The Primary Concern of the United States in the...

The Primary Concern of the United States in the 1964 Cyprus Crisis

Josh Spesaison

Seminar in History

Dr. Fourshey

Late in December of 1963, an explosion of violence and immense political tension

erupted on the small island of Cyprus. The catalyst was the Cyprus President and Archbishop

Makarios III attempting to violate the Zurich-London Accords of 1959-1960 which defined

Cyprus’s relationships to Greece and Turkey. The resulting conflict between Greece and Turkey

(NATO allies since 1952) provides an illustrative example of a transnational crisis in which the

United States, the de facto leader of the NATO forces, played a major role in settling. Most

often, scholars who have examined the Cyprus dispute have focused on the later events of 1974

when the tensions in the eastern Mediterranean reached its climax. However, by 1974 the United

States had been involved with the Cyprus calamity for a decade. This paper analyzes the U.S.

response to the 1964 Cyprus crisis and that situation’s demand for an immediate diplomatic

solution. United States’ attempts at negotiating a settlement on the Cyprus issue were largely

uninfluenced by governments not directly involved due to the use bilateral, trilateral, and U.N.

sponsored channels for negotiation. As such, the 1964 U.S. response to the situation in Cyprus

can reveal the true motives behind U.S. foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. The U.S.

repeatedly asserted its unbiased stance in the situation, that is, no preference for either Greece or

Turkey and the U.S. Government’s actions supported their claim. Through the examination of

the Cyprus crisis of 1964 it will be argued that the goal of the United States was to ensure the

cohesion and strength of the NATO alliance in the eastern Mediterranean and not alienating

either Greece or Turkey. The NATO alliance took precedence over all other concerns due to the

Cold War context and the encroaching threat of the Soviet Union in Mediterranean waters.

It is important for scholars of U.S. foreign policy to take a step back from the swarms of

current affairs and issues to analyze historic moments of U.S. policy. The handling of a crisis

situation cannot be analyzed and utilized as a learning tool while it is a current affair due to its

immediate need for action. Scholars must reflect on how the United States has handled crisis

situations and search for the themes or motifs of U.S. policy. Each crisis situation will be

different and therefore specific actions applied in the past may not be suitable in future events.

However, the more general themes and goals of U.S. foreign policy should be analyzed to

determine if they worked well for the United States and then applied appropriately to current or

future issues.

Long before the United States’ sphere of influence reached the eastern Mediterranean, the

island of Cyprus had played a geopolitically important role across many eras and empires as it

lies at the crossroads between the East and West. The recorded history of Cyprus dates back

nearly 11,000 years and has been controlled by many empires including the Egyptian, Persian,

Roman, and Byzantine empires. The Ottoman Turks ruled the island from 1571 to 1878 when the

British took over control and ruled until the island’s independence in 1960.1 Yet the island has

maintained a primarily Greek and Hellenic culture since the Mycenaean-Achaean people came to

the island around 1200 B.C.E.2 That strong Hellenic culture has factored into the demographics

of the island; 80 percent Greek and 18 percent Turkish. This uneven ethnic split has exacerbated

Turkish concerns of protecting their minority population.

Despite the Greek majority in Cyprus, the island is in fact much closer geographically to

Turkey than it is to Greece in the eastern Mediterranean. Cyprus, and its capital Nicosia, is

roughly 550 miles from Athens, Greece and 330 miles from Anakara, Turkey as map 1.1 shows.3

Philippos Savvides describes the location as “ideally located as a staging area on the doorstep of

the Middle East but beyond the reach of Arab nationalism and untouched by the conflicts of the

1 Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” Political Science Quarterly 95, (1980): 43,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149584 (accessed April 2, 2012). 2 Van Coufoudakis. Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective, Minnesota Mediterranean

and East European Monographs (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006), 1. 3 Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 55.

Arabs with other Middle Eastern nations.”4 Recognizing these assets, the United States found it

in its interest to maintain access to the island as an important base of operations in the Middle

East. As history would reveal, this asset would prove invaluable for the U.S.

There are many authors who have touched on the theories behind U.S. foreign policy in

Cyprus. Authors such as Glen D. Camp define the American policy in Cyprus as obeying the

concepts of Realpolitik. Using this theory, the argument is made that the top-policy makers in the

U.S. considered the Soviet threat to outweigh all other considerations and that “effective

governance” ranked more important than “just governance.”5 In that vein, the U.S. policy was

indifferent to the Cypriot population’s suffering and acted to attain the most stable governance in

Cyprus. If this is accepted as true, then the U.S. government failed awfully considering the

volatile conditions of Cyprus in 1964 and after. Glen Camp is correct to assess the United States

4 Philippos K. Savvides, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the “Theory of Continuity” Still

Relevant?,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24, no. 1 (1998): 38. 5 Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” Political Science Quarterly 95, (1980): 44,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149584 (accessed April 2, 2012).

Map 1.1 – Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean

policy as ‘realist’ as opposed to ‘idealist,’ however, he misplaces the emphasis of U.S. foreign

policy in the crisis situation. Camp’s claim that U.S. policy was “erroneous” is founded only if

the objective of their policy was to stabilize Cyprus governance and end inland fighting. Yet this

was not the primary objective; the goal was to stabilize the NATO southeastern front and the

relations between the two NATO countries forming that flank, Greece and Turkey. This

differentiated U.S. policy angle does not excuse the United States government from their

oversight of the Cyprus population, but does reveal the thought process supporting the policies

implemented.

Other studies of the Cyprus situation have also taken the Realist approach including the

CSIA European Security Working Group. This group analyzed the military capabilities of key

actors in the region to prove that the Soviets were a major threat to NATO’s southern flank. This

analysis concludes that it was important for the United States to have maintained the loyalty of

both Turkey and Greece.6 However, as Glen D. Camp also notes, a pure military perspective on

Greece and Turkey grants favor to Turkey as the larger military power who supplied more troops

to the collective NATO force.7 This bias towards Turkey did not exist, especially for military

means, which is evidenced by the Turkish Arms embargo of 1974, which hindered the Turkish

military strength. This paper agrees that the United States aimed to maintain the loyalty of both

Greece and Turkey, but disagrees that the U.S. policy makers focused on troop contributions to

NATO. Instead, policy makers focused on resolving the diplomatic tensions between their allies,

most clearly exampled by the Dean Acheson Plan, which will be examined in detail later.

6 CSIA European Security Working Group, “Instability and Change on NATO’s Southern Flank,”

International Security 3, (1978): 150-177, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626723 (accessed April 2, 2012). 7 Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” Political Science Quarterly 95, (1980): 51,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149584 (accessed April 2, 2012).

Many other authors focus on the ability of American foreign policy to be implemented

and succeed. These authors such as Suha Bolukbasi and Theodore Couloumbis question whether

the U.S. policy was implemented successfully. Both also frame foreign policy as the works of

influence or ‘influence relationships’. Bolukbasi defines influence as “the ability to move others

through promises or grants of benefits.”8 And Couloumbis views it “as anything that establishes

and maintains the control of man over man.”9 In any case, the studies are not explicit reviews of

U.S. policy and its development. Instead, they examine the relationships the United States had

with other states; Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. This framework and perspective overlaps with the

one presented here. The influence relationships the United States had with these nations was

primarily utilized to maintain the cohesion of the southeastern NATO flank and prevent war in

the theater.

T.W. Adams argues along the same lines found in this paper by claiming that “Even

when America had to take strong diplomatic recourse in the crises of 1964 and 1967, the goal

was strict impartiality in order to perpetuate the southeastern flank of NATO and to maintain the

fragile stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.”10

The argument of this paper is in full agreement

with T.W. Adam’s statement. Like the works of David Camp and the CSIA European Security

Working Group, Adams puts NATO first in the eyes of the United States. However unlike them,

T.W. Adams makes the case that “quiet diplomacy” and negotiations were the key to U.S. policy

implementation in Cyprus. This is a peculiar argument to make considering that the Cyprus

situation and all the missions of negotiation were highly publicized in American newspapers.11

8 Suha Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, Exxon

Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 4. 9 Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1983), 2. 10

T. W. Adams, “The American Concern in Cyprus,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Social Science 401, (May 1972): 95, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed January 2, 2012). 11

The New York Times Index: A Book of Record 1964, 1st ed., s.v. “Cyprus.”

Philippos K. Savvides also argues that U.S. foreign policy towards the Cyprus crisis was

focused on removing any force threatening to engage Greece and Turkey into war, namely

Makarios III, and thus disbanding the southeastern flank of NATO. Indeed, the argument and

focus of this paper may be seen as an expansion to Savvides’ coverage of 1964 by offering a

more detailed account. Savvides’ research also finds “the U.S. world view, constructed by the

parameters of the Cold War, was the basis on which foreign policy was built.”12

Framing the

basis of foreign policy in a singular U.S. world view prevents one from speaking specifically

about realist policy decisions in which national interests are principal factors, versus idealist

policy decisions in which ideological considerations are important factors. Savvides overlooks

the importance of the ideological standoff between U.S. policy makers and the Soviet Union’s

support for Makarios III. Mark Kramer, a scholar on the cutting edge of debate over which

consideration, ideology or national interests, took prominence in Cold War foreign policy

decisions, maintains that ideological compatibility was very important to the NATO structure.13

For this reason, a reliance solely on realist theory or interests-based foreign policy is damaging to

an understanding of U.S. policy in the 1964 Cyprus crisis. All members of the NATO alliance

supported a liberal democratic agenda, which inherently placed Cyprus outside the United

States’ exclusive network of friendly democracies.

These authors take on different foci in the Cyprus issue of 1964 and subsequent years.

Authors have disagreed on the impartiality or bias towards one ally or the other the United States

embodied in 1964. For example, while T.W. Adams and Philippos Savvides argue that the

United States aimed to remain impartial throughout its handling of the situation, Coufoudakis

12

Philippos K. Savvides, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the “Theory of Continuity” Still

Relevant?,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24, no. 1 (1998): 34-35. 13

Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (October 1999):

551, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097622 (accessed November 24, 2012).

argued that Washington adopted an unswerving pro-Turkish policy throughout the entirety of the

Cyprus crisis.14

The former is focused on the U.S. policy goals and the later on the results of U.S.

foreign policy decisions. In contrast to Coufoudakis, the success and outcomes of U.S. policy in

the eastern Mediterranean are not of concern in this paper. Instead, the events surrounding

Cyprus and U.S. foreign policy in 1964 are analyzed in search of Washington’s foreign policy

goals and intentions.

Additionally, authors on the Cyprus crisis have debated the framework of Washington’s

foreign policy. The clearest example is the differences between T.W. Adam’s ‘quiet diplomacy’,

Savvides’ ‘world view’, and the ‘influence relationship’ adopted by Bolukbasi and Couloumbis.

These concepts are not mutually exclusive; rather each framework highlights different aspects of

foreign policy. The frameworks are a means to discussing foreign policy and affairs. In the

interest of being as specific and clear as possible, the framework used to discuss foreign policy in

this paper will be national interests, ideology, deterrence and coercive diplomacy strategies. U.S.

national interests in the Cyprus crisis, as it will be argued, was primarily comprised of

maintaining the strength of NATO. The U.S. ideology during the Cold War is well accepted as

promoting Liberal Democracy and the containment of Communism. Both deterrence, the attempt

to make a rational actor not act as they would otherwise, and coercive diplomacy, the attempt to

make a rational actor do what they would not otherwise, work through threatening detrimental

penalties. These two strategies became popular to both scholars and officials after the failure of

appeasement in controlling Hitler’s ambitions prior to World War II.15

Thus, employing the

14

Glen D. Camp, “Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus,” Political Science Quarterly 95, (1980): 53,

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2149584 (accessed April 2, 2012). 15

Janice Gross Stein, “Crisis Management: Looking Back to Look Forward,” Political Psychology 29, no. 4

(August 2008): 555-558, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447144 (accessed November 24, 2012).

terminology of national interests, ideology, deterrence and coercive diplomacy is both specific

and appropriate for discussing a crisis situation in the context of the Cold War.

The Cyprus crisis of 1964 was a direct consequence of the island nation’s constitution

created by the 1959-60 Zurich-London Accords. In these accords, Cyprus became “allied to

Greece and Turkey but not to NATO” and the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) ensured that Cyprus

would not unify with another sovereign power either politically or economically.16

If such a

scenario were to take place the three Guarantee powers, Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain, could

take unilateral measures to return the state affairs to the status prescribed by the Zurich-London

Accords. Additionally, the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus prescribed laws that limited

the effective ruling capability of the local government: The President had to be Greek and the

Vice-President Turkish, and both had veto powers over policies affecting foreign affairs and

security issues.17

The Cyprus constitution assumed there was a collective Cypriot identity, but in

reality the two Cypriot ethnicities were much closer to their respective motherlands, Greece and

Turkey. These conditions were immensely immobilizing for the sovereign Cyprus nation and

Cyprus President and Archbishop Makarios III. Attempting to revise the Cyprus constitution,

Makarios III proposed thirteen points in order to, as he put it, move around the “Turkish

‘obstruction’ and permit the government to function.”18

The obstruction Makarios III referred to

included the required majority in both Greek and Turkish Cypriot parliaments to pass laws, a

separate judicial system for the Turkish-Cypriot community, and the veto power of the vice-

president. Makarios’ unilateral alteration of the nation’s constitution, and therefore nullification

16





Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1963, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 132.

of the London-Zurich Accords, was the spark which ignited the outbreak of violence on Cyprus

in late December 1963.19

As a result of the 1956 Suez Canal crisis the United States was confirmed as the

hegemonic power of the Western hemisphere and NATO alliance.20

By 1963 the United States

was well established as one of two global powers and the de facto leader of the western NATO

alliance. In this new found role America’s leadership and strength was being tested not only by

their rivals in the east, the Soviet Union, but also by cooperative problems between NATO allies,

Greek-Turkish strife being the case in point. In 1964 the United Kingdom called upon the United

States to lead its allies out of a dangerous situation safely, without a full-scale war, and with as

little political damage as possible. The situation brewing in Cyprus threatened to pit two NATO

allies, Greece and Turkey, in war and effectively crumble the western alliance’s military strength

in the eastern Mediterranean. This required the United States to develop a diplomatic solution to

a rapidly worsening crisis in Cyprus. Thus, Lyndon B. Johnson was tasked with solving an

international crisis through diplomatic means; a situation he referred to as “one of the most

complex problems on earth.”21

L.B. Johnson had his hands full with handling the Cyprus

situation. As with all Cold War crisis situations the danger lied in failing to manage the tensions

between smaller allies and allowing tensions to reach a boiling point causing or providing an

excuse for war between the two Cold War superpowers.22

Cyprus in 1964 presented a most difficult situation for American diplomats. Glen D.

Camp summarizes the intricate task at hand well:

19




Relevant?,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24, no. 1 (1998): 37. 21




(August 2008): 555, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447144 (accessed November 24, 2012).

First, no policy can be forced upon either Greek or Turkish Cypriots; it must be

negotiated. Second, and paradoxically, internal initiatives must be aided by external

pressures, for internal forces cannot overcome the deeply rooted obstacles. Third, only

the U.N. secretary-general enjoys the requisite confidence in all capitals to serve

successfully as mediator; yet to achieve a lasting settlement he must be strongly

supported in the background by the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe,

and Canada.23

The situation left no room for easy solutions and the complexity of the issue, along with the

constantly changing positions of states and sub-state actors, led to much confusion. The leaders

of American foreign policy had to make tough decisions that often resulted in undesirable

outcomes, but throughout 1964 and subsequent years the United States had one primary concern

for the eastern Mediterranean; the well-being and strength of NATO security forces and its

ability to act as a deterrent to Soviet and Communist influence. This concern was not unique to

the Cyprus crisis or the eastern Mediterranean; after the start of the Korean War in 1950, the

United States felt threatened enough by the U.S.S.R. to initiate a large scale expenditure of

military support for the NATO structure. This created a substantial deterrent to Soviet power

across the globe.24

There were many factors that affected the specifics of U.S. Cyprus policy

including internal influences such as the Greek-American lobby, external influences including

Greek, Turkish, and Cypriote grand strategy, as well as the military capability of the involved

parties. Yet all these influences can be examined and analyzed in the Cyprus crisis to elucidate

the motives and concerns of the United States foreign policy. This exercise aims to reveal the

underlying trends of American foreign policy regarding the Cyprus crisis and provide a deeper

understanding of U.S. foreign policy. A consistent pattern will emerge illustrating that the United

States foreign policy in the Cyprus crisis fundamentally changed very little throughout 1964 and

23



Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (October 1999):

547, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20097622 (accessed November 24, 2012).

imperfectly maneuvered the volatile situation in pursuit of maintaining the peace and strength of

the NATO alliance.

Violence in Cyprus broke out between the two local ethnic communities; Greek and

Turkish. Less than a month after the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, the U.S.

perspective was that “All such minor quarrels were swept into the background by the tragic event

of November 22. The sense of loss that darkened the Western world on President Kennedy’s

death was scarcely less intense than that in the United States itself.”25

Mourning President

Kennedy’s premature death dragged on the American spirits for years to come. A mere month

after the assassination the Western allies, especially the United States, were suffering from a lack

of authority due to the time required for Lyndon B. Johnson to move into the Oval Office and be

briefed on the world’s most pressing issues and U.S. assets around the globe. This unfortunate

event effectively worsened the U.S. capability to respond to crisis situations at the time.

Additionally, the Cyprus crisis closely followed the U.S.-Soviet confrontations over Berlin and

Cuba, which made the Soviet threat top of mind in the American psyche.26

The Cuban Missile

crisis in particular drove the Cold War tensions to new heights. Janice Stein claims that after the

Cuban Missile crisis both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. tended to only confront each other through the

means of their smaller allies.27

Such a statement is well supported by the 1964 Cyprus crisis; the

Soviet support for Cyprus sovereignty versus U.S. avocation for Greece and Turkey to resolve

their differences through the elimination of a Cyprus nation.28

Nevertheless, the Western powers

25

Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1963, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 129-130. 26

Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective, Minnesota Mediterranean

and East European Monographs (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2006), 81. 27


(August 2008): 554, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447144 (accessed November 24, 2012). 28

Douglas Brinkley, “The Cyprus Question: Dean Acheson as Mediator,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora

15, no. 3 (1988): 5-18.

were faced with the challenge of bringing a peaceful solution to the Cyprus crisis whether they

were ready to or not.

On 22 December 1963 the New York Times reported that “two Turkish Cypriotes were

killed in Nicosia today in the most serious display of animosity between Greek and Turkish

Cypriotes since Britain freed this Mediterranean island Aug. 16, 1960.”29

The report reveals the

ethnic and nationalist elements of the dispute that would involve both Cypriot communities’

motherlands, Greece and Turkey. This violence was among the first serious offenses that fueled

major ethnic conflict on Cyprus. Soon after this day of ethnic clashes in Cyprus the parties

concerned in the situation wrote to their most powerful ally; the United States of America. The

President of Turkey, General Cemal Gursel, described the events unfolding in Cyprus to U.S.

President L.B. Johnson as “acts of genocide aiming at the annihilation of the Turkish Cypriots.”

Clearly, the President of Turkey was exaggerating the death of two Turkish-Cypriots, but that

does not mean that the fear of genocide was not real. Furthermore, in defense of Cemal Gursel,

these two deaths were not the first, but only a ‘most serious display of animosity’ as the New

York Times reported. In his brief 200-word letter General Gursel also noted that the “Greek

Cypriot terrorists [were] helped by the regular law forces” in implementing a “prearranged plan

[of] atrocities towards Turks of Cyprus without discrimination for women and children.”30

This

was a strong first attempt to convince the United States to weigh in strictly on the Turkish side.

However, to Turkey’s dismay, President Johnson replied, “You may be sure that I will continue

to do everything I can to support any and all actions proposed by the three guarantor powers

29

“2 Die, 9 Hurt in Cyprus Rioting; Greek-Turkish Strife Revived,” New York Times, December 22, 1963,

Late City edition, sec. A. 30

U.S. Department of State, The Official Weekly Record of United States Foreign Policy: The Department of

State Bulletin, “President Johnson Expresses Hope for End of Strife in Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803,

Volume L: numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012).

which offer any reasonable hope of assisting in a peaceful solution.”31

Johnson kept the U.S.

entirely impartial and refused to give preference to Turkey or any other party. Furthermore,

Johnson sent another letter to Cyprus’ President Makarios and Vice President Kutchuk the same

day in which he warned that he would not “presume to judge the root causes, or rights and

wrongs as between Cypriots of the two communities.”32

Once again, the U.S. president affirmed

his impartial stance. This disposition allowed the U.S. to become a concerned third party – not

concerned with moral judgments of the two Cypriot communities or the character of the Cyprus

constitution, but rather concerned with the safety of the Cyprus nation from an encroaching

Soviet threat.

Already the forces of influence between Turkey and the United States were flowing back

and forth. Yet the letters of 25 December 1963 evidence Turkey’s inability to coerce the United

States to condemn the Greek Cypriot actions. This is unsurprising because in the era of the Cold

War the U.S. had one primary concern and it was not human rights; it was the containment of

communism. Furthermore, if the U.S. had absolutely no overriding national interests in the

region, why did the government fail to condemn the violent acts? Upholding a neutral position

suggests that the U.S. was more concerned with not alienating Greece or Turkey from the NATO

alliance than it was with the human rights of the Cypriot population.

The disposition of the United States towards the mounting tensions in Cyprus was clear

by the time 1964 rolled around, but it wasn’t until then, in January, that the Department of State

Office of News Deputy Director revealed that “officials of the Government of Cyprus as well as

31

The Official Weekly Record of United States Foreign Policy: The Department of State Bulletin, “President

Johnson Expresses Hope for End of Strife in Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L: numbers 1280-1305,

http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012). 32

The Official Weekly Record of United States Foreign Policy: The Department of State Bulletin, “President

Johnson Expresses Hope for End of Strife in Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L: numbers 1280-1305,

http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012).

of the three guarantor powers indicated their desire that the United States play a more active role

in the increasingly difficult Cyprus situation.”33

It is important to note that the United States was

asked by all of the involved parties to assist in Cyprus and that the U.S. was in no way acting in

support of any one country or intruding on any nations sovereignty, despite the fact that the

Soviet Union repeatedly accused the U.S of “unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of

the Republic of Cyprus.”34

The United States policy here was no more and no less than to aid her

allies in a difficult situation. Yet with such accusatory statements from the U.S.S.R., there is little

room for doubt that the United States perceived a serious Communist threat to the region. Van

Coufoudakis agrees that the Soviet warning significantly increased the American fears of

Communist interests in the eastern Mediterranean, which was a major threat in the context of the

Cold War.35

Continuing the statement by the Deputy Director, there was an early indication that the

U.S. had a primary interest in the region that must come above all other concerns. The director

continued to say that, “the United States must emphasize that it does have a major interest in the

maintenance of peace in the eastern Mediterranean” and “will do whatever it can to assure that

objective.”36

Being called upon by all of the involved parties was a great convenience and means

for the U.S. to exert its influence (not direct control as the Soviets government asserted) and

pursue the assurance of that major interest. The ‘peace’ the director spoke of can be replaced

33


State Bulletin, “Mr. Ball Leaves for London Talks on Cyprus; U.S. Restates Position,” July 1965, Publication 7803,

Volume L: numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012). 34


State Bulletin, “President Johnson Replies to Soviet Letter on Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L:

numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012). 35




State Bulletin, “Mr. Ball Leaves for London Talks on Cyprus; U.S. restates position,” July 1965, Publication 7803,

Volume L: numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012).

with ‘status-quo’ because NATO was still holding together on the southeastern flank. Yet at this

point, the U.S. did not directly announce that their major interest was the maintenance of the

statues-quo. This allowed the United States to continue playing the role of an impartial mediator,

and assert its influence in a non-combative context to a region where its influence was far from

absolute.

By early February, 1964 the situation in Cyprus, going through a rollercoaster of up and

downs, was quickly turning into reason for all-out war between Turkey and Greece. The ethnic

clashes in Cyprus failed to slow even though cease-fire agreements were made.37

Despite an ease

in tensions on New Year’s Eve due to prisoner exchanges between the two Cypriot communities,

both Greece and Turkey began “renewed military activity” in the region and both also reported

to the U.S. that “they were prepared to use force if the situation continued to deteriorate.” 38

39

The renewed military activity grew out of concern for Greece’s and Turkey’s respective Cypriot

community well-being and the motherland’s ability to quickly respond to a military attack on

Cyprus. It was within this tense context that the “United States was considering … the possibility

of sending United States troops [to Cyprus] as part of a force drawn from members of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization.”40

In pursuit of this policy, General Lemnitzer, the commander of

NATO, was sent to Greece and Turkey to begin the preparations for a NATO plan in Cyprus

prepared by the United States and Britain.41

While the possibility of sending in NATO troops

was reportedly an unlikely scenario, it was the first solution considered by the U.S. and its allies.

37

Lawrence Fellows, “Turkish Soldiers Based on Cyprus Join in Fighting,” New York Times, December 26,

1963, Late City edition, sec. A. 38

Lawrence Fellows, “Cypriots Reduce Tensions by Exchange of Prisoners,” New York Times, January 1,

1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 39

Lawrence Fellows, “Turkey Quitting Cyprus Parley; Crisis Heightens,” New York Times, January 29, 1964,


“U.S. Studies Plea for Cyprus Force”, New York Times, January 29, 1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 41


Relevant?,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24, no. 1 (1998): 40.

Secretary Rusk explained in an interview that the U.S. government “felt that a negotiated

solution would be a much quicker way to come to terms with the problem, to restore peace on

the island, [and] to establish the political process of settlement than to go to the Security

Council.”42

The United States had originally intended to handle the Cyprus crisis within the

NATO family and believed that the Soviets, as a member of the Security Council, would oppose

and block any solution the U.S. supported. Constructing the solution to the Cyprus crisis within

the framework of the NATO alliance further elevated the strategic importance of the alliance in

relation to Cyprus. Settling this crisis within the NATO family circles back to the U.S. and its

foreign policy implementers concern over external influences penetrating Cyprus and the region

to promote non-western ideals and alliances. A NATO only solution would keep the Soviets out

of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union sent a letter to President Johnson on 7 February 1964

expressing their concern for the sovereignty for the Cyprus nation. As mentioned briefly before,

the Soviets believed that the Turkish minority was “being exploited as a pretext for unconcealed

intervention in the internal affairs of the republic of Cyprus” as a means to “place this small

neutral state under the military control of NATO.” In response to these accusations Johnson

wrote a letter nearly a month later on 4 March warning the Soviets that “we should all strive not

to inflame passions from without.”43

The strong tone of these words expressed a skeptical view

of the Soviet intentions in the region. However, the delay in response also suggests that the

Soviets spoke of some truth in their letter. While there’s no evidence that NATO attempted to

42


State Bulletin, “Secretary Rusk Interviewed on Voice of America,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L:



State Bulletin, “President Johnson Replies to Soviet Letter on Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L:

numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012).

formally align Cyprus to the West, the NATO framework of the first proposed solution kept

Soviet influence out of Cyprus and increased NATO influence. Influence may not be military

control, but such strong influence may have led to the inclusion of Cyprus into NATO which

would not serve Soviets interests. This finding is also supported by Philippos Savvides claim

that U.S. interests included not only the military preservation of the eastern Mediterranean, but

also its political preservation as a region, committed to the ideals of democracy, strong enough to

prevent the advancement of Soviet interests.44

In further support of this claim, the U.S. Security Council representative Adlai E.

Stevenson released a statement (while the Soviets waited for Johnson’s response to their letter)

informing that “the important, the imperative, the urgent thing to do is to restore order and

communal tranquility – and do it quickly before new violence breaks out, before the atmosphere

is further poisoned, before the positions of the parties in the political issue that divide them

become more inflexible, and, indeed before peace in the eastern Mediterranean is endangered.”45

This statement proclaimed that the U.S. would support a U.N. peacekeeping force.46

The State

Department announcement introduced a change in U.S. foreign policy strategy, but not a change

in its objectives. A careful look at this statement made on 19 February reveals that the U.S. was

primarily concerned with the Soviet threat in the eastern Mediterranean; the longer the issue

persisted, the more chances the U.S.S.R. had to penetrate into the region. In addition, the

statement never mentioned that a U.N. peacekeeping force could help put an end to the ethnic

conflict on the island but rather speaks of general peace on the island, the urgency of acquiring it,

44




State Bulletin, “U.S. Favors Peacekeeping Force for Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L: numbers

1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012). 46


State Bulletin, “U.S. Favors Peacekeeping Force for Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L: numbers

1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012).

and disclaimers of Soviet accusations. However, this does not mean the United States

government was not concerned with the lives of Cypriot peoples. On 4 March when the U.N.

officially adopted the peacekeeping force resolution, the U.S. ambassador to the Security

Council noted that these actions “will be a ‘victory’ for humanity and for all the embattled and

suffering people of Cyprus.”47

Yet, this move does suggest that the new strategy was a means to

dodge Soviet allegations that the U.S. and its allies were working to incorporate Cyprus into their

alliance.

Unfortunately, there were problems in the financing of the United Nations operation

because the money was meant to come from Cyprus and the nations providing the troops.48

Yet

in the interest of expediency, the United States “offered to contribute up to $2 million to a $6

million fund needed by the Secretary-General in order to get the international force established

quickly.”49

This willingness to use economic power illustrates the U.S. concern for urgency in

the region. Also, this is strictly an impartial and fair act which aids all the involved parties by

expediting the arrival of U.N. peacekeeping forces. The economic contribution aimed to preserve

the status quo; a benefit to the maintenance of NATO solidarity and strength.

Yet, as the peacekeeping force arrived the State Department stated that enforcing any

cease-fire agreements was practically impossible since “Turkish Cypriotes refused to lay down

their arms, since they feared that if they did so, the Greeks would exterminate them.”50

This

perception coincides with the evidence from General Gursel’s earlier letter describing the

violence in Cyprus as acts of genocide. Furthermore, as was reported in January, both Greece

47


State Bulletin, “U.N. Security Council Adopts Resolution on Cyprus,” July 1965, Publication 7803, Volume L:


Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 52-67. 49


State Bulletin, “U.S. Offers to Help U.N. Finance Cyprus Peacekeeping Force,” July 1965, Publication 7803,

Volume L: numbers 1280-1305, http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use# pd-google (accessed February 20, 2012). 50

Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 52.

and Turkey were gearing their militaries for war. Greece would not stop preparing for an

imminent war with Turkey as long as Turkish forces continued to prepare for invasion of Cyprus.

And Turkey would continue to threaten war as long as “the Greek Cypriots were getting the best

of the fighting.”51

In Cyprus the Greek Cypriots had the advantage of national forces due to

Makarios III remaining in the Presidency. The situation around Cyprus turned into a perpetual

state of military chest-pounding between Greece and Turkey. Neither country was willing to

show signs of weakness and therefore continued move towards a military buildup that forced the

other to do the same. As the two NATO allies continued to threaten each other with violent

force, President Johnson moved quickly to prevent a collapse of NATO’s southern flank.

President Johnson wrote a letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on 5 June 1964.

The President stated, “I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through

Ambassador Hare from you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is

contemplating a decision to intervene by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus.”52

Later in

the letter President Johnson threatened that Turkey’s “NATO allies have not had a chance to

consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey

takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its

NATO allies.”53

This is a clear example of deterrent diplomacy; Lyndon B. Johnson was

attempting to force İsmet İnönü to back down from his militaristic inclinations by the threat of

harmful consequences. Such a strong threat, the inaction of NATO on Turkey’s behalf, caused a

serious deterioration of relations between the two countries. It is lucky for the United States that

51



Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter to Prime Minister Inonu from President Johnson dated June 5, 1964, 1964,

http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 53


http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html (accessed January 2, 2012).

President İnönü never revealed “the full content of the Johnson letter” fearing a hostile response

from the public.54

Nonetheless, Johnson’s hasty letter is likely to be the sole reason a head-to-

head conflict between two NATO allies was prevented in 1964.55

Though Johnson wrote this

letter to Turkey’s leader and not the Prime Minister of Greece, Johnson was sure to include

remarks that pointed to similar discontent in Greece with the American policy in Cyprus; “our

policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed

against us).”56

Indeed President Johnson was so concerned that his threat to Turkey may upset

the Ankara government that Johnson included remarks about how Greece was also upset with

U.S. policy. Furthermore, after President Johnson wrote his letter to İnönü he made another

strong demand to Greek Prime Minister Papandreou stressing the need to negotiate now rather

than after a Turkish invasion.57

These actions by President Johnson demonstrate his dedication to

preventing a Greco-Turkish war while not alienating either ally.

In addition, the Johnson letter of 5 June provides a window into President Johnson’s

mindset and who he considered the larger power to control in order to preserve the peace and

NATO solidarity. Turkey was that force in June 1964. The letter does not aim to condemn one

ally and support the other, but rather freeze the military movements of the stronger party. This is

one of the first imperfections of U.S. policy in the Cyprus crisis, yet Johnson’s motives are clear

in this letter; “adhesion to NATO, in its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage

54

Suha Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus, Exxon

Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 78. 55

T. W. Adams, “The American Concern in Cyprus.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and



http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html (accessed January 2, 2012). 57


Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 80.

war on each other.”58

The NATO alliance came first and foremost on the United States Cold War

agenda, which therefore demanded peace between the alliance members.

As a result of LBJ’s power play to İsmet İnönü both the Turkish and Greek leaders were

invited to Washington D.C. to discuss the situation in Cyprus in late June, 1964. Unfortunately,

under-Secretary of State George Ball recalled that the leaders of both Greece and Turkey were

“‘incapable of comprehending the larger issues.’ Both Inonu and Papandreou were so set in their

rigid, ethnic-nationalist identities that they refused to even speak to one another.”59

The actions

of the two opposing leaders suggested that the United States was going to continue having a

difficult time resolving the tensions between their two allies. The meetings went so horribly for

the United States that “both leaders left Washington even more doubtful that the United States

could or should play a meaningful role in the ethnic conflict.”60

This was by no means positive

news for the United States, especially for the reputation of their foreign policy and diplomatic

skills. Yet the fact that both leaders were invited to Washington, and not just Turkish Prime

Minister İsmet İnönü, is indicative of Johnson’s intentions to provide equal support to both

countries.

To this effect, Under-Secretary of State George Ball began to push for the approval of

Dean Acheson by U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant as an additional American mediator. With

the approval of Greece and Turkey, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson was allowed to join

the Convention at Geneva in early July 1964.61

The New York Times reported on 4 July that “The

United Nations has tried for three months to find a solution, without success.” And that “the

58


http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html (accessed January 2, 2012). 59


15, no. 3 (1988): 9. 60


15, no. 3 (1988): 9. 61


15, no. 3 (1988): 10.

former Secretary of State would make himself available for discussion of possible solutions to

the communal strife in Cyprus, without formally supplanting the United Nations team or making

the United States the official channel of negotiations.” 62

Therefore, this move was a onetime

shot for Dean Acheson to solve this precarious situation. If failed, the reigns of negotiation

would be handed back to the U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant. The report is actually quite

telling of the American opinion of Dean Acheson. As a key figure in the implementation of the

Truman Doctrine, Acheson was held in high regard throughout the NATO alliance. It was the

hope of the United States, as expressed in the New York Times, that Acheson would have all the

answers and accomplish what the U.N. could not within three months.

Yet the mission was doomed to fail before it even began. Archbishop Makarios was so

infuriated by the acceptance of an additional American mediator to the Geneva format that he

refused to join the other leaders. Makarios feared that “the ultimate goal of the United States was

to dissolve the republic of Cyprus.”63

Moreover, Makarios was not incorrect. Cyprus as an

independent state was a threat to U.S. national interests. The sovereignty of Cyprus continued to

increase the probability of war between two NATO allies and embolden the Soviet position in

the eastern Mediterranean.64

Furthermore, “the delicacy of the situation was underlined by the

Archbishop’s wooing of Russia and the Arab States.”65

Makarios’ cordial relations with the

Soviet Union removed any possibility of the United States taking a more friendly approach

towards the Archbishop, because he now fell outside the common liberal democratic ideology of

NATO and was creating a path for Soviet interests to enter the Mediterranean. Taking all this

62

“Acheson Assumes Cypriote Mission,” New York Times, July 4, 1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 63


15, no. 3 (1988): 11. 64


15, no. 3 (1988): 12. 65

Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 64.

into consideration, the U.S. aim was to remove the problem of the Cyprus President and move to

deal directly and only with its NATO allies.

The Acheson plan was fairly simple and called for “double enois” meaning double

unification. The plan had four main components: one, Cyprus unified with Greece. Two, Turkey

no longer had the right to intervene under the Treaty of Guarantee. Three, the Turkish Cypriote

community’s protection was ensured. And four, Turkey was given compensation.66

This

compensation was “a smaller, but sizable, portion of Cyprus, in the form of sovereign security

areas to be administered by mainland Turkey.”67

Thus, the proposed solution aimed to satisfy

both governments in Athens and Ankara by providing each with sovereign rule within the island.

Considering the ethnic divide in the island, in which there were significantly more Greeks than

Turks, the Acheson plan was fair to both NATO allies.

Both the Greek and Turkish representatives agreed to Acheson’s plan in principle,

however the Greek government rejected the plan due to frantic lobbying by Makarios in Athens.

Makarios used his considerable influence over the government in Athens to ensure Cyprus’

independence claiming that the proposed plan was “absolutely unacceptable.” Makarios was also

reportedly proud to have forestalled the American attempt to reconcile the conflict between

Greece and Turkey.68

It was Acheson’s opinion that Archbishop Makarios III was the reason he

could not alleviate the tensions between Greece and Turkey.69

For the time being, a recess on the

negotiations was called and the stalemate in Cyprus ensued. Acheson’s opinion of Makarios was

not unfounded. As the negotiations proceeded in Geneva, Makarios was moving to strengthen his

66

Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 63-64. 67

Theodore Couloumbis, The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle (New York: Praeger

Publishers, 1983), 46. 68

“Makarios Scores Acheson’s Views,” New York Times, July 31, 1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 69


15, no. 3 (1988): 11.

control over all of Cyprus. For instance, he employed the government to restrict certain items to

be sold to Turkish-Cypriots and restricted the flow of relief supplies from Turkey to Cyprus.

Additionally, Makarios ordered attacks on Turkish-Cypriot positions, supported by mortars, in

early August. More importantly, Greek mainland troops were deployed to Cyprus from the

Andreas Papandreou government in Athens. The attacks were challenged by Turkish Air Force

bombings on Makarios’ government forces.70

These new developments once again brought

Greece and Turkey to the brink of war and exacerbated U.S. desires for a cease-fire as soon as

possible.71

On 15 August the second round of negotiations in Geneva began, which still included

Acheson as an additional mediator.72

The “Second Acheson Plan” was a good deal like the first plan created just a few months

earlier. The difference was that Turkey was to only be granted a fifty year lease on a base in

northern Cyprus, instead of a permanent and sovereign base. Turkey refused to accept this

revision, demanding that Turkey be at least rewarded a sovereign base on Cyprus, no smaller

than the Karpas peninsula.73

This revision of the original Acheson Plan was a desperate attempt

to resolve the threat of war collapsing the NATO structure, and allowing the Soviets to enter the

Mediterranean. The Acheson Plan illustrates the United States’ goals, intentions, and evenhanded

policy towards Greece and Turkey during 1964. What the plan considered was the interest of

Greece’s enois, the annexation of Cyprus with Greece, and taksim, the partition of the island with

a sovereign Turkish sector. The Acheson Plan accomplished both of these interests in one

70


Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 81-

82. 71

M.S. Handler, “U.S. Holds Cease-Fire Vital to Avert Cyprus Disaster,” New York Times, August 9, 1964,



Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 85. 73


Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 86.

resolution, but it did not consider the interest of the Cypriot populations or that of Makarios III.

In fact, the state department published that in their final analysis of the Acheson Plan, the

suggestions “appeared to point to the dissolution of the Makarios regime.”74

This aspect of the

Acheson Plan was purposefully included as a way to rid the Soviet Union of an ally; President

Makarios III.75

Van Coufoudakis also found that the Acheson plan was largely planned “behind

the back of the government of Cyprus” but did include the larger powers of the United States,

Greece, Turkey, and Britain.76

This analysis highlights the U.S. concern for the NATO structure

and disregard for those, such as Cyprus’ President Makarios, who fell outside U.S. national

interests of stonewalling Communism to the outskirts the Mediterranean.

The failed Acheson Plan also concluded any serious attempt by any party to resolve the

Cyprus conflict in 1964. Luckily, in early August, after Cyprus saw some of its most explosive

violence in 1964, a proposed cease-fire from the U.N. Security Council was accepted by both the

Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot authorities.77

After this cease-fire arrangement was agreed upon, it

was not until 1967 that the next stage of diplomatic scrambling ensued when President Johnson

employed Cyrus Vance to calm the immediate tensions of both governments in Athens and

Ankara.78

In the meantime, the U.N. peacekeeping forces remained in Cyprus and a tense peace

remained between Greeks and Turks. Clyde Farnsworth described the state of Cyprus as “quiet,

solemn and grieving” and the “hospitals were filled with casualties from three days of Turkish

74

Jules Davids, The United States in World Affairs 1964, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 64. 75





Thomas J. Hamilton, “Thant is Pleased: He sees Opportunity for Definitive End to the Fighting,” New York

Times, August 11, 1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 78


Social Science 401, (May 1972): 102, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed January 2, 2012).

air strikes” while small-arms fire continued throughout Cyprus.79

This was more or less the case

within Cyprus in the ensuing years. During this distraught peace between the two motherlands

there were several developments that weakened the NATO integrity. First, Moscow pledged to

support the Cypriot nation in defense over her sovereignty if an external force threatened military

action on the island. New York Times reporter Henry Tanner quotes Soviet Premier Khrushchev

saying “I wish to confirm once again that the sympathies of the people and Government of the

Soviet Union are on the side of the people of the Republic of Cyprus, defending their

independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of their country.”80

This specific development

undoubtedly troubled the U.S. and signaled the Soviets Union’s interests in the Cyprus

government. Second, Anakara began to reopen dialogue with the Soviet Union, a result of their

dissatisfaction with the U.S. handling and disposition throughout the first year of the Cyprus

crisis.81

Also troublesome was the restless state of Cyprus, where clashes between Greek-

Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots continued sporadically throughout 1965-1967.82

The United States crisis management of the disaster in Cyprus beginning in late 1963 was

not an exemplary performance. Despite U.S. attempts to negotiate a solution that would provide

both allies with their essential demands, neither Greece nor Turkey would accept the terms in the

end. Both sides contended that the concessions to the other were too high. This was a result of

the United States’ unbiased disposition towards its two NATO allies. The analysis of U.S.

diplomatic intentions and goals in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1964 confirms that United States

79

Clyde H. Farnsworth, “Cyprus Subsides; Grieves for Dead: Makarios Visits Hospitals–Sporadic Fire

Reported in Nicosia and North,” New York Times, August 11, 1964, Late City edition, sec. A. 80

Henry Tanner, “Khrushchev Asks Turkey to Desist,” New York Times, August 10, 1964, Late City edition,

sec. A. 81


Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 86-

90. 82


Social Science 401, (May 1972): 102, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed January 2, 2012).

interests in the region lie with NATO; its strength, unity, and cohesion. Furthermore, as the

Department of State acknowledged, the proposals made by the U.S. ignored the interests of

Makarios and the Cypriot nation. The United States consistently sought to bypass Makarios and

the interests of the Cypriot population in favor of implanting its own plans for the island.83

This

policy was a reflection of the United States’ primary concern in the region; that NATO holds

strong and does not allow Soviet and Communist influence into the Mediterranean. The

prevention of a Greco-Turkish war was the key aspect of any United States effort in the Cyprus

crisis. Whether those efforts were directed towards Turkey, Greece, or the Soviet Union the

message was clear; the United States would use any means necessary to prevent a war that would

throw the NATO alliance into chaos. From the earliest letters in late 1963 to the failed Acheson

Plan in July-August 1964, the United States policy was realist and in harmony with the broader

U.S. Cold War ideological policy of Containment. Though there was no final solution to the

Cyprus crisis by the end of 1964, the United States was successful in preventing a war and the

collapse of NATO. The United States should be commended for their steady and fair policy that

achieved its primary goal, regardless of Greek or Turkish sentiments.

83


Relevant?,” Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 24, no. 1 (1998): 41.

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