TRANSUMO TRANSPORTS-Deelrapport 2

The Politics of Evidence Based Policy-making

Insights from the Dutch policy debate about Amsterdam Airport Schiphol

and lessons for triggering policy transitions

Menno Huys Jan Anne Annema

28 Oktober 2009

TU Delft, 28 Oktober 2009 ISBN/EAN 9789056382308

2

Verantwoording Het project TransPorts is mede mogelijk gemaakt door Transumo. Transumo (TRANsition SUstainable MObility) is een Nederlands platform van meer dan 150 bedrijven, overheden en kennisinstellingen die gezamenlijk kennis ontwikkelen op het gebied van duurzame mobiliteit. Transumo wil bijdragen aan een transitie van het huidige inefficiënte mobiliteitssysteem naar een systeem dat bijdraagt aan versterking van de economische concurrentiepositie, en daarnaast het milieu en de mens grote aandacht geeft. De onderzoeks- en kennisontwikkelingsactiviteiten zijn gestart in 2004 en lopen in ieder geval door tot en met 2009. Inmiddels worden in Transumo verband meer dan 20 onderzoeksprojecten uitgevoerd. Meer informatie is beschikbaar via www.transumo.nl. The project TransPorts is made possible with support of Transumo. Transumo (TRANsition Sustainable MObility) is a Dutch platform for over 150 companies, governments and knowledge institutes that cooperate in the development of knowledge with regard to sustainable mobility. Transumo aims to contribute to a transition from the current inefficient mobility system towards a system that facilitates a stronger position in economic competition, as well as ample attention for people and environment. The research and knowledge development activities of Transumo have started in 2005 en will continue at least until 2009. Currently over 20 projects are conducted within Transumo. More information is available via www.transumo.nl.

3

Summary Evidence-based policy-making This paper analyzes the role research played in the planning procedures for Amsterdam Schiphol airport in the period 1990 - 2009. The intention of the policy-makers and researchers in this highly complex decision-making case could be regarded as carrying out ‘evidence-based policy-making’. Such a process can be entitled as a rigorous approach that gathers, critically appraises and uses high quality research evidence to inform policy making and profession practice. Based on the analysis of research utilization in Schiphol airport planning, this paper aims to identify recommendations on the possible future role evidence-based policy-making may play in planning new large infrastructure projects. Moreover, we will discuss the potential contribution that evidence based practices may make to creating a policy transition. Politicization of research The analysis in this paper shows the Schiphol policy making process as not being really ‘evidence-based’. Based on careful and detailed analysis of reports and interviews with key actors involved, we conclude that policy-makers of the Ministry of Transportation have repeatedly prevented the production of relevant information, narrowed down the scope of research, prevented or rewrote results selectively and used research results selectively. The most important explanation for this selective use of research in the Dutch Schiphol policy debate is politicization. It was the political ambition of airport growth that drove the quest for research evidence mainly, and the way research was utilized in this case. Noise pollution – the counterpart of aviation growth – was taken into account, but it can be shown in discussions and choices made that in final decision-making this problem was seen as secondary. As such, the political goal of growth firmly has influenced the kind of research that has been done in the first place. Besides, the growth ambition has influenced the research process itself via supervision and it has served as a mechanism for selecting the kind of research information that was to be utilized and the information that was to be marginalized. Recommendations for the future We assume that the political nature of policy making for new infrastructure makes several of the usual recommendations for increasing research utilization rather ineffective. For example, improving research communication and dissemination, improving awareness and absorption of research, long-term engagement of researchers with potential users in order to create common understandings and identities and even the creation of a culture of policy learning are not likely to sort great effects in the Schipol case, or other cases revolving around new infrastructure. Instead, we think that we should redefine our ambition and take the political nature of the policy game far more seriously. That is, by ignoring the political influence on the research-policy dynamics it won’t go away. This implies a less ambitious but perhaps more realistic approach to evidence based policymaking. The following recommendations might be helpful here:

4

1. Make sure that independent research institutes may define their own research agendas (including research questions which might result in politically undesirable outcomes) and have sufficient funds available for carrying out independent research, during an infrastructure planning process. In this way an attempt is made to develop an as broad knowledge base as possible with the highest possible quality, including a wide variety (multiformity) of research questions, using different theoretical assumptions and methodologies, scientific knowledge and lay knowledge.

2. Make sure that everyone interested should be able to acquire the information that is being developed in the broad knowledge base. Especially politicians who are involved in the political debate should be able to gather all information developed.

The above mentioned recommendations imply a clear understanding of the different roles in the policy game. Policy makers of a Ministry with a political ambition still may try to get their policy alternatives selected based on their ‘evidence’. But in our view it is important that independent researchers are allowed to deliver alternative ‘evidence’ in the policy-making process without being influenced by the political context. During the political debate politicians will use information selectively. After all, that is part of the game; in politics the main drive is to mobilize support for ones arguments, not the use of research or evidence. Here it is important to understand that we think that selective research utilization is inherent to the political game. Selective use is therefore not prohibited, or bad, in our view, as long as it is clear to outsiders and as long the selection is based on a broad knowledge base. With this last point we mean that selection of evidence could take place based on a choice between reports A, B and C, all three biased. However, we would prefer that selection would take place based on reports A and B (biased) and report D (independent research), even though in both cases report A may be chosen as ‘evidence’. When these recommendations are implemented in the Schiphol noise debate the final policies might still be the same. But at least it will be clear at the expense of which alternatives this choice will come. Research is then not merely a means to legitimize solutions that were already selected. Instead, it serves as a broad and diverse reservoir of ideas and insights from which fully-fledged policy alternatives are derived. It is during the political game that the final policy alternative is selected, during which all political strategies for mobilizing support are allowed (within the margins of what is deemed acceptable, thus without damaging mutual trust). Transitions For developing transition policies the Schiphol case has learned us that it is important to let go of the idea that the creation of unequivocal evidence is possible in the case of policy-making for new infrastructure, and to let go of the idea that research can trigger policy transitions all by itself. At best, research can make a minor contribution to triggering transitions to more sustainable infrastructure. The main role research can play is that it can create opportunities for the development of as much variety in solutions as possible. The variety can serve as the input for the political negotiations.

5

Content 1. Introduction 5

1.1 Objective 1.2 Methodology and scientific cap

2. Evidence-based policy-making in Dutch transport planning processes 8

2.1 Background of EDP 2.2 Dutch infrastructure planning and EDP

10 3. The struggle for evidence 4. Constructing evidence for Schiphol’s noise policy 12

4.1 Start of the noise – aviation growth dilemma 4.2 Reconcile aviation growth and noise pollution (1989 – 1995) 4.3 Planning Key Decision 1995 4.4 Measuring versus calculating noise (1989 - 1995) 4.5 Noise limits exceeded (1997 – 1998) 4.6 A new noise regulative system (1999 – 2003) 4.7 An independent committee (2000 – 2001) 4.8 Within the Ministry 4.9 Dutch Aerospace Laboratory (2001) 4.10 Environmental Impact Assessment Committee (2001 – 2003) 4.11 The Citizen initiative law (2001) 4.12 New information about measuring noise (1997 – 2003) 4.13 The political debate (2001 – 2002) 4.14 Evaluation process (2003 – 2006) 4.15 Loyal to the Minister 4.16 Sensitive political context 4.17 Eversdijk committee: outer areas and measuring noise (2003 – 2006) 4.18 Night flights 4.19 New perspective 4.20 Final report of the Cabinet (2006) 4.21 Alders table (2007 – 2008) 4.22 Local residents 4.23 Poor legal protection (2009) 4.24 Measuring noise pollution (2006 – 2009)

5. Nine strategies for using scientific information in the Schiphol case 36

6. Confronting the nine strategies with research utilization science 40 7. Potential for improving Evidence-Based Policy Practice – a discussion 52 8. Evidence Based practice and policy transitions 54

6

1. Introduction 1.1 Objective This paper analyzes the role evidence-based policy-making has played in planning procedures for Amsterdam Schiphol airport the past decades. Based on this analysis, this paper aims to identify recommendations on the possible future role evidence-based policy-making could play in planning new large infrastructure projects. Moreover, we discuss the potential contribution that evidence based practices can make to creating a policy transition. Schiphol Airport planning has been chosen as the learning casus in this paper for four reasons. The first reason is that the political planning process for this large infrastructure project in The Netherlands could be characterized as technical, complicated and based on many scientific reports. It is fair to say that in this casus like in most large infrastructure planning processes policy-makers at least attempted to base their policies on lots of research findings. The intention was ‘evidence-base policy-making’. If this research utilization was really fair and unbiased, we will show in this paper. The second reason for choosing Schiphol airport planning as the casus is that the airport planning process was carried out in a complex multi-actor context in which each actor used bits and pieces of the ‘scientific’ information. This multi-actor environment is typical for large infrastructure planning. Thirdly, during the planning process important political clashes took place between people defending economic and people defending environmental interests. These clashes between economic and environmental interests make this casus especially of interest for giving recommendations on the future role evidence-based policy making could play in facilitating transitions towards sustainable airports or other large infrastructure projects. Fourth, many of the actors involved in the Schiphol policy debate acknowledge the need for triggering a policy transition. That is, they sense that continuing along the existing paths cannot result in the kind of practical policy solutions that are desired and deemed necessary. After discussing the methodology and scientific gap (1.2) and introducing evidence based policy making in the Netherlands (chapter 2) we discuss the phenomenon of evidence based policy making into more detail (chapter 3). Next, we give a detailed description of 20 years of evidence based policy (chapter 4). In chapters 5 and 6 we present our analysis and in chapter 7 we present the possibilities for improving evidence based practices. In the last chapter (8) we reflect upon the potential contribution of evidence based practice for creating policy transitions. 1.2 Methodology and scientific gap The analysis in this paper consists of four main steps. We have started with describing the Schiphol Airport planning process in roughly the period 1990 - 2009. The description is based on publicly available documents and narrative interviews with important actors involved in the process (see appendix 1 for list of interviews). The narrative interviews were put in small reports, and when desired by the respondent, sent back to them for approval. However, often this was not deemed necessary. Therefore, most interpretations of the interviews were validated during the interviews itself by asking the respondent ‘Is

7

this what you mean?’ The description of the planning process, and especially the role science has played, is the empirical material of this analysis. We think it is of importance that this empirical material is shown to the reader in detail (chapter 3), without comment, and as fair as possible to the actors involved. By doing so, the reader can judge for his or herself if our conclusions and recommendations are valid. The second step in the analysis is identifying the strategies politicians and policy-makers (mostly civil servants of the Dutch Ministery of Transportation) have used in dealing with the scientific evidence (paragraph 5). In the third step these strategies – we have identified nine different strategies – are confronted with scientific literature which explains research utilization in policy-making processes. By doing so, we can identify the most important explanations for research utilization in the Schiphol Airport case. Finally, as we now understand the research utilization in this casus, in the fourth, step, we have attempted to give some general recommendations for an improved future role science could play in large infrastructure planning in the Netherlands. The scientific gap filled with research is that we add new empirical material to the research utilization literature, especially research utilization in complex multi-actor decision-making processes. Moreover, we reflect upon the potential contribution that research practices can play in triggering policy transitions in the case of wicked policy problems.

8

2. Evidence-based policy-making in Dutch transport planning processes The focus in this paper is on the role evidence-based policy-making has played. What is evidence-based policy-making? According to Davies (2004) evidence-based policy-making is a ‘rigorous approach that gathers, critically appraises and uses high quality research evidence to inform policy making and profession practice’. Davies compares this to ‘opinion-based policy, which relies heavily on either the selective use of evidence (e.g. on single studies irrespective of quality) or on the untested views of individuals or groups, often inspired by ideological standpoints, prejudices or speculative conjecture’.

The evidence based practice movement originates in the UK in the field of medical practice (health) and is primarily concerned with promoting the use of scientific research evidence as a basis for (health) policies (Trinder, 2000). It rapidly achieved widespread acceptance in the field of health and the approach has quickly spread to the European Union and many other countries like Germany, US, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands, and to many other fields of professional practice including dentistry, nursing, public health, mental health, social work and education (Jones & Seelig, 2004; Marston & Watts, 2003; Zlotnik, Biegel and Solt 2002). The political ambition to ground public policy in the best evidence available was first coined in the UK also, in its White paper on Modernizing government, and is sometimes related to the New labour government that came to power in 1997 (Nutley et al., 2002). New labour adopted an anti-ideological, pragmatic, utilitarian approach to policy making, translated in the mantra ‘What matter is what works’ (Solesbury, 2002). In 2001 the European Commission adopted a similar stance and took the concept of evidence based policy making up in its White paper on Governance, in which it is emphasized that ‘scientific and other experts play an increasingly significant role in preparing and monitoring decisions’ (CEC, 2001, p.428). In public discussion in the past decade there seems to be an increasingly expressed enthusiasm for ‘evidence-based policy’ (Nutley et al., 2001; Sanderson, 2002; Solesbury, 2002), or evidence informed policy’ (Davoudi, 2006). The main argument for the evidence-based turn is that policy and plan making is not only about creating agreement; it is evenly important that this agreement is embedded in a sound evidence base (Nutley, Davies & Tilly, 2001). In planning and policy theory it is argued that the increasing call for evidence based policies can be seen as a countermove to the communicative turn in planning that boomed during the early 1990s, and that aimed to facilitate the interactive process of policy making (Faludi & Waterhout, 2006). In Dutch transport infrastructure planning we can identify an increasingly expressed enthusiasm for ‘evidence-based policy-making’ the past decade also. It should be noted that the phrase ‘evidence-based policy-making’ is not much used in the Netherlands. However, the notion it self (the use of scientific research evidence as a basis for policies) has become increasingly popular. An important example for this enthusiasm is the decision by the government in 2000 to use a standardized cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in decision -making processes for large infrastructure projects. The Dutch Ministries of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and of Economic Affairs decided in 1998 to make an inventory of the knowledge of economic effects of infrastructural

9

projects – the so-called OEEI research programme. The ministries were moved to start this research programme after observing that the economic effects of major Dutch investments plans were, before 1998, often estimated using diverse methods (Eijgenraam et al., 2000). Noting that the situation surrounding the economic assessment of large infrastructural projects in the Netherlands was very loosely structured, the ministries concluded that ‘not only was the assessment characterised by diverse research methodologies, but many intense, and not always very lucid, discussions about the appropriateness and applicability of these methodologies arise’. Years later, an ad hoc parliamentary committee for projects on infrastructure (House of Representatives, 2004) confirmed the poor quality of Dutch decision making on infrastructure projects before 1998. The committee analysed in depth the decision-making process of two major infrastructure projects carried out from 1990 – 1998: a high speed rail project from Amsterdam to Belgium and a dedicated freight rail project from the port of Rotterdam to Germany (the Betuwe Line). The committee concluded that ‘decision-making for these major projects in that period was based on a combination of fear, hope and belief instead of research findings, debate and creativity’. A very important step in the OEEI programme was to decide to strive for agreement on research methods, in which the programme succeeded. The ‘OEEI community’ – almost all of the important economic institutes and consultancies in the Netherlands – reached consensus on a number of crucial points, for example, the importance of implementing CBA. The most important report in the OEEI-programme (Eijgenraam et al. (2000) contained a set of guidelines for applying CBA to infrastructure proposals. In 2000 the Dutch government decided that this CBA Guide should be applied to all major transport infrastructure plans. Next to the OEEI programme, another important example of the increasingly expressed enthusiasm for ‘evidence-based policy-making in Dutch transport planning is the establishment of a new transport research institute in 2007: the ’Netherlands Institute for Transport policy Analysis’ (KiM). The reason for setting up KiM was the need, as expressed within the policy departments of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, for systematic, scientifically well-founded transport policy analyses and studies that are not swayed by the political issues of the day. Since the end of 2006 KiM carries out transport policy studies and analyses in order by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. On the website of KiM it is stated that these studies and analyses ‘are aimed to being used to strengthen the strategic knowledge base for transport policy-making’ (www.kimnet.nl).

10

3. The struggle for evidence It is one thing to be enthusiastically about the importance of having a strategic knowledge base for transport policy-making. At the same time there is much scientific evidence that shows that it is highly difficult to develop the kind of evidence that is both authoritative and scientifically valid when dealing with complex technical issues, like large infrastructure projects. This is related to the fact that such problems are primary examples of wicked (Rittel & Webber, 1973) or ill structured problems (Dunn, 1994). Such problems are characterized by cognitive and social uncertainties. With regard to the cognitive uncertainties, the involved parties do not only disagree about the solution, but also about the nature of the problem. The main reason for this is that there is no agreement about what counts as (scientifically) valid and authoritative facts (De Graaf & Hoppe, 1989). Actors pose arguments that are all valid in their own right, each sustained by scientific evidence, while pointing towards fundamentally different directions (Van Eeten, 1999; Schon & Rein, 1994).1 With regard to the social uncertainties, wicked problems cut across the traditional jurisdictions and routines of organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the public and private sector. Governments, businesses and civil society are unable to tackle these issues by themselves, and none of them can impose policies or strategies unilaterally (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; p.1). In order to reach ones goals, the actor needs the support of others. In such situations, the actor finds himself in a network. A network can be defined as (1) a number of actors with (2) different goals and interests and (3) different resources, (4) who depend on each other for the realization of their goals. These dependencies can be expressed in several resources: funds, authority, land, information, political friends etc. (De Bruijn & Ten Heuvelhof, 2008; p.1; see also Klijn, 1996; Kickert et al., 1997).2 Interdependence with regard to resources compels actors to interact in order to achieve their own goals. The result is that the actors engage in all kinds of (more or less formalized) interactions, giving rise to arenas of interaction.3 For example, in the Netherlands large infrastructure planning is a matter of national concern, but the national government is not hierarchically superior to the other actors involved. The government is only one of the players involved, and depends just as much as the rest on support of others for the effectiveness and legitimacy of its functioning. Arenas of interaction emerge and decisions are made in networks.4 In general, it can be argued that each wicked public policy issue asks for its own specific mix of command and control strategies (hierarchy), market mechanisms and network management strategies (cf. De Bruijn & Dicke, 2007; Rhodes, 1997).

1 In scientific literature this is related to the idea that actors often hold different and incommensurable, frames, resulting in their own perceptions of reality (cf. Rein & Schon, 1993/ 1994; Weick, 1995).

2 Note that in this thesis networks refer to multi-actor networks and not to networks in technical domains (information networks, transportation networks.

3 Of course, actors who are dependent on each other to achieve their objectives will be prepared to surrender only precisely the amount of autonomy necessary to achieve those objectives (Wassenberg, 1984; p.200)

4 In scientific literature the shift from hierarchical decision making to decision-making in networks is broadly referred to as the shift from government to governance (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Kooiman, 1993; Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). There are several explanations available for the erosion of the steering capacity of the national government in the case of public policy making, ranging from macro-sociological explanations that cause global pressures (i.e. the rise of the network society, see Castells, 2000; Dicken, 1998; Salet et al, 2003; Scharpf, 1999) to the resurrection of civil society, that causes local pressures (Frissen, 1996; Van Gunsteren, 1994; Putnam, 1993). Due to both pressures the power of the nation state has shifted to both supranational and more regional or local actors, which even lead some to proclaim the end of the nation state (cf. Ohmae, 1995). Such a thing has not happened yet, but there is ample empirical proof that internationalization and individualization have spread the resources among more actors, which has lead to a horizontalisation of power and authority.

11

In the next paragraph we describe how policy makers have tried to develop evidence in the argumentative policy struggle about the noise policy for Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, by far the largest airport of the Netherlands.

12

4. Constructing evidence for Schiphol’s Noise Policy In this paragraph we describe 20 years of Schiphol noise debate. By presenting the case description in this paragraph in some detail the reader is invited to develop his own interpretations. Furthermore, it allows us to make clear how we arrived at our interpretations. 4.1 Start of the noise dilemma The public policy debate about the development of Schiphol airport (the sixth airport of Europe, welcoming 47,4 million pax. and 1,5 million tons freight in 2008) is one of the most controversial and long-standing issues on the Dutch policy agenda. Since the 1950s the Dutch government has struggled with the trade off between the economic importance of Schiphol and the environmental impact of the increasing air traffic (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Broer, 2006; Tan, 2001). Up until the 1960s the political struggle was relatively easy, but when an extended Schiphol airport was opened in 1967 the policy controversy really took off. At the same time the jet engine became the standard and with growing traffic numbers the airport caused more noise pollution than expected, resulting in the increase of resistance against further expansions. As air transport demand continued to grow, the sense of urgency to expand Schiphol airport grew as well, especially when traffic volumes exploded during the end of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s. At the same time, the attention for noise pollution as one of the main negative external effects also increased. The Schiphol noise problem is related to the fact that the airport is situated in a densely populated region near the economic heart of the country (figures 1 & 2). Moreover, since the 1960s the surrounding urban areas have extended towards the airport in order to fulfill their housing needs. It is therefore not surprising that the public policy debate about Schiphol has centered on the growth-noise dilemma.

13

Figure 1. Spatial Development in the Randstad (Schiphol area in the middle) 1950 - 2010 1950 1980

2010

Source: Committee Spatial Development Schiphol, Report Mainport 2.0, 2008

14

Figure 2. Close up spatial Situation Schiphol Region 2006

Source: Milieu –en Natuur Planbureau, 2006 (grey represents urban areas) 4.2 Reconcile aviation growth and noise pollution (1989 – 1995) The fundament of the Dutch noise policy was (and still is) to fit the airport, with its noise footprints, in the residential environment surrounding the airport, such that the flight routes avoided living areas as much as possible. The basic assumption was that central spatial planning could offer a solution for the noise problem (Bouwens & Dierikx, 1996; Broer, 2006). In between 1989 – 1995 this principle was elaborated as part of the policy challenge to reconcile aviation growth and noise pollution. The result was the establishment of a noise contour around Schiphol that marked the boundary for the amount of noise pollution (decibels) that was deemed acceptable outside the contour. More specifically, in that period 300 enforcement points were laid out for which the yearly mean of noise pollution was calculated, which was not to exceed 55 decibels

15

(35KE5). In 1995 a housing norm was added; no more than 15.000 houses were allowed within the 35 KE contour until 2003, and no more than 10.000 houses from 2003 onwards (see figure 3) (Ministry of Transportation PKB, 1995). Figure 3. Left: Indicative Noise Zones 4 runway system (< 2003), 35Ke (red) and 45 Ke (purple) and 5 runway system (> 2003), right.

Source: PKB Part 4, 1995 4.3 Planning Key Decision 1995 The first main decision on a new noise policy was taken in 1995, when the so-called Planning Key Decision was made (Planologische Kernbeslissing, PKB 1995). In the PKB the Dutch government put down their main decisions towards the future of Schiphol airport. Amongst others, they decided to choose for a new five runway systematic. Prior to this decision, an extensive debate about ways of reconciling noise pollution and aviation growth took place. During this discussion, it had turned out that future growth would result in more noise pollution than was politically acceptable. For this reason, the policy makers decided to adopt lower future air port growth numbers than estimated in several scientific reports, as it was only with those lower numbers that the noise effects were deemed acceptable (Algemene Rekenkamer, 1998; PAU, 2000). One of the main points of discussion was whether or not to extent a stricter night regime in between 23.00 – 6.00 or between 23.00 – 7.00 hour. In the final PKB report it was stated that research would be conducted to assess the health effects (most notably sleep disturbance) of flights during the period 6.00 – 7.00 hour period, and that these results first needed to be available in order to make a proper decision (Part 4, 1995, p.17). As such, the issue of night flights was removed from the political agenda at that time. It was not mentioned

5 Ke (Kosten eenheid in Dutch) is an old measure for air port noise. It is based on the characteristics of the air fleet 1960. The measure aims at representing in a direct way the amount of severe noise nuisance as a result of use of Schiphol airport. The percentage people with severe noise nuisance is the Ke measure minus 10. So, 35 Ke means that about 25% of the people living in the surroundings of Schiphol airport are hindered severely by air port noise

16

that there had already been a health assessment in 1993 (Staatsen et al, 1993).6 There was some discussion also about the area to which the noise regulations should apply: only to the areas in the vicinity of the airport (inner area) or also to a broader area (outer areas). And there was discussion about whether noise pollution was to be calculated or measured. In the final PKB it was decided to distinguish between measures for the short term and mid term. The regulations for the short term did only apply to the so-called inner areas (i.e. those areas in the vicinity of Schiphol), while the new five runway systematic was to apply to a much broader area (including the outer areas). Moreover, in the final PKB it was stated that from 2003 onwards noise was to be measured (instead of calculated) and the issue of night flights was to be settled (PKB, 1995; Tan, 2001). Several important clues about the possibilities for measuring aircraft noise were excluded from the debate. 4.4 Measuring versus calculating noise (1989 – 1995) In 1989 the newly established Environmental Agency of the Municipality of Amsterdam (Milieudienst Amsterdam) started to wonder whether the many calculations about expected noise levels, based on which the contours were drawn, were actually right. After all, the calculation method contained a large amount of assumptions and estimations. The municipal environmental service discussed this with the research agency of the municipality that was also being established (OMEGAM), and together they decided to develop a measurement system, in order to assess whether the calculated levels were right. The system was called ‘Luistervink’ and its first measuring point was put in operation in October 1990 (on a flat called Bolestein located in Buitenveldert location). A second point became operative from January 1992 onwards (on a flat called Goereesepad in Amstelveen) (see figure 4). On April 12th of 1993 OMEGAM published the first results (Muchall/OMEGAM, 1993).7

6 Staatsen, B.A.M., Franssen, E.A.M., Doornbos, G., Abbink, F., van der Veen, A.A., Heisterkamp, S.H., Lebret, E.,

Gezondheidskundige Evaluatie Schiphol, RIVM rapport 441520010, december 1993 7 Muchall, R.C., (1993) Akoestisch onderzoek naar de geluidbelasting vanwege de luchtvaart op woningen langs de oostelijke

aanvliegroute van Schiphol door middel van meting. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101, April 12th 1993.

17

Figure 4. Locations of the 2 Measuring Points, 1991 - 1992

Source: Muchall, 1994 As can be seen in figure 4, the selected measure points were located at both sides of one runway (the Buitenveldertbaan) which made it possible to compare the results. The measured noise pollution showed that the real noise pollution was much higher (appox. 5Ke) than the calculated pollution (Muchall/OMEGAM, 1993; p.13). In a subsequent report that was published on 21st of September in 1993, the method for measuring had been validated and it was concluded that there could be a deviation of 2Ke at most (Muchall/OMEGAM, 1993b; p.9).8 9 Therefore, the main conclusion of the research was that the calculation method underestimated the level of noise pollution that was really caused by Schiphol. The 35Ke contour was therefore drawn too close to the airport. Based on the measurements the contour had to be 50% larger. However, drawing a wider contour based on the measurements would imply that the amount of houses (60%) and people (100%) within the 35ke would considerably increase. Especially, because the housing density was higher in these areas (Muchall, 1994; p.105).10 This conclusion was not very desirable at a time when the national and local governments together with the Dutch aviation sector were struggling to develop a 35Ke contour containing a maximum of respectively 15.000 (and 10.000 houses for the long term, as we shall discuss next). More specifically, if the measured amounts were used, this was simply impossible (Interview Muchall/ Geluidsconsult, 2009). The RLD of the Ministry of V&W that was responsible for the calculated numbers rejected the findings of OMEGAM. They argued that too much noise was included that was not caused by

8 Muchall, R.C., (1993) Validatie en ijking van de automatische vliegtuiglawaaimetingen van het meetsysteem Luistervink. OMEGAM rapport nr. 1470101-2, September 21st 1993.

9 See also Muchall, R.C., (1993) Onderzoek naar de verschillen tussen meting en berekening van vliegtuiglawaai op meetpunten in Amsterdam en Amstelveen. OMEGAM rapport nr. l470101-3

18

aviation (especially heavy wind blows, but also other sources that produced noise), which caused considerable higher levels of noise pollution. It was not clear anymore whether the calculated or the measured numbers were more realistic.11 At first, the department of Economic Affairs of the municipality of Amsterdam that was in charge of the Schiphol issue on the municipal level didn’t want to continue with the debate. They simply wanted to stick to the calculated numbers and bring the measurement program to an end. For this reason the task force Noise Pollution was abolished in December 1993 (Interview Muchall/ Geluidsconsult, 2009). Moreover, the committee had never presented a final report wherein the conclusions about the validity of the measurements were confirmed. That is, the results were available, but Economic Affairs who chaired the committee refused to write it down (Interview Muchall/ Geluidsconsult, 2009). Nonetheless, the director of the Environmental Agency of Amsterdam did sent a letter to the alderman of the Environment, wherein she explained that she expected her to take the results seriously (including the far-reaching policy implications this would hold).12 The Municipal Board of Amsterdam decided to carry out a second opinion by an independent organization for which Dr. Isermann from the German Aerospace Laboratory was assigned. His main aim was to explain the differences between the calculated NLR and measured OMEGAM levels of noise pollution. He concluded that, if some flaws were taken into account there would still be a difference between both methods, but this difference would be smaller (2KE instead of 5KE) (Isermann, 1995; p.37). The main recommendation was to further refine the method for measuring and use it for validating and improving the calculation method. In short, the calculations could be improved by using a revised data base (1995; p.45). Nothing was done with the recommendation. After the report was finalized, the department of Economic Affairs of the Municipality of Amsterdam issued a press release, although the report itself was not made publicly available. In the press release it was stated that OMEGAM had drawn some incorrect conclusions, which explained the higher levels of noise. If all wrong assumptions were corrected, a marginal difference in between 1 – 2 Ke was all that was left and this difference was deemed acceptable.13 This was not totally in line with the entire report, as it was selectively quoted (Interview Muchall/ Geluidsconsult, 2009). In the final PKB it was stated that more research was needed in order to develop a sound measurement system. Nonetheless, it was stated that aircraft noise was to be measured from 2003 onwards. 4.5 Noise limits exceeded (1997 – 1998) Right after the PKB became effective the noise limits for the short term were exceeded at several of the 300 enforcement points. This was not really a surprise, considering the low growth numbers that had deliberately been assumed, in order to make a political compromise between growth and noise possible. Quite soon it became poltically clear that the noise limits would hamper further growth, which was deemed undesirable by the sector parties and the Cabinet (this is the Dutch government). For this reason it was

11 See also Press Release Dagblad Trouw, November 18th 1999. De lange lijdensweg naar werkelijke geluidshinder, by Vincent Dekker.

12 Milieudienst Amsterdam (1994) Letter send to the Alderman for Environmental Affairs “Collegebehandeling op 1 maart 1994 van Omegamrapport inzake vliegtuiglawaai Buitenveldertbaan.” February 1994, Nr. 8700002/02.

13 Press Release Municipality of Amsterdam issued by the Alderman of Economic Affairs, June 7th 1995. Geluidsoverlast van vliegverkeer onafhankelijk getoetst.

19

decided by the Cabinet that a more transparent noise regulation systematic was to be developed. Due to the excession of the noise limits the relationship between the sector on the one hand and environmental parties and residents on the other, deteriorated rapidly. In order to ‘clear the air’ in September 1998 the Ministry of Transport initiated a new interactive policy approach: the Interim Debate on Schiphol (Tijdelijk Platform Overleg Schiphol, TOPS) was established (Schoon Schip Notitie, 1998; TK 25466, Nr. 27). TOPS was one of the first attempts to give environmental and nature conservation groups, alongside other public interest groups and private interest groups, a formal place in an early stage of political decision-making (Glasbergen, 2002; Weggeman, 2003). The main negotiations within TOPS were done by the sector parties (Schiphol Airport authorities, Royal Dutch Airlines/ KLM) and the environmental interest groups (Milieudefensie, The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment, Milieufederatie Noord Holland). TOPS did not succeed to develop a new regulative system for noise, and the negotiations failed. Meanwhile, alongside TOPS the policy makers of the Ministry of Transportation had been working on a noise systematic themselves and in September 1999 they initiated bilateral appointments with the environmental parties and the sector to discuss these different alternatives. The environmental parties thought one of the alternatives was suitable, but the sector rejected all alternatives and wanted to negotiate only with ONL (a special unit of the Ministry of Transportation) about a revised system. The sector emphasized that they only wanted to negotiate with Ministry of Transportation and not with TOPS (Glasbergen, 2002; Weggeman, 2003). In order to legitimize this strategy the sector and Ministry appealed to the annexes of an earlier White Paper (Strategische Beleidsnota Toekomst Luchthaven, SBTL, 1998), wherein it was stated that the national government was to design a new system with environmental and safety norms during 1999, in close cooperation with the sector. As such, the sector and the Ministry developed the new regulative system for noise and the environmental parties were excluded from the decision making (Interview Hassink, 2007). 4.6 A new noise regulative system (1999 – 2003) In the Cabinet’s report ‘Future of the National Airport’ (Toekomst van de Nationale Luchthaven, TNL, December 1999) a new regulative system was announced. It was stated in the report that the new system would offer an equal level of protection as the PKB system that it came to replace, while its norms were better measurable and controllable, improving the level of transparency and the protection of citizens against negative effects (TNL, 1999, p.6). The new noise system was presented in the White Paper on the Future of the National Airport in December 1999 (Toekomst van de Nationale Luchthaven, TNL, 1999). It basically boiled down to drawing a new set of contours, leaving out the ‘absurdities’ of the old contours, as stated in the White Paper. The closed noise contour of 255 connected enforcement points that made up the 35KE contour was replaced by 29 enforcement points in residential areas, up and around the old 35 KE zone. In the new system, it is stimulated to concentrate traffic above those scarcely populated areas, so that pollution above residential areas could diminish. The night regime was set for the period in between 23.00 – 6.00 hour. In October 1999 the National Health Council had stressed once again that noise during night time had severe health effects (GES, 1999) and the

20

renowned World Healt Organization also indicated the importance of an extended night regime (23.00 – 7.00) (WHO, 1999). Nonetheless, in the TNL report (1999) it was argued that before deciding upon an extended night regime (from 6.00 to 7.00 hour) additional research was to be done to both assess the health effects in between 6.00 and 7.00 hour and the effects on the mainport activities (TNL, 1999, p.17). The Cabinet once again postponed decision-making about the night flight issue, as they had already done during PASO and PKB. Furthermore, the outer areas were still not offered legal protection, although in 1995 it had been promised that this would be the case. Instead, it was argued that new rules for the use of the airport and the airspace (runway use and flight routes, that pilots and air traffic controllers should take into account) were expected to lead to a considerable improvement of noise pollution in the 35 – 20Ke zone (TNL, 1999, annex p.18). Finally, the ambition to replace the calculation method for a real measurement of noise was postponed, as it was argued that there were no proper methods available yet.

4.7 An independent committee (2000 – 2001)

The Lower House had some serious doubts about the level of equivalence between the old and new system. In a response the Cabinet installed a new independent committee of noise experts, chaired by Prof. Berkhout (Commissie Deskundigen Vliegtuiggeluid, CDV) (Staatscourant, 20 juni, 2000). The assignment of the CDV was, amongst other things to advice about the transition from calculating to measuring noise (TNL, 1999). Later, in 2001, the Lower House added another assignment: to develop proposals for the new noise system, especially about calculating the outer areas (TK. 26959, Nr.32/2003). The CDV was very critical about the new noise system. The protection of the outer area was deemed insufficient. All enforcement points were located on the 35Ke zone. The CDV advised to add enforcement points in the outer area. Furthermore, some of the existing points should be relocated, so that they were positioned in the more densely populated areas. Besides, the committee argued that it was possible to measure noise, so that it was about time to replace the calculations for measurements (see figure 5).

21

Figure 5. The new regulative system for noise as proposed by Berkhout Committee (left, including the outer areas) and the Ministry of V&W (right, 35Ke)

Source: Berkhout, 2003 In a way, the CDV did not focus on the question whether the old and the new system were equal, but on the more critical question of whether the new system offered sufficient protection (which was the far more important question according to the committee) (Berkhout, 2003). The Ministry of Transportation was in constant conflict with the CDV, as the advices were not in line with their expectations (Interviews Berkhout, 2007/2008). The ministry argued that the advices were not contributing to the committees’ assignment. In other words, the committee meddled in affairs for which others were made responsible (Interview Dortland, 2009). After several escalations the committee gave back its assignment in December. The minister of Transportation announced that a new committee of noise experts was to be established, with new people and a new and clear assignment (TK 26959, Nr.24/ 2002). According to Berkhout, several strategies were employed to influence their advice. First of all, the committee was put under constant pressure to revise its advices. This went so far as that some of the members of the committee were threatened that they would lose their jobs if they continued. Second, Berkhout had requested additional research funds for investigating the possibilities for measuring noise pollution. These funds were rejected. Third, when the committee asked for all prior information on measuring noise, one important report was deliberately held back. This was the so-called Iserman report, dating back to 1995, wherein it was concluded that aircraft noise could be measured (Interviews Berkhout 2007/ 2008, Interview Ale, 2009). From the perspective of the Ministry the main reason was that the committee had a well-defined assignment, and they constantly tried to broaden the scope of this assignment, which was not desirable (Interview Dortland, 2009; Interview Wubben, 2009).

22

4.8 Within the Ministry During the development of the new noise regulations there were some serious tensions between policy makers of the Ministry of Transportation. Some policy makers didn’t like the way the new noise system was evolving, as was being developed by the program direction that had been established, and they searched for alternatives. They assigned two researchers, Stallen and Van Gunsteren, who had been arguing since 1997 that noise annoyance was mainly caused by non-acoustic factors. Their final advice was published in April 1999 and could count on support of several of the policy makers of the Ministry and the sector parties (Stallen et al., 1999). In the report it was argued that the entire regulative system for noise was based upon wrong assumptions. Noise exposure alone can account for only a small percentage in the variance of human (subjective) reaction to noise (typically in the range of 9%-29% (Job, 1988)). The other part does not relate to random variation, but can be explained by so-called non-acoustical factors, which are social-psychological in nature. These factors lie with the individual (e.g. age, noise sensitivity) but are also social in nature (e.g. the trust in the noise source authorities, social control, perceptions of the costs/benefits of aviation), and are therefore important to take into account in public administration. Hence, not only exposure sec but also the social relationship between the source authorities and those exposed is important, so Stallen et al. (1999) concluded. Frustration (which becomes expressed in a high annoyance score in large-scale surveys) arises when residents believe that the accountability of the designated authorities has failed, which, in turn, is derived from the performance of the institutions they have put into place. These insights would lead to a totally different type of noise policy. In essence, the policies would be based upon agreements that were made on the regional level, instead of regulation via norms based on maximum amounts of decibels. The policy makers within the Ministry that had requested the research were very enthusiastic, as were the sector parties. However, the other policy makers that were in charge (i.e. the project direction) were not interested in a radical change of policy. In personal meetings with the researchers, these policy makers indicated that they agreed with the social-psychological perspective and they even acknowledged that the current technical-rational systematic that was being developed didn’t function well. Still, they indicated that there was simply not enough time to translate the alternative in policy measures, as the new system was to be ready before the end of 1999 (Interview Stallen 2008). Therefore, the alternative was not taken up in the policy debate (and for example the alternative was not part of the TOPS negotiations). Next, the researchers send the report to the Committee on Noise Pollution Schiphol (Commissie Geluidshinder Schiphol, CGS), which consisted of several local residents and municipalities that were to advice about the noise policy regulations. The CGS was very enthusiastic and they send a letter to the Minister of Transportation about the need to broaden the noise regulations (Press Release CGS, June 2nd, 1999, Nr. PB99-04). Instead of merely developing measures to reduce the level of pollution there was also need to steer on non-acoustical factors. For this, more research was to be conducted as soon as possible, which would make it possible to develop fully-fledged policy alternatives. The minister responded that already sufficient research was being done that linked to the non-acoustical factors and that no additional funds were to be invested (Letter from the Minister of Transportation Netelenbos to CGS/ Mevr. Wildekamp, October 7th 1999, DGRLD/VI/L99.340580). It was not until 2003, after the political ratification and

23

implementation of the new regulative system for noise, that the social-psychological perspective would come to the fore (Interview Stallen, 2003). 4.9 Dutch Aerospace Laboratory (2001) Just before the political debate about the new noise regulative system was to begin, and in particular the debate about whether or not it offered an equal level of protection as the old system, one more important research report was developed. This report was requested by the politicians of the Lower House. An independent research institute, the Dutch Aerospace Laboratory (Nationaal Lucht-en Ruimtevaart laboratorium/ NLR) carried out the research, supervised by the Minsitries of Transportation and Spatial Planning, which basically boiled down to the fact that they made some calculations. In the report it was concluded that the old system offered better protection against additional noise pollution than the new system. The limits of the old system were reached after increasing the pollution with 0,4 Lden14, while the new system allowed for an increase of 2,6 Lden (NLR, 2001, p.30 & p.38). In its most extreme form, this could result in 90% more flights over some residential areas, without crossing the legally binding limits (Interview Griese, 2009). The Berkhout Committee on Noise Pollution had also insisted upon carrying out such calculations, but the Minister did not put the requested funds at their disposal that were needed to do the research, although it concerned a relatively small amount of money (Interview Berkhout, 2008). Furthermore, the NLR concluded that there was insufficient protection for the outer areas. This was undesirable from the Cabinet’s Perspective and the Minister of Transportation and policy makers from the Ministry of Transportation decided to reframe the research question, merely assessing the level of equivalence of the inner area (excluding the question of the outer area that clearly had lower levels of protection). By doing this, they could convince other politicians that the new system indeed resulted in same levels of protection with regard to the inner area, whereas additional research for the outer area was needed. Furthermore, they could only do this by excluding the policy makers from the Ministry of Spatial Planning who had been involved in the supervision of the research project, carried out by the NLR. They had clearly indicated that they would never accept such a manipulative reframing (see internal memo Van Deventer, 2001). 4.10 Environmental Impact Assessment Committee (2001 – 2003) The Environmental Impact Assessment Committee (EIA Committee, an important independent committee that advices about EIA studies) was also asked to give advice about the new regulative system for noise. The Advice was presented on March 11th 2002 and was very critical. It was concluded that there was no doubt that the new system did not offer the same level of protection as the old system (EIA Committee, 2002a; Interview Ale, 2009). The Ministers responded by stating that they didn’t agree with the advice (Letter to the Lower House, 28th March 2002). However, they merely responded to a small part of the advice, and the advice itself was presented in selective and incomplete way.15 In the Netherlands an advice of the EIA committee does not have any legally binding power, but due to the selective and wrong way wherein it was interpreted

14 A measure for noise exposure 15 EIA Committee, (2002), Letter to the Members of the Lower House about the EIA advice of March 11th. May 2nd, 2002.

In this letter the committee states that ‘De kritiekpunten van de Commissie voor de m.e.r. worden in de reactie van de ministers slechts ten dele besproken en inhoudelijk selectief en onvolledig weergegeven.’

24

by the Ministers, the Committee decided to send a letter to the Lower House on May 2nd 2002, just before the political debate about the new Schiphol laws was to begin. They argued that the calculated amount of noise pollution was systematically biased, resulting in too low values. The Ministers had ignored this comment. The same held true for their comment that the proposed 31 enforcement points of the new system could never offer equal protection as the 300 points of the old system. The Ministers merely responded to the assertion that there was especially a need for enforcement points in the outer area, arguing that this would be settled before 2006. 4.11 The Citizen initiative Law (2001) Finally, the environmental actors and the local residents responded by developing an alternative Schiphol law the Citizen initiative Law (Burgerinitiatief wet, 2001), which was meant to show how the new regulative system was to look like when drawing on the promises of the PKB decision of 1995. In the proposal, which was developed with help of some juridical experts, it was asserted that far more enforcement points in both the inner and outer areas were needed in order to make the old and new system equally protective. The alternative Citizen Initiative Law was never taken seriously by the policy makers and politicians and did not play a role in the political debate at all (Interview Hassink, 2007). 4.12 New information about measuring noise (1997 – 2003) In 1997 it had become clear that the NLR had conducted research about the differences between measuring and calculating noise, as a sort of second opinion of the Iserman report. The main conclusion was that the measured results were indeed much higher, even higher than Isermann had concluded in 1994 (NLR, 1997; p.23). The report was antedated on 1997, but had already been available during 1996 (Interview Muchall, 2009). However, the results implied even more houses within the 35Ke zone, and even more severly hindered people, which was not very desirable at that time.16 In 1997 the report was discovered by a journalist, who brought it out in the media. This caused a serious political riot. Moreover, the Environmental Agency of the Municipality of Amsterdam had used the measured results in order to assess the conversion from Ke to Lden (the new measure for noise, conform the European standard). The results were presented on April 21st 2001. In the calculation model 35Ke was corresponded with 58Lden. But the measured results showed that 35Ke corresponded with 55 Lden. This difference allowed for a much broader area, which made it possible to facilitate twice as much as flights (OMEGAM, 2001).17 Finally, the CDV Berkhout had requested additional funds for researhering the possiblities for measuring aircraft noise. This money was not made available to them (Interview Berkhout, 2008). In the end, the Ministry of Transportation stuck to its initial argumentation that it was still not possible to measure aircraft noise in a reliable way. For this reason, none of the conclusions was valid to them. The only thing left to do was

16 NLR rapport (1997) Oorzaken Veschil gemeten en berekende geluidsniveaus. NLR rapport Nr. CR97263L 17 Muchall, R. (2001) Notitie Conversie Kosteneenheden – Lden. OMEGAM, Amsterdam April 21st 2001.

25

conducting additional research. The promise about measuring noise from 2003 onwards was therefore postponed. 4.13 The political debate (2001 – 2002) The political debate about the old and new noise regulations was very technical and controversial. Several politicians had heavy doubts about the level of equal protection that the old and new system were said to offer. More specifically, they knew that the level of protection was not the same (Interview Van Gijzel, 2009). Since the Lower House held some serious doubts, the minister agreed to add some enforcement points in the inner area. The issue of the outer areas was to be settled before 2006, as were the issue of night flights (i.e. the question whether or not the night regime was to be extended from 6AM to 7AM) and the issue of measuring noise (instead of calculating noise). Decision-making about most critical issues was therefore postponed, so they were not to hamper the political debate. The Upper House ratified the new law in July 2002 (cf. EK 27603), but demanded the new system to be evaluated within 3 years (2006) (the so-called Baarda Motie, TK 27603, Nr. 88K motion Baarda, 2002). The evaluation was meant to assess whether the old and new system really offered equal levels of protection. If not, the system was to be revised. The political ratification was given under heavy time pressure; the new fifth runway was to be opened in February 2003 and the new regulative system had to be implemented by that time (Interview Dortland, 2009). 4.14 Evaluation process (2003 – 2006) After the implementation of the new noise regulative system the evaluation process began. The first question was what exactly to include in the evaluation and what not. After ample political debate about the content of the Baarda motion (cf. TK 27603, Nr. 99B, May 7th 2003) the actual scope was determined by the Ministry of Transportation who was in charge of the evaluation process. The two main objectives were formulated in the final plan of approach of the evaluation (Plan of Approach Evaluation, 2004; p.6; TK 29665, Nr. 1; June 18th 2004).

1. Was the intended level of protection offered? 2. Did the policy framework work? (Was there sufficient room within the

environmental capacity limits to facilitate mainport development and did the implemented policy measures (limit and rules) led to controlling the negative effects? And which improvements were possible?

The latter question was added because there had been several clues that the new regulative system could be designed in a more effective way, allowing for more flights and less noise pollution (Interview Wulffraat, 2007). Furthermore, a new CDV was to be established in March 2003 (the successor of the Berkhout Committee, who gave back its assignment in December 2002), which was to advice about policy measures to reduce noise pollution in the outer areas and research about the effects of an extended night regime was to be conducted. Nonetheless, a lot of criticism was posed about this specific framing of the evaluation process. The main points were that the outcomes of the evaluation were already clear up front and that the wrong questions were being asked. First, during the creation of the new regulative system it had already been assessed whether they lived up to the PKB

26

conditions, using much higher traffic scenarios (i.e. 500.000-625.000 flights) than were actually carried out in 2004 and 2005 (cf. EIA, 2003; EIA, 2004) (Interview Dassen, 2007; MNP, 2005; p.64). Several of the grassroots organizations with local residents and other environmental actors also stated that, even before the level of equivalence was actually assessed, the conclusion would be that it was equal (Interview Hassink, 2007; Interview Van Ojik, 2007). Second, the wrong questions were being asked. Several actors (i.e. EIA Committee, The Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment, Milieudefensie, Milieufederation North Holland) argued that the central question of the evaluation should therefore be reframed. In their opinion the evaluation was not meant to assess whether the environmental effects of 2004 and 2005 stayed within the old PKB norms, but rather to assess the legal protection that the new system offered in a situation that allowed the maximum amount of traffic as allowed in the old PKB system (Interview Fransen, 2009; Interview Hassink, 2007; Interview Van Arendonk, 2007). Several actors indicated that the evaluation should result in the most effective regulative system possible (i.e. maximum amount of flights, minimum amount of noise pollution). Assessing the level of equivalence did not say anything about whether or not the system was the most effective system available. And by merely allowing for improvements of the existing system (i.e. optimization) there was no room for the development of alternative policies. This point was not only made by several environmental parties and local residents (Interview Fransen, 2009; Interview Van Ojik, 2007), but also by several policy makers of the Ministry of transportation (Interview Wulffraat, 2007) and other ministries involved (the Ministry of spatial planning, Interview Lap, 2007), by several researchers involved (Interview Wubben, 2009; Interview Wijnen, 2009), by the process committee that was installed in order to closely monitor the evaluation process, meant to guarantee independent decision making (Final report Process Committee, 2005) and by the Environmental Impact Committee. 4.15 Loyal to the Minister Nonetheless, the project team of the Ministry of Transportation that was in charge of the evaluation stuck to the initial design. They argued that they had to live up to the political assignment that was given to them. Especially within the Ministry of Transportation, being loyal to the Minister of Transportation is a most important virtue, so assignments are not there to be questioned too much (it is a political choice) but need to get carried out (Interview Abspoel, 2009; Interview Gosse, 2009). The result was that there was no room for the development of alternative, potentially more effective noise regulations. This became most pregnant when everybody was invited to submit proposals for an improved noise system. In total 138 different actors submitted 682 proposals for improving the regulative system in between September 1st 2004 – April 30th 2005. Proposals originated from individual local residents (198), grassroots organizations of local residents (101), municipalities (173), interest organizations (90), sector (6), the CROS (69) and others (46). To70, a research consultant, was assigned to evaluate the proposals and select the ones that were up for further consideration and those that were not. Up front, it had not been clear what the evaluation criteria would be. It was merely argued that it should live up to the dual objective (i.e. facilitate further growth, while not deteriorating or improving the environmental effects). The result was that all proposals that were merely focusing on a reduction of noise pollution were dismissed, with the argument that it

27

would danger further mainport development. For example, the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment called for improvements of the legal protection of residential areas against noise (5 proposals), improved flight procedures (5 proposals) and better tuning of airside and landside developments (3 proposals), all of which were rejected (Interview Fransen, 2009). Furthermore, there was no opportunity to respond to the evaluation of To70. For example, the proposals of the Milieufederation North Holland were also rejected, and they were given 2 days time to respond to this. They indicated that they needed more time to develop a proper reaction, which was not given to them (Interview Van Arendonk, 2009). In other proposals an alternative systematic for noise regulation was set out. For example, Stallen brought forward his social-psychological approach once more (Stallen, 2004), but he never got any response on his proposal (interview Stallen, 2008). And researchers from the Delft University of Technology had developed a new system with new flight procedures, concluding that this would result in 35% less noise pollution. In a response the Ministry of Transportation stated that their proposal fell outside the scope of the evaluation. After all, the evaluation was meant to further optimize the existing system, and not to replace it by a different system. As a follow up, some policy makers would contact the researchers of the Delft University, but they did not do so until after the evaluation (Interview Wijnen, 2009). In the end, only proposals that derived from the assumptions underlying the existing noise system were taken seriously. Alternatives that deviated from these assumptions were dismissed, even though there was ample evidence that they could result in more effective noise regulations. Amongst others, the independent process committee that had been installed for monitoring the evaluation process in order to secure its transparency and objectivity, which was one of the main political requirements related to the Baarda motion, criticized this way of dealing with the proposals. The committee stated that the entire procedure was far from transparent. The communication of deadlines and requirements of the proposals was lacking. According to the committee the choice of evaluation criteria was arbitrary, as was the way trade offs were made (i.e. the relative weight attributed to the different criteria) (Process Committee Derksen, Fifth Advice, July 29th 2005; Eight Advice, January 23th 2006). The narrow framing of the evaluation was criticized once more. On the other hand, the policy makers of the Ministry of Transportation could not expect that such an overwhelming amount of proposals would be submitted. This created a new problem: they wanted to take all proposals seriously and start a dialogue with the submitters, while there was not much time to do so before the end of the evaluation (Interview Abspoel, 2009; Interview Vinckx, 2009). 4.16 Sensitive political context In order to construct evidence for the level of equivalence the evaluation process was not only influenced by the narrow framing of the research questions. Other main criteria influencing the evaluation results were that the research results had to be presented in a publicly friendly way and needed to respect the sensitive political context (Interview De Waard, 2009). At least in the case of one research report the Ministry thought this last criterion was not satisfied. A research consultant was hired to assess if the legal protection of the new Schiphol Act of 2003 was equal to that of a Planning Key Decision. That is, whether both juristic variants offered equal legal safeguards. The consultant concluded that this was not the case: a Planning Key decision or for example a system

28

with environmental permits would offer more legal protection than the Schiphol Act of 2003 did (Novioconsult, 2006; p.12). The policy makers argued that the quality of the report was insufficient and that it had to be rewritten (Interview Gosse, 2009; Interview De Waard, 2009). The main problem was that the scope was too broad. This forced the research consultant to leave aside aspects of the earlier draft version, which made different and less harsh interpretations possible (Interview Van Kessel, 2009). After several rounds of revision the report was finalized in January 2006, when it was too late to play a role in the evaluation. Moreover, the conclusions had still been rather negative, especially about the lacking legal protection of citizens, but nothing was done with this. In the policy documents it was still argued that the PKB and the New Law offered equal protection (Interview Van Kessel, 2009). Several researchers indicated that they had been asked to rewrite their reports. They indicated that this did not necessarily mean that the conclusions changed. But it did mean that some conclusions were split up, some parts were left out of the conclusions, or some conclusions were reformulated in more euphemistic ways (Interview Frankena, 2009; Interview Muchall, 2009). 4.17 Eversdijk committee: outer areas and measuring noise (2003 – 2006) Meanwhile, the Committee of Noise Experts (the so-called Eversdijk committee) that followed up the Berkhout committee, had been busy with finding ways to protect the outer areas and measuring noise (amongst other things). With regard to the first, the committee explored several systems for monitoring noise in the outer areas. Their final advice was to focus only on monitoring systems with locations in residential areas, which implied a repositioning of existing points and an introduction of additional points (Final Advise CDV, January 15th 2006).The proposal was in line with the enforcement system that was developed by the researchers of the Stichting Natuur & Milieu (see figure 6). Second, the committee argued that there was still much to be improved about measuring aircraft noise, but recommended to combine calculations and measurements in order to develop a more precise understanding of noise pollution. More specifically, during one research project that was carried out by one committee member, it was concluded that the difference between calculated and measured levels could differ up to 10 dB during daytime (Eisses/TNO, 2006; p.71).18

18 Eisses et al. (2006) Onderzoek naar verschillen tussen gemeten en berekend vliegtuiggeluid. Deelonderzoek, Januari

2006. TNO Report Nr. IS- RPT- 060017

29

Figure 6. Proposal of the Stichting Natuur & Milieu (Nature & Environment) in order to protect the inner and outer areas, 2006

Source: SNM, 2006 In the end, these recommendations were not taken over by the Cabinet. According to the Cabinet, extra enforcement points in the outer areas would merely provide local information, but wouldn’t do anything about noise pollution. Instead, the agreements of the covenant were to make sure that nuisance in the outer areas was to decrease considerably (White Paper, 2006; p.45). With regard to measuring it was argued that this still could not be done in a proper way and that, again, additional research was needed. However, since 1999 the RIVM (National Institute for Public Health and the Environment) had been involved in the development of tools for measuring noise of transportation. For this purpose they had developed a noise monitoring program. In their yearly noise monitor they report on experiments and the state of the art as regards measuring noise. In the noise monitor of 2006 (RIVM, Geluidsmonitor 2006)19 it was concluded that measurements for road and rail traffic were scientifically valid. Moreover, with regard to aircraft noise, which was still only carried out by model calculations, it was stated that pilot measurements showed that trend monitoring is also possible by unmanned measurement sites, provided that the measurement system has an adequate device for aircraft noise recognition (see also RIVM, 2005).20 The policy makers did not refer to these RIVM insights. According to the local residents, environmental interest

19 RIVM Geluidmonitor (2006) Trend en validatie metingen omgevingsgeluid. Nr. 680300001/2006 20 RIVM (2005) Praktijkmogelijkheden geluidmetingen Luchtvaart in het buitengebied van Schiphol (2005). Jabben J. &

C. Potma (2005). RIVM report 680001001/ 2005

30

parties and noise measuring experts involved the reason to call for additional research is that the policy makers very well knew that measuring noise would result in higher levels of noise pollution, reducing the capacity of the airport (Interview Fransen, 2009; Interview Griese, 2009; Interview Muchall, 2009). 4.18 Night flights (2005) In 2005, the issue of night flights was finally settled after 15 years of postponements. Extending the night regime from 6 AM to 7 AM turned out to be one of the most effective measures with positive effects on sleeping disturbance. In terms of money, calculations showed that the costs of implementing this new regime were limited (approx. 35 – 75 million euros for the period 2005 – 2010) (Muskens et al., 2004)21. On the other hand, the amount of people disturbed in their sleep will decrease with 18%, within a 55x55 km area (RIVM/Fast et al., 2004). One of the main effects of extending the night regime was that it would decrease runway capacity, which, eventually, may hamper further development (To70/ Wubben & Bussing, November 2004)22 The calculations were based on research of the sector parties (Schiphol, KLM, LVNL) about the consequences for their daily operations. According to the sector, the actual negative effects would be much higher. It meant a loss of capacity, but more importantly, the type of flights arriving in between 6 AM – 7 AM was crucial for the hub-operations, and thus for the mainport status. During this hour 26 of the 42 intercontinental flights that the national government labeled crucial for the mainport during the negotiations with KLM/AF arrive at Schiphol. Most of the passengers transfer to early intra-European flights departing shortly after. If such smooth connections became impossible at Schiphol these passengers would transfer via another airport, so the sector parties argued. With all this information available, the Cabinet finally decided about the night regime in 2005. The positive effects on sleep disturbance were acknowledged, but the danger of loosing the mainport position weighed in heavily. Therefore, the Cabinet decided that the 23 PM – 6 AM regime that had become operative after the introduction of the five runway system in 2003 was to remain in place, but additional measures will be implemented in between 6 AM – 7 AM, as long as these measures doesn’t hamper mainport development (i.e. loss of capacity and intercontinental destinations) (TK 25466, Nr. 52, April 27th 2005). According to the policy makers of the Ministry of Transportation one of the main arguments was that there were no causal relationships to be found between noise pollution and health effects (Interview Abspoel, 2009). However, in some research reports, like the one dating back from 1993, it was explicitly mentioned that such causal relationships were very likely in place. 4.19 New perspective (2006) In 2006 the Environmental Planning Agency (an independent Dutch environmental research agency) had developed a new perspective on the noise policy of Schiphol (MNP, 2006). The main conclusion of the report was that it was impossible to facilitate further growth, and improve levels of noise pollution in both the inner and outer areas at the same time. If growth was to be pursued, than the situation of only one of those areas was to be improved. More specifically, growth was accompanied by a reduction of noise in

21 TNO-INRO, SEO, AAC, De maatschappelijke effecten van het verlengen van het nachtregime voor de mainportfunctie van Schiphol, June 2004 (Muskens et al. 22 The Report is called ‘Geluidsbelasting bij een verlengd nachtregime’ November 2004

31

the outer areas, and an increase in noise in the inner areas, or vice versa (MNP Report ‘Options for Schiphol Policy’, June 2006; TK 29665, Nr.33). The report was published in June 2006, well after the White paper had been presented. However, the researchers of the Environmental Planning Agency had informed the policy makers about their expected results in an earlier stadium, before the White paper had been finished (Interview Dassen, 2007). Still, in the white paper it was argued that in the near future both the inner and outer area would be legally protected against increased levels of noise pollution (White Paper, 2006).

4.20 Final report of the Dutch government - Cabinet (2006) In the final report of the Cabinet, which was prepared by the policy makers of the Ministry of Transportation, it was concluded that the old and new regulative system offered equal protection against noise pollution, although the information on which this conclusion was based was highly selective. For example, it was not mentioned that the maximum amount of flights that fits within the new system are higher than those that fit within the old system, nor had the promises to develop policies for the legal protection of the outer area and measuring noise been fulfilled. However, despite the presumed level of equivalence the evaluation process also had brought to the fore that the room for growth, which was envisioned when drawing up the Aviation Law of 2003, could not be fully utilized. This was due to the fact that during the calculations of the new noise limits wrong flight paths had been assumed. In practice, different routes were followed compared to the assumptions in the 2003 calculations, resulting of (near) exceeding of some enforcement points, and lots of spare room at other points. In essence, the maximum capacity to grow could not be utilized due to the mismatch between actual and calculated flight routes (see figure 7) (TK 29665, Nr.13/ 2005; See also sector report, 2005).23 The tight rules about flight paths, and take-off and descending procedures also hampered the introduction of new measures to reduce noise hindrance. This was never the Cabinet’s intention, and the Cabinet therefore announced to amend these policy instruments. After some discussion with the regional parties it was decided that a new regional platform was to be established to facilitate the negotiations, the so-called Alders table, named after its chairman Hans Alders.

23 Report of Schiphol, KLM and ATM ‘Werken aan de toekomst van Schiphol en de Regio’, 2005

32

Figure 7. Mismatch between calculated, legally embedded noise contours (green dots) and actual noise pollution (grey area) around Schiphol, 2003 - 2006

Source: Schiphol Group, 2007 4.21 Alders table (2007 – 2009) Actors gathering around this negotiation table were the sector parties (Schiphol Group, KLM/AF, ATM), the regional and local authorities (North Holland, Amsterdam, Haarlemmermeer, but also the municipalities of Amstelveen, Uitgeest) and the ministries of Transport and spatial planning. Two people represented the local residents. The environmental parties did not take part in the negotiations. After the 1999 TOPS negotiations, which they considered as being a debacle, they had decided to not participate anymore in negotiations. Just as in 1999, the first assignment was to find short-term solutions for revising the existing noise system, of which noise limits had been exceeded in a few enforcement points in 2006 and 2007 (TK 29665, Nr.43/2007). As in all other years, exceeding enforcement points was tolerated by the Cabinet, due to the mismatch in the noise calculations made and in anticipation of the revision of the rigid system (TK 29665, Nr.43/ 2007; TK 29665, Nr.68/2007; TK 29665, Nr.103/ 2008). During the negotiations a controversy emerged among the local residents. Several of the local residents did not support the two representatives anymore and it was decided to include a third representative, representing 26 platforms that did not support the two other representatives. During the negotiations, the Lower House had called for a new regulative system for noise and made this one of the core tasks of the Alders assignment from February 2008 onwards. Due to its expertise the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment (Stichting Natuur en Milieu) was invited to participate in the design of the new noise system. However, during the first meeting, the Ministry of Transportation argued that one thing was undisputable: the enforcement points were to be left out of the new system. Since the creation of a better system with enforcement points was the key

33

priority of Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment (SNM), the first meeting ended in a conflict. After the first meeting SNM wasn’t invited anymore, and thus excluded from the discussion. According to Fransen (working at SNM), the Ministry of Transportation and the researcher of To70 that were hired to represent them didn’t want to explore other potentially valuable alternatives at all. Instead, they had already decided on the most preferred new system. This so-called ‘Vliegen volgens Afspraak’ (VVA, in Engish: Flying according to agreement) system was to replace the old system with enforcement points and if you did not support this system, you were excluded from the debate (Interview Fransen, 2009). During the remainder of the Alders table the VVA alternative was elaborated and served as the backbone of the final agreement. 4.22 Local residents When the final decision-making began, the feelings ran high within the ranks of the local residents. At first, the majority of the local residents rejected the VVA systematic. VVA is about the choice to let go of all enforcement points and to replace this by agreements on how to fly. However, abandoning the enforcement points would greatly diminish the legal protection of the local residents against noise (Interview Berkhout, 2008; Interview Fransen, 2009).24 After all, if there were no legally determined norms for maximum amounts of noise pollution, it would become far more difficult to start a legal procedure. Several of the local residents intended to vote against the proposal, as it contradicted with their main interest: i.e. to secure as much legal protection against noise pollution as possible.25 At first, one of the three local residents decided to vote in favor of the new noise systematic. In September, when the deadline for the final advise came in closer (i.e. October 1st) political pressure to vote for VVA increased. During the days to follow Mr. Alders himself attempted one more time to convince as much platforms as possible in order to increase the support for the agreement. He and his right hand (Mr. Vermeegen) organized a presentation session on 29th of September for the local platforms in order to gain support of other platforms. During this meeting Vermeegen argued that not supporting the agreement meant to exclude oneself from further decision making (in the words of local residents: a blackmail strategy that they had posed 4 times more) (Interview Gosliga, 2009; Interview Von der Meer, 2009). During the final negotiations, a second representative of the local residents all of a sudden made a 180 degrees turnaround and decided to vote in favor of the VVA systematic. Two of the three representatives were now in favour of VVA, which was enough to give the impression that a majority of the local residents was supporting the Alders advice. However, despite all attempts to persuade the platforms and the ‘blackmail’ strategy 14 of the 26 platforms still rejected VVA (a majority). Since these platforms had no voting power, other than via the three representatives at the table, it seemed that a majority was in favor. In the end, two out of three voted in favor of the agreement, as did all other actors involved, and the third representative left the negotiations. On October 1st 2008 the Alders advice was presented to the Minister of Transportation as an unanimous advice. That is, it was argued that all actors supported the agreement, including a majority of the local residents. This was not true, as the majority of the platforms of local residents still opposed the

24 See also the documentaries about the Alders agreement broadcasted by the regional television of North Holland

(October 2008) and Public Net (Zembla, May 2009) wherein several experts criticize the sacrifice of the enforcement points. 25 See for example Minutiae of VGP meeting July 16th 2008, p.2

34

agreement. However, they were excluded from further debate, while the two remaining residents, supporting a minority of platforms, were still included. 4.23 Poor legal protection (2009) During 2009 the VVA was further elaborated (without involvement of the environmental expert of the Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment and the third local resident). Amongst other research assignments, a professor of law from the University of Tilburg (the Netherlands) was approached to evaluate whether the legal protection offered by the new noise systematic (VVA) was equal to the legal protection offered by the old system (with enforcement points). The main conclusion was that this was not the case (Michiels, 2009).26 The report contained therefore sensitive and undesirable informati