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Title:YourMindandHowtoUseIt

AManualofPracticalPsychology

Author:WilliamWalkerAtkinson

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YOURMINDANDHOWTOUSEIT

AMANUALOFPRACTICALPSYCHOLOGY

BY

WILLIAMWALKERATKINSONItisnotenoughmerelytohaveasoundmind—onemustalsolearnhowtouseit,ifhewouldbecome

mentallyefficient.

PUBLISHEDBY

THEELIZABETHTOWNECO.,HOLYOKE,MASS.L.N.Fowler&Co.,London.

Copyright,1911.ELIZABETHTOWNE.

CopyrightedintheUnitedStatesandEngland.

Contents.

CHAPTER PAGEI. WHATISTHEMIND 5II. THEMECHANISMOFMENTALSTATES 11III. THEGREATNERVECENTERS 17IV. CONSCIOUSNESS 24V. ATTENTION 29VI. PERCEPTION 36VII. MEMORY 45VIII. MEMORY(continued) 54IX. IMAGINATION 62X. THEFEELINGS 72XI. THEEMOTIONS 79XII. THEINSTINCTIVEEMOTIONS 88XIII. THEPASSIONS 96XIV. THESOCIALEMOTIONS 104XV. THERELIGIOUSEMOTIONS 111XVI. THEÆSTHETICEMOTIONS 117XVII. THEINTELLECTUALEMOTIONS 125XVIII. THEROLEOFTHEEMOTIONS 131XIX. THEEMOTIONSANDHAPPINESS 136XX. THEINTELLECT 143XXI. CONCEPTION 151XXII. CLASSESOFCONCEPTS 158XXIII. JUDGMENTS 164XXIV. PRIMARYLAWSOFTHOUGHT 171XXV. REASONING 176XXVI. INDUCTIVEREASONING 181XXVII. DEDUCTIVEREASONING 186XXVIII. FALLACIOUSREASONING 193XXIX. THEWILL 201XXX. WILL-TRAINING 213XXXI. WILL-TONIC 219

CHAPTERI.

WhatistheMind?

P SYCHOLOGY is generally considered to be the science of mind,althoughmoreproperlyitisthescienceofmentalstates—thoughts,feelings,andactsofvolition. Itwasformerly thecustomofwriterson thesubjectofpsychologytobeginbyanattempttodefineanddescribethenatureofmind,before proceeding to a consideration of the subject of the various mentalspates and activities. Butmore recent authorities have rebelled against thisdemand, and have claimed that it is no more reasonable to hold thatpsychologyshouldbeheld toanexplanationof theultimatenatureofmindthanitisthatphysicalsciencebeheldtoanexplanationoftheultimatenatureofmatter. The attempt to explain the ultimate nature of either is futile—noactualnecessityexistsforexplanationineithercase.Physicsmayexplainthephenomenaofmatter,andpsychologythephenomenaofmind,withoutregardtotheultimatenatureofthesubstanceofeither.

The science of physics has progressed steadily during the past century,notwithstanding the fact that the theories regarding the ultimate nature ofmatter have been revolutionized during that period. The facts of thephenomenaofmatterremain,notwithstandingthechangeoftheoryregardingthenatureofmatteritself.Sciencedemandsandholdsfasttofacts,regardingtheories as but working hypotheses at the best. Some one has said that“theories are but the bubbles with which the grown-up children of scienceamuse themselves.”Scienceholds severalwell-supported, thoughopposing,theoriesregardingthenatureofelectricity,butthefactsofthephenomenaofelectricity, and the application thereof, are agreed upon by the disputingtheorists.Andsoit iswithpsychology; thefactsregardingmentalstatesareagreed upon, and methods of developing mental powers are effectivelyemployed,without regard towhethermind is a product of the brain, or thebrainmerelyanorganofthemind.Thefactthatthebrainandnervoussystemareemployedinthephenomenaofthoughtisconcededbyall,andthatisallthatisnecessaryforabasisforthescienceofpsychology.

Disputes regarding the ultimate nature ofmind are nowgenerally passedover to the philosophers andmetaphysicians, while psychology devotes itsentireattention to studying the lawsofmental activities, and todiscoveringmethodsofmentaldevelopment.Evenphilosophyisbeginningtotireofthe

eternal“why”andisdevotingitsattentiontothe“how”phaseofthings.Thepragmatic spirithas invaded the fieldofphilosophy, expressing itself in thewords of Prof. William James, who said: “Pragmatism is the attitude oflooking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities;and of looking forward toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts.”Modernpsychologyisessentiallypragmaticinitstreatmentofthesubjectofthemind.Leaving tometaphysics theoldargumentsanddisputes regardingtheultimatenatureofmind,itbendsallitsenergiesupondiscoveringthelawsof mental activities and states, and developing methods whereby the mindmaybetrainedtoperformbetterandmorework,toconserveitsenergies,toconcentrate its forces. Tomodern psychology themind is something to beused,notmerelysomethingaboutwhichtospeculateandtheorize.Whilethemetaphysicians deplore this tendency, the practical people of the worldrejoice.

MINDDEFINED.

Mindisdefinedas“thefacultyorpowerwherebythinkingcreatures,feel,think,andwill.”Thisdefinitionisinadequateandcircularinnature,butthisisunavoidable, for mind can be defined only in its own terms and only byreferencetoitsownprocesses.Mind,exceptinreferencetoitsownactivities,cannot be defined or conceived. It is known to itself only through itsactivities.Mindwithoutmentalstatesisamereabstraction—awordwithoutacorrespondingmentalimageorconcept.SirWilliamHamiltonexpressedthematterasclearlyaspossible,whenhesaid:“Whatwemeanbymindissimplythatwhichperceives,thinks,feels,wills,anddesires.”Withouttheperceiving,thinking, feeling, willing, and desiring, it is impossible to form a clearconceptionormental imageofmind;deprivedof itsphenomena itbecomesthemerestabstraction.

“THINKABOUTTHATWHICHTHINKS.”

Perhaps the simplestmethod of conveying the idea of the existence andnature of the mind is that attributed to a celebrated German teacher ofpsychologywhowaswonttobeginhiscoursebybiddinghisstudentsthinkofsomething, his desk, for example. Then he would say, “Now think of thatwhichthinksaboutthedesk.”Then,afterapause,hewouldadd,“Thisthingwhich thinks about the desk, and aboutwhichyou are now thinking, is thesubjectmatterofourstudyofpsychology.”Theprofessorcouldnothavesaidmorehadhelecturedforamonth.

ProfessorGordyhaswellsaidonthispoint:“Themindmusteitherbethat

whichthinks,feels,andwills,oritmustbethethoughts,feelings,andactsofwillofwhichweareconscious—mentalfacts,inoneword.Butwhatcanweknow about that which thinks, feels, and wills, and what can we find outabout it?Where is it? Youwill probably say, in the brain. But, if you arespeakingliterally,ifyousaythatitisinthebrain,asapencilisinthepocket,then youmustmean that it takes up room, that it occupies space, and thatwouldmake it verymuch like amaterial thing. In truth, themore carefullyyouconsiderit,themoreplainlyyouwillseewhatthinkingmenhaveknownfor a long time—thatwe do not know and cannot learn anything about thething which thinks, and feels, and wills. It is beyond the range of humanknowledge.Thebookswhichdefinepsychologyasthescienceofmindhavenot a word to say about that which thinks, and feels, and wills. They areentirely taken up with these thoughts and feelings and acts of the will,—mentalfacts,inaword,—tryingtotelluswhattheyare,andtoarrangetheminclasses,andtellusthecircumstancesorconditionsunderwhichtheyexist.Itseemstomethatitwouldbebettertodefinepsychologyasthescienceofthe experiences, phenomena, or facts of the mind, soul, or self—of mentalfacts,inaword.”

Inviewof thefactsof thecase,andfollowingtheexampleof thebestofthemodern authorities, in this bookwe shall leave the consideration of thequestion of the ultimate nature of mind to the metaphysicians, and shallconfineourselvestothementalfacts, the lawsgoverningthem,andthebestmethodsofgoverningandusingthemin“thebusinessoflife.”

Theclassificationandmethodofdevelopmenttobefollowedinthisbookisasfollows:—

I.Themechanismofmental states, i.e., the brain, nervous system, senseorgans,etc.

II.ThefactofConsciousnessanditsplanes.

III.Mental processes or faculties, i.e., (1) Sensation and Perception; (2)Representation, or Imagination and Memory; (3) Feeling or Emotion; (4)Intellect,orReasonandUnderstanding;(5)WillorVolition.

Mental states depend upon the physical mechanism for manifestation,whatevermaybe theultimatenatureofmind.Mental states,whatever theirspecial character, will be found to fit into one of the above five generalclassesofmentalactivities.

CHAPTERII.

TheMechanismofMentalStates.

T HE mechanism of mental states—the mental machinery by means ofwhichwefeel,think,andwill—consistsofthebrain,nervoussystem,andtheorgansofsense.Nomatterwhatmaybetherealnatureofmind,—nomatterwhatmaybethetheoryheldregardingitsactivities,—itmustbeadmittedthatthemindisdependentuponthismechanismforthemanifestationofwhatweknowasmental states.Wonderfulas is themind, it is seen tobedependentupon this physical mechanism for the expression of its activities. And thisdependence is not upon the brain alone, but also upon the entire nervoussystem.

Thebestauthoritiesagreethatthehigherandmorecomplexmentalstatesare but an evolution of simple sensation, and that they are dependent uponsensationfortheirrawmaterialoffeelingandthought.Thereforeitisproperthat we begin by a consideration of the machinery of sensation. Thisnecessitatesapreviousconsiderationofthenerves.

THENERVES.

The body is traversed by an intricate system of nerves, which has beenlikenedtoagreattelegraphsystem.Thenervestransmitsensationsfromthevariouspartsofthebodytothegreatreceivingofficeofthebrain.Theyalsoservetotransmitthemotorimpulsesfromthebraintothevariouspartsofthebody,whichimpulsesresultinmotionofappropriatepartsofthebody.Therearealsoothernerveswithwhichwehavenoconcerninthisbook,butwhichperform certain physiological functions, such as digestion, secretion,excretion,andcirculation.Ourchiefconcern,atthispoint,iswiththesensorynerves.

The sensory nerves convey the impressions of the outside world to thebrain.Thebrain is the great central stationof the sensorynerves, the latterhaving countless sending stations in all parts of the body, the “wires”terminatingintheskin.Whenthesenervousterminalstationsareirritatedorexcited,theysendtothebrainmessagescallingforattention.Thisistruenotonlyof thenervesof touchor feeling,butalsoof thoseconcernedwith therespective senses of sight, smell, taste, and hearing. In fact, the best

authorities hold that all the five senses are but an evolution of the primarysenseoftouchorfeeling.

THESENSEOFTOUCH.

Thenervesofthesenseoftouchhavetheirendingintheoutercoveringorskinofthebody.Theyreportcontactwithotherphysicalobjects.Bymeansofthesereportsweareawarenotonlyofcontactwiththeoutsideobject,butalsoofmanyfactsconcerningthenatureofthatobject,asforinstance,itsdegreeof hardness, roughness, etc., and its temperature. Someof these nerve endsareverysensitive,as, forexample, thoseof the tipof the tongueandfingerends, while others are comparatively lacking in sensitiveness, as, forillustration, those of the back. Certain of these sensory nerves confinethemselvestoreportingcontactanddegreesofpressure,whileothersconcernthemselves solely with reporting the degrees of temperature of the objectswith which their ends come in contact. Some of the latter respond to thehigherdegreesofheat,whileothersrespondonlytothelowerdegreesofcold.Thenervesofcertainpartsofthebodyrespondmorereadilyanddistinctlytotemperaturethandothoseofotherparts.Toillustrate,thenervesofthecheekarequiteresponsivetoheatimpressions.

THESENSEOFSIGHT.

Thenervesofthesenseofsightterminateinthecomplexopticalapparatuswhichinpopularterminologyisknownas“theeye.”Whatisknownas“theretina”isaverysensitivenervousmembranewhichlinestheinner,backpartof theeye,and inwhich thefibersof theopticnerve terminate.Theopticalinstrumentoftheeyeconveysthefocusedlightvibrationstothenervesoftheretina,fromwhichtheimpulseistransmittedtothebrain.But,contrarytothepopular notion, the nerves of the eye do not gauge distances, nor forminferences of any kind; that is distinctly thework of themind. The simpleofficeoftheopticalnervesconsistsinreportingcoloranddegreesofintensityofthelightwaves.

THESENSEOFHEARING.

Thenerves of the senseof hearing terminate in the inner part of the ear.The tympanum, or “ear drum,” receives the sound vibrations entering thecavitiesoftheear,and,intensifyingandadaptingthem,itpassesthemontotheendsoftheauditorynerveintheinternalear,whichconveysthesensationto the brain. The auditory nerve reports to the brain the degrees of pitch,intensity,quality,andharmony,respectively,ofthesoundwavesreachingthe

tympanum.Asiswellknown,therearecertainvibrationsofsoundwhicharetoolowfortheauditorynervetoregister,andotherstoohighforittorecord,bothclasses,however,capableofbeingrecordedbyscientificinstruments.Itis also regarded as certain that someof the lower animals are consciousofsoundvibrationswhicharenotregisteredbythehumanauditorynerves.

THESENSEOFSMELL.

Thenervesofthesenseofsmellterminateinthemucousmembraneofthenostrils. Inorder that thesenerves report theodorofoutsideobjects, actualcontact ofminute particles of the objectwith themucousmembrane of thenostrilsisnecessary.Thisispossibleonlybythepassagethroughthenostrilsofaircontainingtheseparticles;merenearnesstothenostrilwillnotsuffice.These particles are for the most part composed of tenuous gases. Certainsubstances affect the olfactory nerves much more than do others, thedifference arising from the chemical composition of the substance. Theolfactorynervesconveythereporttothebrain.

THESENSEOFTASTE.

Thenervesofthesenseoftasteterminateinthetongue,orratherinthetinycellsof the tonguewhich are called “tastebuds.”Substances taken into themouthchemicallyaffectthesetinycells,andanimpulseistransmittedtothegustatorynerves,whichthenreportthesensationtothebrain.Theauthoritiesclaimthattastesensationsmaybereducedtofivegeneralclasses,viz.:sweet,bitter,sour,salty,and“hot.”

Therearecertainnervecentershavingimportantofficesintheproductionandexpressionofmentalstates,locatedintheskullandinthespinalcolumn—the brain and the spinal cord—whichwe shall consider in the followingchapter.

CHAPTERIII.

TheGreatNerveCenters.

T HEgreat nerve centerswhich play an important part in the productionand expression of mental states are those of the brain and spinal cord,respectively.

THESPINALCORD.

Thespinalcordisthatcordorropeofnervesubstancewhichisinclosedinthe spinal column or “backbone.” It leaves the lower part of the skull andextends downward in the interior of the spinal column for about eighteeninches.Itiscontinuouswiththebrain,however,anditisdifficulttodeterminewhereonebeginsandtheotherends.Itiscomposedofamassofgraymattersurrounded by a covering of white matter. From the spinal cord, along itslength,emergethirty-onepairsofspinalnerveswhichbranchouttoeachsideofthebodyandconnectwiththevarioussmallernerves,extendingtoallpartsof the system. The spinal cord is the great central cable of the nervoustelegraphicsystem,andanyinjurytoorobstructionofitcripplesorparalyzesthoseportionsofthebodythenervesofwhichenterthespinalcordbelowtheseatoftheinjuryorobstruction.Injuriesorobstructionsofthiskindnotonlyinhibit the sensory reports from theaffectedarea,butalso inhibit themotorimpulsesfromthebrainwhichareintendedtomovethelimbsorpartsofthebody.

THEGANGLIAOR“TINYBRAINS.”

What are known as ganglia, or tiny bunches of nerve cells, are found invariouspartsofthenervoussystem,includingthespinalnerves.Thesegroupsof nerve cells are sometimes called “little brains,” and perform quiteimportantofficesinthemechanismofthoughtandaction.Thespinalgangliareceive sensory reports, and issue motor impulses, in many cases, withouttroublingthecentralbrainregardingthematter.Theseactivitiesareknownas“reflexnervousaction.”

REFLEXACTION.

Whatisknownasreflexnervousactionisoneofthemostwonderfuloftheactivitiesof thenervousandmentalmechanism,and theknowledge thereofusuallycomesasa surprise to theaverageperson, forhe isgenerallyundertheimpressionthattheseactivitiesarepossibleonlytothecentralbrain.Itisafactthatnotonlyisthecentralbrainreallyatrinityofthreebrains,butthat,inaddition to these,everyonehasagreatnumberof“littlebrains”distributedover his nervous system, any and all of which are capable of receivingsensory reports and also of sending forthmotor impulses. It is quiteworthwhileforonetobecomeacquaintedwiththiswonderfulformofneuro-mentalactivity.

Acinderenters theeye, thereportreachesaganglion,amotor impulse issent forth, and the eyelid closes. The same result ensues if an objectapproachestheeyebutwithoutactuallyenteringit.Ineithercasethepersonisnot conscious of the sensation andmotor impulse until the latter has beenaccomplished.This isreflexaction.Theinstinctivemovementof thetickledfootisanotherinstance.Thejerkingawayofthehandburntbythelightedendof the cigar, or pricked by the point of the pin, is another instance. Theinvoluntaryactivities,andthoseknownasunconsciousactivities,resultfromreflexaction.

Morethanthis,itisafactthatmanyactivitiesoriginallyvoluntarybecomewhatisknownas“acquiredreflexes,”or“motorhabits,”bymeansofcertainnervouscentersacquiringthehabitofsendingforthcertainmotorimpulsesinresponsetocertainsensoryreports.Thefamiliarmovementsofourlivesarelargelyperformedinthisway,as,forinstance,walking,usingknifeandfork,operatingtypewriters,machinesofallkinds,writing,etc.Thesquirmingofadecapitated snake, the muscular movements of a decapitated frog, and theviolentstruggles,fluttering,andleapsofthedecapitatedfowl,areinstancesofreflexaction.Medicalreportsindicatethatincasesofdecapitationevenmanmaymanifestsimilar reflexaction insomecases.Thuswemaysee thatwemay feel andwill bymeans of our “little brains” aswell as by the centralbrainorbrains.Whatevermindmaybe,itiscertainthatintheseprocessesitemploysotherportionsofthenervoussystemthanthecentralbrain.

THETHREEBRAINS.

Whatisknownasthebrainofmanisreallyatrinityofthreebrains,knownrespectively as (1) themedulla oblongata, (2) the cerebellum, and (3) thecerebrum.Ifonewishestolimit thementalactivitytoconsciousintellectualeffort, thenand thenonly ishecorrect inconsidering thecerebrumor largebrainas“thebrain.”

TheMedullaOblongata.—Themedullaoblongataisanenlargementofthespinal cord at the base of the brain. Its office is that of controlling theinvoluntary activities of the body, such as respiration, circulation,assimilation,etc.Inabroadsense,itsactivitiesmaybesaidtobeofthenatureof highly developed and complex reflex activities. It manifests chieflythroughthesympatheticnervoussystemwhichcontrolsthevitalfunctions.Itdoesnotneedtocallonthelargebraininthesematters,ordinarily,andisabletoperformitstaskswithouttheplaneofordinaryconsciousness.

TheCerebellum.—The cerebellum, also known as “the little brain,” liesjust above the medulla oblongata, and just below the rear portion of thecerebrumorgreatbrain. It combines thenatureofapurely reflexcenterontheonehand,withthatof“habitmind”ontheother.Inshort,itfillsaplacebetween the activities of the cerebrum and the medulla oblongata, havingsomeofthecharacteristicsofeach.It is theorganofanumberof importantacquired reflexes, such as walking, and many other familiar muscularmovements, which have first been consciously acquired and then becomehabitual.The skilled skater, bicyclist, typist, ormachinist dependsupon thecerebellumfortheeaseandcertaintywithwhichheperformshismovements“without thinking of them.” One may be said never to have thoroughlyacquiredasetofmuscularmovementssuchaswehavementioned,until thecerebellumhastakenoverthetaskandrelievedthecerebrumoftheconsciouseffort. One’s technique is never perfected until the cerebellum assumescontrolanddirectionof thenecessarymovementsand the impulsesaresentforthfrombelowtheplaneofordinaryconsciousness.

TheCerebrum.—Thecerebrum,or“greatbrain”(whichisregardedas“thebrain”bytheaverageperson),issituatedintheupperportionoftheskull,andoccupiesbyfarthelargerportionofthecavityoftheskull.Itisdividedintotwo great divisions or hemispheres. The best of themodern authorities areagreedthatthecerebrumhaszonesorareasofspecializedfunctioning,someofwhichreceivethesensoryreportsofthenervesandorgansofsense,whileothers send forth the motor impulses which result in voluntary physicalaction. Many of these areas or zones have been located by science, whileothers remain as yet unlocated. The probability is that in time sciencewillsucceed in correctly locating the area or zone of each and every class ofsensationandmotorimpulse.

THECORTEX.

Theareaofthought,memory,andimaginationhasnotbeenclearlylocated,exceptthatthesementalstatesarebelievedtohavetheirseatinthecortexorouterthinrindofgraybrainmatterwhichenvelopesandcoversthemassof

brainsubstance.Itis,moreover,consideredprobablethatthehigherprocessesofreasoningareperformedinorbythecortexofthefrontallobes.Thecortexofapersonofaverageintelligence, ifspreadoutonaflatsurface,measuresabout foursquarefeet.Thehigher thedegreeof intelligencepossessedbyaloweranimalorhumanbeing,asa rule, thedeeperandmorenumerousarethefoldsorconvolutionsof thecortex,andthefiner itsstructure.Itmaybestated as a general rule, with but very few exceptions, that the higher thedegree of intelligence in a lower animal or human being, the greater is theareaofitscortexinproportiontothesizeofthebrain.Thecortex,itmustberemembered,isfoldedintodeepfurrowsorconvolutions,thebraininshape,divisions, and convolutions resembling the inner portion of an Englishwalnut. The interior of the two hemispheres of the cerebrum is composedlargelyofconnectivenerveswhichdoubtlessserve toproduceandmaintaintheunityoffunctionofthementalprocesses.

Whilephysiologicalpsychologyhasperformedgreatwork indiscoveringbrain-centersandexplainingmuchof themechanismofmentalprocesses, ithasbuttouchedthemostelementaryandsimpleofthementalprocesses.Thehigher processes have so far defied analysis or explanation in the terms ofphysiology.

CHAPTERIV.

Consciousness.

T HEfactofconsciousnessisthegreatmysteryofpsychology.Itisdifficulteven to define the term, although every person of average intelligenceunderstands what is sought to be conveyed by it. Webster defines it as“knowledge of one’s own existence, sensations, mental operations, etc.;immediateknowledgeorperceptionofanyobject, state,or sensation;beingaware;beingsensibleof.”Anotherauthoritydefinesthetermas“thestateofbeingawareofone’ssensations; thepower,faculty,ormentalstateofbeingaware of one’s own existence, condition at themoment, thoughts, feelings,and actions.” Halleck’s definition is: “That indefinable characteristic ofmentalstateswhichcausesustobeawareofthem.”

Itwill be seen that the idea of “awareness” is the essence of the idea ofconsciousness. But, at the last, we are compelled to acknowledge that it isimpossible to closely define consciousness, for it is something so entirelyunique and different from anything else thatwe have no other terms at allsynonymoustoit.Wecandefineitonlyinitsownterms,aswillbeseenbyreference to the definitions above given. And it is equally impossible toclearlyaccountforitsappearanceandbeing.Huxleyhaswellsaid:“Howitisthat anything so remarkableasa stateofconsciousnesscomesaboutby theresultofirritatingnervoustissue,isjustasunaccountableastheappearanceofthe jinnee when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.” All that we can ever knowregarding the nature of consciousness must be learned from turning theconsciousnessinourselvesbackuponitself—byfocusingconsciousnessuponitsownmentaloperationsbymeansof introspection.By turning inward theconsciousgazewemayperceive the flowof the streamof thought from itsrise from the subconscious regionsof themind to its finaldisappearance inthesameregion.

It isacommonerror tosuppose thatwearedirectlyconsciousofobjectsoutsideofourselves.This is impossible, for there isnodirectknowledgeofsuchoutsideobjects.Weareconsciousmerelyofoursensationsof,ormentalimages of, the outside objects. All that it is possible for us to be directlyconsciousofareourownmentalexperiencesorstates.Wecannotbedirectlyconscious of anything outside of our own minds. We are not directlyconsciousof the treewhichwesee;wearedirectlyconsciousmerelyof the

sensationofthenervesarisingfromtheimpactofthelightwavescarryingtheimageofthetree.Wearenotdirectlyconsciousofthetreewhenwetouchitandperceiveitscharacterinthatway;wearedirectlyconsciousmerelyofthesensationreportedbythenervesinthefingertipswhichhavecomeincontactwith the tree.Wearedirectlyconsciousevenofourownbodiesonly in thesameway. It is necessary for themind to experience that ofwhich itmaybecome conscious. We are conscious only of (1) that which our mind isexperiencingatthismoment,or(2)thatwhichithasexperiencedinthepast,andwhichisbeingre-experiencedthismomentbytheprocessofthememory,or which is being re-combined or re-arranged this moment by theimagination.

SUBCONSCIOUSPLANES.

But itmustnotbethought thateverymentalstateormentalfact is inthefieldofconsciousness.Thiserrorhasbeenexplodedformanyyears.Thefactisnowrecognizedthatthefieldofconsciousnessisaverynarrowandlimitedone,andthatthegreatfieldofmentalactivityliesoutsideofitsnarrowlimits.Beyond and outside of the narrow field of consciousness lies the greatsubconscious storehouse ofmemory inwhich are stored the experiences ofthepast,tobedrawnagainintothefieldofconsciousnessbyaneffortofthewillintheactofrecollection,orbyassociationinordinaryremembrance.Inthatgreatregion,also,themindmanifestsmanyofitsactivitiesandperformsmuchofitswork.Inthatgreatregionareevolvedtheemotionsandfeelingswhichplay such an important part inour lives, andwhichoftenmanifest avaguedisturbingunrestlongbeforetheyrisetotheplaneofconsciousness.Inthatgreatregionareproducedtheideas,feelings,andconceptionswhicharisetotheplaneofconsciousnessandmanifestthatwhichmencall“genius.”

On the subconscious plane the imagination does much of its work, andstartlesitsownerbypresentinghimwiththeaccomplishedresultinthefieldofconsciousness.Inthesubconsciousfieldisperformedthatpeculiarprocessof mental mastication, digestion, and assimilation with which all brainworkers are familiar, and which absorbs the raw mental material given it,separates, digests, and assimilates it, and re-presents it to the consciousfacultiessometimeafterasatransformedsubstance.Ithasbeenestimatedthatat leasteighty-fivepercent.ofourmentalactivitiesareperformedbeloworoutside of the field of consciousness. The psychology of to-day is payingmuchattentiontothisformerlyneglectedgreatareaorareasofthemind.Thepsychologyofto-morrowwillpaystillgreaterattentiontoit.

The best of the modern authorities agree that in the great field ofsubconscious mentation is to be found the explanation of much that is

unexplainableotherwise.Infact,itisprobablethatbeforelongconsciousnesswillberegardedasamere focusingofattentionuponmentalstates,and theobjectsofconsciousnessmerelyasthatportionofthecontentsofthemindinthefieldofmentalvisioncreatedbysuchfocusing.

CHAPTERV.

Attention.

I NTIMATELYconnectedwiththeobjectofconsciousnessisthatprocessofthe mind which we call “attention.” Attention is generally defined as “theapplication of the mind to a mental state.” It is often referred to as“concentratedconsciousness,”butothershaveventuredthesomewhatdaringconjecturethatconsciousnessitselfisrathertheresultofattention,insteadofthelatterbeinganincidentofconsciousness.Weshallnotattempttodiscussthisquestionhere,excepttostatethatconsciousnessdependsverymateriallyuponthedegreeofattentionbestoweduponitsobject.Theauthoritiesplacegreatimportanceupontheintelligentdirectionoftheattention,andholdthatwithoutthisthehigherformsofknowledgeareimpossible.

It is the common belief thatwe feel, see, hear, taste, or smellwheneverobjects affecting those senses come in contact with the organs of sensegoverning them. But this is only a partial truth. The real truth is that webecome conscious of the report of these senses only when the attention isdirectedtowardthesensation,voluntarilyorinvoluntarily.Thatistosay,thatinmanycasesalthoughthesensenervesandorgansreportadisturbance,theminddoesnotbecomeconsciouslyawareofthereportunlesstheattentionisdirected toward it either by an act of will or else by reflex action. Forinstance,theclockmaystrikeloudly,andyetwemaynotbeconsciousofthefact, forweareconcentratingourattentionuponabook;orwemayeat thechoicest food without tasting it, for we are listening intently to theconversation of our charming neighbor. We may fail to perceive somestartlingoccurrencehappeningunderourveryeyes,forweareburiedindeepthoughtconcerningsomethingfarremovedfromthepresentscene.Therearemany cases on record showing that one may be so interested in speaking,thinking,oracting thathewillnotexperiencepain thatwouldotherwisebeintolerable. Writers have forgotten their pain in the concentrated interestbestowedupontheirwork;mothershavefailedtofeelpainwhentheirinfantsrequired urgent attention; orators have been so carried away by their owneloquence that they have failed to feel the pricking of the pin bymeans ofwhichtheirfriendshavesoughttoattracttheirattention.Notonlyperceptionand feeling depend largely upon attention, but the processes of reasoning,memory, and even of will, depend upon attention for much of theirmanifestation.

Psychologistsdivideattentionintotwogeneralclasses,viz.:(1)voluntaryattentionand(2)involuntaryattention.

Voluntaryattention isattentiondirectedby thewill tosomeobjectofourownmoreorlessdeliberateselection.Itrequiresadistincteffortofthewillinordertofocustheattentioninthisway,andmanypersonsarescarcelyawareofitsexistence,soseldomdotheymanifestit.Voluntaryattentionistheresultoftrainingandpractice,andmarksthemanofstrongwill,concentration,andcharacter. Some authorities go so far as to say that much of that which iscommonly called “will power” is really but a developed form of voluntaryattention,themanof“strongwill”holdingbeforehimtheoneideawhichhewishestorealize.

Involuntary attention, often called “reflex attention,” is attention calledforthbyanervousresponsetosomesensestimulus.Thisisthecommonformof attention, and is but the same form which is so strongly manifested bychildrenwhoseattentioniscaughtbyeverynewobject,butwhichcannotbeheldforanylengthoftimebyafamiliaroruninterestingone.

It is of the utmost importance that one should cultivate his power ofvoluntaryattention.Notonlyisthewillpowerstrengthenedanddevelopedinthis way, but every mental faculty is developed by reason thereof. Thetrainingofthevoluntaryattentionisthefirststepinmentaldevelopment.

TRAININGTHEATTENTION.

Thatthevoluntaryattentionmaybedeliberatelytrainedanddevelopedisafact which many of the world’s greatest men have proved for themselves.Thereisonlyonewaytotrainanddevelopanymentalpoweroffaculty—andthat is by practice and use. By practice, interest may be given to objectspreviously uninteresting, and thus the use of the attention develops theinterestwhichfurtherholdsit.Interestisthenaturalroadoverwhichattentiontravelseasily,butinterestitselfmaybeinducedbyconcentratedattention.Bystudyingandexamininganobject,theattentionbringstolightmanynewandnovelfeaturesregardingthething,andtheseproduceanewinterestwhichinturnattractsfurtherandcontinuedattention.

Thereisnoroyalroadtothedevelopmentofvoluntaryattention.Theonlytruemethod iswork,practice, and use. Youmust practice on uninterestingthings, the primary interest being your desire to develop the power ofvoluntaryattention.Butasyoubegintoattendtotheuninterestingthingyouwill become interested in the task for its own sake. Take some object and“placeyourminduponit.”Thinkofitsnature,whereitcamefrom,itsuse,itsassociations, its probable future, of things related to it, etc., etc. Keep the

attention firmly upon it, and shut out all outside ideas. Then, after a littlepracticeof this kind, lay aside theobject for the timebeing, and take it upagainthenextday,endeavoringtodiscovernewpointsof interest in it.Themainthingtobesoughtistoholdthethinginyourmind,andthiscanbedoneonlybydiscoveringfeaturesofinterestinit.Theinterest-lovingattentionmayrebelatthistaskatfirst,andwillseektowanderfromthepathintothegreenpastureswhicharefoundoneachsidethereof.Butyoumustbringthemindbacktothetask,againandagain.

Aftera time themindwillbecomeaccustomed to thedrill,andwillevenbegintoenjoyit.Giveitsomevarietybyoccasionallychangingtheobjectsofexamination. The object need not always be something to be looked at.Instead, select some subject in history or literature, and “run it down,”endeavoringtobringtolightallthefactsrelatingtoitthatarepossibletoyou.Anythingmay be used as the subject or object of your inquiry; butwhat ischosenmustbeheldinthefieldofconsciousattentionfirmlyandfixedly.Thehabit once acquired, you will find the practice most fascinating. You willinventnewsubjectsorobjectsofinquiry,investigation,andthought,whichinthemselveswillwellrepayyouforyourworkandtime.Butneverlosesightofthemainpoint—thedevelopmentofthepowerofvoluntaryattention.

Instudyingthemethodsofdevelopingandtrainingthevoluntaryattention,thestudentshouldrememberthatanyexercisewhichdevelopsthewill,willresultindevelopingtheattention;and,likewise,anyexercisewhichdevelopsthevoluntaryattentionwilltendtostrengthenthewill.Thewillandattentionaresocloselyboundtogetherthatwhataffectsonealsoinfluencestheother.Thisfactshouldbeborneinmind,andtheexercisesandpracticesbaseduponit.

Inpracticingconcentrationofvoluntaryattention,itshouldberememberedthat concentrating consists not only of focusing the attention upon a givenobject or subject, but also of the shutting out of impressions from otherobjectsorsubjects.Someauthoritiesadvisethatthestudentendeavortolistentoonevoiceamongmany,orone instrumentamong themanyofabandororchestra.Othersadvisethepracticeofconcentratingonthereadingofabookin a room filled by persons engaged in conversation, and similar exercises.Whateveraidsinnarrowingthecircleofattentionatagivenmomenttendstodevelopthepowerofvoluntaryattention.

Thestudyofmathematicsandlogicisalsoheldtobeanexcellentpracticein concentration of voluntary attention, inasmuch as these studies requirecloseconcentrationandattention.Attentionisalsodevelopedbyanystudyorpractice which demands analysis of a whole into its parts, and then thesynthesisorbuildingupofawholefromitsscatteredparts.Eachofthesenses

shouldplayapartintheexercises,andinadditiontothisthemindshouldbetrained to concentrate upon some one idea heldwithin itself—somementalimage or abstract idea existing independently of any object of immediatesensereport.

CHAPTERVI.

Perception.

I Tisacommonmistakethatweperceiveeverythingthatisreportedtothemindbythesenses.Asamatteroffactweperceivebutaverysmallportionof the reports of the senses. There are thousands of sights reported by oureyes, sounds reported by our ears, smells reported by our nostrils, andcontactsreportedbyournervesoftouch,everydayofourlives,butwhicharenotperceivedorobservedby themind.Weperceiveandobserveonlywhentheattention, reflexorvoluntary, isdirected to the reportof thesenses,andwhen the mind interprets the report. While perception depends upon thereports of the senses for its raw material, it depends entirely upon theapplicationofthemindforitscompletemanifestation.

Thestudentusuallyexperiencesgreatdifficulty indistinguishingbetweensensationandperception.Asensationisasimplereportofthesenses,whichisreceivedinconsciousness.Perceptionisthethoughtarisingfromthefeelingof the sensation. Perception usually combines several sensations into onethoughtorpercept.Bysensationthemindfeels;byperceptionitknowsthatitfeels, and recognizes the object causing the sensation. Sensation merelybrings a report from outside objects, while perception identifies the reportwiththeobjectwhichcausedit.Perceptioninterpretsthereportsofsensation.Sensationreportsaflashoflightfromabove;perceptioninterpretsthelightasstarlight, or moonlight, or sunlight, or as the flash of a meteor. Sensationreportsasharp,pricking,painfulcontact;perceptioninterpretsitastheprickof a pin. Sensation reports a red spot on a green background; perceptioninterpretsitasaberryonabush.

Moreover, while we may perceive a simple single sensation, ourperceptions are usually of a group of sensations. Perception is usuallyemployed in grouping sensations and identifying them with the object orobjectscausingthem.Initsidentificationitdrawsuponwhatevermemoryofpast experiences themindmay possess.Memory, imagination, feeling, andthought are called into play, to some extent, in every clear perception. Theinfant has but feeble perception, but as it gains experience it begins tomanifestperceptionsandformpercepts.Sensationsresemblethelettersofthealphabet,andperceptiontheformingofwordsandsentencesfromtheletters.Thus c, a, and t symbolize sensations, while the word “cat,” formed from

them,symbolizestheperceptionoftheobject.

Itisheldthatallknowledgebeginswithsensation;thatthementalhistoryof the race or individual begins with its first sensation. But, while this isadmitted, itmustbe remembered that sensationsimplyprovides the simple,elementary, rawmaterial of thought.The first process ofactual thought, orknowledge, begins with perception. From our percepts all of our higherconcepts and ideas are formed. Perception depends upon association of thesensation with other sensations previously experienced; it is based uponexperience. The greater the experience, the greater is the possibility ofperception,allelsebeingequal.

Whenperceptionbegins,themindlosessightofthesensationinitself,foritidentifiesitasaqualityofthethingproducingit.Thesensationoflightisthoughtof as aqualityof the star; thepricking sensation is thoughtof as aquality of the pin or chestnut bur; the sensation of odor is thought of as aquality of the rose. In the case of the rose, the several sensations of sight,touch,andsmell,intheirimpressionofthequalitiesofcolor,shape,softness,andperfume,aregroupedtogetherintheperceptofthecompleteobjectoftheflower.

Aperceptis“thatwhichisperceived;theobjectoftheactofperception.”Thepercept,ofcourse,isamentalstatecorrespondingwithitsoutsideobject.Itisacombinationofseveralsensationswhichareregardedasthequalitiesoftheoutsideobject,towhicharecombinedthememoriesofpastexperiences,ideas, feelings, and thoughts. A percept, then, while the simplest form ofthought, isseen tobeamentalstate.Theformationofaperceptconsistsofthree gradual stages, viz.: (1) The attention forms definite conscioussensations from indefinite nervous reports; (2) the mind interprets thesedefiniteconscioussensationsandattributesthemtotheoutsideobjectcausingthem; (3) the related sensations are grouped together, their unity perceived,andtheyareregardedasqualitiesoftheoutsideobject.

Theplaindistinctionbetweenasensationandaperceptmaybefixedinthemindbyrememberingthefollowing:Asensationisafeeling;apercept isasimplethoughtidentifyingoneormoresensations.Asensationismerelytheconsciousrecognitionofanexcitationofanerveend;aperceptresultsfromadistinctmentalprocessregardingthesensation.

DEVELOPINGPERCEPTION.

It is of the utmost importance that we develop and train our powers ofperception. For our education depends verymaterially upon our perceptivepower. What matters it to us if the outside world be filled with manifold

objects, ifwe do not perceive them to exist?Upon perception depends thematerial of ourmental world.Many persons go through the world withoutperceiving even the most obvious facts. Their eyes and ears are perfectinstruments,theirnervesconveyaccuratereports,buttheperceptivefacultiesofthemindfailtoobserveandinterpretthereportofthesenses.Theyseeandhear distinctly, but the reports of the senses are not observed or noted bythem;theymeannothingtothem.Onemayseemanythings,andyetobservebut few. It is not upon what we see or hear that our stock of knowledgedepends,somuchasitdoesuponwhatweperceive,notice,orobserve.

Not only is one’s stock of practical knowledge largely based upondeveloped perception, but one’s success also depends materially upon thesamefaculties.Inbusinessandprofessionallifethesuccessfulmanisusuallyhe who has developed perceptive powers; he who has learned to perceive,observe, and note. Themanwho perceives and takesmental notes ofwhatoccurs in his world is the man who is apt to know things when suchknowledgeisneeded.Inthisageof“bookeducation”wefindthattheyoungpeoplearenotnearlysoobservantasare thosechildrenwhohad todependuponthepowersofperceptionfortheirknowledge.TheyoungAraborIndianwillobservemoreinanhourthanthecivilizedchildwillinaday.Toliveinaworld of books tends, inmany cases, toweaken the powers of observationandperception.

Perceptionmay be developed by practice. Begin by taking notice of thethings seenandheard inyourusualwalks.Keepwideopen theeyesof themind.Notice the faces of people, theirwalk, their characteristics. Look forinterestingandoddthings,andyouwillseethem.Donotgothroughlifeinadaydream,butkeepasharplookoutforthingsofinterestandvalue.Themostfamiliar thingswill repay you for the time andwork of examining them indetail, and the practice gained by such tasks will prove valuable in yourdevelopmentofperception.

An authority remarks that very few persons, even those living in thecountry,knowwhetheracow’searsareabove,below,behind,or infrontofher horns; nor whether cats descend trees head first or tail first. Very fewpersons can distinguish between the leaves of the various kinds of familiartrees in theirneighborhood.Comparatively fewpersonsareable todescribethehouseinwhichtheylive,at leastbeyondthemostgeneralfeatures—thedetailsareunknown.

Houdin, the French conjurer, was able to pass by a shop window andperceiveeveryarticleinit,andthenrepeatwhathehadseen.Butheacquiredthisskillonlybyconstantandgradualpractice.Hehimselfdecriedhisskillandclaimedthatitwasasnothingcomparedtothatofthefashionablewoman

whocanpassanotherwomanonthestreetand“takein”herentireattire,fromheadtofoot,atoneglance,and“beabletodescribenotonlythefashionandqualityofthestuffs,butalsosayifthelaceberealoronlymachinemade.”AformerpresidentofYaleissaidtohavebeenabletoglanceatabookandreadaquarterofapageatonetime.

Anystudyoroccupationwhichrequiresanalysiswilldevelopthepowerofperception. Consequently, if we will analyze the things we see, resolvingthem into their parts or elements, we will likewise develop the perceptivefaculties.Itisagoodexercisetoexaminesomesmallobjectandendeavortodiscoverasmanyseparatepointsofperceptionaspossible,notingthemonasheetofpaper.Themostfamiliarobject,ifcarefullyexamined,willyieldrichreturns.

Iftwopersonswillenterintoacontestofthiskind,thespiritofrivalryandcompetitionwillquickenthepowersofobservation.Thosewhohavehadthepatience and perseverance to systematically practice exercises of this kind,reportthattheynoticeasteadyimprovementfromtheverystart.Butevenifonedoesnotfeelinclinedtopracticeinthisway,itwillbefoundpossibletobegin to take notice of the details of things one sees, the expression ofpersons’faces,thedetailsoftheirdress,theirtoneofvoice,thequalityofthegoodswe handle, and the little things especially. Perception, like attention,followsinterest;but,likewise,interestmaybecreatedinthingsbyobservingtheirdetails,peculiarities,andcharacteristics.

Thebestknowledgegainedbyoneisthatresultingfromhisownpersonalperception.There is anearnessand truenessabout thatwhichoneknows inthiswaywhich is lacking in thatwhich hemerelybelieves because he hasreadorheardit.Onecanmakesuchknowledgeapartofhimself.Notonlyisone’s knowledge dependent uponwhat he perceives, but his very characteralsoresultsfromthecharacterofhispercepts.Theinfluenceofenvironmentisgreat—andwhatisenvironmentbutthingsperceivedaboutone?Itisnotsomuch what lies outside of one, as what part of it gets inside of one byperception.Bydirectinghisattention todesirableobjects,andperceivingasmuchofthemasispossible,onereallybuildshisowncharacteratwill.

The world needs good “perceivers” in all the walks of life. It finds ashortageofthem,andisdemandingthemloudly,beingwillingtopayagoodpricefortheirservices.Thepersonwhocanvoluntarilyperceiveandobservethedetailsofanyprofession,business,or tradewillgo far in thatvocation.The education of children should take the faculty of perception into activeconsideration. The kindergarten has taken some steps in this direction, butthereismuchmoretobedone.

CHAPTERVII.

Memory.

P SYCHOLOGISTS class as “representative mental processes” thoseknownasmemoryandimagination,respectively.Theterm“representation”isusedinpsychologytoindicatetheprocessesofre-presentationorpresentingagaintoconsciousnessthatwhichhasformerlybeenpresentedtoitbutwhichafterwardpassedfromitsfield.AsHamiltonsays:“Thegeneralcapabilityofknowledge necessarily requires that, besides the power of evoking out ofunconsciousness one portion of our retained knowledge in preference toanother,wepossessthefacultyofrepresentinginconsciousnesswhatisthusevoked.”

Memory is the primary representative faculty or power of the mind.Imaginationdependsuponmemoryforitsmaterial,asweshallseewhenweconsiderthatfaculty.Everymentalprocesswhichinvolvestheremembrance,recollection, or representation of a sensation, perception, mental image,thought, or idea previously experiencedmust depend uponmemory for itsmaterial.Memoryisthegreatstorehouseofthemindinwhichareplacedtherecordsofpreviousmentalexperiences.Itisapartofthegreatsubconsciousfieldofmentalactivity,and thegreaterpartof itswork isperformedbelowtheplaneofconsciousness.Itisonlywhenitsresultsarepassedintothefieldofconsciousness thatweareawareof itsexistence.Weknowmemoryonlybyitsworks.Ofitsnatureweknowbutlittle,althoughcertainofitsprincipallawsandprincipleshavebeendiscovered.

Itwasformerlycustomarytoclassmemorywiththevariousfacultiesofthemind,butlaterpsychologynolongersoconsidersit.Memoryisnowregardedasapowerofthegeneralmind,manifestinginconnectionwitheveryfacultyofthemind.Itisnowregardedasbelongingtothegreatsubconsciousfieldofmentation,anditsexplanationmustbesoughtthere.Itisutterlyunexplainableotherwise.

The importance of memory cannot be overestimated. Not only does aman’s character and education depend chiefly upon it, but his verymentalbeing is bound up with it. If there were no memory, man would neverprogressmentally beyond themental state of the newborn babe.Hewouldneverbeabletoprofitbyexperience.Hewouldneverbeabletoformclearperceptions. He would never be able to reason or form judgments. The

processes of thought depend for material upon the memory of pastexperiences;thismateriallacking,therecanbenothought.

Memory has two important general functions, viz.: (1) The retention ofimpressionsandexperiences;and(2)thereproductionoftheimpressionsandexperiencessoretained.

It was formerly held that the memory retained only a portion of theimpressionsandexperiencesoriginallynotedbyit.Butthepresenttheoryisthatitretainseveryimpressionandexperiencewhichisnotedbyit.Itistruethatmany of these impressions are never reproduced in consciousness, butexperiments tend to prove, nevertheless, that the records are still in thememoryand thatappropriateandsufficiently strongstimuliwillbring theminto the field of consciousness. The phenomena of somnambulism, dreams,hysteria,delirium,approachofdeath,etc., showthat thesubconsciousmindhas an immense accumulation of apparently forgotten facts, which unusualstimuliwillservetorecall.

The power of the memory to reproduce the retained impressions andexperiences is variously called remembrance, recollection, ormemory.Thispower varies materially in various individuals, but it is an axiom ofpsychologythatthememoryofanypersonmaybedevelopedandtrainedbypractice.Theabilitytorecalldependstoagreatextentupontheclearnessanddepthof theoriginal impression,which in turndependsupon the degree ofattentiongiventoitatthetimeofitsoccurrence.Recollectionisalsogreatlyaidedby the lawofassociation,or theprinciplewherebyonemental fact islinkedtoanother.Themorefactstowhichagivenfactislinked,thegreatertheeasebywhich it is recalledor remembered.Recollection is alsogreatlyassistedbyuseandexercise.Likethefingers,thememorycellsofthebrainbecome expert and efficient by use and exercise, or stiff and inefficient bylackofthesame.

In addition to the phases of retention and reproduction, there are twoimportant phases of memory, viz.: (3) Recognition of the reproducedimpression or experience; and (4) localization of the impression, or itsreferencetoamoreorlessdefinitetimeandplace.

The recognition of the recalled impression is quite important. It is notenough that the impression be retained and recalled. If we are not able torecognize the recalled impression as having been experienced before, therecollection will be of but little use to us in our thought processes; thepurposes of thought demand that we shall be able to identify the recalledimpression with the original one. Recognition is really re-cognition—re-knowing.Recognitionisakintoperception.Themindbecomesconsciousoftherecalledimpressionjustasitbecomesconsciousofthesensation.Itthen

recognizestherelationoftherecalledimpressiontotheoriginalonejustasitrealizestherelationofthesensationtoitsobject.

The localization of the recalled and recognized impression is alsoimportant. Even if we recognize the recalled impression, it will be ofcomparatively little use to us unless we are able to locate it as havinghappenedyesterday,lastweek,lastmonth,lastyear,tenyearsago,oratsometimeinthepast;andashavinghappenedinouroffice,house,orinsuch-and-such a place in the street, or in some distant place.Without the power oflocalizationwe should be unable to connect and associate the rememberedfactwiththetime,place,andpersonswithwhichitshouldbeplacedtobeofuseandvaluetousinourthoughtprocesses.

RETENTION.

The retention of a mental impression in the memory depends verymateriallyupontheclearnessanddepthof theoriginal impression.Andthisclearnessanddepth,aswehavepreviouslystated,dependuponthedegreeofattention bestowed upon the original impression. Attention, then, is theimportant factor in the forming and recording of impressions. The rule is:Slightattention,faintrecord;markedattention,clearanddeeprecord.Tofixthisfactinthemind,thestudentmaythinkoftheretentiveandreproductivephasesofmemoryasaphonographicrecord.Thereceivingdiaphragmofthephonographrepresents thesenseorgans,andtherecordingneedlerepresentsthe attention. The needle makes the record on the cylinder deep or faintaccordingto theconditionof theneedle.Aloudsoundmayberecordedbutfaintly, if the needle is not properly adjusted. And, further, it must beremembered that the strength of the reproduction depends almost entirelyupontheclearnessanddepthoftheoriginalimpressiononthecylinder;asistherecord,soisthereproduction.Itwillbewellforthestudenttocarrythissymbol of the phonograph in his mind; it will aid him in developing hispowersofmemory.

Inthisconnectionweshouldrememberthatattentiondependslargelyuponinterest. Therefore we would naturally expect to find that we rememberinteresting things far more readily than those which lack interest. Thissuppositionisborneout inactualexperience.Thisaccountsfor thefact thateveryoneremembersacertainclassofthingsbetterthanhedoesothers.Oneremembersfaces,anotherdates,anotherspokenconversation,anotherwrittenwords,andsoon.Itwillbefound,asarule,thateachpersonisinterestedinthe class of things which he most easily remembers. The artist easilyremembers faces and details of faces, or scenery and details thereof. Themusicianeasilyrecallspassagesorbarsofmusic,oftenofamostcomplicated

nature.Thespeculatoreasilyrecallsthequotationsofhisfavoritestocks.Theracingmanrecallswithoutdifficultythe“odds”postedonacertainhorseonacertainday,orthedetailsofaracewhichwasrunmanyyearsago.Themoralis:Arouseandinduceaninterestinthethingswhichyouwishtoremember.Thisinterestmaybearousedbystudyingthethingsinquestion,aswehavesuggestedinaprecedingchapter.

VISUALIZATIONINMEMORY.

Manyof thebest authorities hold that original impressionsmaybemadeclear and deep, and the process of reproduction accordingly renderedmoreefficient, by the practice of visualizing the thing to be remembered. Byvisualizing is meant the formation of a mental image of the thing in theimagination.Ifyouwishtoremembertheappearanceofanything, lookat itclosely,withattention,andthenturningawayfromitendeavortoreproduceitsappearanceasamentalpicture in themind.If this isdone,aparticularlyclearimpressionwillbemadeinthememory,andwhenyourecallthethingyouwillfindthatyouwillalsorecalltheclearmentalimageofit.Ofcoursethegreaterthenumberofdetailsobservedandincludedintheoriginalmentalimage,thegreatertheremembereddetail.

PERCEPTIONINMEMORY.

Not only is attention necessary in forming clear memory records, butcarefulperceptionisalsoimportant.Withoutclearperceptionthere isa lackofdetailintheretainedrecord,andtheelementofassociationislacking.Itisnot enough tomerely remember the thing itself; we should also rememberwhat it is, and all about it. The practice of the methods of developingperception, given in a preceding lesson, will tend to develop and train theretentive,reproductive,recognitive,andlocativepowersofthememory.Theruleis:Thegreaterthedegreeofperceptionaccordedathing,thegreaterthedetailoftheretainedimpression,andthegreatertheeaseoftherecollection.

UNDERSTANDINGANDMEMORY.

Another importantpoint inacquiring impressions inmemoryis this:Thatthe better the understanding of the subject or object, the clearer theimpressions regarding it, and the clearer the recollection of it. This fact isprovedbyexperimentandexperience.Asubjectwhichwillbe rememberedonlywithdifficultyunderordinarycircumstanceswillbeeasilyrememberedif it is fully explained to the person, and accompanied by a few familiarillustrationsorexamples.Itisverydifficulttorememberameaninglessstringofwords,whileasentencewhichconveysaclearmeaningmaybememorizedeasily. If we understandwhat a thing is for, its uses and employment, werememberitfarmoreeasilythanifwelackthisunderstanding.Elbringhaus,whoconductedanumberofexperimentsalongthisline,reportsthathecouldmemorizeastanzaofpoetryinaboutonetenththetimerequiredtomemorizethe same amount of nonsense syllables. Gordy states that he once asked a

capablestudentoftheJohnsHopkinsUniversitytogivehimanaccountofalecturetowhichhehadjustlistened.“Icannotdoit,”repliedthestudent;“itwasnotlogical.”Theruleis:Themoreoneknowsaboutacertainthing,themoreeasilyisthatthingremembered.Thisisapointworthnoting.

CHAPTERVIII.

Memory—Continued.

T HE subject ofmemory cannot be touched upon intelligently without aconsiderationoftheLawofAssociation,oneoftheimportantpsychologicalprinciples.

THELAWOFASSOCIATION.

What is known inpsychology as theLawofAssociation is basedon thefactthatnoideaexistsinthemindexceptinassociationwithotherideas.Thisisnotgenerallyrecognized,andthemajorityofpersonswilldisputethelawatfirst thought. But the existence and appearance of ideas in the mind aregovernedbyamental lawas invariableandconstant as thephysical lawofgravitation. Every idea has associations with other ideas. Ideas travel ingroups,andonegroupisassociatedwithanothergroup,andsoon,untilintheend every idea in one’smind is associated directly or indirectlywith everyotheridea.Theoretically,atleast,itwouldbepossibletobeginwithoneideainthemindofaperson,andthengraduallyunwindhisentirestockofideasliketheyarnontheball.Ourthoughtsproceedaccordingtothislaw.Wesitdownina“brownstudy”andproceedfromonesubject toanother,untilweareunabletorememberanyconnectionbetweenthefirstthoughtandthelast.Buteachstepofthereveriewasconnectedwiththeoneprecedingandtheonesucceedingit.Itisinterestingtotracebacktheseconnections.Poebasedoneofhiscelebrateddetectivestoriesonthislaw.Thereveriemaybebrokenintoby a sudden impression from outside, and we will then proceed from thatimpression,connectingitwithsomethingelsealreadyinourexperience,andstartinganewchainofsequence.

Oftenwefailtotracetheassociationsgoverningourideas,butthechainistherenevertheless.Onemaythinkofapastsceneorexperiencewithoutanyapparentcause.Alittlethoughtwillshowthatsomethingseen,orafewnotesofa song floating to theears,or the fragranceofa flower,hassupplied theconnectinglinkbetweenthepastandthepresent.Asuggestionofmignonettewill recall somepast event inwhich theperfumeplayedapart; someone’shandkerchief,perhaps,carriedthesameodor.Oranoldfamiliartuneremindsoneofsomeone,something,orsomeplaceinthepast.Afamiliarfeaturein

thecountenanceofapasser-bywillstartonethinkingofsomeoneelsewhohadthatkindofamouth,thatshapednose,orthatexpressionoftheeye—andaway he will be off in a sequence of remembered experiences. Often thestartingidea,ortheconnectinglinks,mayappearbutdimlyinconsciousness;butrestassuredtheyarealwaysthere.Infact,wefrequentlyacceptthislaw,unconsciously and without realizing its actual existence. For instance, onemakesaremark,andatoncewewonder,“Howdidhecometothinkofthat?”and, if we are shrewd, we may discover what was in his mind before hespoke.

Thereare twogeneralclassesofassociationof ideas inmemory,viz.: (1)Associationofcontiguity,and(2)logicalassociation.

Association of contiguity is that form of association depending upon thepreviousassociationintimeorspaceofideaswhichhavebeenimpressedonthe mind. For instance, if you met Mr. and Mrs. Wetterhorn and wereintroducedtothemoneaftertheother,thereafteryouwillnaturallyrememberMr. W. when you think of Mrs. W., and vice versa. You will naturallyrememberNapoleonwhenyouthinkofWellington,orBenedictArnoldwhenyou think of Major André, for the same reason. You will also naturallyrememberbandcwhenyouthinkofa.Likewise,youwillthinkofabstracttime when you think of abstract space, of thunder when you think oflightning, of colic when you recall green apples, of love making andmoonlight nights when you think of college days. In the same way werememberthingswhichoccurredjustbeforeorjustaftertheeventinourmindatthemoment;ofthingsnearinspacetothethingofwhichwearethinking.

Logical association depends upon the relation of likeness or differencebetween several things thought of. Things thus associated may have nevercome into the mind at the same previous time, nor are they necessarilyconnectedintimeandspace.Onemaythinkofabook,andthenproceedbyassociationtothinkofanotherbookbythesameauthor,orofanotherauthortreatingof thesamesubject.Orhemaythinkofabookdirectlyopposed tothefirst,therelationofdistinctdifferencecausingtheassociatedidea.Logicalassociationdependsuponinnerrelations,andnotupontheouterrelationsoftime and space. This innerness of relation between things not connected inspaceortimeisdiscoveredonlybyexperienceandeducation.Theeducatedmanrealizesmanypointsofrelationshipbetweenthings thatare thoughtbytheuneducatedman tobe totallyunrelated.Wisdomandknowledgeconsistlargelyintherecognitionofrelationsbetweenthings.

ASSOCIATIONINMEMORY.

It follows froma considerationof theLawofAssociation thatwhenonewishestoimpressa thinguponthememoryheshould,asanauthoritysays,“Multiplyassociations;entanglethefactyouwishtorememberinanetofasmany associations as possible, especially those that are logical.”Hence theadvice toplaceyour facts ingroupsandclasses in thememory.AsBlackiesays:“Nothinghelpsthemindsomuchasorderandclassification.Classesarealwaysfew,individualsmany;toknowtheclasswellistoknowwhatismostessential in the character of the individual, and what burdens the memoryleasttoretain.”

REPETITIONINMEMORY.

Another important principle of memory is that the impressions acquiredepthandclearnessbyrepetition.Repeatalineofpoetryonce,andyoumayrememberit;repeatitagain,andyourchancesofrememberingitaregreatlyincreased; repeat it a sufficient number of times, and you cannot escaperemembering it. The illustration of the phonograph recordwill help you tounderstand the reason of this. The rule is: Constant repetition deepensmemory impressions; frequent reviewing and recalling what has beenmemorized tends to keep the records clear and clean, beside deepening theimpressionateachreview.

GENERALRULESOFMEMORY.

Thefollowinggeneralruleswillbeofservicetothestudentwhowishestodevelophismemory:—

MakingImpressions.

(1)Bestowattention.(2)Cultivateinterest.(3)Manifestperception.(4)Cultivateunderstanding.(5)Formassociations.(6)Repeatandreview.

RecallingImpressions.

(1)Endeavortogetholdofthelooseendofassociation,andthenunwindyourmemoryballofyarn.

(2)Whenyourecallanimpression,senditbackwithenergytodeepentheimpression,andattachittoasmanynewassociationsaspossible.

(3) Practice a littlememorizing and recalling each day, if only a line ofverse. The memory improves by practice, and deteriorates by neglect anddisuse.

(4) Demand good service of your memory, and it will learn to respond.Learn to trust it, and itwill rise to theoccasion.Howcanyou expect yourmemorytogivegoodservicewhenyoucontinuallyabuseitandtelleveryoneof “the wretched memory I have; I can never remember anything”? Yourmemory is very apt to accept your statements as truth; ourmental facultieshaveanannoyinghabitof takingusatourword in thesematters.Tellyourmemorywhatyouexpectittodo;thentrustitandrefrainfromabusingitandgivingitabadname.

FINALADVICE.

Finally, remember this rule:Yougetoutofyourmemoryonly thatwhichyouplaceinit.Placeinitgood,clear,deepimpressions,anditwillreproducegood, clear, strong recollections. Think of yourmemory as a phonographicrecord,andtakecarethatyouplacetherightkindofimpressionsuponit.Inmemoryyoureapthatwhichyouhavesown.Youmustgiveto thememorybeforeyoucan receive from it.Ofone thingyoumay restassured,namely,that unless you take sufficient interest in the things to be remembered, youwillfindthatthememorywillnottakesufficientinterestinthemtorememberthem. Memory demands interest before it will take interest in the task. Itdemands attention before it will give attention. It demands understandingbefore it will give understanding. It demands association before it willrespond to association. It demands repetition before it will repeat. Thememory is a splendid instrument,but it standson its dignity and asserts itsrights. It belongs to the old dispensation—it demands compensation andbelievesingivingonlyinequalmeasuretowhatitreceives.Ouradviceistogetacquaintedwithyourmemory,andmakefriendswithit.Treatitwellanditwillserveyouwell.Butneglectit,anditwillturnitsbackonyou.

CHAPTERIX.

Imagination.

T HE imaginationbelongs to thegeneral classofmental processes calledthe representative faculties, bywhich ismeant theprocesses inwhich therearere-presented,orpresentedagain,toconsciousnessimpressionspreviouslypresentedtoit.

As we have indicated elsewhere, the imagination is dependent uponmemory for its materials—its records of previous impressions. Butimagination ismore thanmerememory or recollection of these previouslyexperienced and recorded impressions. There is, in addition to the re-presentationandrecollection,aprocessofarrangingtherecalledimpressionsinto new forms and new combinations. The imagination not only gatherstogether the old impressions, but also creates new combinations and formsfromthematerialsogathered.

Psychology gives us many hairsplitting definitions and distinctionsbetweensimplereproductiveimaginationandmemory,butthesedistinctionsaretechnicalandasaruleperplexingtotheaveragestudent.Intruth,thereisvery little, if any, difference between simple reproductive imagination andmemory, althoughwhen the imagination indulges in constructive activity anew feature enters into the process which is absent in pure memoryoperations.Insimplereproductiveimaginationthereissimplytheformationof the mental image of some previous experience—the reproduction of apreviousmental image.Thisdiffersverylittlefrommemory,exceptthat therecalledimageisclearerandstronger.Inthesamewayinordinarymemory,in the manifestation of recollection, there is often the same clear, strongmental image that isproduced in reproductive imagination.The twomentalprocessesblendintoeachothersocloselythat it ispracticallyimpossibletodrawthelinebetweenthem,inspiteofthetechnicaldifferencesurgedbythepsychologists. Of course the mere remembrance of a person who presentshimselftooneisnearertopurememorythantoimagination,fortheprocessisthatofrecognition.Butthememoryorremembranceofthesamepersonwhenhe is absent from sight is practically that of reproductive imagination.Memory, in its stage of recognition, exists in the child mind beforereproductiveimaginationismanifested.Thelatter,therefore,isregardedasahighermentalprocess.

But still higher in the scale is that which is known as constructiveimagination. This form of imagination appears at a later period of childmentation,andisregardedasalaterevolutionofmentalprocessesoftherace.Gordy makes the following distinction between the two phases ofimagination: “The difference between reproductive imagination andconstructive imagination is that the images resulting from reproductiveimagination are copies of past experience, while those resulting fromconstructiveimaginationarenot.***Tolearnwhetheranyparticularimage,or combination of images, is the product of reproductive or constructiveimagination,allwehavetodoistolearnwhetherornotitisacopyofapastexperience.Ourmemories,ofcourse,aredefective,andwemaybeuncertainonthataccount;butapartfromthat,weneedbeinnodoubtwhatever.”

Manypersonshearingforthefirsttimethestatementofpsychologiststhatthe imaginative faculties can re-present and re-produce or re-combine onlytheimageswhichhavepreviouslybeenimpresseduponthemind,areapt toobject that they can, and frequently do, image things which they have notpreviouslyexperienced.Butcantheyanddothey?Isitnottruethatwhattheybelieve to be original creations of the imagination are merely newcombinations of original impressions? For instance, no one ever saw aunicorn,andyet someoneoriginally imagined its form.Buta little thoughtwillshowthattheimageoftheunicornismerelythatofananimalhavingthehead,neck,andbodyofahorse,withthebeardofagoat,thelegsofabuck,thetailofalion,andalong,taperinghorn,spirallytwisted,inthemiddleofthe forehead.Each of the several parts of the unicorn exists in some livinganimal,althoughtheunicorn,composedofallof theseparts, isnon-existentoutsideoffable.Inthesamewaythecentauriscomposedofthebody,legs,andtailofthehorseandthetrunk,head,andarmsofaman.Thesatyrhasthehead,body,andarmsofaman,withthehorns,legs,andhoofsofagoat.Themermaidhasthehead,arms,andtrunkofawoman,joinedatthewaisttothebodyandtailofafish.Themythological“devil”hasthehead,body,andarmsof aman,with the horns, legs, and cloven foot of the lower animal, and apeculiar tail composed of that of some animal but tippedwith a spearhead.Eachof these characteristics is composedof familiar imagesof experience.The imagination may occupy itself for a lifetime turning out impossibleanimals of this kind, but every part thereofwill be found to correspond tosomething existent in nature, and experienced by the mind of the personcreatingthestrangebeast.

In the sameway the imaginationmay picture a familiar person or thingactinginanunaccustomedmanner,thelatterhavingnobasisinfactsofarasthe individual person or thing is concerned, but being warranted by someexperienceconcerningotherpersonsor things.For instance,onemayeasily

formtheimageofadogswimmingunderwaterlikeafish,orclimbingatreelike a cat. Likewise, onemay form amental image of a learned, bewiggedHigh Chancellor, or a venerable Archbishop of Canterbury, dressed like aclown,standingonhishead,balancingacoloredfootballonhisfeet,stickinghistongueinhischeekandwinkingattheaudience.Inthesamewayonemayimaginearailroadrunningacrossabarrendesert,orasteepmountain,uponwhichthereisnotasyetaraillaid.Thebridgeacrossarivermaybeimagedinthesameway.Infact, this is thewaythateverythingismentallycreated,constructed, or invented—the oldmaterials being combined in a newway,andarrangedinanewfashion.Somepsychologistsgosofarastosaythatnomentalimageofmemoryisanexactreproductionoftheoriginalimpression;that there are always changes due to the unconscious operation of theconstructiveimagination.

Theconstructiveimaginationisableto“tearthingstopieces”insearchformaterial, as well as to “join things together” in its work of building. Theimportance of the imagination in all the processes of intellectual thought isgreat.Withoutimaginationmancouldnotreasonormanifestanyintellectualprocess. It is impossible to consider the subject of thought without firstregardingtheprocessesofimagination.Andyetitiscommontohearpersonsspeak of the imagination as if itwere a faculty ofmere fancy, useless andwithoutplaceinthepracticalworldofthought.

DEVELOPINGTHEIMAGINATION.

Theimaginationiscapableofdevelopmentandtraining.Thegeneralrulesfordevelopmentoftheimaginationarepracticallythosewhichwehavestatedin connection with the development of the memory. There is the samenecessity for plenty of material; for the formation of clear and deepimpressions and clear-cut mental images; the same necessity for repeatedimpression,andthefrequentuseandemploymentofthefaculty.Thepracticeofvisualization,ofcourse,strengthensthepoweroftheimaginationasitdoesthatofthememory,thetwopowersbeingintimatelyrelated.Theimaginationmay be strengthened and trained by deliberately recalling previousimpressions and then combining them into new relations. Thematerials ofmemorymaybetornapartandthenre-combinedandre-grouped.Inthesameway one may enter into the feelings and thoughts of other persons byimaginingone’sselfintheirplaceandendeavoringtoactoutinimaginationthe life of such persons. In this way one may build up a much fuller andbroaderconceptionofhumannatureandhumanmotives.

Inthisplace,also,weshouldcautionthestudentagainstthecommonwasteof the powers of the imagination, and the dissipation of its powers in idle

fancies and daydreams.Manypersonsmisuse their imagination in thiswayandnot onlyweaken its power for effectiveworkbut alsowaste their timeand energy.Daydreams are notoriously unfit for the real, practicalwork oflife.

IMAGINATIONANDIDEALS.

And, finally, the student should remember that in the category of theimaginativepowersmustbeplacedthatphaseofmentalactivitywhichhassomuchtodowiththemakingormarringofone’slife—theformationofideals.Our ideals are the patterns afterwhichwe shape our life.According to thenatureofouridealsisthecharacterofthelifewelead.

Ouridealsarethesupportsofthatwhichwecallcharacter.

It is a truth, old as the race, and now being perceived most clearly bythinkers,thatindeed“asamanthinkethinhisheartsoishe.”Theinfluenceofouridealsisperceivedtoaffectnotonlyourcharacterbutalsoourplaceanddegreeofsuccessinlife.Wegrowtobethatofwhichwehaveheldideals.Ifwe create an ideal, either of general qualities or else these qualities asmanifestedbysomepersonlivingordead,andkeepthatidealeverbeforeus,wecannothelpdevelopingtraitsandqualitiescorrespondingto thoseofourideal. Careful thought will show that character depends greatly upon thenatureofourideals;thereforeweseetheeffectoftheimaginationincharacterbuilding.

Moreover,ourimaginationhasanimportantbearingonouractions.Manyamanhascommittedanimprudentorimmoralactwhichhewouldnothavedone had he been possessed of an imagination which showed him theprobableresultsoftheaction.Inthesamewaymanymenhavebeeninspiredtogreatdeedsandachievementsby reasonof their imaginationpicturing tothemthepossibleresultsofcertainaction.The“bigthings”inallwalksoflifehave been performed bymenwhohad sufficient imagination to picture thepossibilities of certain courses or plans. The railroads, bridges, telegraphlines,cablelines,andotherworksofmanaretheresultsoftheimaginationofsome men. The good fairy godmother always provides a vivid and livelyimaginationamongthegiftsshebestowsuponherbelovedgodchildren.Welldidtheoldphilosopherpraytothegods:“And,withall,giveuntomeaclearandactiveimagination.”

The dramatic values of life depend upon the quality of the imagination.Lifewithoutimaginationismechanicalanddreary.Imaginationmayincreasethesusceptibilitytopain,butitpaysforthisbyincreasingthecapacityforjoyandhappiness.Thepighasbutlittleimagination,—littlepainandlittlejoy,—

butwhoenviesthepig?Thepersonwithaclearandactiveimaginationisinameasureacreatorofhisworld,oratleastare-creator.Hetakesanactivepartinthecreativeactivitiesoftheuniverse,insteadofbeingamerepawnpushedhereandthereinthegameoflife.

Again, thedivinegift of sympathy andunderstandingdependsmateriallyupon the possession of a good imagination. One can never understand thepainorproblemsofanotherunlesshefirstcanimaginehimselfintheplaceoftheother.Imaginationisattheveryheartofsympathy.Onemaybepossessedofgreatcapacityforfeeling,butowingtohislackofimaginationmayneverhave thisfeelingcalled intoaction.Thepersonwhowouldsympathizewithothersmustfirstlearntounderstandthemandfeeltheiremotions.Thishecandoonlyifhehastheproperdegreeofimagination.Thosewhoreachtheheartofthepeoplemustfirstbereachedbythefeelingsofthepeople.Andthisispossibleonlytohimwhoseimaginationenableshimtopicturehimselfinthesameconditionasothers,andthusawakenhislatentfeelingsandsympathiesandunderstanding.Thusit isseenthat theimaginationtouchesnotonlyourintellectuallifebutalsoouremotionalnature.Imaginationistheverylifeofthesoul.

CHAPTERX.

TheFeelings.

I Nthinkingofthemindanditsactivitiesweareaccustomedtothegeneralidea that thementalprocessesarechiefly thoseof intellect, reason, thought.But, as a fact, the greater part of themental activities are those concernedwithfeelingandemotion.Theintellectistheyoungestchildofthemind,andwhilemaking itspresencestrenuouslyknown in themannerofallyoungestchildrensothatoneisperhapsjustifiedinregardingitas“thewholething”inthe family,nevertheless it reallyplaysbutacomparativelysmallpart in thegeneralworkofthementalfamily.Theactivitiesofthe“feeling”sideoflifegreatly outnumber those of the “thinking” side, are far stronger in theirinfluenceandeffect,asarule,and,infact,socolortheintellectualprocesses,unconsciously,astoconstitutetheirdistinctivequalityexceptinthecaseofaveryfewadvancedthinkers.

Butthereisadifferencebetween“feeling”and“emotion,”asthetermsareemployed in psychology. The former is the simple phase, the latter thecomplex. Generally speaking, the resemblance or difference is akin to thatexistingbetweensensationandperception,asexplainedinapreviouschapter.Beginningwith the simple, inorder lateron to reach thecomplex,weshallnowconsiderthatwhichisknownassimple“feeling.”

The term “feeling,” as used in this connection in psychology, has beendefined as “the simpleagreeable ordisagreeable sideof anymental state.”Theseagreeableordisagreeablesidesofmentalstatesarequitedistinctfromthe act of knowing, which accompanies them. Onemay perceive and thus“know”thatanotherisspeakingtohimandbefullyawareofthewordsbeingusedandof theirmeaning.Ordinarily, and so far aspure thoughtprocessesareconcerned,thiswouldcompletethementalstate.Butwemustreckononthe feeling side as well as on the thinking side of the mental state.Accordinglywefindthattheknowledgeofthewordsoftheotherpersonandthemeaningthereofresultsinamentalstateagreeableordisagreeable.Inthesamewaythereadingofthewordsofabook,thehearingofasong,orasightorsceneperceived,mayresult inamoreor lessstrongfeeling,agreeableordisagreeable. This sense of agreeable or disagreeable consciousness is theessentialcharacteristicofwhatwecall“feeling.”

Itisverydifficulttoexplainfeelingexceptinitsownterms.Weknowvery

wellwhatwemean, orwhat anothermeans, when it is said thatwe or he“feelssad,”orhas“ajoyousfeeling,”or“afeelingof interest.”Andyetweshall find itveryhard toexplain themental stateexcept in termsof feelingitself.Ourknowledgedependsentirelyuponourpreviousexperienceof thefeeling.As anauthority says: “Ifwehavenever felt pleasure,pain, fear, orsorrow,aquartovolumecannotmakeusunderstandwhatsuchamentalstateis.” Every mental state is not distinguished by strong feeling. There arecertainmentalstateswhichareconcernedchieflywithintellectualeffort,andinwhichalltraceoffeelingseemstobeabsent,unless,assomehaveclaimed,the“feeling”of interestor the lackofsameisafaintformof thefeelingofpleasure or pain. Habit may dull the feeling of a mental state until it isapparentlyneutral,butthereisgenerallyafaintfeelingoflikeordislikestillleft.

The elementary forms of feeling are closely allied with those of simplesensation. But experiments have revealed that there is a distinction inconsciousness. It has been discovered that one is often conscious of the“touch”ofaheatedobjectbeforeheisofthefeelingorpainresultingfromit.Psychologists have pointed out another distinction, namely: When weexperience a sensation we are accustomed to refer it to the outside thingwhich is theobjectof it, aswhenwe touch theheatedobject;butwhenweexperience a feelingwe instinctively refer it to ourself, aswhen the heatedobjectgivesuspain.Asanauthorityhassaid:“Myfeelingsbelongtome;butmysensationsseemtobelongtotheobjectwhichcausedthem.”

Another proof of the difference and distinction between sensation andfeeling is the fact that the same sensationwill produce different feelings indifferent persons experiencing the former, even at the same time. Forinstance, the same sightwill cause one person to feel elated, and the otherdepressed;thesamewordswillproduceafeelingofjoyinone,andafeelingofsorrowinanother.Thesamesensationwillproducedifferentfeelingsinthesamepersonatdifferenttimes.Anauthoritywellsays:“Youdropyourpurse,andyouseeitlyingonthegroundasyoustooptopickitup,withnofeelingeither of pleasure or pain.But if you see it after you have lost it and havehuntedforitalongtimeinvain,youhaveapronouncedfeelingofpleasure.”

Thereisavastrangeofdegreeandkindinfeeling.Gordysays:“Allformsofpleasureandpainarecalled feelings.Between thepleasurewhichcomesfromeatingapeachandthatwhichresultsfromsolvingadifficultproblem,orlearninggoodnewsofafriend,or thinkingof theprogressofcivilization—between the pain that results from a cut in the hand and thatwhich resultsfromthefailureofalong-cherishedplanorthedeathofafriend—thereisalongdistance.But theonegroupareallpleasures; theother allpains.And,

whateverthesourceofthepleasureorpain,itisalikefeeling.”

Therearemanydifferentkindsoffeelings.Somearisefromsensationsofphysicalcomfortordiscomfort;othersfrompurelyphysiologicalconditions;othersfromthesatisfactionofaccustomedtastes,orthedissatisfactionarisingfrom the stimulation of unaccustomed tastes; others from the presence orabsenceofcomfort;othersfromthepresenceorabsenceofthingsorpersonsforwhomwehave an affectionor liking.Over-indulgenceoften transformsthefeelingofpleasureintothatofpain;and,likewise,habitandpracticemaycauseustoexperienceapleasurablefeelingfromthatwhichformerlyinspiredfeelingofanoppositekind.Feelingsalsodifferindegree;thatistosay,somethingscauseus toexperiencepleasurablefeelingsofagreater intensitythando others, and some cause us to experience painful feelings of a greaterintensitythandoothers.Thesedegreesofintensitydependmoreorlessuponthehabitorexperienceof the individual.Asageneralrule,feelingsmaybeclassifiedinto(1)thosearisingfromphysicalsensations,and(2)thosearisingfromideas.

Thefeelingsdependinguponphysicalsensationsariseeitherfrominheritedtendencies and inclinations or fromacquiredhabits and experience. It is anaxiom of the evolutionary school that any physical activity that has been ahabit of the race, long continued, becomes an instinctive pleasure-givingactivity in the individual. For instance, the race for many generations wascompelledtohunt,fish,travel,swim,etc.,inordertomaintainexistence.Theresult is that we, the descendants, are apt to find pleasure in the sameactivitiesassport,games,exercise,etc.Manyofourtendenciesandfeelingsare inherited in thisway. To thesewe have addedmany acquired habits ofphysical activity, which follow the same rule, i.e., that habit and practiceimpartmoreorlesspleasurablefeeling.Wefindmorepleasureindoingthosethings which we can do easily or quite well than in the opposite kind ofthings.

Thefeelingsdependinguponideasmayalsoarisefrominheritance.Manyof our mental tendencies and inclinations have come down to us from thepast.Therearecertainfeelingsthatareborninone,withoutadoubt;thatistosay,thereisagreatcapacityforsuchfeelingswhichwillbetransformedintomanifestation upon the presentation of the proper stimulus. Other mentalfeelings depend upon our individual past experience, association, orsuggestions fromothers—uponour past environment, in fact.The ideals ofthosearounduswillcauseustoexperiencepleasureorpain,asthecasemaybe,undercertaincircumstances; the forceof suggestionalong these lines isverystrongindeed.Notonlydoweexperiencefeelingsinresponsetopresentsensations,buttherecollectionofsomepreviousexperiencewillalsoarouse

feeling.Infact,feelingsof thiskindarecloselyboundupwithmemoryandimagination.Personsofvividimaginationareapttofeelfarmorethanothers.They suffer more, and enjoy more. Our sympathies, which depend largelyupon our imaginative power, are the cause ofmany of our feelings of thiskind.

Manyofthefactswhichwegenerallyascribetofeelingarereallyapartofthe phenomena of emotion, the latter being the more complex phase offeeling. For the purposes of this consideration we have regarded simplefeeling as the rawmaterial of emotion, the relation being compared to thatexisting between sensation and perception. In our consideration of emotionwe shall see the fuller manifestation of feeling, and its more complexexpressions.

CHAPTERXI.

TheEmotions.

A S we have seen in the preceding lessons, an emotion is the morecomplex phase of feeling. As a rule an emotion arises from a number offeelings.Moreover,itisofahigherorderofmentalactivity.Aswehaveseen,afeelingmayariseeitherfromaphysicalsensationorfromanidea.Emotion,however,asarule,isdependentuponanidea for itsexpression,andalwaysuponan idea for itsdirectionand its continuance.Feeling,of course, is theelemental spirit of all emotional states, and, as an authority has said, is thethreaduponwhichtheemotionalstatesarestrung.

Halleck says: “When representative ideas appear, the feeling incombinationwith themproduces emotion.After thewaters of theMissouricombinewith another stream, they receive a different name, although theyflow toward the gulf in as great volume as before. Suppose we liken thefeelingduetosensationtotheMissouriRiver;thetrainofrepresentativeideastotheMississippibeforeitsjunctionwiththeMissouri.EmotionmaythenbelikenedtotheMississippiafteritsjunction—afterfeelinghascombinedwithrepresentative ideas. The emotional stream will not be broader and deeperthan before.This analogy is employed only tomake the distinction clearer.Thestudentmustrememberthatmentalpowersareneveractuallyasdistinctas tworiversbefore theirunion.***Thestudentmustbewareof thinkingthatwehavedonewithfeelingwhenweconsideremotion.JustasthewatersoftheMissouriflowonuntiltheyreachthegulf,sodoesfeelingrunthrougheveryemotionalstate.”Intheaboveanalogytheterm“representativeideas,”of course, means the ideas of memory and imagination as explained inpreviouschapters.

There is a close relation between emotion and the physical expressionthereof—apeculiarmutualactionandreactionbetweenthementalstateandthephysicalactionaccompanyingit.Psychologistsaredividedregardingthisrelation. One school holds that the physical expression follows and resultsfromthementalstate.Forinstance,wehearorseesomething,andthereuponexperiencethefeelingoremotionofanger.Thisemotionalfeelingreactsuponthe body and causes an increased heart beat, a tight closing of the lips, afrown and lowered eyebrows, and clinched fists. Or we may perceivesomethingwhichcausesthefeelingoremotionoffear,whichreactsuponthe

bodyandproducespallor,raisingofthehair,droppingofthejaw,openingofthe eyelids, trembling of the legs, etc. According to this school, and thepopularidea,thementalstateprecedesandcausesthephysicalexpression.

Butanotherschoolofpsychology,ofwhichthelateProf.WilliamJamesisaleadingauthority,holdsthatthephysicalexpressionprecedesandcausesthemental state. For instance, in the cases above cited, the perception of theanger-causing or fear-causing sight first causes a reflex action upon themuscles, according to inherited race habits of expression. This muscularexpressionandactivity,inturn,isheldtoreactuponthemindandtocausethefeelingoremotionofangerorfear,as thecasemaybe.ProfessorJames, insomeofhisworks,makesaforcibleargumentinsupportof this theory,andhis opinions have influenced the scientific thought of the day upon thissubject. Others, however, have sought to combat his theory by equallyforcibleargument,andthesubjectisstillunderlivelyandspiriteddiscussioninpsychologicalcircles.

Withouttakingsidesintheabovecontroversy,manypsychologistsproceedupon the hypothesis that there is a mutual action and reaction betweenemotionalmentalstatesandtheappropriatephysicalexpressionthereof,eachinameasurebeingthecauseoftheother,andeachlikewisebeingtheeffectof the other. For instance, in the cases above cited, the perception of theanger-producing or fear-producing sight causes, almost or quitesimultaneously, theemotionalmentalstateofangerorfear,as thecasemaybe, and the physical expression thereof. Then rapidly ensues a series ofmental and physical reactions. The mental state acts upon the physicalexpressionandintensifiesit.Thephysicalexpressioninturnreactsuponthementalstateandinducesamoreintensedegreeoftheemotionalfeeling.Andsoon,untilthementalstateandphysicalexpressionreachtheirhighestpointand then begin to subside from exhaustion of energy. This middle-groundconception meets all the requirements of the facts, and is probably morenearlycorrectthaneitherextremetheory.

Darwininhisclassicwork,“TheExpressionoftheEmotionsinManandAnimals,”hasthrownagreatlightonthesubjectoftheexpressionofemotionin physical motions. The Florentine scientist, Paolo Mantegazza, added toDarwin’sworkwithideasofhisownandcountlessexamplesdrawnfromhisownexperienceandobservation.TheworkofFrançoisDelsarte,thefounderof the school of expressionwhich bears his name, is also amost valuableadditiontothethoughtonthissubject.Thesubjectoftherelationandreactionbetweenemotionalfeelingandphysicalexpressionisamostfascinatingone,andoneinwhichwemayexpectinterestingandvaluablediscoveriesduringthenexttwentyyears.

Therelationandreactionabovementionedareinterestingnotonlyfromtheviewpoint of theory but also because of their practicable application inemotionaldevelopmentandtraining.It isanestablishedtruthofpsychologythat each physical expression of an emotional state serves to intensify thelatter; it is pouring oil on the fire. Likewise, it is equally true that therepression of the physical expression of an emotion tends to restrain andinhibittheemotionitself.

Halleck says: “If we watch a person growing angry, we shall see theemotion increase as he talks loud, frowns deeply, clinches his fist, andgesticulateswildly.Eachexpressionofhispassionisreflectedbackupontheoriginalangerandaddsfueltothefire.Ifheresolutelyinhibitsthemuscularexpressionsofhisanger,itwillnotattaingreatintensity,anditwillsoondieaquietdeath.***Notwithout reasonare thosepersonscalledcoldbloodedwhohabituallyrestrainasfaraspossibletheexpressionoftheiremotion;whonever frown or throw any feeling into their tones, even when a wronginflicteduponsomeonedemandsaggressivemeasures.Thereisherenowaveofbodilyexpressiontoflowbackandaugmenttheemotionalstate.”

In this connection we call your attention to the familiar and oft-quotedpassagefromtheworksofProf.WilliamJames:“Refusetoexpressapassionand it dies. Count ten before venting your anger and its occasion seemsridiculous.Whistlingtokeepupcourageisnomerefigureofspeech.Ontheotherhand,sitalldayinamopingposture,sighandreplytoeverythingwithadismalvoice,andyourmelancholylingers.Thereisnomorevaluablepreceptinmoraleducationthanthis,asallwhohaveexperienceknow:Ifwewishtoconquerundesirableemotionaltendenciesinourselves,wemustassiduously,and in the first instancecold-bloodedly,go through theoutwardmovementsofthosecontrarydispositionswhichweprefertocultivate.Smooththebrow,brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of theframe, and speak in amajor key, andyour heartmust be frigid indeed if itdoesnotgraduallythaw.”

AlongthesamelinesHallecksays:“Actorshavefrequentlytestifiedtothefact that emotion will arise if they go through the appropriate muscularmovements.Intalkingtoacharacteronthestage,iftheyclinchthefistsandfrown, they often find themselves becoming really angry; if they startwithcounterfeit laughter, they find themselves growing cheerful. A Germanprofessor says that he cannotwalkwith a schoolgirl’smincing step and airwithoutfeelingfrivolous.”

Thewisestudentwillacquireagreatcontroloverhisemotionalnatureifhewill re-read and study the above statements and quotations until he hasgraspedtheirspiritandessence.Inthosefewlinesheisgivenaphilosophyof

self-control and self-mastery thatwill beworthmuch to him if hewill butapplyitinpractice.Patience,perseverance,practice,andwillarerequired,buttherewardisgreat.Eventothosewhohavenotthepersistencytoapplythistruth fully, therewill be a partial reward if theywill use it to the extent ofrestraining so far as possible any undue physical expression of undesirableemotionalexcitement.

Somewritersseem to regardcapacity forgreatemotionalexcitementandexpression as amark of a rich and full character or noble soul. This is farfrom being true.While it is a fact that the cultivation of certain emotionstends to create a noble character and a full life, it is equally true that thetendencyto“gush”andindulgeinhystericalorsentimentalexcessesisamarkofanill-controllednatureandaweak,ratherthanstrong,character.Moreover,it isa fact thatexcess inemotionalexcitementandexpression tends towardthedissipationofthefinerandnoblerfeelingswhichotherwisewouldseekanoutletinactualdoingandpracticalaction.InthelanguageoftheoldScotchengineer in the story, they are like the old locomotive which “spends saemuchsteamatthewhustlethatshehaenanelefttogaeby.”

Emotionalexcitementandexpressionarelargelydependentuponhabitandindulgence, although there is a great difference, of course, in the emotionalnatureand tendenciesofvariouspersons.Emotions, likephysicalactionsorintellectual processes, become habitual by repetition. And habit renders allphysicalormentalactionseasyofrepetition.Eachtimeonemanifestsanger,thedeeperthementalpathismade,andtheeasieritistotravelthatpaththenexttime.Inthesamewayeachtimethatangerisconqueredandinhibited,the easierwill it be to restrain it the next time. In the sameway desirablehabitsofemotionandexpressionmaybeformed.

Anotherpoint in thecultivation, training, and restraintof theemotions isthatwhichhastodowiththecontroloftheideaswhichweallowtocomeintothemind.Ideativehabitsmaybeformed—areformed,infact,bythemajorityofpersons.Wemaycultivatethehabitoflookingonthebrightsideofthings;oflookingforthebestinthosewemeet;ofexpectingthebestthingsinsteadof theworst.By resolutely refusing to givewelcome to ideas calculated toarouse certain emotions, feelings, passions, desires, sentiments, or similarmentalstates,wemaydomuchtopreventthearousingoftheemotionitself.Emotionsusuallyarecalledforthbysomeidea,andifweshutouttheideawemay prevent the emotional feeling from appearing. In this connection theuniversalruleofpsychologymaybeapplied:Amentalstatemaybeinhibitedorrestrainedbyturningtheattentiontotheoppositementalstate.

Thecontroloftheattentionisreallythecontrolofeverymentalstate.

Wemay use thewill in the direction of the control of the attention—the

developmentanddirectionofvoluntaryattention—and thusactuallycontroleveryphaseofmentalactivity.Thewillisnearesttotheego,orcentralbeingofman,andtheattentionisthechieftoolandinstrumentofthewill.Thisfactcannotberepeatedtoooften.Ifitisimpressedupontheminditwillprovetobeusefulandvaluableinmanyemergenciesofmentallife.Hewhocontrolshisattentioncontrolshismind,andincontrollinghismindcontrolshimself.

CHAPTERXII.

TheInstinctiveEmotions.

M ANY attempts to classify the emotions have been made by thepsychologists, but the best authorities hold that beyond the purpose ofordinary convenience in considering the subject any classification isscientificallyuselessbyreasonofitsincompleteness.AsJamescleverlyputsit:“Anyclassificationoftheemotionsisseentobeastrueandasnaturalasany other, if it only serves some purpose.” The difficulty attending theattemptedclassificationarisesfromthefactthateveryemotionismoreorlesscomplex, and is made up of various feelings and shades of emotionalexcitement.Eachemotionblendsintoothers.Justasafewelementsofmattermaybegroupedintohundredsofthousandsofcombinations,sotheelementsoffeelingmaybegroupedintothousandsofshadesofemotion.Itissaidthatthetwoelementsofcarbonandhydrogenformcombinationsresultinginfivethousandvarietiesofmaterialsubstance,“fromanthracitetomarshgas,fromblack coke to colorless naphtha.” The same thing may be said of theemotional combinations formed from two principal elements of feeling.Moreover, the close distinction between sensation and feeling on the onehand, and between feeling and emotion on the other, serves to furthercomplicatethetask.

Forthepurposesofourconsideration,letusdividetheemotionsintofivegeneralclasses,asfollows:(1)Instinctiveemotions,(2)socialemotions,(3)religiousemotions,(4)æstheticemotions,(5)intellectualemotions.Weshallnowconsidereachoftheabovefiveclassesinturn.

THEINSTINCTIVEEMOTIONS.

Instinctisdefinedas“unconscious,involuntary,orunreasoningpromptingto any action,” or “the natural unreasoning impulse bywhich an animal isguided to the performance of any action,without thought of improving themethod.”An authority says: “Instinct is a natural impulse leading animals,evenpriortoallexperience,toperformcertainactionstendingtothewelfareof the individual or the perpetuation of the species, apparently withoutunderstanding the object at which they may be supposed to aim, ordeliberating as to the best methods to employ. In many cases, as in the

constructionofthecellsofthebee,thereisaperfectionabouttheresultwhichreasoningmancouldnothaveequaled,exceptbyanapplicationofthehighermathematics to direct the operations carried out.Mr.Darwin considers thatanimals, in timepast asnow,havevaried in theirmentalqualities, and thatthosevariationsareinherited.Instinctsalsovaryslightlyinastateofnature.Thisbeingso,naturalselectioncanultimatelybringthemtoahighdegreeofperfection.”

Itwasformerlythefashiontoascribeinstinctintheloweranimals,andinman, to something akin to “innate ideas” implanted in each species andthereafter continued by inheritance. But the application of the idea ofevolution to the science of psychology has resulted in brushing away theseold ideas. To-day it holds that thatwhichwe call “instinct” is the result ofgradualdevelopment in thecourseofevolution, theaccumulatedexperienceof the racebeingstoredaway in the racememory,each individualaddingalittletheretobyhisacquiredhabitsandexperiences.Psychologistsnowholdthatthelowerformsoftheseracetendenciesarecloselyakintopurelyreflexactions,andthehigherforms,whichareknownas“instinctiveemotions,”arephenomenaof the subconsciousmind resulting from racememory and raceexperience.

Clodd says: “Instinct is the higher form of reflex action. The salmonmigratesfromseatoriver;thebirdmakesitsnestormigratesfromonezonetoanotherbyanunvaryingroute,evenleavingitsyoungbehindtoperish;thebeebuildsitssix-sidedcell;thespiderspinsitsweb;thechickbreaksitswaythrough the shell, balances itself, and picks up grains of corn; the newbornbabesucks itsmother’sbreast—all invirtueof likeactson thepartof theirancestors,which,arisingintheneedsofthecreature,andgraduallybecomingautomatic, have not varied during long ages, the tendency to repeat thembeingtransmittedwithinthegermfromwhichinsect,fish,bird,andmanhaveseverallysprung.”

Schneider says: “It is a fact thatmen, especially in childhood, fear togointoadarkcavern,oragloomywood.Thisfeelingoffeararises,tobesure,partlyfromthefactthatweeasilysuspectthatdangerousbeastsmaylurkinthese localities—asuspiciondue tostorieswehaveheardandread.But,onthe other hand, it is quite sure that this fear at a certain perception is alsodirectly inherited.Childrenwhohavebeencarefullyguarded fromallghoststoriesareneverthelessterrifiedandcryifledintoadarkplace,especiallyifsounds are made there. Even an adult can easily observe that anuncomfortabletimiditystealsoverhiminalonelywoodatnight,althoughhemay have the fixed conviction that not the slightest danger is near. Thisfeeling of fear occurs in many men even in their own houses after dark,

although it is much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The fact of suchinstinctive fear is easily explicable when we consider that our savageancestors through immemorable generationswere accustomed tomeetwithdangerous beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were for the most partattackedbysuchbeastsduring thenightand in thewoods,and that thusaninseparableassociationbetweentheperceptionsofdarkness,caverns,woods,andfeartookplace,andwasinherited.”

Jamessays:“Nothingiscommonerthantheremarkthatmandiffersfromlowercreaturesbythealmosttotalabsenceofinstincts,andtheassumptionoftheir work in him by reason. * * *Wemay confidently say that howeveruncertain man’s reactions upon his environment may sometimes seem incomparisonwiththoseofthelowermammals,theuncertaintyisprobablynotdue to their possession of any principles of action which he lacks.On thecontrary,man possesses all the impulses that they have, and a greatmanymore besides. * * * High places cause fear of a peculiarly sickening sort,thoughhereagainindividualsdiffer.Theutterlyblindinstinctivecharacterofthe motor impulses here is shown by the fact that they are almost alwaysentirely unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to suppress them. * * *Certain ideas of supernatural agency, associated with real circumstances,produce a peculiar kindof horror.This horror is probably explicable as theresult of a combination of simple horrors.To bring the ghostly terror to itsmaximum, many unusual elements of the dreadful must combine, such asloneliness, darkness, inexplicable sounds, especially of a dismal character,moving pictures half discerned (or, if discerned, of dreadful aspect), and avertiginous baffling of the expectation. * * * In view of the fact thatcadaveric,reptilian,andundergroundhorrorsplaysospecificandconstantapartinmanynightmaresandformsofdelirium,itseemsnotaltogetherunwiseto ask whether these forms of dreadful circumstance may not at a formerperiod have been more normal objects of the environment than now. Theevolutionist ought to have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, and thescenery that provokes them, as relapses into the consciousness of the cavemen,aconsciousnessusuallyoverlaidinusbyexperiencesofamorerecentdate.”

Instinctiveemotionmanifestsasanimpulsearisingfromthedimrecessesof the feeling or emotional nature—an incentive toward a dimly consciousend. It differs from the almost purely automatic nature of certain forms ofreflex process, for its beginning is a feeling arising from the subconsciousregions,whichstrivestoexciteanactivityofconsciousvolition.Thefeelingis fromthesubconscious,but theactivity isconscious.Theendmaynotbeperceivedinconsciousness,oratleastisbutdimlyperceived,buttheactionleadingtotheendisinfullconsciousness.Instinctisseentohaveitsoriginin

thepastexperiencesoftherace,transmittedbyheredityandpreservedintheracememory.Ithasforitsobjectthepreservationoftheindividualandofthespecies.Itsendisoftensomethingfarremovedintimefromthemoment,orthewelfareofthespeciesratherthanthatoftheindividual;forinstance,thecaterpillarprovidingfor its futurestates,or thebirdbuilding itsnest,or thebees building cells and providing honey for their successors, for very fewbeeslivetopartakeofthehoneywhichtheyhavegatheredandstored—theyareanimatedby“thespiritofthehive.”

The most elementary forms of the instinctive emotions are those whichhavetodowiththepreservationoftheindividual,hiscomfort,andpersonalphysicalwelfare.Thisclassofemotionscompriseswhataregenerallyknownas purely “selfish” feelings, having little or no concern for the welfare ofothers.Inthisclasswefindtheemotionalfeelingswhichhavetodowiththesatisfaction of hunger and thirst, the securing of comfortable quarters andwarmclothing,and thespiritofcombatandstrifearisingfromthedesire toobtain these.Theseelemental feelingshad theirbirthearly in thehistoryoflife, and indeed life itself depended very materially upon them for itspreservationandcontinuance.Itwasnecessaryfortheprimitivelivingthingto be “selfish.” When man appeared, only those survived who manifestedthesefeelingsstrongly;theotherswerepushedtothewallandperished.Eveninourcivilizationthemanbelowtheaverageinthisclassoffeelingswillfinditdifficulttosurvive.

CHAPTERXIII.

ThePassions.

A RISING from the most elemental instinctive emotions, we find whatmaybe termed“thepassions.”By the term“passion” ismeant thosestrongfeelingsinwhichtheelementalselfishinstinctsaremanifestedinrelationtootherpersons,either in thephaseofattractionor repulsion. In thisclasswefindtheelementaryphasesoflove,andthefeelingsofhate,anger, jealousy,revenge,etc.Thisclassofemotionsusuallymanifestsviolently,ascomparedwiththeotheremotions.Thepassionsgenerallyarisefromself-preservation,race preservation and reproduction, self-interest, self-aggrandizement, etc.,andmaybe regarded as amore complex phase of the elemental instinctiveemotions. The elemental instinctive emotions of self-preservation and self-comfort cause the individual to experience and manifest the passionalemotionsofdesireforcombat,anger,hate,revenge,etc.,whiletheinstinctiveemotionsleadingtoreproductionandcontinuanceoftheracegiverisetothepassionalemotionsofsexuallove,jealousy,etc.Thedesiretoattracttheothersexincreasesambition,vanity,loveofdisplay,andotherfeelings.

Itisonlywhenthisclassofemotionsblendswiththehigheremotionsthatthe passions becomepurified and refined.But itmust not be forgotten thatthese emotionswere verynecessary for thewelfare of the race in the earlystage of its evolution, and that they still play an active part in human life,underthegreaterorlessrestraintimposedbycivilizedsociety.Norshoulditbe forgotten that from theseemotionshaveevolved thehighest loveofonehuman being for another. From instinctive sexual love and the “racialinstinct”havedevelopedthehigheraffectionofmanforwoman,andwomanforman, inall theirbeautifulmanifestations—andtheloveof theparentforthechild,and the loveof thechildfor theparent.Thefirstmanifestationofaltruismarisesintheloveofthelivingcreatureforitsmate,andintheloveoftheparentsfortheiroffspring.Incertainformsoflifewheretheassociationofthesexesismerelyforthemoment,andisnotfollowedbyprotection,mutualaid,andcompanionship,thereisfoundanabsenceofmutualaffectionofanykind, the only feeling being an elemental reproductive instinct bringing themaleandfemaletogetherforthemoment—analmostpurelyreflexactivity.Inthesameway,inthecasesofcertainanimals(therattlesnake,forinstance)inwhichtheyoungareabletoprotectthemselvesfrombirth,thereisseenatotalabsenceofparentalaffectionor thereturn thereof.Human lovebetween the

sexes, in itshigherand lowerdegrees, isanaturalevolution frompassionalemotion of a low order, due to the growth of social, ethical, moral, andæstheticemotionarisingfromthenecessitiesoftheincreasingcomplexityanddevelopmentofhumanlife.

The simpler formsof passional emotion are almost entirely instinctive intheirmanifestation.Indeed,inmanycases,thereappearstobebutlittlemorethanahigh formof reflexnervous action.The followingwordsofWilliamJamesgiveusaninterestingviewofthisfactoflife:“Thecatrunsafterthemouse, runs or shows fight before the dog, avoids falling from walls andtrees,shunsfireandwater,notbecausehehasanynotioneitheroflifeorofdeath or of self-preservation. He acts in each case separately and simplybecausehecannothelpit;beingsoframedthatwhenthatparticularrunningthingcalledamouseappearsinhisfieldofvision,hemustpursue;thatwhenthatparticularbarkingandobstreperousthingcalledadogappears there,hemustretireifatadistance,andscratchifcloseby;thathemustwithdrawhisfeetfromwater,andhisfacefromflame,etc.***Now,whydothevariousanimals do what seem to us such strange things in the presence of suchoutlandish stimuli? Why does the hen, for instance, submit herself to thetediumofincubatingsuchafearfullyuninterestingsetofobjectsasanestfulofeggs,unlessshehavesomesortofpropheticinklingoftheresult?Theonlyanswerisadhominem.Wecanonlyinterprettheinstinctofbrutesbywhatweknowofinstinctsinourselves.Whydomenalwaysliedown,whentheycan,onsoftbedsratherthanonsoftfloors?Whydotheysitaroundastoveonacoldday?Why,inaroom,dotheyplacethemselves,ninety-ninetimesoutofa hundred,with their faces toward itsmiddle rather than to thewall?Whydoesthemaideninterest theyouthsomuchthateverythingaboutherseemsmoreimportantandsignificantthananythingelseintheworld?Nothingmorecanbesaidthanthatthesearehumanways,andthateverycreaturelikesitsownways, and takes to following themas amatterof course.Sciencemaycomeandconsidertheseways,andfindthatmostofthemareuseful.Butitisnot for the sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at themomentoffollowingthemwefeelthatitistheonlyappropriateandnaturalthingtodo.Notonemaninamillion,whentakinghisdinner,everthinksofitsutility.Heeatsbecausethefoodtastesgood,andmakeshimwantmore.Ifyoushouldaskhimwhyhewantstoeatmoreofwhattasteslikethat,insteadofreveringyouasaphilosopherhewillprobablylaughatyouforafool.”

James continues: “It takes, in short, what Berkeley called a minddebauched by learning to carry the process of making the natural seemstrange, so far as to ask the why of any instinctive human act. To themetaphysician alone can such questions arise as: Why do we smile whenpleasedandnotscowl?Whyareweunabletotalktoacrowdastoasingle

friend? Why does a particular maiden turn our wits upside down? Thecommonmancanonlysay,‘Ofcoursewesmile,ofcourseourheartpalpitatesat thesightof thecrowd,ofcoursewe love themaiden—thatbeautifulsoulcladinthatperfectform,sopalpablyandflagrantlymadefromalleternitytobeloved!’Andso,probably,doeseachanimalfeelabouttheparticularthingsit tends to do in the presence of particular objects. They, too, are a priorisyntheses.Tothelionitisthelionesswhichismadetobeloved;tothebear,theshebear.Tothebroodyhenthenotionwouldseemmonstrousthatthereshould be a creature in the world to whom a nestful of eggs was not theutterlyfascinating,precious,andnever-to-be-too-much-sat-uponobjectwhichit is to her. Thus we may be sure that however mysterious some animals’instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear no less mysterious tothem.Andwemayconcludethat,totheanimalwhichobeysit,everyimpulseandeverystepofthatinstinctshineswithitsownsufficientlight,andseemsatthemomenttheonlyexternallyrightandproperthingtodo.Itmaybedoneforitsownsakeexclusively.”

One has very little need, as a rule, to develop the passional emotions.Instincthastakenprettygoodcarethatweshallhaveourshareofthisclassoffeelings. But there is a need to train, restrain, govern, and control theseemotions, for the conditionswhich brought about their original being havechanged. Our social conventions require that we should subordinate thesepassionalfeelings,tosomeextentatleast.Societyinsiststhatwemustrestrictourloveimpulsestocertainlimitsandtocertainquarters,andthatwesubdueourangerandhate,except towardtheenemiesofourland, thedisturbersofpublicpeace,andthemenacersofthesocialconventionsofourtimeandland.Thepublicwelfare requires thatwe inhibit our fighting impulses, except incases of self-defense or war. Public policy requires that we keep ourambitionswithinreasonablelimits,whichlimitschangefromtimetotime,ofcourse. In short, society has stepped in and insisted that man, as a socialbeing, must not only acquire a social conscience but must also developsociable emotions and inhibit his unsociable ones. The evolution of man’snature has caused him unconsciously to modify his elemental, instinctive,passional emotions, and subordinate them to the dictates of social, ethical,moral, and æsthetic feelings and ideals, and to intellectual considerations.Eventheoriginalelementalinstinctsoftheloweranimalshavebeenmodifiedby reason of the social requirements of the pack, herd, or drove, until themodifiedinstinctisnowtherulingforce.

Thegeneralprinciplesofemotionalcontrol,restraint,andmastery,asgiveninaprecedingchapter,areapplicabletotheparticularclassofemotionsnowunderconsiderationhere.

(1) By refraining from the physical expression, one may at leastpartiallyinhibittheemotion.

(2) By refusing to create the habit, one may more easily manifestcontrol.

(3)Byrefusingtodwellupontheideaormentalpictureoftheexcitingobject,onemaylessenthestimulus.

(4)Bycultivatingtheoppositeclassofemotions,onemayinhibitanyclassoffeeling.

(5)And,finally,byacquiringacontrolof theattention,bymeansofthewill,onehasthereinsfirmlyinhand,andmaydriveorholdbackthesteedsofpassionashewills.

The passions are like fiery horses, useful ifwell under control, butmostdangerous if the control is lost. The ego is the driver, the will his hands,attention the reins, habit the bit, and the passions the horses. To drive thechariotoflifeundersocialconditions,theegomusthavestronghands(will)to tighten or loosen the reins of attention. He must also employ a welldesignedandshapedbitofhabit.Withoutstronghands,goodreins,andwell-adjustedbit,thefierysteedsofpassionmaygaincontroland,runningaway,dashthechariotanditsdriverover theprecipiceandonto the jaggedrocksbelow.

CHAPTERXIV.

TheSocialEmotions.

A Smanbecameasocialanimalhedevelopednewtraitsofcharacter,newhabitsof action,new ideals,newcustoms, andconsequentlynewemotions.Emotions longentertainedandlongmanifestedby theracebecomemoreorless instinctive, and are passed along in the form of either (a) inheritedstimulus akin to, but lesser in degree and force than, the more elementalemotions; or (b) of inherited tendency to manifest the acquired emotionalfeelinguponthepresentationofsufficientlystrongstimuli.Hencearisesthatwhichwehavecalled“thesocialemotions.”

Under the classification of “the social emotions” are those acquiredtendenciesofactionandfeelingoftheracewhicharemoreorlessaltruistic,andareconcernedwiththewelfareofothersandone’sdutiesandobligationstowardsocietyandourfellowmen.Inthisclassarefoundtheemotionswhichimpel us to perform what we consider or feel to be our duty toward ourneighbors,andourobligationsanddutytowardthestate,asexpressedin itslaws, thecustomsofmenofourcountry,or the idealsof thecommunity.Inanother phase it manifests as sympathy, fellow feeling, and “kindness” ingeneral. In its first phase we find civic virtue, law-abiding inclination,honesty, “square dealing,” and patriotism; in its second phase we findsympathy for others, charity, mutual aid, the alleviation of poverty andsuffering,theerectionofasylumsfororphansandtheaged,hospitalsforthesick,andtheformationofsocietiesforgeneralcharitablework.

Inmanycaseswefindthesocial,ethical,andmoralemotionscloselyalliedwith religious emotion, and by many these are supposed to be practicallyidentical,but there isavastdifference inspiteof their frequentassociation.For instance, we find many persons of high civic virtue, of exalted moralideals,andmanifestingethicalqualitiesof themostadvanced type,whoarelacking in the ordinary religious feelings. On the other hand, we toofrequently find persons professing great religious zeal, and apparentlyexperiencing themost intense religiousemotional feeling,whoaredeficientinsocial,civic,ethical,andmoralqualities,inthebestsenseoftheseterms.Theaimofallreligionworthyofthename,however,istoencourageethicalandmoralaswellasreligiousemotions.

Wemustheremake thedistinctionbetween thosemanifesting theactions

termedethicalandmoralbecause they feel thatway, and thosewhomerelycomply with the conventional requirements because they fear theconsequences of their violation.The first classhave the true social, ethical,andmoralfeelings,tastes,ideals,andinclinations;whilethesecondmanifestmerelytheelementaryfeelingsofself-preservationandselfishprudence.Thefirstclassare“good”becausetheyfeelthatwayandfinditnaturaltobeso;whiletheothersare“good”merelybecausetheyhavetobeorbepunishedbylegalpenaltyorpublicopinion,lossofprestige,lossoffinancialsupport,etc.

Thesocial,moral,andethicalemotionsarebelieved tohavearisen in theracebyreasonoftheassociationofindividualsincommunitiesandtheriseofthenecessityformutualaidandforbearance.Evenmanyofthespeciesoftheloweranimalshavesocial,moral,orethicalcodesoftheirown,basedontheexperienceofthespeciesorfamily,infractionsofwhichtheypunishseverely.In the sameway sympathy and the altruistic feelings are supposed to havearisen.Thecommunityof interest andunderstanding in the tribe, family,orclanbroughtnotonlythefeelingofnaturaldefenseandprotectionbutalsothefiner,innersympatheticfeelingofthepainsandsufferingsoftheirassociates.This, in the progress of the race, has developed into broader and morecomplexidealsandfeelings.

Theologyexplainsthemoralfeelingsasresultingfromconscience,whichitholds to be a special faculty of themind, or soul, divinely given. Science,while admitting the existence of the state of feelings which we call“conscience,” denies its supernatural origin, and ascribes it to the result ofevolution, heredity, experience, education, and suggestion. Conscience,according to science, is a compound of intellectual and emotional states.Conscienceisnotaninvariableorinfallibleguide,butdependsentirelyuponthe heredity, education, experience, and environment of the individual. Itaccompanies themoral and ethical codesof the race,whichvarywith timeand with country. Actions which were thought right a century ago arecondemnednow;likewise,thingscondemnedacenturyagoarethoughtrightnow. What is commended in Turkey is condemned in England, and viceversa.Moraltastesandideals,likeæstheticones,varywithtimeandcountry.Thereisnoabsolutecodewhichhasbeenalwaystrue,inallplaces.Thereisan evolution in the ideals of morals and ethics as in everything else, and“conscience” and the moral and ethical emotions accompany the changingideals.

Manyofthemoralandethicalprinciplesoriginallyarosefromnecessityorutility,buthavesincedevelopedintonatural,spontaneousfeelingonthepartoftherace.Itisheldthattheraceisrapidlydevelopinga“socialconscience”whichwillcausethewipingoutofmanysocialconditionswhicharenowthe

disgrace of civilization. It is predicted that in time the racewill look backupontheexistenceofpovertyinourcivilizationasourgenerationnowlooksbackupontheexistenceofslavery,imprisonmentfordebt,capitalpunishmentforthetheftofaloafofbread,thekillingofprisonersofwar,etc.Itisthoughtthat,intime,warsofconquestwillbedeemedasutterlyimmoralasto-dayisregardedthemurderofabodyofmenbyabandofpiratesorbandits.Inthesameway the economic slavery of to-daywill be seen as immoral as nowseems the physical slavery of the past. In not far distant time it will seemincrediblethatsocietycouldhaveeverallowedoneofitsmemberstodieofhunger in the streets, or of poverty and inattention in the sick room of thehovel.Notonlywilltheidealsandfeelingsofethicalandmoralresponsibilitychange and evolve, but the feelings of personal sympathy will evolve inaccordancetherewith.Atleastsuchisthedreamandprophecyofsomeoftheworld’sgreatestthinkers.

Thesocial,ethical,andmoralemotionsmaybedevelopedbyastudyoftheevolutionandmeaningofsocietyontheonehand,andtheperceptionoftheconditionofthelivesoflessfortunateindividualsontheother.Thefirstwillawakennew ideasof thehistoryand realmeaningof socialassociationandmutualintercourse,andwilldevelopanewsenseofresponsibility,duty,andcivicandsocialpride.Thesecondwillawakenunderstandingandsympathy,andadesiretodowhatonecantohelpthosewhoare“theunderdog,”andalsotobringaboutabetterstateofaffairsingeneral.Thestudyofhistoryandcivilization,ofsociologyandcivics,willdomuchin thefirstdirection.Thestudyofhuman-kind,anditslifeproblemsandcondition,willdothesameinthesecondcase.Inbothcasestherewillbeawakenedanewsenseof“rightandwrong”—anew conception of “ought and ought not”—regarding one’srelationstotherace,society,andhisfellowbeings.

Letnoonedeceivehimselforherselfbythesmugassumptionthattheracehas entirely emerged from barbarism and is now on the top wave ofcivilization.Thetruth,asknowntoallcarefulandconscientiousthinkers, isthatwearebuthalfcivilized,if,indeed,thatmuch.Manyofourcustomsandconventions are those of a half-barbarous people. Our ideals are low, ourcustomsoftenvile.Welacknotonlyhighidealsbutinmanycasesweshowalackof sanity inour social conventions.But evolution ismovingus slowlyahead.A better day is dawning. The signs are in the air, to be seen by allthoughtfulmen.Civilizationisclimbingtheladder,aidedbytheevolutionofthesocial,ethical,andmoralemotionsandthedevelopmentoftheintellect.

In connection with this phase of the emotions, we invite the student toconsiderthefollowingexcellentwordsofProfessorDavidsoninhis“HistoryofGreekEducation”:“Itisnotenoughforamantounderstandtheconditions

of rational life inhisown time.Hemust likewise love theseconditionsandhatewhatever leads to lifeofanoppositekind.This isonlyanotherwayofsaying thathemust love thegoodandhate theevil; for thegood is simplywhatconducestorationalormorallife,andtheevilsimplywhatleadsawayfromit. It isperfectlyobvious,assoonas it ispointedout, thatall immorallifeisduetoafalsedistributionofaffection,whichagainisoften,thoughbynomeansalways,duetoawantofintellectualcultivation.Hethatattributesto anything a value greater or less than it really possesses, in the order ofthings,hasalreadyplacedhimselfinafalserelationtoit,andwillcertainly,whenhecomestoactwithreferencetoit,actimmorally.”

CHAPTERXV.

TheReligiousEmotions.

B Y “the religious emotions” is meant that class of emotional feelingarising from the faith and belief in, or consciousness of the presence of,supernatural beings, powers, entities, or forces. This form of emotion isregardedasdistinctfromtheethicalandmoralemotions,althoughfrequentlyfoundinconnectiontherewith.Likewise,itisindependentofanyspecialformof intellectualbelief, for it is farmorefundamentalandoftenexistswithoutcreed,philosophy,orstatedbelief,theonlymanifestationinsuchcasesbeinga “feeling” of the existence of supernatural beings, forces, and powers towhichmanhasarelationandtowhichheowesobedience.Tothosewhomaythink that this is toonarrowa conceptionof religious emotionwe refer thefollowingdefinitionof“religion”fromthedictionaries:“Theactsorfeelingswhichresult fromthebeliefofagod,orgods,havingsuperiorcontrolovermatter, life, or destiny. Religion is subjective, designating the feelings andactsofmenwhichrelatetoGod;theologyisobjective,denotingthesciencewhichinvestigatestheexistence,laws,andattributesofGod;”or(objectively)“theouterformandembodimentwhichtheinwardspiritofa trueorafalsedevotion assumes,” (subjectively) “the feelingofvenerationwithwhich theworshiperregardstheBeingheadores.”

Darwin,inhis“DescentofMan,”saysthatthefeelingofreligiousdevotionis a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete submission to anexalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear,reverence,gratitude,hopeforthefuture,andperhapsotherelements.Heisofthe opinion that no man can experience so complex an emotion untiladvancedinhisintellectualandmoralfacultiestoatleastamoderatelyhighlevel.TheauthoritiesgenerallyagreewithDarwin,althoughthemorerecentstudyofthehistoryofreligionhasshownthatreligiousfeelinghasafarmoreprimitiveoriginthanthatindicatedbyDarwin.

It is true that the lower animals are not deemed capable of anythingapproaching religious feeling,unless there is a feelingapproaching it in theattitudeofthedogandhorseandotherdomesticanimalstowardtheirmasters.But man, as soon as he is able to attribute natural phenomena to asupernatural cause and power, manifests a crude religious feeling andemotion. He begins by believing in, fearing, andworshiping natural forces

andobjects,suchas thesun, themoon, thewind, thunderand lightning, theocean,rivers,mountains,etc.Itisclaimedthatthereisnonaturalobjectthathas not been deified and worshiped by some people at some time in thehistory of the race.Later,man acquired the anthropomorphic conception ofdeitiesandcreatedmanygodsinhisownimage,endowingthemwithhisownattributes,qualities,andcharacteristics.Thementalcharacteristicsandmoralsof a people can always be ascertained by a knowledge of the averageconceptionofdeityheldbythem.Polytheism,orthebeliefinmanygods,wassucceededbymonotheism,orbeliefinonegod.

Monotheism ranges from the crudest conception of amanlike god to thehighest conception of a spiritual Being transcending all human qualities,attributes, or characteristics. Man began by believing in many god things,theninmanygodpersons,theninaonegod-person,theninoneGodwhoisaspirit, then in One Universal Spirit which is God. It is a far cry from thesavage,manlike god of old to the conception of theUniversal Spirit of the“God-drunkenphilosopher,”Spinoza.Theextremeof religiousbelief is thatwhichholdsthat“thereisnothingbutGod—allelseisillusion,”ofpantheisticidealism. Buddhism (at least in its original form) discarded the idea of aSupremeBeing,andheld thatUltimateReality isbutUniversalLaw; hencetheaccusationthatBuddhismisan“atheisticreligion,”althoughit isoneoftheworld’sgreatestreligions,havingover400,000,000followers.

Butthebeliefsofthereligiouspersonmaybeconsideredasresultingfromintellectualprocesses;hisreligious feelingsandemotionsarise fromanotherpartofhismentalbeing.Itisthetestimonyoftheauthoritiesofallreligionsthat religious conviction is an inner experience rather than an intellectualconception. The emotional element is always active in religiousmanifestations everywhere. The purely intellectual religion is naught but aphilosophy.Religionwithout feeling and emotion is an anomaly. In all truereligion there exists a feeling of inner assurance and faith, love, awe,dependence, submission, reverence, gratitude, hope, and perhaps fear. Theemotional element must always be present, not necessarily in the form ofemotional excess, as in the case of revival hysteria or the dance of thewhirlingdervishes,butatleastintheformofthecalm,ferventfeelingof“thatpeace which passeth understanding.” When religion departs from theemotionalphase itbecomesmerelya“schoolofphilosophy,”oran“ethicalculturesociety.”

Thestudentmustnotlosesightoftheupliftinginfluenceoftruereligiousemotionbyreasonofhisknowledgeofitslowlyorigin.Likethelotus,whichhasitsrootsintheslimy,filthymudoftheriver,anditssteminthemuddy,stagnant,andfoulwatersthereof,butitsbeautifulflowerunfoldedintheclear

airandfacingthesun,soisreligiousfeelingresponsibleforsomeofthemostbeautifulandupliftingidealsandactionsoftherace.Ifitsoriginandhistorycontainmuchthatisnotconsistentwiththehighestidealsoftheraceto-day,itisnotthefaultofreligionbutoftheraceitself.Religion, likeallelseintheuniversal manifestation, is under the laws of evolution, growth, anddevelopment.What thereligionof thefuturemaybe,weknownot.But theprophetsof the racearedreamingvisionsofa religionasmuchhigher thanthatofto-dayasthelatterishigherthanthecrudefetichismofthesavage.

The following quotation from John Fiske’s “Through Nature to God” isappropriate in this place. Fiske says: “My aim is to show that ‘that otherinfluence,’ that inward conviction, the craving for a final cause, the theisticassumption, is itself one of the master facts of the universe, and as muchentitled to respect as any fact in physical nature can possibly be. Theargument flashed upon me about ten years ago while reading HerbertSpencer’s controversy with Frederic Harrison concerning the nature andreality of religion. Because Spencer derived historically the greater part ofmodern belief in an Unseen World from the savage’s primeval world ofdreams and ghosts, some of his critics maintained that logical consistencyrequiredhimtodismissthemodernbeliefasutterlyfalse;otherwisehewouldbeguiltyof seeking to evolve truth from falsehood. ‘Bynomeans,’ repliedSpencer.‘Contrariwise,theultimateformofthereligiousconsciousnessisthefinaldevelopmentofaconsciousnesswhichattheoutsetcontainedagermoftruthobscuredbymultitudinouserrors.’”Fiske,inthisconnection,quotestheTennysonianquestion:—

“‘Whoforgedthatotherinfluence,

Thatheatofinwardevidence,

Bywhichhedoubtsagainstthesense?’”

The religious emotionsmaybedevelopedbyallowing themind todwellupon the Power underlying the universe of fleeting, changing forms; byreadingproseandpoetryinwhichanappealismadetothereligiousinstinct;bylisteningtomusicwhichawakenstheemotionofreverenceandawe;and,finally,bymeditatingupontheinnerspiritimmanentineverylivingbeing.AsanoldHindusageoncesaid:“TherearemanypathsbywhichmenarriveataknowledgeofthepresenceofGod,butthereisbutonegoalanddestination.”

CHAPTERXVI.

TheAestheticEmotions.

B Y“theæsthetic emotions” ismeant thoseemotional feelingswhichareconcernedwiththeperceptionofbeautyortaste,andbyreasonofwhichwe“like”or“dislike”certainperceptionsofsensoryimpressions.Inordertogetacleareridea,letusconsiderwhatismeantby“beauty”and“taste.”

“Beauty”isdefinedas“thatqualityorassemblageofqualitiesinanobjectwhich gives the eye or the ear intense pleasure; or that characteristic in anobjectwhichgratifiestheintellectormoralfeeling.”“Taste”(inthissenseofthe term) is defined as “nice perception, or the power of perceiving andrelishing excellence in human performances; the power of appreciating thefiner qualities of art; the faculty of discerning beauty, order, congruity,proportion, symmetry,orwhateverconstitutesexcellence,particularly in thefineartsorliterature;thefacultyofthemindbywhichwebothperceiveandenjoywhatever is beautiful or sublime in theworks of nature and art. Thepossessionoftasteinsuresgraceandbeautyintheworksofanartist,andtheavoidanceofallthatislowormean.Itisasoftentheresultofaninnatesenseofbeautyorproprietyasofarteducation,andnogeniuscancompensateforthewantofit.***Tastesdiffersomuchamongindividuals,nations,orindifferentagesandconditionsofcivilizationthatitisutterlyimpossibletosetupastandardoftasteapplicabletoallmenandtoallstagesintheevolutionofsociety.”

Theæstheticsense,feeling,andemotionareproductsofthelaterstagesoftheevolutionof themindofman.Their roots,however,maybeseen in thecrude attempts at decoration and adornment in the savage, and still furtherback in the tendency of certain birds to adorn their nests or “bowers.”Moreover, somesenseofbeautymustexist in the loweranimals,whichareinfluenced thereby in theselectionof theirmates, thebrightplumageof thebirds, and the coloring of the insects and higher animals evidencing theexistenceofatleastaprimitiveæstheticsense.HerbertSpencersaysthatonecharacteristic of the æsthetic feelings is that they are separated from thefunctionsvitallyrequisiteandnecessarytosustainlife,anditisnotuntilthelatterarereasonablywellsatisfiedthattheformerbegintomanifestinforce.

Theauthoritiesholdthatthebasicelementconcernedinthemanifestationoftheæstheticemotionalfeelingisthesensoryelement,whichconsistsofthe

pleasurearisingfromtheperceptionofobjectsofvisionorhearingwhicharedeemed beautiful. There is a certain nervous satisfactionwhich arises fromthe perception of the sensation of the sight of a beautiful thing, or of thehearingofbeautifulsound.Justwhycertainsightsproveagreeableandothersdisagreeable, or certain sounds pleasant and others unpleasant, is verydifficulttodetermine.Associationandhabitmayhavesomethingtodowiththebeautyofsightobject,andtheremaybenaturalharmonyofvibrationincolors as there is in sound. In the case of sounds there is undoubtedly anatural harmony between the vibrations of certain notes of the scale andinharmonybetweenothers.Somehaveheldthat thesecretof theenjoymentofmusicisfoundinthenaturalappreciationofrhythm,asrhythmisacosmicmanifestationevidentineverythingfromgreattosmall.Butthesetheoriesdonotaccountforthedifferencesexistinginthetastesregardingcolorandmusicmanifestedbydifferentindividuals,races,andclassesofpeople.

Grant Allen says: “The vulgar are pleased with great masses of color,especially red, orange, and purple, which give their coarse, nervousorganization the requisite stimulus.The refined,withnerves of less caliber,but greater discriminativeness, require delicate combinations ofcomplementaries and prefer neutral tints to the glare of the primary hues.Children and savages love to dress in all the colors of the rainbow.” In thesamewaypersonsof certain typesof taste arepleasedwith “rag time” andcheap, rollicking songs or dances, while others shudder at these and finddelightintheclassicproductionsofthegreatcomposers.

There is also the intellectual element tobe reckonedwith in theæstheticemotions.Theintellectmustdiscoverthebeautyincertainobjectsbeforetheemotion is aroused by the perception. Halleck says: “Every time the minddiscerns unity amid variety, order, rhythm, proportion, or symmetry, anæstheticemotionarises.***Thetravelerwithatrainedintellectwillseefarmorebeautythananignorantone.Inlookingatacathedral,alargepartoftheæsthetic enjoyment comes from tracing out the symmetry, from comparingpartwithpart.Notuntil this process is completewill the full beautyof thestructure as a whole be perceived. If the traveler knows something ofmediæval architecture before starting on his European trip, he will see farmore beauty. The opposite of the æsthetic, which we call the ugly, is theunsymmetrical, the disorderly—that in which we can discover no rhythm,plan,orbeauty.”

Theelementofassociativesuggestionalsoentersintothemanifestationofæstheticemotionalfeeling.Themindacceptsthesuggestionofthebeautyofcertainstylesofart,or theexcellenceofcertainclassesofmusic.Therearefashionsinartandmusic,asinclothes,andwhatisthoughtbeautifulto-day

maybedeemedhideousto-morrow.Thisisnotentirelyduetotheevolutionof taste, for inmany cases the old fashions are revived and again deemedbeautiful. There is, moreover, the effect of the association of the object ofemotion with certain events or persons. This association renders the thingpopular, and therefore agreeable and beautiful for the time being. Thesuggestion in a storywill often cause the beauty of a certain scene, or theharmony of a certain piece of music, to dawn upon thousands of persons.Somenotedpersonsetsthesealofapprovaluponacertainpictureormusicalcompositionandlo!themultitudecallsitbeautiful.Itmustnotbesupposed,however, that the crowd always counterfeits this sense of beauty andexcellencewhichhasbeensuggestedtoit.Onthecontrary,genuineæstheticfeelingoftenresultsfromthediscoverysomade.

There is style and fashion in the use of words, resulting from fashion,which gives rise toæsthetic feelings regarding them.These feelings do notarisefromtheconsiderationofthenatureoftheobjectexpressedbytheword;oftwowordsdesignatingthesamething,onecausesdisgustandtheotheratleast passive tolerance. For instance, in speaking of the sensible moisturewhich is emitted from the pores of the skin, we may use either of therespective terms “sweat” or “perspiration.” Bothmean the same thing, andhave an equally respectable origin. But tomany persons the word “sweat”causesunpleasantæstheticemotion,whiletheword“perspiration”isacceptedwithout remonstrance. Some persons abhor the term “victuals,” while“viands”or“food”areacceptedwithoutprotest.Thereisoftenanunpleasant,low, vulgar association connectedwith somewordswhich accounts for thedisfavorwithwhichtheyarereceived,andwhichassociationisabsentfromthemore “polite” terms employed to indicate the same thing. But in othercases there is nothing but the simple suggestion of fashion and style toaccountfortheæstheticacceptanceorrejection.

Itispossiblethatsomepsychologistofthefuturewillestablishthetruthofthetheorynowtentativelyadvancedbyafewinvestigators,namely,thattasteand the sense of beauty depend almost entirely upon the element ofsuggestion,manifested as association, influence of authority, habit, fashion,imitation, etc. It is known that the emotional nature is peculiarly liable tosuggestion, and that tastes may be created or destroyed by repeatedsuggestionunderthemostfavorablecircumstances.Itisthoughtlikelythatifwe could trace back to its roots every emotion of taste, we would find itarising from some associative, suggestive influence connectedwith anotherandmoreelementalclassofemotions.

Regarding the fact that there is no universal standard of taste or beauty,Hallecksays:“Ithasbeensaidthatæstheticscannotbetreatedinascientific

waybecausethereisnostandardoftaste.‘Degustibusnonestdisputandum‘(‘there is no disputing about tastes’) is an old proverb. Of two equallyintelligentpersons,theonemaylikeacertainbook,theotherdislikeit.***Whileitistruethatthestandardoftasteisavaryingonewithincertainlimits,itisnomoresothanthatofmorals.Asmen’snervoussystems,education,andassociationsdiffer,wemayscientificallyconcludethattheirtastesmustdiffer.Thegreatertheuniformityinthefactorsthelessdoestheproductvary.Ontheother hand, within certain limits, the standard of æsthetics is relativelyuniform. It is fixed by the majority of intelligent people of any age andcountry. To estimate the standard by which to judge of the correctness oflanguageoroftheliterarytasteofanyera,weexaminetheconversationsofthebestspeakers,theworksofthestandardwriters.”

Theæsthetic emotionsmay be developed and cultivated by exercise andpractice,andparticularlybyassociationandfamiliaritywithbeautifulthings,andwiththosewhohave“goodtaste.”Appreciationofbeautyismoreorlesscontagious,uptoacertainpointofdevelopment,atleast,andifonewishestorecognize,understand,andappreciatebeauty,heshouldgowherebeauty is,andwhere its votaries are gathered. The study of standardworks of art, orobjectsofnature,orthebestproductionsofthecomposersofmusic,willdomuchtodevelopandunfoldone’shigheræstheticfeelingsandunderstanding.

It isclaimedbysomeof thebestauthorities that todevelop thefinerandhigheræstheticfeelingsandunderstandingwemustlearntofindbeautyandexcellence in things removed from ourselves or our selfish interests. Thenarrow, selfish emotions kill the æsthetic feelings—the two cannot existtogether.Thepersonwhosethoughtsarecenteredonhimselforherselfveryrarelyfindsbeautyorexcellence inworksofartormusic.GrantAllenwellsums up the subject in the followingwords: “Good taste is the progressiveproduct of progressing fineness and discrimination in the nerves, educatedattention,highandnobleemotionalconstitution,and increasing intellectualfaculties.”

CHAPTERXVII.

TheIntellectualEmotions.

B Y “the intellectual emotions” is meant that class of emotional feelingresulting from the presence of objects of intellectual interest. This class ofemotions depends for its satisfaction upon the exercise of the intellectualfaculties, from the most simple to the most complex, and includingperception, memory, imagination, reason, judgment, and all the logicalfaculties. Those who are accustomed to employing the mind throughvoluntary attention, particularly in the direction of creative ideation orconstructive imagination, experience these emotions to a greater or lessdegree.

Theexerciseofperception,ifweareskilledtherein,givesusapleasurablefeeling,andifwesucceedinmakinganinterestingorimportantdiscoverybyreason thereof, we experience a strong degree of emotional satisfaction.Likewise,we experience agreeable feelingswhenwe are able to rememberdistinctly something which might well have been forgotten, or when wesucceed in recalling something which had escaped our memory for themoment.Inthesamewaytheexerciseoftheimaginationisasourceofgreatpleasure in many cases in the direction of writing, planning, inventing, orothercreativeprocesses,oreveninthebuildingofaircastles.Theexerciseofthelogicalfacultiesgivesgreatpleasuretothoseinwhomthesefacultiesarewelldeveloped.

Halleckwellsays:“TherewasprobablynotahappiermomentinNewton’slifethanwhenhehadsucceededindemonstratingthatthesamepowerwhichcaused theapple tofallheld themoonandtheplanets in theirorbits.WhenWatts discovered that steam might be harnessed like a horse, when aninventor succeeds in perfecting a labor-lightening device, whenever anobscurity is cleared away, the reason for a thing understood, and a bafflinginstancebroughtunderagenerallaw,intellectualemotionresults.”

Thepleasurablefeelingsweexperienceuponthereadingofagoodbook,orthediscoveryofrealpoetry,areformsofintellectualemotion.Thesameclassofemotional feeling isarousedwhenwewitnessagoodplay.Amongotherinstancesofthisclasswementiontheperceptionofcleverworkofanykind,intricatemachinery,ingeniousdevices,helpfulimprovements,orotherworksofmanwhich indicate the existence of thought and inventive ability in the

designerorbuilder.Toappreciatementalworkof thiskindwemustbringamind developed along the same or similar lines. It haswell been said thatbeforeonecantakeawayanythingfromabookhemustbringsomethingtoit.It takes mentality to recognize and appreciate mentality or the work ofmentality.

Thestudyofscientificsubjects isasourceofgreatpleasuretothosewhoare inclined to such pursuits. To the scientificmind the study of the latestwork on the favorite branch gives a joy which nothing else is capable ofarousing. To the philosopher the works of other philosophers of the sameschoolgiveintensesatisfaction.

Itisclaimedthatthesenseofhumorandwitisanintellectualemotion,foritdependsuponthedetectionoftheludicrousfeaturesofahappening.Certainpsychologists haveheld that thedistinctive elementof humor is the feelingattendantupontheperceptionofincongruity;whilethatofwitisthefeelingofsuperiorityonthepartofthewittyperson,andthecorrespondingchagrinoftheobjectofhiswit.Itwouldseem,however,thattheappreciationofwitmustdependupontheintellectualperceptionofclevernessofexpressionandthe pleasure resulting from the discovery thereof, and that the feeling ofhumor is aroused principally by reason of the incongruous element; thefeeling of self-satisfaction as contrasted with the discomfiture of the otherpersonbelongstothemoreselfishemotions.Anauthoritysays:“Humorisamental faculty which tends to discover incongruous resemblances betweenthings which essentially differ, or essential differences between things putforth as the same, the result being internalmirthor anoutburst of laughter.Wit does so likewise, but the two are different. Humor has deep humansympathy,andlovesmenwhileraisingalaughagainsttheirweaknesses.Witisdeficient insympathy,and there isoftenasting in its ridicule.Somewhatcontemptuousofmankind, ithasnot thepatience tostudy themthoroughly,but must content itself with noting superficial resemblances or differences.Humor is patient and keenly observant, and penetrates beneath the surface;while, therefore, the sallies of wit are often one-sided and unfair, those ofhumorare,asarule,justandwise.”

The development and cultivation of the intellectual emotions depend, ofcourse,uponeducation,training,exercise,andpractice.Thecultivationoftheintellect (which has been referred to, in part, in the previous parts of thisbook, and which will be again considered in the chapters devoted to theintellect) results in the development and cultivation of the emotionsaccompanying intellectual effort. In ageneralway,however, itmaybe saidthat the reading of the best works of fiction, science, and philosophy willbring out in time the best form of intellectual enjoyment and feeling. The

highest gives the best—that is the rule.The present chapter should be readandstudiedinconnectionwiththosedevotedtotheintellect.

BLENDEDEMOTIONS.

Aswehavesaidatthebeginningofourconsiderationofthesubjectoftheemotions,themajorityofemotionsarecomposedofseveralfeelings,andtendtoblendandcombineemotionalelements.Forinstance,theemotionofsexuallove certainly has its origin in the instinctive feelings of the race, and itsmotiveelementisthatofpassion.Butpassionisfarfrombeingallthereisinhumansexuallove.Abovetheplaneofpassionisfoundthesocialemotionofcompanionship,protection, andcare; thedesire for thewelfareof the lovedone;theminglingoftheloveoftheparentwiththatofthemate.Humanlovemanifestsmanyofthealtruisticemotionsduringitscourse.Thewelfareoftheloved one becomes the chief concern of life, often stronger even than self-preservation. The joy of the loved one becomes the greatest joy, farsurpassing the more selfish forms of happiness. Then come the æstheticfeelings,whichfindsatisfactioninthetwo“likingthesamethings,”sympathyandcommunityoffeelingbeingtheconnectinglink.Theseveralidealsofthetwo combining, there is produced an idealistic union,which is often called“spiritual harmony.” Finally, there is found the blending of the intellectualemotions,inwhichharmonythereexistsoneofthehighestformsofpleasuresatisfaction between two persons of opposite sexes. It is said that themorethings that a man and woman “like” in common, the closer will be their“liking”foreachother.“IloveyoubecauseyoulovethethingsIlove,”isnorarethoughtandexpression.

So it is seen that though born in elemental instinct and passion, humansexualloveissomethingfardifferentinitsflowering.Andyetwithoutitsrootitwouldnotbe,andcannotbe.Thisisanexcellentexampleofthecomplexnatureofthemostcommonemotions.Itmaybeusedasatypicalillustration.Whatistrueofitisalsotrue,inawayandinadegree,ofeveryotherformofemotion.Thereforeinstudyingaparticularemotion,benottooquicktocry,“Itisthis;itisthat!”butratherseektosay,“Itiscomposedofthisandthat,ofthis and that!” Few, if any, emotions are simple; the majority are verycomplex.Hencethedifficultyofsatisfactoryclassification,andthedangerofdogmaticdefinition.

CHAPTERXVIII.

TheRoleoftheEmotions.

T HE average person greatly underestimates the part played by theemotionalnature in thementalactivitiesof the individual.He is inclined totheopinionthat,withtheexceptionof theoccasionalmanifestationofsomestrongemotional feeling, themajorityofpersonsgo through lifeusingonlythe reasoning and reflective faculties in deciding the problems of life andguiding the mental course of action. There can be no greater mistakeconcerning the mental activities. So far from being subordinate to theintellect, the emotional nature in the majority of cases dominates thereasoning faculties. There are but very few personswho are able to detachthemselves,eveninasmalldegree,fromthefeelings,andtodecidequestionscold-bloodedlybypurereasonor intellectualeffort.Moreover, therearebutfewpersonswhosewills areguidedbypure reason; the feelings supply themotive for the majority of acts of will. The intellect, even when used, isgenerallyemployedtobettercarryoutthedictatesoffeelinganddesire.Muchofourreasoningisperformedinordertojustifyourfeelings,ortofindproofsfor the position dictated by our desires, feelings, sympathies, prejudices, orsentiments.Ithasbeensaidthat“menseeknotreasonsbutexcusesfortheiractions.”

Moreover,intheelementaryprocessesoftheintellecttheemotionsplayanimportant part. We have seen that attention largely follows interest, andinterest results from feeling. Therefore our attention, and that which arisesfromit,isdependentlargelyuponthefeelings.Thusfeelingassertsitspowerin guarding the very outer gate of knowledge, and determines largelywhatshallorshallnotentertherein.Itisoneoftheconstantly-appearingparadoxesofpsychology, thatwhilefeelingshaveoriginallyarisenfromattention, it isequallytruethatattentiondependslargelyupontheinterestresultingfromthefeelings.This is readilyadmitted in thecaseof involuntaryattention,whichalwaysgoesouttowardobjectsofinterestandfeeling,butislikewisetrueofeven voluntary attention, which we direct to something of greater or morenearlyultimateinterestthanthethingsoflesserormoreimmediateinterest.

Sully says: “By an act of will I may resolve to turn my attention tosomething—sayapassageinabook.Butif,afterthepreliminaryprocessofadjustmentofthementaleyetheobjectopensupnointerestingphase,allthe

willing in theworldwill not produce a calm, settled state of concentration.Thewill introducesmindandobject; itcannot forceanattachmentbetweenthem.No compulsion of attention ever succeeded inmaking a young childcordiallyembraceandappropriate,byanactofconcentration,anunsuitableandthereforeuninterestingobject.Wethusseethatevenvoluntaryinterestisnotremovedfromtheswayofinterest.Whatthewilldoesistodeterminethekindofinterestthatshallprevailatthemoment.”

Again, we may see that memory is largely dependent upon interest inrecordingandrecallingitsimpressions.Werememberandrecallmosteasilythatwhichmostgreatlyinterestsus.Inproportiontothelackofinterestinathingdowefinddifficultyinrememberingorrecallingit.Thisisequallytrueoftheimagination,foritrefusestodwelluponthatwhichisnot interesting.Even in the reasoning processes we find the will balking at uninterestingsubjects,butgallopingalong,pushingbeforeittherollingchairofinterestingintellectualapplication.

Ourjudgmentsareaffectedbyourfeelings.Itismucheasiertoapproveoftheactionsofsomepersonwelike,orwhoseviewsaccordwithourown,thanofanindividualwhosepersonalityandviewsaredistasteful tous.It isverydifficulttopreventprejudice,fororagainst,frominfluencingourjudgments.Itisalsotruethatwe“findthatforwhichwelook”inthingsandpersons,andthatwhichweexpectandlookforisoftendependentuponourfeelings.Ifwedislikeapersonorthingweareusuallyabletoperceivenoendofundesirablethings in himor it;while ifwe are favorably inclinedwe easily findmanyadmirablequalitiesinthesamepersonorthing.Alittlechangeinourfeelingoftenresultsintheformationofanentirelynewsetofjudgmentsregardingapersonorthing.

Halleck well says: “On the one hand the emotions are favorable tointellectualaction,sincetheysupplytheinterestonefeelsinstudy.Onemayfeelintenselyconcerningacertainsubjectandbeallthebetterstudent.Hencetheemotionsarenot,aswasformerlythought,entirelyhostiletointellectualaction.Emotionoftenquickenstheperception,burnsthingsindeliblyintothememory, and doubles the rapidity of thought. On the other hand strongfeelings often vitiate every operation of the intellect. They cause us to seeonlywhatwewishto,torememberonlywhatinterestsournarrowfeelingatthe time, and to reason from selfish data only. * * * Emotion puts themagnifying end of the telescope to our intellectual eyes where our owninterests are concerned, the minimizing end when we are looking at theinterest of others. * * * Thought is deflected when it passes through anemotionalmedium,justasasunbeamiswhenitstrikeswater.”

As for the will, the best authorities hold that it is almost if not entirely

dependent upon desire for its motive force. As desire is an outgrowth anddevelopment of feeling and emotion, it is seen that even the will dependsuponfeelingforitsincitingmotivesanditsdirection.Weshallconsiderthispointatgreaterdetailinthechaptersdevotedtotheactivitiesofthewill.

Wewouldremindyouagain,atthispoint,ofthegreattriangleofthemind,the emotional, ideative, and volitional activities—feeling, thinking, andwilling—and their constant reaction upon each other and absoluteinterdependence.We find that our feelings arise from previouswilling andideation,andarearousedbyideasandrepressedbywill;againweseethatourideas are largely dependent upon the interest supplied by our feelings, andthatourjudgmentsareinfluencedbytheemotivesideofourmentallife,thewill also having its part to play in thematter.We also see that the will iscalled into activity by the feelings, and often guided or restrained by ourthoughts,thewill,indeed,beingconsideredasmovedentirelybyourfeelingsandideas.Thusisthetrinityofmentalforcesseeneverinmutualrelation—constantactionandreactioneverexistingbetweenthem.

CHAPTERXIX.

TheEmotionsandHappiness.

“H APPINESS” has been defined by an authority as “the pleasurableemotionarisingfromthegratificationofalldesires;theenjoymentofpleasurewithout pain.” Another has said that “happiness is the state in which alldesiresaresatisfied.”But thesedefinitionshavebeenattacked. It isheldbymany that a state of the absolute satisfaction of desire would not behappiness, for happiness consists largely in pleasurable anticipation andimaginingswhichdisappearupontherealizationofthedesire.It isheldthatabsolutesatisfactionwouldbeanegativestate.Paleyexpressedabetterideawhenhesaid that“anyconditionmaybedenominated‘happy’ inwhich theamount or aggregate of pleasure exceeds that of pain, and the degree ofhappinessdependsuponthequantityofthisexcess.”

Some have held that an existing contrast between pain and pleasure (thebalance being in favor of the latter) is necessary to establish happiness.Bethis as it may, it is admitted by all that one’s happiness or unhappinessdepends entirely upon one’s emotional nature and the degree of thesatisfactionthereof.Anditisgenerallyadmittedthattobehappyisthegreataimandobjectofthelifeofthemajorityofpersons,—if,indeed,notofeveryperson,—thehappiness,ofcourse,dependinguponthequalityanddegreeoftheemotions forming theperson’semotionalnature.Thus it is seen thatwearedependentupontheemotionalsideofourmentallifeinthisasinnearlyeverythingelsemakinglifeworthwhile.

Theologianshaveoftensoughttopointoutthathappinessisnotthegoaloflife and living, but human nature has always insisted that happiness is thegreatest end, andphilosophyhas generally supported it.Butwisdom showsthathappinessisnotalwaysdependentuponthepleasureofthemoment,forthe sacrifice of immediate pleasure frequently results in a much greaterhappinessinthefuture.Inthesamewayanimmediatedisagreeabletaskoftengains for us a greater satisfaction in the future. Likewise, it is frequentlygreaterhappinesstosacrificeapersonalpleasureforthehappinessofothersthan itwouldbe to enjoy thepleasureof themoment at theexpenseof thepain of the other. There is often a far greater pleasure resulting from analtruistic action of self-sacrifice than in the performance of the selfish,egoisticact.But,asthesubtlereasonermayinsist,theresultisthesame—the

ultimatehappinessandsatisfactionof theself.Thisconclusiondoesnotrobthealtruisticactof itsvirtue,however,for thepersonwhofindshisgreatestpleasure in giving pleasure to others is to be congratulated—as is thecommunitywhichsheltershim.

There isnovirtue inpain,suffering,sacrifice,orunhappiness for itsownsake.Thisillusionofasceticismisvanishingfromthehumanmind.Sacrificeon the part of the individual is valuable and valid only when it results inhigherpresentorfuturehappinessfortheindividualorsomeoneelse.Thereisnovirtueinpain,physicalormental,exceptasasteptoagreatergoodforourselvesorothers.Painatthebestismerelynature’salarmandwarningof“not this way.” It is also held that pain serves to bring out pleasure bycontrast, and is thereforevaluable in thisway.Be thisas itmay,nonormalindividual deliberately seeks ultimate pain in preference to ultimatehappiness;thegreatestultimatehappinesstoone’sselfandtothosehelovesisthenormalandnaturalgoalofthenormalperson.Buttheconceptof“thoseheloves,”inmanycases,includestheraceaswellastheimmediatefamily.

Wisdomshowstheindividualthatthegreatesthappinesscomestohimwhocontrols and restrainsmany of his feelings. Dissipation results in pain andunhappiness ultimately. The doctrine of thoughtless indulgence isunphilosophicalandiscontradictedbytheexperienceoftherace.Moreover,wisdomshows that thehighesthappinesscomesnot fromthe indulgenceofthe physical feelings alone, or to excess, but rather from the cultivation,development, andmanifestationof thehigher feelings—the social,æsthetic,and intellectualemotions.Thehigherpleasuresof life, literature,art,music,science, invention, constructive imagination, etc., yield a satisfaction andhappiness keener andmore enduring than can possibly the lower forms offeeling. But the human being must not despise any part of his emotionalbeing.Everythinghasitsuses,whicharegood;anditsabuses,whicharebad.Everypartofone’sbeing,mentalandphysical,iswelltouse;butnopartiswellusedifitusestheindividualinsteadofbeingitselfused.

A recent writer has held that the end and aim of life should not be thepursuitofhappiness,butratherthebuildingofcharacter.Theobviousansweristhatthetwoareidenticalinspirit,fortothemanwhoappreciatesthevalueofcharacter, its attainment is thegreatesthappiness; thewise teach that thegreatest happiness comes to him who is possessed of a well-rounded,developedcharacter.Anotherwriterhas said that“theaimof life shouldbeself-improvement, with a due regard to the interest of others.” This is butsayingthatthegreatesthappinesstothewisemanliesinthiscourse.Anyonewhoiswiseenough,orgreatenough,tomaketheseendstheaimandgoaloflifewillfindthegreatesthappinesstherefrom.ArnoldBennettadvancesasa

good working philosophy of life: “cheerfulness, kindliness, and rectitude.”Cananyonedoubtthatthiscoursewouldbringgreatultimatehappiness?

Happiness consists in that which “contents the spirit,” and the latterdependsentirelyuponthecharacterofthefeelingsandemotionsentertainedbyone,asweighedinthebalanceofreason,andaspasseduponbyjudgmentandthesenseofrightaction.Thegreatestdegreeofhappiness,oratleastthegreatest ratio of pleasure over pain, is obtained by a careful and intelligentcultivationofthefeelingsideofone’sbeinginconnectionwiththecultivationoftheintellectandthemasteryofthewill.Tobeabletobringthecapacityforenjoyment to its highest; to be able to intelligently choose that which willbring the greatest ultimate happiness in accordance with right action; and,finally,tobeabletousethewillinthedirectionofholdingfasttothatwhichis good and rejecting that which is bad—this is the power of creatinghappiness.Thefeelings,theintellect,andthewill—here,asever—combinetomanifesttheresult.

Finally,itmustberememberedthatallhumanhappinessconsistsinpartoftheabilitytobearpain—tosuffer.TheremustbethedashofStoicisminthewise Epicurean. One must learn to pluck from pain, suffering, andunhappiness the secret drop of honey which lies at its heart, and whichconsists in the knowledge of the meaning and use of pain and the meanswhereby itmay be transmuted into knowledge and experience, fromwhichlaterhappinessmaybedistilled.Toprofitbypain,totransmutesufferingintojoy,totransformpresentunhappinessintoafuturegreaterhappiness—thisistheprivilegeofthephilosopher.

Thementalstatesandactivitiesknownas“desire”areadirectdevelopmentofthefeelingandemotionalphaseofthemindandformthemotivepowerofthewill.Desire, infact,maybesaid tobecomposedoffeelingononesideandwillontheother.Buttheinfluenceoftheintellectorreasoningfacultieshasamostimportantparttoplayintheevolutionoffeelingintodesire,andinthe consequent action of the will by the presentation and weighing ofconflicting desires. Therefore, the logical place for the consideration of theactivities of the intellect is at this point—between emotion and will.Accordingly,weshallleavethesubjectoffeelingandemotionforthepresent,tobe takenupagain inconnectionwith thesubjectofdesire,afterwehaveconsideredtheintellectualprocessesofthemind.But,ashasbeenindicated,weshallseethepresenceandinfluenceofthefeelingsandemotionsevenintheactivitiesoftheintellect.

CHAPTERXX.

TheIntellect.

T HEclassofmentalstatesorprocessesgroupedtogetherunderthenameof “intellectual processes,” forms the second great division of the mentalstates,thetwoothersbeing“feeling”and“will,”respectively.

“Intellect”hasbeendefinedasfollows:“Thepartorfacultyofthehumanmindbywhichitknows,asdistinguishedfromthepowertofeelandtowill;the thinking faculty; the understanding;” also as “that faculty of the humanmindbywhich it receivesorcomprehends the ideascommunicated to itbythesensesortheperception,orothermeans,asdistinguishedfromthepowertofeelandtowill;thepowerorfacultytoperceiveobjectsintheirrelations;the power to judge and comprehend; also the capacity for higher forms ofknowledge,asdistinguishedfromthepowertoperceiveandimagine.”

In the preceding chapters we have seen that the individual is able toexperiencesensations inconsciousness,and thathe isable toperceive themmentally, the latter being the first step in intellectual activity.Wehave alsoseen that he is able to reproduce the perception bymeans of memory andimagination, and that by means of the latter he is able to re-combine andrearrange theobjectsofperception.Wehavealso seen thathehaswhatareknownas“feelings,”whichdependuponhispreviousexperienceandthatofhis progenitors. So far themind has been consideredmerely as a receivingand reproducing instrument,with theaddedattachmentof the re-combiningpoweroftheimagination.Uptothispointthemindmaybecomparedtothephonographic cylinder, with an attachment capable of re-combining itsrecordedimpressions.Theimpressionsarereceivedandperceived,arestoredaway,arereproduced,andbytheuseoftheimaginationarere-combined.

Up to this point the mind is seen to be more or less of an automatic,instinctive faculty. It may be traced from the purely reflex activity of thelowestformsoflifeupthroughtheloweranimals,stepbystep,untilaveryhighdegreeofmentalpower isperceived inanimals like thehorse,dog,orelephant.Butthereissomethinglacking.Thereismissingthatpeculiarpowerof thinking in symbols and abstract conceptions which distinguishes thehuman race andwhich is closely bound upwith the faculty of language orexpressingthoughtsinwords.Thecomparativelyhighmentalprocessoftheloweranimalsisdwarfedbythehumanfacultyof“thinking.”Andthinkingis

themanifestationoftheintellect.

What is it to think? Strange to say, very few persons can answer thisquestioncorrectlyatfirst.Theyfindthemselvesinclinedtoanswertheinquiryin thewordsof the child: “Why, to think is to think!”Letus see ifwecanmakeitplain.Thedictionarydefinitionisalittletootechnicaltobeofmuchusetothebeginner,buthereitis:“Toemployanyoftheintellectualpowersexcept that of simple perception through the senses.” But what are the“intellectualpowers”soemployed,andhowaretheyemployed?Letussee.

Statingthematterplainlyincommonterms,wemaysaythat“thinking”isthementalprocessof(1)comparingourperceptionsofthingswitheachother,notingthepointsoflikenessandofdifference;(2)classifyingthemaccordingto the ascertained likeness or difference, and thus tying them up inmentalbundleswitheachsetof“thingsofakind”initsownbundle;(3)formingtheabstract,symbolicmentalidea(concept)ofeachclassofthings,sogrouped,whichwemayafterwarduseasweusefiguresinmathematicalcalculations;(4)usingtheseconceptsinordertoforminferences,thatis,toreasonfromtheknown to the unknown, and to form judgments regarding things; (5)comparing these judgments anddeducinghigher judgments from them; andsoon.

Withoutthinking,manwouldbedependentuponeachparticularexperiencefor his knowledge, except so far as memory and imagination couldinstinctively aid him. By thought processes he is enabled to infer that ifcertainthingsbetrueofoneofacertainkindofthings,thesamethingmaybeexpected from others of the same class. As he is able to note points oflikeness or difference, he is able to form clearer and truer inferences. Inaddition,heisabletoapplyhisconstructiveimaginationtotherearrangementand recombination of things whose nature he has discovered, and thusprogressalong the lineofmaterial achievementaswell asofknowledge. Itmust be remembered, however, that the intellect depends entirely for itsmaterialupontheperception,whichinturnreceivesitsrawmaterialfromthesenses.Theintellectmerelygroupstogetherthematerialofperception,makesinferences,drawsconclusions from,and formsconclusions regarding, them,and in the case of constructive imagination recombines them in effectiveforms and arrangement. The intellect is the last in order in the course ofmentalevolution.Itappearslastinorderinthemindofthechild,butitoftenpersistsinoldageafterthefeelingshavegrowndimandthememoryweak.

CONCEPTS.

Whatisknownasthe“concept”isthefirstfruitoftheelementalprocesses

ofthought.Thevariousimagesofoutsideobjectsaresensed,thenperceived,andthengroupedaccordingtotheirlikenessesanddifferences,andtheresultistheproductionofconcepts.Itisdifficulttodefineaconceptsoastoconveyanymeaningtothebeginner.Forinstance,thedictionariesgivethedefinitionas“anabstract,generalconception,idea,ornotionformedinthemind.”Notveryclear this, is it?Perhapswecanunderstand it better ifwe say that thetermsdog,cat,man,horse,house,etc.,eachexpressesaconcept.Everytermexpressesaconcept;everygeneralnameofathingorqualityisatermappliedtotheconcept.Weshallseethisalittleclearerasweproceed.

We forma concept in thisway: (1)Weperceive a number of things; (2)then we notice certain qualities possessed by things—certain properties,attributes, or characteristics which make the thing what it is; (3) then wecomparethesequalitiesofthethingwiththequalitiesofotherthingsandseethatthereisalikenessinsomecases,invariousdegrees,andadifferenceinother cases, in various degrees; (4) then we generalize or classify theperceivedthingsaccordingtotheirascertainedlikenessesanddifferences;(5)thenweformageneralideaorconceptembodyingeachclassofthing;and,finally,wegivetotheconceptaterm,orname,whichisitssymbol.

Theconceptisageneralideaofaclassofthings;thetermistheexpressionofthatgeneral idea.Theconcept is theideaofaclassof things; thetermisthelabelaffixedtothething.Toillustratethislastdistinction,letustaketheconcept and term of “bird,” for instance. By perception, comparison, andclassification of the qualities of living things we have arrived at theconclusionthatthereexistsagreatgeneralclassthequalitiesofwhichmaybestated thus: “Warm-blooded, feathered, winged, oviparous, vertebrate.” Tothis general class of quality-possessing animals we apply the English term“bird.”Thenameismerelyasymbol.InGermanthetermisvogel;inLatin,avis;butineachandeverycasethegeneralideaorconceptabovestated,i.e.,“warm-blooded, feathered, winged, oviparous, vertebrate,” is meant. Ifanything is found having all of those particular qualities, then we know itmustbewhatwecalla“bird.”Andeverythingthatwecalla“bird”musthavethosequalities.Theterm“bird”isthesymbolforthatparticularcombinationofqualitiesexistinginathing.

There is a difference between a mental image of the imagination and aconcept.Themental imagemust alwaysbeof aparticular thing,while theconceptisalwaysanideaofageneralclassofthingswhichcannotbeclearlypictured in the mind. For instance, the imagination may form the mentalpictureofanyknownbird,orevenofanimaginarybird,butthatbirdalwayswillbeadistinct,particularbird.Trytoformamentalpictureofthegeneralclassofbirds—howwillyoudoit?Doyourealizethedifficulty?First,such

animagewouldhavetoincludethecharacteristicsofthelargebirds,suchastheeagle,ostrich,andcondor;andof the smallbirds, suchas thewrenandhumming bird. It must be a composite of the shape of all birds, from theostrich,swan,eagle,crane,downtothesparrow,swallow,andhummingbird.It must picture the particular qualities of birds of prey, water birds, anddomesticfowls,aswellasthegraineaters.Itmustexhibitallthecolorsfoundinbird life, from thebrightest redsandgreensdown to thesobergraysandbrowns.Alittlethoughtwillshowthataclearmentalimageofsuchaconceptisimpossible.Whatthemostofusdo,whenwethinkof“bird,”istopictureavague, flying shape of dull color; butwhenwe stop to think that the termmustalsoincludethewaddlingduckandthescratchingbarnyardchicken,weseethatourmentalimageisfaulty.Thetroubleisthattheterm“bird”reallymeans“all-bird,”andwecannotpicturean“all-bird”fromtheverynatureofthe case. Our terms, therefore, are like mathematical figures, or algebraicsymbols,whichweuseforease,speed,andclearnessofthinking.

Thetroubledoesnotendhere.Conceptsnotonlyincludethegeneralideaofthings,butalsothegeneralideaofthequalitiesofthings.Thussweetness,hardness, courage, and energy are concepts, but we cannot form a mentalimage of them by themselves. We may picture a sweet thing, but notsweetnessitself.Soyouseethataconceptisapurelyabstractmentalidea—asymbol—akin to the figures 1, 2, 3, etc., and used in the sameway. Theystand for general classes of things. A “term” is the verbal and writtenexpressionofthegeneralideaorconcept.Thestudentisrequestedtofixthesedistinctionsinhismind,soastorenderfurtherunderstandingofthemeasy.

CHAPTERXXI.

Conception.

T HEprocessofconceptionhasbeenwelldefinedbyGordyas“thatactofmindbywhichitformsanideaofaclass;orthatactofthemindthatenablesustousegeneralnamesintelligently.”Headds:“Itis,ofcourse,understoodthatIamusingtheword‘class’todenoteanindefinitenumberofindividualsthatresembleeachotherincertainparticulars.”

PERCEPTION.

The first step in conception, aswe have seen, is that of perception. It isreadily perceived that the character of our intellectual processes dependsmaterially upon the variety, clearness, and accuracy of our perceptions.Therefore,again,wewouldreferourstudentstothechapterinwhichwehavestatedtheimportanceofclearperception.

MEMORY.

Thefuturestepsofconceptiondependmateriallyupontheclearnessofthememory, as we can classify objects only by remembering their qualitiesbeyond the immediatemomentofactual,originalperception.Therefore, thememoryshouldbestrengthenedforthisaswellasotherobjects.

ABSTRACTION.

Thesecondstepinconceptionisthatofthementalabstractionofqualitiesfrom the observed thing. That is, we must perceive and then mentally setasidetheobservedqualitiesofthething.Forinstance,manfirstperceivedtheexistence of certain qualities in things. He found that a certain number ofthingspossessedsomeof thesequalities incommon,whileotherspossessedother qualities in the same way, and thus arose classification fromcomparison. But both comparison and classification are possible only byabstraction,ortheperceptionofthequalityasa“thing”;thus,theabstractionoftheideaofthequalityofsweetnessfromtheideaofsugar.Sweetnessisaquality rather than a thing itself. It is something possessed by sugarwhichhelpstomakesugarwhatitis.

Color,shape,size,mentalqualities,habitsofaction—thesearesomeofthequalities first observed in things and abstracted from them in thought.Redness, sweetness, hardness, softness, largeness, smallness, fragrance,swiftness, slowness, fierceness, gentleness,warmness, coldness, etc.—theseare abstracted qualities of things.Of course these qualities are really neverdivorcedfromthings,but theminddivorces theminorder tomakethinkingeasier.Anauthoritysays:“Animalsareincapableofmakingabstractions,andthat is the reasonwhy they cannot develop formal thought. * * *Abstractthoughtisidenticalwithrationalthought,whichisthecharacteristicfeatureofthe thought of speaking beings. This is the reason why abstract thought isupon earth the exclusive property ofman, andwhy brutes are incapable ofabstractthought.Theprocessofnamingisthemechanismofabstraction,fornamesestablishthementalindependenceoftheobjectsnamed.”

The processes of abstraction depend upon attention—concentratedattention.Attention directed to the qualities of a thing tends to abstract thequalitiesinthoughtfromthethingitself.Millsays:“Abstractionisprimarilytheresultofattention.”Hamiltonsays:“Attentionandabstractionareonlythesame process viewed in different relations.” Cultivation of the power ofabstraction means principally cultivation of attention. Any mental activitywhichtendstowardanalysisorseparationofathingintoitsparts,qualities,orelementswillservetocultivateanddevelopthepowerofabstraction.

Thehabitofconvertingqualitiesintoconceptsisacquiredbytransformingadjectivetermsintotheircorrespondingnounterms.Forinstance,apieceofcolored candy possesses thequalities of being round, hard, red, sweet, etc.Transformingtheseadjectivequalitiesintonountermswehavetheconceptsofroundness,hardness,redness,andsweetness,respectively.

COMPARISON.

Thethirdstepinconceptionisthatofcomparison,inwhichthequalitiesofseveral thingsarecomparedorexamined for likenessesanddifferences.Wefindmany qualities in which the several things differ, and a few in whichthereisalikeness.Classesareformedfromresemblancesorlikenesses,whileindividuals are separated from apparent classes by detection of differences.Finally, it is found that separate things, while having many points ofdifferencewhichindicatetheirindividuality,neverthelesshaveafewpointsoflikenesswhichindicatethattheybelongtothesamegeneralfamilyorclass.Thedetectionoflikenessesanddifferencesinthequalitiesofvariousthingsisan importantmental process.Manyof the higher thought processes dependlargely upon the ability to compare things properly. The development ofattentionandperceptiontendstodevelopthepowerofcomparison.

CLASSIFICATIONORGENERALIZATION.

The fourth step in conception is that of classification or generalization,wherebyweplaceindividualthingsinamentalbundleorclass,andthenthisbundleincompanywithotherbundlesintoahigherclass,andsoon.Thuswegroup all the individual small birds having certain characteristics into aspecies, thenseveral relatedspecies intoa larger family,and this intoastilllarger,untilfinallywegroupallthebirdfamiliesintothegreatfamilywhichwe call “birds” and of which the simple term “bird” expresses the generalconcept.

Jevons says: “Weclassify things togetherwheneverweobserve that theyare like each other in any respect, and therefore think of them together. Inclassifyingacollectionofobjects,wedonotmerelyputtogetherintogroupsthosewhich resembleeachother,butwealsodivideeachclass intosmallerones in which the resemblance is more complete. Thus the class ofwhitesubstancesmay be divided into thosewhich are solid, and thosewhich arefluid, so that we get the two minor classes of solid-white and fluid-whitesubstances.It isdesirable tohavenamesbywhichtoshowthatoneclass iscontainedinanother,and,accordingly,wecalltheclasswhichisdividedintotwo ormore smaller ones the genus, and the smaller ones intowhich it isdivided,thespecies.”

Everyspeciesisasmallfamilyoftheindividualscomposingit,andatthesame time is an individual species of the genus just above it; thegenus, inturn,isafamilyofseveralspecies,andatthesametimeanindividualgenusinthegreaterfamilyorgenusaboveit.

The student may familiarize himself with the idea of generalization byconsideringhimselfasanindividual,JohnSmith.Johnrepresentsthatunitofgeneralization.ThenextstepistocombineJohnwiththeotherSmithsofhisimmediate family. Then this family may be grouped with his near bloodrelations,andsoon,untilfinallyalltherelatedSmiths,nearandremote,aregroupedtogetherinagreatSmithfamily.

Or,inthesameway,thefamilygroupmaybeenlargeduntilittakesinallthewhitepeopleinacounty,thenallthewhitepeopleinthestate,thenallintheUnitedStates;thenallthewhiteraces,thenallthewhiteandotherlight-skinnedraces,thenallmankind.Then,ifoneisinclined,theprocessmaybecontinued until it embraces every living creature from moneron to man.Reversing theprocess, livingcreaturesmaybedividedandsubdivideduntilallmankindisseentostandasaclass.Thentheraceofmanmaybedividedintosub-racesaccordingtocolor;thenthewhiteracemaybesubdividedintoAmericans and non-Americans. Then the Americans may be divided into

inhabitants of the several states, or into Indianans and non-Indianans; theninto the inhabitants of the several counties of Indiana, and thus the PoseyCountiansarereached.ThenthePoseyCountypeoplearedividedintoSmithsandnon-Smiths;thentheSmithfamilyintoitsconstituentfamilygroups,andthenintothesmallerfamilies,andsoon,until theclassificationreachesoneparticularJohnSmith,whoatlastisfoundtobeanindividual—inaclassbyhimself. This is the story of the ascending and descending processes ofgeneralization.

CHAPTERXXII.

ClassesofConcepts.

I N thepreceding chapterwehave seen theprocessof conception—of theformingof concepts.The ideaof a general class of things or qualities is aconcept. Each concept contains the qualities which are common to all theindividualscomposingtheclass,butnotthosequalitieswhichpertainonlytotheminorclassesortheindividuals.Forinstance, theconceptof“bird”willnecessarily include the common qualities of warm-bloodedness,featheredness,wingedness,oviparousness,andvertebratedness.Butitwillnotincludecolor,specialshape,size,orspecialfeaturesorcharacteristicsofthesubfamiliesorindividualscomposingthegreatclass.Theclasscomprisestheindividualsandsubclassescomposingit;theconceptincludesthegeneralandcommon qualities which all in the class possess. A percept is the mentalimage of a particular thing; a concept is the mental idea of the generalqualities of a class of things. A percept arises from the perception of asensation; a concept is a purely mental, abstract creation, whose onlyexistenceisintheworldofideasandwhichhasnocorrespondingindividualobjectintheworldofsense.

Thereare twogeneralclassesofconcepts,namely:(1)concreteconcepts,in which the common qualities of a class of things are combined into oneconceptual idea, such as “bird,” of which we have spoken; (2) abstractconcepts,inwhichiscombinedtheideaofsomequalitycommontoanumberof things, such as “sweetness” or “redness.” Jevons’s well-known rule forterms is an aid in remembering this classification: “A concrete term is thenameofathing;anabstracttermisthenameofaqualityofathing.”

Itisapeculiarfactandruleofconcreteconceptsthat(1)thelargertheclassofthingsembracedinaconcept,thesmallerareitsgeneralqualities;and(2)the larger thenumberofgeneralqualities includedinaconcept, thesmallerthe number of individuals embraced by it. For instance, the term “bird”embracesagreatnumberofindividuals—allthebirdsthatareinexistence,infact,butithasbutfewgeneralqualities,aswehaveseen.Onthecontrary,theconcept“stork”hasamuchlargernumberofgeneralqualities,butembracesfarfewerindividuals.Finally,theindividualisreached,andwefindthatithasmore qualities than any class can have; but it is composed of the smallestpossible number of individuals, one. The secret is this:No two individuals

canhaveasmanyqualities incommonaseachhas individually,unless theyarepreciselyalike,whichisimpossibleinnature.

IMPERFECTCONCEPTS.

Itissaidthatoutsideofstrictlyscientificdefinitionsveryfewpersonsagreein theirconceptsof thesame thing.Eachhashisorherownconceptof theparticular thingwhich he or she expresses by the same term.A number ofpersons asked to define a common term like “love,” “religion,” “faith,”“belief,”etc.,willgivesuchavarietyofanswersastocausewonderment.AsGreen says: “My idea or image is mine alone—the reward of carelessobservation if imperfect; of attentive, careful, and varied observation ifcorrect.Betweenmineandyoursagreatgulfisfixed.Nomancanpassfromminetoyours,orfromyourstomine.Neitherinanypropersenseofthetermcanmine be conveyed to you.Words do not convey thoughts; they are notvehicles of thoughts in any true sense of that term. A word is simply acommonsymbolwhicheachassociateswithhisownideaorimage.”

Thereasonofthedifferenceintheconceptsofseveralpersonsisthatveryfew of our concepts are nearly perfect; the majority of them are quiteimperfectand incomplete. Jevonsgivesusan ideaof this inhis remarksonclassification:“Thingsmayseemtobeverymuchlikeeachotherwhicharenot so.Whales, porpoises, seals, and several other animals live in the seaexactly likeafish; theyhaveasimilarshapeandareusuallyclassedamongfish.Peoplearesaidtogowhalefishing.Yettheseanimalsarenotreallyfishatall,butaremuchmorelikedogsandhorsesandotherquadrupedsthantheyare like fish. They cannot live entirely under water and breathe the aircontained in the water like fish, but they have to come to the surface atintervalstotakebreath.Similarly,wemustnotclassbatswithbirdsbecausetheyflyabout,althoughtheyhavewhatwouldbecalledwings; thesewingsarenotlikethoseofbirds,and,intruth,batsaremuchmorelikeratsandmicethantheyarelikebirds.Botanistsusedatonetimetoclassifyplantsaccordingtotheirsize,astrees,shrubs,orherbs,butwenowknowthatagreattreeisoftenmoresimilarincharactertoatinyherbthanitistoothergreattrees.AdaisyhaslittleresemblancetoagreatScotchthistle;yetthebotanistregardsthemasvery similar.The loftygrowingbamboo isakindofgrass, and thesugarcanealsobelongstothesameclasswithwheatandoats.”

Itisamatterofimportancethatclearconceptsshouldbeformedregardingatleastthefamiliarthingsoflife.Thelistofclearconceptsshouldbeaddedtofromtimetotimebystudy,investigation,andexamination.Thedictionaryshould be consulted frequently, and a term studied until one has a clearmeaningoftheconceptthetermseekstoexpress.Agoodencyclopedia(not

necessarilyanexpensiveone,inthesedaysofcheapeditions)willalsoproveveryuseful in this respect.AsHallecksays:“Itmustbeborne inmind thatmostofourconceptsaresubjecttochangeduringourentirelife;thatatfirsttheyaremadeonly ina tentativeway; thatexperiencemayshowus,atanytime, that they have been erroneously formed, that we have abstracted toolittle or too much, made the class too wide or too narrow, or that here aqualitymustbeaddedorthereonetakenaway.”

Itisagoodpracticetomakeamemorandumofanythingofwhichyoumayhear, but of which you know nothing, and then later to make a brief butthorough investigation of that thing, by means of the dictionary andencyclopedia, andofwhatevergoodworksmaybeobtainedon the subject,not leaving it until you feel that you have obtained at least a clear idea ofwhatthethingreallymeans.Ahalfhoureacheveningdevotedtoexerciseofthiskindwillresultinawonderfulincreaseofgeneralinformation.Wehaveheard of a man who made a practice of reading a short article in theencyclopedia every evening, giving preference to subjects generally classedasfamiliar.Inayearhemadeanoticeableadvanceingeneralknowledgeaswellashabitsofthought.Infiveyearshewaslookeduponbyhisassociatesasamanofaremarkablylargefieldofgeneralinformationandofmorethanordinary intelligence,which verdictwas a just one.As a rulewewaste farmore timeonworthlessfiction thanwearewilling todevote toa littleself-improvement of this kind. We shrink at the idea of a general course ofinstructive reading, little realizing that we can take our study in smallinstallmentsandataverylittlecostintimeorlabor.

Our concepts form thematerial which our intellect uses in its reasoningprocesses.Nomatterhowgoodareasoneronemaybe,unlesshehasagoodsupplyofgeneral informationabout the thingsofwhichhe is reasoning,hewillnotmakemuchrealheadway.Wemustbeginat thebottomandbuildafirm foundation uponwhich the intellectual structuremay be erected. Thisfoundationiscomposedoffacts.Thesefactsarerepresentedbyourclearandcorrectconcepts.

CHAPTERXXIII.

Judgments.

W E have seen the several steps of themental process whereby simplesensations are transformed into percepts and then into concepts or generalideas. The formation of the concept is considered as the first great step inthinking. The second great step in thinking is that of the formation of the“judgment.”Thedefinitionof“judgment,”asthetermisusedinlogic;is“thecomparing together in the mind of two ideas of things, and determiningwhether theyagreeordisagreewitheachother,or thatoneof themdoesordoes not belong to the other. Judgment is, therefore, (a) affirmative or (b)negative,as(a)‘Snowiswhite,’or(b)‘AllwhitemenarenotEuropeans.’”

What in logic is called a “proposition” is the expression in words of alogical judgment. Hyslop defined the term “proposition” as follows: “Anyaffirmation or denial of an agreement between two conceptions.” Forinstance,wecomparetheconcepts“sparrow”and“bird”andfindthatthereisanagreement,andthattheformerbelongstothelatter;thismentalprocessisajudgment.Wethenannouncethejudgmentintheproposition:“Thesparrowisabird.” In thesamewaywecompare theconcepts“bat”and“bird,” findthatthereisadisagreement,andformthejudgmentthatneitherbelongstotheother,whichweexpressintheproposition:“Thebatisnotabird.”Orwemayformthejudgmentthat“sweetness”isaqualityof“sugar,”whichweexpressin the proposition: “Sugar is sweet.” Likewise,wemay form the judgmentwhichresultsintheproposition:“Vinegarisnotsweet.”

While theprocessof judgment isgenerallyconsideredasconstituting thesecondgreatstepofthinking,comingaftertheformationoftheconcept,andconsistingofthecomparingofconcepts, itmustberememberedthat theactofjudgingisfarmoreelementarythanthis,foritisfoundstillfartherbackinthehistoryof thoughtprocesses.By thatpeculiar lawofparadoxwhichwefind everywhere operative inmind processes, the same process of formingjudgmentswhichisusedincomparingconceptsalsohasbeenusedinformingthe same concepts in the stage of comparison. In fact, the result of allcomparison,highorlow,mustbeajudgment.

Halleck says: “Judgment is necessary in forming concepts. When wedecide that a quality is or is not common to a class,we are really judging.This isanotherevidenceof thecomplexityandunifiedactionof themind.”

Brookssays:“Thepowerof judgment isofgreatvalue in itsproducts. It isinvolved in or accompanies every act of the intellect, and thus lies at thefoundationofall intellectual activity. Itoperatesdirectly ineveryactof theunderstanding, and even aids the other faculties of themind in completingtheiractivitiesandproducts.***Strictlyspeaking,every intelligentactofthemind is accompaniedwith a judgment.Toknow is to discriminate and,therefore,tojudge.Everysensationorcognitioninvolvesaknowledgeandsoa judgment that it exists. Themind cannot think at all without judging; tothinkistojudge.Eveninformingthenotionswhichjudgmentcompares,themindjudges.Everynotionorconcept impliesapreviousactof judgment toformit; in formingaconceptwecompare thecommonattributesbeforeweunitethem,andcomparisonisjudgment.Itisthustruethat‘Everyconceptisacontractedjudgment;everyjudgmentanexpandedconcept.’”

It isneedless tosaythatas judgments lieat thebaseofour thinking,andalso appear in every part of its higher structure, the importance of correctjudgmentinthoughtcannotbeoverestimated.Butitisoftenverydifficulttoform correct judgment even regarding the most familiar things around us.Halleck says: “In actual life things present themselves to us with theirqualities disguised or obscured by other conflicting qualities.Men had forages seen burning substances and had formed a concept of them.A certainhard,black,stonysubstancehadoftenbeennoticed,andaconcepthadbeenformedofit.Thisconceptwasimperfect;butitisveryseldomthatwemeetwithperfect, sharply-definedconcepts inactual life.So ithappened that forages theconceptofburning substancewasnever linkedby judgment to theconceptofstonecoal.Thecombustiblequalityinthecoalwasovershadowedby its stony attributes. ‘Of course stone will not burn,’ people said. Onecannottellhowlongthedevelopmentofmankindwasretardedforthatveryreason.Englandwouldnot to-daybemanufacturingproducts for the restoftheworldhadnotsomeonejudgedcoaltobeacombustiblesubstance.***Judgment is ever silently working and comparing things that to past agesseemeddissimilar;anditisconstantlyabstractingandleavingoutofthefieldof view those qualities which have simply served to obscure the point atissue.”

Gordysays:“Thecredulityofchildrenisproverbial;butifwegetourfactsatfirsthand,ifwestudy‘theliving,learning,playingchild,’weshallseethathe isquiteas remarkable for incredulityas forcredulity.Theexplanation issimple:Hetendstobelievethefirstsuggestionthatcomesintohismind,nomatterfromwhatsource;andsincehisbeliefisnottheresultofanyrationalprocess,hecannotbemade todisbelieve it inany rationalway.Hence it isthatheisverycredulousaboutanymatteraboutwhichhehasnoideas;butletthe ideaonceget possessionofhismind, andhe is quite as remarkable for

incredulityasbeforeforcredulity.***Ifwestudythelargerchild,—themanwithachild’smind,anuneducatedman,—weshallhavethesametruthforceduponus.Ifthebeliefsofmenwereduetoprocessesofreasoning,wheretheyhavenotreasonedtheywouldnotbelieve.Butdowefinditso?Isitnottruethat themenwho have themost positive opinions on the largest variety ofsubjects—so far as they have ever heard of them—are precisely thosewhohavetheleastrighttothem?Socrates,weremember,wascountedthewisestmaninAthensbecausehealoneresistedhisnaturaltendencytobelieveintheabsenceofevidence;healonewouldnotdeludehimselfwith theconceitofknowledgewithoutthereality;anditwouldscarcelybetoomuchtosaythattheintellectualstrengthofmenisindirectproportiontothenumberofthingstheyareabsolutelycertainof.***Idonot,ofcourse,meantointimatethatwe should have no opinions about matters that we have not personallyinvestigated.Wetake,andoughttotake,theopinionofsomemenaboutlaw,and others aboutmedicine, and others about particular sciences, and so on.Butwe shouldclearly realize thedifferencebetweenholdinganopinionontrustandholdingitastheresultofourowninvestigations.”

Brooks says: “It should be one of the leading objects of the culture ofyoungpeople to lead themtoacquire thehabitof forming judgments.Theyshouldnotonlybeledtoseethingsbuttohaveopinionsaboutthings.Theyshouldbetrainedtoseethingsintheirrelationsandtoputtheserelationsintodefinite propositions. Their ideas of objects should be worked up intothoughts concerning the objects.Thosemethods of teaching are bestwhichtend to excite a thoughtful habit of mind that notices the similitudes anddiversitiesofobjectsandendeavorstoreadthethoughtswhichtheyembodyandofwhichtheyarethesymbols.”

Thestudyoflogic,geometry,andthenaturalsciencesisrecommendedforexerciseof the facultyof judgmentand thedevelopment thereof.The studyand practice of even the lower branches ofmathematics are also helpful inthis direction. The game of checkers or chess is recommended by manyauthorities.Somehaveadvocatedthepracticeofsolvingenigmas,problems,rebuses,etc.,asgivingexercisetothisfacultyofthemind.Thecultivationofthe “Why?” attitude of mind, and the answering of one’s own mentalquestions,isalsohelpful,ifnotcarriedtoexcess.“DoubtingThomas”isnotalways a termof reproach in thesedaysof scientifichabitsof thought, and“themanfromMissouri”hasmanywarmadmirers.

CHAPTERXXIV.

PrimaryLawsofThought.

I Nconnectionwiththissubjectweherewithcalltheattentionofthestudenttothewell-knownPrimaryLawsofThoughtwhichhavebeenrecognizedasvalid from the time of the ancient Greek logicians. These laws are self-evident,andareuncontradictable.Theyareaxiomatic. Jevonssaysof them:“Students are seldomable to see at first their fullmeaning and importance.All argumentsmay be explainedwhen these self-evident laws are granted;anditisnottoomuchtosaythatthewholeoflogicwillbeplaintothosewhowillconstantlyusetheselawsastheirkey.”HerearetheThreePrimaryLawsofThought:—

I.LawofIdentity.“Whateveris,is.”

II.LawofContradiction.“Nothingcanbothbeandnotbe.”

III.LawofExcludedMiddle.“Everythingmusteitherbeornotbe;thereisnomiddlecourse.”

I.The firstof these laws, called“TheLawof Identity,” informsus that athing isalways itself,nomatterunderwhatguiseor form it isperceivedormay present itself. An animal is always a bird if it possesses the generalcharacteristics of a “bird,” no matter whether it exhibits the minorcharacteristicsofaneagle,awren,a stork,orahummingbird. In thesamewayawhaleisamammalbecauseitpossessesthegeneralcharacteristicsofamammal notwithstanding that it swims in the water like a fish. Also,sweetnessisalwayssweetness,whethermanifestedinsugar,honey,flowers,or products of coal tar. If a thing is that thing, then it is, and it cannot belogicallyclaimedthatitisnot.

II.Thesecondoftheselaws,called“TheLawofContradiction,”informsusthatthesamequalityorclasscannotbebothaffirmedanddeniedofathingatthesametimeandplace.Asparrowcannotbesaidtobeboth“bird”and“notbird” at the same time. Neither can sugar be said to be “sweet” and “notsweet”at the same time.Apieceof ironmaybe“hot”atoneendand“nothot”atanother,butitcannotbeboth“hot”and“nothot”atthesameplaceatthesametime.

III.Thethirdoftheselaws,called“TheLawofExcludedMiddle,”informsusthatagivenqualityorclassmustbeaffirmedordeniedtoeverythingatanygiventimeandplace.Everythingeithermustbeofacertainclassornot,mustpossess a certainqualityor not, at a given timeor place.There is nootheralternativeormiddlecourse.Itisaxiomaticthatanystatementmusteitherbeornotbetrueofacertainotherthingatanycertaintimeandplace;thereisnoescapefromthis.Anythingeithermustbe “black”or “notblack,” abirdornotabird,aliveornotalive,atanycertaintimeorplace.Thereisnothingelsethatitcanbe;itcannotbothbeandnotbeatthesametimeandplace,aswehaveseen; therefore, itmusteitherbeornotbe thatwhich isassertedof it.The judgment must decide which alternative; but it has only two possiblechoices.

But the student must not confuse opposite qualities or things with “not-ness.”Athingmaybe“black”or“notblack,”butitneednotbewhitetobe“not black,” for blue is likewise “not black” just as it is “not white.” Theneglectofthisfactfrequentlycauseserror.Wemustalwaysaffirmeithertheexistenceornon-existenceofaqualityinathing;butthisisfardifferentfromaffirmingordenyingtheexistenceoftheoppositequality.Thusathingmaybe“nothard”andyetitdoesnotfollowthatitis“soft”;itmaybeneitherhardnorsoft.

FALLACIOUSAPPLICATION.

Thereexistswhatareknownas“fallacies”ofapplicationoftheseprimarylaws.Afallacyisanunsoundargumentorconclusion.Forinstance,becauseaparticularmanisfoundtobealiar,itisfallacioustoassumethat“allmenareliars,”forlyingisaparticularqualityoftheindividualman,andnotageneralqualityofthefamilyofmen.Inthesamewaybecauseastorkhaslonglegsandalongbill,itdoesnotfollowthatallbirdsmusthavethesecharacteristicssimply because the stork is a bird. It is fallacious to extend an individualqualitytoaclass.Butitissoundjudgmenttoassumethataclassqualitymustbepossessedbyall individuals in that class. It is a fardifferentpropositionwhich asserts that “some birds are black,” from thatwhich asserts that “allbirds are black.” The same rule, of course, is true regarding negativepropositions.

Another fallacy is that which assumes that because the affirmative ornegative proposition has not been, or cannot be, proved, it follows that theoppositepropositionmustbetrue.Thetruejudgmentissimply“notproven.”

Anotherfallaciousjudgmentisthatwhichisbasedonattributingabsolutequality to thatwhich is but relativeor comparative.For instance, the terms

“hot” and “cold” are relative and comparative, and simply denote one’srelative opinion regarding a fixed and certain degree of temperature. Thecertainthingisthedegreeoftemperature,say75degreesFahrenheit;ofthiswemay logically claim that it isor isnot trueat a certain timeor place. Iteither is 75 degrees Fahrenheit or it isnot. But to oneman thismay seemwarm and to anothercold; both are right in their judgments, so far as theirownrelativefeelingsareconcerned.Butneithercanclaimabsolutelythatitiswarmorcold.Therefore,itisafallacytoascribeabsolutequalitytoarelativeone. The absolute fact comes under the Law of Excluded Middle, but apersonalopinionisnotanabsolutefact.

Thereareotherfallacieswhichwillbeconsideredinotherchaptersofthisbook,undertheirappropriateheading.

CHAPTERXXV.

Reasoning.

R EASONING, the thirdgreat step in thinking,maybesaid toconsistofascertaining new truths from old ones, new judgments from old ones,unknown facts fromknownones; in short,ofproceeding logically from theknowntotheunknown,usingtheknownasthefoundationfortheunknownwhich is sought to be known. Gordy gives us the following excellentdefinitionoftheterm:“Reasoningistheactofgoingfromtheknowntotheunknownthroughotherbeliefs;ofbasingjudgmentuponjudgments;reachingbeliefsthroughbeliefs.”Reasoning,then,isseentobeaprocessofbuildingastructureofjudgments,onerestingupontheother,thetopmostpointbeingthefinal judgment,but thewholeconstitutinganedificeof judgment.Thismaybeseenmoreclearlywhenthevariousformsofreasoningareconsidered.

IMMEDIATEREASONING.

Thesimplestformofreasoningisthatknownas“immediatereasoning,”bywhich ismeant reasoningbydirectlycomparing two judgmentswithout theinterventionofthethirdjudgment,whichisfoundinthemoreformalclassesofreasoning.ThisformofreasoningdependslargelyupontheapplicationoftheThreePrimaryLawsofThought,towhichwehavereferredinapreviouschapter.

Itwillbeseenthatif(a)athingisalwaysitself,then(b)allthatisincludedin it must partake of its nature. Thus, the bird family has certain classcharacteristics, thereforebyimmediatereasoningweknowthatanymemberof that family must possess those class characteristics, whatever particularcharacteristicsitmayhaveinaddition.Andwelikewiseknowthatwecannotattribute the particular characteristics, as a matter of course, to the othermembersoftheclass.Thus,thoughallsparrowsarebirds,itisnottruethatallbirdsaresparrows.“Allbiscuitsarebread;butallbreadisnotbiscuit.”

Inthesamewayweknowthatathingcannotbebirdandmammalat thesametime,forthemammalsformanot-birdfamily.And,likewise,weknowthateverythingmustbeeitherbirdornotbird,butthatbeingnotbirddoesnotmean being a mammal, for there are many other not-bird things thanmammals. In this formof reasoningdistinction isalwaysmadebetween the

universal or general class, which is expressed by the word all, and theparticular or individual, which is expressed by the word “some.” Manypersonsfailtonotethisdifferenceintheirreasoning,andfallaciouslyreason,forinstance,thatbecausesomeswansarewhite,allswansmustbeso,whichisafardifferentthingfromreasoningthatifallissoandso,thensomemustbe so and so.Thosewho are interested in this subject are referred to someelementary text-bookon logic, as thedetailedconsideration is too technicalforconsiderationhere.

REASONINGBYANALOGY.

Reasoning by analogy is an elementary form of reasoning, and is theparticularkindofreasoningemployedbythemajorityofpersonsinordinarythought.ItisbasedupontheunconsciousrecognitionbythehumanmindoftheprinciplewhichisexpressedbyJevonsas:“Iftwoormorethingsresembleeach other inmany points, theywill probably resemble each other inmorepoints.” The same authority says: “Reasoning by analogy differs only indegreefromthatkindofreasoningcalled‘generalization.’Whenmanythingsresemble each other in a few properties, we argue about them bygeneralization.Whenafewthingsresembleeachotherinmanyproperties, itisacaseofanalogy.”

While this form of reason is frequently employed with more or lesssatisfactory results, it is always open to a large percentage of error. Thus,persons have been poisoned by toadstools by reason of false analogousreasoning that because mushrooms are edible, then toadstools, whichresemblethem,mustalsobefitforfood;or,inthesameway,becausecertainberries resemble other edible berries they must likewise be good food. AsBrookssays:“Toinfer thatbecauseJohnSmithhasarednoseandisalsoadrunkard, then Henry Jones, who also has a red nose, is also a drunkard,wouldbedangerousinference.Conclusionsofthiskinddrawnfromanalogyare frequently dangerous.” Halleck says: “Many false analogies aremanufactured, and it is excellent thought training to expose them. Themajorityofpeoplethinksolittlethattheyswallowthesefalseanalogiesjustasnewly-fledgedrobinsswallowsmallstonesdroppedintotheirmouths.”

Jevons,oneofthebestauthoritiesonthesubject,says:“Thereisnowayinwhichwecanreallyassureourselves thatwearearguingsafelybyanalogy.The only rule that can be given is this: That the more closely two thingsresemble each other, the more likely it is that they are the same in otherrespects,especiallyinpointscloselyconnectedwiththoseobserved.Inorderto be clear about our conclusions,we ought, in fact, never to rest satisfiedwithmereanalogy,butoughttotrytodiscoverthegenerallawsgoverningthe

case. * * *We find that reasoningby analogy is not to be dependedupon,unless wemake such an inquiry into the causes and laws of the things inquestionthatwereallyemployinductiveanddeductivereasoning.”

HIGHERFORMSOFREASONING.

Thetwohigherformsofreasoningareknown,respectively,as(1)inductivereasoning, or inference from particular facts to general laws; and (2)deductive reasoning, or inference from general truths to particular truths.While theclassdistinction ismadefor thepurposeofclearconsideration, itmustnotbeforgottenthatthetwoformsofreasoningaregenerallyfoundincombination.Thus,ininductivereasoningmanystepsaretakenbytheaidofdeductive reasoning; and, likewise, before we can reason deductively fromgeneral truths toparticularoneswemusthavediscovered thegeneral truthsby inductive reasoning from particular facts. Thus there is a unity in allreasoningprocessesasthereisinallmentaloperations.Inductivereasoningisasyntheticalprocess;deductivereasoning,ananalyticalone. In thefirstwecombineandbuildup,inthelatterwedissectandseparate.

CHAPTERXXVI.

InductiveReasoning.

I NDUCTIVEreasoningisbasedupontheaxiom:“Whatistrueofthemanyistrueofthewhole.”Thisaxiomisbaseduponman’sbeliefintheuniformityof nature. Inductive reasoning is amental ladder by which we climb fromparticular facts togeneral laws,but the ladder restsupon thebelief that theuniverseisgovernedbylaw.

Thestepsininductivereasoningareasfollows:—

I.Observation,investigation,andexaminationofparticularfactsorthings.Ifwewishtoknowthegeneralcharacteristicsofthebirdfamily,wemustfirstexamine a sufficient number of birds of many kinds so as to discover thecomparativelyfewgeneralcharacteristicspossessedbyallofthebirdfamily,asdistinctfromtheparticularcharacteristicspossessedbyonlysomeof thatfamily. The greater the number of individuals examined, the narrowerbecomesourlistofthegeneralqualitiescommontoall.Inthesamewaywemust examine many kinds of flowers before we come to the few generalqualitiescommontoallflowers,whichwecombineinthegeneralconceptof“flower.”Thesame,ofcourse,istrueregardingthediscoveryofgenerallawsfromparticular facts.Weexamine the factsand thenwork towardagenerallaw which will explain them. For instance, the Law of Gravitation wasdiscoveredbytheobservationandinvestigationofthefactthatallobjectsareattracted to theearth; further investigationrevealed thefact thatallmaterialobjects are attracted to eachother; then thegeneral lawwasdiscovered,or,rather,thehypothesiswasadvanced,wasfoundtoexplainthefacts,andwasverifiedbyfurtherexperimentsandobservation.

II.Thesecondstepininductivereasoningisthemakingofanhypothesis.Anhypothesisisapropositionorprincipleassumedasapossibleexplanationforasetorclassoffacts.Itisregardedasa“workingtheory,”whichmustbeexaminedandtestedinconnectionwiththefactsbeforeitisfinallyaccepted.Forinstance,aftertheobservationthatanumberofmagnetsattractedsteel,itwas found reasonable to advance the hypothesis that “all magnets attractsteel.”Inthesamewaywasadvancedthehypothesisthat“allbirdsarewarm-blooded,winged, feathered, oviparous vertebrates.” Subsequent observationand experiment established the hypothesis regarding the magnet, andregardingthegeneralqualitiesofthebirdfamily.Ifasinglemagnethadbeen

foundwhichdidnotattractsteel,thenthehypothesiswouldhavefallen.Ifasingle bird had been discovered which was not warm-blooded, then thatqualitywouldhavebeenstrickenfromthelistofthenecessarycharacteristicsofallbirds.

Atheoryismerelyanhypothesiswhichhasbeenverifiedorestablishedbycontinuedandrepeatedobservation,investigation,andexperiment.

Hypotheses and theories arise very frequently from the subconsciousassimilationofanumberofparticularfactsandtheconsequentflashingofa“greatguess,”or“sacred suspicionof the truth,” into theconscious fieldofattention.Thescientific imaginationplaysan importantpart in thisprocess.Thereis,ofcourse,aworldofdifferencebetweena“blindguess”baseduponinsufficientdataanda“scientificguess”resultingfromtheaccumulationofavaststoreofcarefulandaccurateinformation.AsBrookssays:“Theformingof an hypothesis requires a suggestive mind, a lively fancy, a philosophicimagination that catches aglimpseof the idea through the formor sees thelawstandingbehindthefact.”Butacceptedtheories,inthemajorityofcases,ariseonlybytestingoutandrejectingmanypromisinghypothesesandfinallysettling upon the one which best answers all the requirements and bestexplainsthefacts.Asanauthoritysays:“Totrywrongguessesiswithmostpersonstheonlywaytohituponrightones.”

III. Testing the hypothesis by deductive reasoning is the third step ininductivereasoning.Thistestismadebyapplyingthehypotheticalprincipleto particular facts or things; that is, to followoutmentally the hypotheticalprincipletoitslogicalconclusion.Thismaybedoneinthisway:“Ifsoandsois correct, then it follows that thus and so is true,” etc. If the conclusionagreeswithreason,thenthetestisdeemedsatisfactorysofarasithasgone.Butif theresultprovestobealogicalabsurdityorinconsistentwithnaturalfacts,thenthehypothesisisdiscredited.

IV. Practical verification of the hypothesis is the fourth step in inductivereasoning.Thisstepconsistsoftheactualcomparisonofobservedfactswiththe “logical conclusions” arising from applying deductive reasoning to thegeneralprincipleassumedasapremise.Thegreaternumberoffactsagreeingwiththeconclusionsarisingfromthepremiseofthehypothesis,thegreaterisdeemed the “probability” of the latter. The authorities generally assume anhypothesistobeverifiedwhenitaccountsforallthefactswhichproperlyarerelated to it. Some extremists contend, however, that before an hypothesismaybeconsideredasabsolutelyverified,itmustnotonlyaccountforalltheassociated facts but that also theremust be no other possible hypothesis toaccountforthesamefacts.The“facts”referredtointhisconnectionmaybeeither(1)observedphenomena,or(2)theconclusionsofdeductivereasoning

arisingfromtheassumptionofthehypothesis,or(3)theagreementbetweenthe observed facts and the logical conclusions. The last combination isgenerallyregardedasthemostlogical.Theverificationofanhypothesismustbe“anall-aroundone,”andtheremustbeanagreementbetweentheobservedfacts and the logical conclusions in the case—the hypothesismust “fit” thefacts,andthefactsmust“fit”thehypothesis.The“facts”aretheglassslipperof the Cinderella legend—the several sisters of Cinderella were discardedhypotheses, the slipper and the sisters not “fitting.”WhenCinderella’s footwas found to be the one foot uponwhich the glass slipper fitted, then theCinderellahypothesiswasconsideredtohavebeenproved—theglassslipperwashersandtheprinceclaimedhisbride.

CHAPTERXXVII.

DeductiveReasoning.

W E have seen in the preceding chapter that from particular facts wereasoninductivelytogeneralprinciplesortruths.Wehavealsoseenthatoneof the steps of inductive reasoning is the testing of the hypothesis bydeductive reasoning. We shall now also see that the results of inductivereasoningareusedaspremisesorbases fordeductive reasoning.These twoformsofreasoningareoppositesandyetcomplementarytoeachother; theyareinasenseindependentandyetareinterdependent.Brookssays:“Thetwomethodsofreasoningarethereverseofeachother.Onegoesfromparticularsto generals; the other from generals to particulars. One is a process ofanalysis;theotherisaprocessofsynthesis.Onerisesfromfactstolaws;theotherdescendsfromlawstofacts.Eachisindependentoftheother,andeachisavalidandessentialmethodofinference.”

Halleckwellexpressesthespiritofdeductivereasoningasfollows:“Afterinduction has classified certain phenomena and thus given us a majorpremise, we may proceed deductively to apply the inference to any newspecimenthatcanbeshowntobelongtothatclass.Inductionhandsovertodeductiona ready-madepremise.Deduction takes that as a fact,makingnoinquiryregardingitstruth.Onlyaftergenerallawshavebeenlaiddown,afterobjects have been classified, after major premises have been formed, candeductionbeemployed.”

Deductivereasoningproceedsfromgeneralprinciplestoparticularfacts.Itisadescendingprocess,analyticalinitsnature.Itrestsuponthefundamentalaxiomatic basis that “whatever is true of thewhole is true of its parts,” or“whateveristrueoftheuniversalistrueoftheparticulars.”

Theprocessofdeductivereasoningmaybestatedbrieflyasfollows:(1)Ageneralprincipleofaclassisstatedasamajorpremise;(2)aparticularthingis stated as belonging to that general class, this statement being theminorpremise; therefore (3) the general class principle is held to apply to theparticularthing,thislaststatementbeingtheconclusion.(A“premise”is“apropositionassumedtobetrue.”)

Thefollowinggivesusanillustrationoftheaboveprocess:—

I. (Major premise)—A bird is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged,oviparousvertebrate.

II.(Minorpremise)—Thesparrowisabird;therefore

III. (Conclusion)—The sparrow is a warm-blooded, feathered, winged,oviparousvertebrate.

Or,again:—

I. (Major premise)—Rattlesnakes frequently bite when enraged, andtheirbiteispoisonous.

II.(Minorpremise)—Thissnakebeforemeisarattlesnake;therefore

III. (Conclusion)—This snake beforememay bitewhen enraged, and itsbitewillbepoisonous.

Theaveragepersonmaybe inclined toobject thathe isnot consciousofgoing through this complicated processwhen he reasons about sparrows orrattlesnakes. But he does, nevertheless. He is not conscious of the steps,becausementalhabithasaccustomedhimtotheprocess,anditisperformedmoreorlessautomatically.Butthesethreestepsmanifestinallprocessesofdeductive reasoning, even the simplest. The average person is like thecharacter in the French playwhowas surprised to learn that he had “beentalking prose for forty years without knowing it.” Jevons says that themajorityofpersonsareequally surprisedwhen they findout that theyhavebeenusing logical forms,moreor less correctly,without having realized it.He says: “A large number even of educated persons have no clear idea ofwhatlogicis.Yet,inacertainway,everyonemusthavebeenalogiciansincehebegantospeak.”

There aremany technical rules and principles of logic whichwe cannotattempttoconsiderhere.Thereare,however,afewelementaryprinciplesofcorrect reasoning which should have a place here. What is known as a“syllogism” is the expression inwordsof thevariousparts of the completeprocessofreasoningorargument.Whatelydefinesitasfollows:“Asyllogismis an argument expressed in strict logical form so that its conclusiveness ismanifestfromthestructureoftheexpressionalone,withoutanyregardtothemeaningoftheterm.”Inshort,ifthetwopremisesareacceptedascorrect,itfollowsthattherecanbeonlyonetruelogicalconclusionresultingtherefrom.Inabstractortheoreticalreasoningtheword“if”isassumedtoprecedeeachofthetwopremises,the“therefore”beforetheconclusionresultingfromthe“if,”ofcourse.Thefollowingarethegeneralrulesgoverningthesyllogism:—

I. Every syllogism must consist of three, and no more than three,propositions,namely(1)themajorpremise,(2)theminorpremise,and(3)theconclusion.

II.Theconclusionmustnaturallyfollowfromthepremises,otherwisethesyllogismisinvalidandconstitutesafallacyorsophism.

III.Onepremise,atleast,mustbeaffirmative.

IV.Ifonepremiseisnegative,theconclusionmustbenegative.

V.Onepremise,atleast,mustbeuniversalorgeneral.

VI.Ifonepremiseisparticular,theconclusionalsomustbeparticular.

The last two rules (V. andVI.) contain the essential principles of all therules regarding syllogisms, and any syllogism which breaks them will befound also to break other rules, some of which are not stated here for thereason that they are too technical. These two rules may be tested byconstructingsyllogismsinviolationoftheirprinciples.Thereasonforthemisas follows: (RuleV.)Because “from two particular premises no conclusioncanbedrawn,”as,forinstance:(1)Somemenaremortal;(2)Johnisaman.We cannot reason from this either that John is or is notmortal. Themajorpremise should read“allmen.” (RuleVI.)Because “a universal conclusioncanbedrawnonlyfromtwouniversalpremises,”anexamplebeingneedlesshere,astheconclusionissoobvious.

CULTIVATIONOFREASONINGFACULTIES.

Thereisnoroyalroadtothecultivationofthereasoningfaculties.Thereisbuttheoldfamiliarrule:Practice,exercise,use.Neverthelesstherearecertainstudies which tend to develop the faculties in question. The study ofarithmetic, especially mental arithmetic, tends to develop correct habits ofreasoningfromonetruthtoanother—fromcausetoeffect.Betterstill is thestudy of geometry; and best of all, of course, is the study of logic and thepracticeofworkingoutitsproblemsandexamples.Thestudyofphilosophyandpsychologyalso is useful in thisway.Many lawyers and teachershavedrilled themselves in geometry solely for the purpose of developing theirlogicalreasoningpowers.

Brooks says: “Sovaluable is geometry as a discipline thatmany lawyersandothersreviewtheirgeometryeveryyearinordertokeeptheminddrilledto logical habits of thinking. * * * The study of logic will aid in thedevelopment of the power of deductive reasoning. It does this, first, byshowingthemethodbywhichwereason.Toknowhowwereason,toseethelawswhichgovernthereasoningprocess,toanalyzethesyllogismandseeits

conformity to the laws of thought, is not only an exercise of reasoning butgivesthatknowledgeoftheprocessthatwillbebothastimulusandaguidetothought. No one can trace the principles and processes of thought withoutreceiving thereby an impetus to thought. In the second place, the study oflogic is probably evenmorevaluablebecause it givespractice indeductivethinking. This, perhaps, is its principal value, since the mind reasonsinstinctively without knowing how it reasons. One can think without theknowledgeof thescienceof thinking justasonecanuse languagecorrectlywithoutaknowledgeofgrammar;yetasthestudyofgrammarimprovesone’sspeech,sothestudyoflogiccanbutimproveone’sthought.”

Intheopinionofthewriterhereof,oneofthebestthoughsimplemethodsof cultivating the faculties of reasoning is to acquaint one’s self thoroughlywiththemorecommonfallaciesorformsoffalsereasoning—sothoroughlythatnotonlyisthefalsereasoningdetectedatoncebutalsothereasonofitsfalsityisreadilyunderstood.Tounderstandthewrongwaysofreasoningistobe on guard against them. By guarding against them we tend to eliminatethemfromour thoughtprocesses.Ifweeliminate thefalsewehavethetrueleftinitsplace.Thereforewerecommendtheweedingofthelogicalgardenof the common fallacies, to the end that the flowers of pure reason mayflourishintheirstead.Accordingly,wethinkitwelltocallyourattentioninthenextchaptertothemorecommonfallacies,andthereasonoftheirfalsity.

CHAPTERXXVIII.

FallaciousReasoning.

A FALLACY is defined as “an unsound argument or mode of arguingwhich,whileappearingtobedecisiveofaquestion,isinrealitynotso;orafallaciousstatementorpropositioninwhichtheerrorisnotreadilyapparent.When a fallacy is used to deceive others, it is called ‘sophistry,’” It isimportant that the student should understand the nature of the fallacy andunderstanditsmostcommonforms.AsJevonssays:“Inlearninghowtodoright it is always desirable to be informed as to theways inwhichwe arelikelytogowrong.Indescribingtoamantheroadwhichheshouldfollow,weought to tell himnot only the turningswhich he is to take but also theturnings which he is to avoid. Similarly, it is a useful part of logic whichteachesusthewaysandturningsbywhichpeoplemostcommonlygoastrayinreasoning.”

In presenting the following brief statement regarding the more commonformsoffallacy,weomitsofaraspossiblethetechnicaldetailswhichbelongtotext-booksonlogic.

FALLACIES.

I. True Collective but False Particular.—An example of this fallacy isfoundintheargumentthatbecausetheFrenchrace,collectively,areexcitable,therefore a particular Frenchman must be excitable. Or that because theJewish race, collectively, are good business people, therefore the particularJew must be a good business man. This is as fallacious as arguing thatbecauseamanmaydrownintheoceanheshouldavoidthebath,basin,orcupof water. There is a vast difference between the whole of a thing and itsseparate parts. Nitric acid and glycerin, separately, are not explosive, but,combined, they form nitro-glycerin, a most dangerous and powerfulexplosive. Reversing this form of illustration, we remind you of the oldsaying:“Saltisagoodthing;butonedoesn’twanttobeputinpickle.”

II. Irrelevant Conclusion.—This fallacy consists in introducing in theconclusionmatter not contained in the premises, or in the confusing of theissue.Forinstance:(1)Allmenaresinful;(2)JohnSmithisaman;therefore(3)JohnSmithisahorsethief.Thismaysoundabsurd,butmanyarguments

areasfallaciousasthis,andforthesamereason.Oranotherandmoresubtleform: (1) All thieves are liars; (2) John Smith is a liar; therefore (3) JohnSmithisathief.Thefirstexamplearisesfromtheintroductionofnewmatter,andthelastfromtheconfusionoftheissue.

III. False Cause.—This fallacy consists in attributing cause to a thingwhichismerelycoincidentwith,orprecedentto,theeffect.Forinstance:(1)The cock crows just before or at the moment of sunrise; therefore (2) thecock-crowing is the causeof the sunrise.Or, again: (1)Badcrops followedtheelectionofaWhigpresident;therefore(2)theWhigpartyisthecauseofthebadcrops.Or,again:(1)Wherecivilizationis thehighest, therewefindthe greatest number of high hats; therefore (2) high hats are the cause ofcivilization.

IV.CircularReasoning.—In this form of fallacy the person reasoning orarguingendeavorstoexplainorproveathingbyitselforitsownterms.Forinstance:(1)TheWhigpartyishonestbecauseitadvocateshonestprinciples;(2) theWhigprinciplesarehonestbecause theyareadvocatedbyanhonestparty.Acommon formof this fallacy in itsphaseof sophistry is theuseofsynonymsinsuchamannerthattheyseemtoexpressmorethantheoriginalconception,whereas they are really but other terms for the same thing.Anhistoric example of circular reasoning is the following: (1) The Church ofEngland is the trueChurch, because itwas established byGod; (2) itmusthave been established byGod, because it is the true Church. This form ofsophistry ismosteffectivewhenemployed in longarguments inwhich it isdifficulttodetectit.

V. Begging the Question.—This fallacy arises from the use of a falsepremise, or at least of a premise the truth ofwhich is not admitted by theopponent. It may be stated, simply, as “the unwarranted assumption of apremise,generallythemajorpremise.”Manypersons inpublic lifeargueinthis way. They boldly assert an unwarranted premise, and then proceed toarguelogicallyfromit.Theresultisconfusingtotheaverageperson,for,thestepsofthereasoningbeinglogical,itseemsasiftheargumentissound,thefactoftheunwarrantedpremisebeingoverlooked.Thepersonusingthisformof sophistry proceeds onAaronBurr’s theory of truth being “thatwhich isboldlyassertedandplausiblymaintained.”

Bulwermakesoneofhischaractersmentionaparticularlyatrociousformofthisfallacy(althoughanamusingone)inthefollowingwords:“Wheneveryouareabouttouttersomethingastonishinglyfalse,alwaysbeginwith:‘Itisanacknowledgedfact,’etc.SirRobertFilmerwasamasterofthismannerofwriting.Thuswithwhatasolemnfacethatgreatmanattemptedtocheat.Hewouldsay:‘Itisatruthundeniablethattherecannotbeanymultitudeofmen

whatsoever,eithergreatorsmall,etc.,butthatinthesamemultitudethereisonemanamongthemthatinnaturehatharighttobeKingofalltherest—asbeingthenextheirofAdam!’”

Look carefully for the major premise of propositions advanced inargument,spokenorwritten.Besurethatthepersonmakingthepropositionisnot“beggingthequestion”bytheunwarrantedassumptionofthepremise.

GENERALRULEOFINFERENCE.

Hyslop saysconcerningvalid inferencesand fallaciousones: “Wecannotinferanythingwepleasefromanypremisesweplease.Wemustconformtocertain definite rules or principles.Any violation of themwill be a fallacy.There are two simple rules which should not be violated: (1) The subject-matter in the conclusion should be of the same general kind as in thepremises; (2) the facts constituting thepremisesmust beacceptedandmustnotbefictitious.”Acloseobservanceoftheseruleswillresultinthedetectionandavoidanceoftheprincipalformsoffallaciousreasoningandsophistry.

SOPHISTICALARGUMENTS.

Thereareanumberoftrickypracticesresortedtobypersonsinargument,thatarefallaciousinintentandresult,whichwedonotconsiderhereindetailastheyscarcelybelongtotheparticularsubjectofthisbook.Abriefmention,however,maybepermittedintheinterestofgeneralinformation.Herearetheprincipalones:—

(1)Arguingthatapropositioniscorrectbecausetheopponentcannotprovethe contrary. The fallacy is seen when we realize that the statement, “Themoon ismadeofgreencheese,” isnotprovedbecausewecannotprove thecontrary.Noamountoffailuretodisproveapropositionreallyprovesit;andnoamountoffailuretoproveapropositionreallydisproves it.Asageneralrule,theburdenofproofrestsuponthepersonstatingtheproposition,andhisopponentisnotcalledupontodisproveitorelsehaveitconsideredproved.Theoldcryof“Youcannotprovethatitisnotso”isbaseduponafallaciousconception.

(2)Abuseoftheopponent,hisparty,orhiscause.Thisisnorealargumentor reasoning. It is akin toprovingapointbybeating theopponentover thehead.

(3) Arguing that an opponent does not live up to his principles is noargument against the principles he advocates. A man may advocate theprincipleof temperanceandyetdrink toexcess.This simplyproves thathe

preachesbetterthanhepractices;butthetruthoftheprincipleoftemperanceisnotaffectedinanywaythereby.Theproofofthisisthathemaychangehispractices; and it cannot be held that the change of his personal habitsimprovesorchangesthenatureoftheprinciple.

(4)Argumentofauthorityisnotbasedonlogic.Authorityisvaluablewhenreally worthy, and merely as corroboration or adding weight; but it is notlogical argument. The reasons of the authority alone constitute a realargument. The abuse of this form of argument is shown, in the abovereferenceto“beggingthequestion,”inthequotationfromBulwer.

(5)Appealtoprejudiceorpublicopinionisnotavalidargument,forpublicopinion is frequentlywrongandprejudice isoftenunwarranted.And,at thebest, they “have nothing to dowith the case” from the standpoint of logic.Theabuseoftestimonyandclaimedevidenceisalsoworthyofexamination,butwecannotgointothesubjecthere.

FALLACIESOFPREJUDICE.

Butperhapsthemostdangerousofallfallaciesinthesearchfortruthonthepartofthemostofusarethosewhicharisefromthefollowing:—

(1)The tendency toreasonfromwhatwefeelandwish tobe true, ratherthan from the actual facts of the case, which causes us unconsciously toassume the mental attitude of “if the facts agree with our likes and pettheories,alliswell;iftheydonot,somuchtheworseforthefacts.”

(2)Thetendencyinallofustoperceiveonlythefactsthatagreewithourtheories and to ignore the others. We find that for which we seek, andoverlookthatwhichdoesnotinterestus.Ourdiscoveriesfollowourinterest,andourinterestfollowsourdesiresandbeliefs.

The intelligentman orwoman realizes these tendencies of human natureand endeavors to avoid them in his or her own reasoning, but is keenlyconscious of them in the arguments and reasoning of others. A failure toobserve and guard one’s self against these tendencies results in bigotry,intolerance,narrowness,andintellectualastigmatism.

CHAPTERXXIX.

TheWill.

T HE activities of the will comprise the third great class of mentalprocesses.Psychologists alwayshavedifferedgreatly in their conceptionofjust what constitutes these activities. Even to-day it is difficult to obtain adictionary definition of the will that agrees with the best opinion on thesubject.Thedictionariesadheretotheoldclassificationandconceptionwhichregardedthewillas“thatfacultyofthemindorsoulbywhichitchoosesordecides.”Butwith thegrowthof the idea that thewillactsaccording to thestrongest motive, and that the motive is supplied by the average struckbetweenthedesiresofthemoment,underthesupervisionoftheintellect,theconceptionofwillasthechoosinganddecidingfacultyispassingfromfavor.Intheplaceoftheolderconceptionhascometheneweronewhichholdsthatthewillisprimarilyconcernedwithaction.

Itisdifficulttoplacethewillinthecategoryofmentalprocesses.Butitisgenerallyagreedthat itabidesintheverycenterof thementalbeing,andiscloselyassociatedwithwhatiscalledtheego,orself.Thewillseemstohaveat least threegeneral phases, viz.: (1)Thephaseofdesire, (2) thephaseofdeliberationorchoice,and(3) thephaseofexpressioninaction.Inorder tounderstandthewill,itisnecessarytoconsidereachofthesethreephasesofitsactivities.

(1).DESIRE.

The first phase of will, which is called “desire,” is in itself somewhatcomplex.On its lower side it touches, and, in fact, blends into, feeling andemotion.Itscenterconsistsofastateoftension,akintothatofacoiledspringoracatcrouchingreadyforaspring.Onitshighersideittouches,penetrates,andblendsintotheotherphasesofthewillwhichwehavementioned.

Desireisdefinedas“afeeling,emotion,orexcitementoftheminddirectedtoward theattainment,enjoyment,orpossessionofsomeobject fromwhichpleasure,profit,orgratification isexpected.”Halleckgivesus thefollowingexcellentconceptionofthemovingspiritofdesire:“Desirehasforitsobjectsomethingwhichwillbringpleasureorgetridofpain,immediateorremote,for the individual or for someone inwhomhe is interested.Aversion, or a

strivingawayfromsomething,ismerelythenegativeaspectofdesire.”

InHalleck’sstatement,abovequoted,wehavetheexplanationof thepartplayedbytheintellectintheactivitiesofwill.Theintellectisabletoperceivetherelationsbetweenpresentactionandfutureresults,andisabletopointthewaytowardthesuppressionofsomedesiresinorderthatotherandbetteronesmaybemanifested. It also serves its purposes in regulating the “strikingofthe average” between conflicting desires. Without the intervention of theintellect,thetemporarydesireofthemomentwouldinvariablybeacteduponwithout regard to future results or consequences to one’s self and others. Italso serves to point out the course of action calculated to give the mostsatisfactoryexpressionofthedesire.

While it isa fact that theactionofwilldependsalmostentirelyupon themotiveforceofdesire,itislikewisetruethatdesiremaybecreated,regulated,suppressed,andevenkilledbytheactionof thewill.Thewill,bygivingorrefusingattentiontoacertainclassofdesires,mayeithercausethemtogrowandwaxstrong,orelsedieandfadeaway.Itmustberemembered,however,thatthisuseofthewillitselfspringsfromanothersetofdesiresorfeelings.

Desire is aroused by feelings or emotions rising from the subconsciousplanes of the mind and seeking expression and manifestation. We haveconsidered the nature of the feelings and emotions in previous chapters,which should be read in connection with the present one. It should beremembered that the feeling or emotional side of desire arises from eitherinheritedracememoriesexistingasinstincts,orfromthememoryofthepastexperiences of the individual. In some cases the feeling firstmanifests in avague unrest caused by subconscious promptings and excitement. Then theimagination pictures the object of the feeling, or certain memory imagesconnectedwithit,andthedesirethusmanifestsontheplaneofconsciousness.

The entrance of the desire feeling into consciousness is accompanied bythat peculiar tensionwhichmarks the second phase of desire.This tension,whensufficientlystrong,passesintothethirdphaseofdesire,orthatinwhichdesireblendsintowillaction.Desireinthisstagemakesademanduponwillfor expression and action. From mere feeling, and tension of feeling, itbecomesacalltoaction.Butbeforeexpressionandactionaregiventoit,thesecondphaseofwillmustmanifestatleastforamoment;thissecondphaseisthatknownasdeliberation,ortheweighingandbalancingofdesires.

(2).DELIBERATION.

Thesecondphaseofwill,knownasdeliberation, ismore than thepurelyintellectual process which the term would indicate. The intellect plays an

importantpart,itistrue,butthereisalsoanalmostinstinctiveandautomaticweighing and balancing of desires. There is seldom only one desirepresenting its claims upon thewill at any particularmoment. It is true thatoccasionally there arises an emotional desire of such dominant power andstrengththatitcrowdsouteveryotherclaimantatthebarofdeliberation.Butsuchinstancesarerare,andasarulethereareahostofrivalclaimants,eachinsisting upon its rights in the matter at issue. In the man of weak orundevelopedanduntrainedintellect,thestruggleisusuallylittlemorethanabrief combatbetween several desires, inwhich the strongest at themomentwins.Butwiththedevelopmentofintellectnewfactorsariseandnewforcesarefelt.Moreover,themorecomplexone’semotionalnature,andthegreaterthe development of the higher forms of feeling, the more intense is thestruggleofdeliberationorthefightofthedesires.

We see, in Halleck’s definition, that desire has not only the object of“bringing pleasure or getting rid of pain” for the individual, but that theadditionalelementofthewelfareof“someoneinwhomheis interested”isadded,which element is often the deciding factor. This element, of course,arisesfromthedevelopmentandcultivationofone’semotionalnature.Inthesamewaywealsoseethatitisnotmerelytheimmediatewelfareofone’sselfor those inwhom one is interested that speaks before the bar, but also themoreremotewelfare.Thisconsiderationoffuturewelfaredependsupontheintellect and cultivated imagination under its control.Moreover, the trainedintellect is able to discover possible greater satisfaction in some course ofactionotherthanintheonepromptedbytheclamoringdesireofthemoment.Thisexplainswhythejudgmentandactionofanintelligentman,asarule,arefar different from those of the unintelligent one; and also why a man ofculturetendstowarddifferentactionfromthatoftheuncultured;andlikewise,whythemanofbroadsympathiesandhighidealsactsinadifferentwayfromone of the opposite type. But the principle is ever the same—the feelingsmanifestindesire,thegreatestultimatesatisfactionapparentatthemomentissought,andthestrongestsetofdesireswinstheday.

Halleck’s comment on this point is interesting. He says: “Desire is notalwaysproportionaltotheideaofone’sownselfishpleasure.Manypersons,afterforminganideaofthevastamountofearthlydistress,desiretorelieveit,andthedesiregoesoutinaction,asthebenevolentsocietiesineverycitytestify. Here the individual pleasure is none the less, but it is secondary,coming from the pleasure of others. The desire of the near often raises astronger desire than the remote. A child frequently prefers a thingimmediatelyifitisonlyonetenthasgoodassomethinghemighthaveayearhence.Astudentoftendesiresmoretheleisureofto-daythanthesuccessoffutureyears.Thoughadmonishedtostudy,hewasteshistimeandthusloses

incomparably greater future pleasure when he is tossed to the rear in thestruggleforexistence.”

The result of thisweighing and balancing of the desire is, or should be,decisionandchoice,which thenpasses intoaction.Butmanypersonsseemunableto“makeuptheirownmind,”andrequireapushorurgefromwithoutbeforetheywillact.Othersdecide,withoutproperuseoftheintellect,uponwhattheycall“impulse,”butwhichismerelyimpatience.Somearelikethefabled donkey which starved to death when placed at an equal distancebetween two equally attractivehaystacks andwasunable to decide towardswhich to move. Others follow the example of Jeppe, in the comedy, who,whengivenacoinwithwhichtobuyapieceofsoapforhiswife,stoodonthecornerdeliberatingwhethertoobeyordersortobuyadrinkwiththemoney.He wants the drink, but realizes that his wife will beat him if he returnswithoutthesoap.“Mystomachsaysdrink;mybacksayssoap,”saysJeppe.“But,”finallyheremarks,“isnotaman’sstomachmoretohimthanhisback?Yes,saysI.”

Thefinaldecisiondependsuponthestrikingabalancebetweenthedesires,—theweighingofdesireforanddesireagainst,—desireforthisanddesireforsomethingelse.Thestrengthoftheseveraldesiresdependsuponnearnessandpresentinterestarisingfromattention,asappliedtothefeelingsandemotionsarising from heredity, environment, experience, and education, whichconstitute character; and also upon the degree of intellectual clearness andpowerinformingcorrectjudgmentsbetweenthedesires.

It must be remembered, however, that the intellect appears not as anopponent of the principle of the satisfaction of desire, but merely as aninstrumentoftheegoindeterminingwhichcourseofactionwillresultinthegreatestultimatesatisfaction,director indirect,presentorfuture.For,at thelast, every individual acts so as to bring himself the greatest satisfaction,immediateorfuture,directorindirect,eitherpersonalorthroughthewelfareofothers,asthismayappeartohimattheparticularmomentofdeliberation.Wealwaysactinthedirectionofthatwhichwillgreater“contentourspirit.”This will be found to be the spirit of all decisions, although themotive isoftenhiddenanddifficulttofindevenbytheindividualhimself,manyofthestrongestmotiveshavingtheirorigininthesubconsciousplanesofmentality.

(3).ACTION.

The third and final phase of will is that known as action—the act ofvolitionbywhichthedesire-ideaisexpressedinphysicalormentalactivity.Theoldconceptionofthewillheldthatthedecisivephaseofthewillwasits

characteristicandfinalphase,ignoringthefactthattheveryessenceorspiritof will is bound up with action. Even those familiar with the newerconception frequently assume that the act of decision is the final phase ofwill, ignoring the fact thatwe frequentlydecide to do a thing and yetmaynevercarryouttheintentionanddecision.Theactofwillingisnotcompleteunless action is expressed. There must be the manifestation of the motorelementorphaseofwill,elsethewillprocessisincomplete.

Aweaknessofthislastphaseofwillaffectstheentirewillandrendersitsprocessesineffective.Theworldisfilledwithpersonswhoareabletodecidewhatisbesttodo,andwhatshouldbedone,butwhoneveractuallyactuponthe decision. The few persons who promptly follow up the decision withvigorousactionarethosewhoaccomplishtheworld’swork.Withoutthefullmanifestationofthisthirdphaseofwilltheothertwophasesareuseless.

TYPESOFWILL.

Sofarwehaveconsideredmerely thehighest typeofwill—thatwhich isaccompaniedbyconsciousdeliberation,inwhichtheintellecttakesanactivepart. In this process, not only do the conflicting feelings push themselvesforward with opposing claims for recognition, but the intellect is active inexamining the case and offering valuable testimony as to the comparativemeritsofthevariousclaimantsandtheeffectofcertaincoursesofactionupontheindividual.Thereare,however,severallowerformsofwillmanifestationwhichweshouldbrieflyconsiderinpassing.

ReflexAction.—Thewill ismovedtoactionbythereflexactivitiesof thenervous system which have been mentioned in the earlier chapters of thisbook. In this general type we find unconscious reflex action, such as thatmanifestedwhenasleeperistouchedandmovesaway,orwhenthefrog’slegtwitcheswhenthenerveendisexcited.Wealsofindconsciousreflexaction,such as that manifested by the winking of the eye, or the performance ofhabitual physical motion, such as the movement in walking, operating thesewingmachineortypewriter,playingthepiano,etc.

ImpulsiveAction.—Thewillisoftenmovedtoactionbyadimideaorfaintperceptionofpurposeor impulse.Theaction isalmost instinctive,althoughthere is a vagueperceptionof purpose.For instance,we feel an impulse toturntowardthesourceofastrangesoundorsight,orothersourceofinterestorcuriosity.Orwemayfeelanimpulsearisingfromthesubconsciousplaneofourmind,causingadimly-consciousideaofmovementoractiontorelievethetension.Forinstance,onemayfeeladesiretoexercise,ortoseekfreshairorgreenfields,althoughhehadnotbeenthinkingofthesethingsatthetime.

These impulses arise from a subconscious feeling of fatigue or desire forchange, which, added to a fleeting idea, produces the impulse. Unless animpulse is inhibited by the will activities inspired by other desires, habits,ideas,orideals,weactuponitinpreciselythesamewaythatayoungchildoranimal does. Hoffding says of this type of action: “The psychologicalcondition of the impulse is, that with themomentary feeling and sensationshould be combined a more or less clear idea of something which mayaugmentthepleasureordiminishthepainofthemoment.”

Instinctive Action.—The will is frequently moved to action by aninstinctive stimulus. This form of will activity closely resembles the lastmentioned form, and often it is impossible to distinguish between the two.Theactivitiesofthebeeinbuildingitscombandstoringitshoney,theworkofthesilkwormandcaterpillarinbuildingtheirrestingplaces,areexamplesofthisformofaction.Indeed,eventhebuildingofthenestofthebirdmaybesoclassed.Inthesecasesthereisanintelligentactiontowardadefiniteend,but the animal is unconscious of that end. The experiences of the remoteancestorsofthesecreaturesrecordedtheirimpressionsuponthesubconsciousmind of the species, and they are transmitted in some way to all of thatspecies.Thenervoussystemofeverylivingthingisarecordcylinderoftheexperiencesofitsearlyancestors,andthesecylinderstendtoreproducetheseimpressions upon appropriate occasions. In preceding chapters we haveshownthatevenmanisundertheinfluenceofinstincttoagreaterextentthanheimagineshimselftobe.

CHAPTERXXX.

Will-Training.

I T is of the utmost importance that the individual develop, cultivate, andtrain hiswill so as to bring it under the influence of the higher part of hismentalandmoralbeing.Whilethewillisusedmosteffectivelyindevelopingand training the intellect andbuilding character, it itselfmustbe trainedbyitself to habitually come under the guidance of the intellect and under theinfluenceofthatwhichwecallcharacter.

Theinfluenceofthetrainedwillupontheseveralmentalfacultiesismostmarked.Therearenofacultieswhichmaynotbecultivatedbythewill.Thefirstandgreattaskofthewillinthisdirectionisthecontrolanddirectionoftheattention.Thewilldeterminesthekindofinterestthatshallprevailatthemoment,andthekindofinterestlargelydeterminesthecharacteroftheman,histastes,hisfeelings,histhoughts,hisacts.Gordysays:“Coöperatingwithapre-existinginfluence,thewillcanmakeaweakeroneprevailoverastronger.*** Itdetermineswhichofpre-existing influences shallhavecontroloverthemind.”

Moreover,concentratedandcontinuedattentiondependsentirelyupontheexercise of the will. As Gordy says: “If the will relaxes its hold upon theactivitiesofthemind,theattentionisliabletobecarriedawaybyanyoneofthethousandsofideasthatthelawsofassociationareconstantlybringingintoourminds.”

Even in the matter of mental images the will asserts its sway, and theimaginationmaybetrainedtobetheobedientservantofthedevelopedwill.Regardingtheinfluenceofthewilluponcharacter,Davidsonsays:“Itisnotenough for a man to understand correctly and love duly the conditions ofmorallifeinhisowntime;hemust,stillfurther,bewillingandabletofulfilltheseconditions.Andhecertainlycannotdothisunlesshiswillistrainedtoperfect freedom, so that it responds, with the utmost readiness, to thesuggestions of his discriminating intelligence and the movements of hischastened affections.”Halleck says: “We graduallymake our characters byseparate acts of will, just as a blacksmith by repeated blows beats out ahorseshoeorananchor fromashapelessmassof iron.Afinishedanchororhorseshoewasnevertheproductofasingleblow.”

TRAININGTHEWILL.

Perhaps thebestway to train thewill is touse it intelligently,andwithapurpose.Thetrainingofanyfacultyofthemindisatthesametimeatrainingofthewill.Theattentionbeingsocloselyalliedtothewill,itfollowsthatacareful training of attention will result in a strengthening of the will. Thetraining of the emotional side of one’s nature also brings results in thestrengtheningofthewill.

Halleck gives his students excellent advice regarding the training of thewill. It would be hard to find anything better along these lines than thefollowing fromhis pen: “Nothing schools thewill, and renders it ready foreffort in thiscomplexworld,better thanaccustoming it to facedisagreeablethings.ProfessorJamesadvisesalltodosomethingoccasionallyfornootherreasonthanthattheywouldrathernotdoit,ifitisnothingmorethangivingupaseatinastreetcar.Helikenssuchefforttotheinsurancethatamanpaysonhishouse.Hehassomethingthathecanfallbackonintimeoftrouble.Awillschooledinthiswayisalwaysreadytorespond,nomatterhowgreattheemergency.Whileanotherwouldbecryingoverspilledmilk,thepossessorofsuchawillhasalreadyfoundanothercow.***Theonlywaytosecuresuchawillistopracticedoingdisagreeablethings.Therearedailyopportunities.***AmanwhohaddeclaredhisaversiontowhathedeemedthedryfactsofpoliticaleconomywasonedayfoundknittinghisbrowoverachapterofJohnStuartMill.Whenafriendexpressedsurprise,themanreplied:‘Iamplayingtheschoolmasterwithmyself.IamreadingthisbecauseIdislikeit.’Suchamanhastheelementsofsuccessinhim.***Ontheotherhand,theonewhohabituallyavoidsdisagreeableactionistraininghiswilltobeofnousetohimatatimewhensupremeeffortisdemanded.Suchawillcanneverelbowitswaytothefrontinlife.”

HABITS.

Habitsarethebeatentrackoverwhichthewilltravels.Thebeatenpathofhabit is thelineof leastresistancetothewill.Onewhowouldtrainhiswillmust needs pay attention to providing itwith the propermental paths overwhichtotravel.Theruleforthecreationofhabitsissimplythis:Traveloverthementalpathasoftenaspossible.Theruleforbreakingundesirablehabitsisthis:Cultivatetheoppositehabit.Inthesetworulesisexpressedthegistofwhathasbeenwrittenonthesubject.

Professor William James has left to the world some invaluable adviceregarding the cultivation of right habits. He bases his rules upon those ofProfessor Bain, elaborates these, and adds some equally good ones. We

herewithquotefreelyfrombothJamesandBainonthissubject;itisthebesteverwrittenregardinghabitbuilding.

I.“Intheacquisitionofanewhabit,ortheleavingoffofanoldone,launchyourselfwith as strong anddecided an initiative as possible.Thiswill giveyournewbeginningsuchamomentumthatthetemptationtobreakdownwillnot occur as soon as it otherwise might; and every day during which abreakdown is postponed adds to the chances of it not occurring atall.”—James.

II.“Neversufferanexceptiontooccurtillthenewhabitissecurelyrootedinyourlife.Everylapseislikethelettingfallofaballofstringwhichoneiscarefullywindingup—asingleslipundoesmorethanagreatmanyturnswillwindagain.”—James. “It is necessary, above all things, in such a situation,nevertoloseabattle.Everygainonthewrongsideundoestheeffectofmanyconquests on the right. The essential precaution is so to regulate the twoopposingpowers that theonemayhavea seriesofuninterrupted successes,untilrepetitionhasfortifiedittosuchadegreeastoenableittocopewiththeopposition,underanycircumstances.”—Bain.

III.“Seizetheveryfirstpossibleopportunitytoactoneveryresolutionyoumake,andoneveryemotionalpromptingyoumayexperienceinthedirectionofthehabitsyouaspiretogain.Itisnotinthemomentoftheirforming,butinthe moment of their producingmotor effects, that resolves and aspirationscommunicate theirnew‘set’ to thebrain.”—James. “Theactualpresenceofthepracticalopportunityalonefurnishesthefulcrumuponwhichthelevercanrest,bywhichthemoralwillmaymultiplyitsstrengthandraiseitselfaloft.Hewhohasnosolidgroundtopressagainstwillnevergetbeyondthestageofemptygesturemaking.”—Bain.

IV.“Keepthefacultyaliveinyoubyalittlegratuitousexerciseeveryday.That is, be systematically ascetic or heroic in little, unnecessary points; doeverydaysomethingfornootherreasonthanthatyouwouldrathernotdoit,sothatwhenthehourofdireneeddrawsnigh,itmayfindyounotunnervedanduntrainedtostandthetest.***Themanwhohasdailyinuredhimselftohabits of concentrated attention, energetic volition, and self-denial inunnecessarythingswillstandlikeatowerwheneverythingrocksaroundhim,and when his softer fellow mortals are winnowed like chaff in theblast.”—James.

CHAPTERXXXI.

Will-Tonic.

I Nadditiontothegeneralrulesfordevelopingandtrainingthewillgivenintheprecedingchapter,weaskyou to toneupandstrengthen thewillby theinspirationtobederivedfromthewordsofsomeoftheworld’sgreatthinkersanddoers. In thesewords there is suchavital statementof the recognition,realization,andmanifestationofthatsomethingwithin,whichwecall“will,”thatitisadullsoul,indeed,whichisnotinspiredbythecontagionoftheidea.These expressions are themilestones on the Path ofAttainment, placed bythose who have preceded us on the journey. We submit these quotationswithoutcomment;theyspeakforthemselves.

WORDSOFTHEWISE.

“Theycanwhothinktheycan.Characterisaperfectlyeducatedwill.”

“Nothing can resist thewill of amanwho knowswhat is true andwillswhatisgood.”

“In all difficulties advance andwill, for within you is a power, a livingforce,whichthemoreyoutrustandlearntousewillannihilatetheoppositionofmatter.”

“Thestaroftheunconqueredwill,

Itrisesinmybreast,

Sereneandresoluteandstill,

Andcalmandself-possessed.

“Sonighisgrandeurtoourdust,

SonearisGodtoman,

Whendutywhisperslow,‘Thoumust!’

Theyouthreplies,‘Ican!’”

“ThelongerIlive,themorecertainIamthatthegreatdifferencebetween

men,betweenthefeebleandthepowerful, thegreatandtheinsignificant, isenergy,—invincibledetermination,—apurposeoncefixed,andthendeathorvictory.Thatqualitywilldoanythingthatcanbedoneinthisworld,andnotalents,nocircumstances,noopportunitieswillmakeatwo-leggedcreatureamanwithoutit.”—Buxton.

“Thehumanwill,thatforceunseen,

Theoffspringofadeathlesssoul,

Canhewawaytoanygoal,

Thoughwallsofgraniteintervene.

“Youwillbewhatyouwilltobe;

Letfailurefinditsfalsecontent

Inthatpoorwordenvironment,

Butspiritscornsitandisfree.

“Itmasterstime,itconquersspace,

Itcowsthatboastfultrickster,chance,

Andbidsthetyrantcircumstance

Uncrownandfillaservant’splace.”

“Resolve is what makes a man manifest; not puny resolve, not crudedeterminations, not errant purpose, but that strong and indefatigable willwhichtreadsdowndifficultiesanddangerasaboytreadsdowntheheavingfrostlandsofwinter,whichkindleshiseyeandbrainwithaproudpulsebeattowardtheunattainable.Willmakesmengiants.”—DonaldG.Mitchell.

“Thereisnochance,nodestiny,nofate

Cancircumvent,orhinder,orcontrol

Thefirmresolveofadeterminedsoul.

Giftscountfornothing,willaloneisgreat;

Allthingsgivewaybeforeitsoonorlate.

Whatobstaclecanstaythemightyforce

Ofthesea-seekingriverinitscourse,

Orcausetheascendingorbofdaytowait?

Eachwell-bornsoulmustwinwhatitdeserves.

Letthefoolsprateofluck.Thefortunate

Ishewhoseearnestpurposeneverswerves,

Whoseslightestaction,orinaction,

Servestheonegreataim.Why,evendeathitself

Standsstillandwaitsanhoursometimes

Forsuchawill.”

—EllaWheelerWilcox.

“Ihavebroughtmyselfbylongmeditationtotheconvictionthatahumanbeingwithasettledpurposemustaccomplishit,andthatnothingcanresistawill which will stake even existence upon its fulfillment.”—LordBeaconsfield.

“Apassionatedesireandanunweariedwillcanperformimpossibilities,orwhatmayseemtobesuchtothecoldandfeeble.”—SirJohnSimpson.

“Itiswonderfulhoweventhecasualtiesoflifeseemtobowtoaspiritthatwillnotbowtothem,andyieldtosubserveadesignwhichtheymay,intheirfirst apparent tendency, threaten to frustrate.Whena firm,decisive spirit isrecognized,itiscurioustoseehowthespaceclearsaroundamanandleaveshimroomandfreedom.”—JohnFoster.

“ThegreatthingaboutGeneralGrantiscoolpersistencyofpurpose.Heisnoteasilyexcited,andhehasgotthegripofabulldog.Whenheoncegetshisteethin,nothingcanshakehimoff.”—AbrahamLincoln.

“I am bigger than anything that can happen to me. All these things are

outsidemydoor,andI’vegotthekey.***Manwasmeanttobe,andoughtto be, stronger and more than anything that can happen to him.Circumstances,‘Fate,’‘Luck,’arealloutside;andifhecannotchangethem,hecanalwaysbeatthem.”—CharlesF.Lummis.

“Thetruestwisdomisaresolutedetermination.”

“Impossibleisawordfoundonlyinthedictionaryoffools.”

“Circumstances!Imakecircumstances!”—Napoleon.

“Hewhofailsonlyhalfwills.”—Suwarrow.

“Thatwhich theeasiestbecomesahabit inus is thewill.Learn, then, towillstronglyanddecisively;thusfixyourfloatinglife,andleaveitnolongerto be carried hither and thither, like a withered leaf, by every wind thatblows.”

“Man owes his growth chiefly to that active striving of the will,—thatencounter which we call effort,—and it is astonishing to find how oftenresultsapparentlyimpracticablearethusmadepossible.***Itiswill—forceofpurpose—thatenablesamantodoorbewhateverhesetshisminduponbeingordoing.”

“A strong, defiant purpose ismany-handed and lays hold ofwhatever isnearthatcanserveit;ithasamagneticpurposethatdrawstoitselfwhateveriskindred.***Letitbeyourfirststudytoteachtheworldthatyouarenotwoodandstraw;thatthereissomeironinyou.”—Munger.

“It’sdoggedasdoesit.”—YorkshireProverb.

“Onetalentwithawillbehinditwillaccomplishmorethantenwithoutit,as a thimbleful of powder in a rifle, the bore of whose barrel will give itdirection, will do greater execution than a carload burned in the openair.”—O.S.Marden.

“Willmaynotendowmanwithtalentsorcapacities;but itdoesoneveryimportant matter—it enables him to make the best, the very best, of hispowers.”—Fothergill.

“Tender-handedstrokeanettle,

Anditstingsyouforyourpains.

Graspitlikeamanofmettle,

Anditsoftasdownremains.”

“Don’tflinch;don’tfoul;buthitthelinehard.”—Roosevelt.

“Themoredifficultiesonehastoencounter,withinandwithout, themoresignificantandthehigherininspirationhislifewillbe.”

TRANSCRIBER’SNOTE:

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