Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845840

coalitions shift, party lists disintegrate and reform, and individual politicianschange allegiances. These kinds of challenges have not disappeared; for example, inopposition, Human Rights splintered, and the new administration had to weathercrises, including one that forced the resignation of the Health Minister. But therecent crises have been modest; and when there was a threat that the rulingcoalition might be about to break down, a surge in public support for the govern-ment prompted potential defectors to reconsider their position. By late 2003 theadministration formed after the 2002 elections, and which had drawn on fewexperienced politicians, was still managing to maintain its authority and to providea stable government in Latvia.

0261-3794/$ - see front matter # 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2004.02.004

The presidential election in South Korea,December 2002

Scott Walker a,�, Kyung-Tae Kang b

a Department of Political Science, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI 48202-2040, USAb Department of International Relations, Silla University, Gwaebop-Dong, Sasang-Gu, Busan City

617-736, South Korea

The presidential election in South Korea, held on 19 December 2002, was the

fourth time the electorate was able freely to choose its political leader in the

aftermath of the 1987 Democratic Movement. Roh Moo-Hyun of the ruling

Millennium Democratic Party (MDP) was elected president, narrowly defeating

Lee Hoi-Chang from the conservative Grand National Party (GNP). Contrary to

expectations, the campaign was not dominated by personalities, but by a number

of political issues, domestic and international. This pre-eminence of politics over

personality suggests a maturing of South Korean democracy. Nonetheless regional-

ism also decided the election, leaving chronic issues unresolved.

� Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-313-577-2647; fax: +1-313-993-3435.

E-mail address: scott.walker@wayne.edu (S. Walker).

841Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845

1. Background

Since its liberation, South Korea had been ruled by military or authoritarian lea-ders for about four decades. Elections were held on and off, but most were taintedby corruption, government intervention, illegal funding, and other irregularities.Governments enjoyed neither legality nor legitimacy. More recently, ‘people power’has changed the entire political arena, with the so-called ‘Democratic Movement’in 1986 cancelling the earlier constitution. According to the new constitution, thepresident is elected directly by popular vote every five years, holds office for a sin-gle term, and is in charge of government and appoints the prime minister. The firstpresidential election under the new constitution was held in December 1987; thefourth, in 2002, was overseen by the independent Korean Central Election Com-mittee. The National Assembly is also directly elected. As the Korean political pro-cess becomes more truly democratic, and elections become more frequent,candidates are tending to make more use of new developments in election cam-paigns, such as opinion polls, the internet, and televised discussions. This alsoapplies to presidential elections.

2. Election campaign

Many anticipated that the 2002 election would serve as a referendum on the per-formance of President Kim Dae-Jung, whose success during his early years in officewas overshadowed by controversy and scandal by the end of his presidency. Kimreceived considerable acclaim for a number of triumphs, such as reconciliation withNorth Korea, leading South Korea out of an economic slump, and repaying allIMF loans within two years. The high point of Kim’s popularity was in July 2000,when he became the first leader of South Korea to visit North Korea and to meetwith the President, Kim Jong-Il. This event was important not just because itreduced tensions between the North and the South, but also because it gave hopeto those seeking an eventual re-unification of the two Koreas.Nonetheless, Kim Dae-Jung and his ruling party were largely discredited by

events during the last two years of his term. An important turning point was theannouncement by North Korea, in October 2002, that it had nuclear weapons andwas considering defecting from the International Atomic Energy Agency. This waswidely viewed as a blow to Kim Dae-Jung’s ‘Sunshine Policy’, which focused oneconomic and humanitarian assistance, along with diplomacy, as the way to securepeace and stability in relations with the North. The aggressive move was a shockto South Koreans, and the blame came to focus on Kim Dae-Jung.The Kim administration also faced other problems. The economic outlook dar-

kened at the end of 2002, with gas prices spiralling in anticipation of a conflictbetween the US and Iraq. Both consumer prices and unemployment soared. Inaddition, the administration faced numerous accusations of corruption, culminat-ing in the jailing of two of Kim’s sons and several key aides for accepting impropercampaign contributions. The government was further discomfited by the landslidevictory of the GNP opposition in the April 2002 local elections.

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845842

Given these problems, the ruling MDP would appear to have stood little chanceof succeeding in the 2002 elections. However, other factors were working in theMDP’s favour, or, at least, at the expense of the GNP. First, the GNP was seen tobe more strongly in favour of the traditionally close relationship with the US thanthe MDP. This stance hurt the opposition because the US was associated with ahard-line approach to North Korea, a position at odds with mainstream publicopinion in South Korea. Public outrage towards the US reached fever pitch follow-ing the deaths of two teenage girls accidentally killed by a US military vehicle dur-ing exercises in June 2001, which was further fuelled by the failure of a US militarycourt to find the soldiers involved guilty of any crime.Another factor favouring the MDP was the personal appeal of its presidential

candidate, Roh Moo-Hyun. Originally from a farming background and holdingonly a high school diploma, Roh had overcome great odds to qualify as a lawyer,and subsequently earned national recognition as a human rights lawyer defendingleft-wing students in the 1970s. Therefore, although Roh lacked the upper-classbackground and political style of the other, more patrician presidential candidates,his record of fighting for democracy was unmatched by the other candidates. Rohalso gained popularity by pushing, in particular, for an end to the cripplingregional divisions that have disfigured Korean politics.A third influence on the election arose from the relationship between Roh and

Chung Moon-Joon, a member of one of South Korea’s most important families,Hyundai Conglomerate. The family was responsible for organising South Korea’s suc-cessful hosting of the 2002 Football World Cup, which sent Chung’s popularity sky-rocketing and inspired him to stand for the presidency. Chung and Roh shared asimilarly progressive ideology, but feared they might split the like-minded vote, thushanding the presidency to the GNP’s candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang. Chung’s NationalAlliance 21 and Roh’s MDP agreed that only one of them should stand (Busan Ilbo,2002). After a live TV debate between Chung and Roh on 23 November, an opinionpoll showed 42.2% support for Chung but 46.8% support for Roh, and the latter there-fore became candidate of the two parties, with Chung promising him full support.Thus, the candidacy was openly decided simply on the basis of an opinion poll.Just eight hours before voting started, however, Chung abruptly withdrew his

cooperation from Roh. Commentators have suggested that Roh and Chung agreedsome form of pact, whereby, in return for standing down in 2002, Chung would beentitled to determine the progressive candidate—that is, to stand himself—in the2007 contest (Hankook Ilbo, 2002). Or perhaps Chung feared that Roh planned torenege on their agreement. In the event, rather than damaging Roh’s chances, thelast-minute defection seems to have created a late surge of support for the MDP.Certainly, on election day internet and cell-phone users were bombarded with mes-sages from Nosamo (roughly ‘the Roh-lovers group’), urging voters to go to thepolls and vote for Roh.The 2002 presidential election was, in fact, historic in the use of new technology.

The Nosamo group consisted largely of younger people, and managed to generatebacking for their candidate among electors who would otherwise have had littleinterest in the election. Younger generations in South Korea tend to be more inter-

843Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845

ested in personal activities than politics (Kang, 2003; Kim, 1999), while older gen-erations are more interested in politics but not well organized. Although, turnoutin the election was low overall, younger people were over-represented amongvoters. And it was Roh that benefited most from the use of new technology. Tele-vision, too, was important: 72% of voters claimed to have watched at least onedebate on TV; 67.5% claimed that their decision was affected by the debates; and37% of those who watched most of the debates changed their candidate preferenceduring the campaign (Kim, 2003).The only candidate of a minor party to play a significant part in the election was

Kwon Young-Ghil of the leftist Democratic Labour Party (DLP). Although leftparties have had little appeal in modern Korean history, Kwon presented lucidviews in the campaign debates; in particular, he called for the introduction of awealth tax to narrow the gap between rich and poor. The DLP had won 8.2% ofthe vote in the 2002 regional elections; and, at one point during the campaign,Kwon’s popularity soared to 15%. He and his party severely criticized Chung’swithdrawal of support from Roh, claiming that it left liberal voters fearing thatLee would win, and pushed them into voting for Roh. In the final tally, Kwon wononly 3.9% of the vote. Thus, the election demonstrated that parties too far to theleft have a hard time winning mass support in South Korea.Finally, the election campaign was generally not oriented around policy issues.

According to the Korean Gallup polls (Park, 2003), Roh’s supporters voted forhim because he was young (13.5%), on account of his image and personality (11%),and because he had the ‘common touch’ (10%). Lee’s supporters, by contrast,chose him for being capable (19.3%), for the promise of stability (11.2%), and onaccount of his party (10.8%). The only policy issue in the election was Roh’s stresson the underdevelopment of outlying areas compared with Seoul. To redress thisimbalance, Roh even suggested moving the capital from Seoul to the centre areanear Daejon. Many people liked this fresh policy initiative, which also played apart in the campaign debates.

3. Election results

The MDP’s candidate, Roh, won the election with 48.9% of the vote, narrowlydefeating the GNP candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, who won 46.6%. Turnout was justover 70%, the lowest in South Korean history. Turnout in presidential electionswas usually over 85% in the past, but fell to 81.9% in 1992 and 80.7% in 1997. Theturnout in the 2002 election thus confirms the downwards trend, at least in presi-dential elections. This may indicate that Korean people are generally more satisfiedwith democratic, civilian governments, no longer compelled to vote as was they didunder the military regimes. On the other hand, this trend may reflect that peoplehave lost interest in elections or politics due to continuing government corruption,regional antagonism, and violations of the electoral laws.Despite signs that ideological differences between parties are beginning to play a

role in national elections, as illustrated by the clear division between the liberalMDP and the conservative GNP, the 2002 presidential election demonstrated that

Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845844

regionalism is still important in Korean politics. The GNP has a very strong power

base in the south-east of the country, and its candidate, Lee Hoi-Chang, won

67.7% of the votes cast in the south-east, as shown in Table 1. Likewise, the

MDP’s support is firmly rooted in the southwest, where Roh won a massive 93.4%

of the votes cast. The election was not decided purely along regional lines, but it is

clear that a candidate without strong support in either the southeast or the south-

west has little chance of winning. These imbalances are similar to those observed in

previous presidential elections (Ahn et al., 1995; Cho, 1996, 1998; Song, 2000).

Although both candidates vehemently pledged during the campaign to demolish

Korean regionalism, both benefited immensely from support in their regional

strongholds.Voting behaviour also differed sharply according to the age of electors, with

Roh’s victory due, in large part, to his popularity among younger voters. A post-

election survey revealed that Roh was particularly popular among voters in their

20s and 30s; in those age groups, more than 60% reported voting for Roh (68% in

the youngest group, 61.3% in the next youngest).1 As shown in Table 2, Roh

almost tripled or doubled the votes for Lee among those age groups. Although

Table 1

Regional distribution of votes in the presidential election, Korea, December 2002 (percentages)

S

1 Responses to thi

ventional manner: t

based on the (appa

group, or at least is

erational differences

eoul

s post-election

hat is, by ove

rently reason

not so much

. (See Table 2

Southeast

survey diver

rstating suppo

able) assump

stronger in th

for the source

Southwest C

ged from the

rt for the vic

tion that this

e younger age

of these surv

hungcheong O

official results i

torious candid

‘bandwagon’

groups as to a

ey data.)

ther regions

n what is becom

ate. The argum

effect operates

ccount for all t

Overall

Roh Moo-Hyun 5

0.6 26.5 93.4 4 1.3 4 6.2 46.6

Lee Hoi-Chang 4

4.6 67.7 2.8 4 1.3 4 6.2 46.6

Kwon Yong-Gil

4.2 5.4 1.2 5.2 4.2 3.9

Notes: Column percentages do not total to 100% as the results for three minor candidates are excluded

from the table.

Source: Korean Central Electoral Commission.

Table 2

Survey estimates of the distribution of votes by age in the 2002 Korean presidential election (percen-

tages)

20–29

30–39 40–49 5 0–59 60+ O verall

Roh Moo-Hyun

68.0 61.3 49.5 4 6.4 51.4 5 6.5

Lee Hoi-Chang

24.7 32.7 45.7 5 0.3 48.1 3 8.8

Kwon Yong-Gil

7.2 6.0 4.8 3.3 0.5 4.7

Notes: A post-election national survey was conducted for a week starting the day after election day by the

Korean Social Science Data Center (http://www.ksdc.re.kr). The survey N was 1500 adults of 20 years or

older. The overall figures for each candidate are different from the actual totals due to sampling error.

ing the con-

ents here are

in each age

he inter-gen-

845Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies 23 (2004) 821–845

Lee’s supporters tend to be in their 50s and older, the margin between support forRoh and Lee was narrower. This age effect was quite probably magnified by theuse of computers and cell phones by the younger generation of Roh supporters.

4. Conclusion

A number of the themes emerging in this election suggest that the political land-scape of Korea is changing. The traditional driving factors in Korean politics—personality and region—are still salient, but many things have changed. First, animportant cleavage appears to have developed between older and younger voters;and the latter group is armed with modern technology that may represent a formi-dable new resource for political mobilization. Secondly, the MDP presented itselfas the more liberal party, dissociating itself to some extent from the stances thatKorea has taken on international issues in the past. Finally, and perhaps the mostimportant of all, this election signifies the end of decades of political influence bythe so-called ‘Three Kims’: Kim Jong-Pil, Kim Dae-Jung, and Kim Young-Sam.These three politicians, all in their 70s, were political ‘bosses’ who dominated vir-tually every aspect of Korean politics for decades. The Three Kims had little effecton the outcome of the 2002 presidential election. Instead, the election witnessed therise of a second generation of political leaders in Korean politics.

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doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2004.02.005