamineswillstriketherichestcountries,forexample.However,nocountrywillbeimmunetotheviolenceconsequencesofglobalclimatechange.Theheateffectonindividuallevelsofaggression and violence applies to all countries. Similarly, it seems obvious that evenwealthycountriesarelikelytoseeincreasesintheproportionofchildrenexposedtoknownriskfactorsforthedevelopmentofviolenceproneyouthandadults.Itislessobvioushowwealthycountrieswillbeaffectedbythethirdprocess,whichleads to increases in civil unrest, ecomigration, genocide, and war. But even ifdeveloped countries do not experience sufficient economic and social stress toinducewar(civilorinternational),civilunrestandecomigrationwithinthemwilllikelyleadtoincreasesinviolentcrime,especiallyafterecologicaldisasterssuchasfloods.Furthermore,increasedpoverty,civildissolution,andwarsindevelopingcountrieshaveanimpactondevelopedcountries.Insomecases,theimpactderives from the global economy and the need for resources. Also, differences


between the have and havenot countries create breeding grounds for internationalterroristgroups.

Whatactionscouldreducethelikelihoodofclimatechange–inducedviolence?Thereissomelimitedevidencethattheheat–aggressioneffectonindividualscanbereducedbysimplymakingpeopleawarethatwhentheyareuncomfortablyhottheytendtoreacttominorprovocationsininappropriatelyhostileways.However,giventheimmediacyandsubtletyoftheheateffectonirritability,hostileperceptionbiases,andaggression,itisdoubtfulthatsuchaneducationalinterventionwillhavealargeimpact.

Ontheotherhand,theothertwowaysglobalwarmingincreaseshumanviolenceappeartobegoodcandidatesforintervention.Ifgovernmentsbeganpreparingnowtofeed,shelter,educate,andmoveatriskpopulationstoregionsinwhichthey can maintain their livelihoods and their cultures, we could dramaticallyreduceboththedevelopmentofviolenceproneindividualsandthecivilunrest,ecomigration,andwarproblems.Thiswillcosthugeamountsofmoneyandwillrequiremoreinternationalcooperationthanourplanethaseverseen.Failuretodosowillresultinadditionaldisastersformillionsofpeople.

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17TheMediaandAggression

From TV to the InternetEDDONNERSTEIN

University of Arizona

R ecentlytheAmericanAcademyofPediatrics(AAP)issuedapolicystatementonmedia violence (AmericanAcademyofPediatrics, 2009a).Thestatementwasclear in termsof itsfindings,position,andrecommenda

tions.InratherstraightforwardtermstheAAPnoted:

Exposuretoviolenceinmedia,includingtelevision,movies,music,andvideogames,representsasignificantrisktothehealthofchildrenandadolescents.Extensiveresearchevidenceindicatesthatmediaviolencecancontributetoaggressivebehavior,desensitizationtoviolence,nightmares,andfearofbeingharmed. Pediatricians should assess their patients’ level of media exposureandinterveneonmediarelatedhealthrisks.(p.1495)

Therecommendationsforparents,practitioners,andtheindustrywereequallyfrankandsuggestedsomeofthefollowing:

• Remove televisions, Internet connections, and video games from children’sbedrooms.

• Avoidscreenmediaforinfantsortoddlersyoungerthan2years.• Avoidtheglamorizationofweaponcarryingandthenormalizationofvio

lenceasanacceptablemeansofresolvingconflict.• Eliminatetheuseofviolenceinacomicorsexualcontextorinanyother

situationinwhichtheviolenceisamusing,titillating,ortrivialized.• Eliminategratuitousportrayalsofinterpersonalviolence.• Ifviolenceisused,itshouldbeusedthoughtfullyasseriousdrama,always

showingthepainandlosssufferedbyvictimsandperpetrators.

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• Videogamesshouldnotusehumanorotherlivingtargetsorawardpointsforkilling,becausethisteacheschildrentoassociatepleasureandsuccesswiththeirabilitytocausepainandsufferingtoothers.

IwouldexpectthattheAAP’sstatementandrecommendationswouldprobablybeacceptedbyasubstantialmajorityofresearchersintheareaofmediaviolence,andaggressioningeneral,includingthoseparticipatinginthisSymposium(Anderson, Gentile, & Buckley, 2007; Huesmann, 2007; Strasburger, Jordan, &Donnerstein,2010).AndasapublichealthorganizationtheAAPisnotaloneinitsrecommendation;groupsliketheAmericanMedicalAssociation,theAmericanAcademy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American PsychologicalAssociationhaveallissuedstatementsovertheyearspertainingtothe“harmful”impactofmediaviolenceonchildren.

Inthischapterwewillprovideanoverviewforthisandotherresearchrelatedtotheseharmfuleffectsbutwithanadditionalfocusonhowviolenceisdisseminatedthroughthelensofnewermediatechnology.Muchoftheresearchonmediaviolencehastraditionallybeenonthemediaoftelevisionandofcourseonvideogames.Thismediaformisnotobsolete;rather,formanychildrenandadolescentsthemediumforthisviewingmightnotbethetimehonoredtelevisionscreenbutinsteadtheInternet,whichoffersanarrayofnewissuestoconsider.ThefollowingsectionexaminestheroleoftheInternetasitrelatestotheconcernswehaveabouttheinfluenceofmediaviolence.

the internet aS a medium for media violenceUnliketraditionalmediasuchasTV,therearerelativelyfewstudiesontheimpactofInternetviolence.Thesearereviewedlaterinthechapter,butitisinterestingtonoteattheoutsettherecentcommentaryofresearchersaboutthepotentialandfarreachinginfluencesofthis“newer”technology:

TheInternetisfastbecomingthetelephoneofthe21stcentury,withanestimated97%ofyoungpeoplebetweentheagesof12and18yearsusingonlinecommunication. Almost all youths now have online access, and this accessmayincreaseopportunitiesforchildrenandyouthstobeexposedtoviolence.(Ybarra,West,Markow,Leaf,Hamburger,&Boxer,2008,p.930)

Formanyyouthithasbecomethemajorsourceofinformationandentertainment.Itisperhapstheonemediumwherechildrenmaycomeacrossnonintentionallycontentthatislessavailableintraditionalmediasuchassevereviolence,violentpornography,childpornography,hategroups.(Feilitzen,2009)

TheInternetbecomesthemediuminwhichtraditionalmedia likeTV,film,andvideogamescanbedownloaded,viewed,andprocessedcognitively.Themostrecent survey of children and adolescent media use by the Kaiser Foundation(2010)indicatedthattheamountoftimeviewingTVcontenthadincreasedoverthe lastdecadebut that this increase isaccounted forprimarilyby theviewingofsuchprogrammingovertheInternetandmobiledevices.TheInternetisalso

the media and aggreSSion 269

a vehicle, however, for the creation of aggressive images and the acting out ofaggressivebehavior.It isbothpassiveandactive.Itincorporatesourconceptionofhowchildrenandadolescentscognitivelyprocessconventionalmediaviolence,butitaddsanewdimension—actuallybeingaggressive.WecanseeinFigure 17.1(adaptedfromcommentsbyFeilitzen,2009)howthismightbeconceptualized,both in terms of the Internet generally and in the use of new technologies asmobilephones.

TheInternetallowstheindividualtoviewtraditionalTVandfilmandvideogamesthroughlivestreamingordownloads.Forthechildoradolescent,accesstowhatmightbeconsideredrestrictedmaterials(adultrated)ismucheasierviabothlegaland“illegal”outlets.Websitesofferanotherdimensiontotheviewingofviolence:thecreationanduploadingofviolentmaterials.Websitesoffernotonly theprospectof viewingmore severe violence (e.g., realdecapitations andexecutions)butalsoaccesstohateandterroristgroups.Theviewer,however,cannowbecome thecreator of violent images in an almost formulaicmanner andcanplacethatmaterialacrosstheglobeinstantaneously.Finally,Websitesandinparticularsocialnetworkingsites,blogs,chatrooms,andemailnotonlyallowforthecreationofaggressionbutalsoprovidetheabilitytoactuallypersistentlyaggressagainstanother(i.e.,cyberbullying).Onephenomenon,whichbringsthistoa“strange”confluence,is“happyslapping,”whereavictimisassaultedandthedepictionisuploadedtotheInternet.AsCalveteetal.(2008)noted,adolescentswhousetheirmobilephoneswiththisaimarecharacterizedbyseveraltypesofaggressiveness,by justificationofviolencebeliefs,andbyhighexposuretoviolenceinthefamilyandmedia.

Consequently,unliketraditionalmediasuchasTV,theInternetandthesenewtechnologiesgivechildrenandadolescentsaccesstojustaboutanyformofcontenttheycanfind(e.g.,Livingstone&Haddon,2009).Forthefirsttime,theseindividualswillbeable(oftenwithlittleeffort)tohavetheabilitytoviewalmostanyformofsexualbehavior,violentcontent,orotherriskrelatedcontent(Donnerstein,2009;Strasburgeretal.,2010).Unlikeyearspast,thiscanbedoneintheprivacyoftheirownroomwith littleknowledgeor supervisionof theirparents.The interactive

Traditional massmedia• Receive and consume “traditional” film and TV violence• Video games

Web sites• Traditional mass media available• Severe violence, hate groups• Send, create, and upload violent content

Socialnetworkingsites, blogs,chat, email• Receive aggression (e.g., cyber-bullying)• Create and send aggression

figure 17.1 TheInternet,newtechnology,andmassmediaviolence.

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natureoftheInternet,whichcanleadtomorearousalandmorecognitiveactivity,wouldsuggestthatinfluencessuchasthosefoundfrommediaviolencewouldbefacilitated(seeHuesman,2007).

media uSe and the child audienceAmerican children and adolescents spend significant time in front of a screen(Strasburgeretal.,2010).IntheirnationalsurveyofmediauseintheUnitedStates,theKaiserFamilyFoundation (2006,2010) foundthatchildrenandadolescentswerespendingonaveragemoretime in frontofascreen thanreadingorbeingactiveoutdoors.Moreinterestingwasthefindingthatofallthoseundertheageof3,anagemanywouldsuggestismorevulnerabletoeffects,overtwothirdsusesomescreenmediaaday,andathirdarealreadyusingacomputer.Achild’sbedroomisnolongeraplaceofisolationinthatmediatechnologyispartofthefurniture.Twothirdshadatelevisionset,onehalfhadaVCRorDVDplayerorvideogameconsole,andnearlyonethirdhadInternetaccessoracomputer.Moreimportantly,theuseoftheInternetandmobiledevicesformediaconsumptionhasincreasedsignificantly,particularlywiththerapidexpansionofbroadbandavailability.

WhileittookdecadesforTVtobecomepartofthefamilyhousehold,Internetusehasachievedthisinashorttimeframe.RecentresearchbythePewInternetandAmericanLifeProject (PewFoundation,2009)revealed that93%ofyouthaged12 to17 areonline sometimeduring theday, and71%havea cellphone.Whetheritiswatchingvideos(57%),usingsocialnetworkingsites(65%),orplayingvideogames (97%),childrenandadolescentshave incorporatednewtechnologyintotheirdailylives.Thesefrequenciesarealsoobservedacross21differentcountrieswithinEurope.TheEUKidsOnlineProjectfoundthatin2005onaverage70%of6–17yearoldsusedtheInternet.By2008,itwasat75%withthelargestincreaseoccurringamongyoungerchildren(6–10)inwhich60%werenowonline(Livingstone&Haddon,2009).

Inthinkingaboutthisuseofthemassmedia,weneedtorememberthatveryoften those who are the most vulnerable to negative impacts (e.g., aggression,deceptiveadvertising)arechildren,andtheirprocessingofthemediaisdifferentfromadults.Inthefirstplace,youngerchildreninterpretmediamessagesdifferently.Theypaymoreattentiontoperceptualfeaturesandmoresalientcontextualfeaturesratherthantoplot.Theyarelesscognizantofconsequencesandmotives.Childrenalsohavedifficultydistinguishingbetweenfantasyandreality.Thisplaysanextremelyimportantroleinchildren’smediaviewinginthatwhenweexaminetheeffectsfromexposuretomediaviolenceonecriticalcontextualvariableistheperceivedrealityoftheaggression.Finally,childrenhavedifficultiesandarelesscapableoflinkingscenestogether.Adultsrecognizethattheperpetratorofaggression was caught, punished, or reprimanded for his or her behavior in the finalscene.Ayoungchilddoesnotalwaysperceivethisrelationship.

Weneedtorealizethatnotallviolentportrayalsposethesameriskofharmtoviewers.Researchindicatesthatcertaindepictionsofviolenceincreasetheriskofantisocialeffectsmorethanothers(seeStrasburger,Wilson,&Jordan,2009).Simplyput,thecontextorwayviolenceispresentedinfluencesitsimpactonthe


audience.Basedonanextensivereviewofstudiesinthisarea,researchers(Smith&Donnerstein,2003;Wilsonetal.,2002)haveidentifiedarangeofcontextualfeaturesthatinfluencehowaudienceswillrespondtotelevisedviolence(e.g.,advertisements;Tajimaetal.,2008)andalsotovideogameviolence(Horiuchiet.al.,2008).Themostimportantcontextualfactorsareattractiveperpetrators,thepresenceofweapons,graphicandextensiveviolence,consequencesforaggressionsuchaspunishmentsorpain,andrealism.

Muchof theviolencepresented in themedia isoften sanitizedandglamorized,andinchildren’sprogrammingitoftenispresentedashumorous(Strasburgeretal.,2009).Thesecontextualfactorsareimportantindeterminingthe“risk”ofexposure primarily to young children. Portrayals with an attractive perpetratorandthatarerealistic, justified,gounpunished,andshownoharmare themostproblematicforyoungchildren.Thesetypesofmediadepictionsoccurmostofteninthetypesofshowsviewedbychildren(e.g.,Wilsonetal.,2002).

Interactive media seems to be no different from traditional television when itcomestodepictionsofconcernforchildrenandadolescents.Arecentanalysisofvideogamesrevealedthatmorethanhalfofallgames—including90%ratedasappropriateforchildrenaged10yearsandolder(Andersonetal.,2007)—containviolence.Contextualcharacteristicsthatareconsideredmoreofariskforsubsequentaggressivebehaviorhavealsobeenfoundinvideogames.Inarecentanalysisjustifiedviolencewasfoundin60%ofthegames,violencewithweaponswasfoundin65%,andrewardforviolencein89%.Factorswemightconsiderasinhibitingaggressionsuchaspunishmentsforviolencewerefoundinonly26%ofthegames(Horiuchietal.,2008).

Bydefinition, theInternetencompassesall the typesofviolencedepicted intraditionalmedia andvideogames.While there isnomajorcontentanalysis forvideogameslikethereisfortraditionalmedia,researchersacknowledgethatmorerealworldviolence,hategroups,violentpornography,andotherformsofviolencearemoreprevalent(Ybarraetal.,2008).ThereiscurrentlyalackofdataonhowmanychildrenoradolescentsareintentionallyviewingthesesitesandwhethertheInternet’sincreasedeaseofaccesstothesetypesofdepictionshasresultedinhighratesofexposureamongyoungviewers(Hamburger,Ybarra,Leaf,&West,2009).

media violence effectS: televiSion, video gameS, and the internet

In this section we will brieflyexamine theknown effects of media violence onaggressivebehavior.Eventhoughthereviewisseparatedintothreecategories(TV,videogames,Internet),theinterrelationshipsareevident.Sinceonemajorgoalofthischapterwastoexaminetheuniqueaspectsofnewertechnologies,inparticulartheInternet,thisclassificationseemsmorefunctional.

Television

Inareportonyouthviolence,thesurgeongeneraloftheUnitedStates(2001)identifiedaseriesofriskfactorsthatwereconsideredto(1)increasetheprobabilitythat

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ayoungpersonwillbecomeviolent,and(2)predicttheonset,continuity,orescalationofviolence.Inconsideringthesevaryingfactors,thesurgeongeneral’sreportnotedthatmoreimportantthananyindividualriskfactoristheaccumulationoffactors.Whenconsideringthemost importantfactors inyouthviolence,beingamalehadthehighesteffectsize.Amongothermajorfactorsandtheireffectsizeswerethefollowing:

Substanceabuse=.30Antisocialparents=.23Weaksocialties=.15Mediaviolence=.13LowIQ=.12Brokenhome=.09Abusiveparents=.07Antisocialpeers=.04

Thoughitisnotthemajorcontributor,mediaviolenceisconsidered,especiallywhenotherfactorsarepresent,asignificantforceinthedevelopmentandonsetofaggressivebehaviorinyouth.Asresearchershavestronglysuggested,exposuretoviolentmedianeedstobepartofthemeasurestakenwhenriskfactorsforaggressive behavior are considered (Boxer,Huesmann,Bushman, O’Brien,& Moceri,2009;Bushman,Huesmann,&Whitaker,2009).

Anycriticalexaminationoftheliteraturewouldindicatethatexposuretomediaviolencecancontributetoarangeofantisocialeffectsonviewers(Huesmann&Kirwil,2007).Theconclusionthatviolenceontelevisioncontributestonegativeeffectsonviewersishardlynovel.Theeffectsthatseemtobemostpronouncedarethelearningofaggressiveattitudesandbehaviors,desensitizationtoviolence,andincreasedfearofbeingvictimizedbyviolence(seeHuesmann,2007;Huesmann&Taylor,2006).

Overthelast40years,severalgovernmentalandprofessionalorganizationshaveconductedexhaustive reviewsof the scientific literature toascertain the relationshipbetweenexposuretomediaviolenceandaggression.Theseinvestigationshavedocumentedconsistentlythatexposuretomediaviolencecontributestoaggressivebehaviorsinviewersandmayinfluencetheirperceptionsandattitudesaboutviolenceintherealworld.Heavyviewingofmediaviolenceiscorrelatedwithaggressivebehaviorand increasedaggressiveattitudes(seeAndersonetal.,2003foranextensivereview).Thecorrelationbetweenviewingviolenceinthemediaandexhibiting aggressivebehavior is fairly stable over time, place, anddemographics (e.g.,Huesmann,Moise,Podolski,&Eron,2003).Experimentaland longitudinalstudies also support theposition that viewing televised violence is relatedcausally toaggressivebehavior(Andersonetal.).Evenmoreimportant,naturalisticfieldstudiesand crossnational investigations reveal that viewing televised aggression leads toincreasesinsubsequentreallifeaggressionandthatsuchbehaviorcanbecomepartofalastingbehavioralpattern(Bushmanetal.,2008;Huesmann,Boxer,&Bushman,2009).Thesestudieshavebeenconsistentinresearchconductedinanumberofdifferentcountries(seeBushman&Huesmann,2006;Huesmann,2007).


Froma theoretical perspective, Huesmann (2007; see also Chapters16 and19inthisvolume)andothers(e.g.,Anderson&Bushman,2002)wouldagreethattheshorttermeffectsofexposuretomediaviolencearemostlydueto(1)primingprocesses, (2) arousalprocesses, and (3) immediatemodelingof specificbehaviors(observationallearning).Longtermeffectsseemtobedueto(1)longertermlearningofcognitionsandbehavioralscriptsand(2)theactivationanddesensitizationofemotionalprocesses.

Video Games

In terms of demonstrating increased aggressive behavior from exposure, theresearch on video games is as consistent as that with television violence (seeAnderson et al., 2007, 2010 for an extensive review). Metaanalyses (Anderson,2004;Anderson&Bushman,2001;Andersonetal.,2010)havebeenconsistentintheirfindings.Whilesomehavedisagreedwiththesestudies(Ferguson,2010),theconsensusofresearchersisthateffectsfromplayingviolentvideogameshavebeenshownforthefollowing:

1.Increasedaggressivebehavior(Andersonetal.,2008) 2.Hostileaffect(Carnagey&Anderson,2005) 3.Physiologicalarousal(Anderson&Bushman,2001) 4.Aggressivecognitions(Anderson&Huesmann,2003;Bluemke,Friedrich,

&Zumbach,2010) 5.Reductionsinprosocialbehaviorfromdesensitization(e.g.,Bushman&

Anderson,2009)

Theseresultshavebeenobservedbothinshorttermandlongitudinalstudiesaswellascrossculturally(e.g.,AndersonetAl.,2008,2010).

Anderson (2000, 2007) noted that there are strong compelling reasons toexpectthatviolentvideogames,duetotheirinteractivenature,wouldhavestrongereffectsonaggressionthanmoretraditional formsofmediaviolencesuchasTV.Invideogamestheprocessofidentificationwiththeaggressor,activeparticipation,repetitiveactions,ahostilevirtualreality,andreinforcement foraggressiveactionsareallstrongmechanismsforthelearningandretentionofaggressivebehaviorsandattitudes(Gentile&Anderson,2003).

The Internet

AnumberofareasdeserveconsiderationwhendiscussingtheeffectsoftheInternetasapotentiallyuniquecontributortoaggressivebehavior.Aswenotedearlier,theInternetnotonlyactsasaplatformfortheviewingofmediabutalsoisavehicleforactingoutaggression.Itisthislaterfunctionthatformanyhealthprofessionalshasbeenofimportance.Forthatreasonwewillexaminefirsttheconcernsaboutcyberbullyingandsexualexploitation.Followingthisdiscussionwewilllookatthecontentofviolentmediathatmightbeconsideredunique,orcertainlymoreaccessible,ontheInternet.

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cyberbullying Theoneareathatseemstobeofprimeimportanceiscyberbullying.Ithasbecomeasignificantsocialissueprimarilyamonghealthcareandotherprofessionals(AAP,2009b).Olweus(1993)definedbullyingasfollows:

Apersonisbulliedwhenheorsheisexposed,repeatedlyandovertime,tonegativeactionsonthepartofoneormoreotherpersons,andheorshehasdifficultydefendinghimselforherself.(p.14)

Thisdefinitionincludesthreeimportantcomponentsinthatitis(1)aggressivebehaviorthatinvolvesunwanted,negativeactions,(2)involvesapatternofbehaviorrepeatedovertime,and(3)involvesanimbalanceofpowerorstrength.Cyberbulling,often referred toas Internetharassmentor Internetaggression,incorporates these components and in many ways is similar to other forms ofbullying(e.g.,Heirman&Walrave,2008;Williams&Guerra,2007)but takesplaceovertheInternettorepeatedlyharass,threaten,ormaliciouslyembarrass.Research also suggests that Internet bullying shares common predictors withverbal and, to some extent, physical bullying (see Williams & Guerra). Whiletherearecertainlydebatesabouttheusageoftheterm,bothpolicymakersandthepublicacrossmanycountrieshaveincorporatedthetermcyberbullyingintotheirlexicon,anditwillbeusedinthischapter.Itinvolvesthefollowingbehaviors(NCPC,2009):

• Sendingunsolicitedorthreateningemail• Encouragingotherstosendthevictimunsolicitedorthreateningemail• Sendingvirusesbyemail(electronicsabotage)• Spreadingrumors• Making defamatory comments about the victim in public discussion

areas• Sendingnegativemessagesdirectlytothevictim• Impersonating the victim online by sending an inflammatory message

thatcausesotherstorespondnegativelytothevictim• Harassingthevictimduringalivechat• LeavingabusivemessagesonWebsiteguestbooks• Sending the victim pornography or other knowingly offensive graphic

material• CreatingaWebpagethatdepictsthevictiminnegativeways

Those conducting research in this area would acknowledge that victims ofcyberbullyingaswellaschildrenwhoarebulliedinpersonmayexperiencemanyof the sameeffects, such as adrop ingrades, lowered selfesteem, a change ininterests, ordepression (see Journal of Adolescent Health, 2007; NCPC, 2009).Chapter3inthisvolumediscussescyberostracism—theeffects ofbeingignoredandexcludedovertheInternet,whichcanleadtosimilareffects(e.g.,anger,aggression)as“facetoface”ostracism.However,cyberbullyingcanseemmoreextremetoitsvictimsbecauseofseveralfactors:


• Itoccursinthechild’shome.Theplacethechildoradolescentoftenseesassecurenowrepresentsbeingavictim.

• Itcanbeharsherbecauseoftheanonymityoftheaggressorandinabilitytoseethevictim’sreactions. Theabilitytoempathizewiththevictimismuchmoredifficultinthesesituations(seeChapter7inthisvolume).

• ItcanbefarreachinginthatoncepostedonaWebsiteitis“forever”incyberspace.

• It may seem inescapable since not going online takes away one of themajorplaceschildrenandadolescentssocialize.

TherecentU.S.DepartmentofJustice(2009)NationalSurveyofChildren’sExposuretoViolencefoundthatInternetharassmentwaslesscommonthanotherformsofbullying.Itwasfoundthat6%reportedInternetharassmentwithinthepastyearand8%duringtheir lifetimes.Whilethismayappearatfirstglanceasmallpercentage,weneedtorememberthatthiswasanationalsurveywithintheUnitedStatesandthatthesepercentagescertainlyrepresentedasignificantnumberofyouthwhoareimpacted.

Surveys reported by the Pew Foundation (2007) and Hinduja and Patchin(2009) indicate that, although cyberbullying is less common than school bullying,anywherebetween15and35%ofyouth reporthavingexperienced it.Thedata also indicate that 10–20% of students admit to cyberbullying others, andgirlsare justas likely, ifnotmore so, tobe involved in this typeofbehaviorasboys(e.g.,Kowalski&Limber,2007).TheseeffectsseemtobeconsistentintheUnitedStates,Australia,andEurope(e.g.,Brandtzæg,Staksrud,Hagen,&Wold,2009).Mostofthesesurveysindicatethatinvolvementincyberbullyingseemstopeakinthemiddleschoolyears(grades6–8).ThereisalsorecentresearchtosuggestoverlapamongvictimsofschoolbullyingandonlineharassmentbothwithintheUnitedStatesandGermany(e.g.,Wolak,Mitchell,&Finkelhor,2007;Katzer,Fetchenhauer,&Belschak,2009).

Anumberofresearchersarebeginningtoexaminetheplatformforcyberbullying.Althoughthisresearchisjustemerging,thereissomeevidencetosuggestthatatleastwithintheUnitedStateschatroomsandinstantmessaging(IM)aremorefrequentlyemployedwhereasemailisthepreferredtechnologyinEurope(Brandzægetal.,2009).

Sexual exploitation Anothermajorconcernwith theInternet isthesexual exploitation of children and adolescents. Sending sexual information overemailorpostingsonbulletinboardshasbeenalongtermissue.OneofthemostcomprehensiveseriesstudiesontheseissueshascomefromtheCrimesAgainstChildren Research Center at the University of New Hampshire (http://www.unh.edu/ccrc).This excellent seriesof studies ( Wolak,Finkelhor,Mitchell,&Ybarra,2008)involvedarandomnationalsampleof1,500childrenages10–17interviewedin2000andthenanadditionalsampleof1,500interviewedin2005.Thisprocedureallowedtheresearchestolookatthechangesinyouths’experienceswiththeInternet.Themajorfindingsfromthisstudycanbesummarizedasfollows:

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1.Therewasan increaseover the5yearperiodfrom25%to34%of theyouthwhoindicatedthattheywereexposedtounwantedsexualmaterials.ItisinterestingtonotethatthisincreaseoccurredinspiteofthefactthatmorefamilieswereusingInternetfilteringsoftware(over50%)duringthisperiod.AEuropeanstudyof21countries(Livingstone&Haddon,2009)indicatesthatabout40%ofyouthreportexposuretopornography.

2.Atotalof15%ofalloftheyouthreportedanunwantedsexualsolicitationonlineinthepreviousyear,with4%reportinganincidentonasocialnetworkingsitespecifically.Perhapsmoreimportantly,about4%ofthesewere considered “aggressive” in that the solicitor attempted to contactthe user offline. These are the episodes most likely to result in actualvictimizations.

3.Additionally,inthisstudy4%ofthosesurveyedwereaskedfornudeorsexuallyexplicitpicturesofthemselves.Ofmoreconcernmaybethefindingthatlessthan5%ofthesewerereportedtolawenforcementofficialsortheInternetprovider.Inmanyjurisdictions,theseconstitutecriminalrequeststoproducechildpornography(Wolaketal.,2008).

4.Inthestudy,4%saidtheywereupsetordistressedasaresultoftheseonlinesolicitations.Thesearetheyouthmostimmediatelyharmedbythesolicitationsthemselves.

5.Theseresearchersalsoreportedanincreaseinonlineharassmentandbullying.Manyoftheseepisodesoccurfromconfrontationsinschoolfromindividualswhoknoweachother.Mostofthosewhowereharassedwerefemales.

Two interesting questions have been raised about the Internet and sexualexploitation(Wolaketal.,2008;Ybarra&Mitchell,2008).First,doestheInternetmakechildrenmoreaccessible tooffenders?And if offendersparticipate in sexsitesandhaveeasieraccesstochildpornography,doesthis“trigger”theoffense,orwouldithaveoccurredanyway?Bothanswersarespeculative,andadditionalresearchisimperativetomorefullyunderstandthecomplexitiesoftheInternetandchildexploitation.

Withrespecttothefirstquestion,theInternetcanmakechildrenmoreaccessibletooffendersthroughsocialnetworkingsites,email,andtextinginamannerthatismoreanonymousandoutsidethesupervisionofparents.Childrenmayalsofindthe“privacy”andanonymityofelectroniccommunicationmoreconducivetodiscussionsofintimaterelationshipsthaninafacetofacesituation.

Withrespecttothesecondquestion,therearesuggestionsthattheInternetcanfacilitatesexualoffendingsuchaspedophiliaviatherapidexchangeofimages,thelocatingofvictims,anddevelopmentofnetworks(e.g,Beech,Elliott,Birgden,&Findlater,2008;McDonald,Horstmann,Strom,&Pope,2009).Therationalesuggestedisasfollows(seeWolaketal.,2008):

• Thereiseasieraccesstochildpornography,whichcanevokeorpromoteinterestsinchildren.

• There are Web sites and Internet groups that explicitly encourage andlegitimizesexualbehaviorswithyouth.


• Thereistheinitialanonymityforcontactandsolicitationofachild.Socialnetworkingsitesandchatroomsmakeaccesseasier.

AsWolaketal.(2008)noted,alternativehypothesesshouldbeconsidered.Intheend,muchmoreindepthresearch isneeded,particularly inanareathat isbothnewandoftentimesmoredifficulttoinvestigate.

exposure to violence on the internet Concernsaboutchildrenandadolescents’useoftheInternetarenotlimitedtosexualcontent.Exposuretoviolentorhatefulcontenthasalsobeenamongthe typesofmaterialsconsideredrisky.AmongthesetypesofcontentareWebsitesforterrorismandotherradicalviolentorganizations.Someonlinearchivesprovide instructions formakingbombsorotherweapons.SincetheeventsofSeptember11,terroristgroupsmakeextensiveuseoftheInternettorecruitandspreadpropaganda.Chapter10inthisvolumeoffersanexcellentinsightintothistypeofterroristactivity.TheproliferationofhatespeechandhategroupshasalsobecomeeasilyaccessibleontheWeb.AreportbytheSimonWiesenthalCenter(2009)indicatesthatinthepastdecadetherehasbeenatenfoldincreaseofInternetbasedhategroupsthatmakeextensiveuseofsocialnetworkingsitesforrecruitment.

In an extensive survey of European countries, the EU Kids Online project(Livingstone&Haddon,2009) found that seeingviolentorhateful contentwasexperiencedbyapproximatelyonethirdofteenagers,makingitoneofthehigherriskconcerns.Oneproblem,however,wasthattheseverityandnatureoftheviolentcontentencounteredwasnotwellresearched,mainlyforethicalreasons.

Thisisoneofthemajorresearchproblemsinthisarea.ItisdifficultinthesestudiestoseparateoutthecontentonecouldseeofflineanywayandsimplyusetheInternetasamediumforviewing.ItistruethattheInternetallowschildrenandadolescentseasieraccesstomaterialswealreadyconsiderriskrelated(violenceonTVandfilm,videogameviolence),butamoreimportantquestionistherolethatmaterial“unique”totheInternetmightplayinaggressivebehaviors.Theresearchinthisareaislimited,andassomehavesuggestedwedonotreallyyetknowhowmanyyouthare“intentionally”viewingviolentWebsitesorarebeingexposedtographicrealisticviolence(Hamburgeretal.,2009).Aswealreadynotedregardingchildpredators,wearestillinneedoffurtherresearchontheuniqueroleoftheInternetcontentintheseareas.

However,somerecentresearchdoessuggestthatthetypesofmaterialsfoundexclusively on the Internet may have a relationship to aggressive behavior. In anational surveyofyouth,Ybarraetal. (2008) foundanassociationbetween theviewingofInternetviolenceandselfreportedseriouslyaggressivebehavior.Whileexposuretoviolenceinthemediaoverallwasrelatedtoaggressivebehavior,youthwhoreportedthatmanyoralloftheWebsitestheyvisiteddepictedrealpeoplefighting,shooting,orkillingwerefivetimesmorelikelytoreportengaginginseriouslyviolentbehavior.ThesetypesofsitesseemedtobeuniquetotheInternetandincluded(1)hatesites,(2)Websitesshowingpicturesofdeadpeopleorpeopledying,ora“snuff”site,(3)Websitesshowingsatanicrituals,(4)Websitesshowingpicturesofwar,death,or“terrorism,”or(5)Websitesshowingcartoons,suchas

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stickpeopleoranimals,beingbeatenup,hurt,orkilled.TheauthorsspeculatedthattheinteractiveenvironmentoftheInternetandthedepictionofrealpeopleengagedinviolencemayexplainthestrongerassociationwithreportedseriouslyviolentbehavior.Weneedtokeepinmindthatthisisacrosssectionaldesignstudyanddoesnotestablishcausality.

AnothernationalsurveyconductedinTaiwanalsosuggestssomeuniquecontributionoftheInternettoyouthaggression.Inasurveyofover9,000adolescents,Ko,Yen,Liua,Huang,andYen(2009)foundthatheavyusersoftheInternetweremorelikelytoselfreportaggressivebehaviorduringthepastyear.Thiswasthecaseaftercontrollingfortheviewingofviolenttelevisionprograms.Thisreportedaggressionalsooccurredmoreofteninstudentswhowereinvolvedinonlinechatting, adult sex Web sites, online gaming, online gambling, and bulletin boardsystems.Theauthorssuggestthattheselateractivitiesofferbothanonymityandgroupidentification.

Another concern, suggested earlier, is the proliferation and access to hategroupsandotherpotentiallyviolentorganizationsthroughWebsites,chatrooms,andotherInternetplatformsthathavethepotentialtorecruit,organize,andreinforceindividualsforaggressiverelatedbehaviors.InhisbookondemocracyandtheInternet,Republic.com,Sunstein(2001)acknowledgestherisksweencounterwithanopenanduncensoredInternet.UsingoneexampleforthegroupUnorganizedMilitias,henoted:

AcrucialfactorbehindthegrowthoftheUnorganizedMilitiahasbeentheuse of computer networks, allowing members to make contact quickly andeasilywithlikemindedindividualstotradeinformation,discusscurrentconspiracytheories,andorganizeevents.(p.22)

Anumberofexcellentdiscussionsinthisvolumeoningroupattachments(seeChapters2and10)speaktoSunstein’s(2001)assertion.Thequestionconsideredearlier, however, about theuniqueness of the Internet from offline exposure toviolentmaterialscanalsoberaisedwithregardtohateorradicalgroups.Whilethereisanincreaseintheproliferationofthesegroupsaswellas(1)examinationsoftheircontent(e.g.,Douglas,McGarty,Bliuc,&Lala,2005)and(2)speculationof their influences, there is little systematic research on the specific influencesoftheseonlinesitesanddiscussiongroupsforsubsequentofflinebehaviors.Inarecentreviewofthisliterature,McDonald,Horstmann,Strom,andPope(2009)notedthattheefficacyofWebbasedhategroupsisstillunclear.

ArecentstudybyWojcieszak(2009)doessuggestthatparticipationinradicalonlinegroups,suchasneoNazis,increasesofflineactionsthatsupportneoNazimovementsaswellasinactionsthatpromotethesemovements.Thisstudycertainlyhasanumberoflimitationssuchascausality,selfselection,andvalidityofbehavioraloutcomes.Nevertheless,itexaminestheroleoftheInternetasanalternativetotraditionalfacetofacesocializationinunderanalyzedcommunities.

Sexual violence WhileitisimportanttoexaminetheuniquecharacteristicsofInternetcontent,weshouldnotsummarilydismisstheinadvertent(orperhaps


intentional) exposure to materials children or adolescents would have difficultyviewingoffline.Oneconcern raisedabout childrenandadolescents’ interactionwiththeWebistheinadvertentexposurenotonlytoextremeformsofviolencebutalsotosexualviolence(e.g.,Donnerstein,2009;Feilitzen,2009;Strasburgeretal.,2010).Todate,therehasbeenvirtuallynoresearchontheeffectsofexposure to sexualviolenceonadolescentviewers, althoughresearchershavespeculatedonitsimpact(e.g.,Malamuth&Impett,2001;Donnerstein&Smith2001;Wright,Malamuth,&Donnerstein,2010).Forethical reasons these studiesarenearlyimpossibletoundertake.However,numerousstudiesinvolvingcollegeagestudentshaverevealedthatdepictionsofsexualviolenceinthemediacanpromoteantisocial attitudesandbehavior.Given that someof this researchhas involvedRratedfilms,thereiseveryexpectationthatadolescentsandchildrenwouldbeexposedtothesetypesofmaterialsviatheInternet.Particularlydetrimentalareviolentimagesinpornographyandelsewherethatportraythemyththatwomenenjoyorinsomewaybenefitfromrape,torture,orotherformsofsexualviolence(e.g.,Donnerstein,2000,2008;Harris,2009).Ifanything,wemightexpectevenstrongereffectsofsuchcontentonyoungerviewerswhomaylackthenecessarycriticalviewingskillsandtheexperiencetodiscounttheseportrayals.Toanadolescentwho is searching theWeb for informationabout relationships, the inadvertentexposuretosexualviolencemaybeapotentsourceofinfluenceoninitialattitudestowardsexuality.

Summary Inmanyways the issueof Internetviolence isperhapsataplacethatvideogameviolencewasadecadeago.ThereisagooddealofspeculationandtheoreticalassumptionstoassumethattheInternetwillbeasubstantialfactorinthedevelopmentofaggression.Whatbroughtvideogameviolencetotheforefrontwassolidempiricalandtheorydrivenresearch(e.g.,Andersonetal.,2007,2010).WearebeginningtoseethiswithintherealmofresearchontheInternetandviolence.Inconsideringthefutureofthisresearch,anumberofindividualsreviewingthisresearchacrossvariouscountrieshavepointedtoareasthatneedspecificconsideration(e.g.,Livingstone&Haddon,2009;McDonaldetal.,2009).Someoftheserecommendationsareasfollows:

1.Longitudinalresearchtoexaminethecausalrelationshipsbetweenonlineparticipationandengagingincriminalacts

2.The major risk factors (i.e., individual, environmental, social) that arerelatedtosomeone“acting”onthisInternetexposure

3.GiventheincreasinguseoftheInternetbyyoungerchildren(undertheageof12),thereisaneedforspecificresearchonthispopulation.Inparticulararestudiesonthoseintheunder6yearoldrangewhowillhavelesscapacityto“cope”withriskieronlinecontent.

4.Researchonexpandingplatforms likemobilephonesandvirtualgameenvironmentsaswellaspeertopeerexchanges

5.Increasedresearchonpublichealthissueslikeselfharm,suicide,drugs,andaddiction

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concluSionInthischapterwesetouttoaddresstheissuessurroundingtheeffectsofexposuretomediaviolenceonprimarilychildrenandadolescents.Thisisnotanewendeavor,asmanyinthepsychologicalcommunityhavewrittenaboutthesevaryingeffectsfordecades(e.g.,Andersonetal.,2010;Huessman,2007).Formany,therehasbeentheoverallassumptionthatexposuretomassmediaviolencecanbeinfluentialinthebehaviorandattitudesofchildren,adolescents,andevenadults.Myintentinthisreviewwasnottoreiteratewhathasbeenfocusedonin thepastbutrathertoexpandthediscussiontonewertechnologies,inparticulartheInternet.Inthismanner the focusbecomesoneonmediatedviolenceandexamines the varyingmediumsyouthhaveattheirdisposalforbeingexposedtowhatwewouldconsiderriskrelatedcontent.

Inreflectingonthisbriefreview,itwouldbesafetoconcludethatthemassmedia,inallitsdomains,isacontributortoanumberofantisocialbehaviorsandhealthrelatedproblemsinchildrenandadolescents.Wemustkeepinmind,however,thatthemassmediaisbutoneofamultitudeoffactorsthatcontributeand,inmanycases,isnotalwaysthemostsignificant.Nevertheless,itisoneofthefactorsinwhichproper interventionscanmitigate its impactand, furthermore, canbecontrolledwithreasonableinsight(Strasburgeretal.,2010).

Unlikethemoretraditionalmediumsforexposuretomediaviolence,thereisgeneralagreementthatconsiderablymoreresearchisneededwithregardtotheInternetinitsroleasatechnologyforthelearning,social,andcognitivedevelopmentofchildrenandadolescents.Thereisnoquestionthatweneedtoenrichourunderstandingofthesenewtechnologiesasmoreandmorechildrencomeonlineandthetechnologyitselfchangesandexpands.

WhenthinkingaboutthesenewertechnologiesweshouldkeepinmindwhatHuesmann(2007)notedaboutthedecadesofresearchandtheoryontraditionalmedia.Thisextensiveresearchandtheorydevelopmenthasprovideduswithsignificant insights into the role new technology will play in the development andmitigationofaggressivebehavior.Assomehavesaid,“Thetechnologyconduitmaybechanging,buttheinfluentialprocesses(e.g.,priming,activationanddesensitization)maybethesame”(Ferdon&Hertz,2007,p.55).

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18AreSupernaturalBeliefs

CommitmentDevicesforIntergroupConflict?

ROBERTKURZBANandJOHNCHRISTNERUniversity of Pennsylvania

A rguablythemostimportantpoliticaleventofthealbeitstillyoungtwentyfirstcenturywasacaseofintergroupconflictinwhichsupernaturalbeliefsplayedapivotalrole.TheattackontheWorldTradeCenterinNewYork

City,thePentagoninWashington,D.C.,andthefoiledattackbythehijackersofUnitedAirlinesFlight93onSeptember11,2001,wasmotivatedbyintergroupconflictbutwasmadepossibleinnosmallpartbecausetheperpetratorshadbeliefsabouttheafterlife.Whilewedonotattemptheretosortoutthemanycausalantecedentsofthisattack,whichareundoubtedlycomplex(seealsoChapters2,10,and16inthisvolume),wedoproposeanexplanationforthebroaderphenomenon:whypeopleentertainsupernaturalbeliefsandtheirrelationshiptointergroupconflict.

introductionTruebeliefsareuseful, somuchso thatphilosophershavearguedthattheonlythingmindsaregoodforis“thefixationoftruebeliefs”(Fodor,2000,p.68),sentimentsthathavebeenechoedbyothers(e.g.,Dennett,1987;Millikan,1984;forarecentdiscussion,seeMcKay&Dennett,2009).Thegeneralideaisintuitiveandcompelling:truebeliefsaidinaccomplishinggoalsand,withappropriateinferencemachines,ingeneratingadditionaltruebeliefs.

Symmetrically,falsebeliefsare,ingeneral,lessuseful.Actingonthebasisofbeliefsthatdonotcapturesomethingtrueabouttheworldcanleadtoanynumberofbadoutcomes.Falsebeliefsaboutwhat is edible can lead topoisoning, falsebeliefsaboutwhatissharpcanleadtocuts,andsoon.Falsesupernaturalbeliefs,

roBert kurzBan and John chriStner286

asWright(2009)recentlydocumented,causetheirbearerstoengageinanarrayof costly behaviors, including enduring—even selfinflicting—severe harm and,fromanevolutionary standpoint, themostcostly choiceofall,electing to forgoreproduction(seealsoIannaccone,1992).

Inlightofthesearguments,onewouldexpectminds—absentsomeselectiveforce—tobedesignedtoresistadoptingfalsebeliefs.Thereare,however,important exceptions. Consider binary decisions suchas fleeingor notfleeing from apotentialpredatorinwhichthecostsoferrors(misses,falsealarms)andthebenefitsofbeingcorrect(hits,correctrejections)areasymmetrical.Insuchcases,ifthesystemisforcedtoadoptonebelieforotherandtoactonthebasisofthebelief,selection will not favor maximizing the probability of true belief; it will rathermaximizeexpectedvalue(Cosmides&Tooby,1987;Green&Swets,1966).Thatis,ifweassumethattheremustbeabeliefeitherthatthepredatorispresentorthatitisabsent(asopposedtosomeprobabilisticrepresentation),thenevenweakevidenceshouldgiverisetothe(likelyfalse)beliefthatthepredatorispresentsothattheappropriateaction(i.e.,fleeing)canbetaken.

Thisprincipleisreflectedinthedesignofbothhumanartifacts,suchasthesmoke detector, and human physiology (Nesse, 2001, 2005; Nesse & Williams,1994).Asmokedetectorcannotsignalthattheremightbeafire,soitsignalsthatit“believes”thereisoneevenonscantevidence.Inhumans,allornonedefensessuchastheimmunesystem(Nesse,2001)reflectthesameidea.

Thisprinciplegovernsthedesignofevolvedmechanismsforinferencesaboutthestateoftheworldacrossanynumberofdomains.AsWiley(1994)putit,ratherthan maximize percent correct, “basic decision theory suggests that a criterionshould maximize the expected utility for the receiver…” (p. 172). Wiley shows,usingastandardsignaldetectionanalysis,thatselectioncanfavor“adaptivegullibility”(i.e.,erringonthesideoffalsepositivesinthecontextofmating)and“adaptive fastidiousness” (i.e.,erringonthesideofmisses in thecontextofdetectingprey).Thepropensityforerror—false“beliefs”aboutwhatisandisnotamateorprey—isbuilt into thesemechanismsbecauseselectionwill sift indesignspacefordesignsthatmaximizefitnessratherthanaccuracy.Thisisastrueforevolvedhumansystemsasitisforotherorganisms’systems(Haselton&Buss,2000;Nesse&Williams,1994;Tooby&Cosmides,1987).

Thereisasecondimportantselectionpressurethatcancounteractthetendencyforevolutiontofavortruthpreservingbeliefsystems.Thispressurearisesinthecontextofstrategicinteractions,inwhichindividuals’payoffsareaffectedbyothers’actions(vonNeumann&Morgenstern,1944;Smith,1982).Toseethepotentialadvantagesoffalsebeliefs,denotepasthetruestateoftheworldandp*asafalsebelief(p≠p*).Supposeegoisbetteroffintermsofsocialadvantagesifeveryonebelievedp*ratherthanp.(Supposep*isthategoishighlyintelligent,forexample.)Supposefurtherthatego,byherselfbelievingp*,increasesthechancesthatotherswilladoptp*.(Weassumethat“genuine”beliefcanhaveadvantagesoversimplydissembling,perhapsbyvirtueoftheprobabilityofpersuasion;Trivers,2000.)Insuchacase,byvirtueoftheeffectsp*hasonothers’behavior,itcanbeadvantageousforegotobelievep*(Nesse&Lloyd,1992;Trivers,2000).Socalledpositiveillusions(Taylor&Brown,1988)mightbesuchcases,inwhichfalsepositivebeliefs

are Supernatural BeliefS commitment deviceS? 287

aboutoneselfcanaidinpersuadingotherstoadoptthisstrategicallyadvantageousbeliefp*(Kurzban&Aktipis,2006,2007).Systemscancometobedesignedtogenerateandadoptp*’saslongasthecostsofthefalsebeliefdonotoutweighthestrategicbenefits(Kurzban,inpress).

Itisimportanttobearinmindboththepowerandthelimitsofthistypeofargument.Putativecasesofdesigntobringabout falsebeliefsmustrespect thedistinctionbetween,ononehand,whenthedecisiononemakes inandof itselfdeterminesone’spayoffand,ontheotherhand,whenthedecisiononemakesandwhatonecommunicatestootheragentsaffectsone’spayoff.

Thedistinctionisimportantbecausetherelentlesscalculusofdecisiontheoryandnaturalselectionpunishesmechanismsthatdonotmaximizeexpectedvalue.Holdingasidewhatiscommunicatedtoanotherindividual—andtherebypotentiallychanginghisorherbehaviorand,inconsequence,thedecisionmaker’sdownstreampayoff—amechanismthatmaximizesexpectedvaluecannotbebeaten.(Maximizingexpectedvalueis,ofcourse,notthesameasmaximizingpercentcorrect,asindicatedalready.)

Substantialconfusionsurroundsthispoint.Forexample,considertheputativebenefitsofbeing“too”optimistic.Systemsthatgenerateerrorsthatcauseonetotrymorethanone“should”—giventheexpectedvalueoftryingornottrying—willlosetheevolutionarygametosystemsthatmaximizeexpectedvalue.Thereisnowayaroundthis.Thecontemporaryemphasison“positivethinking”mayalsoinvolveavarietyofsignificantcostsforsimilarreasons(seealsoChapter8inthisvolume).

Somemodelsalsopurporttoshowthaterrorcanbeadvantageousevenwithoutconsiderationofthestrategicadvantagesofinfluencingothers’behavior.However,thesemodelssucceedonlybecausetheyartificiallypenalizestrategiesthatmaximizeexpectedvalue.Nettle(2004),forexample,modelsadecisioninwhichcommunicationplaysnorole,soanalgorithmthatmaximizesexpectedvaluecannotbebeatenbyanyotherstrategywithoutgivingnonmaximizershelp.Inthemodel,“optimists”—whooverestimatethechanceofsuccess—aregivenexactlysuchhelp:themodel’s“rational”(nonoptimistic)agentsrelyonandusecompletelyinaccurateestimatesof the chanceof success.When (rational) agentshaveno informationatallaboutthechanceofsuccess,theyshouldusethedecisiontheoreticcorrectestimateof.5inmakingtheirdecision.Itistruethatwhentheexpectedpayoffof trying ishigher than theexpectedcostof failing, then“optimists”arebetteroffthanthe“rational”agents(andsymmetricallyforpessimists;seealsoHaselton&Nettle,2006),but themodel’s “optimists”and“pessimists”winonlybecausetheythrowoutthemisleadinginformationthatthe“rational”agentsdonot.Asweexploresubsequently,oneprominentmodelofsupernaturalpunishmentrunsintothisproblemaswell.

Outsideofcasessuchasthese,asfarasweknow(McKay&Dennett,2009),inwhichthereisanadvantagetoerrorbecauseofconsiderationsofdecisiontheoryorthevalueofthecommunicativeeffectofone’sdecisions,onewouldnotexpecttofindmechanismsdesignedtoadoptfalsebeliefs.Further,onewouldexpecthumancomputationalarchitecturetobedesignedtorejectfalsebeliefs,giventheirpotentialcosts.

Fromthisperspective,thefactthathumansseemtohavemechanismsthatendorse supernatural beliefs—which are (by assumption) guaranteed to be


false—ispuzzling.Firstisthebarefactthathumansseemnotjustdisposedbutalsopositivelyeager toendorse supernaturalbeliefs (Dawkins,2006;Dennett,2006). Second, these beliefs seem to have high costs. Even holding aside therelationshipbetween supernatural beliefs and intergroup conflict—the subjecthere—supernatural beliefs seem to play a large role in any number of costlybehaviors.Thiswould include things like timeconsuming (butuseless)prayer,buildingmonumentstononexistentgods,sacrificinggoatsorotheranimalswithoutconsumingthem,doingraindances,andtakingrisksbecauseofpredictionsofdivineintervention.

So,holdingasidethetwopreviousarguments,selectionshould,everythingelseequal,haveeliminatedbeliefgenerationmechanismsthathadthepropertyofgeneratingandacquiringsupernaturalbeliefs.Why,then,aresupernaturalbeliefssopervasiveinourspecies?

theorieS of Supernatural BeliefManyscholarshaveaddressedtheissueoftheoriginofsupernaturalbelief.Herewediscussonlyafewprominentmodels,which,broadly,fallintotwoclasses.Thefirst class is byproduct explanations. On this view, humans have mechanismsdesignedtoconstruct,transmit,andacquirerepresentationsforonefunction,andsupernaturalbeliefsemergeasasideeffectofthewaythesesystemsoperate.Wereviewthesefirstandthenturntothesecondpossibility:thatthemechanismsthatgeneratesupernaturalbeliefsaredesignedforpreciselythisfunction.

By-product Views

Oneofthemostprominentbyproductmodelsofsupernaturalbeliefsbeginswiththebroad idea thatpeople transmit informationsocially.People learnfromoneanotherinpartbecausetherearetremendouscostsavingsinsociallyratherthanindividuallylearninginformation(Boyd&Richerson,1985).Further,givensociallearning,itfollowsthat,byvirtueofthewaythatlearningmechanismsoperate,some kinds of ideas, beliefs, and practices will be more likely to be generated,recalled,andtransmittedthanothers(e.g.,Sperber,1985).Thisisanaturalconsequenceofanysociallearningsystem,andthisideaiseasilyseeninthedomainoflanguage,inwhichvariousrulesconstrainthegrammarentertainedbylanguagelearners(Pinker,1994).

Fromthis,itfollowsthat,byanevolutionaryprocess,certainideaswilltendtopersistandbeobservedovertimemorethanothers.Ideasthatare“sticky,”havingproperties thatmake themmemorableand transmitted (Bartlett,1932),willbeobservedmorethanthosethatdonot“fit”withhumancognition.

Oneofthemajormodelssurroundingsupernaturalbeliefs—the“ontologicalheresy”(OH)model—beginswiththisideaandturnsononeimportantelementoflearningsystems:thatthereseemtobecategoriesofentitiesthatthemindispreparedtolearnabout.Eachofthesecategoriescomeswithasetofdefiningcharacteristicsthatapplytoallentrieswithinit,sowhenanewentryisaddedmanyofitsfeaturesare“automatically”assigned,eliminatingtheneedtorelearnthem.For


example,categorieslikePERSON,ANIMAL,TOOL,PLANT,orOBJECTeachprovideascaffoldingofinferencesonwhichtobuildnewconcepts.Whenlearningaboutanewanimal,peopledonotneedtorelearnthattheanimal’sinnardsresemblethoseofconspecifics,thatithasoffspringthatgrowintoadults,thatitmovesofitsownaccordandpursuesgoals,andsoon.TheseinferencesareautomaticallyprovidedbytheANIMALcategory.

TheOHmodelhighlightsthatsupernaturalbeliefstendtoberepresentationsthatconformtoontologicaltemplatesbut,crucially,departfromtheminaparticularwayandthatthiscombination—conformityplusexception—givesrisetotheir“stickiness.”

Consideraghost,whichisaPERSONbutviolatestheusualtemplateinthatitpassesthroughobjectsand,most importantly,isnotalive,acriticalfeatureofaPERSON.Aghost, then,canbeunderstoodasaPERSON—preservingmostPERSONrelatedproperties (e.g.,hasamind,movesaround)plusviolations—aghostcanpassthroughsolidmatterwhereaspeoplecannot.

BoyerandBergstrom(2008)recentlywroteaboutideassuchasghosts:

Suchnotionsare salient and inferentiallyproductivebecause theycombinespecificfeaturesthatviolate somedefaultexpectationsforthedomainwithnonviolatedexpectationsheldbydefaultastrueoftheentiredomain(Boyer,1994).Thesecombinationsofexplicitviolationandtacitinferenceareculturallywidespreadandconstituteamemoryoptimum(Barrett&Nyhof,2001;Boyer&Ramble,2001).Thismaybebecauseexplicitviolationsofexpectationsareattentiongrabbing,whereaspreservednonviolatedexpectationsallowonetoreasonaboutthepostulatedagentsorobjects(Boyer,1994).(p.119)

Thekeypointisthenotionofa“memoryoptimum.”Onthisview,supernatural beliefs persist as a byproduct of the fact that humancomputational systems“like”representationsthatallowonetoreasonaboutthem(thePERSONpartofaghostorspirit)combinedwiththefactthatwealsoattendmoretoideasthatviolateourexpectations(thenonlivingcomponentofbeingaghost).Supernaturalbeliefs,on this view,persist as abyproductofmechanismsdesigned for inferences andattention.

Arelatedbyproductviewisthatsomebeliefs,byvirtueoftheircontentandtheirtendencytomovefromoneheadtoanother,replicatethemselvesnotbecausethebeliefsareusefultothepeoplewhohavethembutsimplybecausetheyarethesortsofbeliefsthatleadtotheirownpropagation.Dennett(2006)arguesthatreligioussystemsofbeliefseemtohavepropertiesthatmakethemgoodatreplicatingthemselves,includingtheinjunctiontotransmitinformationtochildren,toreproduce,andtoconquerandconvertothers.Thesefeaturesofabeliefsystem,heargues,contributetothespreadofthebeliefsthemselves.

There are three primary difficulties of these models. First, as the costs ofsupernaturalbeliefsincrease,sodoesthestrengthofselectionto“cleanup”thesystem,makingbyproductclaimslessplausible.Thatis,byproductexplanationsareunlikelytotheextentthatcostsarehighandselectioncouldhaveselectedoutthese supernaturalbeliefgeneration systems without compromising the systemthat thesebeliefgenerationsystemsareabyproductof.Webelieve that these


costsare, indeed,highandthat there isnoreasontothinkselectioncouldnothavemodifiedlearningsystemstoresist,ratherthanendorse,supernaturalbeliefs.Second,byproducthypothesesexplainwhysupernaturalbeliefsarememorablebutnotwhy supernaturalbeliefsareendorsed (Dennett,2006).Theseare twoimportantly distinct claims. Finally, models such as Dennett’s rest on largelydomaingeneralandcontentfreelearningsystems,which,fromanevolutionaryview,areunlikelytocharacterizehumanpsychology(Tooby&Cosmides,1992).

Adaptationist Views

Thesecondclassofarguments suggests that themechanismsunderlyingsupernaturalbeliefacquisitionaredesignedtoadoptthem.Onthisview,thereissomeadvantagetohavingsupernaturalbeliefs,andthisadvantageexplainstheexistenceofthemechanismsdesignedtogenerateandadoptthem.

Oneprominentaccount isthatsupernaturalbeliefs“steeredindividualsawayfromcostlysocialtransgressionsresultingfromunrestrained,evolutionarilyancestral,selfishinterest(actswhichwouldrapidlybecomeknowntoothers,andtherebyincur an increased probability and severity of punishment by group members)”(Johnson&Bering,2006,p.219).Thatis,thosewithsupernaturalbeliefs—particularlyfalsebeliefsaboutpunishmentandtheafterlife—wouldhaveavoidedactionsthatwouldhaveledtocostsintherealworld,thusmakingthembetteroff.

Thisargumentisagametheoreticalargument thatagentswiththesesupernaturalbeliefs could invadeapopulationof agentswithout them. Inevaluatingthisargument,thekeyistoconsiderapopulationatequilibrium.Thiswouldbeapopulationofagentswhomaximizeexpectedvalue.Inaworldinwhichsomeacts are punished, maximizing expected value entails taking into account theprobability of detection and the costs of punishment. Maximizing individualsdo not take advantage of all opportunities for selfish, normviolating gain; theytakeadvantageofopportunitieswithpositiveexpectedvalue.JohnsonandBering(2006)assumethisissueaway:“Aslongasthenetcostsofselfishactionsfromrealworldpunishmentbygroupmembersexceededthenetcostsoflostopportunitiesfromselfimposednormabiding,thengodfearingindividualswouldoutcompetenonbelievers”(p.219).However,thereisnoreasontothinkthatthedefaultstateisadesignthatfavorsengagingin(selfish)actionswithnegativeexpectedvalue.Indeed,thereverseisthecase.Selectionshouldcontinuouslypushcomputationalmechanisms toward such optima, subject to all the usual constraints (see, e.g.,Dawkins,1982).Intheabsenceofanargumentaboutaconstraintthatispushingthedesignoffthisoptimum,gametheoreticmodelsmustassumeexpectedvaluemaximizationasthedefault.

Further,evenifoneweretoassumethatatsomepointapopulationwereoutofequilibriuminthisway,suchapopulationisalwaysinvadable—again,byagentswhodonotadoptoutcomereducingsupernaturalbeliefs.Ifthesocialworldwerelikepoker,considerthecostofhavingtheviewthatthosewhobluffwillendureendlesspunishmentintheafterlife(and,therefore,neverbluff).Suchpeopleareatadisadvantageandwill lose,eventually, tothosewhousebluffingasatactic,unhinderedbyfalsebeliefsaboutthecosts.


Asecondadaptationistargumentforsupernaturalbeliefsturnsonthevalueofsuchbeliefsinthecontextofsignalingtoothers(seeChapter9inthisvolumeonthevalueofsignalinginthecontextofanger).Argumentsofthisnaturedrawonthebehavioralecology literature,especiallymodels thatshow thatsomesignalsevolvebecauseof,ratherthaninspiteof,theircost(Grafen,1990;Zahavi,1975).Thetypicalexampleisthepeacock’stail.Becausethelargetailhasgreatenergeticcostsandmakesonevulnerabletopredation,onlyveryhealthyandhighqualityorganismscanaffordtosupportthem.Forthisreason,peahensthatselectpeacockswithsuchtailsasmatesareatanadvantage.

In the context of religion, it has been argued that enduring the high costsimposed by religions (e.g., physical harm, deprivation of food and water, laborrequirements)sendsignalstoothers(Irons,2001;Sosis&Alcorta,2003).Inparticular,ithasbeenarguedthatthesecostscommitthosewhoendurethecoststothegroup.(SeeHenrich,2009forarecentrelatedbutdistinctidea.)

However,caremustbeexercisedintherelationshipbetweencostandsignal.Inthecaseofthepeacock’stail,thecostconveyssomethingaboutqualityasanintrinsicfeatureofthecost.Poorqualitypeacockssimplycannotendurethecost.Thesameargumentdoesnotapplytocostsandcommitment.Enduringacosttoenteragroupdoesnot,asaninherentconsequenceofthecost,preventsomeonefromdefectingorleavingthegroup.Allcostsinthissensearesunk,asarecoststhatareimposedwhileoneisinthegroup(suchasatithe).

Performingritualscanindeedbecostly,andsuchritualsoftenincludesupernaturalbeliefsasjustification.Enduringsuchcostsmightbesignalingsomething.However,itisnotclearthatthesecostshonestlysignalcommitment,giventhatitispossibletoendurecostsandthenleavethegroup.Havingsaidthat,somekindsofsignalsmight,infact,makeleavingmoredifficult.Wenowturntothisissueandourownviewofthefunctionofsupernaturalbeliefs.

Supernatural BeliefS aS commitment deviceS

The Value of Commitment

Difficultieswithexistingexplanationsforsupernaturalbeliefssuggestthatitmightbe worthwhile to look for alternatives. The idea sketched here requires severalinferentialstepsandisthereforeperhapsnotthemostelegantmodel,butitarguablysolvestheproblemswithpreviousmodels.

We begin with the premise that human evolutionary history was characterizedbyshiftingcoalitionsandalliances(DeScioli&Kurzban,2009;Kurzban&Neuberg,2005;Cosmides,Tooby,&Kurzban,2001;Sidanius&Kurzban,2003;Tiger,1969;Tooby,Cosmides,&Kurzban,2003).Thisisnottosaythatsomealliancesweren’trelativelystable,suchasthosearrangedalongkinlines,asobservedinotherspecies,suchasbaboons(Cheney&Seyfarth,2007).Theargumentturnsonlyonthenotionthattherewassomevolatilityinalliances.

Wefurtherassumethat,inaworldofalliances,beingamemberofanallianceisabenefit,and,symmetrically,notbeingamemberofanallianceisacost.Oncepeople can form alliances, individuals left out of the protection of a group are


subjecttoeasyexploitation.Evidencethatpeoplederivepleasurefrommembership ingroups (Baumeister&Leary,1995)andexperiencepainwhenexcludedfromthem(Chapters3and13inthisvolume)isindicativeofmotivationalsystemsexecutingthisfunction.

In this hypothetical world of shifting group memberships, there would, ofcourse,bemanydimensionsalongwhichpeopleareevaluatedforpossiblemembership in a group. These would presumably have to do with properties of theindividual,suchasskills,intelligence,physicalcondition,andsocialconnections.

Whilethesepropertiesareallnodoubtimportant,onekeyparametermightbe the extent to which an individual is viewed as likely to change sides as thefaultlinesofconflictshift.Whenalliancesaredynamic,amemberwhocan,whenopportunityarises,shifttothecompetinggroupisextremelydangerous.Thissuggeststhattheabilitytosignalthatonewillnot—or,evenbetter,cannot—switchalliancescanbeabenefit,ratherthanacost,becausecommittingcanmakeoneamorevaluablegroupmember(Frank,1988).Thisideaisaspecificcaseofthegeneralnotionthatremovingone’sownoptionscanbestrategicallyadvantageousifitissignaledtoothers(Schelling,1960).

Thisideamighthelptoexplainvariouspracticessurroundinggroupmembership.Scarification—thepracticeofmakingpermanentmarksonone’sskinwithcolorsorshallowcuts—mightbedesignedtohelppersuadeothersthatoneiscommittedtoone’sgroup(e.g.,Rush,2005).Totheextentthatrivalswouldnotacceptanindividualwiththesepermanentmarksintotheirgroup,thesesignalsarehonestinthetechnicalsenseoftheterm.

Scarificationandtattoos (like falsebeliefs)canbedangerous, leading to thepossibilityofdamageorinfection.Despitethis,itisstillpracticedwidely,pointingtothepossibilityofanevolvedappetiteforvisiblesignalsofcommitment,whethertogroupsorromanticpartners.

Supernatural Beliefs as Loyalty Signals

Beliefs,unlikescarsandtattoos,areinvisibleandeasilyrevised.Spokenstatementsare themselves ephemeral, limiting their effectiveness as commitment devices.Havingsaidthat,givingrisetoabeliefinanotherperson’sheadcan,undercertaincircumstances, recruit thepowerofcommitment.Forexample,asFrank(1988)discusses,informationthatmakesonevulnerablecanbeusefulinthiscontext.IfAlfredtellsBobinformationthatwouldbedisastrousforAlfredshoulditgetout,Alfredhas,effectively,assuredBobthathewon’tactinsuchawaythatwouldmakeBobunfavorablydisposedtowardhim.WhenBobknowsinformationthatwouldcompromiseAlfred—perhapswheretofindevidenceofacrimethatAlfredhascommitted—BobcanbeassuredofAlfred’sloyalty.So,transmittingcertainkindsofinformationtootherscanincreasetheextenttowhichtheyarelikelytobelieveyouwillremainaloyalally,whichcanyieldimportantbenefits.

Broadcastingbeliefsmightallowcommitment.Forexample,publicstatementsofloyaltytoaparticulargroup—orantipathyforotherlocalgroups—mighthelpassure potential allies of one’s commitment. However, talk is cheap, and suchpronouncementsdonotbindone’sactionsinthesamewaythattattoos,scars,or


disclosing incrimination information does. Opinions can change; apologies andrestitutioncanbemade.

Somestatements,however,mightmakeonewhatBoyer(personalcommunication,October20,2007)hascalled“unclubbable,”meaningundesirableasamemberofagrouporcommunity.Suchstatements,accordingtothelogicofcommitmentabove,are, tobeclear,potentiallygoodthings: fromthe standpoint of commitment to a group, ways to disqualify oneself from alternativegroupmembershipsarethegoal.

Considerthefollowingstatements:

1.*ChristopherColumbusdiscoveredAmericain1215. 2.*Theearthisflat. 3.*Ienjoyeatingmyownfeces.

Statements1and2,inmoderntimes,would,itseemsreasonabletosay,inviterelativelynegativeevaluations.Everythingelseequal,peopleprefergroupmemberswhodonothavebeliefsthatarethoughttobeobviouslyfalse.However,evenifitwereknownthatsomeonehadsuchfalsebeliefs,heorshewouldnotnecessarilybesubjecttosocialexclusion.

Statement3,incontrast,aslongasitisnotsaidinobviousjest,wouldbeparticularly likely to elicit negative evaluations. As the literature on social stigmasuggests,suchdeviationsfromnormalhumanbehaviorelicitverystrongnegativeevaluations(Kurzban&Leary,2001).

The problem with 1 and 2, then, is that they are not strong enough—theydon’tmakeyouunclubbableinanygroup.Statement3,incontrast,istoostrong;itmakesyouunclubbableineverygroup.

So,tosolvethecommitmentproblem,whatisrequiredisthesincereendorsementofabeliefthatmakesoneunclubbableineverygroupexceptthegrouptowhich one is trying to signal loyalty. What sort of belief will make one a poorcandidateforgroupmembershipinnearlyeverygroupexcepttheonethatoneiscurrentlyinorwishestocommitto?

ToreturntoStatement3,whatmakessomeoneunclubbableaboutthisisthedeparturefromcanonicalhumannature.Humansocialcognitivesystemsappeardesigned to sift through the social world, evaluating others as potential mates,allies,andgroupmembers.Departures fromthe skeletal structureofbasic featuresofhumannatureactascuesthatcountheavilyagainstcandidatesforsocialinteraction(Kurzban&Leary,2001).

RecallourdiscussionofBoyer’s (1994) ideas surrounding intuitiveontology.Toafirstapproximation,byvirtueofsharedhumancomputationalarchitecture,peopleshareintuitiveontologicalcommitments.Supernaturalbeliefsviolatethesecommitments.Inthissense,supernaturalbeliefsaresingularlygoodatmakingoneappeartohavebeliefsthatviolatefundamentalcausalintuitiveprinciples.Inthis,theyareverydifferentfromgardenvarietyfalsebeliefs.Beliefs1and2arefalse,buttheirfalsenessdoesnotcomebyvirtueofaconflictwithintuitiveontology.

Inthissense,supernaturalbeliefsmightbewellsuitedtomakingoneunclubbablebecausetheyconnotedeviationfromthespeciestypicaldesign.Individuals


whodonotrespectthebasicprinciplesthatgoverncausalreasoningaboutfundamentalcategoriesintheworld—ARTIFACTS,ANIMALS,andPEOPLE—arebyandlargeseen(withakeyexception)asmentallyill.

TheDiagnostic and Statistical Manual(DSM) reflectsthisidea.IntheDSM, fourthedition,textrevised(DSM-IV-TR),adelusionisdefinedthisway:“Afalsebeliefbasedonincorrectinferenceaboutexternalrealitythatisfirmlysustaineddespitewhatalmosteverybodyelsebelievesanddespitewhatconstitutesincontrovertibleandobviousprooforevidencetothecontrary”(APA,2000).Harris(2005,p.821)pointsoutthesimilaritybetweenasupernaturalbeliefandadelusion:“Wehavenamesforpeoplewhohavemanybeliefsforwhichthereisnorationaljustification.Whentheirbeliefsareextremelycommonwecallthem‘religious’;otherwise,theyarelikelytobecalled‘mad,’‘psychotic,’or‘delusional’”(p.72).

Thekeypointisthatsupernaturalbeliefswillbeeasilyidentifiedbypeopleasfalsebecauseofpeople’sintuitiveontologicalcommitments.Thiswillleadpeopletoinferthatthepersonwhoendorsessuchbeliefs—and“firmlysustains”them—is, toafirstapproximation, insane.Thementally illareoneof themostheavilystigmatizedgroups(Corrigan,2005).

Thishasoneverylargeexception,asindicatedbythedefinitionintheDSM-IV-TR.Falsebeliefsthatthataresharedby“almosteverybodyelse”arenotconsidereddelusions.Considerthefollowing:

4.*Eatinganotherpersongivesyouaccesstohisorhersoul. 5.*Ifaspecialpersonsaysspecialmagicwordsinaspecialbuilding,certain

crackersturnintothebodyofapersonwhowasalivebutisnowdead. 6.*Acertainkindoftreecanbemadetofruitifaprettywomankicksit. 7.*Keepingyourdeadgrandmother’shairinajarkeepsherspiritaround.

First,itisworthaskingifonecanintuitwhichofthesebeliefsaresupernaturalbeliefs culled from the world’s cultures and which are delusional beliefs culledfromtheclinicalliterature.(Notethat4and7aredrawnfromclinicalaccounts,whereas5and6arereligiousbeliefs.)

Peoplewhoendorsesuchbeliefsmightbetakenforeithermentallyillornot,depending on the social context in which such beliefs are uttered, specificallywhetherthesupernaturalbeliefiscommonlyheldbytheotherpeopleinasocialgroup.Amongthosewhobelieveintransubstantiation,5willnotmakeoneappearmentallyill.Indeed,endorsingthisbeliefnotonlydoesnotelicitexclusionbut,infact,insomecommunitiesisalsoessentiallyarequirementforinclusion.Wright(2009)quotes an interesting observationof this generalphenomenon suggestedbytheApostlePaul,whoasks,if“thewholechurchcomestogetherandspeaksintongues,andoutsidersorunbelieversenter,willtheynotsaythatyouareoutofyourmind?”(p.270).

Theveryfirstcommandment,ofcourse,echoesthis idea.Thecalltomonotheism,andtheharshpunishmentsintheOldTestamentforpolytheism,isconsistentwiththeideathatsupernaturalbeliefsareforpreventingmembershipinothergroups.Thefirstcommandmentessentiallypreventedswitchinginaworldinwhichothergroupswereworshipingmultipledeities.Inthissense,themodern


practiceofreligioustolerancecanbeseenasevidencefor,ratherthanagainst,ourposition.Themassiveeffortsthatmustbemadetotrytogetpeopletobetolerantofothers’religiousviewssuggeststhatthisisnotthedefaultstate.

Relatedly,Iannaccone(1994),drawingonearlierargumentsbyKelley(1986),suggeststhatreligiousgroupsaresuccessfulbecausethethingsthatmakethemdistinctive “invite ridicule, isolation, and persecution” (p. 1182) and that suchgroups“demandofmemberssomedistinctive,stigmatizingbehaviorthatinhibitsparticipationorreducesproductivityinalternativecontexts…”(p.1188).Theseareideasthatresonatecloselywiththenotionthatsupernaturalbeliefsareeffectivewaystocommittoonegroupoverothers.NotethatIannacone,however,suggeststhatthebenefitofsuchcostshastodowithpublicgoodsratherthanthepresentargument.HequotesSingh(1953):“TheGuruwantedtoraiseabodyofmenwhowouldnotbeabletodenytheirfaithwhenquestioned,butwhoseexternalappearancewouldinvitepersecutionandbreedthecouragetoresistit”(p.31;seealsoIannaccone,1992).Thoughthepresentargumentfocusesonsupernaturalbeliefs,certainly it is plausible that there are other ways to make oneself unclubbable,through,forinstance,physicalappearanceorone’schoiceoffoods.Aslongasone’sbehaviorreducesthe(perceptionof)thechanceofswitchinggroups,thepresentargumentholds.

Summary

Tosummarize,ourargumentbeginswiththenotionthatsupernaturalbeliefsthatprecludemembershipinothergroupsarevaluablebecausetheyrepresentcommitment.Supernaturalbeliefs,whichviolatethebasicontologicalcommitmentsofevolvedintuitivetheories,makeoneappearmentallyilltothosewhodonotsharesuchbeliefs,anideareflectedinmodernpsychiatricclassification.Ifsupernaturalbeliefsdohavethisproperty,thentherecouldhavebeenselectionformechanismsdesignedtogenerateandendorselocallydistinctivesupernaturalbeliefs.Suchamechanismpotentially solves thecommitmentproblembyallowingone toprecludemembershipinanygroupsotherthanthelocalone.

Supernatural beliefs have advantages over other potentially distinctive localbeliefs.Forexample,falsebeliefsabouthistory,althoughtheymightbelocallydistinctive,donotprecludemembershipinothergroups.Supernaturalbeliefs,unlikeotherbeliefs thatmightbe locally shared,have theparticularpropertyofcommittingonetothelocalgroupthatsharesthesupernaturalbelief,makingthemfunctionalinawaythatessentiallyanynonsupernaturalbeliefcouldnot.ThisgivesafunctionalexplanationforBoyer’s(1994)findingregardingsupernaturalbeliefsandmighthelptoexplainhowthecostsoffalsebeliefsmightbeoffset.

Itseemsplausible—thoughthisisnotcentraltothepresentargument—thatritualsmightbewaystosignalone’sendorsementofthefalsebeliefthatgoesbeyondsimplestatementstothateffect.Takingcommunion,forexample,mighthelptopersuadeothersthatoneendorsesBelief5.Otherrituals,insteadofbeingcostlysignals,mightbemeansofpersuadingothersthatonereallyendorsesparticularsupernaturalbeliefs.Thischangesthevalueofritualfromsignalingcostpersetosignalingbelief.


implicationS for intergroup conflictOnepuzzlingfeatureofreligiousconflictisthedegreeofantipathybetweengroupsthat share nearly all of their supernatural beliefs, with only a handful of suchbeliefsdistinguishingthem.Thevariousantipathiesoftheworld’smajormonotheisticreligionsarewellknown,as isthebloodspilledoverdetailsofsupernaturalbeliefsamongthedivisionsofChristianity.Onemighthavepredictedthatsimilarity reduced hostility, with, say, monotheistic Catholics most fiercely antagonistictowardpolytheisticHindubutlesstowardMormons.Thisdoesnot,however,seemto be the case.Despite massiveoverlap in largenumbersof false beliefs, a tinynumberofsuchbeliefsthatdifferseemtobesufficientforstrikingnegativeemotionandhostility,asoneseesinfightsamongsects.(Forsomedataontherelationshipbetweenorganizedreligionandaggression,seeChapter19inthisvolume.)

Thereare,ofcourse,manypossibleexplanationsforthisphenomenon,includingthefactthatgroupswithsimilarbeliefsmightbeengagedinconflictforthesameresources(Wright,2009)becauseoftheirproximity,butitsitswellwiththepresentview.Ifsupernaturalbeliefsaredesignedspecificallyforthepurposeofcommittingpeopletoparticulargroupsbecauseofthepotentialforconflict,thenitisnotsurprisingthatdifferencesinsupernaturalbeliefsbetweengroupsshouldbreedfearandhostility.

Alongsimilarlines,thepresentviewresonateswellwiththefactthatorganizedreligionsarethelocusoftrustandcooperation(Wilson,2002).Ifsharedsupernaturalbeliefsareagoodcuetogroupcommitment,thentheyoughttobringaboutemotionsoftrustandsupport.Inthecontextofintergroupcompetition,mutuallybeneficialwithingrouptransactionsareveryvaluable.Itisworthnotingthatthereisnothinginandofitselfthatsuggeststhatfalsebeliefsheldincommonwouldleadtotrustandstrongcommunityties.

Theforegoingsuggeststhatsupernaturalbeliefsshouldplayaspecialroleinbothwithinandbetweengroupsocialrelationships(seealsoChapter10inthisvolume).Withingroups,sharedsupernaturalbeliefsandanyactsthatareindicativeofsuchsharedbeliefs(e.g.,particularrituals)shouldmakeothersfeelthatthepersoninquestionistrustworthyandaloyalmemberofthegroup.Thisshouldbeparticularlythecaseforpublicactivities,whichwouldservethefunctionofdisqualifyingonefrommembershipinothergroups.Thisisdistinctfromotherkindsofbeliefs.Forexample,falsesharedhistoricalbeliefsshouldnotleadtoinferencesoftrustworthinessinthesamewaythatsupernaturalbeliefsmight.

Inshort,wearguethatsupernaturalbeliefsarenot, in themselves,accidentalconsequencesofdesign;neitheristhefactthattheyareatthecenterofintergroupconflictanaccidentalconsequenceofdesign.Onthepresentview,then,mechanismsthatgiverisetosupernaturalbeliefsthatcausetheirbearertobefearedandhatedbyotherswhodosharethebeliefarefunctioningpreciselyastheyweredesigned.

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301

19TheEffectofReligious

ParticipationonAggressionOverOne’sLifetimeand

AcrossGenerationsL.ROWELLHUESMANN

University of Michigan

ERICF.DUBOWUniversity of Michigan and Bowling Green State University

PAULBOXERRutgers University and University of Michigan

D uringthepastdecade,therehasbeenaburgeoninginterestintheroleofreligiosityinfamilyfunctioningandchildandadolescentadjustment(e.g.,Bridges&Moore,2002;Mahoney,Pargament,Swank,&Tarakeshwar,

2001)andasaresourceforadultscopingwithstress(Pargament,1997,2007).Thefocusofthischapterisontheroleofreligiosityacrossthelifespaninpredictingadulthood aggressiveness. We use data from a 40year prospective longitudinalstudytoexamine(1)theextenttowhichparentalreligiositywhenachildis8yearsoldisrelatedtothechild’sreligiosityatages19,30,and48,andthegrandchild’sreligiosity;and(2)theextenttowhichgrandparental,parental,andchildreligiosityactaslongtermprotectivefactorsagainstaggressivebehaviorinchildhood,youth,andadulthood.

l. roWell hueSmann, eric f. duBoW, and paul Boxer302

the importance of religioSityAccording to theGallupConsultingOrganization (2008),93%ofAmericans18yearsofageandolderreportedthattheybelieveinGodorauniversalspirit;54%reportedthatreligionis“veryimportant”intheirlives,andanother26%reportedthatreligionis“fairlyimportant”intheirlives;61%saidthattheyareamemberofachurchorsynagogue,and38%saidthattheyhadattendedreligiousservicesinthepast7days;and57%agreedthatreligioncananswerallormostoftoday’sproblems. Inanationally representative sampleofeighth through twelfthgraders,Wallace,Forman,Caldwell,andWillis(2003)foundthat60%ofadolescentsreportedthatreligionisanimportantpartoftheirlives,and50%saidtheyattendreligiousservicesregularly.Whilecomparablestatisticsaredifficulttoobtainforothercountries, the available statistics forotherWesterncountries arenot thatdifferent.Forexample,88%ofItalianssaytheybelongtoachurch,andabout30%saytheyattendregularly.Accordingtothe1996WorldValuesSurvey(1996),onlyabout36%ofEuropeanssaid theynever(orpracticallynever)attendedchurch.Thus,whilethecurrentstudyfocusesentirelyontheUnitedStates,wheremostofthedatarelatingreligiositytobehaviorhavebeenobtained,cautiousgeneralizationstotherestoftheworldarepossible.

Inextensivereviewsoftheliteratureontheroleofreligioninchildandadolescentadjustment,BridgesandMoore(2002)andMahoneyetal.(2001)reportedthathighlevelsofparentandchildreligiosity(mostoftenmeasuredbyparentalorselfreportsoffrequencyofchurchattendance,frequencyofprayer,andimportanceofreligiontoone’slife)werelinkedtolowerlevelsofdelinquency,behaviorproblems,andsubstanceuseandtohigherlevelsofadolescentresponsibility.Relatedly,Chapter14inthisvolumeshowsthatforgivingisrelatedtoreligion.Whilehistoryhasshownthatreligiousdevotioncanpromoteterrorismandaggressioninsomecases(e.g.,Chapter10inthisvolume),themajorityofempiricalresearchtodateseemstoindicatethatreligiousparticipationisrelatedtomorepositiveoutcomesinyouth.

empirical StudieS of the relation BetWeen religioSity and aggreSSion and delinQuency

Johnson,DeLi,Larson,andMcCullough(2000)reviewed40studiespublishedfrom 1985 to 1997 on the relation between religiosity and delinquency. A totalof30ofthe40studiesshowedanegativerelationbetweenreligiosityanddelinquency.Onlyfivestudieshadalongitudinaldesign.

Severalstudieshaveassessedtherelationbetweenparentalreligiosityandchildaggressionanddelinquency, andmosthave shownnegativecorrelationsbetween parental church attendance and risk for aggression, delinquency,or criminality of their children (Ellis & Pettersson, 1996; Pettersson, 1991).Bartkowski,Xu,andLevin(2008)useddatafromthenationallyrepresentativeEarlyChildhoodLongitudinalStudyKsample(over20,000kindergartenandfirstgradersin1998–1999).Parentalreligiositywasmeasuredbyfrequencyof

the effect of religiouS participation on aggreSSion 303

churchattendance,religioushomogamy(similaritybetweenparentsintermsoffrequencyofchurchattendance),andfrequencyofdiscussionsofreligionwiththechild.Higherlevelsofeachparent’sfrequencyofattendanceandreligioushomogamy were related to most parent and teacherrated measures of childdevelopment,includinghigherlevelsofselfcontrolandlowerlevelsofimpulsivenessandexternalizingbehaviorproblems.Kim,McCullough,andCicchetti(2009)examineda sampleofmaltreatedandnonmaltreatedchildren.Amongnonmaltreatedchildren,parents’importanceoffaithwasrelatedtolowerlevelsofinternalizingandexternalizingbehaviorsinmiddlechildhood,andparentalreligious influence seemed tobe strongerwhen the child reported lower levelsof importanceof religion.Theseeffectswerenotobserved formaltreatedchildren;however, inaseparatestudyKim(2008) foundprotectiveeffectsofreligiosityoninternalizingsymptomsformaltreatedfemales.Finally,usingdatafrom our Columbia County Longitudinal Study (CCLS), we found that boyswhoseparentsattendedchurchmorefrequentlywhentheboyswere8yearsoldwerelessatriskforcriminalitybyage30thanwereequallyaggressive8yearoldboyswhoseparentsattendedchurch less frequently (Huesmann,Eron,&Dubow, 2002). This finding held even after controlling for family interactionvariablesandthechild’sIQ.

Several recent studies assessedadolescents’ selfreportsof theirown religiosity.Herrenkohl etal. (2003)useddata from theSeattleSocialDevelopmentStudy.Theparticipantswerechildrenwhowerehighinteacherratingsofaggressionatage10.Lowerprobabilityofviolenceatage18wasassociatedwithseveralage15 variables: attendance at religious services, good family management byparents,andschoolbonding.Pearce,Jones,SchwabStone,andRuchkin(2003),inasampleofhighriskurbanadolescents, foundthatreligiousnessassessedbychurch attendance and selfrated religiousness was associated negatively withconductdisorderandthat“privatereligiousness”(e.g.,prayer,readingreligiousliterature)wasassociatedwithdecreasesover1yearinconductdisorder.RegnerusandElder(2003)useddatafromtheNationalLongitudinalStudyofAdolescentHealth to examine whether religiosity would be most important for highriskyouthbecausereligioussupport“providesfunctionalcommunitiesamiddysfunction”(p.635).Thechildrenwereingrades7–12attime1andwereassessed1yearlateraswell.Underconditionsofhigherpoverty,therewasindeedastrongerrelationbetweenfrequencyofchurchattendanceand“stayingontrackacademically,”whichincludedacompositeofgradepointaverage,gettinghomeworkcompleted,gettingalongwithteachers,notbeingsuspendedorexpelled,andnotskippingschool. Fowler,Ahmed,Tompsett, JozefowiczSimbeni, and Toro (2008) examinedasampleofover300lowincomeAfricanAmericanandCaucasianemerging adults (average age 20 years old).Public religious affiliation (i.e., the valuetheparticipantsheldintheirchurchmembership)bufferedtherelationbetweenexposuretocommunityviolenceandsubstanceuse.Privatereligiousness(i.e.,theextenttowhichparticipantsindicatedthattheirreligiousbeliefsprovidedthemwithpersonalmeaning)buffered the relationbetweenexposure to communityviolenceanddeviantbehaviorandconductproblems,butthisfindingwaslimitedtoAfricanAmericanparticipants.


theoretical explanationS for Why parental and child religioSity Should protect againSt aggreSSion and delinQuency

Researchers have reviewed theoretical explanations for potentially positive effects of parental and child religiosity on family functioning and childandadolescentoutcomes(e.g.,Bridges&Moore,2002;Mahoneyetal.,2001;McCullough & Willoughby, 2009; Smith, 2003). We organize these explanationsintothreecategories.Thefirstexplanationisthatreligionisamarkerforother structural characteristics in the home, such as good parenting. BridgesandMooreandMahoneyetal.notedthatreligionmaydirectlyaffectparentingbyimbuingchildrearingwithamoralandspiritualsignificanceleadingtheparenttoseethechildasa“holygiftfromGod”whorequiresspecialattentionandcareorbyofferingspecificchildrearingguidance.Theauthorsalsonotedindirect effects of religion on parenting; that is, religiosity may enhance thestabilityandqualityof,andsatisfactionwith,themaritalrelationship,aswellasparentalmentalhealth,whichinturncanpromotepositiveparenting.Mahoneyetal.reviewed94studiesontheeffectsofreligiononmaritalandfamilyfunctioningandfoundbroadsupportforthesedirectandindirecteffectsofparents’religiosity. For example, Gunnoe, Hetherington, and Reiss (1999) found thatparents’religiosity(howreligionismanifestedintheirinteractionswithothers)predictedhigherlevelsofobservedauthoritativeparenting(awarm,supportiveenvironmentcoupledwithhighageappropriatedemands),which in turnpredictedadolescents’andparents’reportsoftheadolescents’socialresponsibility(perseverance,selfcontrol,obediencetoparentsandteachers).Acrossseveralstudies,thecorrelationsbetweenparentalreligiosityandchildoutcomespersistevenaftercontrollingforvariablesthoughttoinfluencebothparentreligiosityandchildoutcomes(e.g.,socioeconomicstatus,thechild’scognitiveability).

Parentsalso imparttheirreligiousbeliefsandbehaviorstotheirchildren; inturn,asreviewedearlier,thechild’sreligiosityisrelatedtolowerlevelsofaggressionanddelinquency.KirkpatrickandShaver(1990)suggestedthatthechild’sdevelopingreligiousbeliefsandpracticesareinfluencedbythoseoftheirparents,andthistransmissionisaffectedbythequalityoftheparent–childrelationship.Ifthechildis securelyattached to theparent, thechild ismore likely toadopt theparent’sbeliefs(seeChapter2inthisvolume).GunnoeandMoore(2002),usingdatafromthe NationalLongitudinal Surveyof Youth, found that for late adolescents andearlyadults(ages17–22),frequencyoftheirchurchattendanceandimportanceofreligionwerepredictedbyearlierparentalreligiousinfluencessuchasattendingchurchasachild,maternalimportanceofreligion,andattendingreligiousschool.Thesefindingsheldevenaftercontrollingforfamilysocioeconomicstatusandthechild’scognitiveability.Acrossstudies,FlorandKnapp(2001)reportedcorrelationsinthe.50rangebetweenparentandoffspringreligiosity.

A second theoretical explanation for religion’s potentially positive effects onchilddevelopmentisthatthereligiousestablishmentprovidessupporttohelpparentswithproblemchildrensuccessfullydealwiththeproblems.Thisexplanationstemsfromsocialcontroltheory(Hirschi&Stark,1969)andalsoisconsistentwith


researchandtheoryonsocialcapital(e.g.,Coleman,1988)andsocialsupport(e.g.,Dubow&Ullman,1989).Smith(2003)suggestedthatthereligiouscommunityisaformofsocialcapitalthatcansupportparentalvaluesandcanprovidecrossgenerationalrelationshipsforthechildand“networkclosure”(densenetworksofindividualswhoknowthechildandthechild’sparents,sotheycanprovideinformationtotheparentsaboutanynegativechildbehaviors).Similarly,religiouscommunitiesofpeersandreligiousleadersalsocanprovideformalaswellasinformalsocialsupporttoparentsandchildren;forexample,parentsmightseekguidancefromclergyonhandlingchildproblems,whereaschildrenmightrelyonpeernetworksthroughtheirreligiousinstitutionsforadviceormorenondirectiveformsofsupport.

Athirdtheoreticalexplanationofreligion’spositiveeffectsonchilddevelopmentisthatreligiousexposurebuildsstronginternalselfregulatingstandardsinachild,suchasnormativebeliefsopposingaggressionorfaiththatthisisGod’splanand“thingswillgetbetter”(e.g.,Smith,2003).McCulloughandWilloughby(2009)reviewedstudiespublishedthroughJuly2008totestkeypropositionsrelevanttotherelationbetweenreligionandselfcontrol.Acrossstudies,thereweresmallbutsignificantcorrelationsbetweenreligiosityandpersonalitytraitsindicativeofselfcontrol(e.g.,agreeableness,conscientiousness)andselfcontrolmediated the relationbetween religiosity and substanceuse inone study (Desmondetal.,2008,citedinMcCullough&Willoughby,2009).Inaseriesoffiveexperiments,Koole(2007)showedthatprayerhadasalutaryeffectonaffectregulation:praying foraperson inneedwasshowntopromoteamorepositivemood.Thepromotion of positive affect is hypothesized to beprotective against aggressionand antisocial behavior. Still, despite the important experimental evidence thathasbeenobtained,examiningthedevelopmentthroughchildhoodofinternalizedstandardsthatpromoteprosocialbehaviorandreducethelikelihoodofantisocialbehaviorasthefunctionofexposuretoreligiouspracticesandinstitutionsrequiresalongitudinaldesign.

the columBia county longitudinal StudyIntheremainderofthischapterweexaminetherelationbetweenreligiosityandaggressionwithdatafromthe40yearColumbiaCountyLongitudinalStudy.TheCCLS isaprospective studyof8568yearoldswhowere in the thirdgrade inColumbiaCounty,NewYork,in1960,whentheyandtheirparentswerefirstinterviewed.Thechildrenweresubsequentlyreinterviewedatages19,30,and48.Weexaminethecontinuityofreligiosityfromyouthtoadulthoodandacrossthreegenerations,howthisreligiosityrelatestoconcurrentandfutureaggressionwithinandacrossgenerations,andhowreligiositymodifiestheexpectedtrajectoryofaggressionfromchildhoodtoadulthoodandacrossgenerations.

Methods

TheColumbiaCountyLongitudinalStudywasinitiatedin1960(Eron,Walder,& Lefkowitz, 1971) when the original sample of 856 children, all of the thirdgradersinColumbiaCounty,NewYork,werefirstassessedatWave1ofwhathas


nowbecamea40year,fourwavelongitudinalstudy.Subsetsofthesamplewerereassessed10years later in1970when theparticipantswere19;11yearsafterthatin1981whentheparticipantswere30;and19yearsafterthatin2000whentheparticipantswere48onaverage.Thisprojecthasgenerateda largeamountofdataconcerninghowaggressiondevelopsfromchildhoodintoadulthood(seeEron,Huesmann,&Zelli,1991;Eronetal.,1971;Huesmann,Dubow,&Boxer,2009;Huesmann,Eron,Lefkowitz,&Walder,1984)aswellashowchildhoodandadolescentaggressionnegativelyaffectadulthoodsuccess(e.g.,Dubow,Boxer,&Huesmann,2008;Dubow,Huesmann,Boxer,Pulkkinen,&Kokko,2006).

participants and procedures Whenthestudybeganin1960,thesampleof856childrenwasdrawnfromallofthepublicandprivateschoolsinColumbiaCounty,NewYork.Over90%oftheoriginalsamplewasCaucasian;51%weremale,and49%werefemale.Inthisfirstwave,85%oftheparticipants’mothersand71%oftheirfathersalsowereinterviewed.Theparticipantscamefromabroadrangeofsocioeconomicbackgrounds(mean[M]=5.01,standarddeviation[SD]=2.23ona10pointscaleoffather’soccupationalstatusderivedbyEronetal.,1971,basedonsevenpointscalefromWarner,Meeker,&Eells,1960;thismeanreflectsjobssuchascraftsmen,foremen,andskilledtradesmen)anddisplayedawiderangeofintelligence(meanIQof104,SD=14).

In1970,427participants(211boys,216girls)werereinterviewedforWave2.Theyhadamodalageof19yearsandhadcompleted12.6yearsofeducationonaverage.In1981,therewasathirdwaveofinterviews,butwewillnotbeusingdatafromthatwaveinthischapterasreligiositywasnotassessed.

In1999–2002,523 of theparticipants (268males, 255 females; 61%of theoriginalsample)werereinterviewedforWave4.Theirmeanagewas48.46yearsold(SD=.77);theiraverageeducationlevelwasbetweensomecollegeandacollege degree; their average occupational attainmentwas middleclass status (theaverageoccupationalprestigecodeusingStevens&Hoisington’s [1987]prestigescoresreflectedjobssuchassales,bookkeepers,secretaries);and69%oftheoriginalparticipantswerelivingwiththeirspouses.Theiraverageverbalachievementscoreon theWRATwas99.15 (SD=13.72).During this samewave,we interviewed536offspringofouroriginalsubjects.Theyweretheoffspringof325different subjects. To keep the sample independent for this study we selected theoldestoffspringwhenmorethanonewasinterviewed.Thisgaveusasampleof349independentchildren,youth,andyoungadultswhowerechildrenofouroriginalsubjectsandgrandchildrenoftheparentsweinterviewedin1960.Thissamplewas51%femaleand49%male.Theagesoftheoffspringrangedfrom8to33withameanageof21.75.

Interviews Datacollectionproceduresforthefirstthreewavesofthestudyhavebeen reported elsewhere (e.g., Eron et al., 1971; Huesmann et al., 1984, 2002;Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1977). At age 8, two main sources ofdatawereused:classroombasedpeernominationsandextensiveindividualparentinterviews.Atage19,participantswereadministeredavarietyofselfreportmeasures,aswell aspeernominations, in individual interviewsatafieldoffice.


Atage48,interviewswereconductedbycomputerinafieldofficeandbymailortelephoneforparticipantswhocouldnotcometotheoffice.TheoffspringofthesubjectswereinterviewedusingthesameproceduresasforthesubjectsinWave4exceptthatphoneandmailinterviewswerenotconductedwithanywhowereyoungerthan13.

Attrition Information Ofthe39%whowerenot interviewedatage48,37wereconfirmed dead, 112 had disappeared and could not be found despite intenseefforts,40couldnotbeinterviewedbecauseofdistanceandschedulingdifficulties,and144refused.Acomparisonofmeansonage8scoresrevealedthat,comparedwithparticipantswhowerereinterviewedatage48,participantswhowerenotreinterviewedhadhigherlevelsofaggression,t (854)=4.06,p<.001(Mdifference=.13,SEdifference=.03),lowerlevelsofpopularity,t(854)=4.19,p<.001(Mdifference=4.45,SEdifference=1.06),lowerpeercompliance,t(854)=3.86,p<.001(Mdifference=3.40,SEdifference=.88),andlowerIQatage8,t(852)=5.69,p<.001(Mdifference=5.70,SEdifference=1.00).However,analysesofthe1960datafromthe39%whodroppedoutalsorevealedthattherewasnosubstantialrestrictionofrangeonany1960variableduetotheattrition.

Measures

Specific aggression measures for all Waves Peer-nominatedaggres-sionwasassessedatages8and19usingapeernominationproceduredevelopedbyEronetal.(1971),whodefinedaggressionas“anactwhosegoalresponseisinjurytoanotherobject”(p.30).Their10peernominatedaggressionitemscoverphysical(e.g.,“Whopushesandshovesotherchildren?”),verbal(e.g.,“Whosaysmeanthings?”),acquisitive(e.g.,“Whotakesotherchildren’sthingswithoutasking?”),andindirect(e.g.,“Whomakesupstoriesandliestogetotherchildrenintotrouble?”)aggressiveacts.Thescore(α=.90)representstheproportionoftimesthechildwasnominatedbyclassmatesonthe10itemsoutof the timesthechildcouldhavebeennominated.Atage8thiswasthenumberofchildrenin theclassroom.Atage19,becauseparticipantsalreadyhad lefthighschool,the proportion for a participant was computed based on the number of otherparticipantswhosaidtheyknowthatparticipant“wellenoughtoanswersomequestionsaboutthem.”

Self-reports on peer-nomination questionswereobtainedforthechildrenwhowereinterviewedinWave4astheirwidegeographicdistributionmakeobtainingpeernominationsimpossible.Fortheyoungeroffspringthesamequestionswereusedashadbeenusedforthesubjectswhentheywere8yearsold;fortheolderoffspringweusedthequestionsthathadbeenusedwiththe19yearolds.

Severe physical aggressionwasassessedforthesubjectatages19,30,and48andforthechildofthesubjectinWave4throughselfreportsofhowofteninthelastyeartheyengagedineachoffourbehaviors:(1)chokedsomeone;(2)slappedorkickedsomeone;(3)punchedorbeatensomeone;(4)knifedorshotatsomeoneorthreatenedtodoit(1=neverto4=alot).Scoreswerelogtransformedforanalysisduetoskewness(α=.66).


Aggressive personality was measured at ages 19, 30, and 48 and amongchildrenof the subjectswhowere13orolder inWave4by taking the sumofscales4,9,andFfromtheMinnesotaMultiphasicPersonalityInventory(MMPI;Hathaway&McKinley,1940).Inearlierstudiesbyourgroup(e.g.,Huesmannetal.,1984;Huesmann,Lefkowitz,&Eron,1978),thesummedTscoresofthesethreescalesreflectedareliableandvalidmeasureofantisocial–aggressivebehavior(α=.78).

Fortheanalyses,wefirstconvertedtheaggressionmeasuresobtainedineachwave (peer nomination, selfreport of peernomination questions, selfreport ofseriousphysicalaggression,MMPIF+4+9)tostandardizedzscores.Ateachage, where more than one aggression measure exists (i.e., ages 19 and 30), wecomputedameasurementmodelforcombiningthemeasures.Thenacompositemeasureofaggressionwascomputedas theweightedmeanof theoneto threeaggression scores available for the subject during that wave or for the subject’schildduringWave4.Becausethesecompositescoresarestandardizedwithineachwaveofdata,theyprovideastandardscaleonwhichindividuals’locationscanbecomparedacrosswaves independentlyoftotalsampleshifts inaggressivenessordifferencesinmeasuresobtained.

religiosity In Wave 4, the subjects and their offspring both indicated their frequency of religious service attendance on aninepoint scale (“Howoftendoyouattendreligiousservices?”,ratedas1=never,2=lessthanonceayear,3=1–2timesayear,4=severaltimesayear,5=aboutonceamonth,6=2–3timesamonth,7=nearlyeveryweek,8=everyweek,and9=severaltimesaweek).Additionally,boththesubjectsandtheiroffspringreportedontheirreligiouspreference;theirspirituality(“Towhatextentdoyouconsideryourselfaspiritualorreligiousperson?”,ratedas1=notspiritualorreligiousatall,2=slightlyspiritualorreligious,3=moderatelyspiritualorreligious,4=veryspiritualorreligious);andtheirfrequencyofpraying(“Howoftendoyouprayprivatelyinplacesotherthanachurch,mosque,orsynagogue?”,ratedas1=never,2=lessthanonceamonth,3=onceamonth,4=afewtimesamonth,5=onceaweek,6=afewtimesaweek,7=onceaday,8=morethanonceaday).

InWave1,theparentsofthesubjectswerealsoaskedtheirfrequency of reli-gious service attendance (responsescale:0=never,1=afewtimesayear,2=aboutonceamonth,3=afewtimesamonth,4=onceaweek,5=morethanonceaweek).Theywerealsoaskedtheirreligionpreference,buttheywerenotaskedanyquestionsaboutspiritualityorpraying.

SimilarlyinWave2,the19yearoldsubjectsthemselveswereaskedtoreportontheirfrequency of religious service attendanceusingthesameprocedureandscaleasusedwiththeparentsinWave1.

other outcomes and covariates InWave4,wealsoassessedthenorma-tive beliefs about aggressionofboththesubjectsandtheiroffspring(Huesmann&Guerra,1997).Thenormativebeliefscaleisa20itemscalethataskstherespondentabouthisorherapprovalofaggression,suchas,“Supposeamansayssomethingbadtoanotherman,John.DoyouthinkitisOKforJohntohithim?(4=


perfectlyOK,3=sortofOK,2=sortofwrong,1=reallywrong).Thenormativebeliefsscalescore is themeanofall theresponsesandhasbeenshowntobeahighlyreliableassessmentofapprovalofaggressionbytherespondent(Huesmann&Guerra,1997).

InWave1,parents’ educational level(Eronetal.,1971)reflectstheparents’selfreportedlevelsofeducationalattainment(1=under7yearsto7=graduateorprofessionaltraining).Thefamilyscorewascomputedasthemeanofthemother’sandfather’seducationallevel.

Finally,inWave1wealsoobtainedthesubject’sIQ score.Thechild’sIQwasassessedwiththeCaliforniaShortFormTestofMentalMaturity(Sullivan,Clark,&Tiegs,1957).Kuder–Richardsonreliabilitycoefficients rangefrom .87 to .89acrossgrades;thetotalscorecorrelatesapproximately.75withotherIQmeasures.

Results

religions of participants InFigure 19.1, thedistributionof selfreportedreligious affiliations is shown for the participants in the study when they were8 years old (as reported by their parents) and when they were 48 years old (asselfreported).InFigure 19.2,theirchurch(orsynagogueormosque)attendanceis graphed for the same two times. The sample was predominately Christian–ProtestantandChristian–Catholicin1960withasmallsampleofJewishandother(including“no”)affiliations.By2000,thesamplewasstillpredominatelyProtestantorCatholic,butamuchlargerproportionreported“other”or“no”affiliation.Also,asshowninFigure19.2,by2000whenthesubjectswere48yearsold,onaveragetheyattendedreligiousservicesmuchlessthantheirparentshadattendedthem40yearsearlier.

religiosity The three measures of religiosity that were assessed in Wave 4amongthe48yearoldsubjectsandamongtheiroffspring(averageage=21.75)werehighlycorrelatedasshowninTable 19.1.Afactoranalysisofthethreemeasuresshowedthatonefactorcouldexplain69to71%ofthevarianceinthescales

Protest

Cath

Other

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0Mother Father

Protest

Cath

Other

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0Females Males

figure 19.1 Thereligionsoftheparentsofthesubjectswhenthesubjectswereage8(leftpanel)andthereligionsofthesubjectsthemselves40yearslateratage48(rightpanel).


Pare

nts’

Chur

ch A

tten

danc

e19

60Su

bjec

t’s C

hurc

h At

tend

ance

2000

0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0

0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05 0

Nev

erFe

w ti

mes

/yea

rO

nce/

mon

thSe

vera

l/mon

thEv

ery w

eek

Nev

erFe

w tim

es/y

ear

Onc

e/m

onth

Seve

ral/m

onth

Ever

y wee

k

fig

ure

19.2

T

hec

hurc

hat

tend

ance

oft

hep

aren

tso

fthe

sub

ject

sw

hen

the

subj

ects

wer

eag

e8

and

the

chur

cha

tten

danc

eof

the

subj

ects

them

se

lves

40

year

s la

ter

ata

ge4

8.


in both cases. Furthermore, all three scales had loadings of .77 to .88 in bothcases.Consequently,anyoneofthemeasurescouldbeusedtorepresentreligiosityadequately.AsonlythemeasureofreligiousparticipationwascollectedinWaves1and2aswellasinWave4onthesubjectsandontheirchildren,wedecidedtousethatmeasureforallanalyses.

continuity of religious participation The correlations over 40 yearsbetween the subject’s parent’s religious participation when the subject was 8yearsold, the subject’sown religiousparticipationatage19andatage48,andthesubject’schild’sreligiousparticipationwhenthesubjectwas48areshowninTable 19.2. Religious participation clearly displays continuity within and acrossgenerations.Mostnotably,perhaps,thesubject’schild’sreligiousparticipationcorrelates.52(p<.001)withthesubject’sconcurrentreligiousparticipationatage48,correlates.28(p<.001)withthesubject’sreligiousparticipation30yearsearlier,andcorrelates.21(p<.001)withthegrandparent’sreligiousparticipation40yearsearlier.Ofcourse,theselatercorrelationsrepresentonlymodesteffectsizes,andthereissubstantialvariabilityinthetrajectoriesofreligiousparticipationoverthelifecourseandacrossgenerations.Whenwepartitionedreligiousparticipationintoupper,middle,andlowertertiles(calledHigh,Medium,andLowParticipation),wefoundthatinonlyabout44%ofthecaseswasthelevelofparticipationthesamewithinthesubjectatages19and48;inonlyabout20%ofthecaseswasthelevelofreligiousparticipationthesameforthefamilywhenthesubjectwas8,19,and48;andinonlyabout10%ofthecaseswasthelevelofparticipationexactlythesameforthegrandparent,thesubjectatage8and48,andforthesubject’schildwhenthesubjectwas48.Additionally,ingeneraltheparticipationratesdeclinedoverthe40yearsfrom1960to2000,aswasshowninFigure 19.2.

the relation of religious participation to aggression over time and generations InTable 19.3,thecorrelationsareshownbetweenthereligiousparticipationofthesubject’sparents,thesubject,andthesubject’schildandtheconcurrentandsubsequentaggressivebehaviorandbeliefsofthesubjectand

taBle 19.1 correlations Between different components of religiosity in 2000 at age 48 (Below diagonal) and at age 12 to 30 (average age 21.75; above the diagonal)

Subject’s Self-Reported Religious

Participation

Subject’s Self-Reported Frequency

of PrayerSubject’s Self-

Reported Spirituality

Subject’sselfreportedreligiousparticipation

.48*(N=303)

.56*(N=204)

Subject’sselfreportedfrequencyofprayer

.52*(N=481)

.67*(N=204)

Subject’sselfreportedspirituality

.46*(N=479)

.65*(N=480)

* p<.001.


thesubject’schild.Thecorrelationsateachagebetweenaperson’sownreligiousparticipationandhisorherownaggressivebehaviorarenegativeandsignificant.Higherreligiousparticipationisrelatedtolowerconcurrentaggression.Theeffectsizesarenotlargebutaresignificant:–.20atage19and–.13atage48.Additionally,thegrandparents’religiousparticipationassessedin1960notonlycorrelatessignificantlynegatively(–.09,p<.05)withtheirchild’sconcurrentaggressionatage8butalsocorrelatessignificantlynegativelywiththeirgrandchild’saggressionandaggressivebeliefs 40 years later (–.15,p< .01; –.13, p < .05).This is true eventhough the grandparent’s religious participation does not correlate significantlywiththesubject’s(theirownchild’s)aggressionatage19or48,andthesubject’sreligiousparticipationatage48doesnotcorrelate significantlywith thegrandchild’sconcurrentaggressiveness.Allinall,thistableofnegativecorrelationsprovidesevidencethatnotonlyisaperson’saggressivenessnegativelyrelatedtotheirconcurrentreligiousparticipation,butitisalsorelatednegativelytohigherlevelsofreligiousparticipationwithinthefamilysystem.

It is illustrative toexamine these relationsover time in termsofhowpredictive very frequent religious participation is of lower aggression compared withveryinfrequentreligiousparticipation.Wepartitionedreligiousparticipationintoapproximatethirdswherehighparticipationmeansattendingservicesonceaweekormore,lowparticipationmeansattendingchurchneverornomorethanonceayear, andmediumparticipation iseverything inbetween.We thenanalyzed themeandifferencesforthehighandlowgroupsontheaggressionmeasuresateachpointintime.TheresultsareshowninFigure 19.3.Ineverysinglecase,thosehighinreligiousparticipationscoreloweronaggressionandaggressivebeliefsthanthoselowinreligiousparticipation.However,notalloftherelationsaresignificant.Mostly

taBle 19.2 correlations of religiosity over three generations and 48 years

Subject’s Parents’ Religious

Participation When Subject

Is Age 8

Subject’s Religious

Participation at Age 19



Subject’s Child’s

Religious Participation When Subject

Is Age 48

Subject’sparents’religiousparticipationwhensubjectisage8

Subject’sreligiousparticipationatage19

.36**(N=374)

Subject’sreligiousparticipationatage48

.17*(N =401)

.31**(N=305)

Subject’schild’sreligiousparticipationwhensubjectisage48

.21**(N=274)

.28** .52**(N=196) (N=294)

* p<.01.** p<.001.


theresultsareconsistentwiththecorrelationsinTable 19.3butshowthatthecorrelationsreflectlargedifferencesbetweenfairlyhighandfairlylowlevelsofparticipationratherthansmalldifferencesacrossthecontinuumofparticipationscores.

predicting adult aggression from youth aggression and religious participation Inanumberofpriorpublications,thecontinuityofaggressionwithin and across generations in the Columbia County Longitudinal Study hasbeenshowntobesubstantial(Huesmannetal.,1984,2009).Theanalysessofarhaveshownboththatthereiscontinuityofreligiousparticipationacrosstimeandgenerationsandthatreligiousparticipation is inverselyrelatedtoaggressivenessconcurrentlyandovertimeandgenerations.Giventheseresults, itmakessensetoexaminewhetherreligiousparticipationinyouthpredictsadultaggressivenesswhenonecontrolsforyouthaggression.Wecreatedacompositereligiousparticipationscore forWaves1and2by takingthemeanofthestandardizedparticipationscoresforeachwave(Wave1religiousparticipationreportedbysubject’sparentandWave2 religiousparticipation reportedby subject).WealsocreatedacomparablecompositeaggressionscoreforWaves1and2inthesameway.Weconductedaregressionanalysispredicting thesubject’sWave4aggressionfromthese twovariables and their interaction (productof their standardized scores).TheresultsareshowninTable 19.4.

taBle 19.3 correlations of religious participation With aggression over three generations

Subject’s Parents’ Religious

Participation When Subject

Is Age 8





Subject’s Child’s

Religious Participation When Subject

Is Age 48

Subject’saggressionatage8

–.09**(N=706)

–.04(N=427)

–.04(N=481)

–.05(N=325)


–.04(N=373)

–.20****(N=426)

–.21****(N=305)

–.14**(N=196)


–.05(N=399)

–.09(N=303)

–.13***(N=476)

–.16***(N=293)

Subject’sbeliefsapprovingofaggressionatage48

–.02(N=398)

–.11**(N=304)

–.22****(N=476)

–.12**(N=293)

Subject’schild’saggressionwhensubjectisage48

–.15***(N=292)

–.17**(N=215)

–.07(N=316)

–.13**(N=325)

Subject’schild’sbeliefsapprovingofaggressionwhensubjectisage48

–.13**(N=275)

–.07(N=208)

–.11*(N=304)

–.19****(N=307)

* p<.10.** p<.05.*** p<.01.**** p<.001.


0.3

0.2

0.1 0

–0.1

–0.2

–0.3

Lo R

elig

Hi R

elig

Lo R

elig

Hi R

elig

Lo R

elig

Hi R

elig

Lo R

elig

Hi R

elig

Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 8

Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 1

9

Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 4

8 Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 4

8

Subj

’sAg

gBe

liefs

Age 4

8

Child

’sAg

g whe

nSu

bj is

48

Child

’sAg

gBe

liefs

when

Subj

is 48

Child

’sAg

g whe

nSu

bj is

48

Child

’sAg

gBe

liefs

when

Subj

is 48

Subj

’sAg

gBe

liefs

Age 4

8

Child

’sAg

gwh

enSu

bjis

48

Child

’sAg

gBe

liefs

when

Subj

is 48

Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 1

9

Subj

’sAg

g at

Age 4

8

Subj

’sAg

gBe

liefs

Age 4

8

Child

’sAg

gwh

enSu

bjis

48

Child

’sAg

gBe

liefs

when

Subj

is 48

p <

.03

p <

.02

p <

.01

p <

.02

p <

.01

p <

.06

n. s.

n. s.

n. s.

n. s.

p <

.02

p <

.001

p <

.05

p <

.02

n. s.

n. s.

n. s.

Aggression z-score

0.3

0.2

0.1 0

–0.1

–0.2

–0.3

–0.4

Aggression z-score

0.3

0.2

0.1 0

–0.1

–0.2

–0.3

–0.4

Aggression z-score

0.3

0.2

0.1 0

–0.1

–0.2

–0.3

Aggression z-score

Agg

ress

ion

as F

unct

ion

of P

aren

ts’ R

elig

ious

Part

icip

atio

n W

hen

Subj

ect W

as A

ge 8

Agg

ress

ion

as F

unct

ion

of S

ubje

ct’s

Age

19

Relig

ious

Par

ticip

atio

n

Agg

ress

ion

as F

unct

ion

of S

ubje

ct’s

Age

48

Relig

ious

Par

ticip

atio

nA

ggre

ssio

n as

Fun

ctio

n of

Chi

ld’s

Relig

ious

Part

icip

atio

n W

hen

Subj

ect’s

Age

48

fig

ure

19.3

M

ean

aggr

essi

veb

ehav

iora

ndm

ean

aggr

essi

veb

elie

fsfo

rthe

subj

ecta

tage

8,1

9,a

nd4

8an

dfo

rth

esu

bjec

t’sc

hild

whe

nth

esu

bjec

tis

48

asa

fun

ctio

nof

the

fre

quen

cyo

fre

ligio

usp

artic

ipat

ion

oft

hes

ubje

ct,t

hes

ubje

ct’s

pare

nts,

and

the

sub

ject

’sch

ildo

ver

the

40y

ears

of

the

stud

y.


Asexpected,youthaggressivenessisrevealedtobeahighlysignificantpredictorofadultaggressiveness30to40yearslater(β=.38, p<.001).Theregressionalsorevealsthatayouth’slevelofreligiousparticipation30to40yearsearlierdoesnotaddatallsignificantlytothispredictioneventhoughtheirreligiousparticipationatage8and19correlatednegativelywiththeirconcurrentaggressionatthattime.However,whilethatearlyreligiousparticipationdoesnothaveadirecteffecton adult aggression, it does significantly moderate the trajectory of aggressionfromyouthtoadulthoodas indicatedbythehighlysignificant interactioneffectofyouthparticipationandyouthaggressiononadultaggression(β=.15,p < .002).Tounderstandthemeaningofthisinteraction,weplotteditinFigure 19.4intwoways—firstasathreedimensionalplotshowingthesurfacedefinedbythecomplete regressionequationandsecondas a limitplot showinghowhighand lowyouthaggressionandhighandlowreligiousparticipationinyouth(asdefinedbyplusandminusoneSD)combinetopredictadultaggression.

Theresultsarestriking.Ifoneacceptsthatthedirectionofeffectsmustbefromreligiousparticipationtoaggression,theresultsindicatethathighreligiousparticipationexacerbatestheeffectsofyouthaggressiononadultaggression.Forthoseloweronyouthaggression,highreligiousparticipationispredictiveofevenloweradultaggressionandlowerparticipationofhigheraggression.Forthosehigheronyouthaggression,theeffectisreversed.Highreligiousparticipationispredictiveofevenhigheradultaggressionandlowerparticipationofloweraggression.

Onemaywonder if theseeffectsare independentofotherparticipant characteristics.ThethirdcolumnofTable 19.4showsthattheyare.Theparticipant’s

taBle 19.4 multiple regression predicting Subjects’ aggressive Behavior at age 48 from their aggressive Behavior at age 8 and 19 and their participation in religious Services at age 8 and 19 controlling for their gender, intelligence, and parents’ educational level

Step 1 Standardized Regression Coefficients



Subject’saggressionasyouth(meanofages8&19)

.35** .38** .38**

Subject’sreligiousparticipationasyouth(meanofages8&19)

–.04 –.04 –.02

Interactionofsubject’syouthaggressionandyouthparticipationinreligiousactivities

.15* .15*

Subject’sgender –.01Subject’sIQatage8 .04Subject’sparent’slevelofeducation –.17**R2 .123** .143** .169*** p<.01.** p<.001.


genderandIQatage8donotchangetheresultsatall,and,while theparent’seducationlevelisasignificantpredictorofthesubject’saggression40yearslater,itsinclusioninthemodeldoesnotchangethemoderatingeffectofreligiousparticipationinyouth.

A similar regression analysis was conducted to predict the subject’s child’saggressionwhenthesubjectwas48(meanageofchild=21.75).Whilethesubject’slifelongaggressionwasahighlysignificantpredictorofthesubject’schild’saggressionwhenthesubjectwas48(β=.25,p<.001),theanalysisrevealednosimilarinteractiveeffectofthesubject’slifelongreligiousparticipationoncrossgenerationaltransmissionofaggressionandnomaineffectofthesubject’sreligiousparticipationontheoffspring’saggression.

Finally,weconstructedalongitudinalstructuralmodeltorepresentboththeeffectsofreligiousparticipationonaggressionandthecontinuityofaggressionandreligiousparticipationwithinandacrossgenerations.ThefinalmodelthatbestfitthedataisshowninFigure 19.5.

Again,wemaketheassumptioninthismodelthattherelationbetweenreligiousparticipationandaggression(totheextentanyrelationexists)isinthecausaldirectionofparticipationaffectingaggression.Themodelfitsquitewell(fullinformationmaximumlikelihood[FIML]solution,N=856,chisquare=27.8,df=23,p>.22,comparativefitindex[CFI]=.99,rootmeansquareerrorofapproximation[RMSEA]=.016).Themodelshowstheexpectedstrongcontinuityofbothaggressionandreligiosityoverthelifecourseandacrossgenerationswithstrongercontinuitywithingenerationsforaggressionandacrossgenerationsforreligiosity.Themodelalsoshowssignificantconcurrentdirectnegativeeffectsofthesubject’sreligiosityatage19tohisorheraggressionatage19andfromtheparent’sreligiosityin1960tothechild’sconcurrentaggressionatage8.Theeffectsfromsubjects’age48 religiosity to their age48aggressionwereonlymarginally significant asweretheeffectsofchildren’sreligiosityontheirownaggressionin2000.However,takentogether,thefourconcurrentpathscertainlyindicatethatreligiosityhasadampening main effect on concurrent aggression. Furthermore, the interactiveeffectofsubjects’religiosityandaggressionintheiryouthontheiradultaggression

Hi Agg inYouthLo Agg inYouth

Lo Religiosityin Youth

Hi Religiosityin Youth

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

–0.2

–0.4

–0.6

–0.8

2

1

0

–1

Age 4

8 Ag

gres

sion

z-sc

ore

Adul

t-Agg

Youth-Religiosity

Youth-Agg –10

0

1

1

2

2–2

–2–1

figure 19.4 The moderating effect of youth religious participation on the relationbetweenyouthaggression(meanofages8and19)andadultaggressionatage48.


thatwehaddiscoveredwiththeregressionanalysisremainedsignificantandsubstantialinthismodel(β=.12,p<.008).Beinghighonreligiosityinyouthseemstoexacerbatethetendencyoflowaggressiveyouthtowardlowaggressioninthefutureandhighaggressiveyouthtowardhighaggressioninthefuture.Themodelexplains24%ofthevariationinthesubject’sage48aggression,12%ofthevariationinthesubject’sage48religiosity,7%ofthevariationinthesubject’schild’saggression, and27%of the variation in thechild’s religiosity.Thestandardizedtotaleffectsizesofpriorfamilyreligiositycombinedwithconcurrentselfreligiosityonaggressionwere.078forage48subjectaggressionand.146forthesubject’schildreninWave4.Thoughthesearenotlargeeffectsizes,theyaresignificantandlargeenoughtobeimportant.

+ p < .20 * p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01

Child Relig2000

–.07+

–.06+

–.13**

–.10**

–.15***–.13***

–.10** –.05

–.15***

–.10***

–.18***.19***

.30***

.12***

.50***

.22***

.21***

.43***

.49***

.13**

.38***

.20***

Subj ReligAge 482000

Subj ReligAge 191971

Par Relig1960

Sex0=F, 1=M

Subj AggAge 81960

Subj AggAge 191971

Subj AggAge 482000

Child Agg2000

InteractionRelig & Agg1960 & 71

figure 19.5 Structuralmodelshowingdirectandindirecteffectsofreligiousparticipationthroughoutthelifecourseonsubsequentaggressionintheselfandinone’soffspring(fullinformationmaximumlikelihood[FIML]solution,N=856,chisquare=27.8,df=23,p> .22,comparativefitindex[CFI]=.99,rootmeansquareerrorofapproximation[RMSEA]=.016).


Discussion

Ouranalysisofthesefourwavesofdataspanningthreegenerationsand40yearsshowedfirstthatreligiousparticipation,prayer,andspiritualityarehighlyintercorrelatedandcanberepresentedsubstantiallybyasingleconstruct.Becauseofthisresultandbecauseparticipationinreligiousservicesistheonlymeasurewehadinallfourwaves,webasedallouranalysesonthismeasure.Obviously,thisisapotentialweakness,andourresultsmustbeconsideredinthecontextthatspiritualindividualswhoneverparticipate in religious servicesaremisclassified in theseanalyses.Ofcourse,themostlikelyeffectofthisomissionwouldbetoweakenoureffectsizesforreligiosity.

We found clear evidence both thatparticipation in religious activities has amaineffectonreducingconcurrentaggressionatanyageandinyouthhasanadditionaleffectofexacerbatingthetendenciesoflowaggressiveyouthtogrowuptobelowaggressiveadultsandofhighaggressiveyouthtogrowuptobehighaggressiveadults.Theseeffectswerenotduetorelationsbetweenreligiosityandgender,IQ,ortheeducationallevelofthefamily.Theseeffectsremainedinthecontextofalongitudinalmodelthataccountedforthesubstantialcontinuityofreligiosityandaggressionbothoverthelifespanandacrossgenerations.

Althoughthisstudydemonstratestheseeffectsfairlyconclusively,itdoesnotexplainwhytheyoccur.Aswediscussedintheintroduction,religiosity,andparticularlyparticipation inreligiousactivities,hasanumberofbenefitsthatcouldexplainthemaineffectsofreligiosityinreducingaggressioninadditiontoaffectingnormativebeliefsaboutaggression.Thethreemaintheoreticalideaswereviewedwereasfollows:

1.Parents’ religiosity is a marker of more proximal factors that influencechildoutcomes(e.g.,goodparenting,thechild’sdevelopingreligiosity).

2.Religiousorganizationsprovidesocialsupportwhenproblemsoccur. 3.Religious exposurebuilds strong internal selfregulating standards in a

child,suchasnormativebeliefsopposingaggression.

Relevanttothethirdexplanation,wedidshowthatanadult’sandyouth’snormative beliefs about the appropriateness of aggression were significantlyrelated to their religiosity in the direction that more religiosity predictedlower approval of aggression. However, the direct relation between religiosityandconcurrentnormativebeliefswasmodest(–.19to–.22inTable 19.3).Consequently, while we could not directly test mediation models becausescores on normative beliefs were available only in Wave 4 of the study, it isunlikelythattheeffectsizesofreligiosityonnormativebeliefsarelargeenoughtocompletelyexplainthetotaleffectsofreligiosityonaggression.Similarly,thefactthattherelationsbetweenreligiosityandaggressionwerenotdiminishedmuchwhenwecontrolledforgender,childIQ,andparentallevelofeducationsuggeststhatnoassociationbetweenreligiosityandanyoftheseothervariablesrelatedtoaggressioncanaccountfortheeffectbyitselfasthefirstexplanationmightsuggest.


Undoubtedly,ourmostnotableresultwasthefindingthathighreligiosityexacerbates the tendencyofhighaggressiveyouth togrowup tobehighaggressiveadultsandlowaggressiveyouthtogrowuptobelowaggressiveyouth.Thisresultwasnotexpectedandiscontrarytoouroriginalhypothesisthatthesocialsupportprovided through participating in religious activities might ameliorate the tendencyofyouthtorespondtostressorsandsocialproblemswithaggression.

We propose that this interactive exacerbating effect most likely reflects a“selfjustification”process.Mostreligioustextscanbereadindifferentwaysandcanequallywellprovidejustificationforbehavingaggressivelyorprosocially(seealso Chapter 18 in this volume for the possible divisive effects of supernaturalbeliefs).Christianscanfocuson“turning theothercheek”whenprovokedoronobtaining“aneye foraneye.” Ifonehasalreadybeenbehavingaggressively in one’s youth, participating in religious activities and focusing on textssupportingaggressionmaymakeiteasiertoselfjustifyone’saggressivenessbyprovidingconsensual validation for thebehavior.On theotherhand, ifone isalreadybehavinglessaggressively,onecanfindconsensualvalidationforthosebehaviors in religion as well. Thus, while religious participation can promotepeacefulbehavioramongalreadypeacefulyouth,itcanalsoincreasetheriskforviolence(andfundamentalist terrorism;seeChapter10in thisvolume)amongthoseyouthleaningtowardaggression.

Certain cognitive characteristics associatedwith high religiousparticipationmay also contribute to the exacerbating effect of religiosity on early behavioraltrends.Researchon“cognitiveclosure”(Kruglanskietal.,1996)suggeststhathighneedforclosureindividuals“freeze”morestronglyonearlyideasandnorms.If,asseemsplausible,familieswhoparticipateregularlyinreligiousactivitieshaveahigherneedforcognitiveclosure,thenitwouldnotbesurprisingthattheirchildrentendtocontinuedownthebehavioralpathsofaggressivenessornonaggressivenessthatareestablishedearlyinlife.

Final determination of the processes through which religious participationinfluencesaggressionmustawaitmoredevelopmentalstudiesassessingthehypothesizedfactorsinvolvedintheprocesses.Nevertheless,itseemsfairtoconcludefromthisstudythattheviewthatreligiosityhasastraightforwardprotectiveeffectinreducingthedevelopmentofaggressionistoosimplistic.Itistruethatparticipating inreligiousactivitieshasageneralprotectivemaineffectonconcurrent aggression and promotes religious participation later in life and insubsequentgenerationsandthat theseeffectsarerelatively independentofIQ,educational level, and gender. However, these main effects are limited by thesignificant tendencyofparticipation in religious activities to turn thedevelopmentaltrajectoryofaggressionupwardforyouthhighinaggressionanddownward for youth low in aggression. Intense religious participation may promotenonaggressivepeacefulbehavioramongyouthalreadytendinginthatdirection,butitalsoseemstoexacerbatethetendenciesofaggressiveyouthtodevelopintomoreaggressiveyoungadults.Whether thisexacerbatingeffect ismoreduetothe selfaffirming support for behavior that religion can provide or due to thetendencyofthoseneedingcognitiveclosuretoparticipateinreligionremainstobeinvestigated.


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323

Indexa

AbusiveBehaviorInventory,61Abusiveindividuals,13,60,167–179,209,228Adolescents,27,269,270,274,302–303,

313–316Affect,119–138

andaggression,130–131andcognition,12,114andconflict,4,121,123–124andconflictmanagement,119–120andnegotiation,124–125andostracism,201–214andpartnerviolence,167–184andrelationshipconflict,167–184andstereotyping,130–131asinformationmodel,122emotionandmood,120–121

AffectInfusionModel,123–124Affectiveinfluences

oninformationprocessing,122–123onjudgmentalerrors,127–128onpersuasivecommunication,129–130onrequesting,125–126

Affectiveriskfactorforaggression,169–173Aggression

againstbystanders,208–210andautomaticity,84–86andclimatechange,249–266andheat,250–252,255andhumannature,4,14andmodeling,8,9,273andostracism,37–52,201–216andpersonalsignificance,153–166andreligion,301–319andself–discrepancy,153andthemedia,267–284betweengroups,27–31ethologicalapproachto,5,7,8evolutionaryapproachesto,14,15,16,20,

23,38,122,128,131,134,157,161,233–243,286

indevelopedvs.developingcountries,249–266

instincttheoriesof,5,6–7,237inintimaterelationships,167–179measurementandoperationalizationof,

10–11motivationsfor,53–64passive,53–64physicalvs.psychological,61

Agreeableness,220–221,222–223Amends,seeForgivenessAngermanagement,174–175

Anger,ix,8,13,23,55,56,59,70,72,86,88,112,139–152,171–175,205–206,209

expressionof,140–141regulationof,142–145,173–175

Antisocialbehavior,41–42,206,209,212,257Anxiety,19,20,25,26,27,28,29,31,75,121,

160–161,Approvalseeking,24Arab–Israeliwar,260–261Assertiveness,ix,12,44,65–82,105–106,125,

131–132,134–135andperspectivetaking,106definitionof,66–67expectancies,70–73motivations,73–74Attachmentandgenderdifferences,26inadulthood,21–23ofintergroupconflict,27–31orientations,23–27theory,ix,11,19–36

Attributions,42,44,45,47,91,96,124,127,128,141–142,171,211–212,

Automaticityofsocialbehavior,5,84–86Avoidance,7,19,20,25,26,27,30,239,243

B

Bangladesh,260Beliefs,285–286

ascommitmentdevices,285–296Broadenandbuildmodel,22

c

Catharsis,8Civilwar,261Climatechangeandaggression,x,14,249–266Closemindedness,104,149Cognitiveappraisal,143Cognitiveinfluencesonaggression,12,168–169Cognitivemechanismsofaffectcongruence,

121–122Collectivismandaggression,154–155,158–159ColumbiaCountyLongitudinalStudy,305–310Communicationskillsandaggression,173–177Competitivealtruism,238Conflict

andaggression,definitionof,5–6,10–11inrelationships,13,185–197andassertiveness,67–68andculture,4,8,9,161,234,238,251,263

index324

andevolutionarytheory,233–248andforgiveness,217–232andgoals,185–197andintergrouprelations,285–300ethologicaltheoryof,7managementandinsecurity,25–26measurementandoperationalizationof,

10–11resolutionandperspectivetaking,110

Cooperation,4,29,88,104,108,112,124,188,296

Crimeandheat,250–252,255Cubanmissilecrisis,104Culturaltheoriesofviolence,168–169Cultureandconflict,4,14,Cyberbullying,269,274–275

d

Decisiontheory,286–287Dehumanization,37,236Delinquency,302–303,304–305Dictatorgame,131–133Displacedaggression,208–210Distressedcouples,167–179Domesticviolence,26,27,167–179,228Doormateffect,217–229Dualconcernmodel,108–111

e

Economictheories,132Emotion

affectandmood,12–121andostracism,205–206regulation,140–145innegotiation,146–147

Empathy,4,12,25,103–118,228andemotionalprediction,113–114

Ethnography,238Ethologicaltheoryofconflict,7,8Evolutionarytheoriesofaggression,9,14,15,

233–248,285–296Expectancies,69–70Extremistgroups,46–47

f

Feminism,x,13,168–169,170,173,178Feministtheoryofmaritalviolence,168–169,

170Forgivenesstest,221Forgiveness,14,76,217–232

effectsof,217–218perceptionsof,221–223

FrenchRevolution,261Frustration–aggressionhypothesis,8Fundamentalattributionerror,127–128

g

Genderandostracism,205–206Genderdifferences

inaggression,168–169,233–248inattachment,26

Genetic–environmentalinteraction,258–259Genocide,259–260Goalconflict,13–14,83–102,185–197Goalincompatibility,194–195Goalsimilarity,186–189Goalbiasedinferences,87–89Goaldirectedaggression,94–95Goals,185–200

andmotives,83–102andnonconsciousbehavior,84–86andpolarization,86–87andrelationshipconflict,185–197

Groupbehavior,233–243

h

Heatandaggression,250–252,255–256Historyofresearchonsocialconflictand

aggression,ix–x,3–5,3–19Hooliganism,30,234,238Hormonesandaggression,9,243,256Hostility,11,175,Humannatureandaggression,4–5,233Hunter–gatherers,238

i

Iceageeffects,261Ideologyvs.scienceinexplainingviolence,

167–179Implicitmotivation,89–90Indirectaggression,11,54,56,57,58Industrializedsocieties,4Insecurity,26,27–31Instincttheoriesofaggression,5,6–7,237Interdependencetheory,187,214–215Intergroupaggression,234,235,239–240,

242–243,285–296Intergroupconflict,285–296

attachmenttheoryof,15,27–31andsupernaturalbeliefs,296

Internetandaggression,267–284Interpersonalconflict,19–36Intimatepartnerviolence,167–179,228

J

Justicesystem,13

l

Languageinstinct,7

index 325

Leadership,68–69,236,240–241Loyalty,236,241,292–295

m

Maleaggression,233–248Malewarriorhypothesis,168,233–243

definitionof,236psychologicalmechanismsof,239–242

Massmediaandviolence,270–271Mediaviolenceandaggression,8,15,267–284MiddleEastconflict,29,30Mixedmotivesituations,111–112Modeling,8,9,273Moodcongruence,122,123,124Moodeffects

onconflictandaggression,12,119–138oninformationprocessing,122–123,

127–128onrequestsanddemands,125–126

Mood,emotion,andaffect,120–121Moralsentiments,108Mortalitysalience,157–158Motivation–preventionvs.promotionfocus,

88,89Motivationforaggression,ix,8,57–59,73,

153–166Motivationforassertiveness,73–74Motivation,implicit,89–90,92Motivesofothers,83–84

n

Needfortificationandostracism,42–43Needs,42–43,45–46,203–204Negotiation,ix,11,12,13,24,32,65,67,70,71,

72,73,76,104,106,108,109,110,111,124,135,139–152,162,219

andaffect,124–125andemotionregulation,146–148andperspectivetaking,109–110

Neuralevidenceforemotionregulation,145–146

Neuropsychology,120Non–conscioussocialbehavior,84–86,95Nonverbalmessages,38,40,93,96,105,Norms,9,120,132,133,142,157,161,237,241,

262,319Nuclearwar,9,103,104

o

Organizationalleadership,68–69Ostracism,ix,x,14,55,37–52,201–216

andaffect,201–214andaggression,206–208andantisocialbehavior,41–42andattributions,45

andneedfortification,42–43andpredictivecontrol,40andretaliation,213–214deletionsystem,38–39effectsof,203–205functionsof,202–203moderatorsof,211–213researchparadigmsof,43

p

Parent–childinfluences,15,19,21–22,301–318Partnerviolence,x,13,59,72,167–184Passiveaggression,53–64

definitionof,53–54Patriarchalideology,168,170Perpetratorsofviolence,167–168,218,225–227Perspectivetaking,103–118

andassertiveness,106andempathy,12andmixed–motivesituations,111–112andnegotiation,109–110

Persuasivecommunication,13,129–130,135,234,286

Pornography,268,271,274,276–277,279Poverty,15,154,155,251,252,253,254,257,

262,303Prejudice,27,89,234,236,240–241,243Promotionvs.preventionmotivation,88Prototypicality,29Psychoanalysis,5,6,7,8,121Psychologicalaggression,59–61Psychopathology,173–175,177Pugnacity,6

Q

Questforsignificanceandaggression,154–155Questforsignificancetheory,157–160

r

Rejectionandviolence,210;seealsoostracismRelationshipconflict,x,13,26,167–184,

185–200Religion,15,301–319Religiosityandaggression,302–304,311–312,

313–316Religiosityandfamilyinteraction,301–302,

304–305Religiousparticipation,311Reproductivesuccess,237Requesting,125–126Retaliation,213–214Revenge,55,206–207,213–214Riskfactorsforpartnerviolence,169–173Romanticrelationships,19,185–197Rumination,144–145

index326

S

Scepticism,128Schoolviolence,46,202,207,210,212,275Secondaryattachmentstrategies,20Selfconceptclarity,221–223,224,225Selfconstruals,159–161Selfdiscrepancyandaggression,153–154Selfharm,210–211Selfregulation,9,13

ofanger,142–145ofnegativeemotions,173–175

Selfrespect,220–220,221–223,224,225Sexualexploitation,275–277Sexualviolence,278–279Silenttreatment–seeostracismSimilarity–attractionhypothesis,186–188Socialconflict

andaffect,119–138historyofresearchon,3–19resolutionof,26,103–118

Socialidentitytheory,27–28Sociallearningapproachtoviolence,170–171Socialperception,83,87,88,89,95Socialstatus,141,142,238Socializationandviolence,169–170Spousalabuse,167–179Stanfordprisonexperiment,238Stereotypingandaffect,130–131Stereotyping,69,240–241Subconscious,6,7,122Subliminalexposure,28,29,30,85,88,89,91,

93,130Suicide,156–157,167,210,211,258,279Supernaturalbeliefsandintergroupconflict,

296Supernaturalbeliefs,15,285–300

ascommitmentdevices,291–29theoriesof,288–290

SydneySymposiumofSocialPsychology,x–xi,

t

Televisionandaggression,267–284Terrorism,x,13,46–47,153–166,238,258–259,

285andcollectivism,155–156andquestforsignificance,154–155andsuicide,156–157motivationsfor,153–154

Thanatos,6,7Tribalbehavior,x,14,233,234,235,236,238,

239,241–242,243

u

Ultimatumgame,85,113,114,145,146,148

v

Vicariousexperience,75Victimbehavior,218,219–220Victimself–respect,220–221,223–224Videogames,271–271,273Violence

counselorsof,172determinantsof,168–169

Violenceagainstintimatepartners,167–179Violenceandostracism,205–206Violenceinthemedia,270–271ViolenceontheInternet,277–278Violenceproneindividuals,257–258

W

War,260–262WorldTradeCenter,285WorldWarI,6

y

YouTube,15

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