The Power of Looking at 'Their' Choice: The South African Case Roger Fisher

T hree visits to South Africa are per­haps enough to let one know

how little he knows about the coun­try and how much there is to learn. It is easy to recognize the desirability of change. That need is recognized by the Government and by a wide spec­trum of South African society. But any outsider should be hesitant to prescribe a substantive solution.

South Africans themselves, how­ever, have invited suggestions with respect to questions of process. Is it possible that disinterested experts in negotiation and mediation might sug­gest, and perhaps facilitate, better ways of dealing with differences?

South Africa faces enormous so­cial, political, and economic ques­tions. The chance that any effort, however skillful and however welI­intended, will make a significant dif­ference is modest at best. But if there is, perhaps, even a small chance of making a constructive difference then, considering the magnitude of the stakes involved, the effort is probably worthwhile.

Where should one start? In In­ternational Conflict for Beginners (Fisher, 1969), I suggested the value of constructing a chart that illumi­nates the currently perceived choice of those we may be trying to influ­ence. Over the years, I have found

this to be one of the most useful tools of which I know for thinking clearly about a conflict or any negotiating situation. During the course of a re­cent trip to South Africa this judg­ment was confirmed.

A working assumption that often explains poor outcomes is the prem­ise that if we are not making prog­ress, and if I am being reasonable, then you are being unreasonable. Put another way, the assumption in many conflict situations is that if one side is responding rationally to its perceived choice, then the lack of progress is the fault of the other side.

This situation is well illustrated in today's South African context by looking at the currently perceived choice of two hypothetical leaders. Let us first consider the choice that is being faced by a hypothetical Black leader who is being asked by the Government to work with it in some way toward peaceful change. Per­haps the leader is being asked to accept appointment to some advi­sory post or otherwise to cooperate with the Government in developing proposals for change.

Whatever the request may be, it is likely to appear to our hypothetical Black leader as taking a step that risks looking like collaboration to other Blacks and proponents of basic

Roger Fisher is Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, 523 Pound Hall, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. He and William Vry are the authors of Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Bos­ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1981).

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Table 1 CURRENTLY PERCEIVED CHOICE OF A

HYPOTHETICAL BLACK LEADER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Question: Shall I take a step that will be seen as collaborating with white minority rule and undercutting the armed struggle?

IF YES

-I will lose my constituents.

- I risk being treated by them as a tfaitor.

- I will be seen as helping to maintain an inferior status.

- I weaken the momentum for change.

- I worsen divisions within the Black community.

- Black action will be led by more radical elements.

change. The currently perceived choice of any such leader is illus­trated by the chart shown in Table 1.

If that is the way the choice looks, it is not surprising that the Black leader says "no." Since this decision appears to be so clearly rational, such a Black leader is likely to assume that the fault lies with the Government.

Let us now look at the choice facing a hypothetical Government leader. Such leaders are being asked to take immediate and significant steps toward majority rule. If we try to put ourselves in the shoes of such a leader, how would we perceive the likely consequences of taking such a step? The chart shown in Table 2 il­lustrates the way the Government leader's personal balance sheet may be perceived.

Black and Government leaders have told me that these charts ac­curately portray the problem. On each Side, leaders are not being stu­pid or irrational but are reasonably

130 Roger Fisher Looking at 'Their ' Choice

IF NO

+ I can maintain and build my leadership role.

+ We continue the struggle for much needed change.

+ We are loyal to all those who fought and died.

+ We demonstrate that govemment violence does not work.

+ We pursue legitimate ends by means that are justified.

+ We have much world-wide support.

+ We are certain to win in the end.

BUT:

- There is a risk of an even more reactionary government.

responding to what they are being asked to do. To be sure, some gov­ernmental leaders may be greedy or selfish_ And perhaps some Black leaders care more about political power for themselves than for social justice. 'But that does not change the fundamental nature of the problem.

In conflict situations, people tend to see the negotiating task as being to persuade those on the other side to do what they do not want to do. But, as long as the requested action is con­trary to their enlightened self-interest as they see it, efforts to persuade are likely to be in vain. The negotiating task is usually best understood not as persuading people to act contrary to their interests as they see them, but rather to invent better choices. Typ­ically, there is a need to invent and to serve up choices that are in the inter­est of leaders on both sides of a con­flict, and then count on them to act in their own best interest.

A rigorous approach to the task of

Table 2 CURRENTLY PERCEIVED CHOICE OF A

HYPOTHETICAL GOVERNMENT LEADER IN SOUTH AFRICA

Question: Shall I now announce (or propose) a major Governmental step toward "Black majority" rUle?

IF YES

- We risk losing control over the process of change.

- We start down a slippery slope with no clear end in sight.

- We risk losing everything.

- We reward Black violence and encourage more.

- We encourage foreign pressure.

- The Right will abandon us.

- Divisions within the National Party will worsen.

- Liberals will criticize us for doing too little.

- We will not have solved any basic problem.

influencing a leader is not completed by understanding his currently per­ceived choice. We then need to iden­tify a "Target Balance Sheet" - a choice some days or weeks in the fu­ture that we might be able to create and one to which there would be a fair chance of expecting a "yes" answer.

For example, it would presumably be easier for a government official to respond affirmatively to a request that came from a conservative South African group than to one that came from Blacks engaged in violence. The risk of appearing to reward violence would be somewhat less. Similarly, it might be easier to say "yes" if there were some reward for doing so - if, for instance, the steps being re­quested were regarded by foreign bankers as sufficient progress to jus­tify rolling over commercial credit for another year.

IF NO

+ We can relain control over what happens.

+ We stand firm.

+ We preserve our values and what we have built.

+ We may succeed in controlling the situation as we have in the past.

+ We buy time.

+ We preserve support from the Right.

+ The National Party may stand united.

- Liberals and foreigners will criticize us (but they will anyway).

- We must still address basic problems.

BUT: + We keep our options open.

Any leader will fmd a decision easier to make if the leader can see a way to explain and defend that ac­tion to his or her constituents. For example, a Black leader would like to see that taking a particular step would still leave open the revolution­ary option; a government leader, on the other hand, would like to see that making a particular decision did not mean abandoning control over the process of change.

Such considerations illustrate the kind of thinking and hard work that may be necessary to loosen today's deadlock in South Africa, and to open the door for the significant con­structive action that is so widely un­derstood to be necessary. A currently perceived choice chart is simply diagnostic. It does not tell us what to do. But it may help point the way.

In the South African context, going forward needs to take into account

Negotiation Joumal April1986 131

the stated position of the South Afri­Government. In January 1986, Mr. Chris Heunis, Minister of Constitu­tional Development and Planning, is­sued a formal statement that included the following points:

We reject any form of discrimination, be it on the grounds of race, culture, religion or sex.

We accept power-sharing among all population groups as a necessary in­gredient of democracy in a plural society. All groups will therefore have to be accomodated on an equal basis.

We believe in universal franchise, meaning that no South African citizen will be excluded from full political rights.

We accept one citizenship for all South Africans, implying equal treatment and opportunities.

The statement included other points of a similar nature, but also made clear the Government's view that it was up to the Government to devise a new constitution.

Government leaders tend to see such statements as proof of their good intentions. Black leaders are more likely to see the gap between such statements and the present re­ality in South Africa as proof of Gov­ernment hypocrisy. Despite such dif­ferences, all recognize the need for a new constitution for South Africa. It is equally well recognized that such a constitution cannot be produced overnight.

In the light of this Situation, what is it that a third party facilitator might do? Where should it devote its efforts?

It may well be possible to reach widespread agreement on a declara­tion of intent or a statement of gen­eral principles. Here the task is not only to draft the statement of prin­ciples, but also to draft the opera­tional language that various leaders could sign, whether that be a joint recommendation to a future constitu-

1:'>2 RORer Fisher LookinR at 'Their' Choice

tional convention, a commitment to adhere to such principles, or some other form of undertaking.

Concurrently with work on the long-term constitutional problem, there is a need for interim action that deals with such issues as passbooks, lifting bans on selected political leaders and organizations, security arrangements for the townships, edu­cation, and so forth.

Against this background, there ap­pear to be four tasks that third-party experts on process might usefully take as a focus for their efforts: 1. Helping participants understand the problem. A third party might, over time, meet with perhaps a hun­dred or more people who will have a significant role to play in the future of South Africa. The better each of these leaders and potential leaders understands the interests of the oth­ers, the better off all will be. Today, many of them are not talking with each other. A facilitator can help overcome some of the circumstances that now limit effective communica­tion. 2. Helping generate "yesable" prop­ositions. A second task is to help the parties turn problems into potential answers. For each substantive issue, there is someone who could take some constructive action. A good question is, "Who could do what about this tomorrow morning?" By going back and forth among many people, it should be possible to col­lect a lot of suggestions and help shape them into operational steps upon some of which agreement should be possible among those whose action would be required. 3. Workshops on process. Many in South Africa would benefit from joint working sessions on process. All of the various parties have some-

thing to learn from each other. Both theory and practice can be improved by conscious attention to process. 4. Helping create a replacement team. If outsiders have a contribu­tion to make, that should be a tempo­rary phenomenon. Perhaps outside negotiation experts can help to "put out a fire." But, certainly within a year's time, there should be a South

African team capable of doing all or most of the facilitating that outsiders may now be able to provide. While dealing with urgent issues, a third party should probably also stand ready to provide any assistance that might be requested to help South Africans organize and undertake any activity that is now being undertaken by outsiders.

REFERENCES Fisher, R. International Conflict for Beginners. New York: Harper & Row. 1969.

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