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    CHAPTER 10

    The Psychology of Risk: The BehavioralFinance PerspectiveVICTOR RICCIARDIAssistant Professor of Finance, Kentucky State University, andEditor, Social Science Research Network Behavioral & Experimental Finance eJournal

    What Is Risk Perception? 86What Is Perception? 88

    A Visual Presentation of the PerceptualProcess: The Litterer PerceptionFormation Model 89

    Judgment and Decision Making: How DoInvestors Process Information withinAcademic Finance? 90The Standard Finance Viewpoint: The EfficientMarket Hypothesis 90

    The Behavioral Finance Perspective: TheSignificance of Information Overload andthe Role of Cognitive Factors 91

    Financial and Investment Decision Making:Issues of Rationality 91The Standard Finance Viewpoint: ClassicalDecision Theory 92

    The Behavioral Finance Perspective: BehavioralDecision Theory 93

    What Are the Main Theories and Concepts fromBehavioral Finance that Influence anIndividuals Perception of Risk? 95Heuristics 96Overconfidence 98Prospect Theory 98Loss Aversion 99Representativeness 100Framing 100Anchoring 101Familiarity Bias 101The Issue of Perceived Control 102The Significance of Expert Knowledge 103The Role of Affect (Feelings) 103The Influence of Worry 104

    Summary 105Acknowledgments 105References 106

    Abstract: Since the mid-1970s, hundreds of academic studies have been conducted inrisk perception-oriented research within the social sciences (e.g., nonfinancial areas)across various branches of learning. The academic foundation pertaining to the psy-chological aspects of risk perception studies in behavioral finance, accounting, andeconomics developed from the earlier works on risky behaviors and hazardous activi-ties. This research on risky and hazardous situations was based on studies performedat Decision Research (an organization founded in 1976 by Paul Slovic) on risk percep-tion documenting specific behavioral risk characteristics from psychology that can beapplied within a financial and investment decision-making context. A notable themewithin the risk perception literature is how an investor processes information and thevarious behavioral finance theories and issues that might influence a persons percep-tion of risk within the judgment process. The different behavioral finance theories andconcepts that influence an individuals perception of risk for different types of financialservices and investment products are heuristics, overconfidence, prospect theory, lossaversion, representativeness, framing, anchoring, familiarity bias, perceived control,expert knowledge, affect (feelings), and worry.

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    86 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    Keywords: risk, perception, risk perception, perceived risk, judgment, decisionmaking, behavioral decision theory (BDT) , behavioral risk characteristics ,behavioral accounting, standard finance, behavioral finance , behavioraleconomics, psychology, financial psychology, social sciences, efficientmarket hypothesis, rationality, bounded rationality, classical decisiontheory, information overload

    An emerging subject matter within the behavioral fi-nance literature is the notion of perceived risk pertainingto novice and expert investors. The author provides anoverview of the specific concepts of perceived risk andperception for the financial scholar since these two issuesare essential for developing a greater understanding andappreciation for the psychology of risk. The next section dis-cusses the notion of classical decision making as the cor-nerstone of standard finance which is based on the idea ofrationality in which investors devise judgments (e.g., theefficientmarket hypothesis). In contrast, the alternative view-point offers behavioral decision theory as the foundationfor behavioral finance in which individuals formulate de-cisions according to the assumptions of bounded rational-ity (e.g., prospect theory). The reader is presented with adiscussion on themajor behavioral finance themes (that is,cognitive and emotional factors) that might influence aninvestors perception of risk for different types of finan-cial products and investment services. Amajor purpose ofthis chapter was to bring together the main themes withinthe risk perception literature that should provide other re-searchers a strong foundation for conducting research inthis behavioral finance topic area.Perceived risk (risk perception) is the subjective decision

    making process that individuals employ concerning theassessment of risk and the degree of uncertainty. The termis most frequently utilized in regards to risky personalactivities and potential dangers such as environmentalissues, health concerns or new technologies. The studyof perceived risk developed from the discovery thatnovices and experts repeatedly failed to agree on themeaning of risk and the degree of riskiness for differenttypes of technologies and hazards. Perception is theprocess by which an individual is in search of preeminentclarification of sensory information so that he or she canmake a final judgment based on their level of expertiseand past experience.In the 1970s and 1980s, researchers at Decision Research,

    especially Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff, and Sarah Lich-tenstein, developed a survey-oriented research approachfor investigating perceived risk that is still prominenttoday. In particular, the risk perception literature frompsychology possesses a strong academic and theoreticalfoundation for conducting future research endeavors forbehavioral finance experts. Within the social sciences, therisk perception literature has demonstrated that a con-siderable number of cognitive and emotional factors in-fluence a persons risk perception for non-financial deci-sions. The behavioral finance literature reveals many ofthese cognitive (mental) and affective (emotional) charac-teristics can be applied to the judgment process in relat-ing to how an investor perceives risk for various types

    of financial services and investment instruments such asheuristics, overconfidence, prospect theory, loss aversion,representativeness, framing, anchoring, familiarity bias,perceived control, expert knowledge, affect (feelings), andworry.Since the early 1990s, the work of the Decision

    Research organization started to crossover to a widerspectrum of disciplines such as behavioral finance, ac-counting, and economics. In particular, Decision Researchacademics began to apply a host of behavioral risk char-acteristics (that is, cognitive and emotional issues), var-ious findings, and research approaches from the socialsciences to risk perception studies within the realm offinancial and investment decision making. (See, for exam-ple, Olsen [1997]); MacGregor, Slovic, Berry, and Evensky[1999];MacGregor, Slovic,DremanandBerry [2000];Olsen[2000]; Olsen [2001]; Olsen and Cox [2001]; Finucane[2002]; and Olsen [2004].) Academics from outside theDecision Research group have also extended this riskperception work within financial psychology, behavioralaccounting, economic psychology, and consumer behav-ior. (See, for example, Byrne [2005]; Diacon and Ennew[2001]; Diacon [2002, 2004]; Ganzach [2000]; Goszczynskaand Guewa-Lesny [2000a, 2000b]; Holtgrave and Weber[1993]; Jordan and Kaas [2002]; Koonce, Lipe, andMcAnally [2005]; Koonce, McAnally and Mercer [2001,2005]; Parikakis, Merikas, and Syriopoulos [2006];Ricciardi [2004]; Shefrin [2001b]; Schlomer [1997];Warneryd [2001]; and Weber and Hsee [1998].)

    WHAT IS RISK PERCEPTION?Since the 1960s, the topic of perceived risk has been em-ployed to explain consumers behavior. In effect, withinthe framework of consumer behavior, perceived risk isthe risk a consumer believes exists in the purchase ofgoods or services from a particular merchant, whetheror not a risk actually exists. The concept of perceived riskhas a strong foundation in the area of consumer behaviorthat is rather analogous to the discipline of behavioral fi-nance (that is, there are similarities regarding the decision-makingprocess of consumers and investors). Bauer (1960),a noted consumer behavioralist, introduced the notion ofperceived risk when he provided this perspective:

    Consumer behavior involves risk in the sense that anyaction of a consumer will produce consequences whichhe cannot anticipate with anything approximating cer-tainty, and some of which are likely to be unpleasant.At the very least, any one purchase competes for theconsumers financial resources with a vast array of al-ternate uses of that money . . .Unfortunate consumerdecisions have cost men frustration and blisters, their

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    INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 87

    self-esteem and the esteem of others, their wives, theirjobs, and even their lives . . . It is inconceivable that theconsumer can consider more than a few of the possi-ble consequences of his actions, and it is seldom thathe can anticipate even these few consequences with ahigh degree of certainty.When it comes to the purchaseof large ticket items the perception of risk can becometraumatic. (p. 24)

    Cox and Rich (1964) provided a more precise definitionof perceived risk; its a function of consequences (the dol-lar at risk from the purchase decision) and uncertainty(the persons feeling of subjective uncertainty that he orshe could gain or lose from the transaction). Stone andGronhaug (1993) made the argument that the marketingdiscipline mainly focuses on investigating the potentialnegative outcomesofperceived risk. This focus on theneg-ative side of risk is similar to the area of behavioral financein which researchers examine downside risk, the poten-tial for below target returns, or the possibility of catas-trophic loss. Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) and Tarpey andPeter (1975) developed six components or dimensions ofperceived risk, including financial, product performance,social, psychological, physical, and time/convenienceloss. Tarpey and Peter were not solely concerned withthe consumers judgments as related to perceived risk (inwhich consumers minimize risk). They investigated twoadditional aspects: (1) perceived risk in which the con-sumermakes purchase decisions that he or shemaximizesperceived gain and (2) net perceived return in which thedecision makers assessment consists both of risk and re-turn. These two components are analogous to the tenetsof modern portfolio theory (MPT) in financial theory: thepositive relationship between risk and return.Human judgments, impressions and opinions are fash-

    ioned by our backgrounds, personal understanding, andprofessional experiences. Researchers have demonstratedthat various factors influence a persons risk perceptionand an ever-growing body of research has attempted todefine risk, categorize its attributes, and comprehend (un-derstand) these diverse issues and their specific effects(see Slovic, 1988). In some academic disciplines, findingsreveal that perceived risk has more significance than ac-tual risk within the decision-making process. Over theyears, risk perception studies have been conducted acrossa wide range of academic fields, with the leading onesfrom the social sciences, primarily from psychology. Inessence, these groupswere interdisciplinary, but the lead-ing academic involvement has been psychological and themethodologymainly psychometrics. Other disciplines tobe involved in the field have been economics, sociologyand anthropology (Lee, 1999, p. 9).The notion of perceived risk has a strong historical pres-

    ence and broad application across various business fieldssuch as behavioral accounting, consumer behavior, mar-keting, andbehavioral finance. These academicdisciplinesattempt to examine how a persons feelings, values, andattitudes influence their reactions to risk, along with theinfluences of cultural factors, and issues of groupbehavior.Individuals frequently misperceive risk linkedwith a spe-cific activity because they lack certain information. With-out accurate information or with misinformation, peoplecould make an incorrect judgment or decision.

    All of these different issues demonstrate that a personmay possess more than one viewpoint regarding the ac-ceptability or possibility of a risky activity dependinguponwhich factor a person identifies at a certain period oftime. So it is understandable that we cannot simply definerisk perception to a single statistical probability of objec-tive risk (e.g., the variance of a distribution) or a purelybehavioral perspective (e.,g., the principles of heuristics ormental shortcuts). Instead, the notion of perceived risk isbest utilizedwith an approach that is interdisciplinary andmultidimensional in nature for a given decision, situation,activity or event as pointed out in Ricciardi (2004) andRicciardi (2006). When an individual makes judgmentsrelating to a financial instrument the process incorporatesboth a collection of financial risk measurements and be-havioral risk indicators (Ricciardi, 2004). Weber (2004) hasoffered this perspective of risk perception:

    First, perceived risk appears to be subjective and, in itssubjectivity, casual. That is, peoples behavior is medi-ated by their perceptions of risk. Second, risk percep-tion, like all other perception, is relative. We seem tobe hardwired for relative rather than absolute evalua-tion. Relative judgments require comparisons, somanyof our judgments are comparative in nature even insituations where economic rationality would ask forabsolute judgment. Closer attention to the regularitiesbetween objective events and subjective sensation andperception well documented within the discipline ofpsychophysics may provide additional insights for themodeling of economic judgments and choice. (p. 172)

    Risk is a distinct attribute for each individual for thereason that what is perceived by one person as a majorrisk may be perceived by another as a minor risk. Risk isa normal aspect of everyones daily lives; the idea that ajudgment has zero risk or no degree of uncertaintydoes not exist. Risk perception is the way people seeor feel toward a potential danger or hazard. The con-cept of risk perception attempts to explain the evaluationof a risky situation (event) on the basis of instinctive andcomplex decision making, personal knowledge, and ac-quired information from the outside environment (e.g.,different media sources). Sitkin and Weingart (1995) de-fined risk perception as an individuals assessment ofhow risky a situation is in terms of probabilistic estimatesof the degree of situational uncertainty, how controllablethat uncertainty is, and confidence in those estimates(p. 1575). Falconer (2002) provided this viewpoint:

    Althoughwe use the term risk perception tomean howpeople react to various risks, in fact it is probably truerto state that people react to hazards rather that themore nebulous concept of risk. These reactions havea number of dimensions and are not simply reactionsto physical hazard itself, but they are shaped by thevalue systems held by individuals and groups. (p. 1)

    The prevalent technical jargon within the risk percep-tion literature has emphasized the terminology risk, haz-ard, danger, damage, catastrophic or injury as the basis fora definition of the overall concept of perceived risk. Riskperception encompasses both a component of hazard andrisk; the concept appears to entail an overall awareness,experience or understanding of the hazards or dangers,

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    88 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    the chances or possible outcomes of a specific event oractivity. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1988) in the field ofmanagement define perceived risk into three main group-ings: (1) the amount of the loss, (2) the possibility of loss,and (3) the exposure to loss. Essentially, perceived risk is apersons opinion (viewpoint) of the likelihood of risk (thepotential of exposure to loss, danger or harm) associatedwith engaging in a specific activity. Renn (1990) provided asummary of findings in which perceived risk is a functionof the following eight items:

    1. Intuitive heuristics, such as availability, anchoring,overconfidence, and others.

    2. Perceived average losses over time.3. Situational characteristics of the risk or the conse-

    quences of the risk event.4. Associations with the risk sources.5. Credibility and trust in risk-handling institutions and

    agencies.6. Media coverage (social amplification of risk-related in-

    formation).7. Judgment of others (reference groups).8. Personal experiences with risk (familiarity). (p. 4)

    WHAT IS PERCEPTION?As a general rule, academic studies on risk or investorperception fail to express a working or introductory def-inition of the term perception or neglect to address theissue of perception in any substantive form or discussion,whereas works by Chiang and Vennkatech (1988), Epsteinand Pava (1994), Epstein and Pava (1995), and Pinegar andRavichandran (2003) provide the term perception in thetitle and failed to discuss the term or concept again in theirwritings. Unfortunately, this is rather misleading to thereader in regards to the true subjectmatter of the academicwork. Even though much of the research on perception isbasic knowledge for researchers in the behavioral sciencesand organizational behavior, it has been essentially disre-garded or not adopted for application by researchers intraditional finance. The work of Gooding (1973) on thesubject of investor perception provides the only work infinance that has provided an extensive discussion of per-ception in terms of a behavioral perspective. Only a smallnumber of research papers by economists have addressedthe notion of perception in a substantive manner in worksby Schwartz (1987), Schwartz (1998), and Weber (2004).The notion of perception or perceived risk implies that

    there is a subjective or qualitative component,which is notacknowledged by most academics from the disciplines offinance, accounting, and economics. Websters dictionaryhas definedperception as the act of perceiving or the abil-ity to perceive; mental grasp of objects, qualities, etc. bymeans of the senses; awareness; comprehension. Wadeand Tavris (1996) provided this behavioral meaning ofperception as the process by which the brain organizesand interprets sensory information (p. 198). Researchersin the field of organizational behavior have offered thesetwo viewpoints on perception:

    1. The key to understanding perception is to recognizethat it is a unique interpretation of the situation, not

    an exact recording of it. In short, perception is a verycomplex cognitive process that yields a unique pictureof the world, a picture that may be quite different fromreality. (Luthans, 1998, p. 101)

    2. Perception is the selection and organization of envi-ronmental stimuli to provide meaningful experiencesfor the perceiver. It represents the psychologicalprocess whereby people take information from theenvironment andmake sense of theirworld. Perceptionincludes an awareness of the worldevents, people,objects, situations, and so onand involves searchingfor, obtaining, and processing information about thatworld. (Hellriegel, Slocum, and Woodman, 1989, pp.6162)

    Perception is how we become conscious about theworld and ourselves in the world. Perception is alsofundamental to understanding behavior since this pro-cess is the technique by which stimuli affect an in-dividual. In other words, perception is a method bywhich a person organizes and interprets their sensoryintuitions in order to give meaning to their environ-ment regarding their awareness of events or thingsrather than simply characteristics or qualities. The pro-cess of perception involves a search for the best expla-nation of sensory information an individual can arriveat based on a persons knowledge and past experience.At some point during this perceptual process, illusionscan be intense examples of how an individual mightmisconstrue information and incorrectly process this in-formation (Gregory 2001). Ittelson and Kilpatrick (1951)provided this point of view on perception:

    What is perception? Why do we see what we see, feelwhat we feel, hear what we hear? We act in terms ofwhat we perceive; our acts lead to new perceptions;these lead to new acts, and so on in the incredibilitycomplex process that constitutes life. Clearly, then anunderstanding of the process by which man becomesaware of himself and his world is basic to any ade-quate understanding of human behavior . . .perceptionis a functional affair based on action, experience andprobability. (pp. 50, 55)

    Morgan and King (1966), elaborated further with theirdescription of perception from the field of psychology.They provided two distinctive definitions of perception:

    1. Tough-minded behavioralists, when they use the termat all define perception as the process of discriminationamong stimuli. The idea is if an individual can perceivedifferences among stimuli, he will be able to make re-sponses which show others that he can discriminateamong the stimuli. . . .This definition avoids terms suchas experience, and it has a certain appeal because itapplies to what one can measure in an experiment.(p. 341)

    2. Another definition of perception is that it refers to theworld as experiencedas seen, heard, felt, smelled, andtasted. Of course we cannot put ourselves in anothersplace, butwe can accept another persons verbal reportsof his experience. We can also use our own experienceto give us some good clues to the other persons expe-rience. (p. 341)

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    The academic literature has revealed a wide inter-pretation among the different branches of psychologyregarding the exact meaning of the concept of perception.(See Allport [1955], Garner, Hake, and Eriksen [1956],Hochberg [1964], Morgan and King [1966], Schiffman[1976], Bartley [1980], Faust [1984], McBurney andCollings [1984], Cutting [1987], Rock [1990], Rice [1993],and Rock [1995].) This is a similar predicament in termsof the different interpretations of risk across variousdisciplines. Researchers from the area of finance andinvestments should focus on these basic characteristics ofperception: An individuals perception is based on their past expe-rience of a similar event, situation or activity.

    People focus or pay attention to, different components(information) of the same situation.

    A major premise of perception is individuals have theability to only process a limited number of facts andpieces of information at a time in order to make a judg-ment or decision concerning a certain activity, event orsituation.

    In general, its human nature to organize information sowe can make sense of it. (We have a tendency to makenew stimuli match what we already understand andknow about our environment.)

    A stimulus (impulse) that is not received by an individ-ual person has no influence (effect) on their behaviorwhile, the stimulus they believe to be authentic, eventhough factually inaccurate or unreal, will affect it.

    Perception is the process by which each individualsenses reality and arrives at a specific understanding,opinion, or viewpoint.

    What an individual believes he or she perceivesmay nottruly exist.

    Apersons behavior is based on their perception ofwhatreality is, not necessarily on reality itself.

    Lastly, perception is an active process of decision mak-ing, which results in different people having rather dif-ferent, even opposing, views of the same event, situationor activity.

    One final perspective is the one presented by Kast andRosenzweig (1974) who summarized the entire discussionof perception:

    A direct line of truth is often assumed, but each per-son really has only one point of view based on indi-vidualistic perceptions of the real world. Some consid-erations can be verified in order that several or manyindividuals can agree on a consistent set of facts. How-ever, in most real-life situations many conditions arenot verifiable and heavily value laden. Evenwhen factsare established, their meaning or significancemay varyconsiderably for different individuals. (p. 252)

    A Visual Presentation of the PerceptualProcess: The Litterer PerceptionFormation ModelHere we discuss Litterers simple perception formationmodel (Litterer, 1965), shown in Figure 10.1, from the areaof organizational behavior in order to provide a visual

    Past experience

    Interpretation

    Selectivity

    Closure

    Information

    Mechanisms ofperceptionformation

    Perception

    Behavior

    Perception Formation

    Figure 10.1 The Litterer Perception Formation ModelSource: Litterer, J. A. (1965). The Analysis of Organizations, p. 64.New York: John Wiley & Sons.

    presentation and further explanation of the perceptualdecision-making process. This model provides a good ap-plication of the previous discussion of perception. Thisperception model has been described in detail by Kastand Rosenzweig (1974) and Kast and Rosenzweig (1985)from the field of management and applied in finance byGooding (1973) in an extensive research study on investorperception.Litterers model provides an illustration regarding how

    perceptions are produced and thus affects an individualsbehavior. There are two inputs (external factors) to thisperceptual process, which are information (e.g., financialdata) and past experience of the individual (e.g., the deci-sion making process of the investor). The model containsthree mechanisms of perception formation that are con-sidered internal factors (developed from within a person)which are selectivity, interpretation and closure. The no-tion of selectivity (selective perception) is an individualonly selects specific information from an overwhelmingamount of choices that is received (that is, a method forcontending with information overload). In essence, wecan only concentrate on and clearly perceive only a fewstimuli at a time. Other activities or situations are receivedless visibly, and the remaining stimuli become secondaryinformation in which we are only partially aware of. Dur-ing this stage, a person might unconsciously foresee out-comes, which are positive (e.g., high returns for their per-sonal investment portfolio). A personmay assign a higherthan reasonable likelihood of a specific outcome if it isintensely attractive to that individual decision maker. Ul-timately, this category of selectivity can be related to vol-untary (conscious) or involuntary (unconscious) behaviorsince a person might not decide upon the rational (opti-mal) decision and instead select from a set of less desir-able choices (that is, the idea underlying the principlesof prospect theory and heuristics). However, the choicesmight not be less desirable, at least in some cases. Theseoptionsmight be the only feasible ones available given thecircumstances, lack of data or pressure of time.The purpose of the second mechanism known as inter-

    pretation makes the assumption that the same stimulus(e.g., a specific risky behavior or hazardous activity) can

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    90 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    be understood in a different way among a number of deci-sion makers. This process of interpretation relies on a per-sons past experience and value system. This mechanismprovides a structure for decoding a variety of stimuli sincean individual has an inclination to think or act in a certainway regarding a specific situation or activity. Lastly, theclosure mechanism in perception formation concerns thetendency of individuals to have a complete picture ofany specified activity or situation. Therefore, an individ-ual may perceive more than the information appears toreveal. When a person processes the information, he orshe attaches additional information to whatever appearssuitable in order to close the thought process and make itsignificant. Closure and interpretation have a feedback toselectivity and hence affect the functioning of this mech-anism in subsequent information processing (Kast andRosenzweig, 1970, p. 218).Our discussion of perception has provided some im-

    portant principles on the perceptual process that shouldprovide an enhanced understanding of the notion of per-ceived risk throughout this chapter. The discussion hasattempted to demonstrate the complexity of the percep-tual decision-making process from a behavioral financeviewpoint. The awareness of this perceptual process isconnected directly to how investors process informationunder the assumptions of behavioral finance such asbounded rationality, heuristics, cognitive factors, and af-fective (emotional) issues.

    JUDGMENT AND DECISIONMAKING: HOWDO INVESTORSPROCESS INFORMATIONWITHINACADEMIC FINANCE?The finance literature has two major viewpoints in termsof how individual investors and financial professionalsprocess information:

    1. The standard finance academics viewpoint that in-vestors make decisions according to the assumptionsof the efficient market hypothesis.

    2. The behavioral finance literatures perspective that in-dividualsmake judgments based on and are influencedby heuristics, cognitive factors, and affective (emo-tional) issues.

    In order to understand and consider the notion of thepsychology of risk, it is necessary to have a basic knowl-edge of how information is processed from a standard andbehavioral finance points of view.

    The Standard Finance Viewpoint:The Efficient Market HypothesisSince the 1960s, the efficientmarket hypothesis (EMH) hasbeen one of the most important theories within standardfinance (Ricciardi, 2004, 2006). The central premise of theEMH is that financial markets are efficient in the sensethat investors within these markets process information

    instantaneously and that stock prices completely reflectall existing information according to Fama (1965a, 1965b).The following is a brief description of each of the threedifferent types of market efficiency:

    1. The weak form. The market is efficient with respect tothe history of all past market prices and information isfully reflected in securities values.

    2. The semistrong form. The market is efficient in whichall publicly available information is fully reflected insecurities values.

    3. The strong form. The market is efficient in that all in-formation is fully reflected in securities prices.

    Nichols (1993) provided this point of view on the EMH,implicit in Famas hypothesis are two important ideas:first, that investors are rational; and second, that rationalinvestors trade only on new information, not on intuition(p. 3). In other words, participants exist in a market inwhich investors have complete information (knowledge),make rational judgments and maximize expected utility.The long-lasting dialogue (debate) about the validity ofthis theory has provoked an assortment of academic re-search endeavors that have investigated the accuracy ofthe three different forms of market efficiency. In reality,most individual investors are surprised when informedthat a vast amount of substantive research supports theEMH in one form or another.Modern financial theory (standard finance) is based on

    the premise that individuals are rational in their approachto their investment decisions. College students and finan-cial experts are taught that investors make investmentchoices on the basis of all available information (publicand private) according to the tenets of the EMH. For ex-ample, an individual utilizes a specific investment toolsuch as stock valuation that is applied in a rational andsystematic manner. Ultimately, the objective of this ap-proach for investors is the achievement of increased fi-nancial wealth. Advocates of the efficient market theoryargue that it is futile to practice or to apply certain in-vestment techniques or styles since an investors exper-tise and prospects are already reflected either in a specificstock price or the overall financial market. Therefore, itis unrealistic for investors to spend their valuable timeand resources in order to attempt to outperform themar-ket. Professional investment managers and behavioralfinance academics have suggested that market inefficien-cies (e.g., the evidence in the existence ofmarket anomaliessuch as the January Effect) exist at certain points in time.First, the argument for market inefficiency would allowfor arbitrage opportunities (the chance to find mispricedsecurities and generate superior returns) within financialmarkets. If some investors believe the chance to arbitragedoes exist, they will attempt to identify a security firstso they can profit by exploiting that information and uti-lize a specific active investment style such as technicalanalysis.Nevertheless, supporters of the efficient market philos-

    ophy believe current prices already reflect all knowledge(information) about a security ormarket. Secondly, if mar-ket inefficiencies exist this implies investors may some-times make irrational investment decisions or judgments

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    that do not comply with the strong assumptions of ratio-nality. Therefore, this would demonstrate that individualsare influenced by some different types of cognitive (men-tal) processes and/or affective (emotional) factors. Thesetypes of behaviors in tandem with market inefficienciescould result in the following issues: (1) investor percep-tions are influenced by their current risk judgments con-cerning a certain financial instrument or the overall mar-kets, and (2) individuals failure to discover and determinethe right investment such as selecting a stock or mutualfund investment.

    The Behavioral Finance Perspective: TheSignificance of Information Overloadand the Role of Cognitive FactorsThe question that should be asked regarding the assump-tions of the EMH is Do investors process information thislogically, efficiently, properly, and neatly? Faust (1984)made this observation about the poor judgment abili-ties of scientists and other experts in which cognitivelimitations . . . lead to frequent judgment error and . . . setsurprisingly harsh restrictions on the capacity to man-age complex information and to make decisions (p. 3).Statman (2005) provided this perspective, Investors werenever rational as defined by standard finance. Theywerenormal in 1945, and they remain normal today (p. 31).In recent years, individual investors, investment pro-

    fessionals, and financial academics are sometimes over-whelmed by the amount of available information and theabundant investment choices with the advancement of in-formation technology and the Internet. These new formsof Internet communication include online search engines,chat rooms, bulletin boards, web sites, blogs, and onlinetrading. For investors, a direct link exists between the cog-nitive biases and heuristics (rules of thumb) espoused bybehavioral finance and the problems associated with in-formation overload. Information overload is defined as oc-curring when the information processing demands on anindividuals time to perform interactions and internal cal-culations exceed the supply or capacity of time availablefor such processing (Schick, Gordon, and Haka, 1990,p. 199). In the future, this problem of information over-load can only be expected to worsen when the follow-ing statistics in terms of the expected upsurge of avail-able information attributed to the Internet Revolution areconsidered:

    300,000: Number of years has taken the world popu-lation to accumulate 12 exabytes of information (theequivalent of 50,000 times the volume of the Libraryof Congress), according to a study by the University ofCalifornia at Berkeley.2.5:Number of years that experts predict it will take tocreate the next 12 exabytes. (Macintyre, 2001, p. 112)

    This observation concerning the relationship between thetenets of behavioral finance and the problems of informa-tion overload is supported by Paredes (2003), who wrote:

    Studies making up the field of behavioral finance showthat investing decisions can be influenced by vari-ous cognitive biases on the part of investors, ana-lysts, and others . . .An extensive psychology literatureshows that people can become overloaded with infor-mation and make worse decisions with more informa-tion. In particular, studies show that when faced withcomplicated tasks, such as those involving lots of in-formation, people tend to adopt simplifying decisionstrategies that require less cognitive effort but that areless accurate than more complex decision strategies.The basic intuition of information overload is that peo-ple might make better decisions by bringing a morecomplex decision strategy to bear on less informationthan by bringing a simpler decision strategy to bear onmore information. (p. 1)

    Behavioral finance focuses on the theories and conceptsthat influence the risk judgment andfinal decision-makingprocess of investors, which includes factors known as cog-nitive bias or mental mistakes (errors) (Ricciardi, 2004,2006). As human beings we utilize specific mental mech-anisms for processing and problem solving during ourdecision making known as cognitive processes. Cognitiveprocesses are themental skills that permit an individual tocomprehend and recognize the things surrounding you.This process is taken a step further in terms of the cog-nitive factors and mental errors committed by investors.Those in the behavioral finance camp study the under-standing of how people think and identify errors madein managing information known as heuristics (rules ofthumb) by all types of investors. Researchers in financialpsychology (behavioral finance) have conducted studiesthat have shown humans are remarkably illogical regard-ing theirmoney, finances, and investments. (See, for exam-ple, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky [1982]; Plous [1993];Piatelli-Palmarini [1994]; Olsen [1998]; Olsen and Khaki[1998]; Shefrin [2000]; Shefrin [2001a]; Warneryd [2001];Nofsinger [2002]; Bazerman [2005]; Shefrin [2005]; Adamsand Finn [2006]; Pompian [2006]; and Ricciardi [2006].)In essence, decision making pertaining to risk frequentlydeparts from the standard finances assumptions of ra-tionality and instead adheres to the ideas associated withbehavioral finances tenets of bounded rationality. Later inthis chapter, we examine the affective (emotional) aspectsof how investors make risk assessments and judgmentsaccording to the principles of behavioral finance.

    FINANCIAL AND INVESTMENTDECISIONMAKING: ISSUES OFRATIONALITYThis section provides a general overview of the debatebetween classical decisionmaking (theproponents of stan-dard finance) and behavioral decision making (the sup-porters of behavioral finance). Rational financial and in-vestment decision making has been the cornerstone oftraditional (standard) finance since the 1960s. The stan-dard finance literature advances the notion of rationalityin which individuals make logical and coherent financialand investment choices. In contrast, behavioral finance

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    92 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    researchers have supported the concept of behavioraldecision theory in which the concepts of bounded ratio-nality, cognitive limitations, heuristics, and affect (feel-ings) are the central theoretical foundation. Customarily,standard finance has rejected the notion that certain be-havioral and psychological factors might influence andprevent individuals from making optimal investment de-cisions. Curtis (2004) provided this assessment of bothschools of academic thought:

    Modern portfolio theory represents the best learningwe have about how capital markets actually oper-ate, while behavioral finance offers the best insightsinto how investors actually behave. But markets dontcare what investors think of as risk, and hence id-iosyncratic ideas about risk and what to do aboutit are bound to harm our long-term investment re-sults. On the other hand, Daniel Kahneman, AmosTversky, and their followers have demonstrated be-yond doubt that we all harbor idiosyncratic ideas andthat we tend to act on them, regardless of the costs toour economic welfare. (p. 21)

    According to classical decision theory, the standard fi-nance investor makes judgments within a clearly definedset of circumstances, knows all possible alternatives andconsequences, and selects the optimum solution. The dis-cipline of standard finance has advanced and flourishedon four basic premises in terms of rational behavior:

    1. Investors make rational (optimal) decisions.2. Investors objectives are entirely financial in nature, in

    which they are assumed to maximize wealth.3. Individuals are unbiased in their expectations regard-

    ing the future.4. Individuals act in their own best (self) interests.

    Classical decision theory has often been described asthe basic model of how investors process informationand make final investment decisions. According to Stat-man (1999), an attractive aspect of the standard financeperspective is it uses a minimum of tools to build aunified theory intended to answer all the questions offinance (p. 19). Thus, by advocating rationality, stan-dard finance researchers have been able to create influen-tial theories such as modern portfolio theory (MPT) andEMH. At the same time, these researchers have been ableto develop effective risk analysis and investment toolssuch as the arbitrage pricing theory (APT), the capital as-set pricing model (CAPM), and the Black-Scholes optionpricingmodel in which investors can value financial secu-rities and provide analysis in an attempt to predict the ex-pected risk and return relationship for specific investmentproducts. Nevertheless, an extensive debate has ensuedabout the validity of rational choice (that is, issues of ratio-nality) between the disciplines of economics and psychol-ogy in works by Arrow (1982), Hogarth and Reder (1986),Antonides (1996), Conlisk (1996), Schwartz (1998), andCarrillo and Brocas (2004). According to Arrow (1982), thehypotheses of rationality have been under attack for em-pirical falsity almost as long as they have been employedin economics (p. 1).Psychologists from the branches of cognitive and ex-

    perimental psychology have made the argument that the

    basic assumptions of classical decision theory are incor-rect since individuals often act in a less than fully ratio-nal manner. According to the assumptions of behavioraldecision making, the behavioral finance investor makesjudgments in relation to a problem that is not clearlydefined, has limited knowledge of possible outcomesand their consequences, and chooses a satisfactory out-come. Thedisciplines of behavioral finance and economicswere founded on the principles of bounded rationality bySimon (1956) inwhich a person utilizes amodified versionof rational choice that takes into account knowledge limi-tations, cognitive issues, and emotional factors. Singer andSinger (1985) described the difference between two sets ofdecision makers from this viewpoint, economists seek toexplain the aggregate behavior of markets, psychologiststry to describe and explain actual behavior of individuals(p. 113). A noteworthy criticism of standard finance wasoffered by Skubic and McGoun (2002), for a disciplinehaving individual choice as one of its fundamental tenets,finance surprisingly pays little attention to the individual(p. 478).

    The Standard Finance Viewpoint:Classical Decision TheoryWithin the fields of finance and economics, there is still anongoing debate relating to the subject of rationality. As ex-plained earlier in this chapter, traditional economics andstandard finance are based on the classical model of ra-tional economic decision making. In general, standard fi-nance assumes that all individuals arewealthmaximizers.In other words, an investor is considered rational if thatperson selects the most preferred choice, customarily de-fined as maximizing an individuals utility or value func-tion. This rational investment decision maker is assumedto maximize profits, possess complete knowledge, andcapitalize on his or her own economic well-being. More-over, rational behavior described by the classical modelof decision making employs a well-structured judgmentprocess based on the maximization of value, a painstak-ing and all-inclusive search for all information, and anin-depth analysis of alternatives. Classical decision the-ory makes the assumption that an individual makes well-informed systematic decisionswhich are in their own self-interest and the decision maker is acting in a world ofcomplete certainty. March and Shapira (1987), provide thefollowing assessment:

    In classical decision theory, risk is most commonly con-cerned as reflecting variation in the distribution of pos-sible outcomes, their likelihoods, and their subjectivevalues. Risk is measured either by nonlinearities in therevealed utility for money or by the variance of theprobability distribution of possible gains and losses as-sociated with a particular alternative. (p. 1404)

    Under the tenets of rational behavior, an investor is as-sumed to possess the skill to predict and consider all per-tinent issues in making judgments and to have infinitecomputational ability. Rationality suggests that individu-als, firms, and markets are able to predict future eventswithout bias and with full access to relevant information

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    INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 93

    at the time the decision is to be made. A person cannotselect a course of action that is not presented or cannotconsider information that is unknown.Those in the camps of standard finance and conven-

    tional economics make the assumption that an individualinvestor based on the notion of rational behaviormaximizes an objective value function under a specifiedcollection of restrictions in aworld of perfect markets. Thebasis of the work by Savage (1954) focused on expectedutility, which is the central aspect of the neoclassicaltheory of rational economic behavior. Decisions are madebased on the following three assumptions: (1) withina predetermined collection of objective outcomes andparameters; (2) with (subjectively) known probabilitydistributions of outcomes for each option; and (3) insuch a way as to maximize the expected value of a givenutility function. Moreover, Doucouliagos (1994) describedthree key notions of rationality, which are: (1) maxi-mizing (optimizing) behavior; (2) the cognitive abilityto exercise rational choice; and (3) individualistic behav-ior and independent tastes and preferences (p. 877).While Coughin commented, the neoclassical modelin economics is built on the concept of the economicactor who is a rational calculator operating in a free andcompetitive marketplace (1993, p. A8).The optimal or normative approach to financial

    decision-making has emphasized that rationality as thefoundation of standard finance theories and models suchas the EMH, modern portfolio theory, the CAPM, and thedividend discount model. These theories and conceptsare based on the notion that investors behave in a ratio-nal, predictable, and an unbiased manner. Ricciardi andSimon (2000a) provided this standpoint on the judgmentprocess:

    Investment decisions regarding an individual stock orwithin the entire portfolio with the objective of max-imizing their profits for a minimum level of risk. Ra-tional investors will only make an investment decision(buy, hold, or sell) in a systematic or logical manner af-ter they have applied some sort of accepted investmentapproach such as fundamental analysis. (p. 7)

    The assumption made is that investors utilize conven-tional investment techniques or financialmodels that havean established historical presence.

    The Behavioral Finance Perspective:Behavioral Decision TheoryBehavioral economics and financial psychology haveexplored various degrees of rationality and irrational be-havior in which individuals and groups may act or be-have differently in the real world, departing from theconstrained assumptions of rationality supported by thestandard finance literature. The alternative disciplinesof behavioral finance, economics, and accounting departfrom the purely traditional statistical and mathematicalmodels in which rationality (that is, classical decisiontheory) has been the centerpiece of the accepted theoryacross a spectrum of different disciplines (e.g., standardfinance, conventional economics, traditional accounting).

    The alternative perspective is known as behavioral deci-sion theory (BDT), which has an extensive academic his-tory within the social sciences such as cognitive andexperimental psychology that has provided a more de-scriptive and realistic model of human behavior. Thebasis of this theory is that individuals systematicallyinfringe upon (violate) the normative tenets of eco-nomic (finance) rationality by: (1) miscalculating (un-derestimating or overestimating) probabilities, and (2)making choices between different options based onnoneconomic (nonfinancial) factors. (See, for example,Edwards [1954], Slovic [1972], Slovic, Fischhoff, andLichtenstein [1977], Einhorn and Hogarth [1981], Kah-neman, Slovic and Tversky [1982], Slovic, Lichtenstein,and Fischhoff [1988], Weber [1994], Gigerenzer and Gold-stein [1996], Mellers, Schwartz, and Cooke [1998], Mul-lainathan and Thaler [2000], Shefrin [2001a], Warneryd[2001], Gowda and Fox [2002], Bazerman [2005], Barberisand Thaler [2005], Coleman [2006], and Taylor-Gooby andZinn [2006].)BDT explains how the human aspects of decision mak-

    ing affect individuals such as the measurement of com-mon systematic errors that result in individual investorsand professional investors departing from rational behav-ior. In its simplest form, the behavioral decision makeris influenced by what he or she perceives in a given sit-uation, event, or circumstance. For this discussion, oneof the substantive aspects of BDT is the significant roleof bounded rationality. Bounded rationality proposes thatdecision makers are limited by their values and uncon-scious reflexes, skills, and habits as identified by Simon(1947, 1956, and 1997). In effect, bounded rationality isthe premise that economic rationality has its limitations,especially during the judgment process under conditionsof risk and uncertainty. According to Ricciardi (2006), in-vestors would identify more with the tenets of boundedrationality proposed by behavioral finance instead of thelimited constraints of rationality espoused by standardfinance.According to behavioral finance decision theory (the

    descriptive model), an investor displays cognitive bias,heuristics (rules of thumb), and affective (emotional) fac-tors that have been disregarded by the assumptions ofrationality under classical finance decision theory (the nor-mative model). Shefrin (2000) clarifies the difference be-tween cognitive and emotional issues, cognitive aspectsconcern the way people organize their information, whilethe emotional aspects dealwith theway people feel as theyregister information (p. 29). Olsen (2001) provided thefollowing perspective of the behavioral finance decision-making process:

    Financial decision makers preferences tend to be mul-tifaceted, open to change and often formed during thedecision process itself.

    Financial decision makers are satisficers and not opti-mizers.

    Financial decision makers are adaptive in the sensethat the nature of the decision and environment withinwhich it is made influence the type of the process uti-lized.

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    94 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    Financial decision makers are neurologically predis-posed to incorporate affect (emotion) into the decisionprocess. (p. 158)

    Behavioral finance is based on the assumption that in-dividuals are sometimes irrational or only quasi-rational(Thaler, 1994), and they are often inconsistent in termsof strict rationality in their investment decisions relativeto standard finances notion of rationality. Additionally,behavioral finance advocates believe that investors makedecisions at different levels of rationality or satisfactionaccording to Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) and individ-uals should realize the importance of understanding thenotion of bounded rationality as indicated by Barberis andThaler (2005) and Bazerman (2005). Investor judgment isinfluenced by internal and external factors such as: (1)the psychology of other individuals or groups within themarketplace (e.g., the notion of crowd psychology, herdbehavior) and (2) the favorable or unfavorable memoryof a prior financial or investment decision (this is depen-dent on whether the final outcome of the judgment was asuccess (gain) or failure (loss)).A well-established premise (assumption) in behavioral

    finance is that investors make decisions according to theprinciples of prospect theory. Prospect theory empha-sizes that there are lasting biases affected by cognitiveand affective (emotional) processes that influence an in-dividuals decisions under specific circumstances of risk-taking behavior and uncertainty. Schwartz (1998) statedthat prospect theory makes the assumption an investorwill assess outcomes in terms of gains or losses in re-lation to a specific reference point instead of the finalvalue within their overall investment portfolio. Bern-stein (1997) commented that prospect theory discov-ered behavior patterns that had never been recognizedby proponents of rational decision-making. . . . First, emo-tion often destroys the self-control that is essential torational decision-making. Second, people are unable tounderstand fully what they are dealing with (p. 24).Investors function in a world in which they are over-confident, hate to lose money, and at times, are ex-tremely greedy, though all this is often in a predictablemanner. Investors have revealed feelings of a cyni-cal nature such as dread, worry, and procrastination,whereas other finance individuals have demonstrateda hopeful state of mind of pleasure, happiness, andgrandiosity.The Nobel Prize winner Herbert Simon criticized the

    discipline of standard economics for its reliance and sup-port of the premise of rationality. In 1947, he offered thisextensive criticism on the limits of standard rationalitybecause it falls short of actual behavior in at least threeaspects:

    1. Rationality requires complete knowledge and antici-pation of the consequences that will follow on eachchoice. In fact, knowledge of consequences is alwaysfragmentary.

    2. Since the consequences lie in the future imaginationmust supply the lack of experienced feeling in attach-ing value to them. But values can be only imperfectlyanticipated.

    3. Rationality requires a choice among all possible alter-native behaviors. In actual behavior, only a very fewof all these possible alternatives ever come to mind.(Simon, 1947, p. 81)

    Furthermore, Simon (1956) rejected rational models ofchoice for ignoring situational and personal limitations,such as time and cognitive ability. In the 1950s, Simondeveloped and advanced the notion of bounded rational-ity that explored the psychological aspects that influencethe economic judgment process. Kaufman, Lewin,Mincer,and Cummings (1989) provided this portrayal of a morerealistic and practical person from the social sciences:

    A textbook description of behavioral man would runalong the following lines: individuals typically do notmaximize, but rather select the first alternative out-come that satisfies their aspiration level, and becausethere are severe limits to information and knowledgeof alternative outcomes, people act on the basis of asimplified, ill-structured mental abstraction of the realworld-an abstraction that is influenced bypersonal per-ceptions and past experiences. Although this model ofman is largely foreign to economists, in various guisesit underlies much of the industrial relations-orientedresearch done by scholars in personnel, organizationalbehavior, and sociology (p. 76).

    Simons work focused on the idea that the decisionmaker possessed limited information (knowledge) anddid not always seek the best potential choice because oflimited resources and personal inclinations. In essence, aninvestor would satisfice financial utility rather than max-imize it, sometimes accepting a satisfactory investmentalternative rather than the optimal choice (that is, maxi-mize gains and minimize losses). Regarding this matter,behavioral finance departs from one or more of the as-sumptions of classical decision-making underlying thetheory of rational choice (that is, the standard financeviewpoint). Rather than maximizing expected utility, in-vestors attempt to find answers by what Simon labelssatisficing and can be described as the following:

    Amethod formaking a choice from a set of alternativesencountered sequentially when one does not knowmuch about the possibilities ahead of time. In suchsituations, there may be no optimal solution for whento stop searching for further alternatives . . . satisficingtakes the shortcut of setting an adjustable aspirationlevel and ending the search for alternatives as soon asone is encountered that exceeds the aspiration level.(Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999, p. 13)

    Academic models of judgment and decision makinghave to take into account known limitations concerningour minds capacities. Since human beings have cognitivelimitations, we must utilize approximate methods to han-dle complex decisions. These techniques include cognitiveprocesses that largely prevent the need for further infor-mation investigations, heuristics (e.g., mental shortcuts)that direct our search and decide when it should end,and simple judgment rules that utilize the informationfound as implicitly. Thaler (2000) divulged this viewpoint

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    INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 95

    in terms the evolution of economic man:

    My predictions can be summarized quite easily: I ampredicting that Homo Economicus will evolve intoHomo Sapiens. This prediction shouldnt be an out-landish one. It seems logical that basing descriptiveeconomic models on more realistic conceptions of eco-nomic agents is bound to increase the explanationpower of the models. Still, a conservative economistmight (emotionally) scoff: If this were a better way ofdoing economics, we would already be doing it thatway! Why arent all my predictions already true? Andwhy should I expect things to change? . . .we can hopethat new scholars in other disciplines can do for eco-nomics what cognitive psychologists such as Kahne-man and Tversky have already done: offer us usefulfindings and theories that are relatively easy to incor-porate into economic models (p. 140).

    Later research extended Simons initial ideas onbounded rationality in terms of utilizing straightforwardjudgments known as heuristics (rules of thumb) in orderto make complex decisions was based on the contribu-tions of Kahneman and Tversky (1974) and Kahneman,Slovic, and Tversky (1982). Payne, Bettman, and Johnson(1993) established that simple decision strategies are uti-lized to reduce a set of choices before implementing amore multifaceted approach or trade-off strategy to theremaining options (alternatives). These divergences fromclassical decision-making theory and the assumptions ofrationality are all too apparent in terms of the extensivelist of items that influence a persons perception of risksuch as heuristics, issues of overconfidence, the notion ofprospect theory, the influence of loss aversion, the con-cept of representativeness, issues of framing, the topic ofanchoring, the notion of familiarity bias, the factors of per-ceived control, the issues of expert knowledge, the role ofaffect (feelings), and the influence of worry. Later in thischapter, we will discuss theories and concepts of behav-ioral finance that influence the decisionmakers judgmentprocess and conflictwith the tenets of rationality espousedby those in the standard finance camp.In summary, Hirshleifer (2001) provided a remarkable

    discussion of the widespread criticisms from both sides ofthe debate on the issue of rationality. He revealed weak-nesses argued by the two schools of academic thoughtpertaining to standardfinance andbehavioral finance. Thefollowing are criticisms of the standard finance viewpointor what Hirshleifer termed the objection to fully rationalapproach:

    Standard finance theory of rationality involves impos-sible capabilities of calculation.

    Judgments are assumed to be objective and quantitativewithin an investment setting.

    The financial data and findings do not support the as-sumptions of rational choice.

    Irrational investors and inefficient financial marketsshould arbitrage away efficiently priced securities.

    Investors according to the assumptions of irrationality(e.g., bounded rationality) take onmore risk andbecomewealthier.

    Accurate investors will obtain the knowledge and expe-rience (learn) to make bad investment judgments.

    The following are criticisms of the behavioral finance per-spective or what Hirshleifer coined the objection to psy-chological approach:

    The so-calledbehavioral biases (e.g., the role of cognitivelimitations, the tools of heuristics) are unscientific.

    The decision-making process involves factors that aresubjective and qualitative in nature.

    Experiments in laboratory settings that produce sup-posed behavioral ideas and findings are not significant.

    Rational investors and the financial markets should ar-bitrage away mispriced securities.

    Investors according to the assumptions of rationalitymake better judgments and acquire greater wealth.

    Confused individuals will obtain the skills and abilities(learn) to make good investment decisions.

    This section has provided a brief discussion of the on-going debate between classical decision making (the stan-dard finance viewpoint) and behavioral decision theory(the behavioral finance perspective). For a more in-depthperspective of the rationality debate consult this sampleof papers by Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor(2002a), (2002b), and (2004) that offered a psychologi-cal perspective in terms of the role of affect (emotions)and rational behavior; Rubinstein (2001) provided a stan-dard finance viewpoint of market rationality; and Bar-beris and Thaler (2005) discussed the subject of man-agerial and bounded irrationality as part of their ex-tensive literature review of the discipline of behavioralfinance.

    WHAT ARE THEMAIN THEORIESAND CONCEPTS FROMBEHAVIORAL FINANCE THATINFLUENCE AN INDIVIDUALSPERCEPTION OF RISK?As explained earlier in this chapter, an extensive numberof research studies within the social sciences have demon-strated various factors that influence a persons perceptionof risk for different types of risky behaviors andhazardousactivities. Rohrmann (1999) documented that the investi-gation of risk judgments (the principal foundation of riskresearch) has focused on these six main issues:

    1. Risk acceptance issues for individual versus societalconcerns.

    2. The fundamental aspects of how information is pro-cessed (that is, the influence of heuristics and cognitivebiases).

    3. The connection between perceived risk versus actualrisk in terms of different categories of hazardous situa-tions and activities.

    4. The issue of personality traits and demographic dif-ferences among a diverse population of subjects andrespondents.

    5. The findings that risk perception studies have beenlinked to statistical data on hazardous activities and

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    96 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    then, applied to the development of risk communica-tion programs for experts and the general public.

    6. The central role of cultural factors among an inter-national research sample for a variety of differentcountries.

    Ricciardi (2004) offers a comprehensive list of behavioralrisk characteristics (see Table 10.1) that were examined byrisk perception researchers in behavioral finance and ac-counting within a financial and investment setting. Table10.1 provides the specific behavioral risk indicators thatwere examined by researchers in these two disciplines:(1) 12 risk behavioral attributes (characteristics) withinbehavioral accounting based on 12 research studies forthe time period of 1975 to 2003, and (2) 111 behavioralrisk indicators within behavioral finance for 71 endeav-ors for the time period of 1969 to 2002. However, belowwe will only provide a brief discussion of the prevalentcognitive issues and affective (emotional) factors of be-havioral finance that influence a persons perception ofrisk including: heuristics, overconfidence, prospect the-ory, loss aversion, representativeness, framing, anchoring,familiarity bias, perceived control, expert knowledge, af-fect (feelings), and worry.

    HeuristicsKahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) noted that whenindividuals are faced with a complex judgment such asa statistical probability, frequency or incomplete informa-tion; various subjects utilize a limited number of heuristicsthat reduce the decision to a simpler task. Heuristics aresimple and general rules a person employs to solve a spe-cific category of problems under conditions that involve ahigh degree of risk-taking behavior and uncertainty. My-ers (1989) provided this viewpoint on heuristics, all ofus have a repertoire of these strategies based on bits ofknowledge we have picked up, rules we have learned, orhypotheses that worked in the past (p. 286). These strate-gies known as heuristics in the formal sense are rulesof thumbs that are considered very common in all typesof decision-making situations. Furthermore, heuristics area cognitive tool for reducing the time of the decision-making process for an individual investor or investmentprofessional. In essence, heuristics are mental shortcutsor strategies derived from our past experience that get uswhere we need to go quickly, but at the cost of sendingus in the wrong direction (Ricciardi and Simon, 2001, p.19) or introducing biases that result in over or underesti-mating the actual outcome. An investor utilizes heuristicswhen given a narrow time frame in which he or she hasto assess difficult financial circumstances and investmentchoices. Eventually, thesemental processes (heuristics) re-sult in the individual making investment errors basedon their intuitive judgments. Plous (1993) wrote:

    For example, it is easier to estimate how likely an out-come is by using a heuristic than by tallying every pastoccurrence of the outcome and dividing by the totalnumber of times the outcome could have occurred. Inmost cases, rough approximations are sufficient (just aspeople often satisfice rather than optimize). (p. 109)

    The significance of heuristics in the domain of risk-takingbehavior anduncertaintyhasbeenamajor sourceofresearchwithin the area of judgment and decisionmakingin works by Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Kahneman,Slovic, and Tversky (1982), Slovic (2000), and Gilovich,Griffin, and Kahneman (2002). Two major types of factorsthat have an affect on a persons perception of risk are theavailability heuristic and overconfidence as indicated bySlovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1979).

    Availability HeuristicOne of the underlying principles of risk perception re-search has been the availability heuristic based on thework of Tversky and Kahneman (1973). This heuristic isutilized in order to judge the likelihood or frequency ofan event or occurrence. In various experiments in psy-chology, the findings have revealed individuals tend to bebiased by information that is easier to recall, influencedby information that is vivid, well-publicized, or recent.An individual that employs the availability heuristic willbe guided to judge the degree of risk of a behavior or haz-ardous activity as highly probable or frequent if examplesof it are easy to remember or visualize. Furthermore, theavailability heuristic provides the inclination for an indi-vidual to form their decisions on information that is easilyavailable to them. The main issues that have involved theavailability heuristic are (1) activities that induce emo-tions, (2) tasks that are intensely dramatic, and (3) actionsthat have occurred more recently have a propensity to bemore accessible in our recent memory. Schwartz (1998)described the availability heuristic in this manner:

    Biases may arise because the ease which specific in-stances can be recalled frommemory affects judgmentsabout the relative frequency and importance of data.This leads to overestimation of the probability of well-publicized or dramatic events . . . or recent events alongwith the underestimation of less recent, publicized ordramatic events . . .A prominent example of the avail-ability bias is the belief of most people that homicides(which are highly publicized) are more common thansuicides, but, in fact, the reverse is true. (p. 64)

    Another example of the application of the availabilityheuristic is a strong majority of individuals (subjects) aremore likely to express or experience a high degree ofanxiety (an increase in perceived risk) over flying in anairplane than driving in an automobile. This increasedanxiety (fear) among the general public towards flying inairplanes occurs because of the extensive media coverageof the few major airline accidents ultimately increases anindividuals perception of the risk, whereas an individ-ual feels safer driving in an automobile. This is becausean individual has the perception of control of the riskysituation or task known as personal control. This conflictswith classical decision theory (that is, the standard financeperspective) since the rational choice (decision) is to fly inan airplane rather than to drive in a car if the persononly considers and examines the statistical data on safety.The safety statistics reveal the number of automobile ac-cidents and deaths from driving a car is far greater thanthe number of airplane crashes and deaths from airlineaccidents.

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    Table 10.1 Risk Perception Studies from Behavioral Finance and Accounting:A Master List of Behavioral Risk Characteristics (Indicators)

    Behavioral Accounting: 12 Behavioral Risk Attributes for 12 Research Studies

    1. Familiarity factor or issues of familiarity (influence of stockname vs. withholding name of company)

    7. Familiarity/Newness (new or old risk)8. Immediacy (immediate or overtime)

    2. Search for additional information 9. Knowledge by management3. Worry 10. Knowledge by participant4. Voluntary 11. Loss outcome5. Control 12. Gain outcome6. Chance of a catastrophic outcome

    Behavioral Finance: 111 Behavioral Risk Indicators for 71 Research Endeavors

    1. Quality of the stock 57. Confidence2. Financial loss 58. The level of investment3. Concern for others 59. Degree of hazard (and gain)4. Optimism (Issues of confidence) 60. Chance of incurring a large loss5. Complexity 61. Economic expectations6. Prestige of investment ownership 62. Financial knowledge index7. Personal attention requirement 63. Chance or incurring a large gain8. Personal attention allowed 64. Locus of control index9. Locus of control 65. Money ethics variable10. Potential for a large loss 66. Law of small numbers factor11. Potential for a gain 67. Illusion of control12. Investors knowledge 68. Overconfidence13. Objective knowledge factor 69. Ability of competitors14. Worry factor 70. Possibility of a loss15. Confidence in own knowledge 71. Magnitude of a loss16. Control 72. Gathering more information17. Knowledge 73. Control over situation18. Catastrophic potential 74. Drawing on expertise19. Dread 75. Consulting with colleagues20. Voluntariness 76. Sharing responsibility21. Equity 77. Reputation22. Novelty 78. Seriousness23. Regret theory 79. Losses delayed24. Uncertainty 80. Not known to investors25. Framing 81. Not known to experts26. Multiple reference points 82. Lose all money27. Prior Gains 83. Adverse effect on economy28. Prior Losses 84. Losses unobservable29. Degree of internalization 85. Complex to understand30. Frequency 86. Unacceptable sales pressure31. Degree of externalization 87. Unsound advice32. Frequency 88. Poor investor protection33. Psychological risk characteristic 89. No regulation34. Financial knowledge 90. Unethical35. Outcome uncertainty 91. Monitoring time36. Potential gains and losses 92. Information prior to purchase37. Perceived safety 93. Ruin38. Situational framing 94. Perceived outcome control39. Personal expectations, 95. Gain (favorable position)40. Perceived control 96. Loss (unfavorable position)41. Risk-seeking behavior 97. Self-efficacy42. Adequacy of regulation 98. Knowledge of investment principles43. Attention 99. Control the possible returns of the decision44. Knowledge factor 100. Control the risks involved in the problem45. Likelihood of losing money 101. Personal consideration of making the decision46. Time horizon 102. Familiarity assets vs. unfamiliarity assets47. Typicality 103. Taking more time to reach a decision48. Anxiety 104. Reducing the number of decisions49. Familiarity 105. Concern for below-target returns50. Postponement of losses 106. Ruinous loss (potential for large loss)51. Clarity of information 107. Acquaintances who invest in instrument52. Independence of investment 108. Divergence of opinion (uncertainty)53. Trust 109. Inability to estimate total amount of potential loss54. Availability of information 110. Perceived personal control (Internal locus of control)55. Catastrophic risk 111. Uncertainty measure (lack of information, inability to

    assign probabilities with degree of confidence)56. Ambiguity (uncertainty)

    97

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    98 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    OverconfidenceOverconfidence is another characteristic that influencesa persons risk perception since there are many waysin which an individual tends to be overconfident abouttheir decisions in terms of risk-taking behavior. Withinthe behavioral finance literature, overconfidence is one ofthe most documented biases according to Daniel and Tit-man (2000). Confidence can be described as the belief inoneself and ones abilities with full conviction whereasoverconfidence can be taken a step further inwhich over-confidence takes this self-reliant behavior to an extreme(Ricciardi and Simon, 2000a, p. 13). As human beings, wehave an inclination to overestimate our own skills, abil-ities, and predictions for success. Myers (1989) providedthis viewpoint on the decision making process:

    Our use of quick and easy heuristics when formingjudgments and our bias toward seeking confirmationrather than refutation of our ideas can give rise to theoverconfidence phenomenon, an overestimation of theaccuracy of our current knowledge. (p. 293)

    A classic study in psychology by Fischhoff, Slovic, andLichtenstein (1977) explored the issue of overconfidence.They provided a group of subjects (individuals) with acollection of knowledge-based questions. Each of the in-dividuals in the research endeavor had to evaluate a set ofpredetermined questions in which the answers were ab-solute. Nevertheless, the participants in the study did notnecessarily have knowledge of the answers to the surveyquestions. For each answer, a subject was expected to pro-vide a percentage or score that measured their degree ofconfidence in terms of whether the person thought theiranswer was accurate. In summary, Ricciardi and Simon(2000a) provided this interpretation of the study:

    The results of this study demonstrated a widespreadand consistent tendency of overconfidence. For in-stance, people who gave incorrect answers to 10 per-cent of the questions (thus the individual should haverated themselves at 90 percent) instead predicted with100 percent degree of confidence their answers werecorrect. In addition, for a sample of incorrect answers,the participants rated the likelihood of their responsesbeing incorrect at 1:1000, 1:10,000 and even 1:1,000,000.The difference between the reliability of the replies andthe degree of overconfidence was consistent through-out the study. (p. 4)

    Ultimately, individuals are very confident in theirchoices formed under the rules of heuristics and are con-siderably inattentive in terms of the exactmanner inwhichtheir decision was formed.Another category of overconfident behavior is the no-

    tion of the It wont happen to me bias. In this instance,individuals tend to consider themselves invulnerable tospecific risky activities or events on an individual basis,while they would readily concede to these risks on a soci-etal level. For instance, most individuals have a tendencyto believe they are better than the average driver, morelikely to live past the age of 80, and are less likely to beinjured by consumer goods according to Slovic, Fischhoff,and Lichtenstein (1980).While Strong (2006) provided thisviewpoint on the psychology of overconfidence, most

    people think they are . . . above average in intelligence, andmost investors think they are above-average stock pick-ers (p. 278).Within the risk perception literature, this overconfident

    behavior extends to expert individuals (e.g., safety inspec-tors) in which they ignore or underestimate the odds of arisky behavior or hazardous activity. When experts arerequired to rely on intuitive judgment, rather than onstatistical data, they are prone to making the same va-riety of errors as novices (e.g., the general public). Slovic,Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1980) pointed out the exis-tence of this expert overconfident behavior in the domainof technology occurred for several reasons such as failureto contemplate theway humanmistakes influence techno-logical systems, the notion of overconfidence in scientificknowledge, inattentiveness to how technological systemsperform together as a whole, and failure to predict howpeople respond to safety procedures.

    Prospect TheoryThe seminal work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)advocated a new theory under conditions of risk-takingbehavior and uncertainty known as prospect theory.Olsen (1997) noted prospect theory gives weight to thecognitive limitations of human decision makers (p. 63).Under the assumptions of prospect theory, an investordeparts from the notion of rationality espoused by clas-sical decision theory (the standard finance perspective)and instead an individual makes decisions on the basisof bounded rationality advocated by behavioral decisiontheory (the behavioral finance viewpoint). Kahnemanand Tverskys prospect theory is based on the notionthat people are loss averse in which they are moreconcerned with losses than gains. In effect, an investoron an individual basis will assign more significance toavoiding a loss than to achieving a gain.Investors utilize a compartment in their brains or a type

    of mental bookkeepingduring thedecision-makingpro-cess. For instance, an investor individualizes each finan-cial decision into a separate account in their mind knownas mental accounting. This investor has an inclination tofocus on a specific reference point (e.g., the purchase pricefor a stock or the original stock investment cost) and theirdesire is to close each account with a profit (gain) forthat single transaction. Heilar, Lonie, Power, and Sinclair(2001) described prospect theory from this perspective:

    This theory separates the decision choice process intotwo stages; in the first stage the menu of availablechoices is framed and edited in accordance with thedecision makers prior perceptions; in the second stagethese prospects are evaluated in relation to the deci-sion makers subjective assessment of their likelihoodof occurrence. The prospect with the highest expectedoutcome is selected. (p. 11)

    A major component of prospect theory is known as thevalue function (see Figure 10.2). The individual valuewithrespect to gains and losses are in comparison to a referencepoint in which the values for negative deviations fromthe reference point will be greater than the values placed

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    INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 99

    Value

    GainsLosses

    Loss Area:Assets with lossesare kept (held) fortoo long

    Profit Area:Assets with profitsare cashed (sold)too early

    Reference Point

    Figure 10.2 Prospect TheoryA Hypothetical ValueFunction

    on positive deviations. Investors treat outcomes as lossesor gains from a subjective reference in two aspects: (1)people are risk averse with their investments which areperforming well (that is, investment gains) and as a resultthey have an inclination to cash in their profits too earlyand (2) individuals are risk seekers for losses (that is, lossaverse) and in order to avoid a realized loss theywill take agamble (by avoiding to sell the asset) that could result in aneven greater loss. Furthermore, the argument is made thatindividuals weigh probabilities in a non-linear manner:small probabilities are overvalued (over-weighted) whilechanges in middle-range probabilities are undervalued(underweighted). Kahneman (2003) commented:

    The shift from wealth to changes of wealth as carriersof utility is significant because of a property of prefer-ences we later labeled loss aversion . . .Loss aversion ismanifest in the extraordinary reluctance to accept riskthat is observed when people are offered a gamble onthe toss of a coin. Most will reject a gamble in whichthey might lose $20, unless they are offered more than$40 if they win. (p. 726)

    For instance, in the actual experiment byKahneman andTversky (1979) subjects were asked to evaluate a pair ofgambles and to choose one of the options.

    Experiment 1: Consider a decision between these twoalternatives:

    Choice A: A certain reward of $7,500 orChoice B: An 80% chance of gaining $10,000, with a 20%

    likelihood of being paid $ 0.Question:Which choice would give you the best prospect

    to capitalize on your profits?

    Ahighpercentage of individuals (that is, strongmajorityof subjects) selected the first option (Choice A), which is ineffect the sure gain. Kahneman and Tversky found thata large percentage of individuals happen to be risk aversewhen presentedwith the prospect of an investment profit.Accordingly, people selected Choice A which is the defi-nite gain of $7,500 and this is considered the less preferredoption. If individuals had selected Choice B, their general

    outlook on an aggregate basis would be a better optionsince there is a larger increase in wealth of $8,000. Withina portfolio of investments, the result would be calculatedby: ($10,000 80%) + (0 + 20%) = $8,000. Most peopleare bothered (that is, may feel dread or worry) by the 20%likelihood in Choice B of a monetary result of zero (noth-ing). This alternative demonstrates the notion that diversecategories of investors prefer financial options that offera high degree of certainty such as a lump sum of cashand have an aversion toward ambiguity (uncertainty).An additional experiment (illustration) incorporates the

    expectations of losing money together with the uncer-tainty associated with this entire process.

    Experiment 2: Consider the following options:Choice C: A realized (fixed) loss of $7,500 orChoice D: An 80% chance of losing $10,000, with a 20%

    possibility of losing no money at all.Question: Which selection would give you the best op-

    portunity to minimize your losses?

    Most participants preferred Choice D because theprospect for a 20% chance of not losing any money de-spite the fact that this choice has more risk since withina portfolio of investments the result would be an $8,000loss. Therefore, as indicated by standard finance (that is,tenets of classical decision theory), Choice C is the accept-able (rational) decision. Curran stated, because peopleshorror of loses exceeds even their aversion to risks, sayKahneman and Tversky, they are willing to takeriskseven bad risks (1986, p. 64). Lastly, Naughton(2002) offered the following perspective on prospect the-ory: Their work revolutionized the field of financial eco-nomics by proposing that behavioural biases in general,and prospect theory in particular are better explanationsof how decisions are made in risky situations (p. 110).

    Loss AversionOlsen (2000) noted Early research, using utility-basedmodels, suggested that investment risk couldbemeasuredby return distribution moments such as variance or skew-ness (p. 50). In contrast, other researchers explored thesubjective aspects of risk and discovered that individualsare loss averse. As explained earlier, a central assumptionof prospect theory is the notion of loss aversion in whichpeople designate more significance to losses than they al-locate to gains. The notion of loss aversion is contrary tothe tenets of modern portfolio theory since the disciplineof standard finance makes the assumption that a loss andgain is equivalent (identical). In other words, accordingto basic statistical analysis, a loss is simply a negativeprofit and is thus, weighted in the samemanner. From aninvestment standpoint, during the decision-making pro-cess, many investors appear thin-skinned and vulnerableto losses, and highly determined not to realize a financialloss. In some instances, investors exhibit a tendency or in-creased readiness to take risks in the desire of reducing oravoiding the entire loss (see Figure 10.2).A main premise of loss aversion is that an individual is

    less likely to sell an investment at a loss than to sell an

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    100 The Psychology of Risk: The Behavioral Finance Perspective

    investment that has increased in value even if expectedreturns are held constant. Several academic experimentsin psychology have demonstrated that for some investorsa loss bothers them twice as much in absolute terms thanthe pleasure from an equal gain. For example, an investorthat loses $10,000 on a specific stock feels twice as muchpain than if that person had a $10,000 profit (reward) onthe same exact investment. Mendintz (1999) commentedwell do foolish things to avoid finalizing and acceptinglosses that have already happeneda phenomenonmanyof us know as throwing good money after bad. So wellspend hundreds of dollars to fix an old car not because itmakes economic sense, but because weve already spenta lot on it (p. 81). These errors in judgment often leador result in an investor not selling their losing investmenteven though it is the correct financial decision.

    RepresentativenessAnother important heuristic that affects a persons per-ception of risk is known as representativeness. Behavioralfinance refers to a fundamental mental mechanism thatwe set in motion because of abstract rules known as men-tal shortcuts that are part of the judgment process basedon the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1971). Decisionmakers manifesting this heuristic are willing to developbroad, and sometimes very detailed generalizations abouta person or phenomenon based on only a few attributesof the person or phenomenon (Busenitz, 1999, p. 330).Human beings utilize mental shortcuts that make it com-plicated to analyze new investment information accu-rately and without bias. Representativeness reflects thebelief that a member of a category (e.g., risky behavior orhazardous activity) should resemble others in the sameclass and that, in effect, should resemble the cause thatproduced it. Ricciardi and Simon (2001) provided this per-spective:

    Representativeness is but one of a number of heuristicsthat people use to render complex problems manage-able. The concept of representativeness proposes thathumans have an automatic inclination to make judg-ments based on the similarity of items, or predict futureuncertain events by taking a small portion of data anddrawing a holistic conclusion. (p. 21)

    The representativeness heuristic is based on the notionthat we tend to form an opinion in terms of events by howmuch they resemble other eventswhichwe are familiar. Inso doing, we ignore relevant facts that should be includedin our decision-making process, but are not. For instance,investors frequently predict the performance of an initialpublic offering by relating it to the previous investmentssuccess (gain) or failure (loss). In some circumstances,shortcuts are beneficial, but in the case of investment deci-sions, they tend to render the persons judgments unrecep-tive to change. Some investors feel that this approach tothe judgment process is