The Politics of Backwardness

THE POLITICS OF BACKWARDNESSReservation PolicY in India

THE POLITICS OFBACKWARDNESS

Reservation Policy in India

Edited by

V.A. PAI PANANDIKER

under the auspices ofCENTRE FOR POLICY RESEARCH

New Delhi

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Foreword

O social issue is perhaps as explosive in India, especially

Hindu India, as that of reservations. A mere decision toextend the period of existing reservations to Lok Sabha seats

in January 1990, which should have been almost non-controversial,started large-scale caste riots and anti-reservation demonStrations inU.P. and Bihar and may well have spread to other parts of the countrybut for some timely political action to bring home to people that thegovemment was not talking of any action on reservations for jobs.

The National Front in its Manifesto for the Lok Sabha election1989, specifically stated that the "recommendations of the MandalCommission will be implemented expeditiously."

Reservation for jobs and in educational institutions is perhaps the

most explosive threat to the Indian polity today. A1l over the country,the young are angry on both sides---one demanding more and more

reservations, the other against even the existing ones. Just a few years

ago, the issue blew up in the face of the then Chief Minister ofKamataka, Ramakrishna Hegde, who had to use all his political skillsto avoid a major blood-bath in Kamataka.

In the early years of Independence, there was a great sense of guiltin Indian society, especially Hindu society, about the injustice of the

caste system and the sufferings ofthe "outcastes" and the tribals, also

referred to as Harijans and Girijans. In the first two decades, when

reservations were sparingly andjudiciously used, there was no prob-

lem.As the pressure for meeting the quotas and later the "roster"

system came into play in govemment jobs and even educational

institutions, political attitudes changed. What is more important isthat by the 1970s, the composition and size of the so-called uppercastes also changed. Indeed, the numbers game changed and so also

the political rhetoric and political action.

The Politics of Backwardness

As India stands in the 1990s, the reservation issue---cspecially ingovernment jobs and in the educational institutions, not only for theOBCs but now even for the Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes-has been a very sensitive issue.

Behind all this lies the changing nature of the Indian polity,economy and society. The question is where will it lead to?

In order to discuss these issues and to look at the Indian experiencein the major States, the CPR commissioned a series of papers whichwere discussed at length at the CPR in New Delhi. Based on thesepapers and discussions thereon, the present book is being presentedto the larger academic and policy community in India.

It is quite clear that the reservation issue is the single most seriousthreat in the 1990s to the intemal Indian polity. A mishandling of thisissue could engulf India from north to south and from east to westinto violence and turmoil. As one distinguished public official oncesaid, India could enter a phase of "civil war". All thinking Indiansand policy makers should, therefore, discuss and debate this issue andfind some consensus lest the country plunge into serious internalstrife. We hope this volume will help'in that direction of discussionand debate and possibly a consensus.

Centre for Polity ResearchNew Delhi

V.A. PAI PANANDIKERDirector

List of Conhibutors

V. A. Pai Panandiker has been Director of the Centre for Policy

Research, New Delhi since l9?3. He hadworked as Spial Officer inthe

Ministry of Finance and was associated with the Gwernrnent of Irdia as

Chairman, Population Policy Committee, Plarming Commission and as

Chairman of the Expenditure Commission's Committee on Industry'

A mernber of seviral national and intematiorul aca&mic atrd cultual

inslitutions, he is Life Trustee of the Population Foundalron of lndia

and the Iniernational Centre, Goa. His prolific ouput of publications

includes more than 20 books, several research reports and articles in

r.**, Enelish lenguge dulies. His lfie$ nublicatiu The Indrsn

Eabinet, the irrst comprehensive study on the subject was released

in early 1997.

Pran Chopra is Visiting Professor, Centre for Policy Research' Earlier

he was Risident Editor, Statesman, New Delhi' He has been guest

commentator tlN Radio and among other things Editorial Director'

piess noundation of Asia. Widely travelled" he has written exensively

on politicat matters in Indian and foreignjounrals' He has also published

several books.

Shri Prakash, Ph,D. (Contab), is Research Professor at the Academy of

Third World Studies, Jamia Mllia University, New Delhi' His numerous

fubtications include those conceming India and Ctina with rderence to

l"o**ic issues. He has been awarded fellowships by the INLAKS

fo*attion, Churchill College, Cambridge and the Japan Foundation

for his research.

SumaChitniswasuntilrecentlyVice.ChancellorofSNDTUniversity';;;"y. She has prwiouslv been Professor { thlfP Institute of

iocial iciences and a Visiting Professor at the Stare University ofNew

Vo* ui Suffulo and the Univirsity of Frankfurt. Her field of speciality

is Sociology ofEducation and she has several publications to her credit'

G. Thimmaiah, Ph.D. (Bom.), did his post doctoral research at Queens'

vt The politics of Bacluardness

lard Univenity, Australia and was later Visiting Scholar at Australian

ltlational University. He has also been Visiting Fellow at BrookingsInstitution, Washington. He was for some time Director ISEC, Bangaloreand has been on sweral official committees in Karnataka. He has morethan a dozen books and numerous research papers on economic issuesto his credit.

Cunently he is Member, Plarming Commission of India.

Sachchidananda, D. Lit., is a distinguished anthropologist who wasducated at Patna University and SOAS, London Universi8. He has beenDirector A N. Sinha Institute, patrn and Vice-Chancellor RanchiUniversity. He has also taught at patna and New york Univenities. Aprofilic writer he has published several books and research papers inanthropology in India and abroad. Currently, he is Director, SulabhInstitute of Dwelopment Studies, patna.

Mrhit Bhattacharya was earlier Chairman, West Bengal MunicipalFinance Commission and one time Vice-Chancellor, iur<twan Uni_versity. He has been Profesor of p'blic Administration at calcuttauniversity and fte rndian Instime 0f puDlrc Aduunntrafion, New DelhiHis special areas of interest and experience lie in field and local admin_

lstration; micro-level planning and dwelopmeng municipal and urbaninstitutional issues.

Prof. D. L. Sheth is Senior Fellow at the Crntre for the study ofDweloping Societies, Delhi and Editor of Alternatives. He is founder_rnember of Lokayan and Member (Social Scientisb), National Commi-ssion for Backward Classes. Sheth has contributed articles to tndian andinternational journals and books in the areas of political sociolog5r,cornparative politics and grassroots mwements.

Ghanshyam Shah is a professor at Lal Bahadur Shastri NationalAcademy of Administration, Mussoorie. He was a Senior Fellow aadthe Director at the Centre for Social Studies, Surat. His area of interestare Social Movements aad Minorities.

B. G. Verghese was educated at Delhi and Cambridge Universities. Hehas been Editor of The Hindustan Times md Tti Indfan Express.From 1966{8 he was information Adviser to the prime Minister. An?:tl\: colgmnis! he received the Magsaysay Award for Journatism in1995. Author ofa number ofbooks he is currently at the Centre for policyResearch.

List of Conlributors ix

Rqieev Dhavaru M.A. (Cantab), 8.A., LL. B. (Allahabad), Ph. D.(London) of the Middle Temple, Senior Advocate, Sqrrerne Court ofIndia, is a practising lawyer. A former academic, he has published various

books and articles on constitutional and public law.

Contents

Foreword v

Li$ of Contibutors vii

Chapter IIntroduction IV.A. Pai Panandiker

Chapter 2An Overview 13

Pran Chopra

Chapter 3Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes: 29

Problems and PersPectives

Shri Prakash

Chapter 4Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and 88

Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence

Suma Chitnis

Chapter 5Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies for 108

SCs/STs and OBCsG. Thimmaiah

Chapter 6Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar 16l

Sachchidananda

xii The politics of Backwardness

Chapter 7Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene lg3Mohit Bhattacharya

Chapter 8The Reservation System in Gujarat 19gShri Prakash

Chapter 9Reservations Policy Revisited ZZtD.L. Sheth

Chapter I0Consequences of Reservations 24OGhanshyam Shah

Epilogue 256B.G. Verghese

PostscriptThe Supreme Court as Problem Solver: 262The Mandal ControversyRajeev Dhavan

INDEX T3

Chapter I

Introduction

V.A. Pai Panandiker

OR the last few years especially since 1990, India has taken a

regressive turn in:o backwardness as a direction of the na-

tional polity. The issue of backward sections of the Indian

society had caused considerable agony to tlre founding fathers of the

Indian Constitution. Who could not be insensitive to idustice inher-

ent in an old civilizztion which while creating a social order also

created by design or default many social injustices? Indian civiliza-tion had obviously many strengths. But it also had many weaknesses.

These weaknesses especially of the age old caste system have given

Indian society a deep sense of guilt and hence sorne of the transitional

provisions of the Constitution regarding reservation of seats in legis-

latures and in the civil service.The dilemma before the founding fathers was whether to undo

history or to build a new India free from its historical evils and

frailties. A new India built on its greater concern of human values, ofessential equality, tolerance aod inded the all-encompassing Dharma.

fie founding fathers including B.R. Ambedkar decided in favour ofbuilding a new India where the evils of caste or community or even

religious divide would not fetter tbe nation. A new India had to be

built.The Constitution which came into force on 26 January 1950 was

therefore a political and social manifesto of the nation. It enshrined

the best of political and social values of India along with the best ofother values available from other human experiences around the

world.

2 The politics of Backwardness

India was to be a casteless society. Freed from the chains ofhistory and moving towards a new political and social order wherethe quintessential Dharma---or the principles which hold everythingtogether-was to be the guiding principle.

H.V. Kamath, a distinguished member of the Constituent Assem-bly participating in the debates on 14 October 1949 while referring tothe reservations for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes said,"Men$en and even friends outside may dispute the wisdom of thiscourse" and went to add "Before I close I only wish to express thehope that, beforc ten years have expired from the commencement ofthe Constitution, in this country of ours which has had an ancienthistory, this country of ours which is ancient, but ever young, therewill be not merely no backward classes, socially and educationallybackward classes left, but that all the classes will corne up to a decentnormal human level, and also that we shall do away with this stigmaof any caste being scheduled. This was a creation of the Britishregime which happily has passed away. We have taken many stridesforward in rernoving or doing away with the numerous evils thatwere associated with the British regime. This is one of the few thatstill remain. I hope, sir, that ere long, this stigma too will disappearfrom our body politic, and we shall all stand before the world as onesingle community." I

Speaking on the Report of tlre Committee on Minorities VallabhbhaiParel on 25 May 194.9 had much the sarne in his mind. He said "Whenwe rnet this tinp, we found a considerable change in the attitude ofthe minorities themselves. Dr Mookherjee moved a nrotion for thedrcpping of tlrc clause on rcservation of seats in the l-egislature onpogrlation basis. When this proposal was moved, Mr MuniswamiPillai, who was represcnting the Scheduled Castes, moved an arend-ment to the effect that the provision for reservation, so far as theScheduled Castes are concemed, may be continued for a period of tenyears. The general opinion in the Advisory Committee-which wasalnrcst unanimous--was that this reservation so far as the ScheduledCastes are concerned, should be continued for that period and that MrMuniswami Pillai's anrendnrent should be accepted." VallabhbhaiPatel concluded by saying "But in the long run, it would be in theinterest of all to forget that there is anything like majority or minorityin this country and that in India therc is only one community."2

Introduction

Speaking on this very issue on 25 August 1949, DrB.R. Ambedkarwho was defending the ten years provision of reservation stated "Forthe scheduled tribes I am prepared to give far longer time. But allthose who have spoken about the reservations to the ScheduledCastes or to the scheduled tribes have been so meticulous that thething should end by ten years. All I want to say to them, in the wordsof Edmund Burke, is "Large Empires and small minds go ill to-gether."r

Alas after more than forty years of operating the Constitution,some of the transitional provisions especially of reservations havebecome the centrepiece of the Indian polity. Pernicious doctrine of"compensatory discrimination" has begun to be evoked as the rem-edy to the sins of the past. Whose sins? Of a social order which wehave deliberately sought to obliterate? Or a discarded social orderwhich we now want to revive.

In an attempt to achieving nanow political ends, the V.P. SinghGovernment in l99O revived the old casteist social order. It wasgiven a new lease of life. In faimess the V.P. Singh Governnrent didnot invent the reservation theory. It has had a long history especiallyin the old Madras Presidency and in Mysore State. But the fight ofnearly a century against the tyranny of the old social order was givenup. Caste was henceforth to become the basis of govemnrcnt andgovernance in India. Reservations and more reservations in govem-ment service, in educational institutions, and in legislatures were tobe the new directions of state policy.

The doctrine of compensatory discrimination for reservations ispernicious for two rcasons. First there is no end to it. Secondly it doesnot serve the purpose for which it is meant. After nearly fifty yean ofindependence, India has the distinction of being one of the poorestand most backward countries in the world. And India is now fightinghard to become more backward. To go back to a social system whichwe consider the main weakness of our civilization.

Who are the backwards? Is there any absolute criteria by which allbackward castes can be classified as entircly backward? Or for thatmatter are all forward castes entirely forward? That India has manypoor and disadvantaged is well accepted. What is diflicult to prove isthat there are no poor and disadvantaged in almost any caste. Hencethe logic of compensatory discrimination is almost impossible to end.

*.

4 The Politics of Backwardness

Practically all castes, and perhaps even Brahmins in some cases, maybe entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of compensatory discrimi-nation.

Caste has developed such a political appeal that religions likeChristianity and Islam which are not afflicted by the vice or sins ofthe caste system, have suddenly discovered their dalits or scheduledcastes and are now demanding the benefits of reservations for theiradherents. It is an extraordinary phenomenon that in the twilightyears of the twentieth century, everyone is struggling to be backward.Compensatory discrimination has emerged as India's new "mantra"for practically each and every caste except perhaps the much villifiedBrahmin.

This national competition for backwardness which the V.P. SinghGovemment has bequeathed to the nation contrasts sharply withglobal trends. The rest of the world is moving towards a more

advanced civilization, materially and morally. The global mega trends

are towards high technology, competence and competition. In Indiatechnology is suspect, competence is at a discount and competition isfrowned upon as anti-smialistic. The world is moving towards greater

integration intemally and extemally. India is moving in the oppositedirection.

The nations of South East Asia and East Asia comnpnced on the

same joumey as India towards modernisation and economic developnrcnt around t 950. By 1970, they had begun to tum the comer and by

1990, these nations had become the world's economic power houses.

Even China which started late has now taken off as a major economicgiant. The ideological shibboleths which kept China backward were

replaced by a pragmatic emphasis on technology, compet€nce and

competitiveness. The countries of East and South East Asia are

rapidly integrating with the rest of the world.India has been waiting long to tum the corner. Meanwhile hun-

dreds of millions of the Indian people wallow in poverty. Malnutri-tion, hunger, ill health, illiteracy afflict almost all castes, some more,some less. Compensatory discrimination and its ilk have broughtIndia to compensatory backwardness. Compensatory because, if wedo not go forward, the compensation is backwardness!

Much is said against Manu and the Manusmriti. However muchManu may be reviled and abused, his laws ceased to operate centu-

Introduction

ries ago. There is no legal sanction behind any of the tenets of Manu

including the Varnashram Dharma. However Manu has now been

revived by the castes who see visions of political mileage in the

revival. This casteist rhetoric may have a political appeal in the short

run. But like every such epiphenomenon, it too is destined to fade

away.The real challenge before India is to free itself from the clutches of

this nefarious history, if one wants to call il so, and to move towards

a new political and social order. The Indian Constitution guarantees

such .a movement. How else could Mulayarn Singh Yadav' Laloo

Prasad Yadav or Mayawati head the govemments of mega states like

Uttar Pradesh or Bihar? Their rise to the highest political office is the

very new political order that the Constitution envisaged.

The most important issue before India's new social order is to

make the transfer of power work. It can and must work essentially

through the political process. This is neither easy nor likely to happen

either by caste politics or reservations. V.P. Singh's theory that

reservations in the civil service are necessary to transfer power

bristles with problems. Despite all the attacks on efficiency, the rot in

the adminisration of the country coincides largely with the 1990s.

There is a great deal of evidence that comrption and its twin ineffi-

ciency have rcached untold heights since 1990. As norms of effi-ciency and integrity have been thrown to the winds, scams of massive

magnitude have come to the fore.It is by no means a coincidence that the large scale transfer of

political power in rccent years has been accompanied by a quantum

jump in public comrption. There is a new ethos in the working of the

government machinery. The rule of law, ethical standards and integ-

rity in administration are no more considered relevant. The cue now

comes from the top. And it cascades down in the form of grand

rapids. The state is for private benefit. Those in power rcserve the

right to grab whatever they can. This is where the transfer of power

in India threatens the vitals of Indian polity.Power does not suddenly become good in the hands of the poor or

the deprived or the backward, no more than power does in the hands

of the rich or the forward. The greatest damage to India's political

institutions was done by an upper caste Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

The caste of political leaders is no guarantee of either.moral or ethical

The Politics of Bachuardness

or politically sound nonns. The theory that the poor or the backwardare somehbw virtuous is no more valid than that the rich or the uppercastes are somehow superior. Comrption and criminality do notknow caste boundaries. They never have. Nor does the economic orpolitical status of the powerful. India's history is replete with socialand political destruction by the wealthy and the powerful. Aurangzebis only one such example. On the other hand the two grehtest Indiansnamely Buddha and Gandhi were not Brahmins and were accepted asgreat despite whatever the Brahmins may have had to say.

No society has found a satisfactory means of identifying thosewho can be trusted with power. Perhaps only saints might qualify.But saints do not seek political power. It is therefore necessary for allsocieties to find ways of ensuring that political power is not abusedor misused. The administrative system with its rules and regulationsis supposed to be an antidote to or a check against the blatant abuseor misuse of power. To make the administrative system representa-tive is neither easy nor workable. It has not worked anywhere in theworld.

The problem of recruitment to tle civil service, however, remains.What is merit? Is it no more than performance in a written examina-tion which is held to be good for all time until retirement? Despite theantiquity of the civil service systems in the world, merit has remainedup to a point an elusive concept. However technical competence isneither elusive nor difficult to measurc. The problem is more com-plex when it comes to general services like the administration or thepolice. .However, reservations deprive the selection by open compe-tition of its relatively greater value and validity which it undoubtedlyhas.

In a system where the aura of power politics is open for anyone,the theory of compensatory discrimination bodes ill for the adminis-tration or civil service. Representative democracy makes reasonablesense. A repr€sentative bureaucracy which deals with the technicalaspects of administration does not. Putting up the state for grabs atboth ends bodes ill for democracy. And yet satisfactory means haveto be found to deal with the perception thar administration is biasedin favour of any group.

Bureaucratic systems have to be devised to make it as "good" as

possible. And to be "good' it will be necessary not only to have a

Introduction

better technology of administratiori but also "good" people. If this

does not happen, demands for all kinds of reservations will make the

bureaucracy an unworkable institution which it has virtually becomealready.

To go back to the second key issue. Does compensatory discrimi-nation work? The simple truth is that it has not worked anywhere inthe world. After more than four decades of reservation in India, theproblem of social justice remains exactly where it was. Studies in theUS also show that affirmative action in that country has not solvedany problems.

Why is it that reservations do not work? Perhaps the remedy isflawed or inappropriate. The theory of compensatory discriminationis built around compensation for past social inequities. What are

these? Generally low social status, low education and low income.Why do they arise? Mostly because those suffering from these socialinequities have made the mistake of being born into the wrongfamilies. Children born of families with a higher social status, highereducational levels and perhaps a higher income enjoy a distinctadvantage over those who are not.

ff this diagnosis is correct, then the remedy to social inequities liesnot in political or legal action but in changing the societal structure.Societal structures are not amenable either to political or legal action,unless the state thinks it can in some way nationalise the family itself.People who seek political remedies for social injustices do so essen-

tially to derive some political mileage, and not to solve the problem.Once their political objective is attained, it matters little what hap-pens to the issue itself or for that matter, to the nation and the societyat large.

One of the groups which has suffered historic disabilities are thetribal people who are growing towards ten per cent of India's totalpopulation. The tribals have historically remained outside the preva-lent socio-political structure of India. Unlike in many Western coun-tries or those colonized by Western nations such as the United Stafes

of America or Australia where the tribal population has been deci-mated, in India the tribal population has incredsed not only in abso-lute numbers but also as a percentage of the national population.However, the social and economic conditions of the tribals in Indiaremain dismal. Of all the have-nots of India- the tribals ar: T the


bottom of the pile. But as the tribals do not offer the same politicalmileage except in the north eastem region, the votaries of socialjustice have never been,greatly attracted by the cause of the tribals.

If as the theorists of social justice argue, empowering the poor and

backwards will automatically solve the problem of social injustice,then many States of the Indian Union and several African countrieswould be shining examples of success. They are not. Obviouslypower does not solve the problem. And reservations which are sup-posed to be proxies for power, have not done so either.

It rs worth examining from global experience as well as national

experience as to what works since the state cannot dictate the qualityof families. The Soviet policies in Central Asia which consisted to a

substantial extent of nomadic tribes seem to have transformed the

Central Asian countries in fundamental ways. Large doses of social

action in terms of education, health and intensive economic develop-

ment including an excellent physical and social infrastructure seem to

have worked. Within India several communities which were consid-

ered relatively backward only a few.decades ago have since made

great strides. The Patels in Gujarat are a case in point' So are the non-

Kshatriya Marathas in Maharashtra or the Kurmis in Bihar. Unlike in

the Soviet Union case, these communities focussed on those issues

which helped them graduate from backward to forward status. Thisprocess which sociologist M.N. Srinivas called the "Sanskritization"

process has had a considerable impact on many castes and communi-

ties in India. Quite obviously the Patels have gained by their own

societal action rather than by external political props. The Patels do

not need compensatory discrimination or reservation. They have

shown what is doable in India.Intemationally the countries which have made dramatic impact on

social inequities are many of our neighbours in East and South East

Asia. They focussed on the few critical factors which dramatically

influence all inequities. They are investments and growth, technol-

ogy, health and education, and global competitiveness. These coun-

tries shared the same handicaps as lndia in the 1960s. Today they

have practically done away with social injustice. Their strategy has

worked and now they enjoy an economic and political status which

India will take a long while more to attain. Their focus was on

societal change: to adopt advanced technology, to ensure health in

Introduction 9

the broadest sense, education to everyone, and to enable every individual to enjoy the benefits of modem society.

India in contrast has worked very hard to have a slow growth rate

and perpetuate poverty. Its anti-poverty slogans have been the great-

est frauds on the poor of India. ln 1967, the percentage of poor in

South Korea was-33.7. In 1990, it was only about 5 per cent' In

contrast in India the percentage of the poor in 1970 was 43. In 1995

the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission had differing

estimates of poverty. Both estimates are high' But one is higher. The

Planning Commission in fact argues that India has larger numbers oftie poor. That such figures reflect a severe indictment of itself does

not bother the Planning Commission. Do we need 40 years of plan-

ning to keep so many so poor? Is that the development strategy which

we have followed since 1950-51?

The votaries of reservation and compensatory discrimination do

not ask as to who is guilty for keeping so many Indians poor and

backward for so long, Nor do they ask how to rid India of its essential

backwardness. The hypocrisy is often so great that when it comes to

treating themselves for their heart ailments or cancer, these advocates

of social justice have no hesitation in going to the United States ofAmerica often at the cost of the state. Nobody asks them that ifreservations do not.affect quality then why not insist on treatment by

medical practitioners who are products of the reservation quota. It isnot the inadequacy ofthe medical profession that is in question but ofthe politicians who preach one thing and practice precisely the oppo-

site.

How does India resolve this issue? Not by political or legal means.

Political instruments by their very nature are designed for the benefit

of politicians, to get them into or keep them in power. Legal steps are

also inadequate. The hapless Supreme Court can work and decide

only within the provisions of the Constitution. Despite what has been

written in this Volume, the Supreme Court did not and does not solveproblems. It only defuses them. That by itself is no small achieve-

ment because time and again, the Parliament and the Cabinet have

failed to solve this as well as many other pressing problems of India.

It has left the baby in the hands of the Supreme Court which, luckilyfor the nation, has defused many a crisis.

The way to solve the backwardness and poverty in India is by

l0 The politics of Bach,vardness

societal change. That is what has worked in all achieving countriesthe world over. The challenge is therefore to the Indian society. TheIndian society has repeatedly shown strength, capacity, and stabilityto face many a challenge. India has been govemed by three types ofstability. That of the government, that of the state and that of theIndian society. The stability of the Indian society is indeed thebedrock on which the entire edifice of the nation rests. Indian societymust therefore address itself to this challenge as well.

It has broadly two options, endogenous and exogenous. For endo-genous solutions, India must look inwards which is what we havedone since 1950. This inward outlook has not worked. An isolatedIndia suffers from inherent handicaps. All societies which have suc-cessfully made transitions to modern technologically and sociallyadvanced nations in recent decades are societies which have lookedoutwards. But there is a massive challenge of intemal integration.Successful nations have also had to integrate their societies intocohesive ones. Many of India:s problems such as in Jammu andKashmir or tlre North Eastem States emanate from the nation'sinability to integrate them effectively into the larger national identity.Such social integration would not imply destruction of tlreir localidentity. Indeed national integration and local identities are perfectlycompatible as evidenced in most oflndia. India's civilizational strengthhas been unity in diversity-a larger Indian identity which subsurnesall the smaller identities.

The most effective exogenous solution is integration with theworld. This is the most important challenge to Indian society. Ironi-cally it is India which philosophically proclaimed that the world isone family-Vasudhaiva Kutumbakarn. Perhaps long colonizationby the British has made India a more defensive society. Some,therefore, see global integration as a threat to India. It need not be so.While Japan has taken full advantage of integration with the world, ithas surrendered neither its sovereignty nor its socio-cultural identity.But countries like Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand knowthat without intemational trade and investments their economies andsocieties cannot grow. And without growth there is no social future,nor even basic national security. Global economic and over timelarger global social integration is a historic necessity perhaps an

inevitabiliw. This is a clear lesson of historv.

Introduction 1l

India must, therefore, in clear terms integrate with the rest of the

world. Such inregration will not prevent India from protecting its

essential sovereign or cultural interests. On the other hand integration

will bring greater exposure of the people of India to new technolo-

gies, new ideas, newer types of organisation and a variety of other

teans to bring about the desired societal change' It is by no accident

that little Mauritius, whose population is ?0 per cent of Indian

descent from those who went as indentured labour, has a per capita

income ten times that of India. Integration on acceptable tenns pays'

lndia must tierefore exercise that option in unambiguous terms'

The objective of this integration is not only for India's philosophi-

cal orientation but more practically to help India grow economically

and socially. As George Verghese has argued in this volume, the

answer to poverty and backwardness lies in increasing the size ofthe

cake. Thus far we have tried vainly to satisfy everybody by distribut-

ing limited jobs and economic opportunities through reservations' Itis now necessary for India to create far more jobs, far more educa-

tional opportunities, far more growth and far more income to over-

come social and economic backwardness. The politics of power or

legislating compensatory discrimination have not and will not solve

India's problems. They will create many many more. A well thought

out high growth str.ategy and societal development and change willaccomplish more. Unfortunately Indian politicians have not shown

the ability to understand lessons of global human history. Indian

society must do so and bypass the political class as much as possible'

The Government, as our experience of nearly fifty years shows, is not

sensitive to Knowledge. Its capacity to govern is in serious question'

The people of India will therefore have increasingly to look after

themselves.What about reservations? They must go sooner than later' The

transitional provisions of reservation in legislatures for ten years even

for SC and ST have been extended to fifty. Further reservations for

new groups are being made. Even more will be demanded until India

is fractured and partitioned again. Message must go clearly from the

people of India. Enough is enough. By the year 2020 all reservations

must go. Seventy years of reservation is long enough time for those

whose power politics depends upon it. The people of India especially

the poor and the backward will gain far more by a r€surgent fast


growing and integrated India than by the divisive and wholly miscon_ceived politics of rcservations.

This volume is an attempt to look at the problems of reservationsfrom differing perspectives and viewpoints. Most of the chapters ofthis volume were prepared around 1991. Much has happened sincethen an! hence we requested Rajeev Dhavan to prepare a postscript.The various authors have differing views on reservations in India. Asonly to be expected, some sftongly support reservations. Othersstrongly oppose reservations. The volume reflects the diversity ofviews and dissent on this vexatious issue which is likely to dominatedebate in India for quite some time to come. It is our hope that Indiawill come out of this legacy and work towards an integrated andcasteless social structurc.

REFERENCES

l. Constituent Assetnbly Debates-efrcial Reporr, Vol. X, Lnk Sabha Sec_retariat, New Delhi, pp. 24243.

2. B. Shiva Rao, The Fmming of India,s Constitarion, Vol. IV, New Delhi.Indian Institute of Public Administration, 4, pp. 6O3-06.

3. Constituent Assembly Debates-Offcial Repon,yol.IX, New Delhi, LokSabha Secretariat, p. 697.

Chapter 2

An Overview

Pran Ch:oPra

fIE practice of reserving or restricting jobs in govemment

services for designated social groups goes back more than a

hundred years- As with any practice which has such a long

history, this one has also developed great complexity, deviations and

mutations. Some of its manifestations bear little resemblance to the

original. tn the process it has happened that what began as a specific

solution to a specifrc problem in a specific area has infiltrated the

whole of society and its institutions, and almost all over India'

Therefore whatever infection grows around these mutations willsoon break out of its pafticular location and infect the whole body

politic. Conversely, whatever problems are solved through "reserva-

tion" in one location will become more amenable to the same remedy

in other places.

The origins of "reservations" lie in whar is now Tamil Niidu' and

in the protest of the non-Brahmins-all non-Brahmins, whether Hindu,

Muslim, Christian or any other-against the overwhelming predomi-

nance of Brahmins in government services. Therefore the initialpurpose of "reservatibns" was to restrict the proportion ofjobs which

Brahmins may hold in governnent services, and leave all the rest

open to an undifferentiated category, "non-Brahmins"- From this

base. reservations infiltrated the educational system because, and

rightly, the "non" felt that the cause of the Brahmins' predominance

in govemment service was that they were virtually the only well

educated community, thanks to their traditional functions in Hindu

society and the high status thus achieved by them in the Hindu

t4 The Politics of Backwardness

hierarchy.This causation distinguishes the Brahmins' predominance in the

early decades of British rule in India from th" p.ido-inun.. which acommunity may gain from its religious or other affinity with therulers of the day; as for example, the job advantages Muslims ac_quired in the states ruled by Muslim princes in Indiu, o. to someextent acquired during the later decades of British rule. The Brah_mins acquired their high representation in jobs, both in British and'princely" India, because candidates with the requisite educationalqualifications were to be found more easily among the Brahmins thanamong other communities.

But this limited and specific causation had seeds of other causa_tions in it, and these, more complex and far-reaching, were soon toflower, watered by four separate streams. The first stream was thegreat importance which the Indian mind has always attached to"government service." The only jobs to which the policy of reserva_tions applied were those in government or semi-govemment offices,and these always constituted only a very tiny proportion of tlre totaljob market, especially if the market of the self-employed was in_cluded in the total. This is as true today as it was when the policy ofreservations began. But polemics regarding this tiny proportion ofjobs have consumed an enornous amount of the energy of the oppo-nents and supporters of the policy of reservations, and in recent yearshave caused social earthquakes of considerable intensitv.

This is partly because of the belief, whetherjustified L not, that aman who is in government service can benefit many more of his casteand community and is a multiplier of benefits for them. But anotherreason is the sense of status which a govemment job gives, in the eyesof others, to the incumbent and also to the community to which theincumbent belongs. That is why job opportunities, or the lack ofthem, in other walks of life have attracted much less attention. Eventhe issue of reservation of seats in legislatures has not raised so muchcontroversy despite the fact that legislatures are supposed to be theforums where govemment policies, at times including those concern_ing reservations, are made or marred.

From this seedbed of government jobs the policy of reservationsflowered into various fields of education in the course of a fewdecades. Because education up to school leaving certificate level is a

An Overview 15

necessary qualification for applying for jobs' especially those in

gou"**ni service, the demand for a "reserved" quota of jobs for

Iertain ethnic communities also brought with it a demand from these

same communities for a "reserved" number of seats in education; the

reservationists felt that without reserved seats in education, they

would not be able to fulfil their reserved quotas in governrnent

service.At one time the demand for reserved seats in educational institu-

tions was confined to institutions of general education, because only

certificates of qualification in general education were required in

applying for governmentjobs. But from here, the demand spread into

inslitutions of professional education as well, such as engineering

and medical colleges. This happened partly because certificates ofqualification from these institutions also began to count in the market

for govemment jobs, and partly because, as this market became

satuiated. reservationists started to demand quotas of seats in the

professional institutions as well for entering the market for profes-

iional jobs. Therefore the demand for reservation in institutions ofprofessional education has become at least as insistent as in institu-

iions of general education. In fact, some major agitations for and

against reservations in recent years began in institutions of profes-

sional education.But more potent has been the assistance given by the second

stream to the further flowering of reservations. This stream origi-

nated in the growing, and growingly assertive, differentiation within

that huge segment of Indian society which was earlier treated as an

undifferentiated mass of "non-Brahmins"' So long as the oljective

was only to restrict Brahmins and to assist non-Brahmins, the battle

over reservations was only between two adversaries- That helped to

keep ia intensity under control and to moderate the social turbulence

caused by it. What helped even mone was that the Brahmins as a

group werc tiny in number compared with the non-Brahmins, and

they decided discretion would be wiser than resistance in an arena

where democracy was going to give great power to greater numbers'

They also showed, as expected, the subtlety of intellect and anticipa-

tion they required for realising that as India developed and the

economy expanded, there would be other pastures for them to move

into. Therefore, precisely in the region, that is southem India' in


which they least resisted their ouster from pre-eminence in govern_ment service, they most significantly gained new positions in busi_ness, commerce and industry.

But as the years passed the battle came to be ioined bv otheradversaries too, and among them were many who pieferred io standtheir ground and to fight for their rights (as seen by them). perhapsthey chose to do so for a variety of reasons, and lack of flexibility andsubtlety, such as the Brahmins showed, might well have been amongthese. But two other major reasons also persuaded them to take thestand they took. First, they lacked the education, the skills and otherassets which the Brahmins had accumulated during the decades oftheir ascendancy and then used for making a strong bid in the newlyemerging areas of the economy. Hence the insistence of these non_Brahmins on their share in govemment jobs. Second, they had thenumbers with which to fight out their battle in the newly emergingareas of democratic decision-making, a battle which the Brahmins,lacking numbers, could not wage.

As the battle developed, new fronts opened up within the ranks ofthe non-Brahmins. The less favoured among the non-Brahmins foughtthe more favourcd with the same slogan of ,Justice for the under-privileged" with which the non-Brahmins as a whole had fought theBrahmins as a whole, one of the celebrated warriors on behalf of thenon-Brahmins being called by that precise name, Justice party, in theformer Madras presidency, wher6 the overthrow of the Brahminsfrom governr4ent and politics was soon to become more complete-and to be accomplished more non-violently-than anywhere else inthe country.

However, on the whole the inner differentiations among the non-Brahmins as rival claimants for govemment jobs did not grow veryrapidly. This is confirmed by Dr G. Thimmaiah in his paper on thehistory of reservations in Kamataka, including the former princelystate of Mysore, which has the longest history of reservations alongwith what is now the state of Tamil Nadu. Dr Thimmaiah says ... . .

from 1874 till 1947, the backward classes included all castes exceptBrahmins, Anglo-Indians, and Europeans" with very little distinctionbetween them in terms of the reservations for them. But this began tochange very rapidly after 1947 because of a sequence of accentuatingcauses. The first was that out of a variety of mixed motives, the

An Overview l7

Congress party decided to accord reservations to the scheduled castes

and icheiutei tribes in govemment services' Among the motives'

one was certainly the purely humanitarian one, urged by Mahatma

Gandhi and otheis, thai for centuries Hindu society had so repressed

these castes and tribes that unless they were assisted for a time by

positive discrimination in their favour, they would never be able to

iet their fair share of the cake in competition with others' But there

ivas also, undoubtedly, a political motive of a lower order' tlat the

scheduled castes and tribes' forming around 20 per cent of the popu-

lation, could be persuaded to become a loyal vote bank of the Con-

gress.

But whatever the motives, they were soon to catalyse a sharp

differentiation of interests within the "non-Brahmin" mass, sharper

and soon to be more violent than the differentiation between the

interests of the Brahmins and the "nc:-". The differentiators now had

two arguments to choose from. First, the argument which had been

used against the Brahmins, that they had cornered too much and must

be divested of some' The differentiators now used the same argument

for demanding that those among the non-Brahmins who had comercd

too much at G expense of other non-Brahmins must also be divested

of some. And second, the argument which the Congress (and others

too) had used in favour of reservations for the scheduled castes and

tribes, that they had been so unjustly deprived of so much for so Iong

that now tiere must be some discrimination in their favour' Hence the

demand of the differentiators that there must also be some discrimi-

nation in favour of those among the non-Brahmins who were not of

the scheduled castes and tribes but whom society had historically

treated with some injustice and who therefore now deserved some

discrimination in their favour. These twin arguments' one drawing

upon the precedent created by the restrictions placed upon the Brah-

;ins, the other drawing upon the precedent created by the positive

discrimination in favour of the scheduled castes and tribes became

the third stream which nurtured the flowering of reservations' The

result was that, as Thimmaiah points out in his chapter, the second

Backward Classes Commission in Karnataka, the Gowda Commis-

sion, "reserved jobs for specific groups constituting about 75 per cent

of the population. The jobs it thus reserved amounted to 68 per cent

of the total iobs."

l8 The politics of Backwardness

A fourth stream was soon added by the dynamics of the electoralprocess. Just as the Congress tried to build up its vote bank among thescheduled casies and tribes by conferring the privilege of reserva-

!o5 unon thern, other parties, and later the Congresi too, tried tobuild altemative vote banks by demanding the privilege for the morebackward among the non-Brahmins---{hat is for occupation groups,classes, castes and other social formations which collectively came tobe known as the "backward castes". The proportion of the populationof Kamataka thus classified by segnrents has now risen to 90 percent. This term began to be used for cast€s which, although moreadvanced than the scheduled castes and tribes, were more backwardthan the higher castes, like the Brahmins and Thakurs. The Constitu_tion allows "special provisions for the advancement of any sociallyand educationally backward classes of citizens or for the ScheduledCastes and Scheduled Tribes."

Until about the late 1950s southern India was more familiar thanthe northern with the phrase -backward castes." Since reservations ofjobs by caste quotas had started much earlier in southern India, thesystem of rcservations percolated through society and the socialconsciousness more widely there and much earlier. But from theearly l!)60s onwards, northern India began to catch up and was soonto exceed the South in the vigour of ..backward

castes" politics. TheSocialist Party leader, Ram Manohar Lohia, set the pace by carvingout an electoral base for his party among the backward castes inBihar. The soil was very fertile for him, because under the antiquatedbut deeprooted land tenure system in Bihar, most land was owned,but not cultivated, by the higher castes, and cultivated but not ownedby the peasant castes. The latter had indeed been severely exploitedfor generations by the former. Lohia used their vast numbers amongthe peasantry, and their resentments, to mobilise their political poweiunder the collective banner of the ..backward

castes", who stoodsomewhere on the middle and lower rungs of the caste ladder, in therural economy below the high land-owning castes and above thescheduled castes, the latter being neither owners nor cultivators but atbest only casual laSour and most often both jobless and landless.

Lohia's very significant successes in the elections in Bihar in theperiod between India's third general elections in 1962 and the fifth in1972 brucarl'rc, atemptation which no political party could resist. As a

An Overview 19

result the backward castes became a major factor in Indian politics

and in all parts ofthe country from about the late 1960s onwards' For

a time they were even able to install their best known leader, the late

Chaudhary Charan Singh, as India's Prime Minister, in 1979. His

incumbency was quickly cut short by other factors in India's politics

at that time. But it signified the strength of the backward castes,

which has proved more durable than Charan Singh and has grown

further in recent years.

This has had the effect, in the first place, of giving the reservations

principle a more entrenched position, and in the second place has

made its impact on society as a whole deeper and wider. If the

scheduled castes and tribes had been its only beneficiaries the prac-

tice of reservations might by now havebeen quietly allowed to witheraway. Although no one objects in principle to positive discriminationfor the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, reservation of govern-

ment jobs for them beyond the lO-year period originally allowed bythe Constitution would have come under gteat pressure from the non-

beneficiaries, who in that event would have included the vast num-

bers of the backward castes. But, being important beneficiaries them-selves, the "backwards", as they are sometimes collectively called,have not only prevented that; they have also used their political clout,much greater now than that of the scheduled castes and tribes, formaking a stronger and on the whole a more successful bid for theirfull share of the reservations cake than the "scheduleds", if one may

so call them, have been able to make, though it was primarily for theirbenefit that the framers of India's Constitution wrote the principle ofpositive discrimination into the Constitution itself. They are so at-

tached now to the label "backward" because of the benefits it bringsthem that a leading caste among them, the Lingayats of Karnataka,

fought hard and successfully when the state government took awaythe label from them on the plea, which was factually correct, that theyhad benefited well enough and long enough to have attained a muchhigher educational, social and economic status and therefore should

make way for other backward castes.

Being more differentiated now among themselves than they used

to be when they were all lumped together as, and with, "non-Brah-

mins", different segments of the backward castes have gravitated

towards different political formations. Conversely, different forma-

20 Thc potitics of Baclwardncss

tions have wooed different segments among them. Both aspects wereamply demonstrated in Karnataka in the early 1970s when the Con_grcss party, fearing that it was losing its hold on certain backwardcastes, worked out an altemative coalition for which it mobilisedcertain other backward castes. This has given the backward caste anissue, and with it the issue of caste-based reservations, a much deeperand more divenified penetration into society and politics than theymight have attained otherwise. How deep and diverse was amplydemonstrated in the mid-1980s when two of India's states which areamong the most advanced politically, Gujarat and Karnataka, werethoroughly shaken by inter-caste conflicts on the issue of reserva-tions. Since the web of caste runs tlrough the whole of Indiansociety-it is pervasive not only among Hindus but in varying de-grees among other communities too-whatever inflames the threadsof this web inflames Indian society as a whole. Few things inflamethem as much as issues of social stahrs and livelihood which, rightlyor wrongly, have come to be identified withjob reservations, and seatreservations in educational institutions as the route to jobs.

The use---or misuse----of the electoral prccess for the purpose ofconsolidating the political clout of a caste in the interests of the castehas often been criticised as undemocratic. But in its defence it isargued that even the framers of the Constitution must have assumeda nexus between social justice for a community, even if it be a castecommunity, and the community's representation as a community inthe legislatures. That is why they provided that seats in prcportion totheir share in the population shall be reserved for the scheduled castesand tribes in the Union Parliament and the state legislaturcs, for thatis where policies are supposed to be made (a supposition which hasbeen severely strained in rccent years, but that is a different matter).

This reservation in legislatures was initially provided for a periodof ten years from the cornrnencement of the Constitution, but wasmade renewable for another ten years if the need for it was still feltat the end of the first ten years. But it has been extended again andagain by ten-year periods since the Constinrtion commenced morethan forty years ago at the time of this writing, and its end is not insight as yet. This only implies the ironic fact that this particularsafeguard for the weak is not seen to have served its purpose. But letthat be. What is more relevant here is a basic inconsistencv which

An Ovemiew 2l

cannot be resolved without running into a more basic dilemma.

The inconsistency is that while in the case of the scheduled castes

and tribes reservations were seen to be necessary both in jobs and

legislatures, for the "backwards" they were provided only in jobs.

The logic which commanded the former dual reservations has notbeen extended in the latter case. But how long can it be denied to the"backwards", seeing the very great political clout they now com-mand? A beginning has been made already in a few places. Legisla-tion regarding local body elections, which under the Constitution are

within the competence of states to legislate upon, has attempted inone state to provide for reservations for certain backward classes

also. It is only a matter of time before the attempt is repeated in morestates, succeeds in some, is then extended to more of them, and fromthere ascends to the Union level as well and into Parliament. When itdoes, we will no longer be voting as individuals on individual issuesof the day but as groups bound together by primordial loyalties. Wemight then be no longer able to argue, as the Law Minister argued inParliament as recently as 24 March that reservations cannot be madein the judiciary because they have not been provided for in theConstitution. They have not been provided for the "backwards" inlocal body elections and yet an attempt has been made to providethem.

Thus the actual operations and consequences of reservations havebrought to the surface some very troublesome contradictions anddilemmas. The foremost and most dangerous is illustrated by whathappened in Gujarat almost throughout the first half of the 1980s andespecially in 1985. A severe and sometimes violent clash developedbetween the beneficiaries and opponents of reservations, and India'smost rapidly advancing state, in economic terms, suffered a serioussetback. The course and the rights and wrongs of the agitation havebeen discussed in detail by Shri Prakash in his second paper in thisvolume and need not be gone into here. But the point here is that thisclash created the worry which triggered the seminar which is thesubject of this volume. Because caste permeates Indian society as awhole, controversies over caste-based reservations are also similarlypervasive. Therefore, clashes similar to the one in Gujarat, unlessforestalled in time, can be safely expected to rip up India as a wholemuch more than such clashes can as, say, between Hindus and


Muslims, which are generally localised by the location of the antago-nists.

And yet every approach at resolving or even containing thesecontradictions opens up more dilemmas than ii rqsolves. Take thefirst approach, which was also the first seed of what was later tobecome to-day's full-blown reservations problem. There was muchto justify the restriction placed over a hundred years ago upon thepreponderance of Brahmins in the services. But it opened up twodilemmas, and both are with us a hundred years later. The first relatesto the efficiency of the services, the second to issues of social justice.

The Brahmins, who had no special affinities with the rulers of theday, preponderated because they were the best available for the

services. How far could the services go, without loss ofefficiency, inrepl.lcing them with recruits from among those who in the circum-ftances of the day were less well-equipped for the jobs? But if the

services had to take the first step in this direction in the name of socialjustice, how could they refuse to take the second, or the twentieth?How could reservation be restricted only to certain categories, and

only up to a certain percentage even for these categories, when by the

same logic other categories could also claim it, and in still higherpercentages? The same logic which justified positive discriminationin favour of the first layer of claimants below the Brahmins justified

it also in favour of all other layers below them and up to their fullproportion in the population, with consequences for efficiency which

could not be brushed under the carpet for long.The issue of efficiency was bound to arise sooner or later. The

framers of the Constitution recognised that it would. In a section ofthe Constitution specifically intended for explaining "special provi-sions relating to certain clauses" made in other articles, in this case inArticles 15 and 16, Article 335 says: "The claims of the members ofthe Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes shall be taken into con-

sideration, consistently with the maintenance of the efieiency ofadministration, in the.making of apPointment to services and posts

. . ." (emphasis added).There is an inconsistency here in so far as this rider is not added to

the reservations made for the same reason under Article 16 for "any

backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not

adequately represented in the services of the State" (which means

An Overview 23

whether at the level of the Union or State govemments). The Su-preme Court has tried to rectify this inconsistency. In applying the

Constitution to the laws, the Court has not only bent the knee toefficiency, it has done so in respect of all reservations. It ruled that thejobs reserved for any reason or class should not exceed half the total,and one of the reasons behind its ruling, as Shri Prakash explains inChapter 3, was that it felt that otherwise efficiency would suffer. Tothat extent it can be said that the Supreme Court has removed thediscrimination which the "scheduleds" would have suffered if thequantum of reservations for them had been restricted by consider-ations of efficiency but not the quantum of reservations for otherclasses and groups. But other inconsistencies remain.

Why should reservations be restricted to half the total jobs whenthose who qualify for reservations within the prescribed criteria formupwards of 6O per cent of the total population of tlre country, or evena higher proportion in certain states under the criteria prescribed bythem? And how can one place the demands of justice above thedemands of efficiency in respect of half the jobs and reverse the orderin respect of the other half? And can one afford half the services ofstate being rendered ineffrcient- assuming (an assumption the presentwriter does not accept at face value) that non-Brahmins are bydefinition less efficient-for the sake of benefining the very tinyproportion of the "backwards" and "scheduleds" who would bebenefircd intris way, or who would be benefited even if the 50 percent limit were removed altogether?

On the pages which follow, three contributors have attempted tosoften these worries in various ways. D.L. Sheth assures us that "forjobs in governrnent services and seats in educational institutions,only thosc who meet certain minimum prescribed standards qualify.These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailing competi-tive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduled castesand scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or lowered only to acertain degree" (emphasis added). He also assures us that "the rate ofutilization by the SCs and STs" of the job quotas reserved for them"rcmains considerably low compared to tle extent of allocationsmade for them."

But two difficulties arise here. First, not everyone is convincedthat the prescribed standards are lowered only to a certain extent. The


contrary opinion, that they are substantially lowered, is much morewidespread, and it is not confined to the categories adversely affectedby the reservations for some other categories. Second, if the reserva-tions policy is to be accepted only on the assumption that in fact itdoes not deliver the benefits to the intended beneficiaries, then it is apolicy which will increasingly come under attack as it succeeds indelivering the intended goods, a fact which Sheth also admits (andregrets). Would it not be better then to eliminate the need for theslight lowering of standards for the beneficiaries, assuming the low-ering is slight, by improving their competitiveness by other means

before they are exposed to the competition, and then to expose themto the competition without lowering any standards at all for them?But of course this whole question of how to improve their competi-tiveness bristles with its own inconsistencies and contradictions,some of which have been discussed by Suma Chitnis.

Mohit Bhanacharya has suggested another way round the clashbetween the demands of social justice and efficiency. He examines

the demands of efficiency at two levels, the policy-making level and

the level of policy implementation. He argues that there is onlynegligible, if any, representation for the scheduled castes and tribes at

the higher rungs of the administration, where policies are made.

Therefore reservations cannot be blamed for any inefficiency at that

level. But at the implementation level efficiency may well improve

with the increased presence of those for whom the jobs are reserved.

They belong to and therefore better understand the needs and the

modes of thinking and working of those categories of society forwhom the reservations are made in the first place. This can make

reservations a useful tool for social justice. But there are two difficul-ties here as well. First, there is an increasing demand, and one that is

fully justified in its own terms, that the under-representation of the

reserved categories at the higher rungs of the administration must

also be rectified. Second, those who hold reserved posts at the lowerrungs of the administrative services do not service only those social

categories for whom reservations are made. They attend to the wholegamut of the services supposed to be rendered by the administrationto society as a whole. On the argument that they have a special

understanding of the needs of one section of society, could it not be

argued that their understanding of the needs of the other sections of

An Overview

society might be below average? I would much rather put my faith inthe view expressed by some very senior administrators present at the

seminar, that after a little acclimatisation officials belonging to the

beneficiary categories appear no different from the others in the levelof their general efficiency.

Sheth, Bhattacharya, Chitnis and others have also attempted tobuild a larger by-pass around the whole problem that arises from thepractice of reservations for such large categories as castes, withoutdisaggregating a category in terms of its internal differentiations.This practice ignores the fact that there are as many differences in thelevels of privilege and deprivation within a caste group as there are

between caste groups. From this practice arises the very distressinganomaly that sometimes an abler and poorer candidate .of a highercaste, for which there may be no reservation, is overlooked in favourof a richer candidate of a lower caste for which there may be. Thesethree and other participants in the seminar therefore suggested thatfor the purposes of reservations people should be classified by theireconomic status and not by caste, and in this way reservations wouldbe for those who are really poor. Sheth also suggests that reservationsshould be made for Xhe poorer households, not for castes as a whole,because that would eliminate the complaint, widespread and veryjustified, that the better off within a caste group monopolise all thereservations intended for the group as a whole. But these remediesinvite an objection which is as comprehensive as the remedies them-selves.

The whole rationale for reservations rests upon the premise thatthe rigid.caste hierarchy of Indian society, especially Hindu society,has subjected the lower castes, as castes, to serious disabilities, andhas done so for such long periods of time throughout history that themembers of these castes are no longer able to take their due place insociety through open competition. Therefore they must be assistedfor a sufficient period of time through sufficiently positive discrimi-nation in their favour so that they may come up to the level fromwhich they can openly compete with others on an equal footing.Reservations for the poorer households rather than for caste catego-ries as such would not be consistent with this rationale. Even lessconsistent with it would be the more general proposition that regard-less of their caste the poor as a whole be given the benefit of

25

26 The politics of Baclcwarclness

reservations. The disabilities of the poor of the highest castes cannotbe put down to historic social discrimination; these arise from anunjust economic order, and the remedies for them must be found inthe right kind of politico-economic policies for the polity as a whole,not in reservations for some on economic grounds.

There is a morc legitimate case for so administering reservationsthat the benefits cannot in future be disproportionately comered, as

they have been in the past, by a small segment of the entitled group.A remedy often proposed is that those within an entitled caste groupwho have already risen up to the average economic standard in thecountry, or who have enjoyed the benefits of reservations for aspecified maximum period of time, should be debarred from a contin-ued share in these benefits so that others. who have not benefitedfrom them, may have better access to them in future. But this too hasbeen opposed on the ground that this is an attempt to drive wedgeswithin the entitled groups and to deprive such groups of the leader-ship of those among their kin who have risen to higher levels ofcompetence. This opposition often comes from those who in facthave received disproportionate benefrtl within the entitled group. Soit did also at the seminar which is the subject of this book, and it wasargued with much cogency and force. However, being essentially an

unreasonable position, and contrary to the basic consideration ofsocial justice not only between but within social groups, it did notrcceive much support from other participants.

Seeing how intricate are the contradictions and inconsistenciesbetween and within the theory and practice of reservations, it shouldnot surprise anyone that very diverse suggestions for resolving themwere thrown up in the course of the intense discussions of thechapters. It is worth pointing out that despite diversity of opinionregarding specific recommendations and remedies, there was a broadagreement on a number of general approaches. In fact most of therecommendations flow from one or another of these approaches.

It was generally agreed for example that in the given historicalcircumstances it was not only desirable but necessary for publicpolicy to intervene in a big way to mitigate, even if it could notentirely remove, the severe injustices and disabilities which largesections of Indian society have had to endure through the centuries.The emphasis was less on questioning the intervention than on mak-

An Overview 27

ing it more effective. Though opinions differed on the specific ways

of making it so, most participants emphasised that while legislationproviding for reservations was important, it was at least equally

important that this benefit should be made better known to the

intended beneficiaries and they should be intensively tutored, at

public cost if necessary, in the ways in which they could use the

benefit effectively.There was also little disagreement about continuing the reserva-

tions for the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and also for the

lowest among the other backward castes. The disagreement was

mostly about extending reservations to the relatively better off amongthe OBCs. There was wide disagreement on the question whether thetarget groups of beneficiaries should be considered qualified by theircastes or by their economic status. But it was generally agreed thatwhatever the criterion chosen, be it social or economic, caution wasneeded both in withdrawing reservations from those presently en-titled to them and in extending them to groups not entitled to themalready. Similarly, there was general agreement that the higher aim ofsocial and economic justice for those most needing it should not be

allowed to be frustrated by the benefit being monopolised by smallsections within the larger entitled groups at the cost of the less

enterprising but more deserving sections among these groups.But the clearest impression that the dimensions left on one's mind

was that the case for reservations as_ well as the case against it, are

transitory, and even more so are the specifics of the two cases. Whatis of more durable relevanae to the whole issue of reservations is thetotality of the socio-economic process. Whatever the origins of thecaste system in times now relatively remote, the hardships it startedto inflict upon the lower castes in relatively recent times havecrystallised out of an environment of economic stagnation and scar-

city. The stagnation has congealed an association between certaincastes and certain occupations, and where the occupations are of a

demeaning kind in one way or another they have also demeaned

those who are engaged in these occupations, and demeaned them as

much in their own eyes as in the eyts of others. Stagnation has also

inhibited those processes of socio-technological progress throughwhich a society grows out of the more distasteful ways of meeting its

functional needs.


Scarcity has added to this its own problems. It has made upwardmobility more difficult even for the abler and more enterprisingamong the lower castes. They are not only held back by the stigma ofcaste but also by the sheer lack of economic space above and aroundthem; the only way they can go is down. Caste prejudice is organisedagainst them as a way in which the more privileged may protect theirown islands against any attempt at assault by the underprivilegedcastes, which together constitute more than half the population. Whenstate policy intervenes on behalf of the low-caste-poor (though ad-mittedly it intervenes as much with a view to picking up votes as togiving some relief to the deserving) caste prejudice is mobilised as adyke against an economic threat.

From this it follows that just as the socio-economic disabilities ofcaste for the low-caste-poor have crystallised out of economic stag-nation and scarcity, similarly the best solvent for the disabilities isalso going to be social evolution and economic growth. This is notsome kind of a latter day "trickle down" theory. Nor is it a stratagemagainst specific intervention by public policy for carrying specificrelief to particular groups by the most direct and the shortest route. Itis only an argument that if the confennent or withdrawal of specificbenefits is attempted in ways which lead us into socio-politicalturmoil and then socio-economic dislocation, the worst sufferers aregoing to be those very sections of society which are the least able toafford any additional suffering. The controversy over reservations istherefore also a controversy over much larger social and economicprocesses.

Chapter 3

Reservations Policy for Other Backward

Classes: Problems and Perspectives

Shri Prakash

SECTION I

The Question of National Consensus

tIE call for evolving a national consensus on the issue of

reservations policy for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs)

has by now been made by many leaders of different political

paEs. e significant cross_section of active political leaders holding

importunt official positions recognize the need for a set of guidelines

which can regulati the future evolution of OBC reservations policy'

A call for Uuitdlng a national consensus was fint made by the then

Prime Minister nillv CanOtrl on 20 luly, 1985 in the context of

efforts by the govemment of Gujarat to increase the reservation quota

in educationJ institutions for the OBCs following the report of the

Rane Commission. Subsequently' similar staternents were made by at

least three chief ministers-those of Kamataka, Andhra Pradesh and

Gujarat. This provides the context for the present paper'

it is obvioui that any attempt at evolving guidelines for a proposed

national consensus cannot be accomplished at one stroke' The ideas

put forward in this essay are meant to act as an input in an ongoing

iiscussion which needs to be extended to include the academic

experts, political leaders at the national and local levels and adminis-

t utott. Onty a proracted process of interaction between those who

suggest, formulate and implement reservation policies can produce a


common national understanding of this issue.At the outset of this analysis it is necessary to explain why thesubject of reservations for the category widely tno*n u, OBCs_properly described in the constitution of India as ..socially

andeducationally backward classes" (Articles 15(4); 1614;_needs to betreated separately from the issue of reservations for irr" schedul"dCastes (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST). In brief, the explanationlies as much in the history, sociology and politics of reservationpolicy as it does in the objective ofeffiiient ani egalirarian economicdevelopment. However, it must first be clarified that while discussingthe issue ofreservations for SC/ST and OBCs it is not true to identifythem as being associates or followers of particular political parties.No one can doubt the fact, as will be shown in deta;t below, that ityas the Congress party and its leaders who won over Dr B.R.Ambedkar, the leader of the Depressed Classes, from a position ofrelative hostility to one ofcooperation and leadership of the Constitu_ent Assembly. In the post-1947 period too the Congi"s. govemmentswere active in promoting various welfare and participatory schemesfor the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and ihe backward classes.In the case of the ',socially and educationally backward,, classesbeing included in the scheme of preferential poli"i"r, the Congressand its leaders again played a prominent role. The Objectives Reso_lution of the Constituent Assembly was moved by Jawaharlal Nehruon December 13, 1946 and itresolved to provid" id"quut" safeguardsfor "minorities, backward tribal areas, depressed and other backwardclasses." So also, the famous clause 4 of Article 15 in which it is said"that nothing in this article shall prevent the state from making anyspecial provision for the advancement of any socially and education_ally backward classes ofcitizens or for the Schedulei castes and theScheduled Tribes," was also moved for adoption by prime MinisterNehru. It was again the cabinet, led by Jiwaharial Nehru whichdecided in August, 196l that since no agreement could be reached onthe implementation of the report of the Kaka Kalelkar Commission,which had given prominence to caste and not to economic criteria,the states could frame their own OBC lists under Article l5(4) andt6@).

. At the time of the framing of the Indian Constitution mosr politicalleaders were associated with the Congress party in one way or

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes 31

another. Later on when some of them parted company with their

;;;;;.;;it"tion, thev tried to project the schgdu]3d caste and the

OBC issues in their own tashion' Dr B'R' Ambedkar founded the

n"p"ur""" Party of India to represent tl" ilt"Tttt of the Depressed

Ail;t, uut it did not do too well in the elections except in a few

Ji"i"" of Maharashtra. Ram Manohar Lohia set out to outline his

ri"*, on m" position of backward castes in Indian society and make

that the basis of one aspect of the politics of the Socialist Party' He

assumed that his division of Hindu society into the dominant "twice

bom" and other castes actually conformed to political or potential

oolitical groups in the all-India national or electoral arena' A closer

!*urninu,ion of the regional variations and changes in social structure

*lrtti" ,f," country would belie the kind of expectations likely to

follow from Ram Manohar Lohia's analysis' Subsequent to the deci-

sion of the central government that the states were free to formulate

their own lists of backward classes, several leading political figures

like Devraj Urs from the Congress party in Kamataka again took the

ini iuriu" in fo.th".iog the evolution of a reservations policy for the

backward classes- Indeed, starting from the latter half of the nineteen

sixties, between 1965 to 1987 Backward Classes Commissions re-

po*O't*i"" in Kerala, Kamataka, and Gujarat and once in Tamil^Nadu,

Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, in addition to the second National

Sackward Classes Commission or the Mandal Commission in 1980'

It is interesting to note that these Commissions were appointed both

Uy Congr".. id non-Congress governments and often as a result of

initiatiu"es coming from above or in pursuance of a strategy for

promoting social justice towards the backward classes' However' on

itri, puttiJut- issue often a non-Congress govemment (as in the case

of the Venkataswamy Commission in Karnataka or the Mandal Com-

mission at the Centre) took up the issue after coming into power' In

thecaseoftheMandalCommissionagain'theCommission'sreportis under consideration at present even though it was initiated by the

Janata government.

It ha's not only been the different govemments which have agreed

on this method of appointing a Public Cornmission for drawing up

OBC lists. A comprehensive survey of the opinions of political

leaders in 1978 in the Karimnagar district of Andhra Pradesh re-

vealed how opinions about reservation policy cut across party lines'


Of the leaders interviewed, 72 per c,entbelonged to the Congress (I),I I per cent to the Janata pafiy, another I I per cent to the CpI and therest had no parry affiliations. of these, z+ p..."ni-.uio thar reserva_tions in general should be time_bound and;;;;;;;;;;"bte afrer theexpiry of the stipulated deadline and 18 per cent ,.iJin.v should betime-barred and hence not renewable (Study by N. Ramchander, inReservation policy in India, ed. ty e.e.V. "Sfra._u

und K. Madhu_sudhan Reddy).It is therefore clear that on the issue of reservations the linesbetween different political parties are Utuo"O unj *i"n ir comes toactual policy formulation and implementation there is often consider-

able overlap between the policies followed by diff.r*igou"rn_.ntr.One fact which stands out. both in the evolution oi poficy anA interms of agitational or protest politics intended to shape reservationlol:y, i, thar much greater controversy and differences surroundOBC reservations than those meant for the scheduled castes andtribes. This also means that there are several aspects of the criteriaused for classifying OBCs which remain under continuing discussionas also the extent ofjobs/college seats reserved for them. By contrast,the quotas sanctioned for SC/ST as well as the scheduled liits namingthe sc/sr enjoy greater acceprance among the different nationalparties.

One reason for looking at the possible causes explaining thegreater social consensus about SC/ST reservations and the morenumerous differences relating to OBC reservations is to see whetherat the policy lever the factors leading to the first result cannot behelpful in promoting a similar effort relating to the oBC issue. In thiscontext, it might be observed that in recent years the consensusrelating to SC/ST reservations has been under some strain in a fewregions due to inter-caste conflicts. What possible consequences suchconflicts may have, if at all, for the scheme of SC/sr reservationremains a subject of separate study. In this paper the focus is strictlyon the backward classes. The issue of the consensus about SC/STreservations is being raised primarily from a comparative view_point.

A vigorous intellectual and reformist opinion against the presenceoflntouchability within Hindu society was first viiced by the socialreform movements which started in the nineteenth century. Both the


Brahmo Samaj in Bengal and the Arya Samaj in Punjab believed in

promoting a dual process of reform when it concemed the issue of

untouchability. As the Arya Samaj did through the Shudhi move-

ment, the untouchables were to become caste Hindus either through

formally adopting ritual ceremonies of the latter or through possible

inter-caste .irriug", as promoted by the Brahmo Samaj' The fact

that a struggle against untouchability required a change of perception

and practii! on ihe part of the upper castes was best brought out in the

philosophy and actions of Mahatma Gandhi' Temple entry move-

ments for Harijans were to be accorrpanied by an effort at changing

the traditional dislike of manual labour by the upper castes' In retro-

spect, it was this kind of thinking which underpinned the policy of

reservations for the Depressed Classes. Job reservations would en-

sure that upper caste employees would accept to work with the

former untouchables. By this it was hoped to better the conditions of

SC/ST who provided the most vlsible examples of social and regional

backwardness in conEmporary Indian society' Such a policy was

intended to be an illustration of growth with social justice and win the

consent and participation of other deprived sections for the demo-

cratic political system as a whole.

Facts too supported the view that untouchabllity in itself consti-

tuted a key element of enforcing hierarchy within the caste system

and that "ifo.tt

to undermine it, when successful would alter that

system. Although the law of occupational specialization in regard to

untouchable castes had already been weakened considerably by the

time of the 1931 census, that of strict residential segregation and

marital exclusion in rural India was and is applicable' According to

the 1931 census, e.g. of the Bombay Presidency, many of the known

untouchable castes had moved away from their traditional occupa-

tions to others within the rural economy and society' Amongst the

bhangis or the scavengers almost 572 ottt of every 1000 persons had

stopp;d pursuing their traditional occupations' Similarly' 547 out of

every 1000 chamars/mochis or shoemakers were no longer engageo

in their traditional occupations' Among the mahars or the village

watchmen in the Bombay Presidency only 179 out of every 1000

were said to be foliowing their traditional occupation' If occupational

specialization or diversification is to be considered as a yardstick for

modemization, then the above mentioned untouchable castes were

34 The politics of Backwardncss

clearly ahead of others. Among the sutars or carpenters, for example,776 outofevery 1000 persons were following tireir traditional occu_pations,in 193 l. Among the lohars or blacksi.f ths in Bombay presi-dency this ratio was 731 out of every lW (Census of India, 1931,vol. VIII, Part I, Statement No.l7).

In the pre- 1947 days, occupational diversification however did notremove the social disabilities associated with the stigma of untouch_ability, a fact which remains true today when the Ind]an Constitutionhas abolished and outlawed untouchab ity and social practices basedo:l it. Discrimination on grounds of being an untouchable was notnecessarily related to being more or less well_off or poor. The merefact that one belonged to a caste locally considered; untouchablemight exclude him/her from using tlie village well, temple, or thevillage chaupal and the right to use such facilities is a subject of manyunknown informal personal struggles even today. G.S. Sharma hasdocumented for us many situations in which barbers refused to servechamars even when the latter were willing to pay for the former,s

1"yi"_"1 (G.S. Sharma, teg islation and Cases on Untouchability and

Scheduled Castes in India.ICSSR, 1975). Such cases are known onlvwhen a formal complaint is made or a commission of inquiryappointed.

A commission of inquiry appointed by the Rajasthan High Courtto investigate reports on the continuing practice of untouchability inthe town of Bari Sadri has found that not only does it prevail there butis sometimes seen in its crudest form. It has been lound that suchdiscrimination prevails in govemment offices, the municipal counciland in the lower munsif courts. Affidavis have been submitted to thecommission by the scheduled caste employees in the primary healthcentre testifuing that they are not allowed to drink thl stoi,ed waternor is the night chowkidar of the municipal council allowed to use theoffice supplies; and the munsif court has denied minimum wages roits scheduled caste employees for thrce years (Economic and politi_cal Weekly, August 30, 1986). More such facts are included inAppendix I to this chapter. An all-India survey by a team of expertsdiscovered many regional variations in the extenf of participation byscheduled castes in the educational system. HowevJr, on" com-onfactor they found was the continuing belief in caste endogamy.Another was the invisible rule that scheduled caste students iouid

Resemations Policy for Other Backward Classes 35

,make friends only among'the scheduled castes and that they contin-

ued to have a poor image of their own status because of the treatment

they received from other caste students' Consequently' they lacked

the confidence to compete openly for employment and were diffident

about venturing into the private sector' (Suma Chitnis' A I'ong Way

to Go: Repoi on a Survey of Scheiluleil Caste High School and

College Sudents in Fifieen States of lndia,ICSSR, p' 16l') Another

.studyif college students found that many from urban and rural areas

were prejudiced against the Harijans. (R'N' Prasad, Caste Prejudice

Amoig bollege Studrntt, A Socio-Psychological S/ady' Varanasi:

Rupa Publishers, 1979.)

ihe need for protective discrimination or for job and political

reservations was first voiced by those among the untouchables who

had done well in relative economic terms. The mahars in the Bombay

Presidency, for example, had been among the first to move away

from theii traditional occupation as village watchmen and take up

jobs in the army and the railways' This headstart led to motivation for

ieform and the growth of political awareness among them' The

movement for political representation for the Depressed Classes was

led by a su""esifol mahar barrister, B'R. Ambedkar' Similarly in the

"ur. of th. chamars in the United Provinces, their consolidation into

a recognizable constituency followed the growth amongst them of a

fairly affluent section due to a sudden spurt in the demand for leather

goois during the Second World War. It is these better off sections

*ho huu" provided the leadership to the scheduled casteVtribes'

The untouchable castes found advocates and leaders not only from

among the ranks of their own better off section but also from among

the many illustrious thinkers and social activists produced by the

growth of Indian nationalism-Swami Vivekananda, Jyotiba Phule'

i{arain Guruswami, Ramaswami Naicker' Lokhitwadi, Gokhale'

Agarker, Munshi Premchand, B. Pantulu, R'Venkatraman, etc' By

the 1920s the country was dotted with movements for giving an equal

status to untouchables within Hindu society. By 1924 the mahars in

the Bombay Presidency had launched a "self respect" movement

under the leadership of Dr' Ambedkar. In Punjab the Adi-Dharm

movement was started in l926.In Bengal there was the Nama Sudra

Andolan, in the Madras Presidency the Adi-Dravida, and in Kerala

the Adi Karnataka Andolan. The Charuman' Palaya, etc' harijan


groups started movements against untouchability. In Andhra therewas an Adi Andhra movement and in Kanpur an Adi Hindu move_ment. Later Mahatma Gandhi published the newspaper F1a rijan. Healso renanrcd the Akhil Bharatiya Anti_Untouchability lrague, startedby Amritlal V. Thakkar, the Servants of Untoucha6les Socie8 andthis subsequently became the now famous Harijan Sevak Sangh.There was thus an all-India scope and dimension to the movement forhelping the scheduled castes to fight untouchability through eco_nomic, political, cultural and educational means. It was easy toachieve a consensus on this iss'le.

It is to be emphasized that whereas untouchability in its differentdimensions provided an easy all-India demarcating line within whichthe scheduled castes could be identified and about the removal ofwhich many social and political leaders were in agreement with eachother, the same was not true of the factors which led to the rise of thenon-Brahmin movement, the progenitor of the social category later tobe described as the Other Backward Classes (OBCs). What thefollowing analysis will emphasize is that purely political factors andrcsponses had a much greater role to play in shaping the OBCs as aconstitutional, legal and social beneficiary. Hence political action hasa'much greater relevance in determining the legai and political timelimits within which such a category can be socially beneficial, than isthe case with the SCTST groups, who constitute a collectivity in amore fundamental cultural, economic and geographical sense.

The origins of the social category called the OBCs goes back tothe non-Brahmin movement and the decisions made by the ruler ofMysore to give preference to the backward classes. In re-examiningthis piece of history one has to ask a question which is of greatcontemporary relevance for policymakers today. Was the classifica_tion of the OBCs, which emerged during this period, a natural out-come of a social movement or a policy decision of the existinggovemment? This distinction has a vital relevance because the de_gree to which the state has fashioned its own criteria and imposed itsown interpretation on social events is more easily changeable than apolicy franework that is the direct outcome of social conditions notacceptable to large groups of people. Thus untouchability creates adeprived social constituency which is unique in its own right and forwhose abolition various special social devices are needed. Is this


equally true of the OBCs? [n order to answer this question one needs

to reconsider some history.

SECTION II

The Non-Brahmin Movement: Largely a Regional Phenomenon

One of the factors that distinguished the social structure in TamilNadu from many other parts of India during the late nineteenth

century was the interlinkage between large landholding educational,professional and political leadership within many Brahmin families,

which set them apart from families belonging to other castes and

gave the Brahmins as a whole a well-knit appearance as a social and

a political group. It is important to note that even at the start of the

twentieth century Tamil Nadu-then a part of the Madras Presi-

dency-was not a region dominated by extensive commercial agri-culture. It could boast of few merchant princes and even fewercaptains of industry. Unlike the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the

Ryotwari Settlement in the Madras Presidency did not lead to a large-

scale transfer of land, primarily because the extent of the revenue

burden imposed on agriculture had over the years been more closelyrelated to the costs of production. The large-scale "sunset" auctioningof land in Bengal initiated certain changes in the social compositionof the landed elites. It created an avenue for upward mobility forpersons who had acquired wealth in trade as agents or carriers for the

East India Company, which had been active in that region of India formore than three centuries. Such a social process also widened the

caste base of the Bengal landed and urban elites, a phenomenon thatled to the coining of a new phrase, the Bhadralok, to describe the

Bengal elite-a term which spanned families from at least three

castes, Brahmans, Vaidyas or Vaishyas and Kayasthas. This to acertain extent foreclosed the attempts to mobilize sections of the

affluent upper castes to head a non-Brahmin movement. It is to be

noted that the caste associations formed in Bengal in the nineteenth

century have disappeared after independence. There has also notbeen any real pressure from below for instituting OBC reservationswhich do not exist in West Bengal. Such social mobility was typicalof areas where landed property showed a quick turnover as in Bengal,


or.where clan systems were more prevalent than sub-castes. Govern_ment-sponsored new land settlements in westem Up, where peasants' .of different origins predominate over older land settlements is an-other example. In the Jat-based villages, as in Punjab, Haryana or inregions of intensive commercial agriculture as in Gujarat, manyKanbis could rise to become Patidars or Patels along with a relativeincrease in their affluence during intervals ofprice rise, as during thecotton boom in the 1860s or the First World War. Also, in Bengal,western UP, Punjab, and Gujarat there was no attempt at mobilizinga politi:al movement for demanding caste-based privileges, exceptfor the untouchables, who existed everywhere in Hindu society.

In contrast to other regions of India, in Tamil Nadu and Mysore,both parts of the Madras Presidency at that time, many of the Brahminfamilies wielded economic and social power quite out of proportion totheir numbers. In Madras Presidency as a whole the Brahmins consti-fited 3.3Vo of the Hindu population. InTamil Nadu their share of thetotal population ranged from I % in the Nilgiri s to 3.7Vo in Tinnevelli,Chingleput and Trichinopoly. This contrasted for example with Gujaratwhere Brahmins constituted 5% of the population in Baroda state, incentral Gujarat and north Gujarat, 47o in south Gfiarat and nearly 1Vo

in Kathiawad. (Census of India. 1931, Madras Presidency and BarodaState.) In Tamil Nadu the Brahmins constituted a high proportionamong the larger landowners. In Gujarat this position was occupiedby Rajput or Patidar (Patel). In the Madras Presidency generally, theBrahmins had long been the literati and hence occupied the positionof clerks, administrators and officials, whether tlre rulers were Tamilkings, Vijaynagar viceroys or the East lndia Company. Once again,the contrast with Gujarat or Bengal is interesting because in these tworegions the literati came not only from among the Brahmins but alsofrom the other castes like the Kayasthas or the Vaishyas, who as

traders in Gujarat looked after personal or public accounts, etc. Onehears of the famous Nagar Sheths of Gujarat who ran their businesses

on their own (Kenneth Gillion: Ahmedabad). In Tamil Nadu theBrahmins invariably held the position of the village Karnam or thevillage accountant and in appreciation of their religious and secularservices they had been awarded land ights as Mirasdars and lramdars.In the case of the Tamil and to a certain extent Telugu Brahmins,

..- traditional status, access to landed wealth, generations ofinvolvement

Reservations Policy for Other Baclcward Clnsses 39

in the administration and aloofness from cultivation were responsible

for the Brahmin domination of the western-educated, professional 'middle class from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards. This

was best illustrated by the male literacy rates in English which were

28.21o for theTamil Brahmins as against 17.4% far the Vellalas, the

leading non-Brahmin caste group in Tamil Nadu. Also, due to their

greater involvement with English education the Brahmins could not

be closely identified with the renaissance of the Tamil language and

literature, a task performed mostly by members of the non-Brahmin

intelligentsia. This again meant that the issue of developing a Tamilculture could become an added element in the opposition to Brahmin

dominance as such.

One of the consequences of the explicit Brahmin dominance at the

regional level in many parts of the Madras Presidency was the attempt

by the educated and professional sections of other castes to mobilize

their caste associations. Between 1905 and 1930 a great number ofcaste associations were set up with the aim of strengthening caste

identity, improving caste status and fostering mutual assistance. Thisprovided the backdrop to the formation of the Justice Party and the

demand for reserved seats for the non-Brahmins in the legislature.

The mere existence of caste associations or even a non-Brahminmovement wzrs not sufficient to get the principle of political reserva-

tions for the non-Brahmins accepted. It was also a fact that at this

time the British govemment, sensing the growing support for the

nationalist movement, was looking for new allies who would support

it within the framework of a limited constitutional government. The

criteria for choosing such allies was that unlike the previous ones

(zamindars, for example) who were chosen mainly for their loyalty,the new allies should enjoy proven mass support. The ability of the

non-Brahmin movement to institutionalize itself into the Justice Party

and win support from caste associations was a good reason why inMarch 1920 the British-appointed arbitrator Lord Meston decided inhis judgement on the implementation of the Montague-ChelmsfordReforms to neserve 28 of the 65 non-Muhammedan general seats. Itwas clearly the political factor which weighed with the Justice Partywhen they got the issue of reservations in the legislature settled intheir favour. For the British govemment this was an act of expedi-

ency but in the special social situation of Tamilnad it signified the


entry of a new social strata into political life and activity. It neededthe special sanction and support of the British state at that time toconvert the heterogenous social groupings constituting the non-Brah_min movement into a reserved political constituency within TamilNadu. Once the Congress-led Constituent Assembly had decided tointroduce adult suffrage in 1949 the need for continuing with thepolitical reservations for the backward classes disappeared. In thiscontext, it must be recognized that the principle of reservations inemployment or educational institutions fot the backward classes inthe Indian Constitution was based on the concept of according wel-fare and equality to the backward sections of society and not on theprinciple of political expediency. In this sense there was a differencein the nature of the political principles that underlay the question ofreservation for backward classes in the pre-1947 period and the waythis issue was defined in the Indian Constitution.

This distinction in the case of political reservations for the back-ward classes, which were discontinued after 1947, also extends to thereservation of government jobs. In connection with this issue theterm "backward classes" first acquired a technical meaning in theprincely state of Mysore. In 1918, the Mysore govemment appointeda committee to enquire into the question of encouraging members ofthe "backward communities" in public service. Marc Galanter hasnarrated the details of this process (Marc Galanter, Cornpeting Equali-ties, 1984, Chapter 6). What he has not emphasized is that during rheBritish period the official committees, by and large, either includedthe untouchafles and the tribes within the rubric of the "backwardclasses" or when they excluded them they often went by the viewgenerated by the non-Brahmin movement that everyone except theBrahmins were backward. Ai least in South India this view becameso widespread that the Miller Committee, appointed by the Mysoregovemment in 1918 under the chairmanship of Sir Lesley Miller, wasprepared to ignore the fact that a few castes had the same literacy rateas the Brahmins. The Miller Committee classified the Mudaliars andPillais as backward when they had a ten per cent literacy rate, almostthe same as Brahmins. By this method the Mysore government hopedto keep all the non-Brahmin castes as their own supporters becausethey wrongly identified the leadership of the freedom movement withthe presence ofpower hungry Brahmin leaders. Thus, purely political

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes 4l

considerations were always crucial in the pre-1947 period in the

classification of the backward classes. The need to tum a policy ofgranting concessions to the backward classes into an instrument for

securing some kind of broad support against the nationalist move-

ment meant that no strict criteria could be formulated for classifying

the OBCs. Different committees used wide definitions to net as large

a cross section as possible and there was no agreement on an all-India

basis on who constituted the backward classes.

After the issue of the Non-Brahmin Manifesto in 1916 and the

formation of the government in Madras by the Justice Party, the lattergave a definitive push to job reservations for the non-Brahmins in the

govemment. The First Communal Govemment Order on September

16, l92l extended job reservations for non-Brahmins from revenue

to all departments. A staff selection board and then a public services

commission was formed to implement these reservation quotas. How-ever, the attempt to raise the non-Brahmin movement to an all-Indialevel on a social plane was a failure. The first all-India non-Brahmincongress was convened in Bombay by Ramaswamy Mudaliar. He

openly described the non-Brahmin movement as 'Jobocracy: the

securing of jobs to the men of our communities and I am not ashamed

of calling myself a job hunter." No other words could portray betterthe fact that at root it was the educated section of the landed non-Brahmin castes who were in the forefront of the demand for job-reservations. The second and last attempt to convene an all-Indianon-Brahmin congress was at Amaraoti in 1925. This occasion was

marked only by a speech from the Raja of Panagal who suggested

some constitutional reforms and inclusion of items like handspinningfrom the programme of the Indian National Congress. It was not onlythe case that the backward classes movement remained restricted tothe local and regional levels. Even when organizations like the

BAMCEF were formed during the 1970s, these were associations

mostly of persons already having government jobs and fighting forbetter or faster promotions. In this sense the non-Brahmin movementwas the largest one of its kind and created the ground in South Indiafor the formation of many caste-based associations that continue tosustain the demand for and practice of reservations there till today.The special conditions which produced the non-Brahmin movementin the South did not exist elsewhere in India to the same extent.


SECTION M

The Constituent Assembly and the Constitutional provisions

The perspective in terms of which the issue of reservations for thescheduled castevtribeyother backward classes (SCVST/OBCs) wasto be viewed, was to change with the dawn of freedom. The Britishadministration had at best produced a series of ad hoc responses andestimates of population of the Depressed Classes, with a view togaining their political support to oppose the Congress by granting afew concessions. Neither the objective nor the criteria of an implicitpreferential policy were ever stated clearly. They could not be, be_cause in the minds of the British rulers most of these concessionswere a short-term political device to try and split the nationalistmovement. The debates in the Constituent Assembly on the otherhand, and the measures or principles this distinguished gatheringembodied in the Indian Constitution, set out the approach towards areservations policy in terms of the goals of promoting nuional inte-gration and providing social justice to the deprived soctions of thepopulation. The exact meaning of the ideas and formulations of theConstituent Assembly need to be restated today, when oppositearguments are being put forward either for entirely doing away witha policy of reservations or for indiscriminately extending it on agrand scale. The middle course proposed by the Constituent Assem-bly, even if it was not written down in the Constitution explicitly,needs to be elucidated in order to devise a practical programme ofaction for attempting to build a national consensus on the reserva-tions policy issue.

The first feature to note in relation to the principle of preferentialtreatment in the Indian Constitution for SC/ST/OBCs is that the wordcaste is used only in rclation to the Scheduled Castes. Both in Article15(4) (which is a part of the broader article prohibiting discriminationon grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth) and in Article16(4) which is included within Article 16 promising equality ofopportunity in matters of public employnrent, the refercnce to thosedeserving special treatment is to "any socially and educationallybackward classes of citizens or the Scheduled Castes and the Sclred-uled Tribes" and to "any backward class of citizens which in the


opinion of the state is not adequately represented in the services under

the state." It is well known that both Article l5(4) and Article 16(4)

wereintroducedbyPanditJawaharlalNehruaftertwojudgementsbythe Supreme Court questioning the validity of the system of 'commu-

nal' reservations of government jobs for the non-Brahmins in the

Madras Presidency. In a significant intervention during the debate'

Jawaharlal Nehru explained why the word "economically" had not

been used separately in phrasing Anicle 15(4) ' According to Jawaharlal

Nehru, this was becauie those who drafted Article 15(4) thought of

backwardness as cumulaiive. The.word 'Socially' in the Article' he

said, covered many things and iertainly included 'economically''

(Parliamentary Debates, vol. XII-XIII (Part II)' col' 9830')

The many things that cumulatively would constitute backward-

ness were not spelt out by the Constituent Assembly nor listed in the

Constitution as such. It was assumed that this task would be per-

formed by the Commission which may, according to Article 340' be

appointed by the President "to investigate the conditions of the

r*iutty and educationally backward classes within the territory of

India and the difficulties under which they labour and to make

recommendations as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or

any state to remove such difficulties and to improve their condition'"

One fact however stood out. There were only very few persons either

from South India or Bihar who thought caste in itself to be a primary

indicator of backwardness. The view expressed by Shri Chandrika

Ram from Bihar was: "Our society is divided into three sections-the

highest consisting of that section known as Scheduled Castes and the

lowest as Harijans, while the third occupying a middle position

between these two and consisting of a larger portion of our people is

what may be termed as the Backward Class." Such an opinion was

far less common than that expressed by Dr Dharam Prakash who

said: "In fact there is no community which does not have a section ofpeople which is backward, whether economically or educationallyor

socialty." (C o nstitue nt As s embly D eb ate s : 3O | | | | 19 49' pp. 680-86')

We will examine below the extent to which the post-1947 commis-

sions on backward classes used caste as a primary factor in listing the

backward classes.

It is not only that the Constituent Assembly sought to de-empha-

size caste as a denotation of backwardness. Over time, it sought to


reduce and finally to abolish caste as an indicator of backwardness.Ttris aim is to be seen nor only in the legal abolition oi untoucnaUlity.It is also to be seen in the Directive priicipf", of Stut" folicy. Article38 clearly affirms that..the state shall strive to promote the welfare ofthe. people by securing and protecting as effectively as ir may a socialorder in which justice-social, economic and poliiical_shall informall the instirurions of the national life, and ir s;all in farticular striveto minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminateinequalities in status, facilities and opportunities no1 only amongindividuals but also amongst g.oup, oip"ople residing in differentareas or engaged in different vocations." Article 46 also states that"the state shall promote with special care the educational and eco-nomic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particularof the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled iribes and shall protectthem from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.,, (Cinstitu-tion of India, Central Law Agency, Allahabad, 19g 1.) As opposed rothe interpretation proposed by Marc Galanter that no specific goalwas set to be achieved through the policy of reservations, the goalwas clearly stated to be the increased werfare of the weaker sectionsthrough a reduction of inequalities in income, education and otherstatus facilities. The clear import of reading together the constitu_tional provisions relating directly or indirectly to reservations is thatas a device they were expected to be used for a long period of time,or as long as the majority view was that goals likl reduction ininequalities and status had not been fully achieved.

At the same time, reservations were seen by the constitutionmakers as a policy which also had some negative aspects and there_fore needed to be worked carefully within well-defined li.its ro a, tocarry the support of those who would not be able to benefit from it.In the case of reservations of seats in the legislature this consensuswas sought to be achieved by limiting such reservations only toscheduled castes/tribes and then restrictrng the period of such reser_vations initially to ten years (Article 334). The really educative partof the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly was that the leadersof the scheduled castes sought actively to build a consensus on theissue of reservations by accepting and even proposing restrictions onthe concessions being granted. It is remarkable that the clause re_stricting the reservation of seats for the SC/STs in the legislature to

Reservations Policy for Othzr Baclcward Classes 45

ten years only was introduced by Dr B.R. Ambedkar who was the

prima donna among the Harijan leaders. When some of the sched-

uled caste members spoke against the time limit Dr Ambedkar re-

minded them that 'they have rcally no cause for complaint because

the decision to limit the thing to ten years was rcally a decision which

has been arrived at with their consent. If at the end of the ten years,

the Scheduled Castes find that their position has not improved or that

they want further extension of this period it will not be beyond their

capacity to invent new ways of getting the same protection which

they are promised here." (Constiuent Assembly Debates:291811949,

pp. 696-7) Such a strategy had a definite impact on those from

among the upper castes who might not have agreed with the policy ofreservations for the scheduled casteytribes. As Jagat Narain Lal from

Bihar put it: "If we have accepted this principle of reservation in the

case of the scheduled castes and the aboriginals, it is because we have

seen speaker after speaker rising from among the scheduled castes tosupport a time limit on reservations." (Ibid.,251811949, p. 691.) The

moral of this illustration is that a conscious strategy of accepting a

limit within which a policy of reservations is to be worked, provides

a viable mechanism for promoting a consensus in rclation to such a

policy and hence minimizes the social conflict likely to arise fromhaving to accord preferential treatment to given sections of society,

sometimes at the cost of others. In the context of a policy of backward

class reservations, we need to rcnew the search for limits acceptable

to the majority social opinion in different parts of tle country. Such

a framework does not exist within the Constitution nor . has one

evolved subsequently at the national or local levels, giving rise tosituations of inter-caste social and political conflicts on more than

one occasion.The l0-year time limit was not the only compromise accepted by

the scheduled caste leaders in order to promote a political consensus.

In Article 335, which specifically promised that in the making ofappointmens to services and posts in the Union or a state the claims

of the members ofthe scheduled castes and tribes would be taken intoconsideration, a tough qualification was introduced which said that

this would be done "consistently with the maintenance of efficiencyof administration." This part of Article 335 clearly states that unless

the criterion of merit is combined with reservation of posts, effi-


ciency would be the likely cisualty. In purely formal terms, no suchqualification was introduced in Article l5(4) and 16(4) menrionedabove, which refer to reservation of jobs for the backward classesalthough in practice a minimum level of competence, as seen in aspecific percentage of marks, is required of any candidate who isentitled to avail of a reserved quota. This defect needs to be removedsince there is no reason why the qualification about efficiency shouldnot apply to both SOST and the OBCs. Further, Dr Ambedkar fullyexpected that in order not to contravene the more fundamental ruleabout all citizens having an equality of opportunity, the number ofjobs or college seats reserved for SCyST/OBCs should .,be confinedto a minority of seats." In fact, in his final summing up of the debateon Articles l5(4) and 16(4) he specifically said that the word .,back-

ward" had been brought in to limit the number of reservations to aminority of the available seats. In answer to a question by T.T.Krishnamachari whether his observation about reservations applyingto only a minority of the seats was justiiiable, Dr Ambedkar said: .,Ifthe local government included in this category of rcservations such alarge number of seats, one could very well go to the Supreme Courtand say that the reservation is of such a magnitude that the ruleregarding equality of opportunity has been destroyed." (CowtituentAssembly Debates; 3Ol | | | 1949, pp. 7 Ol-2.)

It is pertinent to emphasize that Dr Ambedkar regarded the ruleabout equality of opportunity as being more fundamental and onewhich an excessive degree of reservations would tend to undermine.The need to be able to restrict reservations to a limit which does notencroach too greatly upon the principle of providing equality ofopportunity needs to be re-emphasized today, when sbme politicalleaders visualize a rapid expansion of a system of reservations as aviable welfarc strategy through which they can mobilize quick politi-cal support. Whether this is at all a realistic expectation will bediscussed in the last section of this paper. The point to be emphasizedis that even if a strategy of expanding rcservations were to be politi-cally rewarding, it would still conrradict the admirable principle laiddown by the founders of the Indian Constitution, that reservationscan be instituted only if ample safeguards are provided to ensure thatequality of opportunity is available to the majority of the population.

Reservations Poticy for Other Backward Classes 47

SECTION ry

Problems Regarding Classification of BackwardCtasses since 1947

The question ofbeing able to clearly demarcate the Scheduled Castes/

Tribes and the Other Backward Classes was left to be decided either

by the President himself or by a commission appointed by him' lble'scheduled castes and tribes can be referred to only briefly because the

main issue is the criteria used for classifying the OBCs and estiryat-

ing their population. ., ' 'fne tggi

""nsus had estimated the total of the Depressed Cl4ss€s

to be 39.1 million in British India and Ll.l million in the States and

Agencies. The criteria used to identify these castes were not those oftheoretical untouchability i.e., whether a caste, due to its varnd status,

was considered susceptible to touch afid distance pollution. Each

Provincial Superintendent involved with the 1931 census was told to

"reckon as depressed only those castes who definitely suffer from

serious social and political handicap on account of their degraded

position in the Hindu social scheme." The list of llepressed Classes

put together by the l93l census was to be the basis for the special

electoral representation given to the Depressed Classes in the 1935

Government of India AcL Then the Scheduled Castes order promul-

gated by the President in 1950 basically re-enacted the 1936 list. It is

significant to note this fact because it takes away the edge from the

criticism that the scheduled castes list, as it stand$+eduF, is based on

narrow political considerations favourable to the Indian National

Congress then and the Congress(I) now'The 1941 census enunrerabd 12.6% of the total population of

i'pdi:l*edlndia as the Depressed Classes. The l95l census updated

thi( istimate to 14.5% of the population and according to the 1971

census the scheduled castes comprisd 14.6% of the population.

After the additions and the deletions made by the Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order 1956, there have

been no further changes in that list on an all-India basis apart from a

few small changes being made for Jammu and Kashmir (1956),.-'

Andaman and Nicobarlslands (1959), Dadra and NagarHaveli (1962)'

Pondicherry (1964), Uttar Pradesh (1967), Goa' Daman and Diu


(1968), Nagaland (1970) and Sikkim (1978). This again demon-strates a vital aspect of the scheduled caste list often not emphasizedenough. There has been little or no attempt by the parties in power toalter or add on to the scheduled castes liat in any significani *uy .oas to confer concessions on various new castes o. gaup, in the hopeof creating a political alliance with them. One of the criticismslevelled, by the leaders of the Bahujan Samaj party for example, hasbeen that too few from the Dalits (SC/ST/OBCs) fin<t a place ingovemment jobs or education and politics, and that very linle hasactually been done for these deprived groups. This policy of relativeneutrality in the matter of defining those groups to be included withinthe scheduled caste list contrasts with the frequent changes made bythe British government in granting privileges to new groups so as robroaden the narow social basis of its political support. On this pointthere is also a contrast between the list of scheduted castes and thoseof the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) - both nationally (which hasnot been accepted by the government so far) and in those states wherereservations exist for the OBCS. There has been a tendency to appointsuccessive commissions, often by govemments of different politicalparties, which have either increased or revised the number of socialgroups (usually castes) in the OBC lisrs and the proportion ofjobs orplaces in educational institutions reserved for them.

An interesting example of how the OBC lists tend to be prone tosudden expansion or suggestions for expansion is to be found in thecomparison between the reports of the First National (Kaka Kalelkar)Commission and the Second (Mandal) Commission on backwardclasses. According to the Kaka Kalelkar Commission (which re_ported in 1955), 2399 castes were classified as backward. The MandalCommission proposed to increase the number of OBCs to 3743castes. The rationale behind this enhanced list was nowhere clearlyexplained and as the Mandal Commission chose not to publish datait had collected through its field surveys, no basis exists for a publicdebate on this subject. It will always remain a trenchant mysrery as rowhy the Mandal Commission dara was hidden away from the publiceye. In the absence of data with which one can cross-check theclassification of OBCs, the Mandal Commission Report irltimatelyportrays the same problems which had stalked the Kaka KalelkarCommission Report-the unavailability of a firm data base.

Reservations Poticy for Other Backward Classes 49

The two principal difficulties in classifying backward classes are

concemed *ittt th" determination of the population of the OBCs and

the use of various indices for listing the OBCs' It is necessary to look

at these issues in some detail, both at the national and the state levels.

It is a paradox that the commissions appointed and the critics who

have examined their reports have not tumed their attention to the

complex problem of estimating the population of the OBCs when

they are listed caste-wise, as they have been so far. On the face of it,

the figures of populations suggested to date scarcely bear comparison

and indicate that a more systematic examination of the reports of the

backward classes commissions should be undertaken as a sequel to

this paper. The Kaka Kalelkar Commission Report estimated the

OBC population at I 16 million or abotrt 32Vo of the total population

io 1952. The Mandal Commission in 1978 estimated the OBC popu-

lation at 527o of total population. This included the Hindu OBC

castes (43.7To of total population) and the OBCs from among the

non-Hindu communities (8.4Vo of the total population). Incidentally'

the Mandal Commission failed to furnish the absolute figures of the

population involved and it escaped this responsibility in the main

body of the report by merely referring to a Table in the Appendices

which was not then published! (Report of the Backward Classes

Commission, vols. I & II, 1980, p. 56.)

In effect, the Mandal Commission, like the Kaka Kalelkar Com-

mission, made two separate calculations: one was a qualitative sample

survey to collect its own data for designating the backward classes

and tle second was a projection of census data from the 1931 census

(which was the last census to give a complete breakdown of caste-

wise population figures) in order to generate aggregate caste-wise

population figures on an all-India basis. It is quite clear that the data

collected through the sample survey could not give a clue to overall

caste-wise population figures. Even the Mandal Commission, which

conducted the largest exercise so far attempted at a socio-educational

survey, could cover only two villages and one urban block in each

district of India. In addition, it collected information through inter-

views and from the list of OBCs published by different states. Ac-

cording to the schedule of indices constructed by the commission itthen finalized a state-wise list of OBCs. There was no certainty, first

of all, that the method followed by the Mandal Commission had been


able to cover all the castes which claim to exist within the country.Then, given the small size of the sample, the great variations in themix of castes from one area to another, and differences in fertilitypatterns within the same caste group and between states and regioni,there was little possibility of extrapolating aggregate, all_India, caste_wise figures from the breakdown given by the sample survey. yetwithout the aggregate population figures no suggestion could be,made as to the overall share ofjobs or college seats that should bereserved because since the days of the .,Communal G.O.', of 1927 inMadras and subsequently the recommendations made by the KakaKalelkar Commission, the share of reservations for each group hasbeen, in one way or another, proportional to its overall size.

In order to calculate the overall proportion of different castes orclusters, the Mandal Commission undertook a different exercise. Itassumed "that the inter se rate of growth of population of variouscastes, cornmunities and religious groups over the last half a centuryhas remained more or less the same." (Mandat Commission Report,vol. I, p. 56.) Then on rhe strength of its socio-educational survey itculled out from the l93l census caste/community-wise populationfigures for those it classified as forward and backward groups. Therebyit obtained the following classification:

A - Scheduled Castes and TribesA-l Scheduled Castes (SCs)

A-2 Scheduled Tribes (STs)

B_B-lB-2B-3B-4B-5

Total of B

C - Forward. Hindu Castes antl Communities

C-l Brahmins (includingBhumihars)C-2 RajputsC-3 Marathas

Vo of population15.057.51

22.56Total of A

Non-Hindu Communities, Religious Groups, etc-Muslims (other than STs)Christians (other than STs)Sikhs (other than SCs and STs)Buddhists (other than STs)Jains

I l.l92.16t.670.670.47

16.16

cLt of total popu-Iation of India

5.523-902.2r

Resenations Policy for Other Backward Classes

C-4 Jats

C-5 Vaishyas, Bania, etc.

C-6 Kayasthas

C-7 Other forward Hindu casteVgroups

Total of C

TOTAI A/B/C

D - OBCs

D-l Backward Hindu casteVgrouPs

within OBCD-2 529o of religious groups under

section BD-3 Approximate derived pop. of OBCs

rounded off to a unit

5l

1.001.881.072.OO

1?58

56.30

43.7

8.4

52.O

There are several objections to the piocedure used and the results

arrived at by the Mandal Commission. Its estimate of backward

castes and groups from among the Hindus came to 43.7% of the

population. This represents an increase of almost ll%: over the

estimate of OBC population by the Kaka Kalelkar Commission which

only considered the Hindu sections of the population. How is one to

explain this increase, especially when the base year for both esti-

mates is the 1931 census and when despite the slowness of the

modemization process, the growth of primary, secondary and higher

education has more than kept pace with the growth of population in

India? It is difficult to argue from any given set of statistics that

taking the urban and the rural sector together, socio-economic back-

wardness now covers proportionately a greater section of the popula-

tion than it did in 1951. Either the Kaka Kalelkar estimate should be

shown to be a gross underestimation or the data on which the Mandal

Commission has based its calculations be made available before the

estimate of OBCs at 52Eo of rhe population can be accepted.

Looking at the methodology followed by the Mandal Commission

one can conjecture that its estimates of population could not be right,

even as an approximation. The Mandal Commission assumed that

different castes have enjoyed, over the last 50 years, the same rate ofgrowth as the all-India population. This is an impossible assumption

for several reasons. Between 1931 and 1981 the annual rate of

The Politics of Baclcwardness

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population growth has shown an increase. However, this increase hasbeen distributed unevenly between the states and a single nationalFrcentage for the OBCs would not be applicable to rh; unless irwas an average of the actual sizes of the OBC popul.ation in separatestates . Table I has been culled from part II-A of the General popula_tion Tables published by the 1981 census. The lggl census purtogether this special Table by taking the area of stales and unionterritories as found in 1981 and calculating the variation in each ten-year period since 1901. For our purposes it is sufficient to collate thedata since 1931.

Table I contains highly significant data. Since the Mandal Corn-mission nowhere explained the exact method used by it to calculatethe population, one has to assume that it used the average rate ofpopulation growth since l93l as a uniform standard applicable to allthe castevcommunities. This average rate works out to 1.98% perannum between l93l and 1981, this being the average of a rate whichvaried from l.42Vo btween 1931 and l94l to 25% between l97land 1981. A comparison will reveal how much of a gap there isbetween an average all-India rate of population growth and the ratesof growth applicable to different states in different decades.

Table II shows clearly that if the all-India rate of populationgrowth is applied to the states there would be an underestimation andoverestimation in different cases. Taking the overall, average, all-India rate alone, it would be seen that in 8 states the rate will be belowand in the rest above the all-India rate. Often. the difference issubstantial. For example, Gujarat had an average rate of growth of2.43Vo per annum between l93l and 1981. If the all-India rate of1.98% is applied, the population in Gujarat would be.underestimatedapproximately by 23%.In Tamil Nadu a similar procedure will yieldan overestimation of 2lvo. Since the base figures vary greatly accord-ing to the size and population density of a state, the percentagedifferences, which too will increase or decrease from decade todecade, also conceal immensely different magnitudes. It is incon-ceivable that a simple application of the all-India average rate ofpopulation growth would yield an accurate figure over 50 years,especially as it is being applied to different castes and social groups.

The second major shortcoming in the Mandal Commission Reportis that it entirely ignores differentials within the caste in the matter of

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population growth, income levels and educational attainments andfacilities. An interesting World Bank study of fertility decline inIndia argues that it is associated with factors that operate much moreat the level of regions, states and individual families than at the levelof social groups. A fall in mortality rates and better educationalattainment enabled parents both to make rational choices throughfamily planning and also persuaded them to limit the number ofchildren since education became a necessity for economic survival.The increase in wages of agricultural labour diminished the incomeof landowners forcing ihem to adopt fertility control. Wage increases

boosted the cash income of female daily-wage earners, raising theopportunity cost of their time spent in bringing up children (K.C.Zachariah and Sulekha Patel, Determinants of Fertility Decline inIndia: An Analysis, World Bank Staff Paper, No. 699). The obversecorollary of this hypothesis is that given sufficiently high farmerincome levels and labourer's wage levels, the need for family labourto undertake intensive cash cropping could lead to higher fertilityrates among owner-cultivator groups.

The first scenario of improved literacy producing a decline infertility is true of Kerala, whereas the second scenario of an enhancedneed for f4mily labour to undertake remunerative farming leading toa slightly'higher population growth inspite of improving standards ofeducation is to be seen in Gujarat. In either case, however, an in-crease in population would, at the same time, be accompanied by adecrease in social and educational backwardness. It is clear that the

Mandal Commission's figures of OBCs constituting 52% of thepopulation cannot be accepted and needs to be re-examined by acommittee which will have to design a survey method that will take

into account the complexities affecting calculation of population

growth in different states.

The additional questions which the report oI the Mandal Commis-

sion will have to answer when analyzed in detail, are best illustrated

from a close reading of several backward classes commission reports

from the states of Kamataka and Gujarat. It should be remembered

that when after prolonged debate and consideration it was decided by

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's govemment not to accept the Kaka Kalelkar

Commission Report (primarily because of its self-confessed weak

and unverified data base and unexplained adherence to caste as the


principal index of classifying the OBCs), the Cabinet also decided in

iuty t-lOt that the state governments should be free to appoint their

own commissions to make reservations for the backward classes'

both under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution' A more

systematic discussion of these reports will be attempted in a later

publication. Here one can pinpoint only typical problems which

show the need for a detailed and thoroughgoing enquiry'

One of the major paradoxes a researcher is bound to note when

reading successive reports of the backward classes commissions is

the abience of any effort by the later reports to delineate and explain

the differences from the earlier ones. In as much as the backward

classes commissions claim to base their decisions to grant privileged

concessions to certain groups on authentic sociological research and

not on any arbitrary dispensation, the contradictions between two

reports pertaining to the same area need to be explained and ac-

counted for, especially when they refer to key aspects of the issues

under consideration. The Backward Classes Commission in Kamataka

headed by L.G. Havanur took approximately five years to complete

its work (1972-77). Subsequently, due to objections raised by several

groups before the Supreme Court, the Karnataka government

appointed a Second Backward Classes Commission headed by

T. Venkataswamy in 1983. This commission submitted its report in

1986. Both the commissions conducted their own surveys and com-

puted their separate lists of OBCs. The determination of caste-wise

population by the Havanur Commission was made on the basis of a

sample survey i n 1972-73 selecting at least one village in each taluka,

one division or ward in each town municipality, two divisions in each

city municipality and four or five divisions in the city municipal

corporations throughout the state. Every individual in the selected

200 villages and 204 blocks was covered under the survey' The

Venkataswamy Commission undertook an even more comprehen-

sive door-to-door survey to enumerate the population of the state by

religion, caste, and subcaste and to study the existing socio-economic

and educational status of the communities. (Govemment of Kamataka,

Report of the Second Backward Classes Commission, vol. I, 1986'

pp.141-42.) A comparison with the earlier report was however not

made and when this exercise was undertaken it showed imponant

unexolained differences, some of which will be mentioned in this


paper.

^ Quile clearly, despite its declared intention, the VenkataswamyCommission did not undertake a comprehensive state_wide, door_to_door survey. According to its own estimate published in Annexure9.2 of_vol. III of the Report, whereas the Karnataka State populationaccording to the 1981 census was 37,135,j14 at the 1971_ l gg l rateof growtlr, by 1984 it should have been 3g,920,gg3. The acrualpopulation according to the caste-wise socio-educational survev con_ducted by the Commission in 1984 was only 36,124,594 o, 232Eoless than the figure reported by the 19gl census and 9.l57o less thanthe figure projected on the basis of the lggl census for 19g4. Thisdifference is neither acknowledged nor explained in the text of thereport. A comparison with the Havanur Commission Report showsthat one possible reason, when compared to the lgTZ survey, is that8 castes with a scheduled caste component, had been included in theOBC list and were later transferred from it. The population of these8 castes was 6,42,533. But when tle two OBC lists were comparedin detail it was found that the Venkataswamy Commission had alto_gether omitted another 39 castes which. had no scheduled caste com_ponent and whose populati on in 19'12 was g,42,221. Among thesewere substantially numerous castes like the yadavas (4,46,993),Hanbar (34,001), Kodaga (82,271), Kolayam (ZO,97g) and Koracha(20,164). Again, no mention of this fact was found in theVenkataswamy Commission's report, much less an explanation of it.Considering that the population figure produced by the l9g4 socio_educational survey (36,124,594) was the basis for its recommenda_tions, any future report cannot be considered complete unless anduntil the following conditions are met: (a) a rigorous comparison ismade with the previous reports on the Other Backward Classescommissions to explain differences in assumptions, survey methodsand actual data collected; and (D) the data itself are sent to all therelevant experts, those interviewed by the commission and otherassociated persons for their comments, and those comments are thenconsidered and acted upon before finalizing the report. By implica-tion those reports, e.g., the Mandal Commission and the Venkata_swamy Commission reports against which major objections can beraised should not be accepted unless new commissions have re_examined their data.


In continuation of the general criticism of the methodology adopted

by several commissions, it might also be pointed out that there has as

yet not emerged any standard means of setting up a scale of indices

to measure social and educational backwardness. In its judgement in

the famous Balaji case, the Supreme Court had held that if a particu-

lar community is to be treated as educationally backward, the diver-

gence between its educational level and that of the state average

should not be marginal but substantial. The court considered 50%

divergence to be acceptable. It cited the example of Bihar, where

according to the l97l census, the percentage of illiteracy was 807o.

If only those whose social group has a 50% divergence from tle state

average were to be considered educationally backward then no one inBihar could be said to be educationally backward since in order to be

so, l2OVo members of a caste/class would have to be illiterate.The Mandal Commission decided first of all to select about a

dozen castes well known for their social and educational backward-ness from among its own survey in a state and use the average oftheirlevel of achievement as the minimum divergence from the state

average. For instance, one of the indicators for social backwardness

is the rate of student dropouts in the age group 5-15 yeius tls com-pared to the state average. As a result of the above tests it was seen

that in educationally backward castes this rate is atleast 25 per cent

above the state average. Further, it was also noticed that this devia-

tion of 25Va from the state average in the case of most of the

'indicators' gave satisfactory results. In view of this, wherever an

indicator was based on deviation from the state average, it was fixedat 25Vo, because a deviation of 50% was seen to give wholly unsat-

isfactory results and at times to create anomalous situations. Thisshould perhaps be considered one of the more enduring contributionsmade by the Mandal Commission to the OBC survey methodology.

The one fuli-scale report on backward classes after the publication

of the Mandal Commission Report was the Venkataswamy Commis-

sion Report in Karnataka. It was a bit of a regression in this case

because instead of adopting the principle of divergence from the state

average, the Venkataswamy Commission constructed a schedule ofindices in terms of which any deviation above the state average was

considered a sufficient qualification for backwardness. For instance,

the state average for those not owning any house in Kamataka was


l3.llVo and for those owning only kuchha houses was 36.52Vo. Anycaste/recognised social group, which registered a percentage higherthan this scored one point on the scale of backwardness. Out of 17such indices, ifa group scored 9 or more it was considered backwardand 8 or less it was considered forward. Quite clearly, the practice oftaking a single given figure as the average means that the marginalcases on either side of this limit have to be, in a sense, arbitrarilyclassified. Out of the thirty-nine Hindu castes. and five non-Hinducommunities listed by the Venkataswamy Commission, six had anexact score of 9, three had a score of 10. six had a score of I I andseven had a score of 12. Among those listed as forward, four had ascore of 8, six had a score of 7 and nine had a score of 6. Anotherthirteen castes were assessed on a scale of 18-20 points, an exceptionwhich raised doubts about the reason for the special treatment awardedto them. A small exercise was done taking the absolute percentagesagainst each caste and in the case of the castes listed as backwardsubtracting 3Vo and in the case of the castes listed as forward adding3Vo, to see if this range made a differe4ce to their classification. Outof a sample of nine castes it was seen that four castes classified as

forward would revert to the backward category if the 3Eo range wereapplied to them and one caste with a score of 9 would move over tothe forward category. Clearly, the principle propounded by the Su-preme Court and upheld by the Mandal Commission that a diver-gence of 5OVo or 25Vo fromthe state average should be the criteria fordetermining backwardness is more definitive and ought to be used inplace of a single average figure. The same principle is to be appliedin the case of a yardstick like the number of students passing theSSLC or High School exam in a given year being used as a measurefor assessing the educational backwardness of a caste. A one-yearaverage is not a decisive index to the cumulative stock of SSLC passwithin a caste-group and it is this latter ratio or proportion whichought to be estimated in the course of a socio-educational survey.

The general trend has been to use caste as one among manyindices to assess backwardness. There are several difficulties inconcretizing the use of caste as a criterion of backwardness to whichattention needs to be drawn. One of the most basic difficulties, whichwas mentioned as early as the 1931 census in great detail, is thegrowing dissociation between traditional occupation and caste. As


Table III shows, based on the Imperial Tables of the 1931 census of

the 23 castes for whom all-India data is given in 1931' on|y 33% on

an average continued to depend mainly on their traditional occupa-

tion. In ih" "ur"

of Bhats and Chamars only 7 '77o were wholly

dependant on their traditional occupation whereas for the Jat cultiva-

tors this figure was 657o' for the weavers 337o, fot the potters 37%'

This table ieveals the great need for a fresh enquiry into the relation-

ship between caste and occupation in today's circumstances in order

to understand how the process of the growth of a modern economy

has affected vital aspects of the caste system'

It is surprising tLat most of the surveys commissioned by the

various baciward classes commissions have not undertaken to exam-

ine the existing relationship between caste and occupation' The Mandal

Commission Report assumed a more or less static and unchanging

relationship between caste and social structure but the data it sought

to collect did not even seek to answer the questions contained in its

definition of caste' On page 16 it produced its definition of caste'

According to the Mandal Commission Report, "When dealing with

the living social reality what counts is not the fine metaphysical

concepts embodied in great religious works of a people but the

homeipun ideas that have percolated into the consciousness of the

masses and become a part of their world view." One of the homespun

ideas it propounded was: "In this sense the caste system hirs meant a

divisionof Hindu society into numerous isolated castes and jatis who

marry among themselves, dine among themselves and broadly pur-

sue iraditional occupations." (Mandal Commission Report, vols' Iand II, 1980 p.16.) Yet neither the data collected, nor the indicators

used under the heading for social and educational backwardness,

touched on any of these points. The eleven indicators used were

classified as follows:

A. SocialI . CasteVclasses considered as socially backward by others'

2. Castes/classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their

livelihood.3. Castes/classes where at least 25'% females and l07o males

above the state average get manied at an age below 17 years in rural

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4. Castes/classes where participation of females in work is at least25Vo above the state average.

B. Educational5. CasteVclasses where the number of children in the age group

of5-15 years who never attended school is at least 25Vo above thestate average.

6. Castes/classes where the rate of student dropout in the agegroup of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the state average.

7. Castes/classes amongst whom the proportion of matriculates isaI least 25Vo below the state averase.

C. Economic8. Castes/classes where the average value of family assets is at

least 25Vo below the state average.9. CasteVclasses where the number of families living in kuchha

houses is at least 25Va above the state average.10. CasteVclasses where the source of drinking water is beyond

half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the households.I l. CasteVclasses where the number of households having taken

consumption loan is at least 25Vo above the state average.Subsequently all the social indicators were given a weightage of

three points each; educational indicators a weightage of two pointseach and economic indicators a weightage of one point each.

What is noteworthy is the fact that none of the indicators touchedupon the three features earlier said to be the defining characteristicsof the caste system namely marriage within the jati, inter-caste din-ing, and traditional occupations. Instead within the criterion 'social'the indicators used were such that they could not easily tell us muchabcut backwardness. The first criterion,-Castes/classes consideredas socially backward by others-is so relative that it could apply tomost castes. In local terms sub-castes are arranged in an hierarchicalorder and in terms of formal language such usage characterizing acaste as being below your own persists long after economic andsocial practice has destroyed any real hierarchy. Every sub-castewould be considered backward by the one theoretically occupying aposition above it. The second ofthe social indices pertains to "Castes/classes which mainly depend on manual labour for their livelihood".


Now with the decrease in the phenomenon of landlordism and a slow

rise in the wages of agricultural labourers since 1947 two tendencies

have grown stronger--owner-cultivation with a greater'involvement

of family labour and the opportunity for agricultural labourers to

work. Hence the incidence of manual labour in agriculture has gone

up. Such manual labour unlike that of the Bhangis or bonded labour

is economically rewarding and hence enables one to live a better life'

even to educaie one's children. It cannot be counted as a factor of

backwardness. The third criterion is even less related to caste al-

though it does provide a measure for indicating backwardness' This

is concerning casteVclasses where at least 25Vo females and 1O%

males above the state average get married at an age below 17 years

in rural areas and at least 107o females and 57o males do so in urban

areas. Now clearly there is very little evidence to show that marriage

at an early age is determined by caste. It is much more determined by

education, the need for children to participate in family work or

income mobilization, and one's individual belief in ritual and reli-

gion. These factors are not in all cases determined by caste' The

iemaining eight criteria are either educational or economic and once

again, not related to caste.

The contradiction between the desire to use caste as a means oI

assessing backwardness and the inability to use it in any concrete

manner is to be seen in the survey design of the Venkataswamy

Commission Report which is the latest among the backward classes

commission reports. A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme

Court has recently proposed the use of a caste-cum-means criteria for

assessing backwardness. According to the authors, "we laud and

appreciate it (caste-cum-means criteria) as a vital landmark in the

march of the Other Backward Classes towards social justice and

social equality." (Report of the Karnataka Second Backward Classes

Commiision,vol. I, 1986.) Admirable as this desire might seem, it is

a revelation to compare the questions actually asked during its survey

by the Venkataswamy Commission Report. One then discovers that

out ofthe 17 criteria that were applied to collect data, not one refered

to the three characteristics considered fundamental by the Mandal

Commission in defining the caste system : inter-caste marriage, inter-

caste dining and traditional occupation. The indices were divided into

negative and positive aspects. In the case of the negative aspects, if a


group scored above the state average it was an indication of back_wardness and in the case of the positive aspects this happened whenit scored a percentage below the state average. The two indices. eachunder the rubric of negative and positive social aspects respectively,were whether families belonging to specific castes were houselesVsiteless, resided in kuchha houses and those residing in pa*&a housesand the share of the caste living in urban areas. The rest ofthe indicesonce again, were concerning economic assets, educational achieve_ments, and facilities and share in government employment. (Govem_ment of Kamataka, Report of thz Second Backward Classes Commis-sion, vol. II, Annexure 9.6.)

This great ambiguity between the use of the word caste and thetotal absence of empirical criteria for making use of it according to itsacceptable sociological definition raises an important question abouthow to interpret the word 'socially' in the Constitution, which refersto "socially and educationally backward classes." Clearly, the ques_tion is not whether a list of OBCs is written down and published inthe form of a list of castes to whom an income criterion is thenapplied, as happens now. The issue is whether in concrete empiricalterms, one can measure or specifu backwardness caused by caste inthe case of the OBCs and what weight is given to such indices.Clearly, if we try and use the three criteria suggested by the MandalCommission, namely inter-caste marriage, inter-caste dining and tra_ditional occupation, these would not be able to provide an empiricalmeasurre of comparative social backwardness. Either ways are sug_gested of using these criteria empirically or alternative ways ofassessing social backwardness caused by caste are thought of anddata collected by future surveys of Other Backward Classes. Alterna_tively, a likely option is that if no merhods are found ro relatebackwardness to caste, the OBC lists are entirely drawn up in futureaccording to occupation, where social backwardness is seen in termsof indices referring to education, income, assets, languages spoken,travel, share of female employment outside of the home, age ofmarriage, access to entertainment, etc. Some of these indices havenot been used by the OBC commissions in the past but will berelevant, especially in regions where rural development has or willprovide many villagers with facilities now mainly available to urbandwellers.


The inability to really make use of the caste criterion led the

Karnataka government, after it had rejected the recommendations ofthe Venkataswamy Commission Report, to give priority to the in-

come criterion. The Government Order specifying the groups ofOBCs separately under Article l5(4) and under Article 16(4) listed

Groups A to E as shown in Table IV below:

Table IVList of OBCs according to Kamataka Government Order in force

since 13 October, 1986

BackwardClass

UnderArticleIs (4)

UnderArtick16 (4)

Income limit underboth Articles

Group AGroup BGroup CGroup DGroup E(Backward Special)TonI

5%l57ot6%9%5%

50%

5%l39o16%1r%5%

5OVo

No income limitRs 10,000Rs 10,000Rs 10,000

Rs 8,000

iV.B.: 1. Group A refers to Backward Tribes.

2. Income refers to family income of the citizens and hiVher parens/legal

guardians.

3. Limit of reservations for OBCs at 50% in addition to the quota for SCJSTs.

What determines the individual's qualification for being able touse the reservation is not caste-determined criteria in this case but an

income-determined criteria, virtually applicable to the entire popula-

tion subject to a means test. This is especially so because Group Erefers to the Backward Special Group which according to the

Karnataka govemment order "shall consist of the following citizens:(i) an actual cultivator;(ii) an artisan;(iii) a petty businessman;(iv) one holding an appointment either in Govemment service or

corresponding services under private employment including casual

labour; and


_(u) any person self-employed or engaged in any occupation in_

volving manual labour." (Karnataka Government Order No. SWL 66BCA 86, Bangalore, l3rh October, 1986.)

There is no caste qualification as far as the Backward SpecialGroup is concerned. It is to be considered why then there was still aneed to list the castes separately in the OBC list. perhaps in Kamatakathere is a tradition of having caste associations. As the analysis in thefollowing section would show, the reach of these caste associations isoften limited to the economically well-off sections of the castes. Inthis sense it is difficult to make caste into a mass issue and as anidentity, its mobilizing power evokes a greatly diminishing responseat the popular level (when one is talking of millions of people) thanit does when one is talking of the elite groups, especially at the locallevels and in the rural areas (when one is referring to hundreds orthousands of persons). The existence of the Congress and otherparties as all-India organisations has already struck hard at the use ofcaste identities and groups. The emergence of regional political par-ties in India and their substantial success in mobilizing voter support,cutting across caste and other ethnic groups reveals the growingstrength of identities other than caste. The region as a developmentalunit within the nation is gaining a more extensive place in popularconsciousness above that of tbe more localized identities like caste.

This consciousness is quite different from that of the region initself, which was more typical of the princely states of nineteenthcentury India. This is a factor that should be taken into account bythose political leaders who might be tempted to see the issue ofexpanding reservations for the OBCs as a means of winning thepolitical support of "the backward castes". It must after all be remem-bered that many caste associations have been set up at the initiativeof political leaders. It was during the tenure of Devraj Urs as chiefminister of Karnataka that economic and administrative facilitieswere extended for the organisation of associations ofbackward castesand more than thirty such new organisations sprang up. If Devraj Urshad hoped to create a long-term base of social or political supportthen he was to be sadly disillusioned. Once again, the issue raised bythe electoral dimension of political behaviour of people leads us backto the relevance of caste, either as an indicator of backwardness or asa powerful lever of mass identification which must continually be


forced upon issues like that of defining the 'socially and education-

ally backward classes'. The question of caste needs to be examined

separately before deciding on whether or not to dispense with itentirely in the context of classifying the Other Backward Classes.

Another aspect of social reality which weakens the argument

about listing entire caste groups as backward entities is the intemal

economic and educational differentiation within the caste groups.

The difference in economic conditions, assets and educational stan-

dards between castes would be evident when one examines the socio-

economic data put together by any of the backward classes commis-

sions. Take the example of the tables published in the Report of the

Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission in Gujarat.

The difference between the average figures shown for various castes

reveals how those classified as backward castes themselves have

widely differing standards. Each household belonging to the Ghanchi

caste spent Rs 4615 per household, while for the Rajputs this figure

was Rs 3393, for the Bhois Rs 2871 and for the Bajania Rs 1318,

even while all these cirstes were classified as backward.The range of expenditure within the caste group wds further

indicative of internal economic differentiation, as the following Table

of selected castes shows:

Table VAverage, Minimum and. Maximwn Annual Expenditureper Household belonging to Select Castes in Gujarat

Narne ofCaste

AnnualTonI

ExpenditurePer HH in Rs

Ann rul Exp e nditure Ran g e

Minimum Maximum

Brahmin (F)Darji (B)Kanabiheva (F)

Rajput (B)Bajania (B)Bhoi (B)Ghanchi (B)

4,0703,8304,2243,3931,3182,87r4,615

1207to

I,100120350250

1,330

18,50015,75013,21O13,900

4,1502,850

10,750

N.B.: (F) Forward, (B) Backward.

Such intemal differentiation marked all tle castes, including the

70

scheduled castes and tribes.range was as follows:

The Politics of Baclcwardness

For these two categories the income

Annual EryenditureCaste/Group

Scheduled CastesScheduled Tribes

Minimum Maximum

36,2m7,350

Source: Repon of the Socially and E&rcationally Bactcward Classes Com-tnissiion, Gujarat, 1976, vol. tr, Appendix XXIX.

These data show that without an income crit€ria, merely includingthe entire caste group as backward hides severe income inequalities.In the case of the scheduled castes and tribes where a collective socialidentity is morc developed because of the cultural deprivations likeuntouchability, non-inclusion within Hinduism etc., the bener-offmight still suffer from psychological and social stigma and com-plexes. They would then need the support of their ethnic grcrups andwould act to give them real leadership on the assumption that withouta substantial number of their group achieving a higher status, theirown social isolation would not be easily overcome. It is this distinctstatus of visible group deprivation of a social and culnrral type whichdistinguishes the scheduled casteytribs from the other backwardcastes. As one had argued earlier in the case of the OBCs, thecommission rcports so far have failed to establish qmte-governed

deprivation as being applicable to "socially and educationally back-ward classes", and this is especially true of the surveys conducted bythe Mandal Commission and the Venkataswamy Commission. Ifcaste is not shown to be the cause of backwardness, the case forapplying only cultural, economic and educational criterion to identifythe backward classes is greatly strengthened.

A quick survey of the kind of criteria prevailing in the states thathave sanctioned rcservations for the OBCs shows that most of themalrcady specify an economic criterion. Only, it is applied to specifiedcastes who are not represented within the educational set-up and thegovernment services, in proportion to their population. The applica-tion of the income criterion in most states has been chosen without anexplanation being given about it and has been made to change againwithout a proper justification on a number of occasions. The Mandal

3,191

t923230zto

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes '11

Commission did not specify any income criteria' Instead' it estimated

the value of family u""t' und the proportion of families taking

t *r"ttofO "onrumition

loans' Clearln the first criterion' namely t}te

""f""-"f r"*'y urr"t, is a difficuit rule to apply in the case of

i""r*"ra goois and the chances of wrong reporting are far greater

il;;;;";;t" of current familv income' It is also not legitimale to

iisi all famities taking household consumption loans' since the value

;il;;";"t varieJgreatly from one household to another' Hence'

an income criterion should be used'

A summary of income criteria being applied in different states has

U*" p.""ia"i Uy Marc Galanter (Marc Galanter ' Competing Equali'

,irtt to* and the Backward Classes in India' Table 20)' It is neces-

,urv to "onriO"r

this data as a starting point for-an analysis of the

inc'ome criteria to be used in classifying the OBCs'

Table VI

Income Criteria for the Other Bachttard

Classes: A ProfiIe

State Year Name ofGrouP

Estimate of OBC

Population as

share of Total

1. AndhraPradesh

2. Bihar

r97s (, BC(ii) Econom-

icallYBC

1979 BC

92 listed 56w

castes/

communitiesAll with incomeunder Rs 1500

Member of list Sovo

of 128 castes/

communities whose

annual income rs

less than Rs l200oi-

82 listed communities N'A'

All with incomeunder Rs 4800

annually

1978 BC

19'12 F-cono-

micallYBC

3. Gujarat


4. Jammu &Kashrnir

Sociallyand Edu-cationallyBC

BC GroupA

Group B

l. Occupations2. 19 communities3. Border and

poor areas

42 BackwardTribes: No incomelimit

95 castes:

Within them thosehaving an annualincome of Rs 10000

5 communities:Within them thosehaving an annualincome of Rs 10000

I castes:

Within them thosehaving an annualincome ofRs 10000

5 occupations:Within them thosehaving an annualincome of Rs 8000

1973

5. Kamataka 1986

N.A.N.A.

8%

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

Group C

Group D

Group E

1979 0) Bc

(ll) Economi-cally BC

1977 Sociallyand Edu-cationallyBC

List of 16 communi- 45goties, 129 castes

and 62 tribes

All with annualincome underRs 4800

Members oflisted communi-ties with incomeless than Rs 10000

N.A,

6. KeralaN,A.

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes IJ

1972 Sociallyand Edu-cationallyBC

19',10 BC

oBc

Members of listed

communities withincome less than

Rs 6000

Members of 560listed communi-ties with income

less than Rs 8000

list of communities

list of 105communities

list of 58

communities

N.A.

N.A.

1. Maharashtra 1966

Tamil Nadu 1972

N.A.

51%

N.A.

BC

9. Uttar 1978 BCPradesh

Based on Marc Galanter, op. cit., Table 20, and Kamataka Govemment

Order of 13 October, 1986.

Although Marc Galanter has provided the data on the income

criteria actually being used in states, he has said nothing on why tleseare so different or why they have been changed over time. The

discrepancies in the known statistics for wages show that often the

figures are far higher than those prevailing for jobs categorized as

badly paid. Recently, the Labour Ministers' Conference in Delhirecommended a minimum wage of Rs 11 per day for agricultural

workers. With this as the base ii can be seen that in a state like Biharthe annual income of an agricultural labourer would be Rs 3960. Inactual practice, as one knows, the wages paid are often much less

than this and so the limit of Rs 12,000 per annum which has been put

as a maximum criteria for the backward classes contains several other

income levels above that of the agricultural labourers. According toexhaustive data compiled by the Ministry of Labour, the wage rates

of unskilled labour provides a good basis for assessing the income

criterion set up for the backward classes in different states. There is

a need to review these income criteria and justify a new one on the

ground that it actually covers the educationally backward.In Kamataka the wage rate mentioned by the Ministry of Labour

on 30.1.1985 was Rs 9.50 to Rs 14.00 per day, acgording to class of


work and type of land. This gives us an annual income range of Rs342O to Rs 5040. By comparison, the cutoffpoints for mosr groups ofbackward classes under the latest scheme of the Karnataka Govem_ment is Rs 10,000. This is three times the lower figure for unskilledlabour and twice the highest salary given to artisans, handicraftsmen,etc. In many of the states there are no income criteria applicable, forexample, Andhra Pradesh in lg1.1 and Gujarat. Exact istimates ofOBC population are also not available in Gujarat, Jammu and Kash_mir, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and several other states. At the vervleast an enquiry is . alled for to determine the OBC population inthose states wherc a reservation system already exists. Such a de_mand is likely to arise in the future as this is one of the questionswhich groups excluded from the OBC list or individuals unable tomake use of the reservation system could well ask. It also needs to beanswered purely from the view of estimating the actual extent ofsocial and educational backwardness and the economic poverty whichis related to it.

SECTION V

Policy Perspec-tives for the Future

The question of policy about reservations, as far as the backwardclasses are concemed, is whether one should argue for an expansionof the reservation system, for cutting down its size, for freezing it atcertain levels, for its abolition or for other reforms within it to makeit more effective as a means of promoting social equality, withoutprovoking a breakdown of social consensus. It is important to ask thisquestion now because conflicts over the reservation issue add to otherconflicts like terrorism and communalism, which already threaten tofracture the Indian polity. Besides, the system of reservations had atone time, especially in the latter half of the 1960s and the whole of1970s, appeared to many political leaders and policy makers as animportant means of providing an escalator for representatives ofdeprived social groups or of those with nascent economic wealth butwithout a significant presence in the administration or in the educa-tional world. If political leaders had taken the lead in establishing orextending the reservation system for the OBCs expecting to build a

Reservatiorc Pohcy for Other Backward Classes '15

stable politicat base, their calculations have proved to be wrong' In

every national election and major state election, those who have been

ctasiitieO as OnCs have shown the calmcity and the will to take their

own decisions. They have often been influenced by other identities

and other issues. In so far as reservations provide jobs only to a few

persons among a particular social group, their usefulness as an av-

inue of patronage or reward is very limited. This is especially so

because the cohesion of social groups like sub'castes-a cohesion

assumed by certain schools of sociology-never really existed' and ifit did it has now been greatly loosened by a variety of factors like

language, region, occupation and income, which tend to influence

different members of these groups differently.One kind of political opinion advocates eschewing any discussion

or research on the subject of the reservation system in the hope that

this will prcvent notice being taken of its shorrcomings. This is

shortsighted for it overlooks the real social factors which will con-

tinue to force a discussion about the manner in which the system ofreservations is working and the limits that should be imposed on it so

as to prevent it fKrm disrupting the social consensus that has charac-

terized its operation for a long time. It is only when these factors are

highlighted that it becomes obvious why the reservations issue is

likely to be of political relevance for sonrc time to come.

The four states where, in the last year, there has been a vigorous

discussion about the future course of the OBC reservation system (as

well as protests against attempts at expanding it or excluding groups

already included in the OBC list) are Gujarat' Kamataka, Andhra

Pradesh and Kerala. In addition, during the last several years' the two

states where there have been protests against the expansion of the

OBC rcservation system and the operation of a reserved seat system

for the scheduled castes are Bihar and Maharashtra. One common

observable feature in all these six states is that although they have a

varying rate of literacy, the nunSer of colleges and the students

enrolled within them are far above the all-India average.

The key ratios to look at are those concerning the total number ofstudents. In Kerala, the number of students in colleges is l27o less

than the all-India average. In Andhra Pradesh it\s'llVo higher, in

Bihar it is 43% higher, in Gujarat it is 28% higher, in Karnataka62%o

and in Maharashtra 148% higher than the all-India average. In Kerala'


Table VIIRates of Uterocy and Pattem of Higher

Education in Several StatesState/An-India

%lite-rote

Totalt98I

%lite-rare

Urban1981

%lite-rate

RuraIr981

Nunberof Colleges

Arts, Science& Commerce

1961 Total19$n4

TotalNwnber

ofCollegestudents

1983/84

All-India

Aveiageper state

Andhrahadesh

57.2 29.6 5246 3359323

zso 159968

420 273176

473 22844r

28s 204697

498 259804

184 140226

693 397280

3652

174

28729.7 5l.l 23.2

Bihar 26.1 51.9 22.3 331

Gujarat 43.8 60.3 36.3 l9l

Kamataka 38.4 56.4 3 t.l 314

Kerala 69.2 75.0 67.8 128

Maharashtra 47.O 63.8 38.0 472Source: l- Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census of

India, 1981, Series l, India, paper 3, provisional population Totals, Workersand Non-Workers, 1981.

2. University Grants Commission Report, l9t3l84

although the number of students enrolled in colleges is less than thealllndia average, the rclatively greater numbers in the schools makeup for this deficiency. It stands to reason that in these states thenumber of educated job seekers will tend to be higher than in otherstates or the all-India average. This fact is confirmed by a look at thestatistics compiled by the Economic Monitoring Service of the Com_merce Research Bureau in Bombay. These are reproduced in theTable VIII:

Resertatioru Policy for Other Backward Classes 7'1

Table VIIIJob Seekers Registered with Employment Exchanges

(as on June 30, 1980 except where speciJied otherwise)

(In thousands)

States/AUIndia

Matic Grad.uates

ann includingabove post-

but Sraduatesbelow

Toml Unskilledmanual

labourersand others

Toml Jobof all seekers

Job u; onSeelcers May 3 I,

1985

All-India 5882 1415 7297 78'73

Averageper srate 196 47 243 262

AndhraPradesh &uP 487.6 ll4 601.6 714.4

Bihar 594.6 ll7 711.6 1504.4

Gujarat 217 42.3 259.2 118.8

Kamatata 287.2 76.1 363.3 206.7

Kerala 639 71.8 7ll 657

Maharashtra 493.2 l0l 594 539

1517 Ul19

8065l

1316 2218

22t6 2650

448 652

570 8ll

1368 2461

tt34 2102

Source: Commerce Research Bureau, Borlll,zy, October, 1986-

Basic Statistics on State Economies of IndiaThe number ofjob seekers shows the great pressure that exists on

the economy to provide jobs or some form of self-employment- Forthose who consider themselves unemployed the sight of more jobs

being reserved for specific categories is much less acceptable tlanthe feeling that they have won or lost through a system of open

competition. Indeed, our system of education has not been closely

geared to the specific manpower needs of the economy and is there-

fore likely to produce a surplus of the wrong kind of degree holders.

The psychology of the unemployed is not to demand reservations, but


to resist its expansion or demand the application of cultural, educa_tional and economic criteria that are not limited by caste. A goodexample of such a reaction is the loss in popularity suffered by theCongress-led government in Kerala when ii did not implement itsinitial promise to provide a 15% reservation in schools, on the basisof only economic criteria. It would be an interesting exercise to carryout an opinion survey among the job seekers on their view of thlfunction and the future of the reservations system. No such surveyshave been made so far. One of the elementary facts such u .u*"ymay be expected to discover is the spread of educated job seekersover all the different social, religious and linguistic groups.

Another important reason why the reservation issue is going toremain in focus politically is related to the question of how thepopulation of the backward classes has been estimated so far. Ac-cording to the information supplied by the central govemrnent rnin-istries and departments to the Mandal Commission, the latter esti-mated that the OBCs constitute 1255% of the toral number of gov-emment employees, whercas tbeir aggegate population is 52%. Theirrepresentation in Class I jobs is only 4.69%,i.e., less than l/lfth oftheir proportion to the country's total population. (Mandal Commis-sion Report, vols. I and II, 1980, page 63.) As has been shown atlength in this paper, the estimates of OBC population, both ar thenational and state levels, are subject to varying but definite and oftensignificant margins of error. Clearly, if the estimates of OBC popu-Iation themselves are questionable, then to say that only 12% ofOBCs are govemment employees and compare them against anerroneous population estimate is equally mistaken. Until and unless areliable estimate of OBC population is provided, other calculationsbased on such an estimate too will be suspect. The same observationmay be made about the more detailed estimates which are oftenprcsented by Members of Parliament during the course of variousdebates. For example, during the discussion on the Mandal Commis-sion Report in the Rajya Sabha in October 1982 one Member ofParliament prcsented a set of staristics Clable IX) which clairned toshow the relative position of differcnt categories in various classifiedservices.

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Classes

Table IXRelative position of various categories in Central

Govemment Senices as presented by an honourable MP

to the RajYa Sabha in October 1982

Scheduled Castes Other Baclcward Classes

79

Class I

Class II

Class III & IV

Total Services

7 .187o

13.569o

30.9SVo

16.837o

2.59%

3.98%

8.4t%

4.83Vo

Source: Parliamenary Proceedings, Parliament Library, vol XXIV, 11-15

october 1982, pp. 249-50.

The claim made in the above table cannot be a credible one so long

as the actual basis for classifying the backward classes is unavailable.Whereas the MP had claimed that only 4.837o of all Central Govern-

ment employees belong to the OBCs, the Mandal Commission had

estimated this to be 12.55Vo. Clearly, such discrepancies arise be-

cause in order to strengthen the claims of the backward classes manypolitical leaders are often prepared to use statistics that underestimate

the actual extent of representation of the backward groups.

There is a great need, if the future of the reservation system is to

be properly assessed, for a more exdct estimate of the population ofthe backward classes. A committee of social scientists based at the

Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, capable of taking dn objec-tive view and working in tandem with the official machinery of the

l99l census n€eds to be set up by the central government, to definethe national criteria for determining the exact population of the

backward classes, as per the intent of Articles l5(4) and l6(4) and re-

examine the Mandal Commission Report, since it is still under con-sideration by the government. The scope of the committee need not

be to set up reservation quotas but simply to clarify and settle, among

other issues, the controversy regarding the population estimates ofOBCs nationally. This should be done at the national level and instates where they are already recognized by the govemment and

should cover central govemment services, as well as different levels


of the educational system. The report of such a committee will be auseful source of information for discussing welfare schemes of schol-arships, loans and reservations meant for the backward classes. Thecommittee itself may function in liaison with the Ministry of Welfareor that of Human Resource Development, who could provide therequired facilities and information.

Another area of reservation policy where guidelines issued by thecentral government or by Parliament in the form of an amendment toArticles 15(4) and 16(4) is needed is to specify rhe maximum limitfor rescrvation quotas, with a provision for enforcing it by a certaindate. While the state govemments will be free as before to determinethe composition of the backward classes, this general limit shouldprovide a barrier after which selection may only take place on thebasis of merit. The reason why such a limit was not prescribed by theIndian Constitution makers is unclear. The intention to do so wasclear enough in the summing up of Dr B.R. Ambedkar, as wasmentioned in Section II of this paper. Dr Ambedkar had said that inall cases reservations should refer to a minority of posts, or else theywould clash with the constitutional provision to provide equality ofopportunity to all citizens.

Some time after the Constitution was enacted, the Supreme Court,in the famous Balaji case, ruled that reservations for scheduled castes/tribes and the Other Backward Classes together should not be morethan fifty per cent of the total available seats. Since it was a ruling ofthe Supreme Court and not enforceable by law, for some time it wasobserved by all the states. Soon enough, the 5OVo barrier was crossedand today Karnataka reserves 68Vo of seats and jobs for SC/ST/OBCs, Kerala 54%,'tamil Nadu also 687o, Andhra hades.h approxi-mately 43Vo, Jammu and Kashmir almost 507o, and Bihar close to5l%. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has tried torationalize this situation by advising, through a majority decision,that each state can fix its own quotas according to its specific condi-tions. This is an important revision and from the standpoint of theletter and spirit of the relevant constitutional provisions an unfortu-nate one, since it encourages pressures for the further expansion ofthe reservation system. The govemment can help to remedy thesituation by introducing the 50Vo limit as a part of the constitutionalprovisions themselves, emphasizing that a system of reservation must

Resemations Policy for Other Backward Classes 8l

function alongside that based solely on merit and not swallow the

latter altogether. The share of reservations allocated to the scheduled

castes and tribes in this rule should come first and the difference up

to 5OVo be proportionately divided according to the criteria used for

classifying the. backward classes. The case for such a constitutional

amend-ment is strengthened by the fact that despite estimating the

OBC populatio n at 52Vo the Mandal Commission recommended that

onty CTVI of the central government jobs be reserved for the OBCs'

This figure of 27Va was arrived at by deducting the 23Vo aheady

allocated to the SC/ST from the 507o limit prescribed by the Supreme

Court in its ruling in the Balaji case. A conference of different

political parties is needed to discuss and forge a consensus on the

issue of the 507o limit on reservations in all spheres as a whole' With

this 507o as the maximum limit, states can feel free to adjust the level

of reservations at the minimum possible, as per the existing social

consensus and demand. Such an arrangement will both be flexible

and have the additional merit of conforming to the known intentions

of the Indian Constitution makers to restrict the reservations system

to a minority share of available places.

Finally, a major policy issue regarding the system of reservations

as a whole is one of time limit, which may be a renewable one. Such

a time limit exists in the case of Article 340 where reservations ofpolitical seats in the legislatures for scheduled castes and tribes is

done every ten years. Many of the members of the Constituent

Assembly suggested a similar time limit for reservations as a whole.

According to them, a time limit, say of twenty years, would provide

an occasion for a comprehensive review of progress in the implemen-

tation of the reservation quotas and the extent to which they have

achieved the goal of social justice and equality. A strict enforcement

of the education and income criteria will automatically provide an

entry and exit point for members of a family entitled to use the

reservation system. Thought may be given to another kind of entry

and exit system. The Venkataswamy Commission had suggested that

those families who have used the reservation system for three genera-

tions may be disallowed the future use of reservation quotas for some

jobs and for college education. Such exclusion may be accepted if itis also provided that the right to avail of reservations can be restored

to families which have not used the reservation system for three


generatlons.

The provision and enforcement of an entry/exit/re_enrry sysremwould require a proper monitoring machinery as a part of thi regularadministration. The Ministries of Education or Human ResourceDevelopment may be entrusted with this task once it is agreed thatthere is need for an entry/exit system for individual families, and notgroups as a whole, since this allows the small numbers of reservedseatvjobs to b€ accessible to a growing number of families within thesame social group. With the growth in the numbers of the educatedjob seekers such an entry/exit system will prove popular. It wouldprobably face resistance from within those groupVfamilies who haveso far been able to use the system of reservations on a more continu-ous basis. In order that such resistance is not excessive and eventuallygives way to a social consensus, two steps could be advocated. Asearlier suggested, the direct descendants of those ;rho left the reser-vation system after having used it for a specified time could use itagain after a period of time, if they satisfy the income and orhercriteria for the users. Secondly, such provisions for entry/exit may beintroduced as a part of a package scheme for the welfare of thebackward classes, either in the form of an increase in the number ofscholarships or through schemes for giving loans, etc.

In tie present situation of a growing number of educated jobseekers, an expansion ofthe reservation quotas is not at all desirable.The present levels of reservation should either be reduced to at leastthe 5O% maximum limit earlier suggested or frozen at the existinglevel, thereby giving full scope to a system based on merit. Theintroduction of the reservation system into new areas should also beresisted since it offers a solution, if at all, to a tiny minority. If suchan extension becomes necessary as a concession it should be accom-panied by an entry/exit system from the outset. In today's circum-stances and those of the foreseeable future, programmes of increasedgrowth, increasing output and mass welfare rather than reservationsfor small numbers will meet the demands of the people. The adoptionof a statutory maximum limit of 5OVo for all reservations on an all-India'basis, an entry/exit system, a more rational criteria of classifi-cation and estimate of OBC population and a renewable time limitcan provide, as suggested above, a meaningful basis for attempting tobuild a political consensus on the reservations issue during the com-ing decade.

Appendix I

A Report from the Times of India, Delhi'Monday, August 3l,l9E7

Ending Untouchability: A Far Cry

The Commission on Scheduled Castes and Tribes in its sixth report plac€d

before Parliament has pointed out that the home ministry objective of July l97Eto remove untouchability in five years has remained "illusive".

The report for 1983-84 points out that the term 'tntouchability" has not been

defined in the Constitution or the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 underwhich cases of this kind are investigated. Though several crses are registercdmost of them remain infructuous because of doubts about the exact meaning ofthe term'tntouchability".

The commission is equally concemed about the large number of cases

regislered as well as acquitted. The cases are discharged because of failure torelat€ insults or attempts to insult on grounds of untouchability.

Because of the mandatory provision of imprisonment of at least one monthif the offence is established, even the rrial courts appear to hesitate in pronounc-ing anyone guilty. The courts, the rcport says, have no choice in choosing themode or the minimum duration of punishment.

lte report says caiegorically thatjustice is denied to the aggrieved-most ofthem belonging to the lowest socio-economic strata- No case goes beyond thetrial coun. Out of the 9249 cases with the trial courts in 1983, only l95O wereconsidercd by the courts and of these 1707 acquitted.

The commission wfote to seven states, where the number of cases acquittedis the highest, to ascertain the reasons for the high acquittal rate. Only TamilNadu and Kamataka responded. They said because of the delay in investigationby the police as well as delay in disposal ofcases by the court, the witnesses werewon over by the more powerful offenders. The commission has also b€en criticalof the calibre of the investigating police oflicials. Because of poverty, th€victims were unable to pursue their cases in the higher cours.

Only five states, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradeshand Bihar have set up special courts to deal with these cases. The commission

84 The potitics of Backwardness

has said unless such hearings are arranged within a week ofthe submission ofthechargesheet, the acquittal rate will continue to be high.

Though there is only a marginal increase in the total number of casesregistered under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, the rise has been alarming inA.P., Kerala, M.P-, Delhi and Pondicherry. In Delhi the number of cases regis-tered has risen by 266 per cent. The cases registered in Bihar, Gujarat, Kamataka,Maharashtra, Orissa, U.P., Goa, Daman and Diu have decreased.

The cases pending in the couts have risen from 4,545 i^ 1982 to 7,299 il1983. The number of cases acquitted is on a disturbingly high side. In 1980, 69per cent of the cases wete dismissed and in 1983 acquittal rate rose to 87 percent.

State govemments are said to be providing legal aid so that victims can seekjustice. Unfortunately, though legal aid has been announced by some states thenumbers receiving assistance is not known. Under the PCR Act almost everystate has set up a police cell to handle cases ofuntouchability but the commissionhas doubts as to \ hether such cells are really initiating cases.

The commission has asked the home ministry to review the FCR Act. It has

also called for a close look at the functioning of the special courts and policecells.


REFERENCES

A. Reports of ollicial Commissiolls on the Backward Classcs:

l. Report o! the First National Baclcward Class Convnission: Chairman"

Kaka Kalelkar. 3 vols, 1983, New Delhi.

2. Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commhsion: Chairman' B'P'

Mandal. Vols I to VII, 1980, New Delhi.

3. Report of the First Kanataka Backward Chsses Comtnission: Chairman'

L.G. Havanur. 4 vols, 1975, Bangalore.

4. Report of the Second Karnataka Baclowrd Classes Convnission" Chair-

man, T. Venkataswamy. 2 vols, 1986, Bangalore'

5. Repon of the Socially aad E&tcationally Bacl<ward Classes Commission,

Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1976.

6. Report of the Sociatty and Educationally Bacl<ward Classes (Second\

Commission, Gujarat State, 2 vols, 1983.

B. Parliamenlary PaPers:

l. Constituent AssemblY Debates:

(t 30-l l-1948 - Article 16 (4)(ii) 24-8-1949 - Article 330(iii) 14-10-1949 - Article 335

2. Lok Sabha Debates:

(i) 6-8-1977 Discussion Regarding Employment of Scheduled Castes and

Tribes.(ii) 2O-12-1977: Statement by Minister of Railways on Public Sector Em-

ployment of SgsT/oBC.(iii) 11-2-1982'. Debates on the Report of the Second Backward Classes

Commission under Rule 193.(iv) 13-10-1982: Vol. XXIV. Further Discussion on Second Backward Classes

Commission Report.

3. Rajya Sabha Debates:

(D 9-12-19'17: Half-an-hour discussion on points arising out of the answer

given to question regarding reservation of quota in Central Services for Back-

ward Classes and Minoritv Communities.


4. (tr) ll-10-1982 to 15-10-1982: Discussion on the need to imDlemenr theMandal Commission Report, vot. CXXIV.

C. Reports of the C.ensus Commissioner, Government of India:

(i) Cmsus of India, I93I Paill, vol. I, India Report, vol. VlI, India Report,vol. XIX, Baroda Report, Part I.

(ii) Census of India, 1961, vol. V, Gujarat, Part V-A.(iii) Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part IA.(iv) Census of India, 1981, Series -1, India, Pan II-A (i), Table A-2, pp. 573

to 5E4.(v) Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, Census oJ India,

1981, Series l, India Papers of 1981, Provisional population Totals, Workersand Non-Workers. 1981.

D. Other Government reports and publications:

(t Statement of Minimum Wages for Unskilled Workers as fixed by theCentral Govemment and Reported by the State Govemments as on lst January,1987, Ministry of Labour Library, New Delhi.

(ii) Univenity Grants Commission, Report for the Year 1983-84.(iid) Development Programme, l9E7-88, Planning Division, General Admin-

istration Depaiment, Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, February. 1982.

E. Non-Governnrent sources of statistical data:

li) Statistbal Outline of India, 19U, Tat^ Services Limited, Department ofEconomics and Statistics, Bombay.

(ii) Statistical Outline of Gujarat, 1963 Bureau of Economics and Statistics,Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar.

(iii) Basic Statistics on State Economies of India, Economic MonitoringService, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay, October 1986.

F, Unpublished dissertations, survey reports and papers:

(t) C.P. Barthwal, Safeguards for Scheduled Castes in the Indian Constitu-tion, and their Working, Ph.D. dissertation, Lucknow University, 1980, SocialSciences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.

(r;) Suma Chitnis, A Long way to Go . . . (Report on a Sumey of ScheduledCaste High School and College Students in Fifieen Sntes of India). SocialSciences Documentary Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.

(,rr) Victor S. D'Souza, Structural Constraints on Development: Thz Case ofScheduled Castes in India, XlWorLd Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, l8-22August 1986, Symposium II, Session-4.

(iv) Morton Weinfi eld, Counting Racial Minoities and Afirmative Action in

Reservations Policy for Other Backward Clnsses 87

Canada. Xl World Congress of Sociology, New Delhi, 18-22 August, 1986,

section on Ethnic, Race and Minority Relations.

G. Books:

l. B.A.V. Sharma/K. Madhusudhan Reddy, eds., Reservation Policy inIndra. Hyderabad: 1980.

2. B. Shiva Rao, ed., The Fmming of India's Constiturton, vol.lY.3. Constiturion of India-1981 (Allahabad Publication).4. Craig Baxter, District Voting Trends in lzdia. New Delhi, 1980.

5. David J. Elkins, Electoral Participation in a South Indian Context.Califomia: University Press, 1980.

6. David Amold, Iftz Congress in Tatnil Nadu, 1919-1932 Manohar, 1978.7. Dilip K. Basu/Richard Sisson, eds ., Social and Economic Development in

India: A Reassessrn€nt New Delhi, 1986.8. Eugene F. Iraschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India. New

Delhi. OUP. 1976.9. H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India (vols I and II).

10. Iqbal Narain, ed., St4te Politics in India.I 1 . Iswari Prasad, Rese rvation: Action for Social Equality. New Delhi : I 986.12. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: Iaw and the Baclcward Classes in

India. Delhi: OUP, 1984.13. Myron Weiner, ed., State Politics in India. New Delhi, 1968.14. Vimal P. Shat/Binod C. Aggarwal , eds., Reservation, Policy Programmes

and Issues. New Delhi, 1986.15. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in India. New

Delhi, 19E5.

H. Articles:

l. Marc Galanter, "Who are the other Backward Classes? An Introduction toa Constitutional Pu z-zle;' Economk and Politicat lleeHy, vol.13, pp. 18l2-28.

2. Marc Galanter, 'Compensatory Discrimination in Political Representa-tion: A Preliminary Assessment of India's Thirty-Year Experience with Re-served Seats in Legislatwes." Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. 14, pp. 437-54.

3. M.V. Subbarao, "Pro-Reservationists vs. Anti-Reservationists." SocialChange, vol.l2, no. 2, June 1982.

Chapter 4

Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes: A Crisis of Ambivalence

Suma Chitnis

An Outstanding ProvisionHEN the nationalist struggle for self-ruIe, conductedwith courage, tenacity and forbearance for almost threequarters of a century, eventually resulted in political

freedom for India in 1947, it was only the first step in independencethat had been won. The right to self-rule had been established, but thedreams and ideals that had fired the struggle had next to be translatedinto reality. This was a large and complex task.

Looking back, one is impressed by the eclecticism of the leadersresponsible for designing and planning the country's future as an

independent nation. They drew freely from the several social philoso-phies, ideologies, and political systems current at the time. As a

result, the Constitution that they gave the country, anil the plans and

the policies they made to define its future as a nation, combine sorne

of the finest ideals of the twentieth century. However, although the

combination thus forged was bold and full of promise, it was untested

and untried. Inevitably it contained several flaws, ranging from con-tradictions in the conception of ideals, blind spots with reference tohow these ideals could clash with established practices and vested

interests, to inadequacies in the definition of programmes and strate-gies for their implementation. These flaws have now started to sur-

face.

This paper discusses one of the inadequacies in the formulation of

Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 89

what, in spite of its many inadequacies, is one of the most outstanding

provisioni of the Constitution of independent Indial i'e', the provi-

sion for preferential facilities for the advancement of the historically

disadvantaged scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' The particular

inadequacy discussed in this paper is the failure to define the rcrms

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Denotation without ConnotationThe Constitution names the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and

"other" (socially and economicalll') "backward classes" as weaker

sections of society eligible for special protection and care. It does not

define the terms scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, or other backward

classes. Nor does it provide detailed criteria by which these groups

may be identified. It only prescribes that in the first instance these

groups shall be designated for each state by a Presidential order' in

ionsultation with the governor of each state with subsequent modifi-

cation by an Act of Parliament.:

Bold ProvisionsThe Constitution do€s not specify the special provisions to be

made either. But the Government has been innovative in designing

them. The provisions for the scheduled castes and the scheduled

tribes are particularly bold. They range from facilitios for education,

health, housing, etc., routinely provided by a welfare state to a unique

policy of "reserved" seats in Parliament, in the legislatures and in

other representative political bodies, "reserved" admissions in higher

education and reserved jobs in several categories of govemment

employment.The rationale on which preferential provisions are based is that

when a highly hierarchical society chooses to be egalitarian and

decides simultaneously to be free and open, equality is not likely to

be achieved unless groups that rank low in the traditional system of

stratification are purposively assisted to leap across the gap that

separates them from the others: The underlying assumption is that

traditional disadvantage must inevitably operate as a handicap and

traditional advantage as a head start, even if competition is in prin-

ciple free and open.


Inherent ProblemsHumane though it is, this rationale is inconsistent with the conven_

tional concept of equal citizenship. If all citizens are equal then nonehave a right to preferential provisions, however extenuating the cir_cumstances. As may be expected, therefore, the preferential provi_sions provided in the Constitution were openly opiosed at the outset.It was only with the aid of a Constitutional amendment emphasisingthe spirit of equality and reiterating the commitment to go beyond thiliteral interpretation of the ideal that the reservations ior the sched-uled castes and the scheduled tribes could be retained.4

Quite apart from this problem with the established concept ofequality, problems arise from the fact that reservations in educationclash with some of the basic norms and practices by which educa_tional institutions have functioned. For instance, the principles ofqualification by tested performance, ranking on the basis of gradedcompetence, reward for best performance and disqualification forpoor performance. Similarly, in employment, reservations negate theprinciple of selection by qualification and promotion by seniority orby proven competence. Under the policy of reservations, barelyqualified scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates have beenadmitted to institutions for higher education and in employment intoslots where the qualifications required of those who seek to come inthrough open competition are high. In fact, in several instances tleperformance level of those who are rejected in open competition issignificantly higher than that of those who are admitted throughreservations. This compromise has had to be pushed even further ascriteria for "passing" in education and conespondingly for..promo-tion" in employment have been scaled down to facilitate the progres_sion of those who are accepted on the basis of reservations.

Initial AcceptanceInitially, all these compromises were accepted with relative equa_

nimity, largely because the castes and tribal communities, listed inthe Presidential Schedule, were, at the time of their listing, clearly atthe bottom of the social scale. Regardless of whethei p.,

"upituincome, literacy or any such secular criteria were used to assess theirsituation, they were backward. In addition, the scheduled castessuffered the disability of a low caste status, including the traditional

Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 9l

practice of untouchability and the scheduled tribes suffered from

if,isicut and cultural isolation. As groups they were truly the most

iisadvantaged in Indian society. Exceptions in terms of individuals

who had riade good were rare enough to leave the listing of the

groups in the Presidential Schedule valid's Under the circumstances'

ii.,i"i uv denotation had a distinct advantage. It eliminared tedious

burea:uciatic procedures through which individuals and groups would

otlerwise have had to prove their "backwardness" and claim eligibil-

ity for special Protection.

The Changing Parameters of Backwardness

Howevelr. after about two-and-a-half to three decades of the opera-

tion of the policy of protective discrimination, the parameters of the

situation "ttungio.

The scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes

were no longei as uniformly backward as they had been when the

constitutional provisions for preferential facilities for them were

made. Individuals from several of the casteVtribes included in tie

Schedule had moved up-in terms of education, employment' occu-

pational and economic status-to belong to the lower middle or'middle

classes. In instances where they belonged to the all-India

services such as the I.A.S., or were in high political office' they had

moved up to be part of the upper class elite' As individuals they had

reached a polnt at which they seemed to be much less deserving of

preferential provisions than the mass of the population, particularly

the mass that stood below the poverty line'6

In some instances entire casteytribes had advanced to a point

where they were clearly less disadvantaged than some castes/tribes

not includ;d in the Schedule. We do not have adequate data on this

issue yet, but even on the basis of the limited data available one may

hazardthestatementthatthereisapossibilitythatcommunitieslikethe Mahars of Maharashtra or the Chamars of U'P' and Gujarat are

today better-off than some ofthe castes that were not considered to be

baciward enough to be included in the Schedule' Yet, as castes/tribes

listed in the Prisidential Schedule, they continue to be eligible for

these provisions. What is even more significant is that they continue

to use the provisions freely. As may be expected this causes strong

resentment. Caste riots on the issue of reservations have grown to be

a common phenomenon of Indian life since the mid-seventies'7


While this reversal of status between the scheduled casteVtribesand the others creates one set of problems, other problem, ari; ;;,of the fact that the advance of the different scheAuf"O

"u.t"Vt if". f,u,

been extremely uneven.,Carefully documented studies reveal that ineach state some casteVtribes have used, and continue to use, most ofthe facilities to the exclusion of the other casteVtribes in the Sched_ule. usually the casteytribes that have failed to use the facilities arebackward because they are not even in a position to reach out to thesupport offered.

The Need to Deschedule those who have AdvancedThe obvious solution in the face of these anomalies would be to

"deschedule" the individuals, castes/tribes that have ,.advanced,,. Infact, Article 342 of the Constitution anticipates a process ofdcscheduling, inasmuch as it clearly specifies a parliamentary proce_ ,

dure for the purpose and in 1955 the Government did appoint theLokur Committee to advise it on the revision of the existing lists ofscheduled castes and scheduled tribes. This committee noted thecreation of "vested interests" in the listing and categorically statedthat "the time has come when the question of deschiduling of rela_tively advanced communities should receive serious and urgent con_sideration." It further went on to point out that in view of the consti_tutional abolition of untouchability ..it would indeed be inappropriateto apply the sole test of untouchability in preparing the list of thescheduled castes . . . Nevertheless, having regard to the historical.background we have, in revising the list, adopted the list of extremesocial, educational and economic backwardness of castes arising outof the traditional custom of untouchability." In fact, it went so far asto admit that "the line of demarcation between high castes and lowcastes, which was fairly clear in the past has tended to becomeblurred," implying thercby that the problems of the scheduled castescould be bracketed with those of the rural and the uftan poor. Moreimmediately, the committee recommended descheduling of fourteentribes and twenty-eight castes. The Chamars of Bihir, U.p. andPunjab and the Mahars of Maharashtra refened to above were amonqsrthose recommended for descheduling.8

However, it is significant that the committee made these recom_mendations exclusively on the basis of the suggestions they solicited


from "several persons who appeared before us, including eminent

social workers." They did not go through a systematic process ofusing the 1961 census and other data available at the time. In any case

the scheduled caste leadership was extrcmely hostile to the report and

the recommendations it had made faded away. In subsequent efforts

to review and revise the lists made in 1969 and in 1976, controversial

issues such as whether or not to include converts to Islam and

Christianity and non-scheduled caste persons married to scheduled

caste individuals in the lists, or how rigidly to adhere to area rcstric-

tions, etc. have surfaced, but they have never been squarely con-

fronted. They have been accommodated almost ad hoc into the

administration of preferential provisions. Meanwhile, in response to

political pressure from the scheduled casle/scheduled tribe leader-

ship, the ten-year term initially set by the Constitution for the opera-

tion of reservations in political bodies for the scheduled castes and

the scheduled tribes has been successively extended, three times

over, to further ten-year periods, stretching this particular provision,

now scheduled to terminate in 1991 to forty years instead of the ten

initially planned for. The evasion of controversial issues and submis-

sion to political pressures suggests that in the very first instance, the

Government of India swept some explosive problems relating to the

issue of preferential provisions under the carpet by adopting the

denotative method for the selection of castes and tribes to be included

in the Presidential Schedule. These are now beginning to fester. Inorder to handle them it is useful to look at the evolution of the terms,

scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to identify the politicalovertones that they have acquired through the process of their evolu-

tion. The rest of this paper concentrates on this task.

The Politics of the Evolution of the TermsThe terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are the most recent

of a long series of labels that have been used to denote a particular

sector of the socially and economically disadvantaged population inIndian society. The scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes,

together with some other disadvantaged sectors, have often been

collectively referred to as the "depressed classes" and the "backward

classes".In addition, each ofthe several groups have been referred toby some specific terms. For instance, the scheduled casbs have been


referred to as untouchables, ex-untouchables, outcastes, and Harijans.The scheduled tribes have been refened to as the Aboriginees andGirijans.

First used in 1935, the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribeshave evolved through a variety of philanthropic, administrative andpolitical compromises and considerations. They cover a cluster ofseparate deprivations such as poverty, illiteracy, poor access to edu-cation, health care, employment and other opportunities. In addition,the term'scheduled caste' connotes a low position in the castehierarchy, generally implying subjection to the social stigma of un-touchability and all the other oppressions that go with low castestatus in Indian society. The term 'scheduled tribes' denotes anaboriginee population that practices animistic religion and is physi-cally and culturally isolated from the mainstream. These two sets ofcharacteristics have historically been considered to be significantenough to mark the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes as

distinctively different and more disadvantaged than the mass of therural and the urban poor.

Depressed Classes and Backward ClassesEarly, upon their arrival in India, Christian missionaries identified

low caste Hindus, particularly the untouchables, and the tribals as an.oppressed people to whom the Christian doctrine of the brotherhoodof man and of a loving and a compassionate God, would hold specialrelevance and appeal. Accordingly they paid special attention tothese 'depressed classes' in their welfare and proselytizing activi-ties.e By the second half of the nineteenth century, Hindu reformersinspired, and perhaps embanassed by the initiative taken by themissionaries, were also actively engaged in the cause of the 'back-ward classes'. Already, in the 1860s Jyotiba Phule of Maharashtrahad drawn the attention of the British govemment to the plight ofthose who suffered from caste disabilities. He made a bold andpassionate appeal for some action on their behalf.t0

All this had a cumulative impact. During the second half of thenineteenth century the British govemment took a decision to takespecial measures for the welfare of the"depressed classes"J I Inspiredby British benevolence, some native rulers, such as the Princes ofBaroda, Kolhapur and Travancore were also stimulated to act on


behalf of the depressed classes. Towards the end of the century, the

issue derived an added meaning as reports about the discriminationssuffered by Indians in South Africa began to trickle in. The parallels

wer€ too sharp to disregard and consciences that had hitherto re-

mained insensitive on the issue were awakened.By the 1880s, special schools, scholarships and other assistance

for the depressed classes had been established, both by the Britishgovemment and by the native rulers. Activity on their behalf wasparticularly marked in Madras, Baroda, Kolhapur and Travancore,but all over the country reformers had awakened to a new sense ofresponsibility towards these hitherto neglected sections of the soci-ety. Typically, in 1895 Justice M.G. Ranade shonglv underlined the"claims of the aboriginals and untouchables on Hindu society."l2

This many-sided support was effective. Members of the depressed

classes, who for centuries had either consciously (the untouchablecastes) or through circumstances (the tribes) been excluded fromleaming, now had opportunities for education. The rigidity of caste-

defined division of labour and occupation was broken. Untouchablesas well as other lower castes gained access to occupations that theyhad earlier been denied. Both the untouchables and ihe tribals gaineda new confidence and a sense of worth.

The Birth of the Term "Untouchable"Inevitably, tlte attention and exposure that they gained and the

opportunities they experienced gave some of the several groups fromamong those lumped together as the 'depressed classes' a new sense

of identity. It forced them, as well as the other Hindus who had beenparty to their subjugation to question their situation. It was in thecourse of this process that in 1909 the problem of the lowest casteswas first conceptualised under the rubric of'untouchability'. ShridharKetkar used the term in a study of the caste system published inSeptember 1909.13 Soon afterwards, in October 1909, the Maharajaof Baroda used the term 'untouchable' in the course of an address thathe delivered to the 'depressed classes' mission in Bombay.ra Mean-while, the tribals were already being referred to as aboriginees.

The Politics of PhilanthropyIt would be unfair to claim that charity or philanthropy played no


part in Christian missionary, British or the reformers' action onbehalf of the "depressed classes". On the other hand, it would benaive to believe that their intentions were purely philanthropic. Themissionaries were zealously committed to proselytization and boththe untouchables and the tribals were vulnerable to conversion. Asregards the intentions of the British government, it may not be toofar-ferched to suggest that the strategy of 'divide and rule' is likely tohave influenced the British decision. Official action on behalf ofthese two severely neglected sections of the population, particularlythe untouchables was bound to embarrass the Hindu elite and createfor them an awkwardness that had immense political value to theBritish in the context of the nationalist demand for self-ruIe. Theactions of the Hindu reformers must in tum, to some extent at least,

have been a political response to Christian missionary and Britishgovernment overtures.

The Politics of NumbersRegardless of whether, and if so to what extent, the support for the

'depressed' classes was consciously conceived of as a political strat-egy, the fact remains that it had far-reaching political implications.Towards the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the national-ists had been pushing for greater participation in government. How-ever, as this movement gathered momentum towards the end of thecentury, the Muslims started to fear that the Hindu majority woulddominate them, if and when the British acceded to the nationalistdemand. To safeguard their interests they petitioned the Viceroy toprovide them with reserved seats as representatives to be elected bya Muslim electorate. The British agreed. The petition, presented in1906, brought the Muslims separate electorates in the Morley-MintoReforms of 1909. The visible success of the Muslims brought the

idea of communal electorates to the minds of other communities likethe Sikhs, who similarly feared domination by a Hindu majority.Since communal representation was to be proportionate to the size ofa community in the population, the politics of numbers was born.15

Political Leverage from "Untouchability"One of the first expressions of this politics was that the Muslims

sought to chisel down the size of the Hindu representation with the


claim that "properly speaking the outcastes are beyond the pale of

Hinduism, and therefore, their strength should not go to swell the

numerical force of the Hindus." Their voice must have been heard'

for the census commissioner for 1911 seriously raised a question as

to whether the 'depressed classes', who numbered between a fifth to

sixth of the total population, should not be enumerated separately'

While the Muslim League as well as orthodox Hindus promptly

supported the suggestion, the Indian National Congress, eager to

prevent the fragmentation of the Indian force took the opposite stand'

it is significant that this claim on the part of the Congress was

u".o.p*i"d by a new inlerest in the welfare of the untouchables' At

the second meeting of the Indian National Congress in I 886, Dadabhai

Naroji, its President, had categorically declared: "A National Con-

gress must confine itself to questions in which the entire natioir has a

iirect participation, and it must leave the adjustment of social re-

forms and other class (caste) questions to class (caste) congresses"'

But by l9l7 the Congress stand had changed so far as to prompt an

"anti-disabilities" resolution on behalf of the untouchables'

In retrospect, this resolution app€ars feeble and lukewarm' Itreflects the fact that the Hindu leadership of the Congress, which

earlier was extremely slow to respond to Ranade's call for action on

behalf of the untouchables, did begin to recognize the political need

to hold the untouchables in the Hindu fold. But they had not really

warmed up to the idea. There was an absence of fervour and sympa-

thetic conviction in the framing of the resolution' Later' when the

administrative reforms of 1919 provided a few nominated seats for

the Depressed Classes, and the 'untouchables' began to form their

own political base to organise themselves separately under the lead-

ership of Ambedkar, it became even more imperative for the Con-

gress to retain them as Hindus. Alert to the situation, Mahatma

Gandhi, who was just emerging as the new leader of the Congress,

made their welfare a plank of the Congress policy' But with due

deference to Gandhi's personal commitment to the removal of un-

touchability and the uplift of the untouchables, a review of the

functioning of the Congress at that point clearly indicates vested

political interests. The politicization of the issue of tle untouchables

was further accentuated by the fact that the British government

responded by stepping up its own welfare activities for the depressed

Thz Politics of Bacl<wardncss

classes-aossibly as a foil to the Congress. It announced fresh schemesfor land, housing, schooling and government jobs for them anddeclared illegal, age-old practices by which the untouchables weredenied access to schools, wells, roads, etc.r6

Polarization of Pmitions and New LabelsMeanwhile, Ambedkar, who was himself an untouchable. and

Gandhi continued at loggerheads with each other. Ambedkar, a staunchdemocrat, strongly influenced by his experiences as a student in theUSA and comnftted to a secular, political resolution of the conflictwas firmly convinced that the untouchables were unlikely to advanceunless they were allowed separate political representation and power.He was determined to gain such representation for them and toorganise them politically for further advance. Gandhi as a spirirualist,was al3ogether opposed to the solution that Ambedkar proposed. Hecoined the term Harijan (people of God) for the untouchables andclaimed that it was possible to remove untouchability and its accom-panying evils by a change of upper<aste Hindu hearts. He fondlyreferred to the tribals as "Girijans" who could be easily assimilated.

While the term "deprcssed classes', had thus differentiated be_tween thi terms "untouchables", "Harijans" and ..Girijans', in thepolitical dialogue with the Ambedkarites and Gandhians, the Britishcontinued to use the original term. This had significant implicationsas will be evident from the following.

The Communal Award and the Containment of the ConllictIn 1928 when the Simon Commission visited India, Ambedkar

demanded reserved seats for the untouchables in legislative bodies,special educational concessions, and recruitnrcnt to govemnlent posts.These werc accepted in the Commission's report. As expected, Gandhifinnly opposed separate electorates for the untouchables though heconceded them to Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Anglo-Indians. Inspite of Gandhi's objections the Communal Award granted by theBritish in 1932 gave the untouchables regular votes in the generaleleclorate and granted their demand for separate electorates in areasin which they were concentrated. Gandhi protested with his epoch-making fast and finally Ambedkar was forced to compromise in thePoona Pact, which provided 148 reserved seats instead of the Zg

Definition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes

separately elected members provided in the Communal Award. Italso provided a system of primary elections for those seats; a panel offour candidates was to be chosen by electors from what was signifi-

cantly refened to as the "Depressed Classes". In this terminology and

in the Poona Pact, the opposition between Ambedkar and Gandhi

was contained without resolution of the qpnflict that lay at the root

namely, that Gandhi denied untouchability while Ambedkar made itthe core issue. Regardless of this, untouchability scored a new height

as an issue of social and political concem. Shortly after the signing ofthe pact a conference of Hindu leaders met at various places and

adopted a resolution declaring their commitment to assimilate the

Harijans.tT

The G.O.I. Act of 1935 and the Birth of the ScheduleWith the principle of separate representation thus firmly estab-

lished, the administrative task of listing the relevant castes had to be

accomplished. Accordingly, they were listed (i.e., scheduled) in 1936

in order to give effect to the provisions for special electoral reprcsen-

tation as per the Government of India Act of 1935. But the listingpresented several problems.

From 1908 onwards there were several estimates of the size of the

depressed classes in the country. In 1908 Risely counted 50.6 mil-lion. In 191 I Holdemess placed the figure at 50 or 60 million. So didseveral others, including the census of 1911. However, Baines inl9l2 placed it at a low 34.8 million. In 1917 Sir Henry Sharp, who

was Educational Commissioner placed it even lower at 3l .5 million.The Franchise Committee appointed to implement the 1919 Reforms

fornd 42.2 million in British India. A quarter or a third as many were

estimated in the princely states. The census of l92l and the MudaliarCommittee of 1924 conformed to the rough figure of 50 million.However, in 1928, official figures quoted a much lower 28.5 to 29

million. The Hartog Committee of 1929 set the figure at 29.76

million. But at about the same time the Nair Committee placed the

figure at 214.5 million, whereas the Simon Commission itself placed

the figure at 43.6 million. In 1931 Hutton as Census Commissionerestimated the figure as 31.2 million, excluding Bengal but whiledoing so, he had encount€red serious problems. This is significant. Itindicated that the task of defining who was to be given separate


representation was already diffi cult.

From Disability to UntouchabilityDuring the nineteenth century, the British had been able to roughly

ideltify the 'depressed classes' for administrative purposes. They donot seem to have been specifically concerned with identifying vic-tims of untouchability in this context. But as the issue of untouchabil-ity came to be politicized, British administrators grew to be increas-ingly aware of the need to take note of the 'untouchability' factor inthe process of their identification of the depressed classes.

It seems that initially the definitibn of untouchability did not pose

any problems. Conceptually, untouchability appeared to be starkenough to be identified in terms of a practice of ritual and socialexclusion. In fact, political bargaining on behalf of the untouchableshad proceeded on the assumption that untouchables throughout Indiawene set off by some uniform and identifiable usages. Thus theGovernnpnt of India's Fifth Despatch in Constitutional Reform (1919)

mentions that "though they are defined in varying terms (they) are

broadly speaking all the same kind of people. Except for the differ-ences in the rigidity of their exclusion they are all more or less in theposition of the Madras Panchamas, definitely outside that part of theHindu community which is allowed access to their temples." But as

enumerations were made, sharp differences were evident in the Northand the South. In fact, it was apparent that untouchability, as prac-

tised in the South, for instance in the Bombay and Madras regions,

did not exist in U.P. Yet Hindus in U.P. were divided into high and

low castes and the consequent marginalisation, deprivation and op-pression werc as acute as they were due to the practice of untouch-ability in the provinces of Bombay and Madras.

In order to resolve this problem, Hutton as Census Commissionerin l93l developed a series of criteria to gauge the incidence ofdisabilities. These were as follows:18

I . Whether the caste or class in question can be served by Brah-mans or not;

2. Whether the caste or class in question can be served by the

barbers, water-carriers, tailors, etc., who serve caste Hindus;3. Whether the caste in question pollutes a high-caste Hindu by

contact or proximity;

DeJinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 101

4. Whether the caste or class in question is one from whose hands

a caste Hindu can take water;

5. Whether the caste or class in question is debarred from using

public conveniences such as roads, ferries, wells or schools;

6. Whether the caste or class in question is debaned from the use

of Hindu temples;

7. Whether in ordinary social intercourse a well-educated member

of the caste or class in question will be treated as an equal by the

high-caste men of the same educational qualifications;

8. Whether the caste or class in question is merely depressed on

account of its own ignorance, illiteracy or poverty and but for thatwould be subject to no social disability; and

9. Whether it is depressed on account of the occupation followedand whether but for that occupation it would be subject to no social

disability.

The Entanglement of Ritual and Secular DisabilityWith the bracketing of caste and class in sevon out of the nine

indicators listed above we notice the unresolved tangle of ritual and

secular disability. This entanglement has caused serious problems.

The remarks of subsequent cornmentators are significant. Galanterremarks that "the tests clearly point to the incidence of disabilities as

the crucial test." reLelah Dushkin.anothereminentscholar on the issue

remarks that "it is at least clear that occupation, ignorance, illiteracyor poverty or any such forms of backwardness were not intended to

enter into the definition process." Hutton himself had made it clear:"From the point of view of the state, the important test is the right to

use public ssnvsnignss5-1eads, wells and schools-and if this be

taken as the primary test, religious disabilities and the social disabili-ties involved by them may be regarded as contributory only." Some

importance must be attached to them, since obviously if the general

public regards the persons of certain groups as so distasteful thatconcerted action is resorted to in order to keep t}tem away, persons ofthose groups do suffer a serious disability.

Are they disabilities per se or are the religious, ritual discrimina-tions (leading to disability) the crux of the problem? Galanteremphasises the disabilities without reference to their source, which,on the other hand, is exemplified. Dushkin points out that backward-

lO2 The Politics of Backwardness

ness in terms ofoccupation, education, etc. was not intended to be thebasis of the definition, implying that caste is the core issue. Huttonclearly emphasises the absence of the right to use public conve-niences-thus stressing again the ritual factor. Does it mean thatpreferential provisions are primarily to take care of this factor?

Free Scope for Administrative DiscretionMeanwhile, the existence of multiple criteria left census superin-

tendents ample scope to use their own discretion in the compilationof provisional lise. Thus, there is considerable variation in the basison which people have been classified as untouchables in the differentprovinces. Moreover, even the application of a criterion could notguarantee uniformity for the simple reason that the exact form thatthe debarment or exclusion took, could vary substantially from prov-ince to province. For instance, in some cases debarment from atemple meant that the paxticular caste was forbidden to approach tletemple. In other cases it merely meant exclusion from the innersanctuary. In some cases debarment from water entailed the require-ment that they use a separate water supply. But in others it meantdenial to any decent water supply, or dependence on the upper castes

to serve water to the lower castes. One of the most serious conse-quences of these two factors is that castes that were included in theSchedule in one province were omitted in another. hoblems alsoarose out of the fact that census superintendents and commissionersdid not adhere strictly to Hutton's criteria. Often they excluded castes

that were ritually untouchable, but had advanced educationally oreconomically. Correspondingly, they included castes that were notuntouchables but were visibly at the bottom of the social strata.

As may be expected, these anomalies left the Franchise Commit-tee with serious doubts. However, testifying before the FranchiseCommittee in defence of the listing as it stood, Dr Ambedkar, thespokesman for the untouchables emphasised that "it is a fatal mistaketo suppose that differences in tests of untouchability indicate differ-ences in the conditions of the untouchables." The crucial element he

emphasised was "the odium of avoidance" by the upper castes. Oncethis element is present, he claimed "the whole ofthe class ofuntouch-ables so ascertained must be taken into account for the purpose ofrepresentation, without any funher distinction between rich and poor,


advanced and backward. educated and uneducated . . ." Others testi-fying before the Committee, particularly Tambe, Chintamani and

Bakhale rejected Ambedkar's position. They pointed out that outsideof Madras, Bombay and the Central Provinces the untouchables donot constitute a distinct section of the population. They claimed thatin the other provinces, "untouchability is the adjunct not of the personbut of the occupation he occupies." The majority of the Committeefelt that denial of access to temples and causing pollution by touchshould be accepted as tests of untouchability and that those who areonly economically poor and in other ways backward should not beincluded in the Schedule.2o

The Committee finally decided, with considerable hesitation, thelist of untouchables in the North and the East. But on the whole,commentators agree that the castes included in the list were sociallythe lowest Hindu castes in their particular provinces and they werelisted, partly at least, on that basis. It contained over 40 millionpeople. By the census of 1941, the figure, roughly proportionate tothe total increase of the population of the country, had risen to 48.8million, constituting l9percentof the Hindu population and 12.6 percent of the total population of undivided India.

The Presidential ScheduleWhen the President of newly independent India promulgated the

Scheduled Castes Order in 1950, he basically conformed to rhe lisr of1936 with two major additions: some Sikh castes, and castes fromareas that had not till then been included in the Schedule. In 195 I and1956 a few changes were again made, but these were mainly in thenature of correcting errors. The only major change was the inclusionin 1956 of all Sikh untouchables in the list. There were no otherpolicy changes

TribalsThe identification of tribals was less difficult. Upto the early

twentieth century they were included within the depressed classes.But in the wake of the Communal Award, they were clearly identi-fied as aboriginals who pracrised animistic religions. The generalnotion since then has been that this category should include groupsdistinguished by their "tribal characteristics" and by their sparial and


cultural isolation from the population. The problem here is that the

tribals mix animism with Hinduism and that except for a few excep-

tions, their spatial and cultural isolation is not absolute enough forthem to be marked without overlap with the rest of the population.

The other important point is that there is an underlying current ofconcern towards insulating them from exploitation by sophisticated

outsiders and towards protecting them from domination by the main-

stream culture. The British protected the tribals by placing them

outside of ordinary administration and by treating their habitations as

separate reserves.2rThe Government of India Act ofl935 provided forsepzfate representation for the "Backward Tribes" just as it did foruntouchable castes. Accordingly, a list of backward tribes was pro-

mulgated for the purpose.

Complications in Listing Scheduled TribesThe post-independence scheduling of tribes was much less com-

plicated. In 1950 when the President promulgated the list of Sched-

uled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, he only made some additions to the

1935 list of Backward Tribes. Further, there were some transfers

from the earlier scheduled caste list (e.g., in Bengal) to the tribes' list

and vice versa. However, it would be mistaken to infer from the ease

with which the listing was done that the matter was simple and

uncomplicated. Rather, the complications were glossed over.

The scheduled tribes were defined partly by habitat and geo-

graphic isolation but mainly on the basis of their social, religious,

linguistic and cultural distinctiveness and "their tribal characteris-

tics." Just where the line between tribals and non-tribals should be

drawn has never been clear. The issue is intricately intertwined with

controversy over the extent to which tribals are Hindus. Ghurye

describes them as "backward Hindus". Others like Haimendorf de-

scribe them as animists.22 A great deal has been written on the

theoretical complexity of the caste+ribe distinction, but ttre bound-

aries remain hazy and unresolved.

Willingness to Accept AmbivalenceMoreover, as with the scheduled castes, not all who could qualify

for listing have been listed. No religious test was specified. The

underlying assumption is that tribals practise animist religions. Yet'


converts are included. Attempts to exclude them have failed. In 1951

the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes had

remarked that no uniform test for distinguishing the scheduled tribes

was available. He requested the state govemments for their views.After considering the points suggested by each state, he settled uponsome common elements: tribal origin, primitive way of life, remotehabitation and general backwardness in all respects. In the context ofwhat has been said so far these criteria should appear nebulous and

difficult to apply precisely. Nevertheless only a few years later theywere declared to be fully satisfactory. In 1956, the Horr.e Ministerreferred to the "well-defined and easily ascertained" criteria. In 1961

the Dhebar Commission felt no need to solve the problem of identi-fying the tribals.23

An ldeal that has SouredOne wonders at such statements. The foregoing discussion indi-

cates that the terms scheduled castes and scheduled tribes have notyet been precisely defined. Indicators listed from time to time providebroad outlines in terms of which casteVtribes may be included in theSchedule, but boundaries between those to be included and the othersare often hazy. Worse yet, the weightage to be accorded to poverty,rural residence, gerierations of illiteracy and other secular aspects oftheir marginalization has not yet been determined. By way of sum-ming up it may be useful to look at some of the bold implications ofthis.

The Lokur Committee's statement that the line between the disad-vantages of class and caste is already quite blurred, may not be as

valid for rural India as it is for urban India. Nevertheless the factremains that it has become invisible in many quarters. Under thesecircumstances, the failure of the government, to deschedule thosewho have advanced, amounts to a failure to accept this reality andforces those who are affected to question the govemment's intent. Inthis context, it is difficult to forget the vesred political inrerests rhathad initially prompted the Congress to pay attention to the untouch-ables. Correspondingly, it is difficult not to suspect that vested inter-ests continue to influence the Congress govemment, particularlyfrom descheduling the castes which have advanced. In a sense, thefact that the terms scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are not clearlv

I

i:


defined aggravates the matter as efforts to deschedule distintegrate at

the point at which policy must define the basis for descheduling. Asall this happens, the magnificent ideal of equality for the scheduledcastes and scheduled tribes sours. It degenerates into a political game,

creating a crisis of credibility, and fouls up the ethos of democracy inIndia.

At another level, with respect to the more immediate challenge ofadvancing the quality of life of the scheduled castes and the sched-

uled tribes, the failure to define the terms has other far-reachingimplications. Because cf the 'denotative' approach there is a ten-dency to lump the various castes or tribes together as an

undifferentiated mass of 'backward' and disadvantaged people. Verylittle is done to focus action on the exact inadequacies suffered. Thisis unfortunate. Studies into the substance of the disadvantages suf-

fered by the scheduled casteytribes, and their impact, as also the

steps taken to help them remove these disadvantages are as yet very

meagrc. But the few that are available clearly suggest that there are

several different disadvantages that constrain the advance of the

scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and that it is necessary to

understand each of these carefully to direct appropriate ameliorative

or remedial action. The continued reluctance to define the elements

tiat constitute the 'backwardness' of the scheduled castes and the

scheduled tribes results in a failure to recognise and to anend to the

specificities of their situation. It reduces to mechanical, administra-

tive measures, what should be carefully designed strategies for the

advance of a historically disadvantaged section of the Indian society.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

l. Ref. Constitution of India, Article l5(b) of Part Ill-Fundamental Rights'

Articlb 46 of Part lV-Directive Principles of State Policy, and Articles 330' 332

and 334 of Part XVl-Special Provisions Relating to Certain Clauses.

2. Ref. Anicle 366 (Definitions) of Part XIX Miscellaneous (24) "Scheduled

Castes" means such castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within such

castes, races or tfibes as are deemed under article 341 to be Scheduled castes forthe purposes of this Constitution. (25) "Scheduled Tribes" means such tribes or

tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or tribal communities

as are deemed under article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this

Constitution.3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities, University of Berkeley and Los

Delinition of the Terms Scheduled Castes and Tribes 107

Angeles: Califomia Press, 1984, pp. 4l-834. Ref . State of Madras v. Champakatt Dorairaian, A.I.R. 1951 S.C- 226,

l95i S.C.J. 313. Venlcataramana v. State of Madras, A.l.R. l95l S-C. 229.

Jagwant Kaur v. State of Bombay, A.I'R. 1952 Bom. 461. The Constitution(First Amendment) Act, para 2 (1951) and Artiple 15(4), which articulates the

amendment.5. Marc Galanter, op. cit., ChaP. l.6. Suma Chitnis, A lnng Way to Go. New Delhi: Allied Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,

1981, pp. 154-56.

7. A. Yagnik, "Spectre of Caste War", Economic and Political Weekly, vol.xvi, no. 13., 1981, pp.553-55.

8. Department of Social Security: Report of the Advisory Committee on the

Revision of the Lists of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Lokur Com-

mittee). Delhi: 1965, pp. 6-10.9. Charles H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindu Social Reform,

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, pp.53-54.10. Dhananjay Keer, Mahatma Jotirao Phooley: Father of our Social Revo'

lution, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1964.

11. D.N. Sadanshiv, Resenations for Social Justice. Bombay: Current LawPublishers, 1986, pp. 2-3.

12. Marc Galanter, op. cit., p. 24.

13. Shridhar Ketkar, The History of Caste in India. Ithaca: Taylor and

Carpenter, 1909, pp. 86.14. Sayaji Rao III, Maharaja of Baroda. Speeches and Addresses, I'ondon:

Macmillan Co., 1912, pp.'44-45.15. (i) Eleanor Znl7iot, "Dr Ambedkar and the Mahar Movement", Ph.D.

dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, p. 141.(ii) The Hindu population was already dropping steadily. According to the

Census of 1881 Hindus constituted 74.3 per cent of the total population ofBritish India. By 1911 the figure had dropped to 69.3 per cent.

16. Eleanor Zelliot, op. cit., p. 166.17. Marc Galanter, op. cit.,pp. 122-26.18. J.H. Hutton, Caste in India: Its Nature, Function and Oigins.3rd e.d.

Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 194.

19. Marc Galanter, op. cit., pp. 128-29.20. Report ofthe Indian Franchise Committe€, 1932. vol. l, p. 203. Calcutta:

Govt. of India, Central Publication Branch.21. Muc Galanter, op. cit., Chap.5.22. G.S. Ghurye, The Scheduled Tibes, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1963,

p. 19,

23. Scheduled Areas and Tribes Commission (U.N. Dhebar) Report 1960-61,2 vols. Delhi: Manaser of Publications.

Chapter 5

Karnataka Government's ReservationPolicies for SCs/STs and OBCs

G. Thimmaiah

1. Socio-Political Background of Reservation Policy

I'if ARNATAKA has a long history of protective discrimination

f( nolicf for uplifting the socially and educationally backwardI \sections of the population of the state. In order to understandand appreciate the significance ofthe role played by the state govern-ment in improving the socio-economic and educational conditions ofSCVSTs, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and minorities in thestate, it is necessary to review the history ofthe reservation policy inKamataka.

The present Kamataka was crcated in 1956 by integrating Kannada-speaking areas of the former Hyderabad state and of former Bombayand Madras provinces with the then princely state of Mysore. Thoughthe reservation policy of the government of Mysore was influencedby the reform movement in the former Madras province, particularlythe social revolt sponsored by the Justice Party, Mysore had devel-oped its own rudimentary policy of reservation as far back as 1874.tDuring the period between 1874 and 1885 the government of Mysorereserved 20 per cent of middle and lower-level jobs in the policedepartment for Brahmins and 80 per cent for Muslims, Hindus andIndian Christians. Again from 1914, the govemment of Mysoreintroduced a system of nomination of qualihed backward class can-didates to the posts of Assistant Commissioners. Even so, it wasrealised that the backward classes (including SCs and STs) could not

Kamatakn Government's Reserttation Policies

break the monopoly of the Brahmins in the state government servrce'

It may be interesting to know that between 1881 and l9l0 the

demand for jobs for locals inspired by a sort of "sons of the soit'

theory was going on among the Brahmins. At that time, the Mysore

Maharaja was advised to appoint Diwans (Chief Ministers) from

outside the state who came mostly from former Madras Province'

These Diwans used to help their kith and kin belonging to their own

sub-castes to get employment in the state govemment. This was

resented by the local Brahmins who raised a hue and cry against the

Tamil Brairmins' domination of govemment jobs in the Princely state

of Mysore. It would appear as though the Mysore Brahmins them-

selves behaved like backward classes, asking for reservation of state

govemment jobs for Mysore Brahmins only. However, this contro-

versy came to an end with the appointrnent of Sir M. Visveswaraya

as Diwan of the then Mysore state in 1910. But Visveswaraya him-

self resigned in l9l 8 on the issue of reservation for backward classes

in government service. This needs some elaboration.

The social reform movement, the resultant communal order in the

Madras Province and the monopoly of the Brahmins in Mysore

government jobs created a lot of discontent among the backward

classes. No govemment, not even the princely government, could

ignore the demands of a vast majority of the people for a sha-re in the

govemment service. As a positive response to this demand, the First

Backward Classes Committee was appointed under the Chairman-

ship of the Chief Judge of Mysore Chief Court, Sir Irslie C. Miller.This committee which submitted its report within a record time ofabout ll months, laid the foundation for the reservation policy forbackward classes in the state of Kamataka. In fact, the thirty-one-

page report has many original ideas about the criteria to be adopted

for identifying backward classes, measures needed for promoting

their education and the reasons for compromising on merit for ad-

equate representation of the backward classes in government service.

The Miller Committee was the result of the political awakening ofthe backward classes in the princely state of Mysore. The two nu-

merically dominant communities, the Vokkaligas and Lingayats'

while strong economically, were educationally backward. Therefore,

they could not compete with the Brahmins for govemment service,

who constituted only 3.4 per cent of the population. They, thereforc,

109


took the lead in demanding reservations in state govemment jobs. .

They were supported by other backward castes, Muslims, IndianChristians, SCs and STs. They got a semi-democratic political forumto articulate their demands. In 1882, immediately after the renditionof the princely state back to the Mysore royal family, a Representa_tive Assembly was constituted as a forum for consulting differentsections of tle society on state govemment matters. Most of thesemembers were nominated on the basis of thefu economic and socialbackground. This Representative Assembly gave rise to a politicalawakening among the backward classes, though the economicallybetter-off among them took the lead.

There was also another historic factor which paved the way for theearly emergence of the backward classes movement in Karnataka.During the reign of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan which extended over80 years, the population of Muslims increased in the state and a largenumber of them came to hold important positions. After the fall ofTipu many of them suddenly found themselves powerless. Britishrule had reduced substantially the influence of the Muslims in soci-ety. The next generation of Muslims started asking for a larger sharein the govemment service, which provided a complementary supportto the Vokkaligas and Lingayats in their political ambitions. Simul-taneously, the Christians also started growing in numbers after theestablishment of the British rule. Thus the local dominant castes, i.e.,Vokkaligas and Lingayats, longing for power, got an opportunity toarticulate their demands through the Representative Assembly andmade common cause with Muslims and Christians. All of them, puttogether, constituted a major portion of population, who came to beknown as the non-Brahmins. Though SCs and STs were numericallysignificant even in the former Mysore state, the awarenels amongthem was not sufficiently strong until Independence and the introduc-tion of the Constitution.

It was this coalition of self-interest groups which compelled theMaharaja of Mysore to break the monopoly of Brahmins in govern-ment service and throw it open through reservation to non-Brahmins.Although the fortunes of the backward classes fluctuated, dependentas they were upon the social-political whims and fancies of theDiwans who succeeded Sir M. Visveswaraya, the Maharaja could notreverse the policy of reservation as it was demanded by an influential

Karnataka Government's Resemation P olicies

and large section of the people of Mysore.

After Independence and up to the time of the reorganisation of the

state 094't-1956), the Miller Committee recommendations were

implemented. By the time Mysore was integrated into. independent

India, the Brahmins had accepted willy-nilly the growing power of

the backward castes. Because of their minority position, the new

political system came to depend significantly upon the numerical

strength of these castes. During this period, the dominant communi-

ties, along with SCVSTs and the Muslims' resorted to yet another

interesting strategy of driving the Brahmins out of the rural areas'

The dominant communities which controlled the elected government

after Independence, introduced tenancy abolition legislation, under

which the Brahmins lost their izam land to the tenants.2 In the South,

particularly in Mysore, Brahmins never cultivated the vast lands they

owned under th e inamdari system. Their tenants belonged mostly to

the dominant communities though in some places there were SCs

also. This political strength was effectively and intelligently used by

the dominant communities to weaken the economic base of the

Brahmins in the rural areas. As a result, after losing their lands, the

Brahmins moved to urban areas in search of white-collar jobs. Though

they suffered during that transition period, through their resourceful-

ness and ingenuity they rehabilitated themselves comfortably in the

urban areas.

After the integration of the state in 1956, it became necessary to go

through the exercises of reservation once again, in view of the merger

of the areas from other states which did not have any consistent

reservation policies. The attempts of the government of Karnataka toprepare a uniform list applicable to the people of all the integrated

areas were frustrated by the High Court.3 Therefore' the Second

Backward Classes Commission was appointed under the chairman-

ship of a backward class political leader, Dr. Nagana Gowda in 1960,

to determine the backward classes and to recommend the extent ofreservations. This Commission identifred the backward classes basi-

cally on the basis of caste, though it used educational levels and

proportion of people of each caste in govemment service as additional criteria. By using all the three criteria, the Commission de-

clared one of the dominant communities, the Lingayats as forward.

This led to a legal banle which ended in the Supreme Court striking

lll

ll2 The politics of Backwardness

down the state govemment order on reservations in 1963. Conse_quently, the state government implemented a modified reservationpolicy between 1963 and 1977, under which the income of rheparents and their occupation were taken into account for determiningthe backwardness of the people.

This period (1956-1972) was also marked by the rule of Lingayarsin Kamataka under the chief ministerships of S. Nijalingappa andVeerendra Patil, who did not want their own community to be ex-cluded from the list of backward classes and lose tle benefits ofreservation. At the same time, it was alleged that the two dominantcommunities cornered all the benefits under the earlier as well asmodified reservation policies and that a new set of guidelines wasrequired for determining the backward classes. At this juncture, thebackward classes movement took a different turn under the politicalleadership of Devraj Urs. Until that time , all the non-Brahmin castesand communities were considered as backward classes. But a generalfeeling that Lingayats and Vokkaligas dominated the political, eco-nomic, educational and even administrative spheres was exploited byUrs to divide the backward classes. He devised a new politicalstrategy after the 1969 split in the Congress party to wrest politicalpower from the two dominant communities in the state, by uniting thenon-dominant minority backward castes, the Muslims and SCVSTs.Though he was successful in this attempt to begin with, the arithmeticof backward classes compelled him not to ignore Vokkaligas torally.He wanted to formulate a new reservation policy consistent with hisnew political strategy. For this purpose, he found in L.G. Havanur, anactive proponent of the new backward classes ideology, an ablepolicy adviser. While the status of the earlier backward qlasses in-quiry bodies was only those of committees, Urs elevated it to that ofa commission and appointed the First Backward Classes Commis-sion in 1972 under the chairmanship of L.G. Havanur.

This Commission submitted its report after prolonged delibera-tions in November 1975. However, it also left out certain sections ofthe Lingayat community. When the partially modified governmenrorder on reservation was implemented, the national emergency hadalready been declared. The Lingayats could not take to the streetsagainst the recommendations of the Havanur Commission and had towait for a more appropriate time. After the emergency, they decided

Karnatakn Govemment's Reservation Policies

to seek judicial remedy' The Karnataka High Court upheld the rec-

ommendations of the Havanur Commission but partially struck down

the modifications introduced in the govemment order' Even then the

Lingayats went on to appeal to the Supreme Court which directed

both the governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu to review the list

of backward classes in the light of fresh data.

This judicial decision forced the government of Karnataka to

appoint the Second Backward Classes Commission in 1983' which

suUmitteO its report in 1986, excluding not only the Lingayats and

Vokkaligas, but also 13 other communities which were still etiuca-

tionally backward and were also numerically in a minority position'

This sparked off a state-wide agitation and ultimately forced the

Janata govemment to reject the recommendations of the Commis-

sion. The fresh govemment order, issued in 1986' brought back most

of the communities (the former non-Brahmins) to the backward

classes list for the purpose of reservation' This, in brief is the story

of the backward classes movement in Kamataka'

It is necessary at this stage to mention the diversity of the back-

ward classes movement in Karnataka after the reorganisation of the

state. We have noted earlier that from 1874 lill 194"1, the backward

classes included all castes except Brahmins, Anglo-Indians and Eu-

ropeans. The pre-independent backward classes movement in Mysore

state is known as the non-Brahmin movement, as it included all the

non-Brahmin communities of Hindus, Muslims and Christians. The

SCs and STs were part of the backward classes in the princely state

of Mysore, but were followers rather than leaders in the backward

classes movement. But after 1947, particularly after the introduction

of the Constitution which guaranteed proportional reservation forSCs/STs, they started emerging as a separate backward group in

Karnataka. This group became very powerful during Urs's rule.

Consequently, Ambedkarism took deep roots in Karnataka in the late

1970s and early 1980s. They not only started fighting for their

constitutional share, both in admissions to educational institutions

and govemment jobs, but also introduced a roster system in appoint-

ments to governmentjobs and reservations in promotions for SCs and

STs in government service. Over and above these, they even started

asking for a share in the reservation meant for other backward classes.

An interestine feature of the backward classes movement in Karnataka,

113

ll4 The politics of Backwardness

particularly in the 1980s, has been an unprecedented unigr among theSC and ST leaders for the purpose of claiming their legitimate share.Cutting across party lines and ideological overtones, they have be_come a powerful vocal minority in all the state public platforms,including the Legislative Assembly and the Council. Today they area force to rcckon with by political parties and other sections of thesociety.

Another interesting development in the backward classes move-ment in Kamataka has been the subtle move of L.G. Havanur toorganise the Bedas and Nayaks under one group: backward tribe.This tag, given to Nayaks in Maharashtra, was used by him to furtherupgrade the status of the Bedas for the purpose of rcservation as abackward tribe. It may be mentioned in this context that the HavanurCommission classified the OBCs into backward tribes, backwardcastes and backward communities and recommended their sharcs inthe reservation in ascending order. Furtheq by using the constitu-tional provision given to SCs and STs, he manoeuvrcd to see that theincome ceiling was not fixed for the castes included under backwardtribe. Then he started lobbying in Delhi for getting ST status tobackward tribes and this has been challenged by the Second Back-ward Classes Commission and others. But the fight is still going on.

The third recent development in the backward class movement intle state of Kamataka is the fight which has been going on betweenthe Lingayats and Vokkaligas for the backward class status. Whenthe Lingayats were declared as forward by the Havanur Commissionthey were furious, not merely for conferring on them the unprofitableforward status but also for isolating them from the Vokkaligas. Theywould have accepted the forward status if the Vokkaligas were alsomade forward. This intention was explicitly made known to theSupreme Court. Sensing the true intention of the appeal preferrcd byLingayats before the Supreme Court, the Second Backward ClassesCommission made Vokkaligas also forward. Though initially it sat-isfied the Lingayats, the ugly turn that the recommendations of theSecond Backward Classes Commission took made the Lingayats alsoto retrace their steps and fight for the backward tag. The final conse-quence of this development has been that the Vokkaligas have emergedas champions of the neglected minority backward castes in Kamataka.This is because it was the Vokkaligas who took the lead in organising

Karnataka G ov e rnment' s Resemat ion P olic ie s

the l3 other minority castes which were made forward and organised

the joint agitation against the recommendations of the Second Back-

ward Classes Commission.Finally, the Muslims have emerged as an identifiable group, jeal-

ously guarding their own backward tag rather than supporting the

broader backward classes movement. In other words, there is a clear

evidence of every single group of former backward classes trying toprotect its own group interests without bothering about the loss orgain to other sections of the OBCs. The unity of all OBCs, SCs/STs

and minorities is becoming shaky and their split is becoming open.

This is evident even within each major community. For instance, the

fight for supremacy, both in political leadership and for controllingthe money-spinning educational institutions, has been going on be-

tween different sub-castes within the Vokkaliga community. There isa possibility of an anti-reservation movement erupting as it did inGujarat. Furthermore, if Vokkaligas and Lingayats unite for politicalreasons, it may manifest itself in the form of a second anti-Brahminmovement in Karnataka.

2. Share of OBCs, SCs and STs in the State's PopulationThe formulation of any reservation policy depends upon reliable

data on the backward classes population of a state. In Kamataka, as

elsewhere in the country, caste-wise population data are not avail-able. This forced the Second Backward Classes Committee (1960)

and the First Backward Classes Commission (1972) to estimate and

even 'guestimate' the caste-wise population. This has created a lot ofcontroversy relating to the numerical strength of each caste andcommunity in the total population. Perhaps the only committee whichhad the benefit of reliable data on caste-wise composition of popula-tion was the Miller Committee (1918). This committee which was

appointed in 1918 used the 1911 census data, which provided caste-wise demographic information, for formulating its recommendations.

Table I gives the Caste-wise population of Hindus, Muslims,Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians in the princely state of Mysoreaccording to the 1911 census. It may be observed that the depressed

caste population constituted a major proportion and next came theVokkaligas. This was how powerful the Vokkaligas were in theformer princely state of Mysore until after Independence. Subse-

115

ll6 The Politics of Baclcwardne ss

Table IShare of SCs/STs and OBCs in the Total Population of Princely

State of Mysore

Sr. Castel Popul- Per cenlNo. Comna- ation to total

nin Hindus

Ijterate Per cent Literate Vo of totalpopul- to total in literateation literate English Hindus

Hindu in Enplishpopulatian

Brahrnin 193137 3.59 80409 27.35 15455 75.14(3.39),r (23.S9)+ (52.95)+

Kshatriya 36894 0.69 6031 2.05 638 3.10(0.0s)+ (r.71)+ (2.r9)+

Vokkaliga 1328237 24.72 42206 14.35 717 3.58

Q3.ZA1* (12.36)1, (2.52\*Lingayat 728571 13.56 66665 22.67 804 3.92

(12.77)* (19.55)* (2.75)+Mudaliar ll87l O.22 3217 1.09 799 3.88

(0.2t)* (0.x1* Q.lq+Other Hindusnot speciallybackward 527891

Speciallybackward orDepressed

Classes ?447636 10.70 636(9.23)*

3.O9(2.18)'r'

l.

J.

4.

f.

11.68 64059(11.01)*

45.54 31467(42.9O)+

21.79 1499 7.29(l8.zg)* (5.r+;*

Total Hindus 5374237 100.00 29N54 100.00 20568 100.00

8. Mohamme- 291708dans

9. Indian 34mlChristians

10. EuropeanAnglo-Indians 5213

5.11+ 34831

0.60* 7820

10.22* 1307 4.48+

2.29+ U3t 8.33*

0.09* 4199 t.23* 3987 13.66+

Total

Note: * These figures are with reference to total population of the state.

Source: Govemment of Mysore: Report of the Committee Appointed to

Consider Steps Necessary for the Adequate Representation of Communities inthe Public Semice, 1919, p. 24.

5705359 100.00+ 3,!0940 t00.00+ 29190 100.00

Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies

Table IIEstimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and

their Relative Shares in the Total Population of Kamataka in 1960

tt7

Caste/Community Estinated

PoPulation

Percentage Percentage to the

to the total total populationHindus of thc state

l. Ahasa 248800

2. Banajiga 3324003. Beda 10021004. Brahmin 9057005. Darzi 650006. Devanga 2210007. Gangakula 4608008. Ganiga 907009. Idiga 528600

10. Kshatriya 7820011. Kumbara 10910012. Kuruba 14558C0

13. Lingayat 32930001C

14. Mahratta 86170015. Meda ' 2830016. Mudali 11220017. Nayinda 12080018. Neyagi 14200019. Rajput 43800

20. Satani 36600

21. Thigala l527OO22. Uppata 22070023. Vokkaliga 27M3OO

24. Yaisya 1214800

25. Viswakarma 4824OO

26. Yadava 31070027. LamarLi 17840028. Waddar 35980029. Nayar 24600

30. Kodaga 56200

31. Other non- 703600Scheduled HinduCastes

1.351.805.444.920.351.202.50o.492.870.420.597.90

17.884.680.150.610.66o.770.240.200.831.20

14.900.792.621.690.9"1

1.950.130.31

3.82

1.181.584.744.280.311.052.180.432.400.37o.526.88

t:.f /4.080.130.530.570.670.210.170.721.04

12.980.682.281.470.84|.700.12o.z73.30

ll8 The Politics of Backwardne ss

Total non- 15514800 84.24 73.37Scheduled Hindus

Scheduled Tribes 87600 0.48 0.41

Total Hindus 18418{nO 100.00 87.09

TotalPopulation 211473c0of the state

100.00

Sorrce: Govemment of Mysore, Mysore Backward Clnsses Committee:Final Report,1961, p. 41.

quently, the Nagana Gowda Committee (1960) did not have rhebenefit of reliable caste-wise population data, as it was not availablefrom 1951 onwards. Therefore, the committee projected the popula-tion of all the castes by using the rate of growth of populationbetween l93l and 1941. According to this estimation, as shown inTable II, Lingayats constituted the highest proportion of state popu-lation, the next highest being the Vokkaligas. Thus the Vokkaligas,who were a nunrerically dominant backward community in the princelystate of Mysore, were reduced to second position after the firstposition. The SCs and STs, though constituting about 14 per cent ofthe population, came to be separately trcated under the special provi-sions of the Constitution and became a separale entity after Indepen-dence. However, the Christians and Muslims continued to be a part ofthe backward classes though they enjoyed minority status under theConstitution.

The hrst Backward Classes Commission (1972) which is popu-larly known as Havanur Commission also faced the sime problem oflack of data on caste-wise population. However, the Havanur Com-mission used, wherever necessary, the 1911, l93l and 1941 caste-

wise census data as the base-year data for projecting the populationof different castes, depending upon their availability from these

various censuses. The Commission projected the population of dif-ferent castes by using the growth rate of total population. The pro-jected population of different castes for 1972 is shown in Table III.

It may be observed that the relative position of the two dominantcommunities-Lingayats and Vokkaligas-remained the same be-cause of the use of constant growth rate for projecting the caste-wise

Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies ll9

Table IIIEstimated Population of Various Castes and Communities and

their Relative Shares in the Total Population ofKarnanka in 1972

Sl.. Castd EstimatedNo.Communiry population

of 1971

Estimated Percentagepopubrton n the.

of 1972 state.population

Per centto totalHindus

l. Agasa2. Ambalavasi3. Arasu4. Balija5. Bandi6. Banjara

(Lamani)7. Beda8. Bhaat9. Bhunt

10. Bogad11. Brahmin12. Chakkan13. Chaliyan14. Chapparabanda15. Chaptegara16. Charodi17. Chunchar18. Darzi19. Devadiga20. Devanga21. Dombam22. Gambit22. Gangakula24. Ganiga25. Garudi26. Gatti27 . Gavli28. Ghadi29. Giddidki30. Ganiga31. Gosavi32. Gujarathi

3464632059

19595460505

t4459345487

14841688059

2002100

2553t23E42l

4930252429432609181557t4

to84'246s375

273692103466630

695888152983

JA'I I

2535100992852

44118282277842398

1.370.010.081.820.06L36

5.860.030;190.014.890.020.010.010.010.01o.o20.430.?51.080.040.032.750.60

-0.01

0.010.040.010.1?0.010.030.01

3552462108

2t2454724109

14793353882

15196

8277205r93

'2622

12694s55048258430012670185858n

I1156767440

280546105E26733

712922156898

26932596

1034429r8

4513729027968z.59

l.l80.01

0.071.570.001.18

5.060.030.680.014.230.o20.010.010.010.01o.o2o.37o.220.93o.(X0.022.380.580.010.010.030.01

0.150.010.030.01

r2a The Politics of Backwardness

33. Gurav 17867

34. Halwaki Wakkal 4470635. Hambar 3327036. Hoovadiga 13078

37. ldiga 65938338. Jogi 4395539. Kanbi 20f.2340. Kanisan 232041. Kasai 10485

42. Kasar 997543. Kodaga 8481244. Kolayan 2048845. Komarpallic 16965

46. Koracha 16965

47. Koraga 906648. Korarna 9575849. Kotari 245650. Kotegar 1241251. Kshatriya 7J39152. Kudihi 1700253. Kumbara 21300654. Kurma 10147

55. Kuruba 1984697

56. Ladar 699'l57. Lingayat 429239258. Mahraua 101264859. Mala 21883

60. Malava 897461. Malavali 3125

62. Marata 3191

63. Meda 30981

64. Moger 18163

65. Mudali 10201066. Mukkavan 522967. Nadar 11194

68. Natuva 4178

69. Nayar 3395870. Nayinda 186958

71. Neygi 21637872. Pandit 6543

73. Pandarem 1619

74. Patramela 197575. Patwe Keri 11563

0.070.180.130.052.600.170.080.010.040.040.330.080.070.0E

0.040.380.010.05o.290.070.840.047.830.03

16.933.990.090.040.010.011.t20.070.40o.o20.040.020.130.740.850.030.010.010.05

18279458323400111392

6576544507221091

2375107331023786271209791735720164

928398055

2515127077530117410

21839910408

20320327153

4392991036377

2402918831903246

3t74218591

rM9795354

114534280

34696191.502221725

669416562022

t1796

0.060.150.110.042.250.150.070.010.040.030.290.070.060.070.030.330.010.040.250.060.730.036.770.02

14.93.450.070.030.010.010.1I0.060.350.020.(X0.010.124.64o.740.020.010.010.04

Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies t2r

76. Rajapuri77. Rajput78. Sanyasi79. Satani

80. Shikalagar81. Sillekyatha82. Satanike83. Sudir84. Udugadusidda85. Tigala86. Uppara87. Vaisya88. Viswakarma89. Vodda90. Vokkaliga91. Yadava92. Other non-

ScheduledHindu Caste

1860478069

35tJ5212527U

1813227t533753052

217128377487174247674698447695

3455699435686966118

0.070.31

0.01o.2l0.010.070.010.010.010.861.49

0.692.661.77

13.67r.723.79

19050

800523447

534592787

1815327783453)L/,J

2232'19

386573178580690689458560

3546171446893982702

0.060.270.01

0.180.01

0.060.01

0.010.010.74t.290.592.301.53

11.821.493.28

Total 21251086 83.89 2176s362 72.53

Scheduled Tribes 231268 0.01 236865 0.79

Total Hindu 25332388 100.00 25945432 86.46

populationof the state

Nate: The district-wise base year population of different castes was projected

to 1971 by using the district growth rate between the base year population and

the 1971 population.The projected district-wise population of various castes estimated for 1971

and adjusted for the changes in the area and population as per reorganisation ofthe state is further projected to 1972 using the district-wise growth rate ofpopulation between 196l and 1971.

Sorrca: Govemment of Kamataka, Report of the First Backward Classes

Commission. 1975. Vol. L

population. It may also be noted that though both the Second Back-

ward Classes Committee headed by Nagana Gowda and the First

Backward Classes Commission headed by Havanur projected the

rate of growth of population by using caste-wise census data from the


pre-Independence censuses, they did not use the same method. Thedifference in the relative shares of population of various castes pro_jected by them is partly on account of different methods used forprojections.

The Second Backward Classes Commission (19g3) headed by T.Venkataswamy realised the weaknesses of the caste-wise populationprojected by the earlier Backward Classes Comminee and Cornmis-sion and decided to conduct household census in Kamataka to esti-mate for the first time after Independence the caste-wise population.The Commission also collected other relevant socio-economic infor-mation through household survey for determining the relative back-wardness of different castes. For this purpose, the Commission can-vassed two schedules, one for the caste and community associationsand another for households. The Commission however admifted thatthe data collected by it were an underestimate to the extent of Z percent. But actually the total population of Hindus, including SCs andSTs, as estimated by the commission for 1984 was less than tle totalpopulation of Hindus as estimated according to the l98l census. Thedifference was to the extent of l0 pbr cent. What is more, in thecontroversy which followed the release of the Second BackwardClasses Commission Report, it was pointed out that one of themembers, after examining the household data collected, circulated anote among the members of the Commission contending that the totalpopulation covered by the Commission was about 70 per cent only.This would mean the caste-wise population was underestimated bythe CommisSion to the extent of 30 per cent. This has also beenconfirmed by several caste associations in the state.

We have projected the caste-wise population of the major casteamong Hindus by using the rate of growth of different castes between191 I and 193 1 , and also by using the proportions of different castesof the 1931 census. These caste-wise population projections arepresented in Tables VII, Vm and D( in Annex 4. It may be observedthat the population, according to our estimate, is slightly more thanthe Hindu population as revealed by the 1981 census. But the Hindupopulation as estimated by the Second Backward Classes Commis-sion (Table IV) is an underestimate to the extent of l0 per cent onpaper. However, the relative positions of major casteVcommunitiesdo not change. The Lingayats rop rhe rank, followed by Vokkaligas

Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies 123

Table IVPopulation of Castes/Communities and their Relative Shares in the

Total Population of Karnataka in 1984

Population % to totalpopulation

AgasaAmbalavasiAmbalakaranBaandhiBalUaBevajiBedaBesthaBrahminBudubudukiBuntDarziDasaruDeshabandariDevadigaDevangaGattiGollaGondaliGonigaGudigaraHalwaki WakkalHelavaHindu SikkaligaraHindu HugarIdigaJettiJogiKammaKaniyanKanjirabatKatikKodagaruKote KshatriyaKottari

306-141

179188

6435479905

11707994196

10130281377550

966129895211787242733

2325104310268146

3270529222

17587123t42941

69295244412963

l0(X9917953

476621122890651ll5200

6058684f/.328578

6927

1.00

0.000.00o.021.330.032.752.803.810.030.830.33o.L20.010.290.740.011.46

0.050.030.010.190.070.010.032.540.01

0.060.250.00

Neglio.170.230.080.02


KshatriyaKudubiKumbaraKurubaLadaraLingayat/VeerashaivaMarathaMedaraMudaliyarNagadha:uNayarNayindaNeygrPategar

RajputRaju KshatriyaRayaravatHindu SadaruSataniscSTsiddiSomavamsha KshatriyaTewarTigalaUpparaUrsVaisyaViswakarma/PanchalaVokkaligaC,N.K.

Other ReligionsBuddhistChristianGurkaJainMuslimParsisikh

158523

24483252439

25014654459

6ttM661t57547

37824172547

1064257163

215272234884

1547255851

5299426

2116020934

573t0271015601

484824727

497121110747296828865

277495708836

42195202445N

r3269682634

670304013

396307132516643

0.440.070.706.920.01

16.925.ZV

0.100.480.030.160.600.650.040.150.01

Negli0.010.060.06

15.862.820.01

0.070.010.60l.3l0.080.7'l1.96

11.680.68

0.041.890.000.84

10.97

0.01o.o2

Total populationof the state

J6r24594 100.00

Karnaaka Govemment's Reservation P olicies

Notes'. 1. SC = Scheduled Caste

2. ST = Scheduled Tribe

3. CNK = Caste not known4. These caste-wise population data were estimated by the Second Baclcward

Classes Commission (1983) based on its household survey'

Source: Report of the Second Bacl<ward Classes Commission, VoI III' 1986'

pp. 28-30.

and among other backward classes which are in minority' Kurubas,

Marathas, Idigas, Viswakarmas and Upparas come in that order' The

relative positions of artisans are insignificant. Thus the general obser-

vation that the numerically two dominant communities are also eco-

nomically and politically dominant is supported by their relative

demographic position in the state.

As far as the SC and ST population is concerned, we have got

fairly reliable data from successive censuses. However, the data on

ST population, as revealed by the 1981 census are not reliable be-

cauie all the Bedas have reported as Nayaks with a view to getting

the ST status.4 Hence, we find a sudden rise in the ST population of

Kamataka in 1981.

3. Recommendations of Different Commissions

3.1. Miller Committee's Recommendations

We have already mentioned in the first section that the MillerCommittee provided the rationale for the reservation policy in the

princely state of Mysore as far back as 1919. The Committee also

iuggested two basic criteria for determining the backwardness ofdifferent castes and other social groups. These criteria continued to

be followed by successive committees and commissions' with suit-

able modifications.The Miller Committee used the criterion of educational backward-

ness with reference to the percentage of literates in English in each ofthe castes and communities. Since knowledge of English was consid-

ered a necessary qualification for government service' the literacy

rate in English of the different castes and communities was used as an

important criterion for determining their educational backwardness'

This broad criterion was fair enough. However, some degree ofarbitrariness was injected while applying this criterion by treating

r25

126 The politics of Bachrtardness

those castes and communities as backward whose English_knowingliterates were less than 5 per cent of their population. The Commirtees did not elaborate the reasons for using 5 per cent as the cut-offpoint.

The second criterion used by the Miller Committee was the pro_portion of people of different castes and communities in the stategovemment service. Even here, the Comminee excluded the menialand inferior jobs, which according to the Committee were not rel_evant as in any case the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes wouldpredominate in these jobs. The Colnmittee classified those castes andcommunities whose population had less than 5 per cent of literacyrate in English and also those whose members were not adequatelyrepresented in the government service as backward classes. TheCommittee did not bother about limiting the representation in gov-ernment service to the proportion of population of each caste, be-cause the number of non-Brahmins in government service was abys-mally low.

The Committee countered the argument of merit, which was ad-vanced against reservation, in the following way: ..Efficiency, how-ever, is not to be measured solely or even mainly by academicqualifications and it will not be denied that there are many importantbranches of the adrninistration in which other qualities such as sym-pathy, honesty of purpose, energy and common sense go as far tomake an efficient officer as literary superiority."s Further, the Com-mittee maintained that ". . . under the present system of Govemment,the officers of the Government in the higher grades of the servicehave necessarily much influence in shaping the policy of the admin-istration, and the efficiency of the services viewed as machines forsecuring the even and uniform progress of the State, is likely to beincreased by the presence in their ranks, of officers of differentcommunities . . . For the fact cannot be ignored that an officer in theexercise of his duty making appointments and promotions finds iteasier to see the virtues of his own community than those of others."6The Comminee observed, with reference to the field-level jobs ingovernment service: "It is these officers who come most frequently incontact in their official capacity with all the classes of people of theState, and from the point of view of general administration it seemsdesirable that in these grades a full representation of all important

Kamataka Goverrnent's Resemation Policies

communities should be found.-7 These argunrents were used forrecommending reservation in government jobs for the non-Brahmins.

After so justifying the policy of reservation, the Committee found

that all non-Brahmins, except Mudaliars, Anglolndians and Europe-

ans, were educationally backward. However, the Committee recom-

rnended that the Mudaliar and Pillai communities should also be

included in the backward category though the Committee did notjustify or elaborate the reasons for this violation of its own criteria-

Accordingly, all the non-Brahmins were classified as backward classes

by the Miller Commiuee. This is the reason why the backward

classes came to be known as non-Brahmins ia the former princely

state of Mysore.It was realised that a separate rcservation for each caste-group was

not possible at that tfune and therefore, the Comminee classified allcastes into: ( I ) Brahmins, (2) other caste Hindus, Mohammedans and

Indian Christians, and (3) the depressed classes (SCs and STs). The

Committee recomrnended that while applying the reservation policyto governnentjobs, first preference should be given to SCs. This was

so that the dominant backward castes and communities would notmonopolise and corner the benefits. Thus the extent of rcservationwas supposed to be implernented in reverse order, first to the de-

pressed classes and then for other classes such as Hindus, Muslimsand Indian Christians and finally open to the Brahmins. The Commirtee recommended: "within a period of not more than 7 years, not less

than one-half of the higher and two'thirds of the lower appointments

in each grades of the service and so far as possible in each office are

to be held by the members of the communities other than the Brahmin

community, preference being given to duly qualified candidates ofthe depressed classes when such are available."s

The Committee suggested grant of exemptions from qualifying

educational tests, preferential treafinent in the case of equal or nearly

equal qualifications, relaxation of severity of prescribed tests and

prescribed the selection of a minimum proportion of backward classes

in making appointrnents. Though the Committee examined the need

for a roster system in promotion, it found this very difficult to apply

at that time.The two Brahmin members gave dissenting notes to the

Committee's report. One of them recommended proportional repre-

127


sentation for each caste in order it prevent the dominant among thebackward communities cornering the benefits of reservation. But theother member, M.C. Ranga Iyengar, simply rejected most of therecommendations on the ground that any reservation would harmefficiency of administration by preventing persons with merit fromjoining the service.

The government in its order dated 16 May l92l accepted therecommendations of the Committee in regard to reservation but noton promotions. The govemment order did not specify the percentageof reservation but only indicated that the proportion of backwardclasses in government service would be gradually raised to 50 percent of the total strength within seven years from 1921. The maxi-mum age for entering government service was also increased from 25to 28 years and spme relaxation was made in regard to the qualifyingtests and examinations for appointments in some departments of thegovernment.

3.2. Nagana Gowda Committee's RecommendationsThe Nagana Committee used three criteria for the purpose gf

classifying backwardness:I . Social backwardness of a community judged by the status of the

community in society in general, apart from individuals. Thus thefirst criterion used was the caste if the people were in the Hindu castehierarchy.

2. General educational backwardness, based on certain fixed stan-dards. The Committee used the state average of students of differentcommunities studying in High School in 1959-60. For this purpose,those below the state average were classified as educationally back-ward.

3. Representation of Communities in govemment seryice.The Committee submitted an interim report in which it recom-

mended the p€rcentage of literacy of several communities as one ofthe criteria. In addition to this the number of students of each commu-nity studying for the last three high-school classes during 1959-60was also used and those communities whose proportion was equal toand below the state average were classified as educationally back-ward and eligible for reservation.

In its final report, the Committee further classified backward

Kantataka Government's Reservation Policies

classes into 'backward class' (Group-A) and 'more backward class'

(Group-B). The more backward classes were those whose standard of

education was less than 50 per cent of the state average, and those

whose standard of education was above this limit and up to state

average were grouped under backward class. The Cofirmittee recom-

mended that 50 per cent of the seats in the technical institutions and

45 per cent of the jobs in govemment service should be reserved for

the backward classes. The Committee distributed these percentage

reservations between more backward and backward classes in the

following ways: For admission to technical institutions, 28 per cent

for backward classes and 22 pet cent for more backward classes' In

regard to appointment in govemment service, for the purpose of

Article 16(4), the Committee determined that only 45 per cent of the

backward classes was under-represented; of this 2l per cent consti-

tuted backward classes and 24 pet cent constituted more backward

classes. These proportions were determined on the basis of their

relative shares of the population. The Committee estimated that the

total population of backward classes in the state was about 57 per

cent, comprising 33 per cent backward classes and 24 per cent more

backward classes.

The Committee recommended for the first time that all the stu-

dents from families whose income was less than Rs. 1,200 per annum

should be given free hostel and educational facilities' But the Com-

mittee did not use this income criterion for the purpose of reservation

in admission to technical institutions and for jobs in government

service.The Committee also recommended that these reservations should

be reviewed after l0 years (i.e., by l98l), and the communities which

show improvement in their educational status and representation ingovemment service be removed from the list after such a review. One

rnajor recommendation of this Committee was that the entire commu-

nity of Lingayats was made forward. There was a note of dissent

against this recommendation by a member, M.S. Patil' who was a

Lingayat. He alleged that the Committee deliberately got the origi-

nally estimated percentage of Lingayat students studying in High

Schools revised by the Director of Public Instruction (DPI) so as to

make it more than the state average (6.6 per cent) with a view to

removing Lingayats from the backward classes list. This recommen-

r29

130 Thc politics of Baclcwardness

dation sparked off a political conftoversy and in the legal banlewhich followed the Mysore High Court struck down the govemmentorder implernenting the recomnpndations of this Committee.

3.3. Havanur Conmission's ReconunendationsThe Havanur Commission had leamt the lessons from the past

developments in reservation policy, both for the purpose of develop-ing the methodology and appropriate criteria for determining theeducational backwardness of different castes and communities. asalso for forrnulating the recomrnendations in such a way as to satisfyjudicial scnrtiny. The Havanur Commission got a selective samplesurvey otr households done in order to obtain information on thesocio-economic status of differcnt castes and communities in the.state. This infonnation was used rnainly for the purpose of determin-ing the eronomic staus as also for examining the nexus between theeconomic and social staars of different sections of the people. But theCommission used the 1972 datzrc,lating to the percentage of studentsof different castes who passed the SSI-C examination, for determin-ing educational backwardness. Those castes and communities whosepercentage of SSlC-passed students was equal to or below the stateaverage werc classified as educationally backward and those abovethe state avefirge were classified as forward. Knowing the judicialopinion against using caste as a criterion for determining the back-wardness of the people, the Havanur Commission avoided the ex-plicit use of caste but used the educational criterion in such a way as

to obtain the sarne result. For reservations in govemment jobs underArticle 16(4), the Commission used the proportion of people fromeach caste and community represented in governrrent service.

The Havanur Commission Report classified the backward classesinto three grcups: (l) backward tribes, (2) backward castes, and (3)backward communities. The backward tribes were similar to sched-uled tribes. Backward castes were rnostly the artisans and such otherbackward castes, other that the dominang majority backward com-munities. The backward communities includcd all other dominantcasteVcommunities, except Lingayas who should be treated as for-ward. In other words, the Havanur Commission confirmed tle rec-omrnendation of the Nagana Gowda Committee but with more logicand empirical justification. The Commission fixed the proportion of

Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies 131

reservation according to the poPulation of these categories in the total

population.The government of Karnataka, while implementing the recom-

mendations of the Commission, added seven more castes to the

backward castes list and also prescribed a family income criterion ofRs. 10,000, both to filter the better-off among even the backward

castes and communities as also to satisfyjudicial opinion. Even then,

the Lingayats questioned the govemment order in the court of law.

The High Court used the principle of severability and upheld the

major recommendations of the Havanur Commission, but deleted

those castes which were added by the government. The Court also

upheld the fourth category, 'Backward Special Group', which the

govemment order had created, under which all those candidates

whose parents were engaged in traditional occupations and had verylow incomes were made eligible for 5 per cent reservation.

The Lingayats went in appeal against the judgement. The Supreme

Court allowed the state govemment to constitute a new Commissionto collect fresh data and determine the backwardness of the people.

Accordingly, the Second Backward Classes Commission was ap-pointed in 1983.

3.4. Venkataswamy Commission's RecommendationsThe Second Backward.Classes Commission used multiple criteria

to determine the socially and educationally backward sections of thepeople for the purpose of reservations in admission to educationalinstitutions and in government service. The Commission used 17

indicators of which 9 were negative and 8 positive indicators. The 17

indicators included percentages for the following: illiteracy in each

caste, students studying in each caste, households livingin pucca and/<utclra houses, landless households, households owning above 20

standard acres of land, households having an annual income of Rs.

5,000 and below, households having an annual income of Rs. 20,000and above and finally, representation in Classes I, tr and III state

govemment jobs. If a caste or a community scored 9 and above points

in this set of l7 indicators, it was considered as educationally back-ward. The castes and communities which scored less than 9 pointswere classified as forward for the purpose of reservations underArticle 15(4).


For the purpose of reservation in government service under Article16(4), the proportion of each caste population to the total populationwas used. The castes and communities which had more than theproportion of their population in government service were declaredas forward.

Using these criteria, the Commission recommended that32.98 percent of tle total population of the state was educationally backwardand required reservation under Article 15(4). But the Commissionrecommended only 27 per cent of reservation for this 33 per cent ofpopulation, which was identified as educationally backward. Noexplanation was given as to why and how this 27 per cent wils

determined. Further, the Commission used separate tests for reserva-

tion under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). It used the proportion of each

caste representation in Classes I, II, and III jobs twice, once as a part

of 17 indicators for reservation under Article l5(4) and again whileidentifying the castes for reservation under Article 16(4). Whenever

the Commission found contradictory results, such as when some ofthe castes which were classified as educationally and economicallybackward became forward caste for the purpose of reservation under

Article 16(4), the Commission tried to escape from such inconsisten-

cies by using l8 indicators for the purpose of resolving the tie.

The Commission used 17 indicators to classify the educationalbackwardness of only 62 castes. The remaining 13 castes did not

consistently satisfy either the economic backwardness tests or educa-

tional backwardness tests. Some of these castes became education-

ally forward in terms of the basic tests but still economically back-ward, while they appeared economically forward. In order to resolve

this contradiction, the Commission combined the educational test

criterion with the l7 socio-economic indicators, making a total of l8indicators and prescribed 10 as a minimum score for qualifying forthe backward classes tag. Thus, for 62 castes the Commission used

17 indicators and for 13 castes it used 18 indicators.The Commission recommended the application of a family in-

come ceiling of Rs. 15,00O per annum for eliminating economically

better-off families among the backward classes. It also recommended

abolition of 'Backward Special Group' and 'Backward Tribe'.The Commission's report was not unanimous and therefore be-

came controversial. Almost half of the members gave dissenting

Karnataka Government's Reservation Policies 133

notes and five of them submitted a dissenting letter to ihe chiefminister of Kamataka, requesting him to reject the entire report. In

the course of this controversy, the choices of the multiple c$teria and

also the data used were questioned. The Commission's recommenda-

tions bristled with arbitrariness. First, the coverage of the survey was

disputed. As already mentioned, it varied from 70 per cent to 90 per

cent and more imponantly, Bangalore City was not adequately cov-ered by the survey. Second, the data used for determining the status

of different castes in terms of illiteracy, percentage of students study-

ing in SSLC, percentage of urban population, and percentage of self-employed were all found defective as they did not tally with the state

averages of the 1981 census. The criteria used werc not appropriate,partly because there was double weightage given to each of the

criteria, like the percentage of families having an annual income ofRs. 5,000 and below and having an annual income ofRs. 20,00O and

above, p€rcentage of landless families, percentage of families own-ing 20 standard acres of land and above and percentage of familieslivingin pucca and ftutcfta houses. The Commission used 9 points fordetermining the backwardness of 62 castes and l0 points for theremaining l3 castes. Besides, the Commission used the state average

equal to or above for determining the 62 castes as backward but onlyabove the state average for 13 castes.

The most important test for determining the educational back-wardness of different castes was the percentage of SSLC pupils inother castes. The Havanur Commission used the April 1972 SSLCresults, whereas the Venkataswamy Commission used the April 1985

results. The caste-wise information was reported to have been ob-tained from 3017 High Schools out of a total of 3244 High Schoolsin the state. It was found that the information about caste was notinsisted upon from the students appearing for the SSLC examination.How reliable then was the data on caste-wise percentage of SSLCpassed students which the Commission used? Apart from this, theresults of one examination cannot really indicate the educationalbackwardness of different caste-groups because education is a long-drawn process. Therefore, we must take an average of all or severalyears of SSLC qualified people to the total number of SSLC qualifiedpeople to determine the educational status ofeach caste-group. Thoughthe Commission collected data on the total number of SSLC qualified

134 The Politics of Baclorardness

people in each caste through the household survey, it did not use

them for reasons not explained anywhere. What is rnore, the HavanurCommission classified all those castes whose percentages of SSLCpassed students in the total population of different castes was equal to

and below the state average as backward and classified only those

whose percentages were clearly above the state average as forward.

But the Second Backward Classes Commission classified even those

castes whose percentages were equal to the state average as forward.

This has been found to be arbitrary and contrary to the existingjudicial interpretation.

As a result of all these weaknesses, the Second Backward Classes

Commission's report created heated political debates in the state. The

state govemment, while appointing the Second Backward Classes

Commission, had excluded representatives from the two major castes

(Lingayats and Vokkaligas) from the membership of the Commis-

sion. If this was done in the hope that it might ensure the impartialworking of the Commission or force it to include the dominant castes

in the list of backward classes, that hope did not materialise. Other

members, belonging mostly to minority backward castes did not

work as a united team, as is amply evident from the dissenting and

other submissions appended to the report. Subsequently, a lengthy

letter written by five members of the Commission to the chief minis-

ter disowning the recommendations exposed the weaknesses of the

Commission. As a result the govemment of Karnataka was forced to

reject the recommendations of the Commission and issue a tempo-

rary government policy. This brder retains the basic classification ofthe backward classes made in the govemment order of 1977 . Theonly difference is that it includes Lingayats also as a backward

community for the purpose of reservation under Articles 15(4) and

'16(4).

4. Extent of ReservationWe have got information on the extent of reservation for the

purpose of admission to €ducational institutions under Article l5(4)and for government jobs under Article 16(4) from the recommenda-

tions of the Second Backward Classes Committee of 1960, the firstBackward Classes Commission of 1972, and the Second Backward

Classes Commission of 1983. Besides, we have got similar informa-

Karnataka G ove rnment's Re se rvation P olic ie s

tion on the extent of reservations actually made by the state govern-

ment through the government orders which were issued from time to

time. However, we do not have information about the extent ofreservation made in the princely policy based on the recommenda-

tions of the Miller Committee. The Miller Committee's recommen-

dations were accepted by the then state govemment and the govern-

ment order was issued in 1921. From l92l till the govemment order

was issued, it remained in operation. And this order covered almost

97 per cent of the population because it excluded only Brahmins,

Anglo-Indians and Europeans. People of all other castes and commu-

nities were made eligible for reservations. These castes and commu-nities included all the non-Brahmins Hindu castes, SCs, STs, IndianChristians, Muslims, Jains and others. But no clear-cut percentage offeservation was made for each of these castes and communities. Thegovemment order had broadly reserved about 50 per cent of the totaljobs and admissions to educational institutions for all backward

classes. Even this percentage was proposed to be achieved over a

period of seven years.

The Second Backward Classes Committee, (Nagana Gowda Com-mittee), estimated that about 57 per cent of the population in the

integrated Kamataka state could be considered backward. This ex-cluded SCs and STs who constituted 18 per cent of the total popula-tion. Further, the Committee classified the backward classes into'more backward'and 'backward'. It was estimated that the 'back-

ward' group would be about 33 per cent and 'more backward' wouldbe about 24 per cent. But the Committee recommended 28 per cent ofreservation under Article 15(4) for the backward group and 22 percent for the more backward group, thus making the total reservationonly 50 per cent. This excluded 18 per cent reservation for SCs and

STs. If we take into account both these reservations, the total reser-

vation would be 68 per cent, covering 75 per cent of the totalpopulation of the state.

However, for the purpose of reservation in government serviceunder Article 16(4), the Committee recommended 45 per cent reser-

vation only. Accordingly, the Committee fixed 21 per cent for the

backward group and 24 per cent for the more backward group. Thus,

under reservation in govemment jobs under Article 16(4), the totalpercentage of reservation came to 63 per cent. The details relating topercentage of population covered and the percentage of quota of

135


reservation are indicated in Table V.The Havanur Commission recommended classification of back-

ward classes into three groups for reservation under Article 15(4) and

l6(4), viz. Backward Tribes (BT), Backward Castes (BC), and Back-

ward Communities (BCM). The then govemment accepted the rec-

ommendations but added seven more castes to the BCM category and

the Christian converts from SC group to BC group. The extent ofreservations and the population covered by the recommendations ofHavanur Commission are shown below:

Percentage of reservation recommended by Havanur Commission

for purpose of Article 15(4)

Vo of popu- Quota oflation Reservation

2. Backward Castes

3. Backward Tribes

14.498.00

1OVo

6%

Total 44.52 32%

Percentage of reservation recommended for purpose ofArticle 16H)

% of popu-lation

Quota ofReservation

T- --EacEwffi-eommunitiei 19.20 l6va

2. Backward Castes

3. Backward Tribes

14.47 t0%8.00 6Vo

Total 4t.67

According to the Havanur Commission's report, 45 per cent of the

people of the state, excluding SCs and STs, were made eligible forreservations. Including 18 per cent of SCs and STs, the total popula-

tion covered for reservation under Article 15(4) and l6(4) was 63 per

cent. But the govemment expanded the Havanur Commission's list

by adding seven more castes/communities, viz. Arasu, Ganiga, Balija'Devanga, Satam, Rajput and Muslims. It also created a new category

of Backward Special Group (BSG), under which economic back-

wardness was the sole criterion and people from any caste or cornmu-

Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies

Table V

Extent of Coverage and Percentage o.f Rc ".:rvatwtsRecommended by Various Backward Clitr*" Committees/

Commissions in Karnataka

137

Percentage of Population Percentage of Quota ofCovered Reservation

OBC + SC & ST = Total OBC + sC & ST -- TotalPopul- Peration cent

covered QuotaReser-

vation

As per Miller 97Vo 50%

Committee'sRecommendations

As per GovemmentOrder of 1921 9'IVo SOVa

As per Nagana CowdaCommittee'sRecommendationsInterim Report 57Vo + 187o =759o 25qe a l$/o = 4-l9t

As per Nagana GowdaCommittee's Recommen-dations Final Report 57% + 18Vo = 75Vo 5O9o + lSVa = 68Vo

(45Eo)

As per GovemmentOrder of 1960 57Vo + 18% =75Vo 22Vo + lSVo = 4OVa

As per HavanurCommission's 45% + 18% = 63% 32% + 18Vo = 50Va

Recommendations

As per GovemmentOrder of 1977 63% + 189o =81% 4O% + lSVa = 58Vo

As per CovemmentOrder of 1979 499o + 18% =67% 4O7a + ISVo = 58?o

As per VenkataswamyCommission's 33Vo + lSVo = 5l%o' 27% + lSVo = 45Vo

Recommendations

138

As per GovemmentOrder of 1986 777o + lSVo = 95Vo 5OVo+189o=68%

Note: This is for reservation forjobs under l6(4).

nity could qualify for reservation under this category. Therefore, theGovemment Order of 1977 covered 77 per cent of the total popula-tion, including SCs and STs and also Muslims.

According to this order, the number of castes and the percentageof reservations were as follows:

The Politics of Bacla,vardne ss

BCMBCBTBSG

16 castes

129 castes

62 castes

open to all

20%lOTo

5Vo

5%

But this order was questioned in the High Court and the HighCourt removed seven castes from the list of backward classes. Ac-cordingly, the government was forced to issue a fresh order in 1979.According to the 1979 order, 63 per cent of the total population wascovered. This included SCs, STs, Muslims and the Backward SpecialGroup. The relative shares of reservations of OBCs under the 1979government order were as follows:

BaclcwardClass

category

No. of Castes No. of Castesunder Article under Anicle

1s(4) 16(4)

Modified % ofResemation

under Article

BCMBCBTBSG

9114

58

l)ln58

20%'to%

5%5%

t8%lOTo

5%5%- open to all -

The Venkataswamy Commission's recommendations covered only32.98 per cent of the population, excluding SCs and STs. IncludingSCs and STs, it would be 5l per cent of the total population. Thisreduction was mainly because of the elimination of a number ofcastes from the list of backward classes.

The recommended percentage of reservations is shown as follows:

Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies t39

BackwardClass/Group

No. o[ Castes PercenlaSe oJ

and Comrnunities PoPulation

17.77

15.21

Recommended Vo ofR es en'at ion unde r Artic le

t<

20

15(4) 16(4

147o

137o

But the government did not accept the recommendations of the

Second Ba&ward Classes Commission' Instead, it issued Lt ad hoc

order specifying the castes and communities to be treated as educa-

tionally baciward and the extent of reservations' The list of back-

ward ;lasses and the modified percentage of reservation made ac-

cording to this order are as follows:

Group No. ofCasteswd.erArticlcts(4)

No. ofCastesundcrArticleI6(4)

9o of Reser'vation wrder

Article1s(4)

9o of Reservationunder Article

16(4)

A. Backward 61 6lTribe (BT)

B. Backward 135 119

Caste (BC)

C. Backward 7 'l

Community (BCM-D

D. Backward 7 16

Community (BCM-II)

5

l3

16

11

f

5

l)

l6

9

fE. BackwardSpecial GrouP

All '

The Janata Government order of 1986 has retained the earlier

existing total reservation quota of 68 per cent consisting of 50 per

cent for OBCs and 18 Per cent for SCs.

According to the Govemment Order of 1986, about 95 per cent of

the total population has been covered by the backward classes list and

the total percentage of reservation continues to be 68 per cent' This

is mainly because of the retention of backward special group under

which people from any community can claim backwardness if their

econornic position warrants it and also because Lingayats were brought

l4A The politics of Backwardness

back to the backward classes list. Consequently, the recenr govem_ment order covers a larger percentage of people for purposes ofreservation.

^ However, it is necessary to remember that mere coverage in terms

of total population will not benefit such a large population, becauseof the qualifying tests introduced in order to ditermine eligibility forreservation. These are the family income limits and the minimumprescribed educational qualifications which entitle people to get intogovernment service. Looked at the coverage from this angle, onlyabout 25 per cent of the total population might become eligible forcompeting for benefits under reservation. There are several reasonsfor this.

The existing reservation for SCs and STs is lg per cent. Under thenew Government Order, about 5 per cent of the population (it isactually 4.63 per cent as estimated by the Venkatasw;my Commis_sion), is identified as Backward Tribes. Since there is no incomeceiling for them, the entire BT population is entitled for reservation.In the case of OBCs, i.e., those who are covered under B, C, D andE groups, there is a family income ceiling of Rs. 10,000 for casteswhich are included under B, C and D groups and Rs. g,000 under Egroup. The estimated poverty line for the state of Kamataka for theyear 1983-84 is abour Rs. 5,750 for a family offive. people below thepoverty line in rhe state in 1983-84 consriture about 36 per cent ofpeople, of whom 18 per cent are SCs and STs and 5 per cent are BTs.Out of 36 per cent of people who are below the poverty line, if wededuct this 23 per cent, we are left with only 13 per cent. Since thefamily income limit is up to Rs.10,000 we may reasonably assumethat another 20 per cent of the people will become eligible forbenefits under reservation. This means that the total percentage ofpeople other than SC, ST and BT, who will be eligible for reservationunder OBC category would be around 33 per cent. This 33 per centplus 23 per cent would be 56 per cent. Out of this 56 per cent, thosewbo qualify for admission into educational institutions and sovern_ment jobs will be those who pass SSLC and above eduJationalexaminations. This proportion of the population may be estimated byusing the literacy rate. At present, the literacy rate in Karnataka isabout 34 per cent, of which ar least 15 per cent would be eligible forreservation benefits under OBCs, and another l0 per cent under SC

Kamatakn Government's Reservation Policies l4l

and ST categories. In other words, the effective percentage of popu-Iation which will be eligible for competing for benefits under resewa-tion will not exceed 25 per cent of the total population in the state.

This would be about one crore of people. Even out of this one crore,those who are already over-age (above 30 years) may come to about

50 lakhs. So every year, 50 lakh persons will be eligible for reserva-tion under the OBC, SC and ST quotas. This will come to about 12

per cent of the total population. Without attempting to estimate thereally eligible percentage of population, some people have unneces-sarily magnified the percentage to give an impression that reservationwill benefit virtually 95 per cent of the total population of the state.

5. Applicability of Income CriterionArticles 15(4) and 16(4) are intended to enable the government to

formulate such policies as are necessary to promote the educationaladvancement of the socially backward sections of the society. How-ever, they do not indicate clearly as to what constitutes social back-wardness, though educational backwardness can be judged with areasonable degree of accuracy. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in the courseof his reply to the debate on the First Amendment to the Constitution,clarified that social backwardness mentioned in Clause (4) of Article15 included economic backwardness also. Accordingly, successivejudgements ofthe High Courts and the Supreme Court on the issue ofreservation have interpreted that caste alone cannot be considered as

an indicator of social backwardness. They have maintained that thelevel of income of the family should also be considered as a neces-sary criterion for determining the social backwardness of differentsections of the people.

It is curious to note that Article 335, which concems reservationfor SCs and STs in government service does not explicitly indicatethat government should take into account the family income of SCsand STs. As a result, Courts have interpreted that there is no need forapplying the income criterion while making reservations for SCs andSTs. In contrast, even though Clause (4) of Article 15 does notexplicitly mention the income criterion, the Courts have held that it isnecessary to apply it in order to filter the better-off sections of theOBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation. This'varying inter-pretation gives the impression that the Courts, while reviewing the


constitutional reservations for SCs, STs and OBCs have interpretedsimilar constitutional provisions differently with regard to the appli-cation of the income criterion. It looks as though the Courts havethemselves tried to create different constitutional provisions for res-ervations for SCVSTs and OBCs. This has not been noticed byscholars, members of backward classes, legislators and even legalcommentators.

Until such interpretation was given by the High Courts and the

Supreme Court, the state govemments, which were implementing the

reservation policy, did not impose the income criterion to eliminatethe better-off sections of the backward classes from enjoying the

benefits of reservation. In Kamataka, the Miller Committee did notbother about the income criterion in 1919. After Independence and

even after the introduction of the new Constitution, the Second

Backward Classes Committee of 1960 did not prescribe any income

criterion for making reservation for the OBCs. The Committee onlyindicated that those students whose family income did not exceed Rs.

1,200 per annum may be given free hostel facilities and other assis-

tance to enable them to improve their educational levels . The Havanur

Commission also did not impose any income criterion for limitingreservations to only tle worse-off sections of the OBCs. However,

the Government Order of 1977 which was formulated on the basis ofthe recommendations of the Havanur Commission did prescribe an

income criterion. All OBCs whose family income was Rs. 10,000

and above were disqualified from enjoying benefits of reservation

and a lower income limit of Rs. 4,800 was prescribed for those who

would claim reservation benefits under the BSG category. The Sec-

ond Backward Classes Commission justified this income criterionand enhanced the family income limit to Rs 15,000. Accepting the

income criterion as a necessary test for preventing the better-offsections of OBCs from enjoying the benefits of reservation, the

Government Order of 1986 has also prescribed the income criterion

of Rs 10,000 for backward castes and backward communities I and IIand Rs 800 for the BSG. No income criterion is prescribed for the

backward tribes.Thus it may be observed that in Kamataka even those groups of

people who are identified as backward classes and who are in need ofspecial assistance under the reservation policy, have to satisfy the

Karnanka Government's Reservation Policies

minimum family income criterion. This has introduced a concept ofequity into the reservation policy. Unfortunately, the way it has been

implemented or enforced has made a mockery of the whole equity

principle. There have been innumerable cases of false income certifi-

cates being produced, particularly by the better-off sections of the

candidates from rural areas, belofging to backward castes and com-

munities and enjoying the benefits of reservation. Even members ofbackward castes and communities employed in government service

have tried to resort to adoption of children to get the benefits ofrescrvation. It is true that the government of Karnatalia has started

prosecuting those who have submitted false income certificates but

such cases are very few and perhaps only to counter public criticism.It has been rccognised by all right-thinking people that an income

criterion should be used to filter the better-off sections of both the

SCs and STs from enjoying the benefits of reservations under our

constitutional provisions. I-et us hope that the Govemment of Indiaand the state governments will muster sufficient political courage to

enforce this equity criterion for reservation, both for OBCs and SCV

STs, at least after 1990.

6. An Overall EvaluationIn the state of Kamataka a majority of the OBCs have been

enjoying benefits of the reservation policy for a long time, both inadmissions to educational institutions and in government service.

Consequently, some communities like the Vokkaligas and the

Lingayats have come to enjoy adequate representation in the state

government service. This is evident from the data published by the

Second Backward Classes Commission for 1984 (see Table VI).Though the population of various castes and communities has been

underestimated by the Second Backward Classes Commission, we

may surmise with a reasonable degree of accuracy that these twocommunities are adequately represented in the state government

service. However, the case of other castes and communities is open

to question, because of the unreliability of the data, even from officialsources.

As far as SCs and STs are concemed, Karnataka seems to have

achieved a miracle in the past l0 years. The SCs and STs have a

reasonable proportion of governnrent jobs. They have also been

143


Table VIRepresentatiort of Various Castes and Communities in State

Government Semices in Kamataka

(,No.

Religion/Caste

Percentage ofpopulation as

per l9E4 suney

Percentage ofrepresentatnn

in State Govt. Service

Hindul. Agasa

2. Ambalavasi3. Ambalakaran4. Baandhi5. Balija6. Bavaji7. Beda8. Bestha9. Brahmin

10. Budu-Budukill. Bhunt12. Darji13. Dasaru

14. Deshabandari15. Devadiga16. Devanga17. Ganiga18. Gani19. Golla20. Gondhali21. Goniga22. Gudigara23. Halwakki Wakkai24. Helawa25. Hindu Sikkaligara26. Hindu Hugar27. ldiga28. Jeni29. Iogi30. Kamma31. Kaniyan32. Kanjirbat33. Khatik34. Kodagaru

1.00

0.000.000.02I,JJ0.332.752.803.810.030.830.330.120.010.290.740.450.01t.460.050.030.01

0.190.070.010.032.540.010.060.250.000.00o.17o.23

0.750.000.000.031.500.04l.l1|.79

15.540.030.84o.370.050.00o.290.76

0.020.760.030.030.0r0.030.020.000.030.180.030.04o.280.01o.0lo.l41.56

Karnataka G ov e rnme nt' s Re se n ation P olic ie s 145

35. Kote Kshatriya36. Kottari37. Kshatriya38. Raju Kshatriya39. Kudubi40. Kumbara41. Kuruba42. Ladra43. LingayataN eerashaival

44. Maratha45. Medar46. Mudaliar47, Nagartharu48. Nayar49. Nayinda50. Neygi51. Pategar

52. Rajput53. Ravula54. Raya Ravut

55. Hindu Sadaru

56. Satani57. SC58, ST

59. Siddi60. SomavamshaKshatriya61. Tewar62. Tigala63. Uppara64. Urs65. Vaisya66. ViswakarmaPanchala67. Vokkaliga

Other Religions68. Buddhist69. Christian70. Gurka/1. Jaln

72. Muslim73. Parsi

0.08o.o20.440.010.070.706.920.016.923.200.100.480.030.160.600.650.040.150.000.010.060.06

15.862.820.010.070.010.601.31

0.080.771.96

I 1.68

0.041.890.000.84

10.970.01

0.100.o2o.620.070.030.502.810.00

19.68

3.260.040.490.030.180.470.840.030.570.01

0.000.020.178.532.750.000.070.00o.290.830.171.342.24

11.74

0.01

3.93o.o20.809.450.00

74. Sikh 0.02 0.00

Commission, Vol. I , 1986, pp. 245-47.

146 The Politics of Backwardne ss

enjoying a roster system and preference in promotions. The dis-pute is only over achieving the maximum constitutional percentageshare ofjobs in each and every govemment department. Those whoare lagging behind in the field of education as well as in govemmenrservice have been the artisan castes like barbers, washerman, black-smiths, carpenters and the like, whose main weakness lies in theirinsignificant numbers. It looks as though it is mainly the numericalstrength of a caste or community which enables it to mobilise politi-cal power and get its due adequate share in government service and

in educational institutions.It is surprising that the govemment of Karnataka has not bothercd

to make an assessment of the impact of the reservation policy onvarious castes and communities in the field of education and in thewider socio-economic sphere. No attempt has been made, even bythe scholars, to throw light on this aspect. Further, no scholar has

attempted to find out the performance of the candidates of differentcastes and communities who got admission into educational institu-tions and entered govemment service under reservation as comparedto those who got admissions and jobs through open competition.Though such a study will almost certainly be controversial as well as

difficult to conduct, its relevance from the point of view of policy and

social science research methodology cannot be overstated.Finally, it looks as though the 'sociology of knowledge' is all-

pervading in formulating policies, rccommendations, and even imple-menting reservation policy in this country and particularly in Karnatakastate. For example, the two members of the Miller Committee fromthe Brahmin community gave dissenting notes by using merit as an

excuse. They cannot escape from the charge of trying to defend theinterests of their own caste; rnerit was only an excuse to rationalisetheir arguments. In the case of the Second Backward Classes Com-mittee, one member belonging to the Lingayat community submitteda dissenting note against the majority recommendation of mi*ingLingayats forward. Though one may argue that he was equally inter-ested in protecting the intercst of his own commdniry, the argumenthad advanced in his minute of dissent gives an impression that the

Second B ackward Classes Comminee ( I 960) manipulated the data toshow that the educational status of Lingayats was above the state

average.

Karnataka G ovennment' s Reserv ation Policie s

The dissenting notes of the two members from the Brahmin com-

munity to the Miller Comrnittee did not deter the government from

accepting the majority recommendations' But the dissenting note of

a member from the Lingayat community created not only a political

uproar, but also judicial interference into an important social policy

in Karnataka, which ultimately distorted the reservation policy until

almost 1977. In the case of the Havanur Commission, though there

were differences of opinion, L.G. Havanur made sure that the report

would be acceptable to all. But of all backward classes commissions/

comrnittees, the work of the Second Backward Classes Commission

has been considered the most biased. First, the Janata Govemment

saw to it that no members from the major communities, i.e., Brah-

mins, Vokkaligas and Lingayats, were appointed to the Commission,

for fear that they block the work of the Commission or challenge the

recommendations by putting minutes of dissent. What followed was

a sad story. Almost half the members of the Commission submitted

dissenting notes, five of them submitted a separate letter to the chief

minister requesting him to reject the report and one of them charged

another mernber of having manipulated the whole report. The aborted

attempts of some members of the minority castes of backward classes

to remove Vokkaligas and Lingayats from the backward classes listwas evident from the dissenting notes and the letter written by fivemembers to the chief minister of Kamataka.e It appears as though the

Commission first decided on its recommendations and then started

using only relevant data and information to rationalise them. Wher-

ever the household survey data did not manipulated data were used.

From this it becomes evident that caste prejudice is deep-rooted in

Kamataka. The impression that one had, namely that only Brahmins

were jealous of others having reservation is not true. They were as

much guided by their self-interest as were the Vokkaligas and

Lingayats. The only difference was that the Brahmins, being numeri-

cally small, were not so powerful politically as to resist their exclu-

sion from the backward classes list.The Lingayats and Vokkaligas, on the other hand, have been able

to muster sufficient political power to resist attempts to eliminate

them from the backward classes list. Even so, Urs had devised a

reservation policy so as to isolate Lingayats from other backward

classes by taking the support of Vokkaligas. But when both Vokkaligas

r47


and Lingayats were made forward it was politically difficult for anygovernment to resist the combined strength of these two numericallyand politically powerful communities. The Second Backward ClassesCommission lost a great opportunity for formulating a meaningfulreservation policy based on hard facts and with a sense of faimess.Though its intention seems to have been to eliminate both Vokkaligasand Lingayats from the list of backward classes, the Commissionshould have chosen appropriate criteria and used reliable data andinformation to support such a recommendation.

The future of the backward classes in Karnataka bristles withconflicts and contradictions. We have already mentioned some ofthem at the end of the first section. It is desirable, at this stage ofsocio-economic development of the state, to allow these castes spirit.as otherwise too much spoon-feeding will make them unfit for sur-vival in the competitive world. There was a time when they requiredthe government's protection and help for their educational advance-ment. Time has come for them as well as for the government torealise that perpetual continuation of the reservation policy will domore harm than good. Therefore, both for SCVSTs and for OBCs thereservation policy will have to be reviewed more frequently and therelatively better-off sections among them should be asked to competerather than continue to ask for reservations.

Annexure l

Composition of the Backward Classes

CommitteedCommissions in Karnataka(Miller Commitlee, 1918)

1. Sir Leslie C. Miller2. Sri C. Srikanteswara Aiyar3. Sri M.C. Ranga Iyengar4. Sri M. Muthanna5. Sri H. Chennaiah Member6. Mr. Nawab Ghulam Ahmad Kalami Member

President European-ChristianMember BrahminMember BrahminMember Kodava

VokkaligaMuslim

7. Sri M. Basavaiah Member Lingayat (Sadar)

Mysore Backward Classes Committee(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 1960)

Designation CastdReligion

l. Dr. R. Nagana Gowda, MLA2. Shri M.S. Patil

Retd. District Judge3. Sri B. Koragappa

Retd. District Judge4. Sri A. Bhimappa Naik, MLA5. Sri Ramachandra Rao

Junga MLC6. Sri F.D. Ghodke, Ex-MLC7. Sri K. Puttaswamy, MLA8. Sri Mahmood Sheriff*, MLA9. Sri M.B. Shetty

Under Secretary to theGovemment, GeneralAdministration Department

-

Note: +He was appointed as an additional member of the Committee videGovemment Order No. P & D 132 SAD 60 dated 26 September, 1960.

Chairman KurubaMember Lingayat

Member Not known

Member NaikMember Brahmin

Member BrahminMember VokkaligaMember MuslimSecretary Bhunt


First Backward Classes Commission(Havanur Commission, 1972)

Narne Designation CastelReligion

l. Sri L.C. Havanur, MLC Chairman Beda2. Sri Y. Ramachandra Member Kuruba

Ex-Minister3. Sri K.R. Srinivasulu Naidu, Member Velama Naidu

MLC4. Sri K.M. Nagana Member Devanga5. Sri A. Masana Shetty Member Uppara6. Sri Dharam Singh, MLA Member Rajpul7. Sri P.T. Habib Member Darzi8. Sri Puttasomachary Secretary Viswakarma

(Deputy Direcior ofBureau of Economicsand Statistics)

Karnataka Second Backward Classes Commission(VOnkataswamy Commission, 1983)

Name Designation CastelReligion

1. Sri T. Venkataswamy Chairman YadavaRetd. Secretary,Kamataka lrgislature

2. Dr. S. Bheemappa Member UPPara

Professor of Surgery,Bangalorc Medical College

3. Dr. K.H. Cheluvaraju Member Raju Kshatriya

Professor of Pol. Science,

Bangalore University4. Sri M-V. Soorachari, Advocate Member Viswakarma

5. Sri Vidhyadhar Guruji, Member MadiwalaEx-MLA (Agasa)

6. Prof John B. Kutinha Member Christian

Professor of English,Devar's College, Bangalore

7. Dr. Ammenbala Balappa Member Kumbara

Social Worker8. Sri R.S. Naik Member Ediga

Labour lrader (Namdhari)

Karnataka Govemment's Reservation Policies l5l

9. Prof A.M. DharmalingamProfessor of LawSri M.L, Muttennavar, MLAProf B. Puttaiah. AdvocateProf V. VenkataramanEx-TDB PresidentSri M.S. Helwar, AdvocateSri H. Chil*annaEx-controller,State Accounts Deptt.Sri V.D. VeerakyathiahIAS, Director, BackwardClasses and Minority Dept.,Govemment of KamatakaSmt Shantha KumariIAS Devraj

Secretary Christianfrom 12.6.84

Member

MemberMemberMember

MemberMember

Secretary

Mudaliar(Vellala)BedarNayindaBalija

BalijaKuruba

Vokkaliga

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

tf.

16.

lVora: Sri Basheeruddin, a Muslim, who was appointed as a member, resignedon 17.6.1983 as he was concurrendy appointed member of the State MinoritiesCommission.

t.

Annexure 2

Terms of Reference of the Backward Classes

CommitteedCommissions(Miller Committee, I 91 8)

Changes needed, if any, in the existing rules of recruitment to the public

scrvice.Special facilities to encourage higher and professional education among

members of the backward communities.Any other special measures which may be taken to increase the representa-

tion of the backward communities in the public service without materially

affecting efficiency, due regard being paid also to the state by a wider

difhrsion of education and a feeling of increased status, which, it is ex-

pected will thereby be produced in the backward communities'

Mysore Backward Classes Committee(Nagana Gowda Comminee, 196O)

To suggest the criteria to be adopted in determining which sections of the

people in the state should b€ treated as socially and educationally back-

ward. and

To suggest the exact manner in which the criteria thus indicated should be

followed to enable the state govemment to determine the persons, who

should secure such preference, as may be determined by govemment, in

raspect of adrnission to technical institutions and appointments to Govem-

nrent services.

First Karnataka Backward Classes Commission(Havanur Commission, 1972)

To suggest the criteria to be adopted for determining whether any classes ofpersons in the state other than the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes

may be trcated as socially and educationally backward classes;

To investigate into the living and working conditions of all such classes ofpersons with special reference to the difficulties under which they may be

labouring and to make recommendations as to the special provisions which

are necessary to be made by the Government for their advancement and for

the promotion of their social, educational and economic interests generally;

l.

l.

Kamataka Government's Reservation Policies 153

3. To make a list of all classes which may be regarded as backward classes in

the state;

4. To suggest what reservations should be made for such classes in tleeducational institutions maintained by the state or receiving aid out of the

state funds;5. To suggest what other concessions like scholarships, etc., may be giv€n to

such classes bY way of assistance;

6. To determine to what extent such classes are represented in the senices

under the state and to recommend what reservation of posts in such services

may be made for them;7. To generally advise the govemment about the steps to be taken to ensur€

adequate safeguards for the backward classes of citizens in the state.

Second Karnataka Backward Classes Commission(Venkataswamy Commission, I 983)

1. The Commission shall review the existing list of Backward Classes as

approved in G.O. No. SWL 12 TBS 77 dated 22.2.1977 and as amended

from time to time and in the light of the provisions contained in Articles

l5(4) and l6(4) and other relevant provisions of the Constitution and in the

light of the various decisions of the Supreme Court bearing on the subject.

The Commission shall make a scientific and factual investigation of the

conditions of the Backward Classes in the state and recommend specific

measures for their advancement.

The Commission shall review tbe measures so far taken by the State

govemment for the welfare of the Backward Classes and the betterment oftheir conditions and assess the effectiveness of such measures in improving

the conditions of backward classes and in particular in matters relating to

education and representation in public services of the state.

The Commission shall examine and assess with reference to concessions'

privileges and benefits given to them by the State Govemment, the im-provement in the conditions of the "most backward classes" in education

and other matters.The Commission may make recommendations as to the further steps that

should be taken by the State Govemment to improve the conditions of the

"Backward Classes" in resp€ct of:(a) education, including reservation of seats in professional colleges and

institutions of higher leaming;

representation in public industry;

trade. commerce and industry:rural credit, marketing and cooperation;housing;grants; andcommunity development.

J.

n

5.

(b\(c)

@(e)

ak)

t54

6.

7.

The Politbs of Baclcwardness

The Commission may make recommendations in respect of short-term andlong+erm measurcs to be taken by the State govemrnent for raising thelevel of backward classes.The Commission shall on the basis of relevant material so gathercd by itexamine and recommend whether the reservation ordered in G.O. No. SWL12 TBS 77 d^d, 22.2.1977 and as amended from time to rime maycontinue or will need any modification.The Commission shall cover all such questions and issues as have a bearingupon:(a) the question of enumeration and classification of Backward Classes in

the State;(D) the question of reservation in dmission in educational institutions

including professional colleges and institutions of higher learning; and(c) the question of reservation of appointment of posts in favour of

Backward Classes in the services under the state.

Annexure 3

Duration of the Backward Classes Committee/CommissionsAppointed in Karnataka

Commiuees/ Date of Date of Total time

Commissions appoinment submitting taken

the report

2341. Miller Committee 23 August, 1918 July, 1919 I I months

( l9l8)

2342. Nagana Gowda 8 January, 1960 16 May, 196l 16 months

Committee0960)

3. Havanur September, 1972 19 Nov., 1975 3 years

Commission 2 months(ln2)

4. Venkataswamy. l8 April, 1983 3l March, 1986 3 years

Commission

0 983)


Annexure 4

Table VIIProjected Population of Various Castes

and Communities in Karnataka

Caste 1971 Eo to total 1981 1984Hindus

1987

2. Banajiga3. Beda4. Besta5. Brahmin6. Darzi7. Ganiga8. Golia9. Holeya

10. Idiga11. Jogi12. Koracha13. Korama14. Kahatriya15. Kumbara16. Kurubal7 . Lingayat18. Lambani19. Madiga20. Meda21. Mudali22. Nagxta23. NayindaZ. Neyge25. Panchala26. Vaisya27. Satani28. Tigala29. Uppara30. Vokkaliga31. Vodda

Others

3298M l.l9 404565 430123 4572951595805 5.74 1957312 2080962 2212423s33892 1.92 654838 6962M 740188

1264873 4.55 t55t4l2 t649420 115361983907 0.30 1029t5 109417 116329142811 0.51 175163 186229 197993

1047063 3.76 r2842ffi 1365391 r451U7380815 1.37 467083 496590 527961202036 1.05 358193 380821 4f/;87934421 0.r2 42219 44886 4772227158 0.10 33310 35414 3765139172 0.14 48046 51081 5430876665 0.28 94032 99972 106228

164751 0.59 202073 214839 2284rr1719721 6.18 2109299 2242550 23842205079090 18.26 6229684 6623233 7041644360065 1.29 M1633 469533 499195

3208344 11.53 3935148 4183744 4448U516551 0.06 20300 21582 22946s2218 0.i9 64M7 6E093 7239518319 0.07 22469 23888 25398

207968 0.75 25s080 271194 288326282094 1.01 345998 367856 391094213419 0.77 261766 27&303 295884669622 2.41 821315 873200 92836352567 0.19 64475 68548 72878

197112 0.7r 241765 257038 2',73276325263 1.71 398947 425150 450945

3928539 14.12 4818493 5122893 5446523534740 r.92 655878 697312 741364

4580617 16.46 56t8288 5972213 6849854

Total Hindus 27819600 100.00 34121728 36277308 39068299ly'ote: This projection is based on the national growth rate method assuming

that the average Hindu growth rate of O.O2M2 hold good for all castes.

Kamatalea Government's Reservation P olicies

Table VIIIProjected Population of Various Castes in Karnanka

r57

Caste I9EI Eo to lotalHindus

19E4 1967

l.2.J.

f.6.

8.

9.10.

11.

12.13.

14.

15.

i6.17.18.

19.

20.21.22./.J.ai

25.26.27.28.29.

30.31.

-tL.

AgasaBanajigaBedaBesta

BrahminDaziGanigaGoliaHoleyaIdigaJogiKorachaKoramaKahatriyaKumbaraKurubaLingayatLambaniMadigaMedaMudaliNagartaNayindaNeygePanchala

VaisyaSataniTigalaUpparaVokkaligaVoddaOthers

4t2339377654

t827tt66rrn9

t44821596069

16351r1198834436014334367

3941031095,14850

87777l8E63l

19689935815300

412256367339r

189505978720974

2381133229832A43547666,8r'.

60186225643372410

4497978612250

5U4575

1.291.195.741.924.5s0.300.513.761.371.05o.l2o.lo0.140.280-596.18

1E.261.29

I1.530.ffio.l90.070.?5l.0lo-772.41

0.190.71l.7r

14.12t.92

16.46

423925388266

r87M5962il56

148891I987685168106

12325224482.tr1

343763405183196846lll90244

1939322A243225vt8713

423841377f615

194836146;1

21563244404332058251221788224

61477232025382875

4AAy4629455

5391950

426873390965

l89l5l9632E25

1499'2539945s

1692741241090451383346153

408003219046/.3l90871

1952302038396ffi20279

42678838m871

19618618952r7 t3

246506334366252967793708

623U1233639385537

46565U633831

5429490

Total Hindus 318s2029 100.00 3n47A90 32974757

Nrt '. Ttttr is based on the 1931 caste-wise proportions prorated for 1981

census Hindu population. Hindu population is prorated for I 93 I proportions and

projected for 1984 and 1987.' -The relative proportions of differcnt castes would remain constant for all

three vears.

The Politics of B ackwardness

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159Karnataka Covernment's Resemation Policies

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1. Report of the Committee appointed to Consider Necessary Steps for theAdequate Representation of communities in the public service (6hairman:Leslie C. Miller), 1919, p. 4.

2. G. Thimmaiah and Abdul Aziz, The political Economy of Land Reformsin Kamataka, New Delhi, Ashish publishing House, 1993.

3. Report of the First Baclcward Classes Commission (Chairman: L.G.Havanur), vol. I, 1975, p. 7.

4. S. Bheepamappa and C. Thimmaiah, ..politics of ST list in Kamataka,,(Mimeographed), 1985.

5. Op. cit., p. 2.6. Op. cit., p. 2.

7. Op. cit., p. 3.8. Op. cit., p. 4-

9. Govemment of K amataka, A Nett Deal For Baclovard Classes in Kamataka-November 1986, pp. 10-12.

Chapter 6

Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar

Sachchidananda

IntroductionT'f 7 HEN India became free and the new Constitution was

\ru promulgated, a promise was made in the Preamble toV Y secure to all its citizens social, economic and political

justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and

equality of status and opportunity. It had been realised by the fathers

of the Constitution that socio-economic conditions in India militated

against these principles; and, therefore, conscious and concerted

efforts had to be made to reduce inequalities and to liberate the

weaker sections of the community from the exploitation and injustice

meted out to them by oppressive social and economic structures. It is

in pursuance of this objective that Article 46 of the Constitution

stated that the "state shall promote with special care the educational

and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in

particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and shall

protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation."The follow up action in this regard constituted a package of

legislations, ameliorative programmes and preferential schemes forthe benefit of the weaker sections. It was hoped that this would lead

to removal of social and religious disabilities, social and special

segregation, facilitate larger participation by socially disadvantaged

groups in the national polity and to protect them from all forms of

exploitation and oppression.

Reservations or discrimination in the reverse, is part of this pack-

age of policies while reservations in posts and educational institu-


tions had been in vogue for the weaker sections of the populationeven during British rule. The only innovation was reservation of seatsfor scheduled castes and tribes in state and Union legislatures. Thejustification for compensatory discrimination has been put in terms ofthe need to compensate for past discrimination, rationalised by theimplied collective guilt of the ruling groups for past misdeeds and apresumed collective right of the victimised group to redress throughthis process, regardless of whether individual members of the groupsuffered from past discrimination. This implied a kind of patemalism.Many fonns of colonialism and despotism have been rationalised bya paternal ideology that claimed that the system was benevolent tothe oppressed. The critics of this policy have held that whatever itsstated intent and ostensible rationale, its effect is to reinforce andperpetuate group inequalities and differences it claims to diminish orabolish. The compensatory discrimination is said to stigmatise anddemean everyone it touches and results in a system that has more incommon with intemal colonialism than with equal association.

Ifowever, few in independent India have voiced disagreementover the view that the weaker sections of the population deserve andneed special help to bring them up quickly to the level of the others€ctions of the population. However, there has been considerabledebate about who is deserving of such help, about the form it shouldtake, whether enough has been done etc. A number of reports on thescheduled tribes and castes have stressed the point that enough hasnot been done for them. There are others who feel that the reserva-tions have been overdone, and have proved to be costly in terms ofefficiency, utilisation of talent, morale and basic faimess. Reserva-tion on the basis of caste has been taken as a regressive step since itseems to have accentuated caste consciousness and has been detri-nrental to the growth of secularism. It has been held that the reserva-tions constitute a profound contradiction between the objective of acasteless society and the method of evaluating backwardness on acaste basis (Smith, 1963: 316). Rudolph and Rudotph (1962:150)describe the caste basis as a critical contradiction in the govemment'seffort to eradicate the effects of untouchability.

hofile of the PopulationBihar is the second largest state in the country from the point of

Resemation and After: The Case of Bihar 163

view of population. It has a large percentage of people belonging to

the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other backward classes'

The scheduled castes account for 14.51 per cent of the total popula-

tion. They are spread all over the state. However, their presence in the

predominantly tribal region is marginal. In about 90 blocks their

population ranges between 2O and 4O per cent. However, a larger

population of scheduled castes live in the high density population

regions in north Bihar. The scheduled tribes form 8.31 per cent of the

total population. They are largely to be found on the Chotanagpur

plateau and in the Santhal Parganas Division. They are in majority

only in a couple of districts. Each of these communities is divided

into a number of distinctive castes or tribes. The Muslims form 13.5

per cent of the population but a part of the Muslim community

consists of the Muslim backward castes like the Momin, Kunjra,

Churihara, Idrisi, etc.After 1941, no caste census has been published. It is, therefore' not

possible to know the exact population of each caste. However, an

attempt has been made by projecting the caste data on the basis of the

1931 census allowing for the natural increase in population. The fourhigher castes, the Brahmanas, the Rajputs, the Bhumihars and the

Kayasthas constitute around 13 per cent of the total population of the

state. The backward castes altogether account for 52 per cent of the .

population. The largest single caste is that of the Yadavas who are

also known as Ahirs and Gwalas. They comprise l1 per cent of the

population and are spread in all the districts of the state except the

tribal areas. Earlier, their main occupation was cattle grazing and sale

of milk and milk products, but, in course of time, the bulk of them

have acquired land and in most cases, they constitute the majority ofsmall, medium and in some cases, rich farmers are also drawn from

their ranks. In some districts like Saharsa, they form the dominant

caste. In view of their large population they are represented in allpolitical parties and have a sizeable number of MLAs from their caste

in the Bihar Assembly. The next largest caste is that of the Kurmiwho form 4 per cent of the population. They have been traditionallyland-holders and in some districts, they constitute the bulk of the

medium and rich peasantry. Agricultural development in the districts

of Patna and Nalanda has been largely successful due to their efforts.

Koeri is another caste traditionally devoted to vegetable growing.

l& The politics of Backwardness

Yadava, Kurmi, Koeri and 3l other castes comprise the advancedsections of the backward castes in Bihar and figure in Annexure II ofthe List of Backward Castes. Annexure I consists of 94 educationallyand economically depressed communities who are only a shadebetter than the scheduled castes. Among them the Nonia constitute avery large caste. Originally they were devoted to production ofsaltpetre but now most of them are landless agricultural labourers. Anumber of Muslim castes who are weavers, tailors, vegetable sellers,cloth dyers have been recognised as backward castes among theMuslims.

Extent of ReservationsThe scheduled castes have been allowed 15 per cent reservations

of posts whercas the tribals have been given l0 per cent in the stateas a whole. However, the percentage varies from district to districtdepending upon the concentration of the tribal or the Harijan popula-tion. 12 per cent reservation has been allowed to the comparativelyweaker sections of the backward castes or to the castes who figure inAnnex I and the rest of the backward c.rstes have been given 8 percent reservation with the proviso that if suitable candidates are notavailable from Annex I to fill their quot^ of 12 per cent, the unfrlledquota would go to members of Annexure II. As matters stand this isusually the case as the membrs of Annexure I are educationally so

backward that candidates with the requisite qualifications requiredfor the different jobs are not available amongst them. This 20%reservation for backward castes in posts does not include such candi-dates from these castes who are selected in the general quota on theirown merit. In July 1979 the Chief Secretary issued a circular that2O7o resenations would also include the candidates who got into theservices on their own merit, thus in effect reducing the reservationquota for backward castes. However this circular has been rescindednow. Up till now the backward caste reservations do not extend tostate government undertakings or to such institutions which are runwith government gnnts like universities or local bodies. Reservationof 3 per cent of the posts has been allowed for women who maybelong to any caste and 3 per cent reservation has been provided tothe economically backward people (non-income tax payees) belong-ing to the higher castes. Thus an effort was made to give some relief

Reservation and Afier: The Case of Bihar 165

to the poorer sections of the higher castes. All the reservations except

that for the scheduled castes and tribes came into being in 1978

during the Chief Ministership of Shri Karpoori Thakur.

Reservations have been provided for the scheduled castes and the

scheduled tribes and otherbackward classes in the various educational

institutions of all kinds and at all levels. Besides this, there are at

present 29 reserved seats for the scheduled tribes and 46 for the

scheduled castes in the state. The provision for reservation in Irgis-lature has been extended from decade to decade by legislation. It may

be noted that the reserved seats for the scheduled tribes has gone down

from 33 to 29 due to slow rate of population growth among them. The

four extra seats were turned over to the scheduled castes whose rate ofgrowth is higher than that of the general population in the state.

Recommendations of Different CommissionsThe scheduled tribes and castes in Bihar were listed in the

President's order issued in October 1950. This list has been revised

from time to time every ten years. Many communities who feel that

on account of their socio-economic backwardness they should be

included in the list of scheduled tribes and castes, make representa-

tions to the Govemment. After detailed enquiries the State Govem-

ment forwards its own recommendation regarding the acceptance orrejection of their representation to the Govemment of India. As aresult of this, certain changes have been made in the list. It may,

however, be noted that no community in Bihar has up till now been

descheduled. A few years after the promulgation of the Constitution,

the Kaka Kalelkar Commission was appointed to go into the question

of drawing up a list of other backward classes at the national level.

The Commission in its report listed 127 castes both Hindu and

Muslim with a total population of 15.3 million or 31.1 percent of tiestate's population. However, on account of certain political reasons,

the Commission's report was not accepted by the Govemment ofIndia and it was left to Commissions appointed by the state govem-

ment to draw up a list of backward communities in their area. For this

purpose and certain other ancillary tasks, the Bihar Government

appointed a Backward Classes Commission with seven members

under the Chairmanship of Shri Mungeri Lal, a former Congress

Minister in December 1971 . The terms of reference of the Commis-


sion were as follows:1. to examine the extent to which the orders issued by the state

govemment in regard to the reservation of posts and services forscheduled castes and tribes have been implemented by the variousdepartments and to explore the circumstances in which some of theorders were not implemented;

2. to examine whether the different departments have consideredthe claims of candidates belonging to the other backward classes inmaking appointments;

3. to examine the extent of representation of scheduled castes and

scheduled tribes in the various state government undertakings;4. to evaluate the different welfare programmes being imple-

mented for the scheduled tribeVcastes and other backward classes;

5. to assess whether the steps taken for the progress of otherbackward classes are adequate.

The Commission discovered that the representation of scheduled

castes and tribes at the various levels in the services was highlyunsatisfactory. The following table shows their representation in the

various classes of services in 19'12.

Scheduled Castes

Classes ofsetvice

Total numberof posts

Percentage ofresetvation

Number ofSC holding

posts

Percentagein position

Class IClass IIClass IIIClass IV

8905229

10285927442

15.0015.0015.00

15.00

25

t4243133685

/.J

2.74.1

13.4

Scheduled Tribes

Classes oJservice

Total Number Percentage of Nwnber of Percmtageof posts resenalion SC hol.ding in position


890 10.00 15 2.O

60 l.l4651 4.5

nM2 10.00 2273

5229 10.00

102E59 lq.0o8.2

Resemation and After: The Case of Bihar

The Commission was of the view that the Appointing Officers are

not fully aware of the various government orders and instructions,in

regard to reservations, rosters and carrying forward instituted by the

State Government for seeing that the level of representation, as

prescribed by the Govemment, in the services for scheduled castes

and tribes are attained. It was pointed out that many appointingauthorities did not care for such instructions even though they were

aware of them. The Commission emphasized the need for having an

Employment Cell in the Appointment Department which would see

that Government instructions in regard to reservation are imple-mented. It also recommended the setting up of an EmploymentCommittee at the State level consisting of officials and non-officialswhich would inspect Govemment, semi-Govemment and Govem-ment aided offices to see whether the reservation orders are observed.The Commission endorsed the provision for reservations in promo-tions for scheduled castes and tribes only in the interest of socialjustice even though it caused frustration among such officers whohad been superseded by their colleagues belonging to these-commu-nities. The most important work of the Commission was to identify128 backward communities in the State hailine from Hindu. Muslimand Christian faiths.

The Roster SystemRosters have been prepared in respect of posts to be filled in by

general people and by scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Such

arrangement has also been made at the Divisional and District level.There is a system of carry forward by which the reserved posts whichcould not be filled at a particular point of time due to the dearth ofqualified persons from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Closeobservation, however, revealed that this practice was not strictlyfollowed and many of the posts reserved for the tribals and theHarijans were promptly filled in by the Selection Committees withcandidates from outside as suitable candidates were not available. Itwas, therefore, decided that since there is no dearth of people fromthese groups to filI in the Class III posts the reserved posts in thiscategory should be filled solely by persons from the scheduled castes

and scheduled tribes. If, in spite of such effort, no scheduled caste orscheduled tribe is available, a full report has to be furnished explain-

t6'l


ing the whole situation to the Appointment Department which willthen issue them permission for the dereservation of the posts inquestion. It was further desired that appointing authorities should tryto collect information from legislators from the SC/ST constituen-cies, the Harijan Sewak Sangh, District Welfare Officers, the DalitVarg Sangh, Adimjati Seva Mandal, Ranchi, Santal Pahariya SevaMandal, Deoghar, and the Musahar Seva Mandal at Rosera,Darbhanga. These organisations should inform the candidates aboutthese vacancies. The reserved vacancies should be advertised at least

three times. In spite of these efforts, if suitable candidates are notavailable from a particular category, the persons from the othercategory could be appointed. In case a competitive examination is

held for recruitment to a particular post, the qualifying marks for the

SC./ST candidates is 10 per cent lower than for otler candidates.

Filling up of the Reservation QuotaIn 1990 with the advent of the Janata Dal government in the state,

a drive was mounted for filling up vacancies in the reservation quota.

At the end of the year, the position in this regard was as follows:

Class ofServices

Total No. Percentageof posts of reserva-

tion

No. of Percent- No. oJ Percent-SC age in S? age in

portion port on


6707235588648216327

l47o lOVo 45414% to% 1291

t4% 10% 5l5l14% IOVo 2049

t4.77 186 4.U18.24 654 3.6t6.79 ?414 3.58

7.99 917 1.78

Source: hptt. of Personnel, Govt. of Bihar.

These figures do not include the positions filled in the Department

of Minor Irrigation, Relief and Rehabilitation and Human Resource

Development as these were not available at the time of compilation.

It is thus clear that so far as the scheduled castes are concemed, in the

top three categories they have already exceeded the reservations

provided. The scheduled tribes are much behind in the race and they

have not reache d even SOVo in the Class II and IIL While in Class IVthey are very poorly represented. Their overall percentage would go

up in all categories of posts as the numbr of positions in the Minor

Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar 169

Irrigation and Human Resource Development are considerable.

Applicability of Income CriteriaPost-matric scholarships are awarded to all scheduled caste/tribe

students according to a means test based on the parents'/guardians'

income from all sources. Full maintenance allowance in the form ofscholarship and full fees are paid in the case of students whose

parents'/guardians' income does not exceed Rs. 150 per month.

However, for professional courses such as medical, engineering,

agriculture and higher technical courses, full maintenance and fullfees are admissible to students whose parents'/guardians' income

does not exceed 1,000. For suth students, half maintenance allow-ance and full fees are admissible for other courses. For the other

backward classes, the applicants are divided into two categories:(a) those whose family income is below Rs. 1,500 per year; and,

(D) those whose family income is between Rs. 1,500 and Rs.

2,000. For technical courses, the upper limit is Rs. 2,400. Priority isgiven to applicants in the frst slab. The remaining funds are turnedover to the candidates in the higher slab. In case the income is the

same preference is given to merit.Children of such members of the backward castes who paid

income tax were not entitled to reservation in posts. However, most

of the income tax payers belonged to govemment service or toprofessional classes largely in towns. Tlte rich and middle peasants inthe villages are not in the income tax net and as such members of theirfamilies have escaped the provisions of this restriction.

Performance EvaluationIt is generally alleged that compensatory discrimination in Gov-

ernment services at the time of recruitment and promotion is respon-

sible for a decline in administrative efficiency. This has been attrib-uted to the presence of govemment servants with poorer qualifica-tions. It is assumed that there is a direct conelation between tested

merit of govemment s€rvants and the effectiveness of administration.Many research studies have shown thal in recent times there is ageneral lowering of standards in the efficiency of government em-ployees. This may be largely attributed to the rapid expansion in thecadres and general lack of commitment to work. The contribution of


the poor quality recruits and the promotees to this phenomenon isprecious little. A study team of the Administrative Reforms Commis-sion reported that in the All-India non-technical services, the percent-age of first division entrants dropped from 42 per cent in 1950-55 to25 per cent in 1960-65, while the entrants with third class degreesrose from 4 per cent to 19 per cent. However, this phenomenon canhardly be attributed to reservations. It merely shows that Governmentservice does not appeal to the academically most qualified peoplesince there are attractive openings in the business sector. Among thethird class entrants reported in the study, only a minority belonged toscheduled castes and tribs.

In general, however, the perfonnances of adminiskative or educa-tional institutionS in which a proportion of positionVseats arc re-served for allocation on the basis other than merit does not reveal anynoticeable deterioration. This is on account of the fact that the num-ber of such positions is so small that the impact, if any, on the totalperformance of the institution is negligible. At the same time, theeffect of the reservations has not been positive so as to make theinstitutions more rcsponsive to the needs of the deprived area orcommunities. In some cases, there might be zealous members of thedeprived communities who may try to see that benefits of develop-ment progranrmes reach their own needy bretlren. However, theobstacles in this are so many that their efforts may be frustrated.

Sometimes reservations in recruitment or promotion may depress

the motivation or performance of those who feel that their just claimshave been bypassed. However, since it is the general norm, the bulkof them are prepared to take the shock of routine supersession as theycannot avoid it. The frustrations in govemment services arc so manythat one cannot suffer under them too long. As the general commit-ment to work is low, the poor motivation of some workers does notaffeit the performance significantly. There is no difference betweenthe effect of reservations for SC/ST/OBC and for other categorieslike women, ex-servicemen and economically backward people as

their percentage is very small. There has been no empirical work onsuch themes. Even if nothing very different may emerge from such

research, it is worthwhile to go in for this.It is another qdestion whether recruitment of people with lower

academic qualification really affects the administration. There are

Reservation and After: The Case of Bihar l7l

other factors that count for better performance in govemment service.

Some of these factors differ from post to post. The requirements at

the clerical level would indeed be different from those at the level ofofficers. Similarly, the qualities required for extension officers in the

rural areas would be different from those required of establishment

officers in the Secretariat.However, if at any point of time it is felt that the SCYST recruits

have lower efficiency as a group, special training can be devised forthem so that their skills, knowledge and insights are improved and

they are better able to face the challenges of their job. As we get

nearer to the prescribed percentage in each category, these relax-ations can be withdrawn and-the deficiencies, if any, should be

removed by in-service training. It is also advisable to keep the reser-

vations only up to junior level posts in class I.

Genesis and Growth of Backward Class MovementThe other backward classes included a number of peasant castes.

They occupy a low position in the Varna hierarchy and have lowlevels of literacy. They are poorly represented in Government jobsand white-collar occupations but in some areas, such castes occupy adominant position in tle economic and political spheres of villagelife. Not infrequently they are small land owners. In many cases,

where they are numerically predominant, their control over decisionmaking may be decisive. Dominant castes of this kind have devel-oped a vested interest in remaining backward since it enables them tohave education and employment. On account of their voting strength

they also have political clout. .

The British rule released the backward castes from the grip oftraditional sanctions. New codes of laur refused to recognise therights of upper castes to the exclusive use of particular symbols ofstatus. Avenues of sanskritization were thrown open to ever increas-ing sections of society. Those .who seized the first opportunitiesnaturally belonged to the intermediate or middle range castes whowere much above the pollution line. Caste associations helped themclaim higher status or intemal reform made them shed practices

considered degrading by the upper castes. Sanskritization loweredthe fences between sections of society which, at one time, weresharply separated. Social mobility was enhanced by the spread of


education.

However, after some time, there was a conflict between the de_mands of power and the demands of status. Whereas the backwardcastes were prompted to merge their identity with the higher strata toenhance their status, considerations of power and economic advan-tage led them to define their identity in opposition to rhe highercastes. This is the dilemma of backwardness. A low caste would liketo acquire a high sounding title, claim kshatriya status and assume thesymbols of a high caste, and at the same time, it would insist on itsright to be frustrated. In their attempts to gain social acceptance, thebackward castes are increasingly tuming to political action. Thegeneral elections have shown the backward castes the importance oforganised politics. Adult suffrage has given them larger chances ofparticipation in the political system. According to Myron Weiner,India has become tremendously politicised. Politics has become theavenue for personal advancement in a society in which commercialactivities offer little status and administrative posts are relatively fewin number (Weiner, M.: 1960: 192).

The backward casies insist on underlining their separate identityon account of the concessions and advantages given to them by theGovemment. The Central Govemment decided to do away with thecommunal definition of other backward classes but it left the State

Govemments free to take any action they deemed fit. Andre Beteille(1967) writing in the early sixties had hoped that on account of thevast changes in the structure of Indian society, the backward classes

are likely to lose much of their identity. However, in spite of theprofound changes, the traditional structure slill seems to be intact andthe backward classes instead of suffering the erosioo in their identitystill need the reservations as a prop for their progress. It is not thatsocial networks do not cut across the boundaries of caste, but at thegroup level, caste identities still have an importance of their own.Among the backward castes also, an elite has emerged. During thestruggle for backward class reservations in Bihar in 1978-79, thebackward caste elite were able to mobilise large sections of themasses for the cause. Few among the latter realised that only some

were going to be benefited by this decision and these would be

members of the caste elite group. On the issue of reservations therewas a sharp conflict of interest between the upper caste elite and the

Reservation and Afier: The Case of Bihar 173

backward elite.ln the post-Independence period two important developments ac-

."t..ot"O ttt. political mobiliiation of the backward castes' The first

was the abolition of landlordism' The landlords in most areas be-

longed to the upper castes. The advanced sections among the back-

*url .Utt were substantial landholders' They were liberated from

the subordination to the upper caste landlord and began to play a

more important role in village affairs by dint of their larger numb€rs'

They were also the beneficiaries of agricultural developments intro-

duced through communi{ development progmmmes' They took ad-

vantage of tile spread of education. Thus they were able to raise their

sociai consciousness, ns well as their standard of living' Their in-

creased income from larger production as well as better prices of

agricultural produce enabled them to accumulate a surplus which

ciuld be o."d fo. engaging in political activities' The Yadavas and

the Kurmis were firsi to take advantage of these opportunities since

some of their families were quite affluent' It may be mentioned that

Sri Ras Bihari Mandal, the grandfather of Sri B'P' Mandal' Chairman

of the Backward Classes Commission, was educated up to the Inter-

mediate standard and had attended the second session of the Indian

National Congress in Calcutta in 1896'

The introduction of adult franchise and of Panchayati Raj in the

state in the fifties enabled them to realise the strength of numbers

through voting power. The sha4r distinction between the upper back-

wards and the-lower backwards is on aciount of the very low level of

socio-economicdevelopmentamongthelatterwhichreducestheircapacity to.absorb development. They have also very poor' percent-

ug" of ilt"t""y and are more worried about their physical survival

than about social consciousness or political mobilisation'

The first move for the mobilisation of the backward caste in Bihar

couldbetracedtolST0whenKurmieducatedelitesfeltthenecessityof social reform (Verma, K.K.:1979). For this purpose' two confer-

ences were held at Danapur and Sonepat in that year' This was

followed by the formation of the Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha' In l9l0 the

Sabha was registered at Patna' a constitution was drawn up and the

*u"*"nt *oi placed on an organised footing' Sri Sajivan Lal Sinha

who later on became th€ President of the Sabha claimed that the

Kurmi was the purest Kshatriya. Muzaffarpur was the venue of the

r74 The Politics of B achoardness

lTth session of the Sabha in 1929. Some delegates of the KurmiMahto of Chotanagpur who were considered quie distlnct from theother Kurmis also attended the Conference. It w;s at that meeting thatthe Kurmi Mahto were recognised as akin to other Kurmis. It wasrecognised at the l gth session of the Sabha held at purulia that unityamong different sections of the Kurmi would enable the communityto gain power in the political field. The Sabha at the same timeadvanced a claim for Kshatriya status on behalf of the Kurmi. In1939, Sri Dasu Singh, an advocate from patna, stressed the need forthe fusion of different Kurmi sub-castes for the purpose of politicalmobilisation. He hailed from a well-to_do Kurmi i"-ity

"nd *u.

active in the Kisan Sabha as well as in the Coneress.Much earlier, Sri Singh tried to unire the Kirmi, Koeri and the

Ahirs. The Kurmi were agriculturists, the Koeri were vegetable grow_ers and the Ahirs made a living by rending cattle and seliing milk. Allthese communities had an agricultural base. The new organisationcalled Triveni Sangh was formed in 1925.

In 1924 the All India yadava Mahasabha was inaugurated atAllahabad. Yadav leaders from Bihar not only attended the Confer_ence but also held important positions as office_bearers in thatorganisation.

The first backward caste leader to become a Minister in the Bihargovernment was Sri Guru Sahay Lal, a Kurmi advocate from patnadistrict. He was a member of the Interim Ministry headed by Mr.Yunus in 1937 for three months. Another important Kurmi leaderwas Sri Deo Saran Singh who took an active part in the freedommovernent and was also a legislator for a long time. He becameMinister in the Congress government and later was president of theLegislative Council. He was also rhe president of the Backward ClassFederation.

At the thirtieth session of the All India Kurmi Mahasabha at patnain May 1972 leaders from other backward castes addressed the

4th"ltng. The general slogan was .,pichhra Jagao Desh Bachao.,,

The Conference resolved to organise a youth cadre ,,Bhumi putraFauj" to bring about internal social rcform and mobilization of notonly Kurmi but ofother backward class people. It also demanded thecreation of a separate Public Service Commission for backwardclasses. The Kurmi Sabha was an example of how a caste sabha


might be deparochialised to a certain degree to include various dis-

tinlt .utt" "ntities.

It gave these communities consciousness of a new

identity which was a basis for their political mobilisation'

fne faka Kalelkar Commission's report wurs submitted in 1956

but its recommendations were not ac@pted by the Government' By

1960 the tide was strongly against the definition of Backward Classes

by community. In 1961- the Government of India decided to drop the

iiea of drawing up a national list of Other Backward Classes' The

States howeveiwJre free to do so' The view of the Central Govern-

ment was that it would be better to apply the economic test rather

than so bv caste to determine backwardness' The caste criterion was

held is contrary to the principle of social justice and was unfair to the

other poor. The caste- criteria would tend to perpetuate caste and

*ood.r"u," in the recipient both vested interest and a sense of

helflessness. However, in 1966, the All India Backward Classes

Feieration pleaded that social backwardness could only be deter-

mined in terms of caste.

In Bihar the influence of the backward castes had been steadily

increasing. Sri Birchand Patel and Sri Shiva Nandan Mandal were

influential ministers in the Bihar cabinet in the fifties and early

sixties. During the chief ministership of Sri K'B' Sahay (1963-67)

Sri Ram Lakhan Singh Yadav was not only a minister but considered

his right hand man. The backward castes were represented in good

strength in the Socialist, Communist and Jan Sangh parties'

Backward caste mobilization received a shot in the arm with the

advent of the Socialist Party on the political horizon' The party

committed itself to securing 6O% in the leadership posts in political

parties, govemment services, business and armed forces for Shudras'

ifriiunt, Scheduled tribes, religious minorities and women- Dr' Lohia

had iealised that these backward classes could provide an important

source of support in the struggle to unseat the Congress'

By 1962, the upper backward castes accounted for 22% of the

."-b"o of the Congress Legislature Party' The K'B' Sahay cabinet

had 2OVo representation of these castes in 1963' In the year 1967 with

the Congreis debacle, the Socialist Party vote increased from 57o to

l'lVo and its seats from 7 to 68. In the Mahamaya hasad Sinha's

cabinet Karpoori Thakur became the Deputy Chief Minister' There

were 7l mimbers hailing from backward castes in the different


parties in the Bihar Assembly. The yadavas emerged as the secondlargest caste group after the Rajputs in 1967.

. During the next four years Bihar was plagued by political instabil_ity with nine coalition ministries and three ipells of presiOent,s rule.Three of them were headed by backward class leaders like Sri B.p.Mandal, Daroga Prasad Rai and Karpoori Thakur. The new barsain_ing power of the upper backwards for getting a larger share ii theministerial posts was very much evident. Atthougt the ministryheaded by Sri B.P. Mandal lasted only 47 days, it rJpresented morethan a symbolic breakthrough for the backward classes.

The split in the Congress party in Noyember 1969 created newopportunities for backward castes. In the Daroga Rai ministry thebackward and scheduled castes received special attention and weregiven 53Vo ministerial posts. During the Congress ministries betweenI97217 backward class representation in the cabinet varied between2O and 28Vo.In the 1977 elections, a large number of backward castecandidates won the elections. The yadavas alone had 36 members. Inthe Karpoori Thakur ministry the backward caste members got 42Vorcprcsentation while the forward castes had to remain content withonly 29Vo.In its election manifesto the Janata party had called for anend to caste distinction and promised to ensure that the other back-ward classes do not suffer from any discrimination or inequality. Itpromised a radical reduction of disparities in favour of the weakersections of the society. There was also the promise to reserve 25 and33Vo of all appointments to govemment service for backward classes.The issue of reservations for backward castes came to a head early in1978. Sri Jaya Prakash Narayan and the Janata party ChiefChandrashekhar had declared themselves to be in favour of economiccriteria to judge a man's backwardness. The Janata Legislature partyand even the State cabinet were sharply divided over the issue. Therewas persistent pressure from the backward caste lobby. A massivedemonstration demanding immediate declaration of the government'sintention in this regard was organised. The Backward Caste Federa_tion offered satyagrah and courted arrest. Large processions wereorganised for and against reservations by different youth organisations.There were large scale disturbances in many parts of Bihar. Ulti_mately, on 2l March 1978, the Bihar govemment adopted reserva_tions with modifications. It provided reservations only in appoint_

Resemation and Afier: The Case of Bihar 177

ments and not in promotions. Reservations could not be availed by

families whose income was Rs' 1'000 a month or more' These

amendments did not satisfy the warring groups and violent distur-

iun.", .ontinued to grip ih" ttut"' In November 1978' the Chief

Minister announced thi revised reservation formula which according

to Janata Chief Chandrashekhar was the best in the circumstances'

The Parliamentary election from Sitamarhi was fought in the context

of backward cas6 reservations. Twelve per cent reservation in ser-

vices was given to communities of Annex-I' 87o to those in Annex II'

3% reservitions were given for women in general Ni 3Va for eco-

nomically backward persons. At about that time the Central Govern-

ment appointed a Comrnission with Sri B'P' Mandal as Chairman to

determine the criteria of backwardness. Anti-reservation leaders had

to console themselves with the hope that the Mandal Commission

might look into the issue dispassionately and find.a solution to the

prJbt.rn. In course of time the Mandal Commission submitted its

ieport but the Govemment of India has up till now taken no action

upon it.

Absence of Scheduled Caste Movement

Although scheduled castes in Bihar form a substantial proportion

of the population they have not been able to pull their weight in

politica^l decision-making in the State. This is on account of their

extreme poverty and misery. Unlike the border states of Haryana and

West Bengal, untouchability is deeply entrenched in the state' Sev-

enty-six pir cent of the scheduled castes make a living by agriculture'

Howevei, very few of them are land owners' The percentage of

cultivators in the scheduled caste population is about 24 while the

percentage of agricultural labourers is 55. All the cultivators however-are

not land owners and this group includes share croppers and others

who have leased lands from others. Under conditions of extreme

poverty, it is not possible for them to have any political conscious-

n.s. inty are all the time busy in solving problems of survival'

Absenie of mobilisation among them is also on account of their

educational backwardness. The percentage of literacy among the

scheduled castes in 1971 was 6.53. Literacy for males was 1l'92 and

that for females 1.03. Among those who go to school the enrollment

is also poor and the drop-out heavier as compared to the general


population. It is thus clear that even after Independence the growth ineducation among the scheduled castes is extremely slow. In lg1lonly 1.3 per cent had reached the level of matriculation or above.

During the time of the freedom struggle some young men from thescheduled castes were impressed by Gandhdi's work and joined theCongress party. The process was facilitated because very few of thescheduled castes had turned to Christianity. In general, they acceptedthe Congress party and in elections--before and after Independence_they supported the Congress. As early as 1937 Shri Jagjivan Ramwas made a Parliamentary Secretary in Bihar and from 1946 onwardsthere was always one Cabinet Minister from the scheduled castes inBihar.

After some time, when factionalism developed in the Congress theHarijan leadership also came to be divided into important factions.Some leaders, however, were also to be found in the Socialist party,Communist Party and the Jan Sangh. However, except in 1977, theHarijans have solidly voted for the Congress. In the Congress itselfthey have not been able to build a united lobby of their own so thatthey could ventilate their grievances jointly and press the governmentfor the solution of their most important problems.

The absence of a movement may also be attributed to the fact thatin no region do they form a majority ofthe population and even in theconstituencies reserved for them, they have to depend largely on thevotes of the non-scheduled castes. Thus, it is not possible for a veryoutspoken or a belligercnt candidate to win a election. Only one whois acceptable to the dominant population can be elected. In short, theHarijan leaders are not leaders in their own right. They are sub-Ieaders attached to dominant faction leaders in the Congress or othernational parties and their fortunes wax and wane with the fortunes oftheir leaders. Under such circumstances, the scheduled caste move-ment did not take off in Bihar.

An OverviewIn Bihar there is no opposition to reservation for scheduled castes

and tribes. Some years back, there was great opposition to extendingthe benefits to the other backward classes (OBCs). Even now reser-vations for the OBCs arc resented particularly to those in respect ofpromotions. However, public opinion has now bowed to the inevi-


table.Reservations have got to be viewed as a strategy for raising the

quality of life of groups rather than of individuals' It is essentially

meant to mitigate backwardness emanating from historical processes

and conditions of social injustice in which certain groups have been

remaining for a long time. The state can initiate other steps for

eliminating socio-economic handicaps faced by individuals of any

community. Since caste is still a measure of evaluation of status in

society, it has to continue as a criterion for reservation' In the back-

ward caste, however, the economic criterion can be strictly enforced

so that the benefits do not accrue. to undeserving members of the

community and reach the persons who need it most. Those who have

enjoyed the benefits of reservation should not claim it for their

children. Unfortunately, this does not happen and communities de-

velop vested interest in backwardness.

It is not desirable to enlarge the percentage of reservations for such

categories as ex-servicemen, freedom fighters, handicapped, etc. Such

categories should be given all facilities including finance, skill' train-

ing, etc. to compete with other candidates on equal terms. Other

things being equal, preference may be given to them.

Our experience suggests that the aims of reservation could be

better achieved if they are supplemented by measures which would

enable the target groups to compete with others on equal terms in

open recruitment. This can be done through pre-service training or

supplementary coaching for entry into professional colleges like

medicine, engineering, etc. so that their initial handicap is removed

and they would no longer suffer from an inferiority complex all their

lives.Reservations have definitely benefited the target groups in facili-

tating entry into educational institutions and in govemment service'

This has given them security, status and wealth. Many families have

moved to the middle class category and they are all the time striving

for moving up the social ladder. Unfortunately, however, the benefits

have tended to cluster around some communities and also in some

families. This is perfectly natural. Because of some pre-intervention'

endowments or opportunities, certain sections of the population take

time by the forelock and reap the benefits. It is, therefore, necessary

not to leave this to the natural process. Those in charge ofdistribution


of benefits must take special care to see that the most deservingpeople get it and the distribution is more equitable. The more back_ward communities among them must be identified. The income cri_terion may be used to block certain families enjoying higher incomesfrom getting benefiS. This step would also blunt the resentment ofthe non-scheduled caste poor.

It would not be desirable to exclude entire communities fromgetting the benefits as there would still be large numbers of people inthem who deserve such help. In isolating such sections of people usemay be made of the generation of the income criterion.

REFERENCES

l. Beteille, A., '"The Futurc of Backward Classes" in philip Mason (ed.),India and Ceylan, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967.

2. Blair, H., "Rising Kulaks and Backward Classes in Bihaf', Economic andPolitical WeeHy, Jan. 12, 1980.

3. Jha S.S., Pofirtcal Elite in Bilar, Yora & Co., Bombay, 1972.4. Mukherjee, N., Perspectives for a Policy in Seminar No. 268, December

1981.

5. Roy, R., 'Caste and Political Development in Bihat'', in R. Kothari (ed.),Caste in Indiar, Politics, Oriert l-nngmans, New Delhi, 1970.

6. Pflr&,,1., State Politics in India (A Study in Coalition Politics in an IndianState), Uppal Publishing House, New Delhi, 1982.

7. Rudolph, S.H. and Rudolph, L.I., Thc Modemiry or Trad.ition, PoliticalD*elopment in India, Chicago Univenity Press, Chicago, 1967. .'

8. Sachchidananda, Haijan Elite,T\omson Press, Faridabad, 1977.9. Smith, D-E , /z/rd as a Secular Snte, Princeton University Press, Princeton,

1963-lO. Yerma"K.K, Changing Role of Caste Associations,National Publishing

House. New Delhi. 1979.ll. Weiner, M., "Politics of South Asia" in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman

@n.), The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton,1960.


Schedule IList of Extremely Backward Classes

1. Kapadia2. Kanu3. Kawar4. Kalandar5. Kochh6. Kurmi (Mahto) (only for

ChhotanagPur Division)

7. Kewat (Kaut)

8. Kadar9. Kaura

10. Korku1 1. Kaibart12. Kumar Bhag Paharia

13. Khatwa14. Kharwar15. Khatouri16. Klangar1?. Khatik18. Khekta19. Khatwe20. Khond21. Gorhi (Chhabi)

22. Cangu (Nagesh)

23. Gangeta

24. Gour or Gonr

25. Gandharb26. Gulgalia27. Gour28. Chain29. Chapota30. Chandrabansi (Kahar)

31. Tikulhar32. Dhekaru33- Tanti (Tatwa)

34. Tamaria35. Turha

36. Tiar37. Tharu38. Dhanuk39. Dhamin

40. Dhimar41. Dhanwar42. Nonia43. Naiya44. Nai45. Namsudar46. Pandu

47. Pal (BheriharXGaren)

48. Pradhan

49. Pingania50. Pahira51. Bari52. Beldar53. Bind54. Banjaraalakar55. Shekhra56. Bagdi57. BhuiYa58. Bhar59. Bhuiya60. Bhaskar61. Mali (Malakar)

62. Mangar63. Madar64. Mallah (Surhia)

65. Majhwar66. MarkandeY67. Moriyari68. Malar (Malhor)

69. Molik70. Rajdhohi71. Rajbhar72. Rangwa73. Banpar74. BeAia75. Shota (Shota)

76. Sang-Trash (forNawadah distric0

77. Agaria78. Aghouri

182

79. Abdal8o Kasab (Kasai) il i,lXlffJj,'#1,.81. Chik (Muslim) Halalkhor Bhingi82. Dafali (Muslim) (Muslim)83. Dhunia (Muslim) 90. Miriasin (Muslim)84. Dhobi (Muslim) 91. Madari (Muslim)85. Nut (Muslim) 92. Meershiiar lUustiml86. Pamaria (Muslim) 93. Saeen (Muslim)87. Bhathiara 94. Momin (Muslim)

Nor€: Those castes and classes in respect of whom the wordMuslim has notspecifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu and Musrim commu-nities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim Teli.


Annexure IIList of B$kward Classes

wani, Thathera, Kalwar, patwa,Kamlapuri, Vaishya. Sinduria-Bania, Mahuri-Vaishya, AwadhBania, Bangia Vaishya (BengaliBania), Barnwal. AgrahariVaishya, Poddar)Mukri (Mukeri) (Muslim)Yadav (Gwala, Ahir, Gora, Ghasi,Mehar)Rajbansi (Risia or Polia)Rangrej (Muslim)RautiaRaeen or Kunjara (Muslim)LaheriShivhariSonarSutardharSukiarIdiris or Darzi (Muslim)Isai Dharmawalambi (Harijan)Ishai Dharmawalambi (AnyaPichari Jati)

Nare: Those castes and classes in respect of whom the word Muslim has notspecifically been mentioned, would belong to both Hindu and Muslim commtr_oities. For example, Teli means both Hindu and Muslim Teli.

+Added to this schedule by another ordinance.

l. Amat2. KagJi3. Kamar (Lohar & Karmkar)4. *Kurmi

5. Kuswaha (Koiri)6. Kosta7. Gaddi8. Ghatwar9. Churihar (Muslim)

10. ChanauI L Jadupatia12. Jogi (Jugi)13. Tamoli14. Teli15. Dewhar16. Nalband (Muslim)17. Prajapati (Kumhar)18. Partha19. Barhi20. Barai21. Bania (Sundi, Halwai, Roniar,

Pansari, Modi, Kasera, Kesar-

22.23.

24.

25.)611

28.29.30.31.JZ.JJ.

34.35.

Chapter 7

Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene

Mohit Bhattacharya

EFORE describing the policy of .reservation' in West Bengal

and its actual implementation, some preliminary remarks arein order. The reservation policy, discussed here, relates exclu_

sively to jobs in govemment establishments. political reservation.that is reservation in legislatures and local govemment bodies, is notincluded in tlris discussion. Reservation of seats in educational insti-tutions such as medical colleges, universities, etc., is also outside thepurview of this essay.

It is assumed that the rationale for .reservation' as discussed in the

course of the framing of the Constitution of India is well_known anddoes not need rciteration here.r What can be mentioned, in passing, isthat the constitutional incorporation of the reservation provision waspreceded by the imperial policy of reservation during British rule,when reservations were made for different sections of Indian societyusing communal symbols like castes, in a bid to win political supportfrom these sections.

This is not the place to go into the evolution of reservation policyas it was worked out during the colonial rule. Sensitivity to historv is.however, helpfrrl in understanding the essentially p oliiicat natuie oireservation policy, that is apparently directed toward providing be_nefits to designated sections of society blt really intended to ensuregroup support for the ruling class.2

Since 1977, West Bengal has been having a distinctive politicalregime under the leadership of the CpI(M). The l,eft Front govern_

184 The Potitics of Bac*wardness

ment has been consistent in declaring political and administrative

support to the economically neglected sections of the society' Through

u conrcioos policy of rural mobilisation and decentralisation of pow-

ers to the grass-roots (panchayats and municipal) institutions' there

has been a regular effort to politicise the rural masses and increase

their level oi political "onr"ioosness'

Alongside this' a series of

measures has been adopted to offer concrete benefits to the economi-

cally weaker sections. ihese include 'operation barga' or registration

of sirare croppers to guard against their eviction from land, redistribu-

tion of ceiling-surpius land to the rural poor and distribution of

homestead land to the rural homeless. Economic benefits have been

assured to the rural poor through the administration of beneficiary-

oriented rural development programmes. The law and order machin-

ery tras also been overtly tumed to the needs of the poor and instruc-

tions have accordingly been issued to the local police to stand by the

side of the poor and the vulnerable sections of the society'

More importantly, the frontal organisations of the party have been

active in the rural areas, organising the masses and sensitising them

to the social and political environment within which they have to live

and struggle to survive.It is *ithin this broad philosophy and strategy of governance

followed by the CPI(M)-led lrft Front govemment in West Bengal

that one has to review the working of the reservation policy in the

state. According to the CPI(M) theoreticians, caste-based reservation

policy tends to perpetuate narrow caste-consciousness and therefore

i. u itindtun." to the development of class-consciousness' Such a

policy is basically intended to serve the purposes of a bourgeois

i"-o.tu"y. By generating inner conflict among the toilers and splirting the unity of the oppressed class' the policy of reservation proves

to ie a stumbling block to the revolutionary class formation'3

The CPI(M)-ied Left Front government in West Bengal took

office on June 21, 197?. Even before the Left Front victory, the l'eftparties, as partners in the successive united Front governments pre-

ieding the Left Front regime, had conducted vigorous political cam-

paigns among the peasantry to win electoral support' A common

minimum programme was now drafted to spell out the concrete

measur.es to be actually pursued and implemented by the newly

elected regime. The pro-poor decentralist development and rural

Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene 185

mobilisation featured boldly in the declared policy objective.a TheChairman of the Left Front Committee, Promode Dasgupta,s gave acall for "a struggle for establishing the rights of poor peasants,agricultural labourers, village craftsmen, etc., against the vested in-terests and exploiting classes in the villages," by activising thepanchayat bodies at the grass-roots level.

The caste-based reservation policy, in the context of this broaderpolitical objective of the Left Front government, seems not onlyantagonistic but also pernicrous.

Nevertheless, to the new regime, the policy is one of the many"givens" of the Indian constitutional framework within which it hasto function, despite ideological differences.

According to the 1981 census, West Bengal has a total populationof 54.6 million, out of which the scheduled caste population is 12.00million and the scheduled tribe population 3.00 million. Thus the SCconstitute 22 per cent and the ST component is about 6 per cent of thestate's total population. The geographical distribution of ST popula-tion is uneven throughout the 16 districts of the state. The districtswith sizeable (more than l0 per cent) ST concenuation arb Purulia,West Dinajpur, Bankura, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling. High concentra-tion of SC population (more than 20 per cent) can be found in thedistricts of Burdhwan, Birbhum, Bankura, 24-Parganas, Nadia, WestDinajpur, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Bihar.

The Mechanics of ReservationIn fulfilment of the constitutional obligation to ensure adequate

representation for the SC and ST communities in different employ-ments under the state govemment, the Government of West Bengalhad been extending the right of reservation to the members ofthe twocommunities' through executive orders issued by the govemment inthe Finance Department. Till August, 1976 this had been the practiaeand the prescribed percentages of jobs renewed for the SC and STcommunities were respectively 15 per cent and 5 per cent. In prac-tice, however, the provision of executive orders was not actually

* In reply to the Mandal Commission's queries, the Govemment of WestBengal did not agree to the idea of identifying other backward classes on thebasis of caste. The govemment argued instead, that poverty and low livingstandards are better indicators of backwardness than caste.

186 e Politics of Backwardness

adhered to by most govemment establishments. It was discovered in

1976 thar the overall position of representation of the SC and ST

communities in the state services was not encouraging, the actual

percentages being far below the prescribed percentages.

In order to give statutory backing to the reservation policy' the

Congress state govemment enacted the West Bengal Scheduled Castes

and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Services and

Posts) Act, 1976. This Act, along with the Rules framed under it,

came into force with effect from August 15, 1976. Some of the major

highlights of the Act are as follows:I . The Quota. As a general rule, a reservation quota is fixed for

direct recruitment to services and posts in an "establishment": 15 per

cent for SC and 5 per cent for ST. The state govemment may, from

time to time, increase the percentage so that the rcservation shall not

exceed 25 per cent in the case of SC and 10 per cent in the case of ST.

Also, different percentages may be fixed for different districts inaccordance with the percentages of population of SC and ST in such

districts.ln respect of the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial), the percent-

age shall be 10 for SC and 5 for ST.

2. The Scope. The Act applies to any offices of the state govern-

ment, a local or statutory authority constituted under any State Act, ora corporation in which not less than 51 per cent of the paid-up share

capital is held by the state govemment, the universities and colleges,

primary and secondary schools and other educational institutions that

are owned or aided by the state govemment, and an establishment in

the public sector. The 'establishment in public.sector' means any

industry, trade, business or occupation owned, controlled or managed

by the state government or a government company as defined in

Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 or a corporation established

by or under a Central or State Act, in which not less than 51 per cent

of the paid-up share capital is held by the state govemment, on a local

or statutory authority constituted under any state Act.The Act does not apply to any employment in the West Bengal

Higher Judicial Services on any employment which, in the opinion ofthe state government is of a scientific and technical naturc. Centralgovernment establishments, private sector units and employment indomestic services fall outside the purview of the Act'


In view of the specialised qualification or experience necessary forajob, the state government, by notification, may exempt any particu-lar services or post from the provisions of the Act.

3. Promotion Posts. The Act provides for reservation in vacan-cies to be filled by promotion, as distinguished from direct recruit-ment. The general principle of the 15 per cent and 5 per cent quota,as applicable to direct recruitment, applies in this case also. Similarly,the reservation in promotion posts may be increased to 25 percent forSC and l0 per cent for ST. The number of SC or ST employeesappointed on promotion to unreserved vacancies will not be deductedfrom the promotion quota reserved in such services or posts for themembers of the SCIST.

No reservation is envisaged to any post in the pay scale going upto a maximum of Rs 2375.

4. The Roster System and the Carry-Forward Rule. Under a

notification dated August 16, 1976, the stare govemmenr had in-creased tbe reservation quota to 25 per cent for SC and l0 per cent forST. It was explained that the enhanced percentage would be appli-cable only if the total number of SC/ST employees in any service orcadre was less than 15 per cent and 5 per cent respectively, of thetotal number of employees in that service or cadre recruited since theyear 1972. The implication was that the enhanced percentage wouldcease to be effective as soon as the prescribed percentage of reserva-tion (15 and 5) would be attained in respect of any service or cadre.

In practice, the reservation system operates through a 2O-pointroster in which the third, thirteenth and eighteenth vacancies (i.e. 3

out of 20) are earmarked for the SC candidates, and the 8th vacancy(i.e. one out of 20) is similarly earmarked for the ST.

In t}te absence of a qualified SC/ST candidate in a particular year,the vacancy is carried forward for the next two years only and notbeyond.

5. Control Provision. For enforcement purposes, provisions havebeen made in the Act for a reporting system from the appointingauthority to the state government (i.e. the administrative departmentdealing with the Act). In every department under the state govern-ment, an officer has been designated as the liaison officer for thepurpose of implementation of the provisions of the Act in the depart-mental establishment. For the inspection of establishments (to check


whether the provisions of the Act and Rules are actually being

observed), a number of officers have been authorised to act as in-

specting officers.Any SC/ST candidate, who is adversely affected on account of

non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or Rules, may bring the

fact to the notice of the state government. In that event, the state

govemment may call for the records from the establishment con-

cerned and take appropriate action.

As is customary in public administration, a number of registers

and forms and returr,s have been suggested for recording and report-

ing purposes. At least, formally speaking, the paper work in the

government seems thorough and aboveboard.

The Reality on the GroundDespite legislative intention and formulation of elaborate rules

and regulations, the fact remains that accurate information and data

on the actual position in regard to reservation of posts for SC and ST

categories are not available. Since this is the situation in regard to

employments under the Government of West Bengal, the position in

other establishments in the public sector, universities, colleges and

local bodies is anybody's guess. Maintaining an information system

is surely not tle strong point of govemments, especially under present

conditions, *hen govemment organisations have proliferated at all

levels, both secretariat and field, making it well-nigh impossible tokeep track of employee data. The State Department of Scheduled

Castes and Tribes Welfare is the nodal agency charged with the

responsibility of administering the Act and maintaining and updatingstatistical information on reservation. The departments are to statuto-

rily submit annual retums on reservation, both for vacancies and

promotion posts. But such returns are extremely irregular and the

defaulting departments are too many to count.

The machinery for regular collection, processing and retrieval ofemployment (reservation) data within the Scheduled Castes and Tribes

Welfare Department is thoroughly inadequate. Staff census is under-

taken at certain intervals by the state govemment's Bureau of Ap-plied Economics and Statistics. Whatever census data are made avail-able by the Bureau tum out to be the only "authentic" information on

employment under the govemment. The last such staff census report


was published by the Bureau in 1982.

According to the data supplied by the Bureau, the "provisional"estimate of the total number of state government employees is 4,01,000.

This includes even the miscellaneous category of employees drawingpay on consolidated, piece-rate, work-charged and contingent basis.

On April 1,1982, the shares of the SC and ST in total government

employment in West Bengal stood as follows:

GeneralScheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

Total 100.00

Clearly, the prescribed quota could not be reached in both catego-

ries. Appendix II presents a complete picture of the distribution ofSC/ST categories among the different job groups. Their representa-tion on the higher class of jobs (A and B) is extremely low. In the

clerical (group C) category, the representation by contrast, is notinsignificant. But in the lowest category of group D jobs (peons,

messengers, sweepers, etc.), the share of SC/ST is substantial. Inter-

estingly, the sweepers and scavengers forming one part of Group Demployees are drawn largely from the Scheduled Castes (62.447o).ln

the case of other Group D jobs-peons, messengers, book-binders,etc.-the statutory quota for both SC and ST has been fulfilled.

From the limited data, it can be safely infened that in purelygovemment jobs, the statutorily prescribed reservation quota for bothSC and ST could not be reached. The representation of these twocategories in lower jobs-mostly unskilled and manual-has nbtposed any problem. But thejobs at higher levels, especially groups Aand B, have remained virtually out of their reach. Incidentally, the

posts at higher levels, including those in group C, are filled on

competitive basis through the State Public Service Commission. Thegatekeeping function in the hands of the State PSC may be so

rigorous as to dissuade the SC/ST candidates from applying forhigher governmentjobs. Alternatively, such candidates may be find-ing the PSC's screening process too hard to fcllow. In this connection

it may be worthwhile looking at the failure rate of SC/ST candidates

in PSC's tests and exarninations.In the absence of time series data, it is not possible to say if the

85.951 1.58


situation in regard to reservation has been improving or deterioratingover the years. The enactment of the law in 1976 was motivated bythe desire to place the system of reservation on a statutory footing. Itwas also stated at that point of time that "the overall position ofrepresentation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the Stateservices was not at all encouraging." From the 1982 statistics, it doesnot appear that there has been any marked improvement in the overallposition since the enactment of the law.

This state of affairs has not gone unnoticed by the Govemment ofWest Bengal. Recently (August, 1987), a meeting was convened toreview the position. Among others, the ministers present at the meet-ing included the minister in charge of Land and Land Reforms andthe minister for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Welfare.The secretaries and other officers of tlle different state departments,including the chief secretary attended rhe meeting. The minister forSC/ST Welfare was critical of the departments which had failed toenforce the job reservation provisions of the Act. As the ministersaid: "In a number of departments, including the Land and LandReforms Department and the Agriculture Department, not more than13 per cent of the employees are Scheduled Castes and ScheduledTribes. Even the Public Service Commission had failed to providethe requisite number of such applicants for the posts of lower-divi-sion clerks in different departments of the state government. peoplefrom these castes and tribes qualified for the posts of lower-divisionclerks were not wanting and it was not clear why the PSC had failedto select such candidates for the job."

A decision was taken at tle meeting to familiarise the seniorgovernment officers with the provisions of the Act. Issues connectedwith the jobs for the SC/ST members were to form part of theadministrative training cuniculum of the officers of the state govem-ment. The upshot of the discussion at the meeting was that the Actand the rules relating to reservation were henceforth to be strictlyenforced and the departments of govemment were reminded of theirstatutory duties in this regard.6

Such 'shake-up's in government are not uncommon and the bu-reaucracy has its own way of living with them. For the time being,there is likely to be a lot of running around and issuance of letters andreminders. But to keep up the tempo of data gathering and informa-

Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene l9l

tion processing in government on a regular basis is most

ungovernment-like. Unless there is an 'effective demand' for data

and information, collection of data for the sake of collection does not

make sense. In other words, the data on reservation have not so far

been of any consequence for the government of West Bengal. For the

future, one has only to keep one's fingers crossed.

The Efticiency QuestionAgainst this background, it is frivolous to look for the impact of

the reservation policy on efficiency in govemment. Measurement ofefficiency in government is a highly complex job. Cutting red tape'

speeding up files and papers and the O&M kind of streamlining point

to a crude type of administrative efficiency. This is easy to achieve.

Then there is the question of efficiency in the sphere of major

decision-making which can be called p olicy efficiency. Major deci-

sions in regard to location of industries and plants, sectoral invest-

ments, multi-crore purchases of military hardware and so on call forunusual tact. administrative sense, innovativeness and creative fore-

sight. This is where policy efficiency counts.

There is still another kind of efficiency which can be called

semices efficiency. The concern here is with the impact of govern-

ment programmes and projects on the ground. It is not uncommon in

govemment to come across frantic efforts to spend money on projects.

However, the outcome at the ground level in terms of crop productiv-

ity, disease eradication, poverty alleviation and, more importantly,

clientele satisfaction seems nobody's concem. Yet, service efficiency

is essential to improve the public image of government.

Of the three kinds of efficiency, policy efficiency is largely in the

hands of the top echelons in govemment. As stated earlier, in West

Bengal the representation of S(7ST in the highest category ofjobs isinsignificant (SC 4.63 and ST 0.92 respectively). So, the policy level

is virtually out of bounds for them.

At the clerical level, the reprcsenJation of SC and ST is signifi-cantly high-9.50 per cent for the SC category and 2.08 per cent forthe ST category. But administrative efficiency, as defined earlier,

depends on a variety of factors such as organizational format, morale,

motivation, competent supervision, on-the-job training and above all,a clear and obvious need for efficiency within the organization. This


is, no doubt, a short checklist of conditions of efficiency. Without athoroughgoing enquiry into the administrative structure and process,it will be rash and unscientific to pass any judgement on the state ofadministrative efficiency in West Bengal that could be attributedsolely to the reservation policy.

The third kind of efficiency is basically field-oriented. In recenttimes, West Bengal's performance at the field level has been ratedhigh, be it in land reforms or the implementation of the IntegratedRural Development Programme (IRDP), which is essentially an anti-poverty programme. On the basis of somewhat sketchy information,it may not be out of place to commend the efficiency of field services.To the extent it is due.to the efforts of the lower level field bureau-cracy, the credit should go, along with others, to the SC/ST members,whose representation is much higher in the lower category of groupC jobs.

It would pose an extremely difficult methodological problem tomeasure the impact of the performance of this very small section ofemployees on total Govemmental performance. But, at least in publicforums like the press or the legislature there has not been even a ghostof a complaint that the efficiency of the govemment of West Bengalis going down because of the operation of the reservation policy.

The Political FrameworkInstead of searching for the will-o'-the-wisp of efficiency in gov-

ernment, the more important question about West Bengal's reserva-tion policy is : Why is there almost a rotal absence of agitafion on theissue of 'reservation'? Why didn't West Bengal go the Gujarat way?How does one account for the absence of the Bihar+ype caste con-frontations in West Bengal? In other words, the policy on reservationneeds to be examined within a broader framework of the social basisof regional politics.

Obviously, such large issues are likely to take us away from themundane problems of implementation of reservation policy and itsimpact on govemment efficiency. We arc willy-nilly drawn into aninvolved discussion on the social basis of political power.

To draw a broad-brush picture of politics in West Bengal, the firstitem that deserves special mention is the role of the ,bhadralok' inBengal politics. The gentle, urbane and English-educated Bengali

Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene lg3

bhadralok has been basically urban and Calcutta-based. With thecollapse of the zamindari system of landownership by the early1930s, the new bhadralok came forward to give leadership toprogrammes of radical agrarian reform, and political movements.There were successful attempts in many parts of undivided Bengal tomobilise the peasantry against state extortions and oppressivelandlordism. The movement of the sharecroppers gathered momen-tum, demanding a more favourable share of the produce. The Tebhagaagitations durin g 1946-49 were spearheaded by the intelligentsia andbrought within its fold the small ar,d the landless peasants and a largesection of the scheduled castes. After Partition, the Calcutta-basedbhadralok had virtually very little interest in land. He was not a partyto the dispute over land, rent, share of produce-the entire gamut ofagrarian relations. As Partha Chatterjee describes the bhadralok pos-ture:

"Whether it has been a question of landlord versus tenant, orjotdarvenus sharecropper, or the fixing of procurement prices for foodgrains,the highly vocal and articulate bhadralok intelligentsia have judgedthe issues not as insiders in a struggle between contending agrarianparties, sharing the modes and categories of thought developed overcenturies of collective communal allocation of rights and entitle-ments relating to the use of land and associated economic activities.Rather, the bhadralok have viewed such questions from a distance,from the p€rspective of urban consumers of agricultural products,and issues of agrarian relations, land reforms, food prices-whichfonn the bread and butter of state politics under the Indian Constitu-tion-have been seen in terms of much more .objective' categories:landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, small peasant, agriculturallabour, distress sales, terms of trade between agriculture and indus-try, etc. These are the terms in which the debates have been con-ducted in the political arena, party conclaves, mass meetings, and inthe media, and when battle lines have been drawn, the upper-casreintelligentsia were to be found in leading roles in every contendingparty-the ruling party and the party of the opposition, parties ofstatus quo and parties of change."z

The absence of any organised political articulation of the bigpeasantry (West Bengal being basically a small farmer dominatedstate), considerable fragmentation of the middle castes, and the over-

r94 Thc Politics of Backwardness

all cultural domination of the bhadralok have stood in the way ofaggregation of caste interests in West Bengal's political scene'

Politicization of caste and the resultant caste conflicts in many

states in India have mainly been due to the use of caste as a political

device for acquiring power, as the acquisition of power has provided

access to the scarce resources at the disposal of government' West

Bengal's story has been different. The rise of left and radical politics

has ied to the forging of links with the rural masses for purposes ofpolitical mobilization. Even from the pre.Independence days, the left

parties have been active in mobilizing the peasantry against the major

issues of oppressive rents and taxes, and the appropriate share ofcrop, and land to the tiller. Sharing of common political values by the

members of different castes has paved the ground for a 'class' orien-

tation among the rural masses- Hence' battles arre waged between

classes and not castes, and the slogans are political and not parochial'

Last, but not the least, the radical land reforms programme under-

taken by the Irft Front govemment and decentralised local develop-

ment through the aegis of the panchayats have ensured a degree ofdistributive justice in the countryside. The radical politics of the Left

Front has so far been able to encapsulate tlre primordial social group-

ings in rural Bengal. The longevity of secular politics hinges on the

steady growth and dissemination of radical politics. It has to be seen

how long political radicalism survives in the midst of an inhospitable

pan-Indian political environment.To sum up, West Bengal's response to the reservation policy has

been marginally administrative and basically political- Attempts are

no doubt being made to fill up the prescribed quota to fulfil the

constitutional obligation. But the real emphasis has been on

"conscientizing" the economically weaker sections and politicising

them. As the Government of West Bengal told the Mandal Commis-

sion, "poverty and low levels of living standards rather than caste

should be the most important criterion of backwardness," and what is

needed is to formulate comprehensive programmes of ecnonomic

development and educational advancement of the poorer sections ofthe society. This, in brief, symbolises the political response of West

Bengal to the reservation PolicY.

Reservation Policy: The West Bengal Scene

Appendix I(Report from The Statesman, Calcutta, August 1, l9g7)

"State failing to meet reservation quotas"

A number of departments in the West Bengal Covemment have failed to enforcethejob reservation provisions of the West Bengal Seheduled Castes and Sched-uled Tribes (Reservation of Vacancies in Service and posts) Act, 1976 accordinsto Mr Dinesh Chandra Dakua, the State's Minister for Scheduled Castes aniScheduled Tribes in Calcutta on Friday. About 2gVo of t}re State's populationbelongs to these categories, he said.

Thejob reservation quota for Scheduled Castes and Tribes was 15./o and SVo,respectively, in West Bengal. But in a number of departments, including theLand and Land Reforms department, not more ahan lj% members of theemployees are Scheduled Caste and Tribe, Mr Dakua said. Even the publicService Commission had failed to provide the re4uisite number of such appli-cants for the posts of lower division clerks in different departments of the StateGovemment. People from these castes and tribes qualified for the posts oflower_division clerks were not wanting and he wondered why the pSC had failed toselect such candidates for the job.

Mr Dakua said that on Friday a meeting ofthe secretaries and other officersof the different departments of the State Govemment was held at Writers'Building to review the job situation. Mr Benoy Chowdhury, West Bengal Landand Land Reforms ,Minister, who was present at the meeting, also stressed theneed for strict implementation of the provisions of the Act. The State's ChiefSecretary, Mr Rathin Sen Gupta, also attended the meeting.

To make all the senior Govemment officers aware of the provisions of theAct, issues connected with jobs for Scheduled Caste and Tribe members will beincluded in the administrative training curriculum of the officers of the StateGovemment, Mr Dakua said.

Mr Dakua said in Calcutta on Thursday rhat thousands of Scheduled Casteand Tribe students in West Bengal are being inconvenienced by delays in thepayment of their scholarship. The Minister said that administrative lapses werethe primary reason for the delay.

Mr Dakua said that in the pre-matriculation stage nearly Rs 7 crores were tobe given to the students as scholarships and in the post-matriculation stagenearly Rs 6 crores were earmarked for this purpose. But for the past few yearsthe scholarship has never been available to the shldents on time. It was a sorrystate of affairs, he said.

The Minister convened two meetings recently in which it was decided thatthe administrative machinery should be geared up so that eligible students can begiven the scholarships on time. It was suggested that the Gram panchayat bodiesshould be involved in selecting the eligible candidates and that they refer thenames to the authorities concemed with the payment ofscholarships. Eadier, theschool authorities were entrusted with the job of selecting students but on many

195


occasions they failed to refer any names, he added'

Our Special Representative in New Delhi adds: The Central Govemment has

decided to rename the Commission for the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes as the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Sched-

uled Tribes. The Commissioner will be vested with more powers-

The Commissioner will be concerned with reservation quotas for Scheduled

CastesandTribesinthepublicservices,theiradmissiontoeducationalinstitu.tions and the execution of anti-poverty programmes among other things' The

Commissioner's report to the President will be submitted by the end of July

every year and to insure that the recommendations of the report are imple-

rn"niei, ft" Prime Minister will review it twice a year at his meetings with

Scheduled Castes and Tribes MPs and the Chief Ministers'

APPendix IIDistribution of Employees of the Government of West

Bengal by Category of Post and Caste as on lst April' 19E2

CateBoryofpost

Total No.of

Emplo-yecs

Scheduled Castes Schzduled Tibes

No. of 7a to No. of % to No. of to

Emplo- total hrplo- total Emplo- total

yi"t No. in Yees No. in tees No- in

Col.2 Col.2 Col' 2

Group B 57935

Group C 202726Croup D(excluding 107540

swe.epers and

scavengers)Group D 7'l 19

(sw€epers andscavengers onlY)*Others (exclud. 5955

ing sweepers and

scavengers)*Others (sw€€pers 7A

and scavengers onlY)

6.01 4759.50 4225

t6.2t 4350

62.M 530

9.57 140

27.t4 6

0.82 53981

2.O8 1792453479

t9256

t't 434

4789

570

l9

93.1788.42

4.05 85756 '19;14

6.8? 24c0 31.09

2.35 5245 88.08

8.57 45 64.29

Crand Total 401000 46430 I1.58 9901 2.47 344669 85.95

pay on

charged and contingent basis.

Slzrce: Staff census, 1982. Bureau of Applied Economics and Statistics'

Note: () Figures are Provisional.(2) Total No. of state government employees as on 1 4 1982 as per provi-

sional estimate is---4.01,000.

Resenation Policy: The West Bengal Scene

REFERENCES

197

I . The debates of the Constih-rent Assembly on this issue have been summarisedin Rao, B. Shiva, ed., The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study. Vol. l, pp.192-201 and Chap. 25. New Delhi: Indian Institure of public Administrsrion,1968.

2. Gopal, Guru. "Politics of Reservations: A Class Approach.,' Sociery andChange, vol. IV, nos. April and June, Calcutta: 1985.

3. Randive, B.T. Caste, Class and Property Relations. Calcutta: NationalBook Agency, 1982.

4. Ghosh, Anjali. PeacefuI Transition to Power: A Study of Marxist politicatStrategies in West Bengal, 1967-77. Appendix VI. Calcutta: Firma KLM privateLtd., 1981.

5. AP. "Class-Caste Dimension of PanchayatiRaj;' The Marxist Review, vol.XIV. No. 2, August 1980.

6. The Statesman (Calcutra Edition), August 1987. (See Appendix I.)7. Chatterjee, Partha. "Caste and Politics in West Bengal" in Gail Omvedt

el., lnnd, Caste and Politics in Indian,lrares. Delhi: Authors Guild publica-

tions, 1982.

Chapter 8

The Reservation System in Gujarat

Shri Prakash

HERE are two basic reasons why an enquiry into the evolu-

tion and functioning of the system of reservations in Gujarat

would be more significant than a similar analysis of other

states in India. The first reason is that as a state and a distincteconomic and social region, Gujarat has produced a pattern of devel-

opment, in which there has been a grbater distribution of growth

downwards, for a variety of reasons. Such a distribution of gains

from development-relatively much better spread out than in states

like Bihar or West Bengal-has not required the help of an extensive

system of reservations, which has remained within moderate propor-

tions. The second reason is that among otier causes, the attempt to

expand-or in one sense overextend-the system of reservation quo-

tas has produced unnecessary social conflict that can only obstruct

the normal process of growth. In such a situation there is a need to

rely much more on alternative methods of generating growth and

helping to distribute the gains of development, methods that have the

sanction of a social consensus behind them. An argument of this kindhas an absolute cultural relevance in a region where the name and

philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi are a household word. At any rate,

the meaning of a non-violent strategy of social change and demo-

cratic transformation are the same. They involve an attempt at peace-

ful change of ideas and social practices and seek to minimize, if not

altogether abolish conflict and violence. In this sense the need to

work the reservations strategy within well defined limits nationally

and locally, has to be a conscious political decision.

The Resemation System in Gujarat 199

It is important to substantiate the claim that the gains from devel-opment in Gujarat are better spread out than in other states. For thispurpose one can compare Gujarat with Bihar and West Bengal. Interms of size and area the three states are more comparable than interms of population. All threc arc moderate-sized states as mav beseen from Table I below.

Table IDevelopment Profile of j Indian States:

Gujarat, Bihar and West Bengal

l. Population in millions(1981)

2. Persons per square mile(1981)

3. Urban pop. as % of total(1981)

4. Totat inhabited villages(198r)

5. Average population pervillage (1981)

6. Per capita power consum-ption (KWH) (198283)

7. Per cent villages electrified8. No.of tubewellVpumpsets

as on (31/3/1985)

9. Literacy (1981) 7o of totalpopulation

10. Students in Class I-V as %of total pop. in age group6 to 11 (1976-77\

I l. Students in Class VI to VIIIas % of total pop. in agegroup l1 to l4 (1976-77)

12. Students in Class IX to XIIas % of total pop. in agegroup 14 to l7 (1976n7)

13. Number of colleges (1983-84) 28514. Toral studenrs enrolled 2.04.697

(1983-84)

15. Women students as Vo of total

34.1

174

3l.l

t8l l4

1297

252

87%29700)O

44%

94%

42%

2t%

69.9

402

12.5

67546

906

85

49%193000

26%

59Vo

u%

l4%

4732,28,441

l5Vo

54.6

6t5

26.5

38024.

1055

5t%41000

4lVo

83Vo

33Vo

17Vo

3482,48,559

3O7o33%

2m

16. Population served per

hospital bed (1984)

17. Estimated no. of couPles

eligible for sterili sation

in March l98l (1000)

18. (a) % of estimatedno. sterilised

(b) between 1981 and 1984(also total no. '000)

19. Area in hectares coveredunder afforestation ( I 980-83)

20. New drinking water wells

built (1980-83)

21. Area benefited throughminor irrigatior/floodworks (hectares)( I 980-83)

22. Soil, waler conservationand land reclamation (hect.)(198G.83)

23. Number of tractors(as on 31.3.1983)

24. Total daily capacity ofdairy plants in ('000litres) 1979

25. Central l,and DevelopmentBanks-regular members(31/tr81)

26. Prirnary Land DeveloPmentBanks (31/6/81) members

27. Number of Primary HousingSocieties (31/6n980)

28. Number of members of PHS(31/6/1980)

29. Bonowing by members ofPHS (31/6/1980) Rs. lakhs

30. Minimum Needs Prograrnme(1985-90) outlay (Rs. Lakhs)(a) Rural housing (do)(b) Rural water supply (do)

(c) Rural roads (do)

31. Post Offices in rural

areas: Rural pop. per Post


2987l062

Jf /J

16.5Vo

915

5344

12094

42385

78159

47000

t277

4,81,216

56857902

2,40,74r

22,383

63008000

150003018

t3061

7 .1Vo

1004

783

247

1,49,401

591

22040

r82

3,15,000

8288

13%

1066

2707

9220

72052

14893

4000

374

78r9

1,39,0371131

50300

1349

600350035005577

269

16810

92

1400

9500175005965

Office (1982/83

on

Bureau, Bombay, October, 1986.

The Resenation System in Gujarat 2Ol

The key indicators which bring our the grearer distribution ofgains from growth relate to facts like per capita power consumption,per cent of electrified villages, number of tubewells and pumpsets,proportion of literate population, share of women among those en_rolled for higher education, the number of couples sterilized, milkproduction, membership of the Land Development Banks and pri_mary Housing Societies, loans to members of these societies, invest_ments in extending rural housing and water supply, the numbers ofpeople served by hospitals and post offices. On all of these counts,Gujarat is ahead of Bihar and West Bengal, as may be seen from thedata presen0ed above, particularly when it is realized that in terms ofpopulation Bihar has more than twice the numbers than Gujarat andWest Bengal 60 per cent more. Yet, even in absolute figures, Gujaratis ahead of the other two states, when most of the indices are consid_ered. This shows a grcater spread of gains from development inGujarat.

The main question to be considered is whether the system ofreservations has had much to do with this greater distribution ofgains. The answer has to be in the negative for two reasons. Firstly,there were no reservations for OBCs in Gujarat in the educationalinstitutions and state serv'ces until April l,l97g. Secondly, even thereservation system for the SCVSTs in Gujarat evolved slowly, overtime. It was formalized and expanded as the proportion of educatedpersons within these communities grew and the govemment per_ceived the possibility and the need for their greater presence andparticipation within the administration.

Before looking at the actual evolution of the rcservation system inGujarat, it has to be emphasized that the SCVSTs have been able toachieve much else, besides getting government jobs through thereservations system. The percentage of literates among scheduledcastes in Gujarat is almost 40 per cent according to the lggl censuswhile the ratio for non-SC population is zl4 per cent. This is stillhigher than the all-India averages which are 2l per cent for scheduledcastes and 39 per cent for the rest of the population. Similarly, in thecase of urbanization in Gujarat, 32.69 per cent among the SCs live incities, which is higher than the 30.98 per cent for the non-SC popu_lation. In West Bengal, where the share of population estimated to beIiving in urban areas is 30.44 per cent, almost the same as Gujarat, the


share of SCs is only 12.41 per cent. Clearly, the process of social

integration between SC and non-SC communities will be more ad-

vanced in cities than in rural areas, in today's circumstances- This is

especially so in Gujarat where many of the SCs in urban arcas workin textile mills.

From the time of its formation and before that as a part of Bombay

Province, there was reseryation of seats for S(YST in the kgislativeAssembly and the two Houses of Parliament in Gujarat, as in other

states. In 1967, out of 168 Irgislative Assembly seats I I werc

reserved for S(7ST and out of 24 Lok Sabha seats 2 were similarly

reserved. According to the Gujarat Panchayat Act of l96f in Gujarat

at least one seat in every panchayat had to be reserved for a scheduled

caste and one for a scheduled tribe, where they were in large num-

bers. In addition, the state governments had the power to increase the

number of seats prcportionate to the SC/ST population in a village or

a district.As regards rcservations in the educational institutions and in gov-

ernment employment in the 1950s, very few posts were reserved inthe then Bombay Province, Saurashtra and Kutch for the depressed or

the backward classes who then consisted mostly of scheduled castes

and tribes. The Government Reporter of 16.5.51 carried a notifica-tion for reserving some more posts in class III and class IV for the

backward classes and this provision was ofhcially implemented from

9.5.53. (Mahesh H. Dave, "Backward Classes and Reservation" in

Haroobahi Mehta and Hasmukh Patel ed', Dynamics of Reservation

Policy, Patiot Publishers, New Delhi, 1985, p.l0l.) In order to fillthese posts backward class candidates were to be called from the

General Administration Department and their number was to be fixed

on the basis of posts vacant since November 1950. (Government

Reporter of 8.12.54 in Dave, loc. cit.)It is true that when stocktaking was done in October 1959, it was

found that there was a huge backlog of reserved posts that had not

been filled. Besides upper caste prejudices (which resisted the entry

of SC/ST candidates in posts filled through direct recruitment)' one

reason may be the lack of incentive on the part of SCVSTs to go in

for government employment when they were getting other jobs which

allowed them to stay with their families in the cities e.g., jobs in the

Ahmedabad mills. The govemment did not reserve any posts in Class

The Reservation System in Gujarat 203

I and Class II services until 20.9.1969, when the quotas were moreprecisely defined. In Class I and II jobs, 5 and 10 per cent respec-

tively were reserved for the SC/ST; in Class III and IV it was 7 and

14 per cent. At the district level, since 1950, posts in Class III and IVhad all along been reserved more or less in proportion to the SCyST

population. Since 1964, if no backward class (or SC/ST) candidateswere available for the 'reserved' posts, such posts had to be carriedforward for the next two years within the limit of the district popula-tion. Thereafter they could be filled from the unreserved class.

From the 1970s, efforts were made to publicise reserved posts

through voluntary agencies working among backward and tribalpeople. The roster system was introduced in all classes of the ser-

vices. A 40-point roster was created for Class I and II posts and a1OO-point roster for Class III and IV, whereby one post after every 40or 100 was reserved for the backward classes with a maximum limitof 45 per cent and a carry-forward prbvision for two years. The list ofbackward classes was drawn, as before, from the lists of the sched-

uled castes and tribes and the lists maintained by the Ministry ofEducation for the award of scholarships to students from among thebackward classes.

It was in the early 1970s that the issue of expanding reservationsfor the OBCs acquired a renewed momentum. In the early 1960s, theKaka Kalelkar Commission Report, the Lokur Commission Reportand several significant judgements of the Supreme Court had pro-moted a discussion on the reservations issue. The reasons for an

enhanced emphasis on state-sponsored redistribution of incomes inthe late 1960s and the early 1970s were several: the increase in therate of inflation after the drought of 1965, the growth in the numbersof educated job seekers, and last but not least, the growing emphasis,on the part of Congress (I) (led by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi) andsome other political parties, on bringing the backward classes into thearena of representative leadership. Hence the increasing presence oflegislators from the backward communities within the state and thenational legislatures. This created the impression that by expandingreservation quotas from above through statutory action, the politicalrepresentatives of the backward classes would be able to enhance thesocial and economic power of their own communities. The logic ofsuch thinking lead the political representatives drawn from the back-


ward communities to build up pressure for action on the OBC reser-vations issue. The first step often was the appointment of a BackwardClasses Commission to finalize a list of those who would be entitledto use OBC reservations and the size of reservation quotas. One cancount at least ten Backward Classes Commissions which were ap-pointed between 1965 and 1978, whereas there had been very few inthe period 1947-1965. Additional measures like the sening up ofspecial schools or hostels meant only for the OBCs or specific castesamong them, finance commissions for giving loans, etc., were alsoproposed and undertaken by varicus political leaders e.g., Devraj Ursin Kamataka and Karpoori Thakur in Bihar.

Gujarat too was drawn into the vortex of the demand that anexpansion of the base of the political leadership should find animmediate reflection within the bureaucracy, the academia and othersections of the professional and business worlds. Unlike Karnatakaand Tamil Nadu, where there was a social consensus about theoperation of the reservation system through which the elite hadthemselves risen in the British period, in, Gujarat the process of therise of new social groups, like the Pattidars, had been much moreself-propelled and carried out without an excess of state assistance.Hence, ifa strategy of reservations was now to be prescribed, a socialconsensus had to be built up around it. The appointment of theBackward Classes Commission in 1972 wder the chairmanship ofJustice Baxi may be seen as the first step in trying to build such aconsensus. It must be realized, that it would be difficult to actuallyimplement successfully a policy of reservations, unless there was asocial consensus since those in charge of implementing it would notbe drawn from those communities for whom it was meant 4nd if theydid not agree with such a policy would seek to undermine, delay orretard its implementation.

On this point, there is a marked contrast between the responses

evoked by reservations for SCVSTs and backward classes in thelegislatures and the reservations in govemment jobs and the publicsector. Whereas there has been little protest against political reserva-tions for the SCVSTs and the period of their continuance has beenextended several times, that is not the case where attempts have beenmade to expand the reservations system in the educational and em-ployment spherc. The dominant elite groups consider the policy has

The Reservation System in Gujarat 2O5

gone beyond its function of providing social representation to the

backward classes and is now being used to oust them of areas whichthey feel should be mainly controlled on the basis of skills and

training. They are sought to be removed through the use of unfairstate action, by blocking the avenues for their economic and social

mobility. This belief on the part of the elite is the real divider between

consensus and conflict. When the belief takes root that this limit has

been transgressed, protest is a natural corollary, whichever govem-

ment may be in power.

The case of Gujarat illustrates very clearly that while there is aconsensus ahut preferential treatment to the SC/ST/OBCs in every

sphere of education and employment, the elite groups are not ready tocountenance the use of the reservations policy as a battering ram toforcefully deprive them of opportunities for social and economic

mobility. The Baxi Commission identified 82 communities as consti-

tuting the OBCs. These included the Bafan, Dafer, Fakir, Gadhai,

Galiara, Hingora, Julaha, Mir or Langha, Darban, Makrani, Miyana,

Pinjara, Sandhi, Sipai, Theba and Wagher who were Muslims and

Khristi or Gujarati Christian converts from the scheduled castes. Its

report was submitted on 27 February 1976. The Baxi Commission

Report estimated the OBC population to be 45 per cent of the overallpopulation in Gujarat. It recommended that l0 per cent seats should

be reserved in medical, engineering, dental, technical, agriculture and

veterinary colleges. It further recommended that for admission tothese seats, OBC candidates should have marks which were not more

than 5 per cent below the lowest for non-reserved admissions, withan absolute minimum of 55 per cent as qualifying marks.In addition,

5 per cent seats were to be reserved for the OBCs in Class I and Class

II state services and 10 per cent in Class III and Class IV. The 10 per

cent OBC quota was to be reviewed by the governrnent after 10

years, in March 1988. These recommendations were accepted by the

then Janata Party govemment on April 1, 1978. Together with the

existing quota of7 per cent for the SC, 14 per cent for ST and l0 per

cent for the OBC, this brought the aggregate of jobs and seats

reserved to 31 per cent.

It is noteworthy that in 1978 there were no protests against the

Baxi Commission except complaints by some communities that they

had been unfairly excluded from the OBC list. The Baxi Commission


too did not publish the data it had collected through its survey, givingrise to doubts about the complete validity of the classification pro-posed by it. Indeed many of the prominent organisations who couldbe said to be mobilizing the backward classes themselves did notagree with the Baxi Commission. The Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha al-leged that the Commission had left out the poor among the interme-diate and even the upper castes, in its haste to include only castes likethe Kolis and the Barias who constituted almost 65 per cent of the listof OBCs put together by the Baxi Commission. The Kshatriya Sabhaargued "that caste, community and religion should not be the citeriato determine backwardness in the formation of a socialist state. Anyone whose income is below the limit of income tax, no matter ofwhich caste he is-be it Kshatriya, Patikar, Vaniya, Brahmin, Harijan,Adivasi, etc.,-should be considered backward. One becomes back-ward because of one's limited economic income." Some of theleaders also pointed out that there were castes in the BaxiCommission's list which did not even have a 5 per cent literacy rateand they could not be expected to use the OBC reservation quotas.Little information exists about the actual utilization of the 10 per centOBC quota and the social background of those who are able to use it.

Following these representations, the Congress(I) govemment ap-pointed a second Backward Classes Commission in 1981 headed byJustice C.V. Rane. It was asked to consider whether there were "anyother Castes/Communities/Classes which fell in the category of so-cially and educationally backward classes". The Commission wasalso entrusted with the task of making suitable recommendations onthe question whether certain number of seats and posts should bereserved for the OBCs in proportion to their population.

The Rane Commission submitted its report in October, 1983. In amajor departure from the criteria used by the previous Commissionsthe Rane Commission rejected caste as a measurement of backward-ness. It argued that with occupational diversification and the emer-gence of contractual relationships, an occupation criteria should beused to classify the OBCs. It identified 63 occupations as backward,covering about 35 per cent of the population, which was 10 per centless than the Baxi Commission's figure of 45 per cent at that timeaccepted in Gujarat as denoting the size of the OBCs. It recom-mended only 28 per cent total reservations for the OBCs so as to keep

The Reservation System in Guiarat

witlin the aggregate limit of 50 per cent set up by the Supreme Court'

At a meeting on l0 January 1985 the Gujarat Cabinet under the

leadership of Chief Minister Madhavsinh Solanki' accepted the rec-

ommendation to enhance the OBC reservation quota by l8 per cent

but rejected the new criteria of income and occupation'. It also set up

a one-flran committee to identify any other caste/communities eli-

gible for using the OBC reservations in terms of the criteria recom-

mended by the Baxi Comrnission. As is well known, following a

strong agitation, the implementation of this quota was postponed'

It is instructive to look at the pattern and causes of the persistent

unrest against the reservations system in Gujarat. What is noteworthy

is that as a new phenomenon, it has appeared on the social and

political scene only in the late 1970s. During the days of the Nav

Nirman agitation of the early 1970s, also led by the college students

of Ahmedabad. reservation was not an issue, although the carry-

forward system and the roster system had been in existence for

several years. Yet, in November 1979 some students of the B.J.

Medical College, Ahmedabad filed a case in the Gujarat High Court

against the carry-forward, the roster and the interchangeability sys-

tems. They lost the case in court, whereupon they resorted to direct

action.Before analysing the pattern of the unrest, it would be useful to

look at the causes which have shifted the focus of social conflict on

to tlre reservation of seats and jobs. For several decades after 1947

there was little or no open protest against the rcservation system in

Gujarat. However, by the end of the 1970s several factors-amongthem the most significant being the rapid expansion of the educa-

tional system at the school level--had begun to cause a growing

scarcity of college seats, for which competition was becoming fierce.

Between 1961 and 1981,literacy increased from 3l percent to 44 per

cent in Gujarat, the number of high schools from 1099 to 3153 and

the number of colleges from 102 to 371. Between 1965 and 1981 the

number of college students increased from 50,000 to 1,80,000' drawn

from a variety of castes. The number of govemment employees has

risen almost four times, from 1,06,0@ in 1960 to 4'43,952 in 1980.

During the decade 1970 to l980job seekers registered at the employ-

ment exchanges in Gujarat rose more than three times, from I '50,000

in l97Tto 5,21,000 in 1982. Among them, 58 per cent or 3,1 1'000

207

2O8 The politics of Backwardness

were educated. Evidently, college education is either producing moredegree holders than there are jobs or producing the wrong kind ofdegree holders.

In spite of the increase in the number of the educated job seekers,the numbcr of schools has gone on increasing. Between l9g0 and1985 secondary schools in Gujarat increased from 3l lg to 4104_486 more than the target set in the Sixth plan. Similarly, the stategovernment had sanctioned 558 new higher secondary schools dur_ing the Sixth Plan when it was supposed only to have 525. As a result,the number of students registered in l1 and 12 class has gone up at amuch faster rate to 3,45,0@ from 1,95,000. In addition, there is nowat least one Industrial Training Institute in every district of Gujaratand among all the states it has the highest number ofstudents enrolledin vocational courses. At the last count this was 63,00,000 in 19g5.This data clearly reveals that the rapid expansion of the educationsystem at the base has created both a shortage of college seats andgovemment jobs at the same time. The pressure, especially on stu-dents from upper caste/class families to get into professional collegessuch as engineering or medicine, has increased considerably.

Having lost the case they had filed against the system of carry-forward, the roster system and that of interchangeability, the studentsof BS Medical College in Ahmedabad put forward a set of demandsto the Ministry of Health of the Gujarat govemment on 3 I December,1980. These demands reflected their intention of maximizing tlrenumber of college seaG available for use through competition in anyone year. Apart from demanding the abolition of the carry-forwardand the roster systems, the memorandum went on to demand areduction of the reserved seats and an incrcase in unreserved seats atthe post-graduate level. The demand for the abolition of tlre carry_forward system in the colleges must be seen in the light of the factthat in practice, the specified number of SC7ST applicants is notreached. In 1981, there were only 7 SCVST applicants for the 17reserved seats in the post-graduate medical courses. In 1979-g0, inthe rrcdical courses, there werc only 507 SC/ST applicants out of atotal of 4500 seats. According to their share of the state's population(2lVo) the number of applicants should have been 945. The studentsfelt that reserved seats were being carried forward when they werenot being made use of.

Th.e Reservation System in Gujarat

Although the government did not concede the demand of the

students for a total abolition of the reservation system, it agreed toterminate the carry-forward system after some days of agitation on

the part of the students. The unfilled seats were now to accumulate

only up to 45 per cent. A ftesh list of the unfilled seats was to be made

every two years, even if the percentage of the unfrlled seats did notreach 45. In addition, the govemment declared that the system ofinterchangeability of seats would be abolished. According to thissystem, vacant seats in one reserved category used to be transferredfirst to the next reserved category (SC-ST-OBC carry-forward for 2ye:us unreserved) within the defined limits of 13 per cent for ST and

25 per cent of the total reserved seas. Lastly, the govemment agreed

to add one seat to the unreserved category for each SC seat filled inthe specialised departments. All these measures helped to overcome

the shortage of seats and maximize the utilisation of existing seats inany one year.

In the l98l agitation there was also some mobilization against the

SC cultivators and agricultural labourers in the rural areas surround-ing Ahmedabad e.g., in the village of Jetalpur. But from the students'point of view the issue of reservations was quite separate fromproblems of wages for agricultural labourers, use of common grazinggrounds (gochar) in the villages or formation of Harijan cooperatives.

Even within reservations, ending the roster system was not as impor-tant as winding up the carry-forward and interchangeability systems.

Proof of the students' priorities was that they unconditionally with-drew their agitation on I 3 April, I 98 I after the government had made

the concessions noted earlier. Hence it cannot be said that the 1980anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat was part of a broad social uppercaste reaction against the rising incomes and status of the SCVSTs.The different strands need to be separated. The more general issue ofreforms in the reservation system within the colleges was a students'issue. In demanding these reforms, the students could at best mobi-lize an urban agitation.

The cause of the renewed anti-reservation agitation in 1985 wasthe acceptance by the Madhavsinh Solanki gcvernment of the 18 percent increase proposed by the Rane Commission for the OBCs. Amonth after the announcement of this decision by the Cabinet onJanuary I l, the engineering students of Morbi College in Saurashtra-

209

2to The Politics of Backwardness

who were also responsible for the Nav Nirman movement in 1974-went on strike, protesting against the aggregate of reservations beingraised to 49 per cent of the seats. They werc soon followed by the

medical students of Ahmedabad, on whose call almost 30 colleges inthat city joined the agitation. Consequently, examinations were post-poned and teaching suspended. No public leader of any importancespoke out openly on this occasion, in sharp contrast to 1980-81 whenmany had opposed the anti-reservation agitation. The. Ahmedabadstudents soon formed the All Gujarat Educational Reform AgitationCommittee (.\GERAC). AGERAC began organising processicns

and bandhs which at first received a mixed reception but soon broughtforth a significant response from different social groups.

One of the major arguments advanced by the students was thateven the existing reservation quotas for SC, ST, OBC were not beingfully utilized. According to figures quoted by a Gujarat govemment

spokesman the actual utilization had ranged from I I .6 to 17 per centin various courses. The probable reason behind this was that very fewamong the fifteen plus age groups from the SCJSTVOBCs wereenrolling for graduate courses and higher degrees. According to onecalculation only about I per cent of the population in the fifteen plusage group among the SCVSTVOBCs enrolled themselves even forthe graduate courses, while this ratio was 6.6 per cent for the rest ofthe population. (Vimal P. Shah, Az Assessrz ent of Education Amongthe Scheduled Castes in Gujarat, Gujarat University, 198O.) Thestudents felt that the increase of l8 per cent for the OBCs in educa-tion and public employment was clearly a case of overextending the

rcservation system. Whatever purpose it might have been intended toserve politically, in terms of its social utility it could only serve todelay the entry of qualified students to colleges and increase thenumber of entrants with less than average marks. While many ofthem were prepared to accept the existing l0 per cent OBC quota inthe name of rcpresentative justice, increasing this was in their view,tantamount to forcefully excluding them from the chance of compet-ing for a college seat. Some of the students were in fact demanding

the total abolition of the reservation system when the existing 10 percent OBC reservation quota would come up for review in 1988. Itmay be recalled that the Baxi Commission had asked for a review ofthe functioning of the OBC rcservation quota after l0 years-

The Reservation SYstem in Gujarat

The students set up two new organisations to carry forward the

anti-reservation stir, which lasted for 161 days from 18 February,

1985. Its highlight was an indefinite strike by college students, first in

Ahmedabad and later during several other bandhs. These two bodies

were known as the Akhil Gujarat Navrachna Samiti and the Navrachna

Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti. Unlike on previous occasions they were

now backed by the parents' federation known as the Gujarat Vali

Mahamandal. These bodies were an urban, middle class protest move-

ment, against the overextension of the reservations system. They

were not organised along caste lines and sought to unite all students

and parents.

The anti-reservation agitation acquired a rural base mainly through

the participation of the govemment and the district panchayat em-

ployees who were opposing the continuance of the roster system for

deciding on promotions for the SCs/STs/OBCs. They also put for-

ward the argument that the reservation criteria should be structured in

such a manner so as not to exclude the poor amongst the Brahmin, the

Bania or the Patidar communities.In January 1985, the intemees and resident doctors of government

hospitals joined the students of medical and engineering colleges

when the latter organised a strike. The agitation continued despite the

announcement by the govemment in early April that it would appoint

a high-powered committee to look into the reservation issue and not

increase the OBC or SEBC (Socially and Educationally Backward

Classes) quota until tlis report was received. The agitation received

a further boost when, towards the end of April, the state government

employees went on strike demanding an end to the roster system.

They were soon joined by thejunior doctors, lawyers and the district

panchaya! employees, paralysing completely the functioning of the

state in May and June, 1985. At this time, more than 150 business

organisations of Ahmedabad observed a bandh for five days starting

from 5th June, to protest against lawlessness. They included cloth

merchants, dealers in books and stationery, edible oil' spices and

foodgrain, electrical appliances, radio and television, laundry own-

ers, footwear dealers, etc.The strike by govemment employees and

district panchayats was given a sharp focus when the confederation

of 118 unions of state government employees, known as the Gujarat

Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal announced an indefinite strike on 7

June. This was done with a view to forcing the implementation of the

2tl


eleven-point programme for reforming and restricting the roster sys-tem, earlier suggested by the Sadhwani Committee appointed by theGujarat govemment. Soon the civic staff in Ahmedabad and Barodajoined the strike. Between I July and 18 August when the strikeended, 60 per cent of the govemment's workforce was on strike.They had, in that period, been joined by 10 lakh primary teachers.The numbers involved were truly significant and could not be brushedaside as protest by the minority elite.

The government's position was made unenviable by the fact thatthere was very little protest against the anti-reservationists. At theoutset the SC textile workers employed in the spinning and cardingdepartments in Ahmedabad struck work on 24th and 25th Februarybut this action failed to spark off any counter movement, apart fromsome sporadic protest from the Harijan youth in some cities. It was atonce obvious that the issues of reservation policy only concemed atiny minority of the well-educated sections among the SCs/STs andfailed to enthuse the sweepers, scavengers, or cobblers, who had littlein common with the middle class dalits. Moreover. the scheduledtribes in Gujarat numbering 37,33,422 in 1971 or 14 per cent of thestate population are concentrated mainly in Sabarkantha (17,88,004),Surat (827,682), the Dangs (88,028), Banaskantha (77,758), Valsad(77 6,215), Panchmahals (7 12,7 l3), Bharuch (486,90 I ), Kutch(40,381), and Vadodra (473,117). In the remaining 9 districts, lessthan one per cent are from among the $cheduled tribes. Many of thetribal districts are contiguous, providing a thick belt inhabited by theSTs on the eastern and southern side of the state. Still, the basis foruniting even the scheduled castes and tribes is very shaky, for even inthe rural areas they are divided by different occupations. This occu-pational diversification may be seen from Table II.

The small and scattered middle classes among the SCs/STs do notprovide any basis for supporting an agitation for expanding the OBCreservation quotas which does not benefit them directly. Economicdiversification among OBCs is much greater than that among SCs/STs and they have very little social or political organisation. Associa-tions like the Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha which have existed since the1950s are basically constitutional and electoral platforms at bestcapable of acting as ginger grbups within one or several politicalparties and not capable of running a mass agitation. They are also

The Reservation System in Gujarat

Table IIDistribution of Total Workers by IndustrialCategories among SCs/STs: Gujarat 1971

213

Industial Category

2. Cultivators3. Agricultural

labourers

No. of SC

WorkersVo to No. of ST Vo to

total SC Workers total STlflorkers Workers

4. Livestock, Forestry, 2,636Fishing

0.44

5. Mining and Quarrying 5,064 0.846. Manufacturing:

(a) Household Industry 31,110 5.17(D) Other than Household 63,414 10.54

7. Construction 14,388 2.398. Trade and Commerce 6,451 1.079. Transport and 16,632 2.76

Communications10. Other Services

Source: Census of India, 1971, Series 5 Part 1A, p.169

handicapped by the fact that among their supporters not many arefrom the educated middle classes and hence directly interested in theissue of reservations. Even the Gujarat Khet Vikas Parishad startedby Mr Jinabhai Da{i is concerned with organising the rural poor whohave little to gain from reservations.

The contrast was to be seen in the strcngth of the anti-reservationagitation which disrupted life statewide and the weakness of thosewho set out to oppose them. It has already been pointed out howthousands of students and lakhs of government employees went onstrike. Certain towns in the Anand and Upleta districts observedbandhs for as long as five to nine days in succession. Curfew was inforce over all of Ahmedabad for an unbroken period of nine days.Certain middle class areas in the walled part of the city were undercurfew for more than 10 weeks. The five-day bandh by Mahajans inAhmedabad, the closure of clearing operations by banks for 27 daysand the simultaneous and prolonged curfew in 10 towns-all these

110,371 18.3

280,355 46.5914,609 I

728,380 48.34

637,842 42.33

3,400 0.22

10312 0.6835,068 2.33

11,856 0.7912,762 0.8513,603 0.9

2I4 The Politics of Backwardness

happened for the first time in Gujarat. It involved a vast expenditure

of time and energy on the part of thousands of people, time and

energy which could have been put to more constructive uses.

By contrast, those who tried to mobilize sections of tle backward

castes against the anti-reservation stir did not get much of a response.

A few sporadic protests were made by some scheduled caste students

in the colleges but to no avail. Towards the start of August there was

a rally in Rajkot by 7000 members of the Dalit Sangh from all over

Saurashtra to express support for the roster system. About 12,000

state government employees said to be belonging to the backward

castes and classes marched in a procession through the streets ofBaroda on a Sunday to counter the anti-roster agitation. The demon-

stration was organised by the Gujarat Karamchari Utkarsh Mandal. Itwas the high watermark of the backward classes protest against the

anti-reservation stir but its weaknesses revealed why a strategy ofmobilizing the backward classes on a platform of expanding the

reservation system would not work in Gujarat-in the short run, or as

will be argued below, in the long run either.

The central govemment as well as the state government realized

that a strategy of confronting a movement lhat had the active support

of broad sections of the citizens could not yield anything but further

conflict and confrontation. Hence, the decision was taken to remove

the then chief minister Madhavsinh Solanki, who had become too

closely identified with the strategy of expanding reservations and to

bring in a new chief minister, Amarsinh Chaudhari. The Cabinet

appointed two sub-committees to look into the issues of reservation

and the roster system from 16 July onwards' An agreement was

signed with the majority of the students on 19th July and the dissident

minority was brought around later on. In this first accord the govern-

meni agreed to postpone the implementation of the new reservation

quota for the OBCs for one year and to appoint a committee to look

into the question of using the economic criteria to classify the OBCs'

when the original OBC quota of l0 per cent came up for review in

March, 1988. This committee would be appointed before the end of

1987. The students called off their stir on 30 July.

The anti-reservation agitation of the government employees con-

tinued, even after the strike of the municipal employees was called

off on 3 August. The workers of the Gujarat State Electricity Board

The Resemation System in Gujarat

started their strike on 6th August, again demanding the end of theroster system. Subsequently, the leaders of the govemment andpanchayat employees signed an accord and the 73-day-old strikecame to an end. This agreement had 15 points. Although the fullabolition of the roster system was not conceded according to S.C.Naik, Secretary of the Gujarat Rajya Karamchari Mahamandal, thegovernment and panchayat employees were happy about the terms ofthe agreement. According to him they had imposed a brake on theunresricted use of the roster system by persuading the government tofinalize the rules for service a..rd classification only in consultationwith the employees. The fixation of minimum experience for promo-tion under the roster system would also be finalised in consultationwith the employees.

The highlights of the agreement are the introduction of minimumexperience rules, as recommended by the Sadhwani Commission. Itprovides for an option to fix the minimum experience period inconsultation with the employees instead of accepting the set norms of5, 7 and 8 years recommended by the Commission for differentcategories of promotion. The minimum service rules will be fixedwith retrospective effect from tie date of issuing of orders by thegovemment. The government also finally agreed to retrospectivelyconsider, ftom 24 March 1981 the "hardship" cases, who had to bebypassed in promotion due to the operation of the roster system. Allsuch cases would be considered on a one-to-one ratio and would begiven notional promotion from the retrospective date when they weredeemed to have been promoted. Furthermore, in cases where the SCemployees have already gained more than 8 per cent promotions intheir cadres, their further roster promotions will be frozen. Thisagreement has succeeded in winning the consent of the majority ofthe government employees. It also provides a kind of model forsubsequent national modifications that might b€ made in the workingof the roster system.

In my view, it is imperative to answer the question whether in thelong run, in a state like Gujarat, the OBC reservation system ought tobe expanded. Before answering this question it is worthwhile findingout what proportion of the population in Gujarat is classified as

OBCs. The Baxi Commission Report (1976) had not publish€d itssurvey data but had still estimated the OBC population to be about 45

215


per cent (Mahesh H. Dave, Backward Classes and Resemation, op.

cit., p. 102). The Rane Commission estimated the OBC population to

be 35 per cent of the overall state population (ibifi.It did not seek to

explain the reasons for the difference between the two estimates. The

Rane Commission, rather than solving the problem of how exactly to

use caste characteristics to measure backwardness, simply chose to

overlook the existence of castes altogether. It is necessary to work out

a schedule within which caste-generated backwardness is given due

weight and is specified in terms of measurable indices but is stillconsidered much less important than income, eCucation, culture and

occupation. Hence, the task of the committee which the Gujaratgovernment has promised to appoint before the end of 1987 should

be twofold:l. It must first of all ascertain the population of the Other Back-

ward Classes in Gujarat in terms of a schedule that mainly encom-

passes income, education and occupation, while treating caste back-

wardness as a very small element of the overall schedule. It must

ascertain the proportion of OBC employees in the government on the

basis of such comprehensive criteria. The income criteria should not

be high in comparison to the poverty line family income.

2. It is only then that the question of a small representative reser-

vation quota should be considered for the OBCs. In doing so, twofactors must especially be kept in view: (a) the level of higher

education among the OBCs and (D) the actual utilization of reserva-

tion quotas by OBCs in the last ten years. In a state like Gujarat where

social consciousness against the restrictive aspects of reservations is

widespread, it is imperative to keep the size of reservation quotas as

low as possible. The need to introduce an exit system for familieswho have used reservations for two or three generations should be

kept in mind.It is important to realize that some of the reasons which militate

against the use of the reservation system on an extensive scale inGujarat have to do with the greater spread of gains from developmentin Gujarat. During the British period the single most numerous caste,

the Patidars, were the main beneficiaries from the extremely limitedgrowth which took place. However, since the Brahmins did not

dominate in Gujarat in the same way as they did in Madras, the

Patidars did not have to struggle against them. The Vanias too were


amongst the elite castes and as such no common hostility could bedirected against the Brahmins. Hence, there was no basis for thegrowth of a non-Brahmin movement. By the time the KshatriyaSabha was organised in the nineteen fifties the patidars as a socialgroup had risen high enough in most spheres not to be interested inmobilizing a backward classes movement. The Kshatriya Sabha itselfwas supported by multiple groups-Rajputs, Bariyas, Raniparaj, ar-tisan castes, etc.-who were intemally differentiated and widelyspread out all over Gujarat. Unlike the Lingayats in Karnataka, therewas no compact social group to provide a leadership to the backwardclasses, nor is one likely to emerge. Table III from the l93l censusgives an idea of the well spread out or scattered nature ofthe Gujaratcastes, a phenomenon which must have become even more devel-oped with greater urbanization, education, travel, and migration.

Political alignments in Gujarat did not strictly follow caste lines, ifcaste is n.urowly defined in terms of inter-marriage between villagegroups or gotras. For one thing, Gujarati castes werc more likeclusters which had often been added to by new waves of invasions,settlers, travellers or diminished by migrations. As the l93l censuspointed out, the Gujarat Brahmins had 84 divisions widely differentfrom each other because of dialect and social environment. Similarly,the Gujarati Vanias had 40 sub-castes, each a real caste differer,t fromthe others, and some recruited from Rajputs. They did not offer aunified target for social protest as did the Madras Brahmins nor didthey organize as a single caste. The Patidars themselves were splitinto landlords and Kanbis or cultivators with linle basis for buildinga determined statewide caste unity.

No political party or group in Gujarat came to be based on singlecaste groups. The Congress Party in Gujarat for instance, always hada mix of different castes in its ranks and expanded its social base asmore groups entered education and modern politics. This furtherlessened the chances of backward castes emerging as a cohesiveentity. Hence, a strategy of trying to mobilize backward castes througha reservations system would be a non-starter in Gujarat. The needthere is to mainly use educational and economic indicators to identifythe backward classes. Any future effort at revising the OBC listshould keep this fact in view.

It should also be remembered that reservation as a means of

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distributing the gains ofdevelopment is not very popular in states likeGujarat where other delivery mechanisms-tenancy reform, co-op-eratives, rural transport, education, welfare and panchayati admin-istration have been successful in promoting a wider distribution ofeconomic gains. The industrialization and the urbanization p(ocesses

have created a middle class which is gradually absorbing elements ofdifferent social and ethnic groups or sub-castes. Indeed, the greater

the success in promoting those institutions which distribute eco-nomic, cultural and political gains, the less the demand for using

reservations to accelerate the entry of members of different rural and

urban social groups into the middle classes. Given the realization thatscarcity of resources and opportunities remain a major problem,social groups, like individuals, will normally accept a moderate butincreasing representation within the modernization process. As longas this takes place on its own, the demand for reservations will notgrow; it is likely to stagnate or decline. This is the single most

significant lesson from the experience of the reservation system in

Gujarat.

REFERENCES

A. Government Reports:

l. Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes Commission.

Gujarat State, 1976,2 vols.2- Report of the Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (Second)

Commission. Gujarat State, 1983.

3. Development Programme for the Gujarat State, 1987-88. Planning Divi-sion, Ceneral Administration Department, Government of Gujarat, Gandhinagar,February 1987.

4. Census of India, 1931, Vol. XIX, Baroda, Part I, Subsidiary Table l.5. Census of India, 1971, Series 5, Part lA.

B. Newspaper Reports and Analyses:

l. Times of India, Delhi, 10 July, 1985, Girilal Jain, "Gujarat Politics."2. Indian Express, Delhi, l9 July 1985, Parveen Sheth, "Gandhi to Solanki."3. Indian Express, Delhi, 20 July, l985, "Prime Minister's Call for National

Consensus on OBC Reservation Policy."4. The Hindu,21 July, 1985, "Gujarat Agitation Continues."5. Times of India, Delhi, 30 July, 19E5, "Report on Gujarat Negotiations."

22O The Politics of Backwardness

6. The Hindu,31 July, 1985, "End to Agitation in Sight."T.lndian Erpress, Delhi,3l July. l985. "Repon on Gujarat Stir."8. Indian Express, Delh|5 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.9. The Statesman, New Delhi, l2 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.

10. Indian Express, Delhi, 19 August, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.11. Times of India, Delh|20 August, 1985, Report on end to govemment

employees strike in Gujarat.12. Indian Express, Delhi,6 December, 1985, Report on Gujarat Stir.13. Indian Express, Delhi, S December, 1985, Report on Cujarat Chief

Minister's call for a "national consensus on the reservation quotas for the OtherBackward Classes."

14. Indian E-rpress, Delhi, l1 December, 1985, Report on Students' Stir inGujarat.

15. Times of India, Delhi, 14 December, 1985, Report on Accord Reachedwith Gujarat Students.

C, Unpublished Papers and Surveys:

l. C.P. Barthwal, Ph.D Dissertation, Lucknow University, " Safeguards forScheduled Castes in thc Indian Consthution and Their Working," Social Sci-ences Documentation Centre, ICSSR, New Delhi.

2. Ghanshyam Shah, Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-reservationAgitations in Gujarat. Centre for Social Studies, Surat, December, 1986.

D. Non-Government Published Sources of Data:

l. Statistical Outline of Gujarar, 1983. Bureau of Economics and Statistics,Govemment of Gujarat, Gandhinagar.

2. Statistical Outline of India, 1984. Tata Services Limited, Depanment ofEconomics and Statistics, Bombay.

3. Basic Statistics on State Economies of India. Enonomic Monitoring Ser-vice, Commerce Research Bureau, Bombay.

Books:

l. A.K. Vakil, Resenation Policy and Scheduled Castes in 1nda. New Delhi,1985.

2. A.M. Zudi, Annual Register of Indian Political Parties. Haroobhai Mehtaand Hasmukh Patel, eds., Dynamics of Resenation Pollcy. New Delhi, 1985.

3. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities: law and the Backward Classes inIndia. OUP. Delhi. 1984.

Chapter 9

Reservations Policv Revisited

D.L. Sheth

HE anti-reservation agitations, which began in the late seven-

ties in Bihar and spread to other parts of the country, seem tohave succeeded in two important respects. At one level, tley

have succeeded in reopening the basic issue of the validity of provi-sions of positive discrimination for, and preferential treatment of, the

weaker sections of society-a policy embedded in the Constitution ofIndia. At another level, the agitations have forced the state to rcstore

the status quo ante with respect to further implementation of thepolicy. In a state like Gujarat, where the agitations were more persis-

tent and virulent, they have forced reversals of policy on the govem-

ment.The impact that the agitations have made on the minds of the

policy makers and of the intelligentsia in the counry is quite signifi-cant. The agitations have in fact been able to exercise political powerand influence quite out of proportion to their bases of support insociety.

The policy is now questioned both at the level of principle and at

the operational level. Two inter-related questions are posed: (i) Arereservations consistent witn the principles of equality and secularism

as enshrined in our Constitution? and (ii) What criteria for identifyingbeneficiaries should be devised, so that they promote, rather than

militate against, the basic values and goals of social transformationenvisaged in the Directive Principles of State Policy laid down in the

Indian Constitution? It is in the light of these questions that we shall

222 The Politics of Baclo,vardness

examine in this paper the policy of reservations and its rationale,evaluate its performance and make some suggestions for making thepolicy more effective.

The Policy and its RationaleIt should be remembered that reservations are part of a much

larger policy package. It comprises a series of legislations, ameliora-tive programmes and preferential schemes, designed to benefit theweaker sections of society. The package has evolved over a longperiod of time and has been administered by the Central as well as theState govemments. Although the history of these policies dates backto the first decade of this century, the present set of policies derivetheir legal status and legitimacy from the Indian Constitution.

The overall package, as it operates today, is addressed to three setsof policy goals. First, to remove social and religious disabilities ofcertain specified groups suffering disabilities on account of theirsocial segregation and spatial and cultural isolation; namely the sched-uled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST). Second, to facilitate andpromote equal participation with others, of all socially disabled anddisadvantaged groups in organized sectors of the country's economicand political life. This is sought to be achieved through provisions forpreferential treatment in education, in government employment, rcs-ervation of seats in Parliament, state legislatures and local bodies andthrough other ameliorative measures and schemes designed to im-prove their life chances. With the exception of reservations in legis-latures, the other preferential measures are not confined only to thescheduled castes and scheduled tribes; they also extend to the cate-gory described in the Constitution as socially and educationallybackward classes of citizens, better known as the Other BackwardClasses (OBC). Third, to protect, if necessary through legislativeaction and executive orders, all these groups, also described in theConstitution as weaker sections of society, or simply, the backwardclasses, from all forms of social injustice and exploitation.

Reservations, along with other measures of protection andupliftment of the weaker sections of society, should thus be viewed as

an instrument of a larger social policy of the state, addressed to along-term goal of creating a civil society through extending effectivecitizenship rights to the vast sections of the population who have

Reservations Policy Revisited 223

been historically deprived and marginalized.In articulating these goals, the policy has acquired multifarious

contents, of which reservations is one. Thus, we have a series of lawswhich aim at removing disabilities, such as the Untouchability Of-fences Act of 1955, the subsequently amended and tightened Protec-tion of Civil Rights Act of 1976, the legislation to prevent forcedlabour, and the amended Criminal Tribes Act of 1952, removing the

legal disabilities suffered by the so-called criminal tribes. We also

have protective laws preventing alienation of tribal lands, regulatingmoneyJending and providing debt-relief and legal aid to the weakersections. Besides, there are schemes and programmes for land allot-ments, housing, scholarships, subsidies, etc., aimed at providingphysical security and promoting occupational mobility of these groups.

The Five Year Plans have a special feature in the form of tribal andscheduled castes components of plans. The most significant and nowa controversial aspect of the policy is however the provision ofreservations. Although these provisions are based on the same valzesand rationale that inform other parts of the policy package, theirimpact is felt adversely and directly by those outside the beneficiarygroups and that too in the vital area of social mobility where themeans of mobility are always scarce and competition intense.

The beneficiaries of reservations comprise three types of commu-nities: ex-untouchables, designated as Scheduled Castes (SC) (over104 million), the spatially and culturally isolated communities oftribals designated as the Scheduled Tribes (ST) (over 5l million) and

the vaguely defined category of the socially and educationally back-ward classes of citizens called OBC (an estimated 300 million). TheOBC is a category consisting of a wide array of groups in need ofpreferential treatment, but it does not have any centrally identifiable,systemic characteristics such as social segregation or spatial isolationfound respectively in the case of SCs and STs. By and large, thegroups in the OBC category are at the lower rungs of che Sudracastes. They are socially disadvantaged in terms of occupationalmobility and have, in the past, suffered from different degrees ofritual prohibitions.

Let us now briefly review the extent of benefits each of the abovecategories is entitled to receive and has, in fact, been receiving. Forthe scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes reservations arc made


for seats in the legislatures, in govemment employment and in edu-cational institutions, in proportion to their strength in the population.Forjobs in government services and seats in the educational institu-tions only those who meet certain minimum prescribed standardsqualify. These standards are fixed with reference to the prevailingcompetitive standards for all, except that in the case of the scheduledcastes and scheduled tribes candidates they are relaxed or loweredonly to a certain degree.

For the other backward classes there is no provision for legislativereservations; nor are reservetions in governmentjobs and educationalseats, in their case, mandated by the Constitution. Instead, the matterof reservations for the OBCS in these two areas is left to the discretionof the state govemments. Similarly, there are no provisions of reser-vations for the Other Backward Classes in Central Government ser-vices. Since the constitutional provisions in their case are only en-abling and not mandatory, no such reservations for them exist inWest Bengal, Orissa, Assam, states of the north-east, Rajasthan or inany Union Territory. It is only since the mid-seventies, thanks toelectoral pressures, that the states of north India, Gujarat andMaharashtra have begun to extend the benefits of reservations toOther Backward Classes. But the extent of benefits is quite moderatein these states. Compared to their massive strength in the population,the reservations made for tlem are only 10 per cent in Cujarat, 14 percent in Maharashtra, 15 per cent in Uttar Pradesh and 14 per cent inHimachal Pradesh. For entry into educational institutions, the stan-dards are only marginally lowered for them. For example, all theOBC students admitted between 1979-80 and 1983-84 under thereservation provisions in a medical college in Ahmedabad, had ob-tained between 76 to 79 per cent marks at the Standard XII examina-tion.t

The story is quite different in the southern Indian states. TherereseNations for the Other Backward Classes have existed, in oneform or the other, for over half a century. The extent of reservationsthere has reached the point of saturation, covering almost their pro-portional strength in the population.2

PerformanceWhat has the policy achieved? Even after half a century of prefer-


ential treatment only a negligible number of the SC, ST and OBCofficers can be found in Class I positions of the government services.For example, of all the Class I officers on the rolls of the CentralGovernment in 1979, only 5.68 per cent belonged to the scheduledcastes and scheduled tribes taken together and a mere 4.69 per centcame from the OBC category.3 In the public sector, in 1975, therewere only 1.4 per cent scheduled caste and 0.6 per cent scheduledtribe officers in Class I positions. A 1971 survey of Indian managersshowed that only one per cent among them came from all the threecategories of the backward classes taken together.a In the northIndian states and in Gujarat and Maharashtra the utilization raie ofreservations in govemment services and educational institutions bythe Other Backward Classes is much less than the allocations madefor them. For example, in Gujarat, against 10 per cent reservation, theutilization of seats by the OBC students in the engineering andmedical colleges has not exceeded 5 per cent since 1980.s Theunfilled seats have since been dereserved and made available to thenon-backward population. To sum up, the backward classes haveregistered some progress in social mobility through reservations. Buttheir presence in professional and white-collar jobs is, even today,insignificant.

Clearly, the provision of reservadons is not enough. For reserva-tions to improve the life chances of the socially disadvantaged sig-nificantly, other components of the policy will have to show a muchhigher operational efficiency. The low rates of utilization, for in-stance, are indicative of the poor performance of the entire policy; forutilization is essentially a function, not of availability of benefits, butof the capacity of the potential beneficiaries to receive the benefits.For developing this capacity, effective performance of other aspectsof the policy is equally, if not more, important. For example, inMaharashtra and Gujarat, the scheduled castes have, over the lastdecade, reached the national level of literacy. More importantly, overthe last ten to fifteen years, the number of scheduled caste graduates,postgraduates and professionally trained graduates has increasedphenomenally in these states. Their number runs into thousands. Thishas obviously increased their capacity of receiving the benefits ofreservation. Given the very low base of the sixties there has been a

rapid increase in the number of SCs in sovernment offices and in


educational institutions, making their presence more visible in the

eighties. And yet, even in these two states, the rate of utilization by

the SCs and STs remains considerably low compared to the extent ofallocations made for them.

To a significant extent, it is this improvement in the rate ofutilization that has led to elite resentment and agitations against the

policy. It is not accidental that the anti-dalit agitations have since

acquired a persistent, even vicious, character in these two states.

konically enough, the degree of protest against the policy seems to be

related to the extent of its successful implementation. Here lies the

paradox: when judged by the policy's own objectives and the values

and goals that underlie it, its performance on all counts is much

below any reasonable expectation. In no event, does it pose any

serious threat to the life chances of the upper and the middle castes.

But with the change in the overall climate of elite opinion on the issue

of reservations. even a small increase in the rates of utilization is seen

as disturbing the status quo ante and brings the policy under attack.

The upper and middle castes hgan to feel acutely insecure in the

mid-seventies, when many states in north India, and the states ofGujarat and Maharashtra, started providing reservations for the Other

Backward Classes. It was not only the higher rates of utilization by

the scheduled castes, but the actions that were taken, although belat-

edly, to extend reservations to the OBCs, that was responsible for the

agitations.In the mid-seventies, the backward classes commissions appointed

by many of these states stafled submitting their reports, recommend-

ing reservations for the Other Backward Classes. In 1978 the Central

Government appointed the Second Backward Classes Commission

which, in its report, submitted in 1980, recommended central action

in regard to reservations for the Other Backward Classes, assigning

to the Centre the same role that it plays vis-a-vis the scheduled castes

and scheduled tribes. The Commission used caste as a criterion to

determine the social and educational backwardness of the groups ofpotential kneficiaries. The population of the Other Backward Classes

thus included was around 52 per cent of the total population. But inorder to keep the total reservations for all categories within the limitof 5O per cent, prescribed by the Supreme Court, the Commission

recommended only 27 per cent reservations for the OBC with the


caveat that the south Indian states, which had already made reserva;tions above 27 per cent, would remain unaffected by this recommen-dation. Taking a cue from the Commission's recommendations, thestate of Gujarat appoinled its own Second Commission in 1981. Itrecommended an increase of 18 per cent reservations for the OBCs,thereby raising the quantum ofexisting reservations for them from l0per cent to 28 per cent, thus keeping the total reservations in the statewifhin the prescribed limit of 50 per cent. That increase had to bewithheld in the face of agitation. Prior to rhis event, in 1977 govern-ment directive3 were issued to semi- and non-govemmental organrzations receiving government grants or subsidies to reserve 13 percent of jobs for the scheduled castes. Although, by and large, theprovision remained on paper, it gave rise to acute resentment in themiddle classes. The agitations in Bihar, Maharashtra and lately inGujarat were thus a sequel to this belated, even if diluted, implemen-tation of the policy. These agitations have successfully stalled anyfurther implementation of the policy or its rationalization in the northand westem states.

The agitations seem to have 'succeeded' in one other respect.They have created an acute fear of conflict among those of our elite,who think that these problems can be resolved painlessly and whoserhetoric implies avoidance of a clash of interests that social changeinevitably entails. Instead of gearing the state and its policies to meetsuch conflicts they would rather retreat to the safer ground of thestatus quo ante. Any honest and effective measure to implement atransformative social policy-be it land reforms, reservations or theremoval of untouchability-is bound to generate conflicts. Maintain-ing the sfaras quo on such issues is no guarantee that it will not bedisturbed. In fact, what actually happens is that issues that are at onetime solvable in the legal-rational frame of a policy process, getpushed into the arena of direct action; for the implementation of apolicy is often not backed by the political will. The populationaffected by the sratus quo and the disaffected political activisrs thentake the issues to the streets, away from the legislatures and admin-istrative apparatus of the state. It is in this context that the two majorissues, thrown up by the agitations, need to be considered.


Two Major Policy Issues

Two issues have prominently figured in recent agitations and in

the debates they have triggered off in intellectual circles. One per-

tains to the legitimacy of reservations for the Other Backward Classes

and the other to the criteria used for identifying beneficiary groups.

We shall now examine these two issues in the larger perspective ofthe values that underlie the policy.

lrt us first take up the issue of reservations for the Other Back-

ward Classes. We have seen that the provisions of reservations made

for this category are not at all sinilar, either in type or extent, to those

made for the scheduled castes and tribes. But the rationale is similar.

Although, the OBCs are not direct victims of untouchability or

physical and cultural isolation, some communities among them are

disadvantaged and oppressed by the hierarchical system of castes and

as such in need of preferential treatment. But the problem of identi-

fying specific beneficiary groups among the OBCs is quite complex.

This has caused several legal battles, constitutional amendments

and movements and agitations as well. And yet the solution is no-

wherc in sight. In fact, reservation has ceased to be a problem ofadministrative decision-making. It has now become an acute politicalproblem, complicated by the history of policy itself as well as by the

economic and social changes that have taken place since Indepen-

dence. These changes have affected the OBC communities much

more than any other section of the society.

Unlike the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes' the Other Back-

ward Classes were tie first to enter the reservation system and that

too by using political means. Not being totally oppressed and

marginalised like the scheduled castes and tribes, they were the first

among the backwards to organize and mobilize themselves in the

form of a movement. Its beginning can be traced to tle formation ofthe Justice Party in 1916 in Madras. It began as a social reform

movement to fight the ritual domination and cultural pre-eminence ofthe Brahmins. But it soon entered the then prevailing scene of com-

petitive ethnic politics, with a view to wrenching concessions and

benefits from the British Govemment. In the process, the non-Brah-

min groups distanced themselves from the independence movement

led by the Congress and earned for themselves the label of being

'British loyalists'. When the reservation policy was reconsidered at

Reservations Policy Revisitid 229

the time of making the Constitution, this label probably came in rheirway. But, by then, they had acquired significant political clour, arleast in the states of South India and in parts of the erstwhile BombayPresidency-areas beyond which the movement did not spread. Themovement succeeded in obtaining for the backward classes of thesouth a series of concessions and reservations, both from the BritishGovemment and from the princely rulers who themselves were againstthe Brahmin domination. As far back as in 1918 the princely state ofMysore declared all non-Brahmin communities as "backward classes"and allocated for them caste-wise quotas of seats in colleges and jobsin state services. This measure in fact marked the beginning of thesystem of reservations in India. The movement then demanded andgot from the British Govemment in 1919, a share of political repre-sentation. Thus, the movement politically established the claims ofthe backward classes for reservations at the national level and wonthem in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies.

Although the movement started as a front for all backward classes,including the lowest ones, as it developed, it became an organizationof the middle and lower castes. The scheduled castes, then known asthe "Depressed Ciasses" had to chart out a different political route forthemselves. A part of the leadership and organization of the De-pressed Classes operated from within the Congress party. But an-other part acted separately and autonomously, often in tandem, withthe backward classes.

In the process of making the Constitution when the policy ofreservations was being considered anew, the problem of the back-ward classes appeared different from that of the scheduled castes andtribes. This is because the fear of ethnic conflicts that had character-ized the independence movement, loomed large in the minds of ourConstitution makers. There was also a change in their perceptioncaused by the improved economic and political conditions of theOther Backward Classes. As a result, although their claims for pre-ferential treatment were conceded in principle, the Constitutionremained silent on the criteria and mechanisms of sustaining andrealizing these claims. It seems the claims were conceded only grudg-ingly and half-heartedly.

It is important to remember that the whole issue of reservationswas debated and the policy was conceived by the makers of our


Constitution in the context of minority rights. The policy, as then

conceived, had a two-fold objective: One, to protect the interests and

rights of those religious and other minorities who were likely to be

affected adversely by the change in the balance of power after Inde-

pendence. Accordingly, reservations for Muslims, Sikhs, Christians,

Anglo-Indians and some groups of the backward classes in legisla-

tures, the cabinet, government service and education were discussed

and recommended by the Minority Rights Sub-Committee of the

Constituent Assembly. Two, to extend special privileges to the de-

prcssed castes, tribal population and other backward classes to help

them overcome their social disabilities and backwardness and thus

enable tlem to participate in the 'national mainstream' with fullcitizenship rights.

It is an interesting chapter of the politics of Constitution-makingthat, by the end of the process, through a resolution moved by DrAmbedkar, all the previously existing reservations, except for the

scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were abolished. Specific pro-

visions for reservation of seats in legislatures and in the services were

made in the Constitution only for these two categories. For the Other

Backward Classes only a refer€nce to the protection of their interests

was made in one of the Directive Principles. Later, a general refer-

ence in the amended Article 15 allowed the states to take steps for the

advancement of the Socially and Fducationally Backward Classes.

Only Clause 4 of Article 16 made a somewhat direct reference in this

regard. This Article is about guaranteeing equality of opportunities

for all, but Clause 4 makes provision for reservations of posts forwhat it describes as "any backward class of citizens" and that too

only if a class is not adequately represented in the services of the

state. The worrds any and adequarely arc significant. Moreover, through

Article 340, the procedure to determine the need for reservations and

the criteria for identifying beneficiary groups within the category ofsocially and educationally backward classes were left to investiga-

tions by commissions which the President may appoint. As against

this, Article 335 makes explicit provision of reservations for sched-

uled castes and scheduled tribes. In addition, some time-bound pro-

visions, which have now expired, were made for Anglo-Indians. On

the insistence of the Sikh leadership, the depressed castes of Sikhs

were eventuallv included in the scheduled castes list. As for the

Resemations Policy Revisited 231

religious minorities per se, they were all kept out of the reservations

provisions. Indeed, some like the Parsis opted out of their own

volition.Vy'hat does this add up to? The Constitution is unambiguous and

emphatic about according preferential treatment to the scheduled

castes and tribes. It has however left a great deal of ambiguity withrcspect to the OBCs-in the matter of specifying the benefits, inlaying down criteria for identifying the beneficiary groups and inmaking provisions for monitoring and implementing the policy. Con-sequently, as noted earlier, there is no central policy of reservations

for the Other Backward Classes. It is largely left to the discretion ofthe respective state governments. Such ambiguity has led to innumer-able law suits. And now the issue is being fought in the streets inthose states which have exercised their discretion in favour of the

OBCs in the recent past. This is a dangerous development since itseriously threatens the legitimacy of the entire policy of positive

discrimination, not just in favour of the OBCs but also in favour ofthe scheduled castes and tribes. Issues which were settled long ago

are now being reopened.Reopening the issues has become possible because the criteria for

classification, even of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are

not clearly defined in the Constitution. It more or less accepts lheclassification made by the Govemment of India Act of 1935: any

caste, race or tribe designated by the President as "scheduled", can be

included in the list. And once included, only Parliament has the

powers of exclusion. It was possible-then, as it is possible now, toinclude in the scheduled liss several communities currently classi-fied as OBCs whose conditions are no better than those of the

scheduled castes and tribes. But theso communities have been inatio-nally lumped with the well-to-do and upwardly mobile middle castes

among the OBCs. Many among the OBCs, once considered as back-ward, have over the years acquired considerable political clout and

some economic power. They have also improved their social status.

Yet, because they are classihed as OBCs, they continue to receive the

benefits of rcservations.It is precisely for this reason that the problem of inclusion and

exclusion of groups in this category has become a political, ratherthan an administrative problem. In it also lies the source of increasing


rcsentment among the non-beneficiary groups. The prevalent criteriaof identification are essentially social, rather than economic. Hence,the OBC category today includes, especially in some southem states,the dominant castes of agriculturists, who at the local level are oftenlocked in conflict with the scheduled castes. At the same time, thecategory also includes a large number of extremely backward andsocially deprived groups whose condition of disability and disadvan-tage is in no way better-in some cases even worse-than that of thescheduled castes and tribes. In the states of north India and in Gujaratand Maharashtra, where reservations for the Other Backward Classeshave been introduced only recently, the groups identified as sociallyand educationally backward, by and large, include communities ofthe latter type. They comprise ex-criminal tribes, nomadic communi-ties, scheduled castes converted to Christianity or Islam and a wholerange of small castes which suffered from untouchability in relative,though not in absolute terms and are engaged in caste-bound mar-ginal occupations. These groups have little or no capacity to receivebenefits. Yet, enhanced reservations are demanded and given in theirname. But, in reality, a large part of the benefits actually go not tothem but to a minority of the well-to-do and advanced communities,which are technically classified as "backward". If strict criteria ofdisability or social disadvantage were to be applied, they would nolonger qualify for the benefits of reservations. And this is what theupper castes strongly resent.

It is significant that the states in which reservations for the OBCshave recently been enhanced and where agitations have taken placehappen precisely to be the states where the issue of classification hasbeen wmngly handled. In these states, the category of scheduledcastes has been artificially restricted and the category of OBCscorrespondingly expanded. Whereas the national ayerage of sched-uled caste population is about 16 per cent, in states like Punjab,Haryana and Himachal Pradesh around 25 per cent are classified inthat category. In West Bengal the comparable figure is 22 pr cent.As against this, a meagre 7 per cent are included in the category of SCin Gujarat and Maharashtra. This obviously means that many amarginal caste suffering only relative untouchability is included inthe scheduled castes list, say in a state like West Bengal. Similarcastes are included in the OBC lists in states like Guiarat and

Resewations Policy Revisited

Maharashtra. This imbalance in classification has led several states toenhance reservations for the OBCs. The enhancement is intended tocover the deserving but has so far left out backward communities inthe prevailing SC and ST lists.

Clearly, there is a case for disaggregating the category of the OtherBackward Classes and for thoroughly rationalizing the scheduledlists.o A number of communities included in the Other BackwardClasses, which by their condition of disability and disadvantage arecloser to the scheduled castes or tribes, need to be integrated into therespective lists of scheduled castes and tribes.T This will not onlyremove the patent anomalies we now see in the OBC category, it willdo much more. At present, the scheduled castes carry the socialidentification of untouchability. The entry of several "touchable" butextremely backward castes into the schedule will erode such identi-fication.

Now let us consider the issue of criteria for reservations. We sawthat there is ambiguity in the Constitution about tlre status of theOther Backward Classes, and there is also the rise of a section ofpolitically dominant castes among tlem. These factors together haveled to a demand for changing the prevalent criteria of reservations.The demand, now being made through agitations, is not only formodifying the criteria. The agitators seek to alter the very basis of thepresent system of blassification, which will affect not just the OtherBackward Classes but also the scheduled castes and tribes. The cruxof their argument is that economic backwardness should be thecriterion for identification of beneficiaries, in place of the presentcomplex one, based on social disability and disadvantage.

Such a demand, if it is conceded, will call for changes in the basicstructure of our Constitution, involving the Fundamental Rights, notonly of the s'bclally disabled groups but also of the religious minori-ties. For the neif$-bmand recognizes equality only among individuals4ua individuals, didt between groups. The Constitution, on the otherhand, is sensitive to the problems involved in realizing equality in acountry of religious and cultural pluralities on the one hand andoppressive caste hierarchies on the other. So, it has, through variousprovisions, worked out a fine balance between these two notions ofequality. The Indian Constitution cannot accommodate any demandthat trades one notion of equality for the other, without undermining

233

234 The Politics oJ Bacltwardness

its basic character.As it now stands, there is little doubt that the Constitution stipu-

lates social and retgious disabilities (e.g., untouchability) as criteriafor the identification of beneficiary groups. These characteristics,when compounded with economic and educational backwardness,cre.ate a structural situation of backwardness, which the policy seeks

to overcome. The policy of preferential treatment is thus conceived inthe context of membenhip of a group, that is socially disabled anddisadvantaged. It is zor for any individual or household which maybe poor or otherwise economically deprived.

Put differently, reservation is a device to eliminate backwardnessarising from historic conditions of social injustice in which certaingrcups arc located. It is not meant as a scheme to counter conditionsof economic backwardness or poverty of individuals or groups thatmay arise as a by-product of the development prooess itsef. Ofcoursc, there is nothing to prevent the State from formulating specialschemes for overcoming economic backwardness. But rcservation isnot fipant for that pupos€. So, to repeat my poinL there is nosanction in the Constinrtion for applying economic criteria" eitherexclusively or primarily for reservations. There seems to be no es-cape from using caste as a primary critcrion for identifying thebeneficiary groups of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and forincluding the other truly marginalized groups from among the OBCsinto the scheduled lists.

As for the rcmaining communities within the OBC category, othercriteria such as income, education, or occupation can be brought in.There is oo constitutional impedinrcnt in doing this because thecourts have already offered interpretations of the OBCs' ambiguousstatus in the Constitution. While holding caste as the primary crite-rion for identifying social and educational backwardness the courtshave'approved the use of other criteria as well. In fact, in many states

the identification of beneficiaries is done at the individual and house-hold levels from among the OBC communities, by applying theincome and educational criteria. This means that only the deservingindividuals or households within the communities and not the com-munities as a whole are entitled to preferential treatnrent.

The status of the scheduled castes and tribes, in the Constirution,unlike that of the OBC, is however, quitc different. These categories,

Reservations Policy Revisited

specified in the Constitution, have substantial social content.They are

referred to as "castes", "races" and "tribes" and specific lists of them

are constitutionally authorised. While the lists were, for the most part'

inherited from the 1935 Act, the Constitution gave a wide latitude to

the govemment to include any new group, which in its opinion,

deserved to be included. But the Constitution did not empower the

government to change the rationale of classification itself which is

based on considerations of social disability and not of economic

backwardness per se. "social disability" is a condition shared by all

the members of a group; it is not a characteristic of only a fewhouseholds within that group.

Constitutional stipulations apart, it will be a mistake to apply the

logic of economic criteria to scheduled castes and tribes. It is true that

there is among them a small section which has improved its eco-

nomic condition. But, for them, the problem does not end witheconomic upliftment. In fact, it often begins with it because they

continue to suffer acutely from status disability.There is abundant empirical evidence to show that wherever they

have improved their economic position by availing themselves ofbenefits from special schemes, they have become targets of atrocities.

The perpetrators are often the locally dominant castes of the so-called

backwards. Reservdtions, thus, allow the scheduled castes a route to

escape from the life of social tenor in villages to the anonymity oftowns and cities with the help of education and government jobs.

The problem of the scheduled castes and tribes is thus qualita-

tively different. For them, both the economic and social disadvan-

tages constitute two sides ofthe same coin. They are poor because oftheir status disability; and in order that they may get rid of their status

disability, the first thing they have to do is to move out of poverty.

And when they begin to move out of poverty they become targets ofatrocities. A recent analysis based on 1977 -78 data shows how differ-ent the problem of poverty is for.the SC/ST population from that ofthe general population.E The rural population of the SCs and STs,

taken together, is about 27 per cent and the incidence of poverty

among them is over 70 per cent. Whereas, the 73 per cent non-

scheduled rural population has an incidence ofpoverty of 54 per cent.(Among the se 54 per cent, a vast majority are members of the

communities belonging to the OBCs.) The picture of urban poverty

235


in terms of divergence between the scheduled and non_scheduledpopulations is even worse. For 13 per cent urban scheduled popula_tion the incidence of poverty is close to 60 per cent; for g7 per centnon-scheduled urban population the incidence of poverty is 43 percent. A similar pattem was observed with respect to per capitaconsumption. The average per capita expenditure among the bottomhalf of the population was found to be substantially low for thescheduled population than for the rest of the population.

These data leave little doubt about the fact that economic back_wardness for the scheduled population is of a systemic nature, arisingout of their social condition; for them it is not a random occunence.Unless the barriers of social structure are removed, they cannotgraduate either from their present state of penury to any livablestandard, or from social bondage to a state offull citizenship. Ifsocialpolicies of the state were aimed at creating a civil society, they haveto protect and promote the interests of these communities throughreverse discrimination in their favour.

The upper castes, which are getting agitated about reservationsforget that for long they have been the beneficiaries of a parallel andon-going system of discrimination in their own favour. It is notaccidental that in Madhya Pradesh, the govemment bureaucracy isdominated by Kanya-Kubja Brahmins, or that the clerks and officersin a particular nationalized bank have, for long, been recruited largelyfrom two sub-castes of Gujarat-one of the Brahmins and another ofthe Banias; or that, until recently, jobs in the Western Railway werealmost monopolized by the Anavil Brahmins from Gujarat. Again, inGujarat, the sons and daughters of medical doctors, irrespective of .

their poor performance in schools, manage to get admission to medi-cal colleges. One can go on and on with such examples. The point isthat it is not the application of social criteria for reservations whichconsolidates the caste system. It in fact enables the backward popu-lation to move out of traditional, caste-bound occupations. Bydecoupling caste and occupation it destroys the material base of thecaste system. Once this process is accomplished, caste may remain asa form of social consciousness, a political identity, whose membersare socially and occupationally so differentiated that it loses its basisin any collective sense in society. What has consolidated the castesystem in modem times is, in fact, the informal but ongoing system


of social preference and discrimination in favour of the upper castes,

described above. It has imparted a peculiar composition and charac-ter to our middle class.

Our middle class, as it is now constituted, comprises largely thedwija castes and the upper rungs of the Sudra castes. This narrowcaste character of our middle class can change only if its members are

recruited from a wider social base. The middle class is, no doubt,quantitatively expanding. But it is not getting sufhciently diversified.Such a socially stagnant middle class cannot process or dissolveidentities that lie outside its limited cultural ambit. An expanding anddiversifuing middle class, on tle other hand, can become a solvent ofold identities, with the new groups drawn into its fold also contribut-ing to shaping its culture. Reservations reverse the process of ongo-ing discrimination, and prevent the social and cultural self-perpetua-tion of our traditional upper-caste based middle class. By enablingpeople from a cross-section of castes and religions to get into thesystem of higher education and white-collar jobs, reservations con-tribute to the diversification of the middle class.

Suggestions for the PolicyFrom the analysis presented so far, follow certain conclusions and

suggestions for policy. The rcservation policy has been wavering inseveral of its aspects and has been diluted in its implementation. Myfirst conclusion is that it needs to be firmly reoriented in the basicvalues enshrined in the Constitution, namely of equality and socialjustice. Hence, preferential treatment must continue until the basicgoal of bringing significant numbers from the lower social strata ofthe population into professions, white-collar jobs and govemnrcntservices. is achieved.

The problem, as it is now unfortunately formulated, is not offavouring specific groups. It is a problem about the kind of societyand political system we want to build. Let me illustrate this with an

episode from the past. During the discussions in the ConstituentAssembly, Sardar Patel argued against a time limit for reservations.He suggested that reservations continue until the backward classes

had visibly improved their position. But Dr Ambedkar, who is todaythought ofby some people as a sectional leader, pleaded that the issue

should be considered in larger national terms. He argued that on a

238 The Politics ofBackwardness

matter like this the future generations of parliamentarians should notbe bound by the Constitution. So, a time limir should be ser so tharfuture parliaments, in their wisdom, could continue or discontinue it.In contrast, our discussions on the issue today have come to benarrowed down to only legal, constitutional and parochial aspects;they lack the political imagination that should inform thinking onsuch a problem of vital importance for the system as a whole. Wemust, therefore, elevate the discussion of this issue to the largerframework of values and goals for a social policy.

Secondly, the cther aspects of the policy, especially the enablingmeasures aimed at increasing the capability of beneficiary groups toreceive benefits of reservations, need to be vigorously implemented.At present the constitutional obligation of the State is rememberedonly at the time of elections. The action appears as a political gim-mick and tends, thereby, to discredit the entire policy.

Lastly, I shall recapitulate the suggestion I have already made, insomewhat clearer terms. The state should, after detailed surveys,incorporate the oppressed communities of the Other Backward Classes,which today exist on the margins of scheduled castes and scheduledtribes, into the scheduled lists, and the allotments should be propor-tionately increased for these categories. This will not only remove thepersistent anomaly and reduce the resentment felt by the non-benefi-ciaries, it will help blur the social identification of groups comprisingthe ST and SC categories.

From the remaining communities of the Other Backward Classes,those with comparable educational and economic levels (say, abovepoverty line) to that of the non-scheduled and non-backward popula-tion, should be identified and listed separately. While they maycontinue to receive benefits of enabling provisions of the policy, theyshould be excluded from the benefits of reservations. For tbe stillremaining ones, who have yet not graduated to the specified level ofeconomic and educational attainment and could also not be includedin the scheduled lists, the beneficiaries should be identified by apply-ing the economic and educational criteria from within the communi-ties listed as OBCs. Thus, by first applying the criterion of socialidentification, we can proceed with applying other criteria such as

income, land-holding, occupation, education and habitation to locatethe beneficiaries from within each OBC community. This will ensure

Reservations P olicy Revisited

that households within each community of the OBCs,which may be

in feed of preferential treatment can actually get it, as also exclude

those who have improved, over time, their economic and educational

position. This calls for a centralized policy of reservations for the

OBCs to be followed uniformly by the states. Also needed will be

systematic surveys by an independent authority to assess changeV

improvements in their economic and educational conditions. But Iwish to end this paper by repeating what I have already said: For the

scheduled categories, even after the lists are enhanced, only the social

criteria will have to be used, at least until their status disability ceases

to come in the way of their social mobility.


l. Mahesh Dave. 'tsackward Classes and Reservation' in Haroobhai Mehtaand Hasmukh Patel, cds., Dywnics of Resemation Po&cy' New Delhi. 1985'

p. 100 Gable 7)-2. The rqsefvations for OBC are 50 per cent each in Kamataka and Tamilnadu,

rto per cent in Kerala and 25 pe.r cent in Andhra Pradesh . IbA., p. 97 Clable 2).

3. Govemment of lndia:. Reports of the Backward Classes Cotnmission,FitstPart (vols. | & 2), 198O, p. 42.

4. Data from Sagra C. Jain, "Indian Manager: His Origin and Career," 1971.

Reproduced in Mahesh Dave, op. ar., p. 98.

5. Mahesh Dave, op. crt , p. 100 (table E).

6. The classification of OBCs in Bihar, for example, recogrrizes this division.Accordingly, Bihar has two OBC lists: one comprising the rclatively advanced

backward communities and the second listing the extremely backward commu-

nities. Separate quotas are allocated to each with a view to prevent comering ofthe benefis by the 'dominant' castes among the backwards.

7- This anomaly was recognized in Cujarat, but only a partial attempt was

made to correct it. For example the Bavchas, Bhils and Padharias who in the firstinstance should have been included in the Scheduled Tribes list were excluded

from any benelit of reservations. It was only in the mid-seventies that they were

included in the OBC list by the First Backward Class (Baxi) Commission ofGujarat- Subsequently, on the recommendation of the State Govemment they

were included in the Scheduled Tribes list. In the sarne way, the Mochis,ctassified as OBC by the Baxi Commission were included in the Scheduled

Caste list. Such an exercise needs to be undertaken on a larger scale, not only inGujarat but also for other states.

8- K. Sundaram, "Economic Growth and Endemic Poverty in India ' in Ponna

Wignaraja and Akmaal Hussain, eds., D*elopment, Democracy and Regional

Caopemtion.Tokyo: United Nations University (forthcoming publication), I 987.

239

Chapter I0

Consequences of Reservations

Ghanshyam Shah

major objective of the various provisions enshrined in theConstitution providing reservations for the scheduled castes,the scheduled tribes and the other backward castes is to build

an egalitarian social order in place of tlle fragmented and homo-hierarchical social order. The provisions aim at improving their socio-economic condition and integrate them with the mainstream. A re-view of the implementation of these provisions raises two questions:One, to what extent have the deprived communities in general andcertain groups or individuals among them in particular taken advan-tage of the legal provisions and improved their condition? And whatare its consequences on the deprived communities, in regard to theirunity and common identity? Two, how does the dominant stratum ofsociety react to these provisions and what are the consequences of theprovisions on the present socio-political system?

At the outset, it should be mentioned that the ruling class hadevolved the strategy of making provisions for reservation in theIndian Constitution out ofpolitical exigency to resolve the challengesthat they faced in maintaining their dominance.t It is a different thingthat the measures have further sharpened the social contradictions. Itshould be mentioned that the Congress recognised, as far back as in1917, the necessity of "removing disabilities imposed on rhe De-pressed Classes" when the depressed classes demanded .communal

representation' like that of the Muslims and the sikhs. And theCongress agreed to accommodate the Hariians in the distribution of

Conse que nce s of Re se rvations

Assembly and Parliament seats when the British govemment offered'communal representation' to the depressed classes at the RoundTable Conference. Initially Gandhi refused, in the Second RoundTable Conference (1932), not only to consider separate electoratesbut he opposed any form of special representation involving reservedseats for the SCs. Without belittling the moral ground on whichGandhi opposed separate representation, his political calculation alsoshould not be ignored. Gandhi feared that 'the separate electoratewill create division among Hindus, so much so that it will lead tobloodshed. 'Untouchable' hooligans will make common cause withMuslim hooligans and kill caste-Hindus."2 Several tribal groups de-manded separate electorates in the 1930s and some of the tribes,particularly from North-East India demanded a separate state outsideIndia on the eve of Independence. These tribes entertained apprehen-sions that the Hindus would introduce their laws and customs "tosupersede our own customary laws."3 I mention this with a view tounderscore two points: One, the dominant groups accepted reserva-tion not because of the conviction that it was necessary to build anegalitarian social order, but because of the pressure exerted by differ-ent minorities. Two, the groups exercising political domination inIndia desired to secure the support of the depressed classes formaintaining their own power vis-a-vis the dominant groups of othercommunities.

PoliticalReservations for political positions has apparently reduced the

monopoly of political power of the traditionally dominant groups.The latter have been compelled to part with some parliamentary orlegislative seats to the SC/ST individuals. Consequently, members ofthe dominant groups resent political reservation, as their chances forcontesting from their home constituencies, which happen to havebeen declared as reserved, are sealed. One can cite examples wherethe influential political leaders successfully notified and denotifiedsome of the constituencies as 'reserved' or 'general' to enable themto contest from a 'safe' constituency. Moreover, the double-memberconstituencies were abolished in 1961 . One of the underlying reasonsfor the abolition was that it favoured the election of SC/ST legislatorsfrom the unreserved seats. "Having (by their own estimate) done

241

242 The Politics of Baclcwardness

most of the work, spent most of the money, and mobilized most of thevotes for the party ticket, non-scheduled caste politicians faced theprospect of being edged out of the contest by scheduled caste blocvoting. If untouchables gave both of their votes to scheduled caste

candidates regardless of party affiliation, a non-untouchable candi-date might be defeated for the general seat by his own party runningmate."4 For instance, V.V. Giri was defeated in the 1959 election bya scheduled tribe candidate. Thus, the double-member constituencyprovided an oppornrnity to S(7ST candidates to get elected from thegeneral constituency.

With the abolition of tle double-member constituency, the S9STcandidates have been gradually pushed to the reserved constituenciesonly. This is evident from the fact that the number of SCYST candi-dates elected from unreserved constituencies for the Vidhan Sabhas

have declined after the 1962 general elections. ln 1962,48 SCyST

members were elected for Vidhan Sabhas from unreserved constitu-encies. In 1977 only three were elected instead.s

Though SC/ST political leaders have secured legislative positions,they have not proved very effective in implementing the laws enacted

for the benefit of the SCYST. A number of studies on the contributionof the SCTST legislators show that they did not actively participate inthe debates in the state Assemblies or the Parliament concerningissues affecting the deprived communities.6 Despite the constitu-tional directive "to make laws prcscribing punishment" for acts con-travening fundamental rights related to disability arising out of'un-touchability', SC members of Parliament could not effectively expe-

dite the Untouchability (Offences) Act. It took Parliarnent five years

to pass such an Act, which however, by and large, remained on paper.

During the I 960s, the total number of case s registered with the police

under this Act, throughout the country, was less than 5,000, with only700 cases rcsulting in conviction. After repeated demands from thepress and the liberal-minded intelligentsia for stronger protectivelegislation, the Protection of Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1976.

The Bill was lying with the Parliament for six years, indicating notonly the callousness ofthe ruling party but also the ineffectiveness ofthe scheduled caste MPs in pressing the government to pass the Bill.The authorities have by and large rcmained indifferent in implement-ing the Act with any seriousness. A police officer of Tamilnadu was

C onsequences of Re se rvat io ns 243

reported to have said: "If we (the police) take this law seriously, halfthe population of Tamilnadu will have to be arrested. In any case, thepolice have better things to do than go poking their nose into theprivate affairs of the people."7 Nor did scheduled caste MLAs use

their political power for the effective implementation of the Acts.Even SC/ST chief ministers could do very little to protect the civilrights of the communities they represented. For instance, an SCleader, D. Sanjeeviah, of Andhra Pradesh became the chief ministerbecause of the numerical strength of the scheduled caste MLAs in theAssembly in the early 1960s. But the state's per capita expenditure onSC welfare was the lowest in the country. The scheduled caste MLAsof Andhra were indifferent to the Kanchikaderla "Harijan burning"incident in | 968.8 Similarly, the scheduled tribe chief minister ofGujarat, Amarsinh Chaudhari, could do very little to prevent theatrocities against the tribals of Valia taluka. He failed to arrest thepolice officer who raped a tribal woman. In fact, the police depart-ment did not cooperate in the inquiry against the culprit and the chiefminister was helpless.

The SC/ST MLAs and MPs do use their numerical strength as abloc power in the faction-ridden party politics and they work as abalancing force between two rival factions. In retum for their supportto one or another faction, they bargain for political positions in theCabinet or various committees or statutory bodies. But they cannotact effectively when the atrocities are committed against members oftheir communities; nor do they pressurise the administration for theimplementation of minimum wages or distribution of land.

The SC/ST MLAs and MPs owe allegiance to their parry. Theycontest as party nominees and get the benefit of the party machinery,both in terms of numerical and financial support, which enable themto secure victory. Moreover, the political parties select those SC/STpersons as the party candidates who are willing to toe the line of theparty bosses, and avoid taking militant positions on problems con-ceming the SCsiSTs. The party bosses are more interested in captur-ing power rather than in improving the conditions of the deprivedcommunities. Moreover, they select those persons as party candi-dates who are educated and relatively better off. Hence, a majority ofMLAs and MPs belong to the upper strata of these communiries. It issignificant to note that a large majority of the scheduled caste MLAS

244 The Politics of Bachanrdness

of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra have no personal expe-

rience of untouchability. This is indicative of their decaste status.e

One of the SC leaders complained: "This system does the scheduled

castes no good because the people in the reserved seats belong to the

party in power and are often incapable persons. Although they are

educated, they dare not speak out against the party in power. They do

not represent their people to the party and government, but represent

the party in power to their people."ro

l.ooking at the rcpresentation of the various caste groups in legis-lative bodies, it is safe to assume that there would not have been

significant differences in the numerical strength of the SC/ST mem-

bers in the state Assemblies and Parliament without reservation. Itmay be possible that these numbers would have been smaller in the

fifties, but it would have been increased like that of the OBCs in the

subsequent elections. However, it is certain that because of reserva-

tion, S(YST political leaders, whose numbers are assured, have been

co-opted easily by the national political parties. As the SC population

is scattered unlike that of the STs, one may speculate that the SCs

might not have got adequate number of seats in the Assemblies and

Parliament proportionate to their population. Like the Muslims, they

would have had to depend mainly on the 'good will' of the party

bosses; or they would have become more militant and would have

opted for the extra-parliamentary path.

Government EmploymentReservation in government employment for the depressed classes

was introduced in 1943 by the British govemment. But at that time,

hardly any qualified persons from the 'untouchables' and tribals were

available to take advantage of the reservations. In fact, "in 1941 thegovernment decided that no useful purpose would be served by

reservations for scheduled tribes as too few were available for ap-

pointments."rr In 1953, SC and ST combined together did not occupy

even half-a-per cent (0.35 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST) of Class

I; and 2 per cent of the Class [I (1.29 per cent SC and 0.6 per cent ST)positions. They werc less than 7 per cent in Class III (4.52 per cent

SC and 2.3 per cent ST). SC occupied 2l per cent of the Class IVmenial positions, including sweepers. In the caste hierarchy, the

upper and middle castes consider menial work as polluted and meant

Consequences of Reservations 245

for the ati-sudras. Hence, the concentration of SC in Class IV posi-

tions is not surprising.The position of SC and ST did not substantially improve in the

first decade because in order to secure govemment jobs, they were

required to pass qualifying examinations for which at least elevenyears of education even for Class Itr jobs was needed. This was theinitial period for reservation as well as for the higher education of theSCs and the STs. Moreover, some of the states did not enforcereservations in the early fifties for state government jobs. And, therewas no reservation for internal promotion till 1957.12 Some depart-ments, on the recommendation of the Home Ministry, extendedreservations to the promotion posts filled by departmental examina-tions. But it was severely curtailed in 1963. As a result, ". . . not a

single scheduled casteitribe candidate has been promoted either onthe basis of departmental promotion examination or on the basis of ad

hoc selections,"r3 an organisation of SC/ST employees declared. Theroster system for promotion was introduced in the early seventies,thanks to the mounting pressure built up by the SC/ST govemmentemployees against discrimination experienced by them in depart-mental promotion and dereservation of the posts. By the end of theseventies the presenpe of SC/ST employees in different departmentsat various levels had become conspicuous. The proportion of the SCwas 5, 7 and l3 per cent respectively in the Class I, II and III in 1979;though the STs were lagging behind the SCs, they occupied I percent each of Class I and II and 3 per cent in Class IIL The reservationof posts in public sector undertakings came into force in the mid-sixties, though it was agreed to "in principle" as far back as 1954.Consequently, SCs occupied 2,4 and 16 per cent and STs occupied0.47,0.97 andT.41 per cent in Class I, II and III respectively in thepublic sector in 1978.14

It should be noted that the SCs and STs could occupy govemmentpositions in such numbers primarily, though not solely, due to reser-vations. The OBCs who got reservations in the late sixties and earlyseventies lag behind SCs and STs in govemment jobs despite theirlarger numerical strength. They constitute 5 and 11 percentages inClass I and II respectively as against 6 and 18 per cent of the SC/STin the respective classes.rs Thus, reservation has positively helped(though not to the extent expected) members of SC and ST, who were

246 The Politics of Backwardnes s

able to qualify. This has sharpened the stratification among the SCs

and the STs. A small stratum has become middle class, getting

disassociated from their traditional caste ties in day-to-day relation-ships because of their imitation of the life-style and values of the

established middle class. As a result, the composition of the middleclass has changed to some extent during the last three decades. In thepast, the middle class was almost solely constituted of upper and

middle castes. Now, low castes including SCs, and STs have entered

it. This has paved the way for the middle class to become cosmopoli-tan in terms of its caste character, providing opportunity to persons ofdifferent castes to share its class character.r6 To my mind, this is a

prerequisite for building a secular society.

On the other hand, the number of students studying for higher

education has increased more than 15 times (from 3.6 lakhs in 1950-

51 to 47.5 lakhs in 1982-83).t7 Of course, this size is confined to amicroscopic minority of the Indian population,- only 5 per cent ofpersons in the age group between 17 and 23 years. A vast majority ofthem belong to the upper social strata-traditionally the upper and

middle castes. However, all those who have studied up to or above

matriculation are not absorbed in the job market. In fact, the rate ofthe educated (matriculates and above) unemployed is far higher than

the rate of rise in education. There were 1,61,599 educated unem-

ployed in 1952. The number has gone up at an alarming rate-81,43,900 educated unemployed persons in 1980.18 Since education

among higher castes is higher than that among the SC' ST and OBC'

they constitute a larger proportion of the educated unemployed.

The upper and middle castes, which have had a monopoly ofmiddle class jobs, have increasingly felt threatene& as SC/ST and

OBC started taking advantage of reservation in greater numbers'

Though some members of the Constituent Assembly opposed the

constitutional provisions related to reservations for SC, ST and OBC

in 1948-49, there was no widespread uproar at that time from the

upper and middle castes. This was perhaps because of two reasons:

One, at that time, reservations were abstract and did not directly

affect them as there were not many SC/ST qualified candidates

seeking government employment; and two, in the prevailing atmo-

sp-here of democracy and equality there was wishful thinking that the

country would be so prosperous in a decade or so that reservation for

Consequences of Resemations 247

jobs would be redundant, and caste and religious differences woulddisappear. Today the situation is more gloomy than in the earlyfifties. Overall unemployment has increased. On the other hand, theSCs, STs and OBCs have started asserting their rights and are takinggreater advantage of the reservation policy.

Despite past ideological and ritual mechanisms to control theexploited castes, in the course of history, conflict between the domi-nant castes and lower castes has come to the surface. The so-calledharmonious relationship among the castes continued so long as thelower castes did not resist exploitation and social injustice. Contem-porary tensions between upper and middle castes and lower castes onthe issue of reservations reveal the same pattern.

The dominant castes have started opposing reservations on vari-ous grounds. And wherever possible they have sabotaged the imple-mentation of reservation orders. Govemment officers belonging toupper and middle castes who are against reservations hesitate and, ifpossible, delay the implementation of govemment orders regardingrecruitment or promotion of SCs, STs and the OBCs. One can offera number of examples showing the delaying tactics on the part ofupper caste officers in implementing reservation orders. Whereverpossible they dereserve the positions on one excuse or another. Andthose who are recruited often experience humiliation. Their errors aremagnified. They get alienated from their other colleagues in theoffice and are compelled to join hands with their caste fellows. Thecaste bias is reflected in the trade unions as well. The union leaderswho belong to upper or middle castes not only do not show sympathyfor the SC, ST and OBC employees but they also openly oppose thereservation policy. The grievances of SC/ST employees are not prop-erly attended to. Some ofthe trade unions have even given a call thatthe members of the unions who are not SCVSTs "must be united tostart a struggle" against the SCVSTs.le Consequently, trade unionstend to split, and in some places SC/ST/OBC employees form theirown unions to protect their interests.

The conflict between the dominant castes and deprived castes has

come to the surface before in High Courts and the Supreme Court.There were 113 cases reported in law reports about 'compensatorydiscrimination' from 1950 to 1977. A majority of the cases relared rodepartmental promotions and admission to professional courses. The


judiciary, like the government administration, is dominated by theupper and middle castes; and their caste/class bias is reflected ;n theirjudgements. Marc Galanter observes: "No judge has emerged as thechampion of compensatory discrimination; Justice (later Chief Jus-tice) Gajendragadkar probably comes closest by virtue of his opinionin Dora and Rangachari, two of the small number of Supreme Courtcases in which the scope of preferential treatment was given a broad-ening, expansive interpretation. A few other judges sat often enoughto display a consistent tendency to curtail its operation."2O Thosejudge: who have been in favour of preferential treatment often vac-illate on the question of whether caste should be the basis forrecognising backwardness, including that of SC and ST.2l

Upper and middle castes launched agitations against reservationsfor SC, ST and OBC in Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya hadesh and Andhra.Particularly, the numerically large groups such as Harijans and some

backward castes who have taken to higher education and securedgovemment jobs were the targets of attacks by the agitators. InGujarat and elsewhere, houses of the Harijans and backward castes

were set on fire and some were killed, injured and terrorised. Theupper caste agitators have succeeded in curtailing the reservation

facilities.22It is often argued that reservation on caste basis is responsible for

the ugly face of casteism. It invokes caste feeling and strengthens

caste consciousness which is antithetical to secularism. This viewassumes that casteism was not strong before the introduction ofreservation. It also assumes that the members of the upper-middlecastes are benevolent, tolerant and secular. They oppose reservation

because it strengthens casteism and hampers the process ofsecularisation. To my mind, this assumption is unfounded. The uppercastes are 'secular' so long as their monopoly is maintained and theyare allowed to share the benefits among themselves. There was no

reservation for the OBCs in many states, including Gujarat, till the

mid-seventies. But even a cursory analysis of Gujarat politics wouldconvince anyone that before 1976 caste consciousness was as strong-if not more so-than after the introduction of reservation for OBC in1978. The only difference is that after 1978, the upper and middlecastes have had to share at least some of the govemment positions

with the OBCs when the latter began to assert their rights. Gujarat

C onse quence s of Re s e rv ations

politics in the fifties was often considered as non-casteist becausethere was no apparent conflict between the upper-middle castes andOBCs.23 Such an illusory situation had been treated as reality because

at that time power was shared by political leaders belonging to upperand middle castes. As the OBCs started asserting their rights theirdemands were branded as 'communal'. To my mind, one of theprerequisites for building a secular society is to create a mechanism,whereby persons from different castes and communities can enter thesame arena and work together. In the present Indian situation, reser-vation is the mechanism whereby persons from different castes cancome together for secular activities.

Merit and EfficiencyIt is often argued that though reservation provides socialjustice to

the deprived groups, it entails a heavy cost by sacrificing efficiencyand merit. At the outset, let me state that I do not consider efficiencyas a non-issue, nor do I believe that reservation has no impactwhatsoever on efficiency. Nevertheless, the above argument of effi-ciency displays either a great degree of bias against the deprivedgroups by prejudging their ability, or an abstract and partial notion ofefficiency.

The above argument is at best based on stray cases rather than ona systematic study. It assumes that performance in examination andefficiency are closely related. While judging academic performance,one needs to keep in mind the educational system which is structured,in more ways than one, in favour of the better-off sections of soci-ety.24 Students belonging to upper and middle castes/classes not onlyhave a more congenial environment, they also study in relativelybetter schools and enjoy other facilities such as private coaching. Onthe other hand, students from deprived groups, besides sufferingfrom discrimination, lack the facilities and environment for studies.Teachers belonging to the upper and middle castes generally pay lessattention to the SC/ST/OBC students. The inability of these teachersto bring students at least up to minimum standards should also beconsidered inefficiency. However, the inability of teachers to createconfidence among all the students, irrespective of caste, and theirfailure to bring them up to a minimum level have yet to become an

issue of academic or political debate. The efficiency of those teachers

249


who violate the basic legal and ethical principles of teaching bypractising discrimination against students in the classroom and ex-amination usually go unchallenged.

The assumption of a'direct relationship between efficiency and

examination performance needs thorough scrutiny. I have not seen

any published empirical study examining the co-relationship be-tween these two variables. The University Commission Repon (1950),

known as the Radhakrishnan Commission Report pointed out that theexamination system is'linvalid, inadequate, subjective and thereforenot reliable." As late as 1976, the University Grants Commissionobserved: "Examinations have come to dominate the educationalprocess; passing them is more important than acquiring education."2sIt also admits that, "The marking ofthe scripts even at the best publicexamination is hurried and superficial. The marks obtained in exami-nations are not a reliable measure of a student's performance (leave

aside achievement); the combination of raw marks lacks validity."The studies by Edwin Ha4ler,26 Mukherjee,2T George,2E etc. show

variations of 15 marks by different examiners for the same set ofscripts. This is applicable not only to literature but also to mathemat-

ics, physics, zoology, botany, chemistry, etc. The evidence presented

by these studies clearly shows that difference in percentages inmarks, even of 15 per cent, do not definitely reveal a high or lowability.

Notwithstanding these in-built limitations of the examination sys-

tem, and assuming that the system is not defective, the fact remains

that classroom studies have very little bearing on most of tle work innon-professional spheres of administration. Govemment servants ofClass I, tI and trI ranks find very little relevance from what theystudied at graduate or post-graduate level in their day+o-day officework. Even a cursory look into the list of the employees of largeprivate companies reveals quite a few in each company who are justmatriculates or graduates holding very high executive positions. Someof them have even less than ten years' experience. Needless to say,

more often than not they are the sons arid daughters of relatives orfriends of the directors. Here I am not questioning their efficiency.What I am arguing is that examination performance and actual workdo not necessarily go together. And 'under-qualification' of these

executives in private sectors, who gotjobs through nepotism has not

Consequences of Reservations

been questioned by those who worry about merit.Efficiency is related to commitment to one's profession and a

sensitivity towards the societal problems; not to mere ranking inexaminations. This is true of all technical and professional courses. Itshould be bome in mind that all those who qualify to join professions,

say medicine, engineering or aeronautics, have passed the required

examinations. A recent study of Bombay medical students by Padma

Velasker shows, that SC/OBC students have more commitment to-wards the profession and the poor patients than students of the uppercastes and classes. The latter are more interested in making moneyrather than in serving the patients.2e By now, we are familiar with themalpractices committed by well-qualified medical doctors who are inthe rat race for status and money.

It is often argued that the present day inefficiency in the adminis-tration is due to reservation as less qualified persons are recruited.This argument has no validity whatsoever. Even today the totalnumber of persons in government departments recruited throughreservation is very small. One wonders how such a small number canhave such a determining influence on the very large number ofemployees who are recruited on 'merit' and claim to be more effi-cient. West Bengal has relatively less reserved seats in governmentjobs than Tamilnadu or Gujarat. But on any count, the administrationin West Bengal is no more efficient than that of these two states. Byrearranging the data of the Administrative Reforms Commission,Marc Galanter demonstrates that even if the SC/ST candidates whosecured third division were not recruited on reserved seats, the posi-tions would have gone to the "others" who were also placed in thethird division, though "higher percentage of third class degrees."3o

Moreover, there are quite a number of departments which still do .

not have SC/ST/OBC members. Such cases are many in the univer-sities at undergraduate and post-graduate levels. Do we require a

study to show their inefficiency in imparting knowledge and under-taking meaningful research? I feel that we should examine the issue

of efficiency in the context of the overall work ethos prevailing incontemporary Indian society, irrespective of a person's caste or com-munity. The issue is equally related to the administrative structureand procedures which are formed by upper-caste/class mer.nbers whoprovide administrative leadership.

251

252 The Politics of Bachoardness

Uneven Distribution of Benelits and Its ConsequencesReservations have by and large not improved the overall condition

of the deprived communities i.e., the SCs, the STs and the OBCs.They still lag behind the upper and middle castes in educational and

economic spheres. Only a small number have succeeded in acquiringthe benefits of reservation. The fortunate among the deprived com-munities are those who have property or marketable skills whichenable them to acquire secondary or higher education. It should benoted that the SCs, the STs and the OBCs are not homogeneouscommunities. They are divided not only into several endogarnousgroups of high and low status, but economic differentiations also

exist among them. For instance, 6 per cent of the ST households inGujarat own more than 15 acres of land. Some of them have irriga-tion and other infrastructure facilities to produce marketable sur-plus.3l In the north-east frontier regions, till recently, slavery existedas an institution among some tribes, in which one tribe conqueredanother and enslaved its members. These slaves worked as agricul-tural labourers.32 In Mizoram, land is auctioned by the government orleased out for a specific period to so-called 'progressive' farmerswho can afford to pay the price. Such land is taken by a new class ofcapitalist farmers who take to "farming with the purpose of finding a

profitable channel for their accumulation."33 Similar economic dif-ferentiations exist among the SCs and the OBCs.

The differentiations are accentuated by the development strategiesof the post-Independence period. In the present development stra-

tegy, only those who have a viable quantum of land and possess

infrastructure facilities produce a marketable surplus. And those whocan produce a marketable surplus can afford to provide education totheir children. Our educational system, needless to say, caters to theneeds of a small section of society which is in a privileged position.It condemns the bulk of the children belonging to the poor to be rlrop-outs and failures.3a Hence, despite scholarships and o\er facilitiesonly very few students from the deprived communities can have highschool and college education. One needs money to travel from one'svillage to the town where the high school is located. And withoutsecondary education, they have no scope for taking professionaleducation or govemment jobs. Similarly, looking to the prevalentelectoral system, no one can successfully fight elections for an As-

Consequences of Resewations 253

sembly or Parliament seat without at least some financial standing.

One needs a piece of land with infrastructure, a business or a perma-

nent job with an assured income which enable one to contest elec-

tions.35

As a result of the reservations, those who acquired political posi-

tions and govemment white-collar jobs have formed a tiny middle

class. They have adopted the life-style in dress, diet, etiquette, lan-

guage etc., of their peer group, the upper and middle classes. Their

interaction with their kin and clan brethren is limited and they find itdifficult to adjust themselves to their traditional way of life. They are

alienated from their communities. On the other hand, they experience

iubtle discrimination from the non-deprived communities who domi-

nate the political and economic sectors. The situation frustrates them.

OverviewReservations have certainly helped, at least a very small number of

SC/ST/OBC, in acquiring political and administrative positions. As a

result the circle of the middle class has been widened. Economic

differentiations among the deprived communities have become sharp,

which have initiated the process of disintegration of these groups.

However, the privileged strata of the deprived communities have not

yet integrated in the middle class dominated by upper and middle

castes. To some extent, reservations have throttled the growth ofmilitancy among the deprived groups. On the other hand, the tension

between the traditionally upper and middle castes and lower castes

have come to tlle surface. Violence erupted in the streets for settling

the issues. This is inevitable because those who dominate political

and economic spheres would not like to share the benefits; whereas

the deprived groups arc bound to assert their rights.

NOTES

l. See Ghanshyam Shah, "The Congress and the Deprived Communities" inRam Joshi and R.K. Hebsur eds., Social Intemention for lustice. Bombay:

Popular Prakashan, 1986.

2. Quoted by Eleanoi Zelliot, 'Gandhi and Amhedkar: A Study in L€ader-

ship" in Michael M ahar, The Ilntouchables in Contemporary lndiaTuscon: The

University of Arizona Press, 1972.

3 . Ghanshyam Shah , Minoitizs and Nation Building: A Case of Muslims and

254 ' The politics of Backwardness

Scheduled Tribes in Ind.ia. Y aranasi: Banaras Hindu University, 19g3.4. Lelah Dushkin, "Scheduled Caste polirics', in Michael Mahu ed., The

Untouchables in Contemporary India. Aizona: The University of ArizonaPress, 1972.

5. Report of the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and, Schedukd Tribes1978-79, (fwenty-sixth Reporr), Delhi, Manager, Covemmenr of India press,

1980. For further discussion see Ghanshyam Shah, "protective Discrimination,Equality and Politi calWill" in Reservatian: Policy, programmz and Issues, eds.,Vimal Shah and Binod C. Agrawal. Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1986.

6. G. Narayana, "Rule Making for Scheduled Castes: Analysis ofLok SabhaDebates," Economic and Political WeeHy, vol. XV, no. 8, February 23, 1990.

7. Dilip Hiro, The Untouchables in India. Lnndon: The Minority RightsGroup, 1982.

8. Dushkin, ap. cir.9. Manseesha Tikekat " Scheduled Caste Legislators in Maharashtra." ph.D.

thesis, Bombay, Department ofCivics and Politics, 1986. See also Shiva Reddy," Harijan Elite in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh." Ph.D. study under progress,Surat, Centre for Social Studies.

10. Dushkin, op. clr.ll. Marc Galanter, Competing Equalities. Delhi: Oxford University press,

1984.12. Ibid.13. rbid.14. Repon of the Commissioner- op. cit.r5. rba.16. Ghanshyam Shah, " Middle Class Politics: A Case of Anti-Reservation

Agitation in Gujarat." Mimeographed. Surat: Centre for Social Studies, 1985.17 . India 1954 and 1984. Delhi: Publications Division, covemmenr of India,

1955 aad 1985.18. India 1954 and Basic Statistics Relating to the Indian Economy. Bombay:

Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, 1982.19. Repon of the Commissioner. op. cir.20. Galanter, op. cit.21. For Justice D.A. Desai's views, see Haroobhai Mehta and Hasmukh

Patel, eds., Dynamics oJ Reservation Poiicy. New Delhi: patriot publication,1985.

22. Ghanshyam Shah, "Middle Class Politics: A study of Anti-ReservationAgitations," Economic and Political WeeHy, Annual Number, May 1987.

23. Ghanshyam Shah, "Caste Sentiments, Class Formation and Dominancein Gujarat" in Frankel and M.S.A. Rao, eds., Caste, Class, Ethnicity and Domi-nance. Delhi: Oxford University Press (in Press). See also, "strategies of SocialEngineering: Reservation and Mobility of Backward Communities in Gujarat.',Paper presented in the seminar on Comparative Dimensions of Ind.ian Electionsand Party Politics, organised by the University ofCalifornia, Los Angeles, Junet987.

C ons equenc e s of Re s e rv ations 255

24. Citizens for Democracy, Education for Our People. Bombay: Allied

Publishers, 1978.

25 . University Grants Commissi on, Examination Reform: A Plan of Action.

Delhi: University Grants Commission, 1976.

26. A. Edwin Harper Jr., "Ninety Marking Ten: A Study of Examinations,"

Indinn Educational Review, vol. 2, no.l, January 1987. See also Research on

Examinations in India. Delhr: National Council of Educational Research and

Training, 1976.

27. N. Mukherjee, "On Examinations," Journal ofGuiarat Research Society,

vol. 23, 1961.

28. A. George, Srurdy on Assessment of Standard Valuation and Comparative

Performance of Collcges in the Pre-University Emmination-Kerala: Department

of Statistics, Kerala University, 1964.

29. Padma Ramkrishna Velasker, lnz quality in Highzr Education: A study ofScheduled Caste Students in Medical Colleges of Bombay. Bombay: Tata Insti-

tute of Social Sciences, 1986.

30. Galufier, op. cit.31. Ghanshyam Shah, "stratification among the Scheduled Tribes in the

Bharuch and Panchmahal Districts of Gujarat" in S.C. Malik, e.d., Determinants

of Social Sntus in India- Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1986.

32. B.P. Mishra, "Kirata Karyokinesis: Mode of Production in Tribal Societ-

ies in North-East India" in Arvind Das and V. Nilakant e'ds', Agraian Relations

in India. Delhi: Manohar, 1979.

33. IbA.34. Citizens for Democracy, Education for Our People. Bombay: Allied

Publishers, 1978.

35. Ghanshyam Shah, "Stratification and Reservation," Mainstrmm, vol.XIX, no.41. June 13, 1981.

(I thank Mrs Deviyani Punalekar for drawing my attention to the study on

examinations.)

Epilogue

B.G. Verghese

NDIA is a very large, plural, diverse society, more diverse thanany in the world. With the burden of ancient wrongs, mistakenpriorities and lags in performance much that is inegalitarian

remains. The Constitution the people of India gave to themselves in1950 pledged Justice, Liberty, Equality of status and opportunity,and Fratemity. While it provided for equality of opportunity it didrecognise social and economic realities and admit of special consid-eration for the claims of members of the Scheduled Castes andScheduled Tribes in the making of appointments to public services"consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of administration".It also provided for the appointment of a Commission to investigatethe condition of (other) socially and economically backward classesand to recommend measures for their amelioration.

In the one case the reference was to certain disadvantaged castecategories and to tribes and in the other to "backward classes". Ineither case the categorisation is on the basis of collectivities deserv-ing of group benefit rather than of individuals meriting compensa-tion.

The idea of preferences or positive discrimination through affir-mative action has been well articulated and many variants have beenin vogue in the United States and elsewhere. Preferences or reserva-tions as they have been called in India are not novel either, goingback to a century and more in the former Madras presidency and theprincely state of Mysore. These preferences were based on elaborategovernment orders prescribing recruitment to specific posts in a

Epilogue 257

given communal rotation. These have been discussed in the earlier

chapters.Post-Independence saw no controversy about reservations for

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as they were and still are

clearly seen as having suffered historical prejudice or neglect forwhich they must be compensated. As notified by the President with-out any fuss or acrimony, they were found to constitute around 22.5

per cent of the population, 15 per cent being Scheduled Castes and

the rest Scheduled Tribes.Problems however arose with the attempt to define the backward

classes, these being far more numerous and far less distinctive at any

boundary. [n a poor country, most people are "backward". But where

to draw the line among those who claim to be more backward than

others?

The first Backward Classes Commission under Kaka Kalelkarwas defeated by this challenge. The second so-called Mandal Com-mission enumerated 52 per cent of the population as "backward" butlimited the cut off point for preferences to some 27 per cent. With the

22.5 pr cent SC and ST reservation, the Commission wished toremain within the outer limit of 50 per cent reservation which the

Supreme Court had once prescribed with reference to equality ofopportunity, though some States subsequently exceeded that limit.

This is where the country stood when the storm broke in August1990 with the National Front Prime Minister, V.P. Singh's resolve to

implement the Mandal Report. The course of events that followedhave been described. The country divided. Protest spilled on to the

streets. Passions reached a dangerously strident pitch with numerous

anti-reservation immolations by impressionable youth.The eye of the storm was in the northern, largely Hindi states

rather than in the South, where this battle had been fought decades

back, or in the Western shtes where the reservation issue peaked

about a decade ago. The eastem region was least affected as the

backward classes here constitute a rather small proportion of the

population.The criticism against "Mandal" was that it defied merit in a

situation of large and growing educated unemployment. Further, itwas felt to b€ "unscientific" in defining who was backward, lackingin proper economic criteria in failing to provide for any exit; and


burdensome in appearing to include a system of rostering, carry-overand promotions. Some of these latter objections disappeared follow-ing clarification that they did not form part of the package. But thereremained strong objections on the ground of merit and of splitting thenation into what could become a pe(manent caste divide when inte-gration and national unity were the need of the hour.

Admittedly, implementation of the Mandal Report had been in-cluded in the National Front manifesto and the President's Address.But the actual announcement was made with such little public prepa-ration and in such a highly political context, as if to counter atroublesome party warlord, that the matter came to be seen as afurther unfolding of political gamesmanship rather than as a mea-sured step forward towards social reform.

Equally, many critics found the announcernent begged the ques-

tion of the uplift of the backward classes in a more comprehensivelystructured manner. It made no reference initially and subsequentlyonly in passing to attacking the roots of backwardness by pressingforward energetically with universalisation of primary education,vocational training and skill formation, agrarian reform, access tocredit and employment opportunities to the backward and so on.Without emphasis on tlese, the Mandal package appeared only totouch the fringe of the problem, offering a cosmetic solution for a realproblem by coopting some among those who had been unable toascend the escalator of social progress and economic opportunitythrough primary schooling.

The critics certainly had a case. But so did the champions of theMandal package. V.P. Singh defended his proposal on politicalgrounds. In his words, only by sharing the "throne" (of bureaucraticpower) would the backward ever be in a position to control the"treasury" or the decision-making process leading to the prioritisationand funding of economic opportunity. [n his view, the permanentgovernment in the form of the bureaucracy wields great power andunless the backward classes become part of that apparatus as powerbrokers or decision makers they will not be in a position to steer theship of state towards preferred shores. Hence, in his judgement, it isfutile to wait for the educational system to create a meritocracyamong the backward classes who might be able to compete and enterthe privileged halls of bureaucratic or govemmental power. On the

Epilogue 259

contrary, once empowered, the rest would follow.The Mandal protagonists argued that the Mandal Commission had

built certain economic criteria into the definition of backwardness on

a point-system and they defended the absence of any exit on theground that the percentage of backward classes cunently employedin Class I and II posts in the Central Govemment was way belowtheir numbers and that the preference accorded was to a class ratherthan merely to individuals. Further, caste was taken only as one

element in determining class and the ambit of backwardness ex-tended to Muslims, Christians and others who qualified under the test

ofbackwardness. In order to answer the criticism that backward class

reservation would squeeze out the disadvantaged among the so-

called forward castes, some reservation was to be accorded to thepoor irrespective of caste.

Despite these clarifications, conffoversy raged. The merit issuewas repeatedly stressed. Not only should meritorious applicants notbe excluded from opportunity in govemment service to accommo-date less qualified backward class candidates, but the constitutionalinjunction about "maintenance of effi ciency in administration" shouldnot be ignored. The pros and cons were debated back and forth. Whatis merit? How is it to be evaluated and by whom? If the administra-tion has thus far been carried on predominantly by "meritorious"candidates of the forward castes then how is one to explain the mess

and muddle in which the country finds itself? Furthermore, backwardclass candidates could be given special coaching and training bothbefore and after selection.

For some the din and dust appeared to tum more on issues ofdegree than of kind. With some sronger and more visible eligibilityand exit criteria the package might be acceptable alongside othermeasures for attacking rural and artisanal backwardness, and througheducation. But it is also quite evident that a certain middle class

hysteria had also been unleashed among other urban forward class

circles on the basis of an unspoken triage-type or first-come-first-served theorem in a situation of job-seekers outpacing new jobopportunities.

Howsoever one measures it, anyone who has looked at the prob-

lem objectively must admit that there are categories of persons out-side the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are genuinely

zffi The Politics of Bachuardness

socially and educationally backward. Such backwardness not merelyhandicaps them but constitutes a drag on society, sharply militatingagainst the constitutional imperative of equality and fraternity. It maywell be that the Mandal figure of 52 per cent wrongly estimates thesize of the backward classes and that if the political fat is taken off thereality may be nearer 30 per cent. Be this as it may, while accuracyis necessary and important in all things, the impact of reservation forthe backward classes in terms of substituting competition and meritby preference was to be limited to 27 per cent under the NationalFront package. There could be heartburning among the backwardclasses as to who might be included or excluded, but reservationswould remain limited to 27 per cent.

Against this though, it can equally be argued that a deservingcandidate qualifying in open competition might be prepared to bedisplaced by a truly backward class candidate deserving of prefer-ence. He or she would, however, resent being elbowed out by onewho might in fact be more privileged than himself or herself in lifebut more "backward" by notification in the list of backward classes.

Some of the more rerent state backward class commissions likethe Chinappa Reddy Commission in Andhra Pradesh have clearlydefined an exit criterion which would exclude children of parentswho have attained a given and easily measureable social or economicstatus. Adoption of such a system would be relatively simple, auto-matic and non-discriminatory and would have the further merit ofcreating space within the reserved 27 per cent quota for the moredeserving among the backward categories.

This is an important consideration as the backward classes, likethe Scheduled Castes are not an undifferentiated, monolithic mass

but a highly stratified group distinguished by deepening shades ofdisadvantage and deprivation. Ifno differentiation is made within thegroup then the highest castes or class among those Scheduled ordefined as backward will garner all the benefits not just in the firstround but in succeeding rounds as well, depriving the less privilegedof any share of the cake. This factor has been repeatedly brought tonotice in rcspect of 40 years of Scheduled Class reservation and has

been a cause for much dissatisfaction among the lower rungs ofScheduled Castes who have seen a new and sometimes parasitic eliterise on their backs. The point is well taken as no Scheduled Caste has

Epilogue 261

ever been denotified. Once in, always in and the devil take thehindmost, defeating one of the principal pulposes of reservation-touplift the lowest and most deprived.

The entire debate must of course be seen in the context of popula-tion growth far outstripping job opportunities. India is today adding16 to l7 million net to its population annually. More significantly, itis adding between eight and nine million net annually to the labourforce. This is a horrendous burden and weighs even more harshly ona developing society with large numbers at or below the poverty line.And since social status moves fairly closely with economic opportu-nities, placement in the job market and the acquisition of skills tomove up the ladder or to be upwardly mobile becomes very impor-tant.

Any consideration of reservations without reference to the growthof the economy and opportunities for people to improve their positionin life must therefore be inadequate and incomplete. Unfortunately,the debate on preferences in India has tended to ignore these largerand ultimately more relevant secular trends. As a result, public policyhas focussed too much on the micro aspects of who is in and who isout by juggling with definitions without giving equal thought to tlrefar more basic task of enlarging the cake, widening opportunities andplacing a rein on numbers.

When everything is said in favour of reservations for the backwardclasses it still remains less important to legislate fair shares of a smallcake than to strive to make everybody more competitive througheducation and otherwise enable them to take a full and equal place inan achieving society in which the cake grows far more rapidly.Levelling up in the end is a better answer than levelling down,although the latter is not to be altogether excluded or.denied.

Postscript

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver:The Mandal Controversy

Rajeev Dhavan

I

J NDIA's Constitution makers are partly to blame for subordinat-

I ing the "justice" texts of the Constitution to the "political" texts.I Many of the promises wrinen into the Constitution resulted from

' political compromises ratler tian a deeply felt commitment to par-

ticular values. For fear that a nation torn by distress may not come. together, many demands were symbolically brushed under a mythical

carpet which was yet to be woven. Many compromises were intendedto remain compromises unless the coincidence of strong political willand fortuitous good luck made their fulfilment possible. This is notintended to belittle the Justice' texts of the Constitution, nor dampen

, the ardour of those who think that politics is more than the 'art of thepossible'. Yet, politics-no less democratic politics as any other-often suffers Justice' into further compromise. The various forcesthat compete for success are unequally poised and rewarded withunequal and uneven results. Constitutional controversies are firmlylocated in the politics that give rise to them. This is no less true of thecontrovprsies which erupt in courts of law as those which find ex-pression in parliamentary fora or on the streets.l

We are concerned here with the vague promises of special treat-ment made to a nebulously defined class of persons who have come

, to be known as the "other backward classes" (OBC).'?The term itself

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Contoversy 263

suggests a residuary concem and puzzled many in its relatively shortjoumey into constitutional acceplance. Before Independence, theOBCs were variously included amongst the "depressed classes", withthe term 'backward' acquiring administrative meaning in the princelystate of Mysore in 19183 and a loose definition in the Hartog Com-mittee as consisting of "(c)astes and classes which are educationallybackward".a At least one politician-S.D. Singh Chaurasia-claimedthat he coined the phrase around 1930. Yet, by 1948 a vigilantConstituent Assembly was confused by the term-not quite sure whothe OBCs were and what their 'otherness' (aird, if so, from whom)consisted of.5 Decades would elapse before various persons andauthorities sought the courage to provide clear constitutional answersto this question.

At the time of Constitution making, spokespersons for many groupsand communities demanded "special treatment". The more headydemands-such as those by the Muslim League-for separate repre-sentation led to Partition. Had the logic of special electoral represen-tation in parliament and the administration on communal lines beenaccepted, each religious group or community would have been justified in demanding similar representation in ways that could only havebeen divisive.6

The cardinal principle evolved by the Constitution appears to bethatfear of majoritarian discrimination was not by itself a sufficientground for constitutionally designated preferential treatment whichwould be accorded to only such communities and groups which hadhistorically suffered both hostile discrimination and disadvantage.To this end, three kinds of preferences were envisaged: specialelectoral representation in legislative bodies Qtreferential electoralrepresentation) 7, special recruitment in public services Qtreferentialemployment)8 and special schemes, action and accommodations inother areas especially those relating to welfare and education (prefer-ential teatmenr).e The formal decision that there should be just oneelectoral roll did not exclude providing for special reservations foruntouchables, tribals and the Anglo-Indian community for a transi-tional period of l0 years which has, in tum, been extended decenni-ally from time to time into the next century.r0 As far as preferentialtreatment and employment were concerned, the largest anticipatedbeneficiaries---other than untouchables and tribals (and. to a more


limited extent, women and children)-were the OBCs.rr The absence

of criteria to define OBCs and the lack of awareness of the potential

benefits that could accrye as a result of preferential progftImmes

rendered these constitutional promises relatively non-contentious.

They have yet to acquire a politics that would give them substance.

Even though the Constituent Assembly had no reason to doubtK.M. Munshi's explanation that the term 'OBC' "signifies people-touchable or untouchable belonging to this community or that, whoare so backward that special protection is required (for them) in the

services"t2, the term was less of a misnomer for delegates from the

south of India where such preferential schemes for such backward ordepressed classes had been in operation for some time. In 1921, theprincely state of Mysore had already instituted a programme for"recruiting all communities other than Brahmins who (were) . . . not

adequately represented in the public service".l3 By 1925, similarprogrammes in Bombay virtually covering all backward classes otlerthan Brahmins, Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banias and Christians

even though a later committee in 1930 clarified that "in ordinary

usage the phrase Depressed Classes is taken to mean untouchables".ra'sensing the opening up of preferential benefits, a nascent politicsrapidly gathered momentum to voice the demands of the yet to be

clearly defined OBCs. The breeding ground for such demands was tobe found in the many movements against brahmin domination in the

South as opposed to movements elsewhere (such as the UP HinduBackward Classes League) which interpreted terms like 'depressed'

and 'backward' classes ejusdem generis as-4roadly speaking----of

the same genre as classes that suffered from the practice of untouch-

ability. In Madras, the Madras Provincial Backward Classes League

(started in 1934) wanted to extend special treatment to a large num-ber of non-brahmin communities-a goal that found substantial rec-

ognition in special public jobs reservations provisions of l947.tsWith opportunities in the air, backward classes federations were

formed in many States (such as Bihar in 1947) and nationally (such

as the All India Backward Classes Federation founded in 1950)

because the intended beneficiaries felt that the Constituent Assembly

had "mustered courage to take up the problem of (OBCs) . . . and

place it on a national plane".to By 1954, it was estimated that there

were some 88 reasonably known such organizations. But, apart from

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 265

the broad object of maximizing the possible uses of the new dispen-sation, each group had its own agenda.l7 It is not surprising that thefirst cases that reached the Supreme Court in l95lr8 concemed a

distinctly anti-brahmin Madras scheme which sought to divide the

benefit of reserved job and other quotas principally to non-brabnincommunities. That the scheme was struck down as being communalin nature was inevitable. Yet the scheme was not formulated withmalafide intent but was based on a genuine mal-understanding ofwho were to be included amongst the 'backward classes'. The ab-sence of any r-rational indication of the criteria to be used to identifythe backward classes meant that each State (or, conceivably localauthority or institution) could devise their own definition andprogramme until a national policy or the judiciary caught up withthem.

In order to ensure that tle OBCs were identified, high poweredState Commissions were appointed amongst which the more wellknown are the ones appointed by Mysore in 1960-1, Maharashtra in1964, Kerala in 1966, Kashmir in 1969, Tamil Nadu in 1971,Kamataka in 1975, Gujarat in 1976, Bihar in 1978 and various otherStates at different times.re By this time, electoral politics had becomeimbricated in the formulation of OBC policy. The wider and moreextensive the definition of beneficiaries and benefits, the larger tlegrateful vote bank that would vote for the regime. Each of theseschemes ran into constitutional rough weather when they came to be

examined by the judiciary.Unsure of the deadly mix of righteous 'justice' and 'unscrupulous'

politics that such preferential programmes could engender, the UnionGovemment steered clear of taking a definite position. The strongmodemist secularism of Nehru abjured caste based divisions to tra-verse from social life into public policy. Since the OBC programmewas in relation to classes other than the untouchables and tribals inwhose favour favourable schemes had already been inaugurated,there was an intuitive de-prioritilation of the OBC cause. A Commis-sion was appointed in 1953 to determine the criteria for identifyingthe BCs other than the untouchables and the tribals (who by this timehad come to be described as the Scheduled Castes (SC) and Sched-uled Tribes (ST) after the "Schedules" in which tleir names wereincluded). The task of the (Kalelkar) Backward Classes Commission


which reported in 195520 was not to identify the 'poor' but thosecommunities and groups who suffered additional or special disadvan-tage so as to entitle them to special preferential treatment. Its exerciseended by identifying 113.5 million people comprising some 3l.8Vo ofthe population which was in addition n rhe 2O% (or so) for SC andST. It had received 3344 memoranda and interviewed 5636 persons,

but in the main relied on census reports and the general impressionsof public persons and social workers. Where data was sparse orunavailable, a 'benefit-of+he-doubt' - principle was used in favour ofinclusion of that community in the OBC list. The prescriptive mea-sures suggested were reservations for jobs in public services on asliding scale (257a,33tlrrd, and 4O7o in Class I, [I, and III and IVservices respectively) and massive reservations (of 70Vo) in medical,scientific and technical colleges in addition to various other support-ive educational welfare measures. In a society in which social statusmobility had come to be identified with government jobs and special-ist professional technical opportunities, such extensive'reservations'of posts in services and admission seats in educational institutionscould not but alarm the mainstream non-beneficiary communitieswhose members would be directly affected by this 'reservations'programme. Quite apart from the predictable consequentialist effectsof the Commission's prescriptions, there was an ideological resis-tance to using 'caste' as a basis for identifying disadvantage in anIndia which had set its aims at establishing a casteless society. TheReport was undermined-in this regard by a dissenting note by itsown Chairperson and three others who rejected caste as a basis foridentifying OBCs,2t It was this question of caste to identify OBCsthat provided the vehicle to attack the Commissionk recommenda-tions and put them in cold storage for several decades. Even ifvarious lists were used by the state governments to provide educa-tional and other benefits, the initiative of devising comprehensivepreferential employment and benefit schemes for the OBCs passed

on to the State Governments; and, came under the shadow ofjudicialscrutiny.

But, the Backward Classes Commission's report of 1955 definedthe central issue for future controversy namely, could 'caste' ever be

a criterionfor futennining backwardness? Rather than concern itselfwith the plight of backward classes who deserved preferential treat-


ment, the controversy became both ideological and political in na-

ture. Politically, it was easier and electorally more fortuitous todefine backwardness in terms of 'caste', especially because there was

no denying that caste considerations were chiefly responsible for the

combination of discrimination and disadvantage that led to back-wardness. However, since Nehru's India had committed itself to

eradicating caste and creating a casteless society, any kind of adher-

ence to caste was seen as a symbolic surrender that undermined thevery foundations of India's egalitarian constitutional order.z2

The argument represented the triumph of symbolism over reality.Nor did it make sense to argue that the Constitution forbade helpingvictims of caste on the grounds that they belonged to one. To theGovernment the answer lay in using "economic criteria", hoping thatthe States would adopt such a pattern because casie criteria wereinimical to justice. Not willing to throw the electoral baby out withthe ideological bath water, the central government in its letter of 14

August 1961 permitted the state govemments to choose their owncriteria for defining backwardness but added that in its view "itwould be better to apply economic tests than go by caste".23 Byemphasizing the discretion of the state government and yet makingits ideological stance clear, it sought to have the best of all possibili-ties. But, surely, it was justice considerations that required the Gov-emment to get to the root of the true causes of the injustice; and, notthe symptoms that might manifest itself as the social description of aclass. If the economic criteria consisted of a 'means' or 'income' test,

the term 'backwardness' would become inter-changeable with 'pov-erty'. If a more complex occupational test were used, any honestproposal could not discount 'caste' for the purpose of defining 'back-ward' occupations or exclude the strong possibility that the identifiedclass had caste characteristics. Meanwhile, the States went their ownway. It is misleading to conclude that preferential schemes for 'back-ward' classes were motivated solely for the electoralr benefit ofbuilding political vote banks for elections. Such schemes were inoperation in Princely States, like Mysore, long before electoral con-siderations loomed ahead as rewarding possibilities. Anti-brahminmovements in the South were notjust rooted in historical anger butalso inspired by genuine considerations of justice which-at least, atthat fime-had not been devalued to a point fiat they were viewed


purely as devices for electoral gains, de hors the sentiments thatinspired them. Be that as it may, from the early sixties the dominanttone of the debate-both in courts and otherwise---concerned itself,in the main, with the use of 'caste' criteria to define backwardness.The ideological indecision of the government was reflected in Courtdecisions.

il

Before we turn :c judicial pronouncements, the constitutional dispen-sation merits scrutiny. A family of articles of the Constitution in thefundamental rights chapter deal with equality,2a commencing withthe foundation right that the "State shall not deny to any personequality before law and equal protection of laws" (Article l4). Fromthis flow further injunctions against general discrimination by theState (Article 15(1)) only on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex andplace of birth as well as discrimination in the matter of State employ-ment only on these grounds as well as on the grounds of descent andplace of birth (Article 16(2)). Inherent in rhe promise of equality isthe assurance that unequals will not be treated unequally. This, byitself, provides the basis for preferential treatment of, amongst others,socially disadvantaged groups and persons. But, the Constitutionwent further. Specific provision was made in the original Constitu-tion for preferential employment for the 'backward classes':

"Nothing in this (equality) article shall prevent the Srate frommaking any provision for tle reservation of appointments of postsin favour of any backward class of citizens which-, in the opinionof the State is not adequately represented in the services under theState" (Article 16(4)).

Following some awkward observations in the Madras communalreservations cases (1951),b the Constitution was amended to add tothe already existing provision permitting "any special provision forwomen and children" (Article 15 (3)), a further clause to makeexplicit what was already implicit:

"Nothing in this article (general equality in respect of State


action) or Afticle 29(2)) (admissions to aided minority schools)shall prevent the State from making any special provision for theadvancement of any socially and educationally backward classes

of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes"(Article l5(4))

The provisions in the general discrimination article (Article 15) wercdifferent from those in the State employment article (Article 16). Thecommon thread was that preferential discrimination was permissibleboth generally and for state jobs. It also seemed that the employmentprovision used the wider term "any backward classes" whereas thegeneral provision included within its catchnrent Scheduled Castes

and Tribes; and, in addition, "any (other) socially and educationallybackward classes". Hence, the question: who were the "other back-ward classes?" Although the Constitution made specific provisionfor the President to appoint a Commission to investigate the condi-tions of socially and educationally backward classes and make rec-ommendations on the steps to be taken by the Union and States ondealing with their problems, tle question of how they would beidentified and by what criteria remained open.

But, in order to fully comprehend the context in which schemeswere being devised and considered by the various High Courts, it isnecessary to understand what was at stake. Apart from financialsupport and earmarked welfare schemes, the general preferentialprogrammes acquired a cutting edge when professional educationalschemes 'reserved' special seats and quotas for the SC and ST as wellas the other backward classes. This has come to include notjust seats

in mainstream tertiary education but also preferential access to scarcelyavailable seats for professional education; and, through such access,

to jobs. Every reserved seat meant a lesser chance for general candi-dates to become doctors, engineers, lawyers and such professionals.The speciJic employment related reservations cut deeply into theavailability of public service jobs which were highly prized in Indiaas secune constitutionally protected employment, the incumbents ofwhich exercised the power of the State at all levels of administration.As far as the SC, ST and OBCs were concemed, there was no way(other than by reservations of seats and jobs) that their memberscould ever join the ranks of professionals or occupy govemment

270 The Politics of Baclcwardness

positions of power. It was, to use a now famous phrase, a question of'competing equalities'26 and determining whether the edge would begiven to the backward classes to achieve real and substantive equalityor to the merit candidates from the forward classes. It was understoodthat while some relaxation could be made in favour of the backwardclasses, both reserved and mainstream candidates would have to meetthe prescribed minimum eligibility criteria. In other words, illiterateswould not be treated as literates. nor would butchers be selected as

surgeons. The requirement of competence would not be compro-mised. It is in this context that the issue of reservations slowly, butsurely, exploded into law and politics. A rapidly transforming nationwas opening up professional and public service opportunities in an

India whose populace were hungry for social mobility jobs, status,

wealth and power. Such an issue could only attract controversy.The ideological resistance to using 'caste' to identify 'un-equals'

and redress inequality by giving preference to groups identified onthe basis of 'caste' sought to make the Constitution 'caste blind' inprecisely those areas of social action on which its egalitarian eyes

should have been wide open. The initial reaction of the judiciary wasenviably balanced. Following the Supreme Court's lead in the Ma-dras cases (1951)'z7, in 1958, the Jammu and Kashmir High Court2E

refused to permit these provisions to be used to "remove communaldisparity", and the Mysore High Courtze refused to countenance a

thinly disguised attempt to cover all but the Brahmin communities.But, while the Mysore Court had misgivings about the identifiedgroups, it was perceptively just in concluding that while criteria otherthan caste could be used to identify such beneficiaries,

". . . (it was not possible to accept) . . . that backward classes

cannot be determined on the basis of castes, and tley must alwaysbe determined on the territorial, economical, occupational or somesuch basis . . . (IX cannot be said with any such rigidity thatdetermination can in no case be made on the basis of caste".3o

This set a realistic tone on the discussion, and should have quelled allsensible controversy. No doubt, this did not obviate the need forshowing the backwardness of the 'caste' in question and the kind ofdisadvantage or discrimination it suffered. But, the desire of diverse


governments to assist identifiable groups and communities whoseinclusion in the list of beneficiaries was controversial added morefuel to fire. By the time the Supreme Courtsr dealt with the Mysorecases in 1963, it was obvious that the schemes would fail for otherreasons (concerning the relative level of literacy required to qualifyas 'backward classes'). But, Justice Gajendragadkar did not want tomiss the ideological wood for the trees. Aware-perhaps annoyed-by the anti-brahmanical nature of the reservations but unwilling tostate this intuition openly, ideologically against the use of casre todefine governmental programmes, inspired by a Hindu reformism,anxious to project the view that 'caste' was an aberrational andartificial addition to Hinduism and not its basis, Justice Gajendra-gadkar, in the Supreme Court, placed his anxieties on an eclecticpedestal to make the plea tlat the issue had to be examined in a"rational and scientific way".32 For him this meant that both caste andpoverty were relevant for determining backwardness, but caste couldnot be the sole or dominant test.33 It is this aspect that was emphasisedby Justice Subba Rao in a case that was reported in the next year in1964, where he refused to equate 'caste' witi ,class' but permittedcaste to be one of the factors that would define a class.3a Such anapproach was practically impossible even if theoretically sound. Toundertake the task of identifying individuals who share .backward'

common characteristics was asking for a national social census fromwhich, new and old groups would be identified. Such a task wasnothing short of Hercuiean. Apart from being unmanageable andexpensive, it was like determining which needles in a multitudinousnation full of haystacks were socially similar. Surely, the correctapproach was to start with groups (including caste groups whichwould invariably be the most numerous); and, then, consider whetherthe groups were backward. Apart from this impracticality, this ap-proach has conectly been described as "flagrantly unhistorical"3ssince the choice of the word "classes" in the constitutional text couldnot, by any stretch of imagination, have implied that the Constitutionmakers wanted to exclude 'castes' from consideration as OBCs.Indeed, the very identification of SCs (untouchables) and STs (disad-vantaged tribes) showed that hostility to, and rhe disadvantage suf-fered by, traditional disadvantaged caste groups was precisely whatthe Constitution makers wished to amend.


Juristic proclamation had secured the ideological victory of mini-

mizing the importance of caste in identifying backwardness, but itbrought its own problems. If the OBCs could not be just caste groups,

there was no knowing where to stop' Surely, traditional groups and

communities were all entitled to be considered for preferential

prograflrmes as long as they were able to show that they fell within

the prescribed indicia of backwardness. Elections, and the need for

captive vote banks, drove the govemment into increasing the catchment

of groups identified for preference. Kerala's attempt to include the

Ezhavas and the Muslims found judicial rebuke-not necessarily

because of the manner in which the group was defined but because ofthe lack of supporting data.36 If one Pandora's box Oased on 'caste')

was partly half shut, another more general box was re-opened. Com-

munal reservations or reservations of rural communities were sported

for examination and found wanting. But the resistance to 'caste' as a

criterion continued on the strikingly reductionist and over-simplifiedargument that the Constitution's aim of a 'casteless' society pre-

vented constitutional functionaries from rectifying the cumulated

injustice of centuries encrusted in the caste system. A fragile refuge

from proceeding in this over-stylized manner was sought in declaring

that a class could never solely be based on 'caste', which probably

meant no more than saying that although the group tested for 'back-

wardness' could be a caste group, it would still have to be shown that

the group was socially and educationally backward.3T But, the ideo-

logical tone of the judgements shows resistance to the idea of groups

being identified by their caste. The attempt to exclude caste groups as

beneficiaries is all the more inacceptable because the arguments over

caste are confined to the OBCs even though they apply with a

similarly forceful logic to the SC (if not the ST) as well. Yet' the

question is not one ofjust academic importance because it goes to the

heart of the purpose behind the reservations. Are reservations onlyabout rectifying the imbalances of the past? If that is the case, itwould be limited to those categories or classes who were 'backward'

at the time the Constitution was promulgated and who would, by the

by, become 'forward' as time passes. In this view, although these

provisions of the Constitution were not expressly transitional, they

could be treated as transitional by force of interpretation in that no

new groups would be added to the OBCs list on the basis that some


future social, economic or political circumstances may create newOBC groups who constitutionally deserved preferential treatment. Itis not necessary for our present purposes to explore this furtherexcept for the limited purpose of accepting that although 'caste'

groups were historically the main intended beneficiaries of prefer-ence, other groups could also be included within the rubric of such

remedial justice. To that extent, the 'not-caste-alone' formula couldnot be ignored. But, such an approach was not intended to exclude'caste' groups but to include others. The possibility that new groups

can also claim preference as part of the mandate of equality cannot beforeclosed for the future. Where the Constitution does not intend a

provision to be transitional, interpretation should not render the use

of its beneficial provisions otiose for the future. After all, apan fromelectoral reservations, special provisions for SC and ST, women and

children have not been declared transitional. The Constitution is aliving document, to be used to achieve its Justice' imperatives in thefuture with as much force as it might have endeavoured to have doneso in the past. There are many new disadvantaged groups that couldbe created-whether by migration or the exigencies of social and

economic life. To exclude the possibility of a substantive justice forsuch groups does not sit easily with the Constitution's aims and

objects.The muddle over the issue of 'caste' was inspired by ideological

considerations; but it soon acquired a social momentum bordering onan undeclared 'caste'war-at least at the level of perceptions, litiga-tion, public response and politics. As the govemments responded byidentifying a large number of enormous OBC expectants, the Courtswere invited to intervene. The judiciary's initial intervention echoedboth the views of the central government and Nehru's philosophy.This symbiosis of juristic instinct and government policy is by nomeans 'a-typical' of judicial decision making in India; or-for thatmatter 'anywhere'----else. There was a distinct 'class' (in the Marxistsense) element in all this. Having lost their campaign with the state

govemments, the privileged classes looked to the central govemmentand the Courts for protection. It is a matter of record that they won apartial success with the Courts. But it was a success which-over thesixties and into the seventies-slowly lost ground.


ilI

The judicial response of the sixties failed to interpret the mandate ofequality contained in the Constitution in all its fullness. The mandate

of equality in the Constitution encompasse s both anti-discrimination(that citizens be dealt with on the basis of their merit without takinginto account their antecedents of caste, race, sex, place of birth,residence and so on) as well as a positive commitment to eliminatedisadvantage (by giving preferential treatment to persons to over-come their disadvantage). Needless to say, even the anti-discrimina-tion principle is founded on the assumption that unequals should notbe treated equally. So, if disadvantaged persons are treated on parwith the advantaged such action would be, ex facie, discriminatory.Preferential treatment is not an exception (or for that matter even an

addition) to the anti-discrimination principle. It is very much a part ofequality.3s Even if preferential treatment were not written into theConstitution, schemes of preferences-no less in tle matter of oppor-tunities for professional education as well as government jobs-would not fall foul of formal principles of equality. If nothing else,

the joumey of the American Supreme Court into issues related withaffirmative action demonstrate this most ably even though a recentjudgement of the Supreme Court may support a break in the continu-ity of that Court's egalitarian commitment to substantive social equal-ity.3e It is, of course, arguable that preferential discrimination is oftwo distinct kinds.4 Thelrsr relates to preferential treatment in thematter of welfare and the creation of special schemes in order toenable self improvement. The second is preferential employmentwhich'entails either the preferential selection of disadvantaged can-didates (where the candidate otherwise meets the eligibility require-ment for the job) or the relaxation of some of the eligibility require-ments Out never below the qualificatory level consistent with an

efficient discharge of thejob in question) or the creation of special in-service training and other programmes and benefits (which bothcompensate disadvantage as well as enable self development).at Thesedistinctions betw een p refe rential tre atment and p referential employ-ment arc by no means water tight. During the course of arguments inthe Mandal case, it was suggested that India's Constitution itselfacknowledges and accepts this distinction since it locates the com-


pensatory discrimination programme in two distinct locations in the

chapter on Fundamental Rights, namely the general preferential treat'

ment prograrnme which is in the Article which otherwise injuncts

general discrimination by the State inter alia, on grounds of caste

(Article 15(4)) and the p referential employment programme whichisin the Article dealing with a similar non-discrimination in matters ofpublic employment (Article 16(4)).42 But the Supreme Court rejected

the argument that the compensatory schemes could be put in such

rigid compartments.a3 Yet, the distinction is both rational and not

without constitutional or public significance. Time and time again,

those against reservation in public employment have argued that the

proper approach is not to reserve jobs for the less meritorious (even

if minimally qualified), but to create educational and other opportu-nities so that, in the course of time, the disadvantaged and theirchildren may overcome their handicap. So, the war cry of even some

of the sympathetic anti-reservationists in relation to preferential em-ployment was "Training: Yes; Jobs: No". Such an argument gets

increasingly thin in its generosity when the anti-reservationists fur-ther argue that preferential admission to courses in professional edu-cation (such as to medical, engineering, law, architecture and so on)should be placed on par with preferential employment-since such

admission to and success in such courses is a pre-condition to a

professional career in these fields. This argument has now been

decisively rejected by the Supreme Court which has-it would ap-

pear-affirmed the distinction between affirmative action and prefer-

ential employment which it rejected somewhat cursorily in its Mandaljudgement.aa Some anti-reservationists take the argument further and

assert that there should be no reservations in tertiary education at all;and all that should be done is to either minimally relax the examiningcriteria to give the disadvantaged a fighting edge over merit candi-dates or to create special facilities for their self improvement at

primary and secondary levels. By leaving even the conceptual foun-dations of reservations under Article 15(4) and Article 16(4) unclear,

the Supreme Court has left many options open and invited litigationon the application of the principles flowing from the Mandal jtdge-ment on employment questions to other areas.

Without getting into too many finite distinctions, one importantIndian aspect of preferential public employment cannot be over-


looked. Govemment jobs in India have a special status. In order toensure the independence of the civil service, the Constitution con-tains various protections for govemment employees in the mat[er oftheir dismissal, removal or rcduction in rank.as Since any action takenagainst public employees is a function of the government, all suchactions are liable to be tested against the fundamental rights chapterand set aside ifthey are arbitrary or unreasonable. But these layers ofconstitutional protection-and all the litigation that they have givenrise to-are expressions of the importance of the status attached togovernment jobs and nc: the reason for it. Apart from the importanceattached to the 'job' security of state employment, a social andcultural importance is attached to government jobs in India at alllevels-be they ever so low. The IAS (Indian Administrative Ser-vice) and the other services carry a special significance in the matri-monial market which is eclipsed only (even if that) by the importanceof well-off business and industrial families and groups. With thegrowth of private s€ctor, the eclipse is gathering ground, but notsufficiently to take away the social shine from the status of civilservants and bureaucrats. After Independence, India's massive regu-latory economy made bureaucracy extremely powerful because thelatter was the custodian of the power exercised by the Indian State. Ina 'license' Raj in which permits and permissions arc required forvirtually everything, govemment servants soon became possessed ofthe kind of absolute power that corupts absolutely.

But, quite apart from the dividends that would flow from powercorrupting itself, there is no denying that the formal power of theState in India is visibly exercised by politicians and administrators. Itis in this sense that the present writer successfully argued before theSupreme Court in the Mandal case that job reserving for the SC, STand OBCs were an instrument for their empowerment in order toenable them to share the power of the State.$ The form in which thissubmission was made found favour with the majority judgement ofthe Court. To a cynic, it may seem that the Indian State was up forgrabs and any reservation programme was no more than an unscrupu-lous conspiracy to capture as much of it as possible. Such a cynicalreading ignores the social reality that certain castes, groups and

communities had not only been systematically excluded from sharingboth social power and the power of the State by a combination of

The Supreme Court as problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 277

sustained discrimination and deprivation, but were likely to be soexcluded for many years to come. The reservation p.og.u*rn" *ur,thus, not just a vehicle to achieve ,*Af ,oUlity;.but, no less, anexercise in egalitarian democracy enabling the .have nots, to sharepower with the ,haves'. It is these normati;e urp".u of rrc constitu_tional scheme rhat seem to have been dr"*;.;1;;;robsrs of theelite resisting an assault on their priuileges.

- -' *-,During the fifties and sixties, the fun'damental fallacy in the ap_proach of the courts_led by the Suprem" Coun_*u. a steadfast

yl.usal 1o

give due importance to the ieleological aims of the Consti_tution. Faced with a massive litigation "r;i;;';;"r,rs, rhe su_preme court silenced appeals to social justice .onoin"o in the Direc_tive Principles of State policy on a format Ufu"t_iJt". .."Aing of theconstitutional text that such principles were ..not eiiorceable by any

"oy.Ij"]"n though) . . . fundamenial in the governan-ce of the coun_try".i? Thi: had,its impact on rhe inrerprjation oi irre .equality,mandate of the Constitution. In the very first ,"r"*utlon, aur" in195148, the Court made it clear rr,r uair..tiu.l.in.iiiJUurra upp"ufto

interpr.et the reasonably clear provisions O"aIng *itfr equality wasnot permissible . By 1962, when the Supreme c""n *", consideringthe applicability of reservarions to promoti;;;;';;"n throughboth Justice Gajendragadkar and Justice Wanchoo ui"r1o trc p."f"._ential employment provisions a s exceptions to the equality provisionsand nor as a parr of them.ae Once the ,.r.*u,io;;;;;ramme wasrelegated to the status of an

rost-itsentitrem;;;;;;##;"":"Jr".r"il:'Jtiilil,l.iiir,;llquest for real equality. This was f"rtt

". ;urtin"O -io'

U" fu*ou,Mysore case ( 1963) on the consequentialist iasis that

"(t)he demand for technicians. scientists, doctors, economists,engineers and experts for the economic advancern# of the coun_try is so great that it would cause great pr.:rOl." to nationalinteresrs if considerations of merit-aie "o;;;;.il""tuded bywholesale reservations of seats in all technical, _Ji*f and engi_neering colleges or institutions of that kind,,.sd

----

Put in this form, the dilemmas inherent in the compensation discrimi_nation programme were highly exagger"t"d. d;-;;;;ramme (as

The Politics of B ackwardnes s278

manifest in the reservation of seats in professional education or posts

in qovemment employment.l was' thus' seen as not only against the

p,i";;;ffi;'iilq""ritv which was perceived. as being con-

i"t".i*itt.,i"t, but aiso inimical to the overall national interest' It

was not the case that the Court took the view that the Constitution did

not empower such "reservations" of seats and posts' Much rather' it

even conceded that "reservationJ' were available also for promo-

donal posts.sl But, it seemed to take the view that although such

"reservations" could be made, they were-ty and large-against the

gtJrn "iii" p""ciple of equalityio which they were an exception:

ini *.t" further a-threat to the national inrcrest'

The fundamental fallacy in emphasizing one aspect of the equality

.unJu* in*-oiscriminaiion on grounds of merit) and ignoring the

substantive and remedial utf""t li"Aing w-ith redrlsinc the inequi

ties of cumulatively sedimented social disadvantage) was highlighted

ily l"ui* S"UUa Rao in a 1964 case in a powerful passage:

"Article 14 lays down the general rule of equality' Article 16 is

an instance of the applicatiin of the general rule with special

reference to opportunity of appointments under the State' It says

ii.iit "t .rt"ri te

"qo"tity or opportunity for all citizens in matters

relating to "mployment

t' oppointt"nt to *.L:ll"t under the

State. If it stood alone, all the backward communities would go to

the wall in a society of uneven basic social structure; the said rule

oi equafity would remain only an utopian conception' unless a

practical content was tiven to it' Its itrict enforcement brings

about the very situationit seeks to avoid. To make my point clear'

iJ" o" ilfoutution of a horse race' Two horses arsset down to run

a race-one is a first class race horse and the -other

an ordinary

one. Both are made to run from the same starting point' Though

theoretically they are given equal opporrunity torun the race' in

;;;;; ordinary io's" is-not given an equal opportunitv to

compete with the race horse' Indeed' that is denied to it' So a

;;;ii;"p may be iiven either in the nature of extra weight or a

start from a longer distance' By doing so' what rvould otherwise

have been u tu'"t of u totpetition would be made a real one' The

same difficulty had confronted the makers of the Constitution at

the time it was maOe' -Centuries

of calculated oppression and

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 27g

habitual submission reduced a considerable section of our com_munity to a life of serfdom. It would be well nigh impossible toraise their standards if the doctrine of equal opportunity wasstrictly enforced in their case. They would not have any chance ifthey were made to enter the open field of competition withoutadvertitious side till such time when they could stand on their ownlegs. That is why the makers of the Constitution introduced cl.(4)in Article 16. The expression .,nothing in this article', is a legisla-tive device to express its intention in a most emphatic way thit thepower confened thereunder is not limited in any way by the rriainprovision that falls outside it. It has not really carved out anexception, but has preserved a power untremelled by the otherprovisions of the Article."52

However, despite the lucidity of this explanation, the emphasis on theanti-meritorian principle and the ideological resistance to using casteas a criterion for identifying backwardness continued with a desreeof uniform ambiguity. The judgements went out of their way to mlakeit clear that the compensation discrimination programme was anexception to equality and not a fulfilment of it, confening no morethan a discretionary power in the State.

The truth is that till the end ofthe sixties, the socialjustice aims ofthe Constitution (whether contained in its preamble, the DirectivePrinciples or the chapter on Fundamental Rights) were not given theconstitutional weight they deserved. This recognition came slowly asjudges came to talk of the pivotal importance of the Directive prin_ciples. In the famous Fundanental Rights Case (1g73)s3 due impor_tance was given to the broad commitment of democratic iustice in thePreamble to the Constitution which-despite its unabashldly rhetori_cal tone--did, after all, reflect the Objectives Resolution of 22 lanu_uy 1947, passed by the Constituent Assembly after so much unex_pected discussion.sa In this case-which represents a turning point inIndia's constitutional history in more wayJ than one_all tt

" iuOg",

werc agrced as to the importance of a truly egalitarian society.sl Lateron, when Justice Krishna Iyer reflected on the importance of this seachange in the Supreme Court's approach, he felt that the Fundamen-tal Rights case (1923) '.had clinched the issue of primacy between. . . Fundamental Rights and Directive principles . . ., neither part


being superior".s6 Over the years' the social justice- texts began to

guiOi the interpretation of fundamental rights which had' hitherto'

foncemed themselves much more with individual claims rather than

in. UrouA"t conspectus of social justice within which they had to be

understood and interpreted.

It was in the famous Thomas casesT that the basis of this funda-

mental fallacy about the substantive aims of equality was examined

and found wanting. We are not concerned with the issues in the case

concerning the relaxation on certain criteria for reserved SC cand!

dates. Theimajority took the view that "special provisions ' ' ' for the

advancement tf backward classes and reservations of appointments

and posts for them to secure adequate represen'."d?1 :; t brile oyt fe

conient of equality guaranteed (by the Constitution)"'s8 Another judge

exhorted: "ti*" ari to achieve equality' we can never afford to relax';wrtif" in"qourity is easy, since itdemands no more than to float with

tfr" "orrtnt,

equality is Oimcut for it involves swimming against

it'."se As if to underscore the parameters of the reversal' Justice

iisf,na Iyer emphasized that "(rFservation based on classification

.f tt t*itq and^forward classes without detriment to adminisrative

standards . . . is but an application of the principle of equality"' For

fri- "t"l clear vision oi the true intendment of these provisions

O"*onOt u O""p understanding of the Indian spiritual secular idea that

ilt"-y dwells in all and that ancient environmental pollution and

,o"iuf pfu..."nt, which the State must extirpate' account for the

"orrent .ocio-economic backwardness of the blacked out human

areas . . ."e All this did not silence the narrow view of equality being

.unuurr"a by some of the judges who found refuge in the earlier

jurisprudence to take a mu"h rnot" formal view of equality' To them

it" 'l.r"ution of classes for favoured and preferential treatment for

poifi. ".pfoy."nt

(would) ' ' ' erode the concept of equality of

ipp"n*iiy for all citizens in matters relating to the employm€nt

under the State".6l

But once the Thomas case (1976) had successively shifted the

Uatance of focus by which the equality mandate was to be under:

,iooO,joOg"t like Iirishna Iyer lost no time in seeking recourse to the

ino^i, titing to emphasize that "equality clalses in our constitu-

iionat etttic trive an equalizing ttttug" and egalitarian meaning"'62

Tho^o, *a, con""m"d with SC' But' Iustice Krishna Iyer went out

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy Zgl

of his way to state that

"But the core reasoning has crucial significance in all cases ofprotective discrimination. The process of equalisation and benigndiscrimination are integral, and not antagonistic, to the principle ofequaliry. In a hierarchical society with an indelible feudal stampand incurable actual inequality, it is sophistry to argue that pro_gressive merBures to eliminate group disabilities and promotecollective equality are anathema on the score that every individualhas entitlement on pure merit of makers. This nanow .unsocial,

pedantry subverts the seminal essence of equal opportunity evenfor those who are humble and handicapped. Meriiocracy, cannordisplace equality when the utterly backward masses labour undergroup disabilities. So we may weave those special facilities intothe web of equality which, in an equitable setiing, provide for theweak and promote their levelling up so that, in tni tong run, thecommunity at large may enjoy a general measure of real equalopportunity. So we hold, even apart from Article l5(3) and (4) thatequality is not negated or neglected where special provisions aregeared to the larger goal ofthe disabled getting over their disable_ment consistently with the general good and individual merit.Indeed, Article 14 implies all this, in its wider connotation. andhas to inform the interpretation of Article 15."63

Iustice Krishna lyer's view found support from various colleagueswho stressed the importance of State action being directed to ensur_.ing that "under-privileged, the deprived and exploited are . . . pro-tected and nourished so as to take their place in an egalitarian soci-

:ry", :9 that "equality of opportunity', musr be ,u"h u. ro yield to"equality of results" .".6a The argument was not that ,,public

employment may be treated as a new form of private property-_because there was a danger that the reservatirons programme beviewed in that light.6s Much rather, it was because the Indian Statehad an overall remedial commitment to uplift the OBCs from themarginalised predicament into which their future had been rnsensi_tively mortgaged and from which they were unlikely to emerge in thenear future without the help of a comprehensive compensatorv dis_criminatory programme.


There is one other constitutional aspect that merits examination'

Even under the general doctrine of equality, there is a broad principle

that the State may classify persons into various categories and ear-

mark tle various categories for differential treatment' Recognising

difference is not, by itself, conuary to equality' Accordingly' the

doctrine of classification permits classification which is founded on

rational criteria which bears a nexus or relationship with the purpose

for, and in the context of which, the classification was made' If no

classifications were made, the cause of equality would suffer' No

doubtJusticeSubbaRao'swarningthatthedoctrineofclassificationshouldnotbecomeasubstituteforequalityitselfneedstobeborneinmind.6 But, for our present purposes, it is important to stress that no

one has ever proteited where preferential admissions have been

given to parti;hr classes of persons irrespective of-merit and not-

iuitttrt-&ng the fact that the class so earmarked for preferential

treatment his not been a disadvantaged class' Under the not so well

known doctrine of'source', admissions to tertiary and even profes-

sional education have been permitted to classes like sportsperson'

children of freedom fighters' children 'of India's diplomats abroad'

children of foreigners from certain countries and so on'67 If reserva-

tionscanbemadeonthebasisofarationalclassificationinfavourofotherwise privileged persons' the case for reservations for the disad-

vantaged can hardly be without egalitarian merit' Such reservations

are mentioned only to emphasize that apart from the compensatory

discrimination programme there are various other kinds of reserva-

tions which also eat intG-but have not been regarded as an impedi-

ment to-the narrow concepts of a merit based equality' This also

demonstrates that the prejudice against caste based compensatory

discrimination may be founded more on social prejudice and less on

intimations of the public interest to which appeals have been made'

This prejudice is demonstrated by the fact that the concept of a

"creamy layer" (denying the benefit of reservations to the truly better

off amongst the disadvantaged) has been imposed on the OBC reser-

vation but not on reservations either under the doctrine of source or

res€rvations for the SC and 5T.68

Animated by the personality of individual judges constitutional

theory has to keep pace with political crisis. Unfortunately' accounts

of thi Supreme Court's jurisprudence on compensatory discrimina-

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2gj

tion have tended to be 'a-historical' , treating the whole period of itsdevelopment en bloc without recognising the social and politicalnuances that gave rise to thejuristic change ofheart.6e Since the formin which law is practised is declaratory in nature, the historical-asopposed to the factual---4ontext within which the decision occurredis often flattened out of the discourse. Of course, lawyers and judgesplaying around with precedents are aware of the circumstances inwhich precedents are born-no less the tussles in court and theambitions and personality of the judges that dominate the creation ofconstitutional jurisprudence. However much one would like to be-lieve that judicial decision making is preconceivedly bounded by thecast iron constraints of the rule of law, the truth runs much further andgoes well beyond this declaratory assertion. euite apart from the vastdiscretions which the 'law' itself concedes to the judges and theexpectation judges will decide on neutral and principled grounds,Tothe internal politics of a Court and the extemal circumstances inwhich it is situated and to which it responds play a pivotal role.?rWhen judges (especially those of the higher judiciary) decide, theyare both policy makers and legislators. That they err on the side ofcaution and hide behind the mysticism of legal argument in articulat-ing their power is inevitable. Many judges stay within rhe confines ofthe received arguments within the law because of their personality,their conservative perception of their own role and their belief thattheir overall function is to decide and, perhaps, warn, but not inno-vate. Yet, even such conservatism must not be tom out of its contextai a mere personality trait. As experienced actors in a complexpolitical economy, the judges-more than anyone else-know thevalue of the stakes involved in any legal argument, not just for thelitigants but also the class and other interests which are visibly andinvisibly also before the Court.72 The Court does not just confrontpublic discourse with its judicial wisdom. In most cases, it workswith government to resolve issues, sometimes taking the lead andsometimes embarrassing the government into constructive response.There are more than occasional failures in this equation of under-standings. Invariably, the govemment, using its power to appointjudges, seeks to insure itself against unexpected risks. But, even thegovemment is aware that a wholly captive judiciary will lack thecredibility that gives legitimacy to the constitutional enterprise as a


whole.It is in this context that we have to view the interplay between the

judiciary, and the Union Pnd state govemments over the finite edges

of the jurisprudence of 'reservation'. Even though the 'Congress'

Union Government in the fifties and sixties had taken the ideological

stance that reservations should not really extend beyond the SC and

ST to extend to caste based OBCs because this was inconsistent with

the goal of a casteless society, the Congress state governments of the

South, animated by powerful anti-Brahmin sentiments' had plans oftheir own. While the Supreme Ccurt in 1951 had no difficulty inknocking out generally communal reservations, it failed to give cre-

dence to the historicity of the claim of a large number of caste

communities who had been systematically deprived of access to

wealth, power, status and opportunity and who were determined by

the sheer dint of their numbers to stake their claims through the new

democratic process. Both electorally and otherwise, no govemment

could ignore their claim or 'rubbish' it as unreasonable. The histori-

cal facts were incontrovertible; and the demands that flowed from

these facts more than insistent. It was typical of Nehru's policy to

wax eloquent in Delhi about a casteless society, but permit-forelectoral and otler reasons-the exploration of caste based reserva-

tions by Congress State govemments.T3 Nehru's party-as opposed

to his government-could have tried to resolve these controversies

by shessing the egalitarian and remedial nature of caste based reser-

vations and entering a caution against the political exacerbation ofthe issue beyond responsible proportions. But' the Congress chose

not to evolve a base-line of principles from which constructive think-

ing on this issue could commence. The Central Government bowed

out, leaving the Supreme Court to deal with the issue without being

unmindful of the ideological stance that Nehru and his government

had generally taken on this issue.

At the tum of the fifties, the Supreme Court was just coming out

of a major controversy with the govemment over land reform.Ta

Political distrust of the Court was slowly easing. A series of 'fair'non-political appointments to the Supreme Court (which are a credit

to Nehru's govemment), left the Court with an interestingly brilliantcrop ofjudges.?s In this scenario, it was Justice Gajendragadkar who

stepped forward to take charge of the situation in various areas of


contention where it was felt a stable jurisprudence was called for'

Gajendragadkar came to the court with an apparatus for Sanskrit

learning, a reputation in labour matters, a suave capacity for judicial

management, an affinity with the Nehru government views on secu-

larism and socialism and a fund of patience and energy. If anyone

could restore consensus to a divided court and tidy up the Court's

negative image, he was the judge to do it. We are not here concerned

with his contribution to labour law or issues concerning freedom of

religion and the numerous other matters on which he pronounced

with authority.?6 What is significant is that apart from the occasional

unimportant judgement, Justice Gajendragadkar somehow managed

never to be in dissent. He found the median point around which he

could build his consensus and if this meant a more enduring' albeit

eclectic jurisprudence, there were a thousand pragmatic reasons for

steering the middle path without giving the game away. His landmark

Mysore jldgement (1963)?7, set the tone for all the other judgements

on reservations that followed. Symbolically, it accepted the central

govemment's stance on caste based groups without foreclosing the

issue. Practically, it left the state govemments free to pursue their

policy of reservations but threatened future judicial interference ifthey went over the top (although it was not entirely clear what the top

was!). When his colleagues struck a slightly different note' he let

tlose comments sit on the record knowing that his 'constitution

bench' judgement could not be dislodged easily. He defended his

judicial approach as being consistent with the task of achieving

'social engineering through law'' For several years, the arguments on

reservations used his efforts as their starting point.?8

After the Congress split of 1969, the official testarnent of the

Union Government was a socialism in favour of the 'have nots"

Having won the 1971 war with Pakistan, the govemment came in

with a landslide victory. That was not enough'to sustain electoral

support. 'Underdog' socialism was presented as a reason for the

empowerment of the govemment against its opponents. The super-

session of the claims of three judges to be appointed Chief Justice ofIndia in 1973-(which was a needless and arbitrary act) did not add

to the government's reputation. The Emergency (1975-77) further

sullied that reputation.Te It was around this time that some judges

appointed in the seventies went about reconsffucting the jurispru-


dence of the Court. If the name of Justice Krishna Iyer comes tomind, it is because it is often eclipsed by reference to some of hiscolleagues who constituted a cabal which slowly but steadily re-wrote the socialist jurisprudence of the Court. This time the jurispru-dence of the Court was less concemed with the empowerment of thestate whose arbitrariness was itself sought to be disciplined by theCourt. Human rights and socialism were not treated as antithetical.soNor was 'human rights' a bourgeois concept, but one which could beused to protect ordinary people from the everyday atrocities thatplague their lives. Like Gajendragadkar, Krishna lyer, too, possessedmasterly skills. Like him he, too, had never ventured into dissent-using supportive judgements to advance his arguments and cause. Insuch exercises, issues do get fudged; and, they did at the hands ofJustice Krishna Iyer as well. To describe his judicial universe is totraverse vast intricate areas of decision making and judgement writ_ing.81 The Thomas case is not just his testament, but also the state-ment of the other judges. It constitutes a major, albeit symbolic, re-statement of the equality mandate. Reservations were not a necessaryevil and exception to the principles of equality but very much a partof them. Speaking for himself, Krishna lyer would not have gone toofar in favour of backward classes. His brief stopped with the protec-tion of SC and ST. For him the really disadvantaged were the un-touchables. They were a 'super classification' whom the Constitutionhad joined for special attention. Since Thomas was concerned withSC and with relaxation of criteria rather than reservations, he seizedthis opportunity to force the reinterpretation of the mandate of equal-ity itself.82 Once the juristic reversal was complete and the newhuman rights based socialism found its feet, he moved away from thecontroversy. Even after retirement when his voice was heard on somany issues from powerful national platforms he was relatively silenton the issue of reservations for OBCs and the Mandal controversiesof 1992 which tore India's politics apart in 1990. As his colleaguesconfronted these issues, they were aware that the reservations debatehad become stodgy and would need refinement. Krishna lyer,s en-dorsement of an American professor's insight that there was a .creamy

layer' among the OBCs which had been 'liberated' from disadvan-tage found independent endorsement from Justice Chinappa Reddyin 1985.83 The Court seemed to take the view reservations were an


acceptable part of equality- But the jurisprudence of the entire

progiu*. *ould need to be re-examined if it ever reached contro-

veJial levels again. Particular focus was diverted towards ensuring

that the prograrnme was not abused by being appropriated by the

'.r"u.y iuy"t' amongst the disadvantaged' No less troubling was the

maintenance of standards and the lengths to which the programme

would be allowed to go. As long as Pandora's box was not opened'

these issues jogged along under the scrutiny of the Courts' But' when

the lid was itu"g op"n, they unleashed controversies which became

sufficiently potiiicatty unmanageable for the govemment to off-load

the entire controversy on to the Supreme Court which was expected

to devise the final solution.

IV

B.P. Mandal, M.P., was destined to be more famous than anyone ever

imagined he would be. Whether it was in quest of a vote bank or

socii justice, the Janata Manifesto of 19?7 made it clear that it would

implement the now forgotten Kalelkar Commission of 1955' make

reservations betw een 25-33Vo for government service jobs and "for-

mulate a special programme within the framework of the five year

plans for the substantial advancement of the scheduled caste and

trites ana other . ' . backward classes ' ' ' provide adequate funds for

the purpose . . . (and set up) special machinery ' ' ' to implement the

pro!ra*-" and assure fulfilment of the relevant constitutional guar-

antees".* A large number of States had evolved their own compen-

satory discrimination. The arguments of principle lay buried' perhaps

on"oioforr"bly so. But, what was at issue and what had eluded the

reservationisti was the inclusion of prognmmes of preferential em-

ployment in the Central government. This was the prized service-

ailegedfy the real home of the administrative power of the Indian

statJ. Ai officer level, only a handful of jobs were affected' At lower

levels, there were a great deal more. But' the handful of jobs that were

at stake were the ones that were regarded as the cream of the civil

service-jobs for which many werc willing to paYe away their lives'

To go back and use the Kalelkar lists of 1955 simply did not make

,"nJ". So, u n"* Commission was appointed under the Chairmanship

of B-P. Mandal:


"(i) to determine the criteria for defining the socially and edu_cationally backward classes;

(ri) to recomrrrcnd steps to be taken for the advancement of thesocially and educationally backward classes of citizens so identi_fied:

(irr) to examine the desirability or otherwise of making provi_sion for tle reservation of appointments or posts in favour of suchbackward classes ofcitizens which are not idequately representedin public services and posts in connection witi the affairs of theUnion or of any State; and

(iu) prcsent to the president a rcport setting out the facts asfound by them and making such recommendations as they thinkproper."

The Commission was empowered to

"(a) obtain such information as th'ey may consider necessary orrelevant for their purpose in such form and such manner as thevmay think appropriate, from the Central Govemment, the StateGovemrnent, the Union Territory Administrations and such otherauthorities, organisations or individuals as may in the opinion ofthe Commission, be of assistance to them; and

(D) hold their sittings or the sittings of such sub_committees asthey may appoint from amongst their own members at such timesand such places as may be determined by, or under the authoritv ofthe Chairman."8s -

The Commission had the usual power to obtain information andorganize its work and sittings as determined by the Chairman. Witht_r:l:"" extended by one year, the Commission rcported on 3l Dec.1980 rather than the sarne date in 1979. By thii time, the Janatagovernment had gone. The Congress governnrent, carrying the bag_gage of the past and unsure whether the Mandal report w:rs a gift ora liability, pleaded for more rime and consultation in l9g2 and madea weak promise to implement Mandal in lgg3 as it transited closer tothe next general election.e

By late 1989, a new Janata govemment was sworn in. Its primeMinister, V.P. Singh, had resolved to impletrcnt MandaL Despite the


massivecriticismofthisdecision-bothatthetimeandafterthefallof the Singh govemrnent as a conse{luence of pursuing this policy-this decision was a canny decision-not half as foolish or foolhardy

as it is made out to be. Singh and his colleagues knew that there was

a tremendous discontent with caste dominated politics that had

emerged in the North of India which not only systematically ex-

cludeil certain backward castes from power' position, property and

politics but also maltreated the latter. One chapter of Mandal was

ievoted to the differences between the North and the South and drew

pointed anention to the absence of mass movements in UP and Bihar

io "urry

forward the cause of the backward castes against the "tradi

tions oi semi feudalism in UP and Bihar (whereby) the forward castes

. , . keep tight control over smaller backward castes and prevent(ed)

them fromJoining the mainstream backward classes movement"'87

The OBCs had notjust to be preferentially treated but also politically

mobilised. Electoral politics and social justice had found a powerful

meeting ground which would alter the very basis on which elections

would be-fought in the near futurc- Mandal was the means by which

the highly successful antihigher caste politics of the South was to be

ernutu:ted. What was being sought to be released was a new political

energy.To re-capitulate the events of 1990 is as unnecessary as rt rs

necessary to analyse them' Singh's fateful memorandum of 13 Au-

gust 199b was prefaced by a powerful statement in ?arliament' For

tirn n" *gontint of principle was already concluded- SC and ST

reservation-s existed. Self betterment schemes were not enough' It

was a question of empowerrnent.

"We consciously want to give them a position in the decision

making of the country, a share in the power sructurc ' ' ' Merely

makin! programmes of economic benefit for various sections of

society will not do . . . There is a very big forc,e in the argument to

involve the poorest in the power structute''a

He was conscious that "when changing the structure, there will be

resistance". We do not really have to go into grcat detail on the events

of August to October 1990 which led to chaos in Delhi as students

soughi to immolate themselves, protesting that Mandal was anti-


meritorian, ruinous, unfair, political, caste based and communal andwholly contrary to the public interest. The newspaperF-led by Shouriein the Indian Erpress-swung into action, pretending that what washappening was in fact, a popular revolt.se The newspapers carriedportentous stories that implementing Mandal would result in illiter-ates running the country and unqualified butchers becoming qualifiedsurgeons. Such portrayals were literally inflammatory. The argu-ments proceeded with guile and speed. The object was not to discussthe issue but to bring down Singh's govemment which-left toitself-was poised to alter the very basis on which the future ofelectoral North Indian politics was to be written. It was also clear thatin a short span of a few months, the Singh government had demon-strated an intent to fulfil their election promises on a number of issueswith speed. Given is uncertain party position in parliament, Singhcould have been defeated on the floor of the House. But. the otherparties did not want to be seen as paralysing parliarnent. They wantedthe issue out in the strcets in the form of a popular revolt to silenceJanata's ambitions once and for all, by depicting the latter as a partynot fit to govern.

For our present purposes, it is not necessary to do more thanhighlight some aspects of the controversy. In the first place, theargument about merit had little merit in it. The scare that was beinsparaded by way of incitemenr overlooked the simple truth that ttreiwerc 22Vo reservations in the Union Government for SC and ST. Allthe arguments pertaining to 'nrerit' applied equally to the SC and STreservations. But, no party or public person dared to speak too loudlyabout the SC and ST dispensation. Mandal would increase the per-centage to 2'l%o more.If that was the issue, it _was a far narrower issuethan the one that was being paraded for incitement. Second, therewere OBC programmes already in place in virtually every State up tothe permissible limits of 50% which had earlier been suggested bythe Supreme Court as a rule of thumb. So, what was at issue herewere a handful of officer class jobs in central Govemment withwhich the protesting middle class students were directly concemed.The issue of backward class reservations had been settled for allgovemments except the central govemment. All that was being doneby Mandal was to rcduce central govemment's resistance to accept-ing what was settled policy in every state of the Union. Third, the


entire campaign was politically inspired and for the sole political

purpose ofiringlng down the then lanata govemment'e0 This is self

eviient from the attitude of the other political parties whilst the

controversy was set alight on the streets of Delhi and elsewhere' Like

the dog in Sherlock Holmes's adventure of the Silver Blaze, it was

curious that the political parties said virtually nothing about their own

commitment to implementing Ma ndat while the controversy was still

raging. If contraryto their nature, they failed to bark, like Nero they

dJo cho.e to fiddle while Delhi and other cities were victims of

manipulated conflagration. There is one question which the other

political parties should have asked themselves and answered with the

direct honesty that it deserved while the Mandal controversy was at

its pitch and 6eing used as an instrument to bring down V'P' Singh's

Govemment. The question was : apart from minor adjustment to the

caste based lists approved by Mandal, would the other parties have

implemented Maiial to create OBC reservation for the Centre and

Union Territories; and, if so, whether they would do so to the same

extenr of 49Vo (including the 22Va for SC and ST)? The fact remains

that the major political parties-conscious that they were to fight an

election sotn-failed to ask and answer this question honestly for

fear that they might lose the OBC vote' Yet, in retrospect' the

position of iach one of the potitical parties was to support the'implemeniation

of Mandalbutto remain silent about it' In fact' when

the Congress came to power, they issued a further memorandum'

They noionly approved the 277o reservation ordainedby Man"dalbut

wentfurthertodetaill0%furthervacanciesfor..othereconomicallybackward sections of the people who are not covered by any of the

existing schemes of reservation"'er Consider the consequences if the

Congress had made this position clear in the August of 1990 when

the Mandal controversy erupted. This would have broken the con-

spiracy of silence and forced the other parties also to assume a clear

position on Mandal. The real failure of govemance was not Janata's

iecision to implement Mandal which, by itself, could have been

democratically discussed. The real failure was on the part of other

political parties who were determined to have the issue decided on

ihe streets. This colossal failure to countenance the most elementary

requirement of honesty put the then govemment to ransom' A matter

that could have been resolved by the parties tlemselves (since they


were all really ad idem on the issue of implementin g Mandat) wentto the Courts for solution, with Justice Ranganath Mishra (the presid_ingjudge in the initial stages) assuming a wait-and_see posture in thegranting of an interim injunction instead of taking a definite stance.The Mandal conroversy was politically engineered and contrivedinto fame.

,Plunged into controversy, the Mandal Report was nakedly pa_raded for scrutiny. Experts associated with it, disclaimed their ap_proval. Sociologists who had been waiting in the wings ro have theirsay joined the chorus.e2 Every aspect of the Report was attacked.Unlike the Kalelkar Commission, what Man dal uted to do was stressthe need for empirical data while emphasizing its paucity.e3 If casteswere a starting point, it was only natural to refer to the l93l censusafter which reference to caste was not available in any later census.Since the 1961 census contained information about various tribes, itwas used for that purpose.ea The Mandal Commission could notoverlook the fact that various state govemments had compiled lists ofOBCs which-along with the criteria they were based on_hud b""napproved by various High Court and Supreme Court judgements.But, it went one step further and conducted a survey with the adviceof a distinguished panel of experts. In 405 out of 406 districts evervhousehold in two villages and one urban block were surveyed and thedata analysed.es Even this was not regarded as definitive. Havingtoured the country and got .personal' impressions, various othergroups were also tested for backwardness. The test for backwardnesswas contained in an eleven point criterion:

"As a result of the above exercise, the Commission evolvedeleven 'Indicators' or 'criteria' for determining social and educa_tional backwardness. These I I .indicators' were grouped underthree broad heads, i.e., Social, Education and Economic. They are:

(A) Social(i) Castes/Classes considered as socially backward by oth_

ers.(ii) CasteVClasses which mainly depend on manual labour

for their livelihood.(iii) CasteVClasses where at least 25% females and 1096 males


above the state average get married at an age below 17years in rural areas and at least l0% females and SVo

males do so in urban areas.(tv) CasteVClasses where participation of females in work is

al least 25Eo above the State averase.

(B) Educational(v) Castes/Classes where the number of children in the age

group of 5- 15 years who never attended school is at least25Vo above the State average.

(vr) Castes/Classes where the rate of student drop-out in theage group of 5-15 years is at least 25Vo above the Stateaverage.

(vii) CasteVClasses amongst whom the proportion of ma-triculates is at least 25Vo below the State average.

(C) Economic(viii) CasteVClasses where the average value of family assets

is at least 25Vo below tle State average.(ix) Castes/Classes where the number of families living in

Kutcha houses is at least 25Va above the State average.(r) CasteVClasses where the source of drinking water is

beyond half a kilometre for more than 50Vo of the house-holds.

(xt) Castes/Classes where the number of households havingtaken consumption loan is at least 257o above the Stateaverage.

As the above three groups are not of equal importance for ourpurpose, separate weightage was given to 'Indicators' in eachgroup. All the social 'Indicators' were given a weightage of 3points each. Educational 'Indicators' a weightage of 2 points eachand Economic 'Indicators' a weightage of one point each. Eco-nomic, in addition to Social and Educational Indicators, wereconsidered important as they directly flowed from social andeducational backwardness. This also helped ro highlight rhe lactsthat socially and educationally backward classes are economicallybackward also.

294 The Politics of Bachuardness

It will be seen that from the values given to each Indicator, the

total score adds up lo 22. All these l l Indicators were applied to

all the castes covered by the survey for a particular State' As a

result of this application, all castes which had a score of 507o

(i.e.,ll points) or above were listed as socially and educationally

backward and the rest were treated as 'advanced'. (It is a sheer

coincidence that the number of indicators and minimum point

score for backwardness, both happen to be eleven.) Further, in

case the number of households covered by the survey for any

particular caste were below 20, it was left out of consideration, as

ihe sample was considered too small for any dependable infer-

ence.""In the end it may be emphasised that this survey has no

pretensions to being a piece of academic research' It has been

conducted by the administrative machinery of the Government

and used as a rough and ready tool for evolving a set of simple

criteria for identifying social and educational backwardness'

Throughout this survey our approach has been conditioned by

practical considerations, realities of field conditions, constraints ofiesou.ces and trained manpower and paucity of time' All these

factors obviously militate against the requirements of technically

sophisticated and academically satisfying operation."e6

The 'social indicators' were weighted at 3 points each' the educa-

tional at 2 and the economic at l. Having identified the groups

(including caste and other occupational group), it was unable to get a

fix on the exact number of OBCs since no head count had been done'

On the basis of the 1931 census, it made a guess that after excluding

the forward classes and assuming a uniform rate of demographic

growth for all, the OBCs were approximately 527o. Although the use

of 50 year old data and the crude method of calculation have been

criticised, not too much turns on the figure of 52Vo- In line with

Supreme Court judgements that the overall reservation should not

exceed 5O%, the Commission did not rely on its own guess to

propose a further 52Vo reservation but chose to propose 27Vo as

sufficient to provide the compensatory equity that would tilt the

balance in favour of OBC empowerment. Given the nature of the task

and the experience of the Commissions appointed by various states'


the Mandal Commission had done well. The only real attack on it wasthe old ideological attack that it entrenched caste, took reservations tothe farthest limits of around 50% and failed to isolate the creamylayer.

The Government Memorandum of 13 August 1990 was to beprospectively applied from 7 August 1990, with 27Vo OBC reserva-tions excluding all those OBCs who had been selected on meritanyway and giving preference to those OBCs who were in the liststhat were cofilmon to Mandal and the State.eT Wlen the Congresscame in with the experience of a post-Mandal election behind them,they did not, in their Memorandum of 25 September 1991, alter the27 Vo but created a further sub-section-not of the creamv laver but ofthe 'more backward' comprising of the .poorer' sections of ihe OBCswho would be given a preferential edge over the mainstream OBCs.They also added a further residuary 10Zo of .economically' backwardnot covered by the list of OBCs.e8 The extra l0qo took the totalreservation over the 5OVo level, perhaps deliberately to tempt consti-tutional providence. The distinction between the .more backward'and the 'backward' was an interesting political gimmick (even if thedistinction could be constitutionally justified), because the memoran_dum evolved no method of determining who the more backwardwould be; and, merely, promised that a separate list would be issuedseparately. The Congress's attempt to appear different_and justifyits earlier silence-floundered for content. The matter was literallydumped before the Supreme Court which, in turn, constituted a ninejudge bench partly to enable a safety of numbers; and, partly to giveitself the leeway to reassess the entire issue without being hinderedby earlier Constitution benches which had authoritatively quelledprevious controversies.

Since emotions and politics had been charged in exaggeratedproportions, the circumstances under which the Ma ndal case came tobe argued were necessarily dramatic. To the imposing presence ofnine judges were added a battery of lawyers.ee What may have addedto the drama was the unlikely figure of Ram Jethmalani, (who isusually associated with the causes of well-off accused and detenus),defending Mandnl with zest. With this kind of Bench, the judgeswere in the commanding position of re-inventing the entire jurispru-dence on reservations. Conscious that they were ,.sitting in a larger

296 The Politics of Bachttardness

bench", they "kept in mind the relevance and significance of the

principle oi ttorc decisis (not disturbing a previous decision) ' ' '

unless, of course, there (were) . . ' compelling and strong reasons to

depart from it."rm Yet thb Bench split into a majorily consisting of

Justice Jeewan Reddy (writing for Kania C'J, and Venkatachaliah'

Ahmadi and himselfl and Sawant J writing for himself and a minority

consisting of lustices Thommen, Kuldip Singh and Sahai---+ach

writing their own judgements.lor Justice Pandian's judgement was

*o.. -*ith the majority although he differed with them on crucial

questions by taking a stance against the exclusion of the creamy

luy.r, on giving preference to the more backward on the basis of

economic means tests and on rigidly holding on to the 507o ceiling on

reservations inespective of taking into account the adequacy of rep-

resentation.lo2 The differences between the majority and minority

were principally on the importance which the latter attached to merit

and to using the economic criteria to identiS backwardness'

The Court began by posing 8 issues to itself' These were:

(i) Whether Article 16(4) is an exception to Article 16(1) and

would be exhaustive of the right to reservation to posts in services

under the State?

(it) What would be the content of the phrase 'Backward Class' in

Article 16(4) of the Constitution and whether caste by itself could

constitute a class and whether economic criterion by itself could

identify a class for Article 16(4) and whether Backward Classes in

Article 16(4) would include the Article 46 as well?

(iii) If economic criterion by itself could not constitute a Back-

ward Class under Article 16(4) whether reservation of posts in ser-

vices under the State based exclusively on economic criteria would

be covered by Article 16(1) of the Constitution?

(iv) Can the extent of reservation to posts in the services under the

State under Article 16(4) or, if permitted under Article 16(l) and

16(4) tosether, exceed 5O7a of the posts in a cadre or service under

the State-or exceed 56Vo of the appointments in a cadre or service in

any particular year and can such extent of reservation be determined

wiihbut determining the inadequacy of representation of each class in

the di'fferent categories and grades of services under the State?

(v) Does Article 16(4) permit the classification of 'Backward

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2g7

Classes' into Backward Classes and Most Backward Classes orpermit classification among them based on economic or other consid_erations?

(vi) Would making "any provision" under Article 16(4) for reser_vation "by the State" necessarily have ro be by law made by thelegislatures of the State or by law made by parliament? Or could suchprovisions be made by an executive order?

(vi;) Will the extent of judiciat review be limited or restricted inregard to the identification of Backward Classes and the percentageof reservations made for such classes, to a demonstrably perverieidentifi cation or a demonstrably unreasonable percentage?

(viii) Would reservarion of appointments oi posts .in favour ofany Backward Class" be restricted to the initial appointment to thepost or would it extend to promotions as well?

. Th9^1e were re-cast by Justice Jeewan Reddy into 10 sets of ques-tions.r03 It is not necessary to analyse the response to all of them butonly identify the core issues that were important both to publicdiscourse and which occasioned differences amongst thejudges them_selves.

- Thefrsr preliminary quesrion was much too easily disposed of. It

related to whetherthe government could simply by executive orderlaunch on such an extensive and controversiil .t ung.. The answerthat, in the absence of rules (which, too, could be promulgated by thegovemment), the government could introduce reservations on itsmere ipse drxir is far from satisfactory. No doubt, in service jurispru_dence, the govemment could determine the contractual terms onwhich it was going to recruit its civil seryants and deal with theirconditions of service as long as such terms did not offend the Consti_tution. Yet, it is necessary to record the discomfiture ofJustice Sahai:

"Reservation by executive order may not be invalid but since itwas being made for the first time in services under the Union,propriety demanded that it should have been laid before parlia_ment not only to lay down (a) healthy convention but also toconsider the change in social, economic and political conditions inthe country as nearly ten years had elapsed from the date of thesubmission of the Report, a period considered sufficient for evalu_

2g8 The Politics of Backwardness

ation if the reservation should be continued or not'"ro4

The argument of the majority tlat insistence that reservations should

te proiideO ty tarliament would disable local bodies from introduc-

inj ro.tt progr*", does not seem convincing''* we were con-

ceined here with the national civil service who were given special

protection by the Constitution-a policy that could well have been

chall"nged on grounds of violation of fundamental rights' Indeed' an

old ruling of 1t5516, in another context, had warned that the 'execu-

tive' poier could be used to fashion policy but not to interfere with

p"opl"', rights. Schemes involving reservation for the.civil service

rfroofO U" Jonceived and evolved on a statutory basis because they

involve more than a simple condition of service' If they are not

declared by law and Eimply left to the ipse dixit of the.govemment

without any parliamentary oversight' the important policies that un-

derlie thern -..

n"n.t subjected to democratic scrutiny' Once the

government has gone through the exercise of appointing a Commis-

iion and making responsible statements in Parliament, later govern-

ments should h;ve either implemented the recommendations by leg-

islation; or at least,-as Justice Sahai put it-taken Parliament into

confidence. No doubt, to deny the govemment the power to make

day-to-day rules without parliamentary apgrolral may bring both

executivelovemment and Parliameni to a halt' But we are concerned

here with -a

major policy issue. Parliament should have been the

major testing ground fot the nalidity of such a policy' V'P' Singh had

maie the relevant statement to Parliament' But' then' Parliament

abdicated the issue to politically manipulated mob protests' Had

Parliamentexaminedtheissueandvotedonitateachstage'eachpolitical party-indeed, each member-would have had to take a

,t-d on ihir-itsue. This would have pr€vented politicians standing

by and gleefully watching the fun as they watched V'P' Singh's

gou.-ni.o* to a halt and crumble' The reason underlying the

irt" ttt"t executive orders without legislative backing cannot alter

peopte's rights is founded on the sound assumption that questions

ionceming-suctr righs must be routed through Parliament and deter-

mined by Law. The procedure approved by the C,orrrt renders Parlia-

ment entirely powerless on this major issue' If no legislation is

lquired, the nttification becomes prima facie unassailable' Even

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 2gg

parliamentary disapproval would not be enough to dislodge it or thegovemment making it. The purposes of democracy are ill_served ifParliament (and, therefore, the people) are kept outof the discussionto be confronted with a notiftcatory fait accompli.

_ Beyond the preliminary question as to how such policies should bedeclared lay the main question which goes to the hiart of the debate:Is the Constitution caste blind"ttot For a society to agree nor rodiscriminate on grounds of caste, colour or religion is unexceptional,but can any society be totally blind to the fact that discriminationstems from very deep rooted prejudices which the Constitution seeksto outlaw. The whole point of positive discrimination mandate is toempower-€ven mandate-the govemment to take steps to evolve aprogramme to combat the social circumstances whictr would eradi_cate the evils that flow from casteism, racism and bigotry. Americahas a serious problem of racism. Can the State in that country simplyignore what is happening in society on the basis that since the lawforbids the State to discriminate on grounds of race, it has no otherchoice but to do nothing for black people on the assumption that theConstitution forces the State to be .colour blind'. If thi agencies ofState in America were to assume total colour blindness in respect oftheir actions, they would, in fact, be perpetuating injustice of theworst possible kind and inviting riots and unrest. The simple injunc_tion of non-discrimination does not enjoin the State to be a spectatorto racism. If special protection has to be given to protect blacks fromrascist attacks, it is the duty of the State to provide this protection. Ifthe victims of racism require special schemes, the Stateiannot pleadcolour blindness and refuse such remedial justice. The constitutionalcommand not to discriminate falls miserably to the ground if endemicdisadvantage continues to be sustained in society. The injunctionagainst discrimination cannot apply to compensatory discrimination.If it did, the latter concept would be totally dissolved in a way thatwould endanger and mal-construct the concept of equality whlch isfundamental to the constitutionai enterprise as a whole. By its verynature, discrimination involves actions that are d irected work againitpersons who belong to the group or class against whom discrimina_tion is impermissible. A scheme that is discriminatory in favour ofsuch a person, group or class does not discriminate against them. Thefact that it may mal-effect others is precisely why such schemes are

300 The Politics of Baclatt ardne s s

subjected to tests of proportionality. But positive discrimination

schlmes, by virtue of being part of the mandate of equality' must be

liberally construed since they seek to achieve equality much in the

,.." *uy, just as anti-discrimination actions are harshly construed

since ttrey.perpetuate and promote the injustice of inequality' Equal-

ity is a compoiite social concept of pivotal constitutional significance

*A not iuti a black letter law rule to be applied mechanically' One

would h"ave thought that the one lesson to be leamt from American

jurisprudence is tie refusal of its Courts to accept that the American"Constitotion

is colour blind-even if the judges have wavered on the

extent and length to which schemes of compensatory discrimination

can go. Whatever the reservations of some American judges' the

ma.lo-rity in a 1990 caser08 insisted that "benign race-conscious mea-

surls mandated by Congress---+ven if those measures are not 'reme-

dial' in the sense of being designed to compensate victims of past

governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally per-

irissible to the extent that they serve important government objec-

tives . . .". It refused to accept that such programmes should suffer

strict scrutiny and be kept within narrow confines rather than be

allowed to flower with the flavour of the Constitution's comprehen-

sive egalitarian imagination' Perhaps, unnerved by the presence of

some -<lissent,

the Indian Supreme Court in Mandal----even after

Thomas-refused to accept the full value of the American precedent

after having been apprised of it thoroughly'r@ Instead it chose to

make the somewhat lame summary that in America "no single uni-

form pattem of thought can be discemed ' ' ' Ideas appear to be still

inevolution''.ll0Infact,onthebasicquestionof.colourblindness'American legal thought is reasonably uncompromiziag even if recent

judgements -suggest

a less full throated support of reservations in

higher education.The real argument was not about reservations and compensatory

discrimination being or not being a primary part of the principle of

equality (for only Justice Thommen saw the compensatory discrimi-

nation programme as an exception to equality rather than a part of

i,ttor"1 ir o-ver the permissibility of affirmative action' All the judges

*"r" in no doubt ihat affirmative action was a necessary and proper

part of the equality mandate. The majority linked affirmative action

ly ,nt S,u,. to the goals of the Directive Principles' going beyond a

The Supreme Couft as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 301

simple appeal to substantive equality.rrr The minority was a little less

exuberant. One of the minority judges frowned on the idea of job

reservations, preferring the creation of educational and other oppor-

tunities, with the added caveat that any measure must be narrowlytailored to achieve int€nded goals.rr2 The real debate was over whether

the use of 'caste' to identify 'beneficiaries' of compensatory dis-

crimination was part of a massive resurection of a caste ridden

society in which people would acquire a vested interest in sporting

caste identities, and with it caste biases, prejudices and enmities. IfJustices Gajendragadkar and Subba Rao had somewhat fudged thc

issue by suggesting that 'caste' could be a criterion but not necessar-

ily the only onerr3, later judgements in the late sixties had been less

equivocal and accepted that the term 'class' could be equated withcaste.rra If the wrong that was sought to be redressed was 'caste', how

could 'caste' be eliminated from defining the wrong which, itself,was perceived as being caste based? Thomas had closed the issue.r15

But the fact that a political wedge had been used to open Pandora's

box helped its juristic lid from being thrown open.

The majority judges very cautiously steered themselves out ofgetting bogged into the controversy over 'caste'. For them, such a

controversy was arid. It was a hangover from the past. By invokingAmbedkar for the view that backward classes "are nothing else but a

collection of certain castes", the majority dived for historical coverprecisely where they could find it because Ambedkar was both an

untouchable leader as well as the person entrusted with piloting

India's Constitution through the Assembly.r16 He was, thus, the oracle

on this question twice over. But having neutralized the controversy

by appealing to legislative intent, Justice Jeewan Reddy sought to

minimize the importance of 'caste' to the whole issue. For him the

identification of group was only a preliminary steprrT. A 'caste' was

not even a potential beneficiary until and unless it met the test of'backwardness'. As if to soften the blow, it was reiterated by way oflogical possibility that the preliminary identification need not be acaste group. There was a tendency on the part of a majority to take the

theoretical stance that a 'class' could mean anything--€ven a caste.

By accepting that the historical intent was to benefit caste groups but

the definitional sprawl encompassed others, the majority managed to

steer its way past the somewhat over-charged discussion over Mandal


entrenching a caste based society.rrE In a sense, there was nothingmore to say; and, much of it had been said before.

Yet, the harsh truth was that once Mandal was electorally appro-priated, it polarised politics along caste lines. There was no pointpretending that the identification of groups along caste lines waspurely 'preliminary' in nature; and the reality was fulfilling the test of'backwardness'. Justice Kuldip Singh expressed himself with hisusual candour by projecting the simple truth that Mandal and itsdiscontents showed that the caste system was "trying to raise its uglyhead in various forms".rre Justice Sahai, as was his wont, put hisfinger on the problem when he said: "The real issue is not reservationbut identification".r20 He was surely right in hinting that the debate onthe inclusion of 'caste' had prevented the Court from evolving a testto identify backwardness. For him although backwardness was notlimited to SC and ST, any OBC should have suffered from similardiscriminations and disadvantage.r2r If the majority were right andthe real issue was one of 'backwardness', its jurisprudence on thisvexed issue did not really travel too far. While Justice Kuldip Singheliminated 'caste' considerations from featuring in the test of back-wardness altogetherr22 and Justice Sahai refused to read backwardcaste as synonymous with backward classr23, Justice Thommen lookedfor secular criteria grounded in material circumstances so that thebenefits of reservation were extended to those who suffered as aconsequence of "segregation in slums and ghettos and afflicted bygrinding poverty, disease, ignorance, ill health and (being) hauntedby fear and anxiety".r2a All these were, in most cases, felt morepointedly by caste groups. Yet, for the minority, that was not thepoint. They wanted the Court to reassess its previous wisdom andlook at the matter afresh. It was not enough to leave these matters tothe executive. For them, it was for the Court to be a little moreforward in its definition bf 'backwardness'. The minority were rightto the extent that the majority had left things fuzzy on the issue ofcaste in a way that virtually all the pending uncertainties aboutbackwardness remained uncertain. When the dust has settled, peoplewill look in vain in the majority texts for a consistent and reliablemeaning of 'backwardness'. What the majority explicated did notadd fresh insights into our understanding of the compensatory dis-crimination programme. Confronted with the issue of caste, the ma-


joriry skilfully depicted it as unproblematic in theory and a mere

preliminary step in the identification of BCs in practice. But' the

majority did not venture further than that. It had solved its immediate

problem by conceming itself with the criterion and methodology

used by Mandal and concluded that it was not wanting. But, many

things were kept in the air. Should the backward classes be similar to

the SC and ST? Could there be future OBCs? What exactly were the

criteria to define OBCs if they were not just 'caste' and not just

poverty or economic deprivation? For the majority, this was for afuture Commission to decide. And if they got it wrong, there was

always judicial review !

Having accepted the argument of the reservationists in the context

of the political situation in which it surfaced, the majority did not

send away the meritocratists empty handed. There were several

important concessions that were made to the latter. One such concos-

sion was in response to the common sense intuition that the reserva-

tions were going to the wrong people. This did not necessarily arise

from either Ma ndal or the notification implementing it except to the

limited extent that the Congrcss notification entailed giving prefer-

ence to the "poorer sections" of the OBCs125. There was no doubt that

within every "clasJ', some would be less well off, others much better

off. The question was whether it was wise to devise criteria to give

preference within the class to the 'more backward' (M/BC). More

important, could these distinctions be taken to their logical limits so

that the 'more forward' amongst the BC who were alleged to consti-

tnte the 'creamy layer' of the OBCs De excluded from reservations

altogether2 Way back in 1963, Justice Gajendragadkar refused to

accept that the Constitution coantenanced breaking a class into 'back-

ward' and 'more backward'126. Years later, in 1985, Justice Chinappa

Reddy felt that such distinctions "would be necessary to help the

More Backward Classes, otherwise those . . . who might be a littlemore advanced . . . might walk away with all the seats".127 This

distinction would make no difference to the merit candidates who

were to be excluded anyway. If any thing, the argument was that the

potentially more meritorious amongst the OBCs should be excluded

because they belonged to a creamy layer amongst the OBCs and were

no longer OBCs. Nothing would be gained by the merit candidates

from such a distinction except the satisfaction (if it can be called that)

3M The politics of Baclcwarfurcss

of splitting the OBCs into rwo groups and depriving possibly the bestof them of rcservational benefits. What was not clear-and remainsunclear-is whether the purpose behind these distinaiow is to efiecta more equitable distribution of benefits or whether it was to excludesome persons altogether2 What may have been lost sight of was thepeculiar nature of the right involved. Although the right claimed wasby an 'individual', it arose out of belonging to a .group'. If the'group' as a whole transited out of 'backwardness', it would not beentitled to any preference at all.r28 But, was there really any scope formaking mini-distinctions? And, would such mini{istinctions be basedon individual characteristics? Or, would the endeavour be to identifva sub-group? Justice Pandian refused to be drawn into this contro-versy. It was not required for the purposes of the case.r2e While therewas some truth in the assertion that the crcamy layer may be usurpingreservations, but this was not to deny that they were members of thatbackward class. He felt that the fact some individuals were successstories neither affected the beneficiary status of that OBC nor occa-sioned the circumstances whercby some individuals were ..segre-

gated, picked up and thrown ovemight out of the arena of backwardclasses".r3o The answer lay in eliminating . pseudo communities whohave smuggled into rhe backward classes (being) . . . weeded outfrom the list of backward classes . . . by the Government on properverification"- 13r The learned judge was egainst these mini-classifica-tions. They were an invitation to trouble. Where the .creamy layer'was of significant proportions, the entire community could beredesignated and would cease to be OBC. The arguments over the'creamy layer' appear attractive, but are fundamentally flawed. Afamily does not cease to be a member of a group that is subject tocaste and other discrimination because, it had through sheer dint ofpersonal effort, achieved some professional or financial success. Thecreamy layer policy says to individual members of a class: ..Do welland your children will be penalized". The whole controveny over thecreamy layer may well be an attempt to penalize those who havemade a good effort to struggle against their inequitous condition. yet,the 'merit' lobby could not be sent back empty handed. The .crcamy

layer' solution was a response to the grouse (rather than a grievance)nursed by the merit candidates. The majority judgement of JusticeJeewan Reddy saw no impediment to creating the lower classifica_


tion of 'more backward classes', but refused to make such a classifi-

cation mandatory, but found fault with the ambiguous promise of the

Congress notification to threaten to create such a category withoutdevising the basis on which it was made.r32 However, the majorityclearly felt obliged to respond to the discontent which rumoured that

reservations werc going to the better off amongst the OBCs such as

children of parliamentarians, civil servants and the like. But, how

was this to be done? The majority accepted that reservations aimed at

group backwardness. They also agreed that no simple income test

could be used to sepuate the cream from the nflk.r33 Such a separa-

tion would necessarily be based on criteria as complex as those fordetermining backwardness. Financial success or income could never

be a test by itsef. It is precisely this controversy that was somewhat

perfunctorily disposed ofby a twojudge bench ofthe Supreme Court

which considered the Bihar and UP creamy layer schemesr33(u) whichhad created a 'thin' creamy layer designed to exclude only those who

were superlatively successful. Indeed, a 'thick' creamy layer to in-clude mere success stories would destroy the rcservation programme

and overlook the fact that the 'creamy layer' concept took away an

already accrued right. This could not be done lightly on the same

basis as the normal constitutional jurisprudence dispensation (based

on the doctrine of classification), invoked in respect of granting

privileges to distinct classes. In the Bihar-UP Creamy Layer case

judgement-Kuldip Singh J (one of the minority 'Mandal' judges)

and Justice Saghir Ahmad J.-the court simply accepted, that certain

classes of 'success stories were per se excluded without elucidating

the concept of'social advancement' which is crucial to defining the

creamy layer; and overlooking the fact that even if a 'success' story

person may have conquered his disadvantage he remains the victim

of discrimination. The 'creamy layer' judgement is unsatisfactory-if for no other reason because it is incomplete. Shocked by the

thinness of the Bihar-UP creamy layer, it missed a real opportunity to

found its decision on this vexed question on a sound juristic basis.

As if grappling with 'backwardness' was not difFrcult enough, the

Court invented a new but skewed and unlimited concept of'socialadvancement' to exclude those "whose advancement . . . renders

them misfits as backward classes".r3a Unlike the creation of 'more

backward classes' which was optional, the identification of the 'creamy


layer' was treated as compulsory, without which the govemment' s

reservation progran ne would, itself, not survive unless the govem-ment devised acceptable 'social advancement' criteria within fourmonths.r35 It would follow-although this was not expressly stated-that every OBC reservation scheme in the states or elsewhere wouldbecome otiose unless 'creamy layer' exclusions were incorporated inthe scheme. This put at risk all OBC reservations. Having done thisthe Court seems to have conceded the argument in principle byexplicitly stating that the 'creamy layer' exclusion would not apply toSC and ST candidates.ri6 If the Court was right in principle, there isno justification for not extending such exclusions to the SC and ST.What made the contradiction even glaring was the fact that most ofthe complaints about the 'cream' hi-jacking the benefits of reserva-tion werc in relation to the SC and ST. Both the form and content bywhich the majority defined the creamy layer was acceptable to theminority judges. However, they settled for simpler tests-such asmeans tests (Justice Thommen)r37, economic ceilings (Justice KuldipSingh)t3E, social status or economic affluence (Justice Sahai).r3e Suchsimpler tests were naturally more manageable. But mere income ormeans testing would result in arbitrary exclusions. Income windfallswould not by, themselves, eliminate backwardness. At the same time,more complex tests on which the constitutionality of the wholeprogramme depended, was inviting trouble. Justice Pandian wasright when he said that the "argument for the exclusion of the 'crcamylayer' on the face of it appears to be attractive and reasonable"r{ yet,it was over-simplified and, arbitrary, and concerned evolving criteriathat were possibly so complex that they were virtually unmanageableand ignored the very nature of the group rights on which the entireconcept of reservations was based. The majority's zealousness inpicking up this issue (when it did not warrant examination) was aconcession to the meritocrats without advancing the cause ofmeritocrats any further or benefitting their number.

This concessionary over-zealousness to the meritocrats manifesteditself in one other major controversy which was picked up gratu-itously without any relevance to the case. This concemed the main-tenance of "reservations" for promotions. The impugned notificationwas not concerned with promotional reservations but only initialdirect recruitment. But, reservations in matters of promotions was

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 3Oj

framed as an issue to be discussed and answered by the Court. Duringarguments, some counsel got the impression that the issue had beendropped.rarln fact, Justice Ahmadi specifically dissociated from themajority judgement on this aspect because it "did not arise for consid-eration and hence need not be answered".la2

The minority who-in any event-felt that the reservationsprogramme went over the top had little difficulty in supporting theelimination of promotions from the catchment of reservations. Agree-ing that it did not arise for consideration, they felt it was "too vital. . . to be overlooked"ra3 (Justice Thommen), "violative" of equal-ityraa (Justice Kuldip Singh) and defeated the "entire object of equal-ization'tas (Justice Sahai). Even Justice Pandian joined this aspect ofthe decision which permitted reservations in promotions to continuefor five years before the final discontinuance. ta6 The iustificationoffered by the majority was rhar the 9 judge Constitution bench wasconstituted, "to finally settle the legal position relating to reserva-dons"147 The Mandal case was the 'final look'. But, if that were thecase, why was not a final shape given to the criteria for backwardnessand social advancement? What the Court decided to do was toovemrle a long standing decision of 1962, the challenge to which wasrepelled in 1982.ra8 In the Mandal case, the Court ovemrled the 1962decision with prospective effect five years hence. Promotional reser-vations were also to be abolished for SC and STs (who were notbefore the Court) and not just the OBCs (who were before the Court).Here we see a marked-and unexplained---contrast with the 'creamylayer' exclusions which were applicable only to OBCs. Since bothwere decided ostensibly as issues of principle, there was no reasonfor treating the various backward classes differentially on issues asimportant as this unless one accepted Justice Krishna Iyer's view thatthe SC and ST were a group who were 'super-classified' by theConstitution itself for super preferential treatmentlae. And, if that wasthe underlying intuition for not applying the creamy layer exclusionto them, there were equally strong reasons for applying promotionalreservations to them even if they were not applicable to the OBCs.This is without prejudice to our argument that the Court should nothave pronounced on this issue at a1l. Both the creamy layer andpromotional reservations issues seemed to have entered the Mandaldiscourse as side issues to support the general argument that reserva-


tions were too extensive and overgenerous. The court appears to have

rushed into these issues, leaving behind a debris of unresolved politi-

cal and juristic questions. In May 1995' Parliament stepped in to use

its power to amend the Constitution to reverse the Mandal Judgement

on ih" irro" of promotion in so far as it affects the SC and ST'r50

Somewhere along the line, the majority seemed to have ceased to

discuss the issue on principle and concerned itself with the psychol-

ogy of those for and against such reservations' They felt that such

re-servations would "destroy the will to work, compete and excel" and

were "bound t(: generate a feeling of despondence and 'heart bum

ing' among members of the general non-reserved categories"' Con-

viiced thai this would happen, the 'birth mark' of reserved candi

dates was sought to be eliminated because it was felt that such birth

marks were "crutches" which neither blessed them that gave nor

those that received-apart from not being "in the interest of effi-

ciency (and) . . . not in the larger interest of the nation'"I50(") During

nrguments, the anti-reservationists had made much of the constitu-

tiJral provision that recommends that claims of the SC and ST shall

be considered "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of

administration".r5r There was no evidence whatsoever that 30 years

of promotional reservations had undermined efficiency' It was as-

sumed that this would instill 'heart bumifrg' in the general candidates

and induce a 'crutches' mentality in the reserved candidates' It has

already been stressed that no scheme of reservations sacrifices com-

petence, even though merit may be compromised to some extent' So'

th"r" *u. a bottom line on the extent to which efficiency would be

undermined. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically allowed relax-

ations and concessions from merit requirements to continue'rs2 Un-

fortunately, the Court lost sight of, and did not discuss the reasons for

which resirvations exist. Reservations become necessary because the

beneficiary class not only suffers from cumulative disadvantage but

also because they are likely targets for future discrimination' lf the

intuitions about 'heart buming' are important, there was no less a

resentment on the part of the BCs to whom prefereqtial access to the

really important posts and positions of power were denied' Reserva-

tions in piomotion guarded against future discrimination to important

posts rather than simply secured easy promotions' If such reserva-

iion. *"r" not made, the OBCs, SC and ST would be open to


precisely those prejudices and biases that had plagued them over timein trying to get "adequate representation,' in those areas (of promo-tional posts) where real power was exercised by senior officials. Onecannot help feeling that the Court's decision on promotions con-cerned itself more with the emotions Mandal had generated ratherthan with all the issues that should have been considered.

Ifconcessions to the merit candidates were in the air, there was, atleast, one more to come in the shape of the ceiling that could beimposed. Having treated reservations as part of the principle ofequality, the Court unanimcusly took the view that reservations madein the enabling provision (Article l5(4) and l6(4)) were .exhaustive'

of reservations and preferences for the OBCs.r53 If this was so,nothing tumed on the somewhat grander principled stance that reser-vations were part of equality and not an exception to it.lsa Oncereservations were confined within their own narrow sphere, the Court(with the exception of Justice pandian) took the view that the 5OVorule in educational institutions admissions should be applied also tojob reservations.r5s Unlike Justice Pandian who accepted the argu-ment that the test was 'adequacy of representation' in the services atthe given point in time under review; (and, therefore, leeway had tobe given to the administration to achieve adequate levels irrespectiveof any mechanically pre-ordained percentage test),rs6 the majoritytook the view that 'adequate representation' was not proportionalrepresentation. 15? The figure of SOVo was simply accepted whileleaving open the possibility that the rule may be transgressed afterexercising "extreme caution" in "extraordinary situations" wherepeople in remote are:rs have to .be brought into mainstream nationallife.t5E The 507o rule was not to be applied to the cadre as a whole, butonly to the year in question.rse This would place a .go-slow' on theprogramme as a whole especially because any carry forwards fromthe previous year would also have to meet the 5OVo tariff. 160

There were some concessions to the reservationists. The trst wasthat the tariff would apply to reservations proper and not to exemp_tions, concessions and relaxations which lowered the merit criterionand incrcased the competitiveness of the BCs.r6r The sec ond conces_sion was that the BCs selected by merit would not be included in thecomputation of the 5O% threshold of promissible reservations. How_ever, the pithy paragraph dealing with this concession did not clarifv


whether it was open to a govemment to fix a lesser quantum where

sufficient candidates got in on meritr62' The third corcession was to

treat reservations other than those of the BC (such as those of rela-

tively privileged persons under the doctrine of source) as a separate

compartmentJ63 However, there remains a question mark as to whether

tne sOEo rule would cover all reservations (in the wider sense as

including all persons or groups who are given a preference or prefer-

ential tre-atment) even though the Court did ambiguously declare that

it would not.r6a The reason for keeping BC (including SC and ST)

and other reservations separate was to ens'rre that BC reservations

were not conespondingly whittled downr65' But' what would happen

if the combined strength of BC and other reservations went greatly in

excess of 507o? The Court was also insufficiently rigorous on whether

theextranon.BCreservationswereconfinedtocategoriesofdisad.vantaged persons (for example, the handicapped) or whether they

could-atso be extended (as they had under the doctrine of source) to

the relatively privileged (such as those identified by the doctrine of

,oo.." u*, fo, "*a*ple'

children of diplomats abroad being reserved

educational seats and so on)?r6 Amidst this untidyness' the majority

did endeav-ur to do some tidying up'

Aware that lack of courage had made successive govemments

over the years-and even more so in the Mandal case-pass the

'buck' of deciding these very difficult questions on to the Court' the

judges found themselves dealing with matters that could-and

sfroita-nuu" U"en decided by responsible politicians liaising with a

responsible govemment and,-perforce, the people' in a responsible

".y. W" n"* already drawn attention to various parties maintaining

a si'lence when the Mandal agitations were going on' but takiog a pro-

ftfunauf position (with even greater reservations)-orce the storm had

tfo*n ou"t and the V.P. Singh Govemment had fallen' But' once the

court was seized of the issuJand referred it to a nine judge bench, the

Bench was torn between deciding all the principl es de novo and

1.Ut"* solving' the instant crisis' The long drawn arguments in

iourt showed linle let up. The popular protests were directed against

noriust OnC reservations but ieJervations pet se' The arguments of

tfre anti-t"tanOal lawyers in Court were no different and exaggerat-

"aiy u,ti.utut O sentiments that rese ations (including and' perhaps'

rp."iuffy SC and ST reservations) were going to be-if they had not

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Controversy 3ll

already become-the ruination of the country. The nation was at

peril. That is the reason why the Court ventured into questions

concerning SC and ST reservations with such ease. Once the 'na-

tional peril' argument found an emotional place in the intellectual

apparatus of legal argument, the Court was invited into a compromise

that would save reservations programmes while at the same time

being egged on to respond to the ire of meritocratists whose protests

struck a chord with the Cout.t. It cannot be overlooked that what was

before the Court was not the reservation poli cy per se which was part

of the Constitution's dispensation and which no amount of legal

frowning could drive into obsolescence. What was involved was a

very small programme of the central govemment which the latter'spolitical cowardice and ideological confusion had allowed to lay

fallow for many years. The Court could have chosen to nanow its

focus, but it did not do so overtly.

V

T\e Mandal judgenrent contains a mass of material. Since what was

in issue was the report itself and its methodology, a summary of the

report became necessary. The judicial summary was dry and matter

of fact-making as little of the Report and its critique as possible.16T

Since the Supreme Court of India and America had both painted theirgray in gray on these questions, reference to American decisions

added ballast to the arguments.r6s In fact, the majority judgements

add very little to the received precendental wisdom of the past. Whenpast jurisprudence was put into question-such as in the case ofpromotional reservations-the reversal was based on a calculus ofgauging competing sentiments on the issue rather than exhausting allthe principled arguments. The Court seemed determined to make a

policy decision and did so with majoritarian self assurance. On the

very crucial question of defining 'backwardness', the majority seemed

to accept that the Constitution was not caste blind, but its hesitation

in blessing the use of 'caste' as the determinant criterion seemed to

suggest some empathy for the critics for reservation, even though this

empathy lay hidden in its reasoning and was not frankly explicated.

The majority judgement seems inconsistent especially in relation to

not applying the creamy layer to SC and ST but applying the aboli-

312 The Politics ofBackwardness

tion of promotional reservations to them. The latter decision onrennving reservations in the matter of promotions caused the gov-ernrnent to seek a constitutional amendment to rectify the Court'sdecision on promotions in so far as they were applicable to the SCand ST. The Court did not strike down the proposals in the MandalReport, but interpreted them in a way that made it difficult to imple-ment thes€ proposals because of the insistence on excluding thecreamy layer without providing reasonably identifiable criteria toidentify the cream. The truth is that the Court's decision on theMandal care cannct be the last word, on many matters-both politically and constitutionally. This has already surfaced in certain cases

before the Supreme Court. Equally, the issue of reservations forpromotions and the extent of reservations have become live politicalissues once again.

Despite the length of the judgements, the Mandal judgement wasreally a'problem solving' decision.r6e The problem that was to beresolved was not the compensatory discrimination programme, butthe protest to it. After Thomas the answers to many of the ques-tions---cspecially the manner in which the issue was to be ap-pmached-were, more or less, settled. There were a few loose threadsconceming the carry over rule which could have been resolved lessexpensively.rTo The Govemment had diverted anti-reservation pro-test in the direction of the Court. Within the Court itself, the minorityjudges were in sympathy with such protest. They successfully pushedthe majority into a post-Iftomds assessment of the entire jurispru-dence on this vexed issue. The majority, too, yielded to the anti-reservationists in various ways, but, aimed for a compromise. That isexactly how the judgement turned out. It was essentially a compro-mise. Principled decision making was given the go by.

After the judgement, more protests could have ensued; but theydid'not. As with so many publicly contentious cases-of whichMandal and the Babri Masjid cases are examplesrTr-the coolingperiod during which the arguments were heard in Court had a sober-ing effect. Besides, Indian democracy continues to exude some re-spect for the Supreme Court so as to give a qualified social andpolitical finality to the latter's decisions.


VIThe Mandal controversy pre-occupied the nation for a period of one

and a half years. By itself, it was a controversy of finite proportions.

All that was involved was an extension of similar programmes that

already existed in various states to the cadres of the central govem-

ment-a move that was long overdue. Since no political party was

against the changes proposed in the Mandal report (especially the

Congress which not only implemented it but added a further rcsidu-ary lOVo reservation to the Mandal recommendations of 2il%), thesilence and reticence of the vaf.ous political parties whenthe Mandalagitation was at its pitch was nothing short of dishonest. There isevery reason to believe that there was an overt nexus between thepolitics of bringing down the V.P. Singh government andthe Mandalagitation. But, let us assume that this was not the case. Under these

circumstances, the politioal parties were obliged to take a stance; and,not stand idly by. It is their forbearance that-precipitated the crisis.

Those against Mandal pitched their legal and political case veryhigh as a general anti-reservationists case, by re-arguing basic issues

which had long been settled by both politics and law. Their twocentral arguments were: the importance of merit to equality and thepublic interest and the need for the Constitution to be 'caste-blind' inidentifying beneficiaries for the compensatory discriminationprogramme. But, both these arguments did not just apply to theMandal Report on OBCs. They applied with equal force to SC and

ST reservations. Instead of these efforts being treated as settled by the

Supreme Court, they struck a chord with the minority judges (who

sought to reassess the very basis of reservation in so far as theyaffected the OBC) as well as the majority judges (who also wentalong with the minority on the crucial questions of the creamy layer,percentage of reservations and the applicability of reservations topromotions). Trying to minimize the importance of 'caste', tle ma-jority sought to demonstrate it was a preliminary starting point,'backwardness' being the second and more important ttr,st. But, they

failed to shed too much light on the criteria to be nken into accountwhile considering backwardness. Yielding to the anti-reservationargument as a whole, they conceded exclusion of reservations forpromotions even for SC and ST (which was not in issue before the

Court) but excluded the 'creamy layer' exclusion for the SC and ST


without elucidating the meaning of 'social advancement' which wascrucial to determine the nature and extent of the creamy layer. Theresult was somewhat chaotic. When UP and Bihar decided to link'social advancement' to.property ownership and income, the civilservice status of the parents and their graduate qualifications, thesetests were immediately challenged before the Supreme Court whichhas now notjust approved but almost mandated the creation of a thick'creamy layer' which-taken to its logical conclusion-will swallowup the reservation itself. When the whole question of using .effi-

ciency based public interest arguments' and the 50Zo ceiling onreservations was raised in the context of professional medical educa-tion after the Mandal judgement, the Court backed down-hintingthat these questions were really for the govemment and not for theCourts.rT2 The Mandal judgement had declared that reserved candi-dates who had been selected on merit would be wholly excluded fromcomputing the reservation quota. But, a later Constitution benchmade it clear that the "fact that (a) considerable number of membersof a Backward Class have been appointed/promoted against generalseats in the state services may be a relevant factor for the stategovernment to review the question of iontinuing reservation for thesaid class".r73 Most important of all, faced with the Mandal judge-ment exclusion of reservations from promotion from 1997 the Con-gress Government amended the Constitution to reverse the decisionof the Court on this question. The States of Kerala and Tamil Naduhave expressed their discomfort with the imposition of the 5070 ruleand would like to take reservations beyond that level. In retrospect,the Supreme Court did not quell controversies but raised fresh onesanew. Many have already surfaced and are before the SupremeCourt.

But, the more lasting effect of the Mandal controversy was onelectoral politics. The V.P. Singh Govemment may have fallen be-cause of the controversy. But the Janata party and its allies mademuch of the whole controversy in the elections that followed-inparticular, in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where theymanaged to secure the trust and vote of the beneficiary 'backwardclasses'. The other parties tried tc cash in on the 'Mandal' vote bankbut failed. This was especially true of Congress which had tried toenlarge the Mandal dispensation after the V.P. Singh govemment

The Supreme Court as Problem Solver: Mandal Contoversyr' 315

fell, but had kept silent when the controversy was in full swing' What

the Mandal controversy did for a large number of neglected commu-

nities was to galvanise them-provoking them from their p-olitical

stupor. Since they had been vilified during the campaign, they were

noiembarrassed to strike back. Aware that elections and reservations

were a source ofobtaining power of a kind that they had not imagined

in their life time, their members organised their political life inpursuit of power. If V.P' Singh had driven his govemment to disaster'

ih" irtu" he had raised was responsible for transforming issues of

social justice into avenues for political opportunities and claims for

political power and political justice. So far, India's polity has man-

iged to keep these two aspects ofjustice separate' The aftermath of

tl:re Mandal controversy volunteered the demand of "political justice

and empowerment for the backward classes, now!". Development

generally benefits the advantaged. Social equity is thrown in toupp.ut" the badly off. The new demands for political justice and

empowerment meant that the various agendas of the State would no

longer be decided by the advantaged with the disadvantaged as

onlooker beneficiaries. A particular patronizing concept of power

and welfare that had been the hallmark of the Indian state was being

challenged at the hustings. South Indian politics had already been

transformed by these new intimations of political justice' Now, it was

the tum of the North. If India had not noticed that it was walking on

a razor's edge, it would now have to cope with "a million muti-

nies".r7a And, if some blame is to be pointed in some direction, it

must be in the direction of the advantaged who had for too long

neglected the disadvantaged communities. The revolt of the BCs

seems unequivocal, possibly irreversible-at least, for the moment'


l. See R. Dhavan: "The constitution as the situs of struggle: lndia's Consti-

tution Forty Years on" in L. Beer(ed) Cottstitutional Systems in late Twentieth

Century Asia (London, 1992) 373-461. For an account of the discourse in

India's Constituent Assembly on questions of human rights see R Dhavan:

"Tidy Intuitions, untidy discourse :Conversations on Human Rights Discourse

in Iniia's Constituent Assembly (1993) PILSARC Working Paper No' 20)'

2. The term "Other Backward Classes" (OBC) stems from the distinctio'l

between Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) who are given

3r6 The Politics of Backwardness

express recognition by the Constirution in varjous anicles (e.g., article. l5 (4)(positive-action) l7 (dealing with "untouchabres"), art. 243 (Di and article 243(T),_art. 330,332, 334 (Special legislative representation), arr i:S (recognitionof their special claims), art.,338-9 (specij officer and

'provisions)) and the'backward classes' (mentioned jn

-article 16 (4) preferential state employment),

art 15(4) (positive action); arricle Z3(DX6) and arricl e U3 (.f)(6) (ele€tions tolo-cal bodies), art 340 (Commission to investigate neir conOitiong. See furtherMarc Galanter who first asked .,Who are tf,e other gu"k*uio Classes? AnIntroducrion to a Constiturional puzzle', (197g) 13 EpW lSl2-2g. The title ofhisessay echoes the exasperated question asked by one member of the constituentassembly : "Who are those Backward classes,,(197g) 7 CAD 697.

. 1 G.O. (Govemment Order) of 1921 (referring earlier GOs) is ro be found inthe state of Mysore's Nagan Gowda Rep ort of thi Backward Classes Committee(Mysore 1961) pp. 57-61. The discussion on these historical urp""t. i, ,o b"f:lld I Y Galanter: Competing Equatities : Law and the Ba.iara Ch"se" inIndia (Delhi, Oxford, 1984) 154-62 who has made the task ofevery researchereasier and more focussed and who directed me to these and other references.--

4. Indian Statutory Commission (lg2g') 39g.5. For the Constituent Assembly Debates [C.A.D. (194g) 7 CAD 672-jo4:for

the antecedent discussion in Committees see B. Shiva Rao: The Framing ofIndia's Constitutian : Study Volume (196g) pp. 192-201. For an anatysis see M.Galanter (supran.3) pp. 159-62 and contrasiihe Suple4e Court,s own handlingof these discussion s in I ndra S aw hney v. IJnion of I iia (l 992) Supp. 3 S C C ZSO(]y1e1!ter tle Mandal case) at pr. 38-41 pp. 37 4-5 (per pandian J); pr. 265 pp.jll-jO_ ana nn, 466-469 (per Thommen ljfpr. :S:_its pp. a77_8a (per KuldipSineh JI pr.4,?7-s pp.544-5 (per Sawant rj; pr. 570 p. !i6; pr. !z+_5; pr. 6lop 615-6 pr. 687-694 pp. 658-662; pr. 772_717 pp. Zt t_S; pr. 779 pp.'714_5.Unfortu-nately, the supreme court did not examine the hisioricat context andtenor of the discussions in the Constituent Assembly and its Committees._ 6. The initial plan was to havejoint electorates se;arate communal electoratebeing veroed by the Constituent Asse mbly (Vl CAD )47). It was only on 16 June1949, that an amendment was moved that there should be u "o.;";;;;;;r,oll f9r 4l (see VIII-CAD 930): For a summary see Shiva Rao. Framing ofIndia's Constitution : Study Volume (1968) 466_g.

_ 7. Article 330 and 332 (reservations for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Sched_uled rribes (sr)) (note art. 331 and 333 also reserved special seats tbr Anglo-Indians). All these were for l0 years; but they have been periodicatty extendedten Jears at a time. At present, they are due to expire on 26 Jan. 2000 for thebackground, see M. Galanter: "compensatory Discriminations in politicar Rep-resentatlon : A preliminary assessment of India,s Thirty year experience withreserved seats in Legislature,, (1979) 14 Economic and bolitical Weekly (EpW)437-54.

8. Article 16(l) and (4) read with article 335 of the Constitution.9. Article l5(3) (speciat provision for women and children); l5(4) (special

provision for SC and ST and other backward classes).


10. Constitution (Eighth Arnendment) Acr, 1959; Constitution (fwenty rhirdAmendment) Act, 1969; Constitution (Forry fifth Amendment) Act, l9g0; Con_stitution (Sixty Second Arnendment) Act, 1989.

I l. It is difficult to say whether the magnitude of the OBC's was as large asa mixture of patronage and belated discovery has enabled it to become. By themid seventies, the constitutional importance of the .OBC's

was well establishedas the link between group favoritism and electoral victory were becoming moreand more apparent. See M. Galanter : "Who are the other Backward Classes?'(1978) 13 EPW tEt2-28.

12. WI CAD 697 (30 Nov. 1948).13. The G.O. is reprinted in the (Nagan Gowda Mysore) Brckwelrd Classes .

Committee (1961) 57 at 5E.I 4. See [O.H.B. Starte'l Depressed Classes and Abongirml Tnbes Committee

(Bombay Presidency).15. See G.O. 190 of 20 t?[|,. 1944l. @ 343 of 2t Nov 1947 of rhe pubtic

Services Deparnnent and the discussion in S- Saraswarhi: Mittoities in theMadras State; Group Interests in Modem Poiirrcs (Delhi 1974) l2l-12,4; irrtdmore generally R- Hardgrave: The Dravidian Movemenr @ombay 1965)

16- A phrase taken from Dr. Punjabrao Deshmukh spokesman for the OBCswho claims to be responsible for the initiation of such courage; see Galanter(supm n.3) p. 162 f,.n. 44;The Report of the Working of the All-India BackwardClasses Federation from the date of its Fonution upto 30th September 1955.(1955) and subsequenr rcports.

17. The protferation of OBC Groups was necessarily created because of theconstitutional opportunities and noa the other way round. Ambedkar, well awarethat so many problems exist at local level, described the future with his usualperspicacity when he said "we have left it to be determined by each localgovemment. A backward community is a community which is backward in theopinion of the Govemmenf' (see VII CAD 7(D; n nb"d*o had not visualiz€dthat the rnassive political appropriation of the 'Opinion of the Government"would tum India upside down. Galanter's cornment that the .opinion' of thegovemment "is determinative only of the group's 'hnder-representation" not ofits backwardness" (supra n. 3 p: 16O frr. 34) seems to beg the question : who,then, would determine "backwardness"?

18. State o;f Madras v- Champakam Dorairajan AIR l95l SC 226;Venkntaranmna v. State of Madms AIR 1951 SC 229; see also the High Courtdiscussion reported

^t AIR 1951 Mad lm.

I 9. A list of the various Commissions is gSva in the Mandal cue, (supra n.5) in judgement of Jeewan Reddy J's at pp. 7ffi-762 and,pandran J at pp. 367which include.s the following in the Table as shown below:

'"The list of Commissions appotnted by the various States and the CentralGovemment is given as under:


COMMISSIONS OF BACKWARD CZ"ASSES

l9l8-1990

Andhra Pradesh Manohar Pershad Committee (1968-69)

Ananta Raman Commission (1970)

Muralidhara Rao Commission (1982)

Bihar Mungeri Lal Commission (197l-76)

Gujarat A.R. Bakshi Commission (1972-76)

Justice C.V. Rane Commission (1981-83)

Justice R.C. Mankad Commission (1987)

Haryana Gumam Singh Commission (1990)

Justice Gajendragadkar Commission (196 /-68)

Justice J.N. Wazir Commission (1969)

Justice Adarsh Anand Commission (1976-77)

Karnataka Justice L.C. Miller Committee (1918-1920: Mysore)

Naganna Gowda Commission (1960-61)

L.G. Havanur Commission (1972-75)

T. Venkataswamy Commission (1983-86)

Justice Chinappa Reddy Commission (1989-90)

Kerala Justice C.D. Nokes Committee (1935; Travancore-Cochin)

V.K. Vioshvanatham Commission (1961-63)

G. Kumar Pillai Commission (1964-66)

N.P. Damodaran Commission (1967 -70)

Maharashtra O.H.B. Starte Committee (1928-30; Bombay Presidency)

B.D. Deshmukh Committee (1961-64)

Punjab Brish Bhan Committee (1965-66)

Tamit Nadu A.N. Sattanathan Commission (1969-70)

J.M. Ambasankar Commission (1982-86)

Uttar Pradesh Chhedi Lal Sathi Commission (1975-77)

Atl India Kaka Kalelkar Commission (1953-55)

B.P. Mandal Commission (1979-80)

Notes:l. Where two dates are mentioned they refer to year of appointment and

year of submission. Where only one is mentioned it refers to year of submis-

sion which is also the year of appointment in some cases.

2. The three commissions of the colonial period mentioned here had an

ambit wider than those groups that later came to be known as "Backward

Classes".20. (Kalelkar Report ofl) Backwartl Classes Conmtisslon (1955 in three

volumes); see further N.D. Majumdar: "The Backward Classes Commission and

its work" in Planning Commission: Social Welfure in India (Delhi 1955). For

comments on Kalelkar in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) at pr. 584 pp. 599 (per

Sahai J.) pr. 656-658 pp. 638-640 (per Jeewan Reddv).


2l . Kalelkar felt "it would have been better if we could determine the criteriaof backwardness on principles other than caste". (Report supra note 20: l, xiv).On this second thought s€e Jeewan Reddy, I - in the Mandal Case (pr. 656 p.639.) Dissents objecting to the use ofcaste were also entered by Dr. Anup Singh,Shri Arunanshu De and Shri P.G. Shah. The Govemment (in the Ministry ofHome Affairs) Memorandum on thc Repon of the Backward Classes Corunis-sdoz [Delhi, 1956] criticized the report. Later the Study Teatn on Social Welfareof the Backward Classes (Delhi 1959), amidst contradictions in the Reponformally insisted that economic criteria should be the basis of the dispensationof benefits in govemment programmes.

22. ln the debate on the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, whilstAmbedkar was clear that OBC's were "nothing else but a collection of certaincastes" (1951) XII-XIII P.D. (ft.II) Col. 9006 (18 May) Nehru wanted roeliminate "all these infinite divisions" around which a "vast number of fissuresor divisions" have developed "including" the "caste system and religious divi-sions". (iDrd, Col 9616). On Nehru generally on law and the constihrrion see R.Dhavan "Introduction" in R. Dhavan (ed) Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi1992).

23. Laater of 14 August 196l reproduced in the Report of the ScheduledCaste and Scheduled Tribes (1960-l) II, 366; also referred to in the Mandal case(supra n.5) at pr. 658 pp. 639-40).

24. Articles 14-18, Constitution of India.25. Supra n. 18.26. The title of M. Galanter's book (supra n. 3).27. Supra n. 18.28. Sen Jagar Nath Babu v. State of J&K AIR 1958 J&K I affirmed AIR

1958 J&K 14.

29. See Rana Kishna Singh v. Mysore AIR 19ffi Mys 338; see also A.R,V.Achar v. Madras AIR 1954 Mad 561; Hariharan Pillai v. Kerala AIR 1968 Ker42,Cf Kerala v. Jacob Mathzw (1964'12 Ker 39 rev: AIR 1964 Ker42 cf cases

in which religious groups gratified for reservation irrclude Kesava lyengar v.Mysore AIR 1956 Mys 2O.

30. Ramakishna Singh v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 Mys. 338.31. Balaji v. State of Mysore AIR 1963 SC 649.32. Ibid., pr. 36 p. 664, pr.23 p.659.33. Ibid., pt.22-25 pp. 659-660.34. Chitalekha v. Mysore AIR 1964 SC 1823 at 1834.35. M. Galanter (supra n. 3) p. 194.36. Kerala v. Jacob Mathcw (supra n. 29).37. P. Rajendran v. Madras AIR 1968 SCi0l2 at l0l4-15; A.P. v. Sagar

AIR 1968 SC 1379. High Court reactions betwe.en BaIQi (supra n. 3t) andRajendran include Jacob Mathew (supn n. 29) and Hariharan v. Kerala (AlR1968 Ker 42) Sukhdev v. Govt. (1966) | Andh.WLR 294, Desa Rayadu v. APPSC AIR 1967 AP 353 and Sagar y. AP AIR 1968 AP 165; Nanda KisftoreSharma v.,Bihar AIR 1965 Pat 372; Umesh Chandra v. Singh AIR 1968 Pat. 8;


Chait Ram v . Sikander AIR 1968 Pat. 337; Hridaya v. Mohd. Shnrif AIR 1968

Pat.296.38: While these debates were ostensibly put to rest by Stcte of Kerala v. N.M.

Thomas (19'16) 1 SCR 906, the Mandaljudges obviously felt that they simmered

sufficiently for the Mandal case to finally hold that preferential discriminationwas part of the corrective mandate of equality and not an exception to it (see pr.

741-2 pp.69l-2 (per Jeewan Reddy J.); pr. 165-72 pp. 406-8; (Pandian J.); pr.

428-32 pp.515-7 (per Sawant J.). While Kuldip Singh J. admitted that they

operate in the same field, he opined that "article 16(4) being a special provision

regarding reservation, it completely takes away such classification from article

16(l)" (at pr. 382 p. 491) - suggesting that article 16(4) is really an exception toarticle 16(1). He specifically agrees (at pr. 383 p. 491) with Sahai J. who (at pr.

563 pp. 580-l) demarcates constitutionally allocatable areas to each of these

articles. Art. 16 (1) deals with substantive equality which is a fundamental rightof the citizen enforceable in a Court of Law whereas art. 16(4) is part of ". . .

equality which is an obligation of the State not carrying a constitutional compul-sion." This approach greatly reduces the importance of 16(4) but raises thequestion of its enforceability as a power coupled with a duty (on which see

Comptroller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan AIR 1987 SC 537 at 546).Morc generally see A. Goldman : Jr stice and Reverse Discriminalion (Pnnceton1979); W.T. Blackstone and R.D. Heslep (ed) Social Justice and PreferentialTreatmmt (Atheni, Georgia 1977): N.E. Bowie: "Equality and DistributiveJusticd'(1970) 45 (142) Philosoplry 140-8; B.R. Gross (ed) Reverse Discrimi-nation (Blrffalo, 1977); ibid: Reverse Discrimination (New York 1978); M.Cohen, T. Nagel T. Scanton (ed) Equa liry and Preferential Treatmzn s erinceton1977). R. Dworkin : "What is Equality2" (1981) Philosoplry and Public Affairs185-U6.283-345.

39. See generally Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 98 L. Ed.843 (347

US 483); Billing v. Sharpe (1954) 98 L. Ed 884 (347 US 497); and morespe*ifically De Funis v. Charles Odegaard (1974) 40 L.Edn (2d) 164 (416 US312); Regents of the University of Califumia v. Bakka (1978) 57 L Ed. (2d), 750(438 US 265); Fallilovev. Phillip M. Khitznbk (1980) 65 L. Edn. (2d) 9O2 (448)

US 448); Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission(1990) 58 fW (5053). More recently, the US Supreme Court seems to have

become less enthusiastic in its support for preferential discrimination.For how US case Law was dealt within the Mandal case see L Reddy J at pr.

715-733 pp.675-686; Pandian J. at pr. 161-4 pp. z105-6; Thommen at pr. 258 p.

436; pr.322p.461; Sawant J. at pr. 419 pp. 512:,pr.47O-473 pp. 531-2 (quoting

Brennan J's view on Bakka (supra) that the Constitution is not "colour blind");Sahai J. at pr. 557 p. 573-4 (on the political question doctrine), pr. 558-9 pp.

515-6i pt.565 p. 583, pr. 575 p. 591-2; pr. 614 p. 618, pr. 624 p. 624: pr. 628p.626. What is siglificant is that each judge seems to draw their own conclusionsfrom the same American decisions.

40. The Supreme Court in the Mandal case (supra n. 5) rejected this distinc-tion, reftising to accept that such initiatives can be confined within water tight


constitutional compartments see pr. 846 pp. 755-6.41. For aspects of the importance of this distinction in terms of definine

govemment programmes see J. Edwards: positive Discimination, Social Justiciand Social Policy: Moral Scrutiny of a policy practice (Inndon 19g7) whichadvocates the somewhat conservative approach of restricting state action topositive action schemes for disadvantaged groups to better tiemselves ratherthan preferential appointments and benefits in particular areas such as employ-ment, distribution of land and the like.

42. This was suggested by R. Dhavan both in oral arguments and the writtensubmission in the companion case (S reenarayana Dharma paipalana yogatn v.Union of India WP 1094 of 1991 : Written Submissions of Rajeev Dhavan forthe Petitioner) to Mandal case along with which it was heard.

43. Supra n. 40.,14. See Ajai Kumar's case (infra n. 172). Even in the Mandal case what is

rejected is not the distinction but the exclusive location ofeach such programmein specified articles in the equarity dispensation of the constitution and no other.

45. Article 3 I I of the Constitution of India. For an interesting exploration ofproviding bureaucracy such protections see U. Baxi,s ..Introduction

to M. RamaJois: Serylces und.er the Slare " (Bombay t927) xiv - xii.

46. This was the strong submission made by R. Dhavan to the effect that"reservation" were a form of , power sharing" (see Wittm Submisslon supra n.42, see Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 750 p. 699 and esp. pr. ?gg p. 720). Ttre maiorityjudges accept this argument (see Jeewan Reddy at pr. 694 p. 662; pr.7gg p.7V5;Sawant J. at W.414, p. 509 pr. 482 p. 538).

47.The afticle37, Constitution oflndia. For the earlier view ofthe DirectivePrinciples which marginalized the importance of Directive principles see R.Dltayy: The Sunreme Court of India : A Socio-I*gal Analysis of its JuristicTechniques (Bombay 1977) 87-94. The turning point was tie famous h-unda-mental Rights case (Kesavananda v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC Z2). There_after these principles were trcated notjust as a source of empowerment but alsoresponsibility. On the need to emphasize the importance of socio_economicrights see R. Dhavan: "Ambedtar's prophecy: poverty of Hwnan Rights inIndia" (1994) 36 loumal of The Indian Law Institute g-36. imbedkar,s famousspeech that by igloring social and economicjustice India was entering a.,life ofcontradiction" see Xl CAD 979-80. More generally see B.p. Jeewan Reddy andR. Dhavan "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights" in D.N. Beatty (d) HunanRights and Judicial R*iew: A Comparative perspective (London, 1gg4) 175_2_26. On the Directive Principles see K. Markandam : Direcrive principtes ofState Policy (Delhi, 1960): P. Diwan and V. Kumar(ed) Directive principlesJuisprudence (Delhi, I 982).

48. Champakatn (supra n. 18)

_ 49. General Manager v. Rangachari AIR 1962 SC 36 (per GajendragadkarJ and per Wanchoo J.).

50. Balaji (supra n.3l) ar pr. 32 p. 662.5l . Rangachai (supra n. 49) eventhough the Mandal case rcversed the view


that reservations were constitutionally permissable in the matter of promotions'

52. Devadassan v. Union of India (1964) 4 SCR 680 at 700'

53. Kesavananda (suPra n. 47).

54- See I CAD 57-65 (13 Dec. 1946). But the Resolution ran into trouble and

was debated at length; see further R. Dhavan : "Introduction" in R' Dhavan (ed)

NehruandtheConsriruriaz(Bombay1992)XXIv-XxvllandProfessorMittal,scontribution in the same volume (at pp- 22-44)'

55. Kesavananda (supra n.47) on the importance of the Objectives Resolu-

tion of 22 Jan. 194? and its goals at pr. 15 p 306; pr' 82-91 pp' 32O-3; pt 292

;. 366 (p€r Sikd CJ); pr. 486-9 pp. 408-410 (per Shelat and Grover JJ); at pr' 648

p. +'le ip"t Hegde and Mukerjea JJ); pr. 890 p' 849 (Ray J last sentence); pr'

i r Se pp. ell-slper Reddy J.); pr- 1302 p. 709-10 (per Palekar J);.pr' l47l-5 pp'

ZSZ-O 1p.t Xfta"na J); pr. 162G1 pp.852-3 (per Mathew,J); pr ' 1863-7 pp' 922-

3 (per bwivedi l.); pi. ZOIS p. 986 (per Chandrachud J') On the question of

sutstantive equality see Sikri CJ at prs. 82-91 pp' 320-3 pr ' 136 pp 330; pr' 178

p. 339 (on minorities); Shelat and Grover JJ at pr' 489 p' 410 Hegde and

i"tuke4ea JJ at pr. fl8 p. 479; Ray J at pr' 1013-4 pp' 500;-pr' 1016 p' 581;

ReAdy f at pr. t 159 pp. 637-8; Palekar I at pr' 1302 p' 709-10;Xianna J at pr'

1475'p.789; pr. l+tii-Z pp.792-4; Mathew J' atpr' 17O7 p' 879; Beg J at pr'

1303-7 pp. g0Z-4; Owivedi J at pr. 1867 p. 923; Chandrachud I xpr'212Opp'

999-1000.56. N.M. Tlnmas (supra n. 38\ 906 at 976-77 '

57 . Thomas (suPra n. 38).

58. Ibid at Pr. 932-3.59. Ibid atp.95l-2 (Per Mathew J).

6O. Ibid at 973 (per Krishna lyer J).

61. Ibid ar942-41(per Khanna J); Gupta J at pp' 986-7; Beg at 959 (agreeing

with Gupta and Khanna JJ) and at pp. 960-l '62. (risnna Iyer J in A.S. Iyer v' Balasubramanyam (1980) I SCR 1036 at

1066 G-H.63. Krishna lyer J. in Jagdish Saran v. lJnion of India (1980\ 2 SCC 768 at

pr. 29 pp. ?81-2; see also Charles Skaria v. C' Mathew (1980)2SCCatpr' 15

pp.767-69.64. Chinappa Reddy J' in ABSK Sangh v' IJnion of India (1981) 2 SCR l8-5

ar 257-259 generallY-

65. Chin-appa neOOy f. in State of Maharashtra v' Chandra Pradhan TaIe

(1983) 3 SCb'387 at pr. 2 p. 390; Cf. Varadarajan at pr' 19 pp 39l-2' On

ireating benefits as 'property' see Chaies Reich: Iha Greening of America

(London 1970) and hii article'The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LI 733' But

notethecriticismofthisviewR.Defriend:"WelfareLawLegaltheoryandlegaleducation" in M. Paning and J. Jowell (ed) llelfore law and Policl' (London)

43-64.66. See Inchrnn Das v. State of Punjab (1963) 2 SCR 353 at 395 see also

A.S. Iyer (supra n. 62) at 1067-8.

67. On the doctrine of source rr:e Chitra Ghosh v' Union <tf India (1970\ |


SCR 413; D.MCftanchala v. State of Mysore (197 t) S'tpp. SCR 6O8; Nidamarativ. State of Maharashtra (1986) 2 SCC 534; Deepak Sibal v. State of Punjab(1989) 2 SCC 145. For an interesting decision on reservations for women seeGovernment ofAP v. PB Vijaykumar (1995) 4 SCC 520. lt is not clear whetherthis is treated as a form of reservation or part of the doctrine of source as areasonable classification. For a situation which has both aspects of "source" and"reservation" see Swati Gupta v. State of UP (1995) 2 SCC 560. An estimate ofconstitutionally permissible quotas after taking into account both "source" and"reservations" quota is overdue. I had raised this in my submissions in Mandal-The Court, however, treated "Source" reservations in addition to the 50% SC/STand OBC reservation. This leaves open the possibility of IOOEa reservations.

68. On the creamy layer concept see infra n. 83.69. This is no less true of Galanter's Competing Equalities (supra n. 3); ser-

a review of this book by R. Dhavan : "Marc Galanter's Competing Equalities"(1986) 28 kw and Policy 365-377.

70. The idea of'neutral principles' is taken from H. Weschler : "Towardsneutral principles of law" (1959)'13 Harvard LR l.

71. Unfortunately, too much legal analysis tends to be over-reductionist andsimplistic in its approach to judicial decision making, as for example J.A.G.Griffths : Policies of the Judiciary (London 1980), or U. Baxi's: The SupremeCourt and Politics (Lucknow. 1980).

72. Apaft from Sastri CJ's candidly confessorial statement in this regard inState ofMadrasv. 14G. Rop AIR 1952 SC 196 at 200 that even the predilectionsof a judge are part of judicial decision making, the actu4l process of suchdecision making is much more complex. For an account of the Supreme Courtin the early years see R. Dbavan : The Supreme Court of India (supra n. 47).Judges do belong to a class but their class bias is tempered by their intimationsof their judicial role. Judges are purposive in their intent and artful in their useofjuristic techniques but they do not wholly abandon their craft to the momen-tary exigencies of the bias of the moment. Were that not the case, the reputationof the judiciary as an institution of governance would surely have fallen todubious levels of malappreciation.

73. See P. Singh : "Nelrru on equality and compensatory discrimination" inR. Dhavan (ed). Nehru and the Constitution (Delhi,l992) I l0 generally. Nehruwas uncomfortable with reservations on caste lines but was forced to give a freehand to his party to appeal to caste in elections. It is Nehru's legacy that therewas no OBC reservation in the Union's civil services till 1992 -long after hisdeath. It is no less Nehru's legacy to substitute words for wisdom, allow rhetoricto triumph over reality and allow pragmatic considerations to give way toarguments over principle.

74. The legal slory is recounted in R. Dhavan : Suprente Court of lnclia(supra n. 47) 128-205.

75. Clcarly the formula now evolved of the Chief Justice having a decisivesay was extant in the 50's and 60's. The following line of Chief Justices from1950 to 1973 Kania, Shasrri, Mahajan, Das, Sinha Gajendragadkar, Sarkar,

324 The Polirtcs ofBackwardness

Subba Rao, Wanchoo, Hidayanrllah, Shah, and Sikri speaks for itself.

76. On his judicial decision making see P.K. Tripathi : "Mr. Justice

Gajendragadkar and Constitutional Interpretation" (196) I J-I-LI. 479; S-N.

Dhyani : "Justice Gajendragadkar and Labour Lad'(1967) 7 Jur IJ 69; P.W.

Rege: "Contributions of Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar to Hindu Law" (f966) 8

JII"I 58E. In the field of 'secular-socialism' , apart from Barzii (sr?ra n. 3 I )' note

his judgements on the freedom of religron (e.g. Tilkayat v - Raiasthan AIR I 963

SC 649; Dursah Conminee v. Hussain Ati AIR l%l SC 1'z02) and his re-

definition of the very concept of a 'Hindu' (on which see YagnapurusMasji v.

Mullas NR 1966 SC I19, on which see Galanter : 'Law and Society in Modem

India' (Delhi 1989) 237 and J.D.M. DerretL '"The definition of a Hindu" (1966)

2 SCC Inl 6?; "Hindu - a definition wanted for the purpose of applying a

personal law' (1968) 70 Tzitschrifi Verglcisclunde Rechswissensch{t.

77 . Balaji (supm n. 3l).78. For his general appmach see : P.B. Gajendmgadkar I'aw' Liberty and

Justire (I-ondon 1965); Constitution of India (l-llrldlon l97O); Secularism and

the Constitution of India @ombay 1972); Indian Democmcy : Its MaiorImpemarives (Delhi 1975); Indian Parlianunt and the Fundanenml Rights

(Calcutta 19721; Kashmir : Prospea and Retmspect (Bombay, 1967); Tradition

and Social CIwryc (Bornbay 1967): lau'aharlnl Nehm : Glimpses of the Man

and his Teaching (Nagpur 1967); Imperatives of Indian Federalism(Bombay,l968) as also his autobiography .The etr*. of Balaji (sr?ra n. 3l) isself evident. It was cited and refened n ia Devadasan v- Union of India

(Mudholkar J.) AIR l95/- SC l79i Tiloki Nath v - Statc a/J&K (Subbarao C.J.)

AIR t967 SC 1283; C.A. Rajendran v. Union of hdia (Rann Swami J.) AIR1968 SC 507; P. Ralendran v. Stalte of Madms (Wanchoo C-J.) AIR 1968 SC

l}l2: Sute of A-P- v. P. &gar (Shah J.) AIR 1968 SC 1379; D'N. Charnhala

v . Smu of Mysore AIR l97l SC 1762; A Periakarruppan v - State ofTamil Nadu

(Hegde J) AIR l97l SC 23O31' Janki Pmsadv. State of J&K NR 1973 SC930;

A.R. Chomdhry v. Ilnion of India AIR 1974 SC 532; A-B-S.K. Sangh (RIv) v.

Union of Indb NR l98l SC 298; S.S. Shatma v. Union of India AIR l98l SC

588; A.B.S.K. Sangh (Ny) v- Ilnion of India (1981) I SCC 246 at707'l SCC

397 at4os; K.C- Vasanth Kuur v. Sarc of Kantnla (1985) Supp. SCC1|4at725,746,777; Chotdradtur Paswan v' Snte ol Bihar (lgaA\ 2 SCC 214

^t217 Deepak Sibal v - Punjab Universitt (1989) 2 SCC 145 at 1591' Smte of AP v .

K. Ranganathan (199()) 4 SCC 636 at 638; Sr. Stzplcn's College v- University

of Delhi {1992) I SCC 558 x 612: Molan Singlania v. Union (1992) Supp ISCC 594 il 6311' Indm Sawhney (the Mandal case) (1992) Supp- | SCC2l7

^t381, 394, 396, 4Al, M, 4lO, 4r2. 4m, $8, 44A, 44r, 444, 44E, M9, 451' 452'4s4. n6,477,5r9,52r,522,526,545, 555, 558, 559, 584, 585, 593, 598' 613'

616, f43, 656, 665, ffi, 6l l, 6t2, 687, 692, 700, 713, 715,7 19, 721, 722' 725'726, 729,731,736,738,'139,749, 759: T. Sudhaknr Reddv v- Govt' of A.P.

(1993) Supp. 4 SCC 439. But Balaji had that 'tu2ry' quality of landmarkjudgements of the period interpretative rather than pontificatory but leaving a

considcrable roorr fa judicial manoeuvre" After reviewing Baloii and Chitmlatllta


Justice Sawant rightly observed in the Mandal case (sap ra n. S) xpr.459 p. 527that the observations in those cases "leave many things unanswered".

79. The literature on this is summed up in R. Dhavan : The Supreme Courtof India (Bonrbay 1977) 27-28.

80. See R. Dhavan: "Human rights and Socialism : India,s unfinished experi-ment" in J. Chan and Y. Ghai : The Hong Kong Bill of Rights: A ComparativeApproach (Hong Kong, 1993) 451-466.

81. See generally H . Swap: For whom the Law is Made : Mind and Faith oflustice V.R. Kislma lyer (Seelisburg 1984), K.M. Sharma : .,The JudicialUniverse of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer" in R. Dhavan (et at1 Judges and theJudicial Power 316-336 ibid : Judicial grandiloquence : Would Fewer Wordsand Shorter Judgments do" (1973) 4Inwasia 192; N.C. Bedhan: Justice V.R.Krishna lyer-A Statesman 'Judge' (1981) 1 Jabalpur Law euarterly 24.

82. Thonas (supra n.38). Although Thonns hu been criticized as beingpurely symbolic in significance (see M. Galanter : ,.Symbolic activism: Ajudicial encounter with the contours of India's Compensatory DiscriminationPolicy" in R. Dhavan et aI. Judges and the Judicial power (supra n.8l) 229) yetan important controveny conceming the egalitarian basis of reservations neeCedto be resolved.

83. In an interview Krishna Iyer J. says that it was professor Marc Galanterwho coined the word and it was passed on by Justice Krishna Iyer to ChinappaReddy J. who used it in K. C. Vasanth Kumarv. State of Kamamka (19g5) Supp.SCC 714 at pr.72 p.225 from where it entered the discourse of the law andpolicy on reservations. For the discusiion on the creamy layer in the Mandal case(supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy I at pr. 79O-93 pp. 722-725; per Sawant J. at pr.. 520-22 pp. 553-54; per Thommen J. pr.295-7 pp.454-65; per Kuldip Singh J.pr. 385 p. 492; per Sahai I xpr.627 p. 626; per pandian J. at pr. 219-211 pp.422-25 . ln the UP-Bihar Creamy layer judgement (see Ashoka Kumar Thakur v .

State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC 503) Kuldip Singh J. seems ro rely more oneconomic criteri^to determine "backwardness',, thereby converting his minorityview in the Mandal case (shared with Thommen and Sahai JJ) into the view ofthe Court.

84. Manifesto of the Janata Party (1989).85. Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Delhi 1980) - {hereafter

Mandal Reportl pp; vii reproduced in the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr.659 p.640.

86. In the first debate in 1982. Shri R. Venkararaman (later president oflndia,then the Minister of Defence and Home Affairs) felt that ,lhe problem thatconfronts Govemment today is to arrive at a satisfactory definition of backwardclasses and bring about an acceptance of the same by all the States concemed".A meeting of Chief Ministers was to be called. By 1983 - as the general electiondrew near - P.C. Sethi, Minister for Home Affairs stated more confidently andwith less reserve : ". we now desire to continue this commission andimplement its re.ommendations". These statements are quoted in the Mandalcase (supra n. 5) pr. 672-3 pp. 649-50 per Jeewan Reddy J.).


87 . Mandal Report (supra n. 5) p. 36 subpara 6 see "Chapter VIII : North

South Comparison of Other Backward Classes Welfare" pp. 31-36'

88. V.P. Singh speech in Parliament quoted in the Mandal case (supra n' 5)

pr. 674 pp.650-1. The Memorandum of l3 August 1990 is reproduced at pr' 675

pp.65l-2.89. Arun Shourie, then, editor of the India E;?ress led the campaign instill-

ing doubt where there was conviction and fear where there was doubt. Thus, itis a matter of record that Singh had introduced legislation about the electronic

media and ombudsperson (Lokpal) and initiated a debate on official secrecy'

This was a part of a unique and marked eagemess to implement the manifesto

quickly and comprehensively.90. For further elaboration on this see R. Dhavan: "Reservations :Equality or

Deceit" (1990) Hindu (4 Dec.); ibid: "Economic criteria relied on by Mandal"(1990) Hindu (5 Dec.)

91. See the Congress's Memorandum of 25 Sept. 1991 (quoted in Mandal

case (supra n. 5)) which added lOVo of vacancies in civil posts and services

under the Govemment of India for "other economically backward sections ofthe

people, . . . uncovered by any of the existing schemes ofreservations" in addition

iothe2TVo for the other OBC's already suggested by the Mandal Report (r pra

n. 85) and declared in the Memorandum of 13 August 1990 (sapra n 88)'

92. The 'Preface' to the Mandal Reporl (supra n.85) (ix) acknowledged, the

service of Professors M.N. Srinivas, Jogindra Singh, B.K. Roy Burman who

seem to have abjured their contribution when, years later, the Report became

controversial. In fact the Report (pr. 3.12 p 13) suggests Prof. Srinivas headed

a panel to devise the methodology (pr. 41.4 p. 50; Vol. II' 99-101)'

93. Mandal Report (supra n- 85) pr. 3.1-3.2 pp. 12 also quoted in the Mandal

case(supran.5) pr. 661 p. 641. Note also the survey of state programmes in the

Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter II pp. 5-1 l.94. See Mandal Report (ruprd n. 85). The location of the 1931 Census

containing "considerable detail" is in the Experts Report (rlid pr. 5 p' 99)' The

Census of 1961 was used to identify tribals and the like (ibid pt. 12.7 p. 54) The

Census of 1931 was used for projecting numbers under broad, but necessarily,

crude assumptions about demographic growth.

95. Mandal Report (supra n. 85) Chapter XI : "Socio-economic field survey

and Criteria of Backwardness pp. 50-53. The various Schedules are found at

Vol.II pp. 102-112; and the list of the floods survived at pp. 1 13-1 19; see also

the study by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences in Part II Volume IV of the

Report (at pp. 139-164) and the Socio-educational survey tables in Vol' V pp'

t6'1-225.96. Mandal Report (srpra n. 85) pr. 11.23 - p 11.25 pp. 52; also Mandal

Judgement (supra n. 5) y.667 pp 645-7.

97. Supra n. 88.98. Supra n. 91.99. Mandal case (s upra n' 5), Sahai J's judgement thanks the various lawyers

at pr. 637-8 pp. 631 which read as follows :


"Valuable assistance was rendered by Shri K.K. Venugopal and Shri N.A.Palkhivala, the leamed senior counsel, who led the arguments and placed oneview. They were ably supported by Shri P.P. Rao and Smt. Shyamala pappu,

Senior Advocates. Arguments were also advanced by Smt. Hingorani, Mr.Mehta, Mr. K.L. Sharma, Mr. S.M. Ashri, Mr. Vishal Jeet, Shri K.N. Rao andCol. (Dr) D-M. Khanna appeared in person as interveners and were ofassistance.

Shri Ram Jethmalani, the leamed Senior Advocate appearing.for rhe StateofBihar was equally helpful in projecting the other view. Shri K. parasaran,

the leamed Senior Counsel for the Union of India while supporring ShriJethmalani placed a very dispassionate view ofthe entire matter: Dr. RajeevDhavan was also very helpful. Shri R.K. Garg, Shri Shiv Pujan Singh, ShriS. Siva Subramaniam, Shri Poti, Smt. Rani Jethmalani also made submis-sions. Shri Ram Avadesh Singh argued in person."l00. Mandal case (supra n.5) at pr. 683 p. 657. For the manner in which the

referedce to the larger bench took place see pr. 679-685 pp. 654-658l0l. The judgements (see Mandal case, supra n. 5 pp. 217-772) occupy a

total of around 450 printed pages divide as follows : headnote (pp217-360); andthen thejudgements of Pandian (pp 361-430), Thommen (pp. 430-469), KuldipSingh (pp. 469'501); Sawant (pp. 501-579); Sahai (pp. 57 t-631) and JeewanReddy JJ (pp. 631-772) - containing, as they do; a mixture of detailed analysisand hyperbole.

102. Mandal case (supra n. 5) Pandian I at V. 200-207 pp. 415-19 (on themeans test); at pr. 211-218 pp. 420-422, ageeing with Balaji (supra n. 31) that,the division into 'backward' and 'more backward' was not salutary ; atpr.219-234 pp.422-426 on the need to reject the creamy layer; at pr. 178-191 pp. 410-3 on the need for a flexible percentage as approved to a rigid 507o ceiling onreservations.

1O3. Mandal case (supra n.5) pr. 681 pp. 654-655 ar pr. 682 pp. 655-7 (perJeewan Reddy J).

104. Mandal case (supra n.5) per Sahai J. pr. 636 pp. 630-l105. Mandal case (supra n. 5) pr. 735-6 pp. 687-8; see also Pandian J at pr.

170-2; pp. 407-8 Kuldip Singh J, at pr. 392 pp. 495; Sawanr J. at pr. 526-8 pp.357-8.

106. State of Punjab v. Ram Jawayya Kapur AIR 1955 SC 549.107. Constitutional Caste blindness in India is like Constitutional 'Colour'

blindness in America where the argument has been rejected in a series of caseswhich affirm the duty to de-segregate (see Edwards v . Califurnia (1941) 31 4 US16O; Brown v . Board of Education (1954) 347 US 483; Green v. County SchoolBoard of New Kent Counry Q968) 391 US 430; Swann v . Charlotte - MecklenburgBoard of Education (1971) 402 US.; Wright v. Council of City Emphoia (1972)407 US 451) and the need to take affirmarive action on rhe basis of the forbiddencategories e.g. colour; or, as in our case, caste (see DaFanis v. Odegaard (1974)416 US 312; Regents of University of Califurnia v. Bakke (1978) 438 US 265;Steelworkers v.lleber (1979) 443 IJS 193; Fullilove v. Khutznkk (1980) /148


us 448).lO8. Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC (1990) 58 IW 5053 A powerful

minority (consisting of O'Connor for herself, Rhenquist CJ, Scalia and Kennedy

JJ) demanded greater scrutiny.109. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the references (supra n' 3).

1lO. Mandal car,e (supra n.5) at pr. 733 p. 686.

llDa. Mandal case (supra n. 5) and the details cited at fn 38.

lll. Mandal case (supra t. 5) per Jeewan Reddy (at pr' 641-2 pp. 632-3; pr'

649-655 pp. 635-40; per Sawant J (at pr. 415-8 pp. 508-1 l; pr. 429 pp. 515t pr.

480-482 pp. 536-8); per Pandian I (at pr. 11 p.364; pt.2l'2 pp.365-66; pr' 37

p.373).112. In the Mandal Case (supra n. 5) the minority does not question the

importance of the Directive Principles (e.8. Thommen I at pr- 297 -8 p' 455'

Sahai J at pr. 564 p. 582 pr. 627 pp.625-6 and also on Rawls and Dworkin at pr.

615-6 pp. 619-20).lt simply ignored their importance - its intuition being that

positive action to help OBCS, rather than reservations, is the answer.

I 13. See Balaji (supra n. 31) and (Chitralekha (supra n. 34)

ll4. Supra n. 37 .

115. Thomas (supra n. 38).116. Mandal case (supra n. 5) refeting to Ambedkar at pr. 40 pp. 37 4-6 (per

Pandian J) pr. 251 p. 433-4, pr. 265 pp. 439'4O, pp. 446-469 (per Thommen J)

pr.356-7 pp. 479-80 pr.362-3 pp. 481-483 (per Kuldip Singh J), pt 446 pp.

322-3i pr.49?-8 pp. 3zl4-5 (per Sawant J); pr. 569 pp. 585-6 pp. 574 p. 589, pr.

618 p. 622 (per Sahai J) pr. 687-94 pp. 658-662 (per Jeewan Reddy J), with each

judge deriving different strengXhs and accents from the same intervention.

ll7 . Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pa lewan Reddy J. that the identification ofthe group was only a preliminary step at pr. 782 p.716. This muddles the issue

somewhat. The cri teia for backw^rdness is "seculat''not 'cas!e', which, in tum,

is one of the principal causes of "backwardness"

ll8. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 756 to 765 (pp' 700-706) pr.772-779

pp.710-714; pr.784 p. 717-8 (per Jeewan Reddy J); at$.44-89 pp 376-385

(per Pandian J.)

ll9. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pt 34O p. 472.

l2O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 567 p. 584.

l2l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 571 p. 586-7.

122. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr' 349-351pp. 47 5'76.

123. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr. 568-570 pp. 585-6.

124. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Thommen J . ^t

pt ' 323 sub. pr. 4 pp. 462-

125. Mandal Case (supran.5) atpr.677 p.653 where the Memorandum of25 Sept. 1991 is reproduced in full. The reference to "poorer" sections is in pr.

(1) and is relatively easier to handle as a principle of preference on the basis ofa simple means test.

126. Balaji (supra n.31) at pr. 29 p. 661.

127. Chinappa Reddy J in K C. Vasanth Kumar v. Srate of Kamataka (1985)


Supp, SCC 714 at V. 72 p. 763 using graphic language to suggest the "creamylayer" is "snapping away" posts. lnthe Mandal case (supra n. 5),Iewan ReddyJ uses the imagery of "lapping" up the benefits at pr. 79O p.723.

128. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J. ^t

pr. 228 p.4Z and generallyon subdivisions within a group at pr. 21A-234 pp. 42U426.

129. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 229-234 pp.4%-426 per Pandian J.

130. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Pandian J at pr.225-6 pp. 4234 rclyingon Chinnappa Reddy J. in Vasant (rupra n. 127).

131. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet Pandinn I x pr- 228 p. 424.132. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 801-803 pp. 729-

731; pr. 843-5 pp. 753-755; pr. 793 - pp. 725.133. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr.792 pp.7?-45.133(a) Ashol<a Kwnar Thakur v. State of Bihar (1995) 5 SCC ,103.

134. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy at pr. 792 p. 72,4., SawmtJ. has a more comprehensive approach atqr,.520-22 pp. 553-554 requiring thedevelopment of "sufficient capacities" before exit frorn the reserved category iswarranted.

135. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 793 p.725.136. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pet le,ewan Reddy J at pr.792 p.725. Clearly,

the non-application of the creamy layer concept to SC and ST.137 . Mandal Case (snpra n. 5) per Thommen J at pr. 295 -6 pp. 454-5; pr.323

(6) and (7) pp. 463.138. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J. at pr. 385 p. 492.'139. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Sahai J at pr.629 p.626 suggesting a

slightly wider exchtsion in addition to the income test.l4O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at pr. 221 p. 422.141. Even on the very last day, it seemed that although the question of

promotions had been framed as one of the issues (see Manda I case supra n. 5 atpr. 681 pp. 654-5 Issue VIII), this question would not be re-examined since it didnot necessarily arise in respect ofthe impugned notifications. Yet, it is arguablethat it did so arise in that allocation of reservation was in rcspect of all vacancies.But this point was not adumbrated as the reason for going into this question.

142. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Ahmadi J atp.74A fn.145. The majorityconceded that the promotion issue was not before the Court (pef Jeewan ReddyJ at V. 220-l pp. 741-2).

143. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Thommen J. at pr. 300 p. 456; also prs.300-314 pp. 456-460.

144. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Kuldip Singh J at pr. 379 p. 490; andgenerally at prs. 371-381 pp. 487-91.

145. Mandal Case (supra n.5) per Sahai I pr. 622 p. 623 and generally pr.620-625 pp.623-4.

146. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Pandian J at W. 2A2 p. 4n.147 . Mandal Case (sipra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J. at pr. 321 p.741.148. General Manager, S Rly v. Rangaclai (19621 2 SCR 586:' Suu o!

Punjab v. Hira Lal (1971) 3 SCR 267i ABSK Sangh u. Union of India (1981) 2

330 The Politics of Backw ardness

SCR l8-5; see also Comptoller and Auditor General v. K.S. Jaganathan (1986)2 SCC 679 at 694.

149. Thomas (supra n.38) Krishna Iyer J at p. 9'74.

150. The Constitution (Eighty Fifth) Act 1995 which added article l6(4A) tothe Constitution which reads as follows:

"Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from makilg any provisionfor reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in theservices under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the ScheduledTribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented inthe services under the State."l5oa. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 828 p.746;'l5l. Mandal Case (supra n.5) at pr. 819 pp. 741-1. This is a Constitutional

requirement emanating from article 335 of the Constitution which reads as

follows:"The claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistently with the maintenance ofefficiency of administration, in the making of appointments to services andposts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State."152. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 831 p. 748 (in respect of promotions);

also pr. 837-8 pp. 751 citing Snte of MP v. Nivedin larn (1981) 4 SCC 296 as

an example, but cautioning (at pr. 83 of p.752\ that in certain technical postspertaining to the physical sciences and mathematics reservations may not beadvisable at all.

153. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 743-5 pp. 693-5,per Pandian J at pr. 168-9 pp. 407, per Sawant J at pr. 4304 pp. 516-7; perThommen J at pr.323(3) pp 4621' per Kuldip Singh J atpr.382-3 pp. 491; perSahai J at pr. 566 pp. 583.

154. This is best brought out by Sawant J in Mandal at pr.430-l pp. 516 whosaw article 16(4) being used for OBC reservations and article 16(1) reservationsbeing used for generally handicapped persons bringing the latter within thegeneral concept of equality (see Mdndal case supran.5 pr. 430 p. 516). Indeed,the only real justification offered by the majority for the 5OVo ceiling on reser-vations is that reservations are "special provisions" to be keptirithin "reasonablelimits" - so much for reservations being a part of equality and not an exceptionto it;

155. Mandal Judgement (supra n. 5) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 804-814) pp.

731-737; Thommen I (at pr. 299 p. 456); Kuldip Singh pr. 384 p. 491-2(agreeing with Sahai J); Sawant J at pr. 495-518 pp. 542-552; Sahai J at pr. 6l I -619 pp. 616-622. Earlier precedent seems 1o have twisted. Balaji v. State ofMysore (1963) | Supp. SCR 439', Devadassan v. Union (1964) 4 SCR 680 andState of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310 are made to sound moredefinitive than they were or intended to be. Insufficient emphasis was placed onthe difference between Chinappa Reddy J and Venkataramiah J respectively inK.C. Vasant Kumar v. Kamataka (1985) Supp. SCC 714 on the interpretation ofBalaji.


156. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at prs. 177-l9l pp 409-413.

157. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 807 p. 734.

158. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 810 p. 735 (per Jeewan Reddy J.).

159. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) pr. 814 pp.736-7 (per Jeewan Reddy J).

16O. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 817 pp. 739-40.

161. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) note the references at pr. 152 supra..

162. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 811 p. 735. This was reiterated in R.K.

Sabarwal (infra n 173) but has given rise to a considerable amount of confusion

on whether a person who has got promotion can get the benefit of access to

further promotion on the basis of his seniority which has, admittedly been

accelerated because he was promoted earlier with the aid of reservation. This

was not tully conceded in Union oJ'India v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 6 but

was in a further case from Punjab (see A7'lr Singh v. State of Punjab (1996) 2

SCALE 526.163. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735 where Jeewan Reddy J

makes a distinction between "horizontal reservations" (across caste lines) and

"vertical reservations" under art.l6(4). But horizontal reservations are not just

limited to "handicapped' (as Justice Jeewan Reddy suggests) or such similarlysituated disadvantaged persons but to all persons who are specially classifiable

as deserving of an allocative quota. This is based on the doctrine of source (on

which see fn.67 supra and cases cited there).

164. Mandal Case (supra n. 5) at pr. 812 pp. 735.165. Ibid. But there is nothing to prevent the executive from reducing the

numbers (see Kuldip Singh J in Sabha rwal (infra n.173) and Jeewan Reddy J. in

V.P.S. Chauhan (infra n. 173). Equally, reservations and quotas could well blockmerit candidates altogether (Cf Deepak Sibal supra n. 67)

166. On the doctrine of source see further the cases cited at n. 67 supra and

note the comments at n. 165.

167 . Mandal case (supra n.5) per Pandian J (at pr. 30-2 pp. 368-9, pr. 124-

150 pp. 395-402); per Thommen J (^t pt.246-249 pp. 931-33) per Kuldip Singh

J (at pr. 369 p. 485; pr. 393-4 pp.495-500); per Sawant J. (atpr.423 p.5i 3); per

Sahai J (at pr. 556 p. 571 pr. 585-88 p. 599-602) per Jeewan Reddy J (at pr. 659-

673 pp. 640--50). It is almost difficult to believe from a reading ofthejudgementthat controversies conceming this issue and case brought down a govemmentjudgement in 1990 and threw, at least, Delhi into chaos.

168. Supra n. 39.169. Curiously, there have been very few critical appraisals of the Mandal

judgement and its aftermath.l'10. Mandal Case (supran.5) per Jeewan Reddy J at pr. 814-8 pp. 736-740.l7l. Mandal Case (supra n. 5); Babri Masjid case (M. Ishmail Faruqui v.

Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 360.172. On the 'Creamy layer see the UP - Bihar cases (supra n.83) and on post-

graduate medical education see Ajai Kutnar Singh v. State of Bihar (1994) 4scc 401.

173. R.K. Sablrurwal v. State of Punjab (1995) 2 SCC'145 which stopped the


operation ofthe quota beyond the prescribed percentage limits. While the authorof this Constiturion Bench ruling (Kuldip Singh J) was in a minoriry in Mandal(supra n. 5) and clearly wanted to restrict rcservations in the matter of promo-tions till 1997, the author of the majority judgement in Mandal (supra n. 5),Justice Jeewan Reddy, was more circumspect and left it to the Govemment inUnion v. V.P.S. Chauhan (1995) 6 SCC 684. Justice K. Ramaswami J. howeverfelt preferential seniority could be given even at the initial stage (see Ghaulat'scase (1995) 5 SCC 625).

174. A phrase taken fiom V.S. Naipaul's : India A Million Mutinics now(London l99l ).

'This is PILSARC Working Paper No.l09 and anybody who will reproduceit may kindly acknowledge that it is a PILSARC Working Paper.

Index

A Long Way n Go: Report on a Sur- 216vey of Schcdaled Caste HighSclnol Backward Classes Comrnission, 17, 31and College Sndents in Fifieen Backward Classes movement, in Bihar,Swes of India,35 l7l-77

Adi Andhra movenpnt,36 Backwadne,ss, changing parameters of,Adi Dharma movement 35 9l-92Adi Dravida Andolan,35 Baines,99Adi Hindu movernent, 36 Balaji cw,59, 8G8lAdi Kamataka Andolan, 35 Baxi Comrnission ,20!-cf.,210, Zl5Adimjati Seva Mandal, 168 Beteille, Andre, 172Agarker,35 Bhanacharya Mohit,2+25, t83Ahmadi, Saghir, 296,3O5,3Ul Bhumi Putra Fauj, 174Akhil Bharatiya Anrt-Untorclability Bihar,

Lcague, 36 absence of Scheduled Caste move-Akhil Gujarat Navr*hna Samiti, 2l I ment in, 177-78Ali, Hyder, ll0 backward casres, 164, 181-82All Gujarat Educational Reform Agi- backward class movenent in, l?l-

tation Commin€e (AGEIIAC),2IO 77All India Backward Classes Federa- development profile, 199-2OO

tion, 175,264 population, 162-64All India Kurmi Mahasabh4 t74 reservation in, l&-82All lndia Yadava Mahasabha, l?4 exrent of, 164-65Ambedkar, 8.R., l, 3, 3G31, 35, 45- filling up quota for, 168-69

' 46,97-98, IO2-03,23O,237,3O1 income criteria appticability,An Assessnent of Education among 169

thz Schedtled Castes in Gujarat, perfonnance evaluation, 169-712lO recommendations, 165-67

Aurangzeb, roster system, 167-68Bihar-UP Creamy Lster case, !O5

BAMCEF,4I Buddha 6Babi Masjid cw,3l2 Burke, Edmund, 3Backward classe.s, 9rl-96Bacl<ward Classes and Resemation, Casu Prcjudice anong Colkge Sal.

334

dents : A Socio- Psycholo gical Sndy,35

Chandrashekhar, 176-77

Chandrika Ram, 43

Chatterjee, Parth, 193

Chaudhari, Amarsinh, 21 4, 243

Chaurasia, S.D. Singh, 263

Chinappa Reddy, 303

Chinappa Reddy Commission, 206Chitnis, Suma, A-25,88Chopr4 Pran, 13

Communal Award, 98-99, 103

Companies Act 1956, 186

Compensatory discrimination, theoryof, 3-9

Competing Equalities, 40,7 |Constituent Assembly, and constitu-

tional provisions for reservations.

4t-46Constitution of India,

article 14, 268afiicle 15, 22,30, 42-43, 46, 67,

79-80, 131-32, 134-36, r4t,230, 268-69, 27 5, 28r, 309

article 16, 22, 30, 42-43, 46, 67,

79-80, 129-30, 132, 134-36,| 41, 230, 268-69, 27 5, 27 8-7 9,

296-97,309article 29,269article 38, ,14

article 46, 44, 161,296uticle 334, 44article 335, 22, 45, 141

article 340, 43, 8lafticle 342, 92

Criminal Tribes Act of 1952,223

Dakua, Dinesh Chandra, 195

Dalit Varg Sangh, Ranchi, 168

Darji, Jinabhai, 213

Dasgupta, Promode, 185

Dave, Mahesh H.,202, 216Depressed classes, 47, 94-100. 225.

240Determinants of Fertiliry Decline: An


AruIysk,56Dharam Prakash, 43Dhavan, Rajeev, 262Dhavan, Rajiv, 12

Dhobar Commission, 105Disabiliry, 100-01

Dushkin, Lelah, 101

Dynamic s of Reservation P olicy, 202

Economic and Political Weekly,34Employment exchanges, job seekers

regi stration with, 77

First Backward Class Commission, see,

Havanur CommissionFranchise Committee, 99, 102

Gajendragadkar, 271, 277, 284-86,301,303

Galanter, Marc, 40, M,71,73, lO1,z5r

Gandhi, Indira, 5,203, 241Gandhi, Mahatma, 6, 17, 36, 97-98,

178, 198

Gandhi, Rajiv, 29

George, A., 250Ghurye, G.S., 104Gillion, Kenneth, 38Gin, v.v.,242Girijans,98Gokhale, 35

Govemment job, reservation policy forSCs/STs and OBCs, 13-28, 108-

59, |64-96, 198-21 9, 221-53,256-316appraisal, 256-61consequences, 240-53evaluation, 221-39in Bihar, 164-82in Gujarat, 198-219in Kamataka, 108-59

in West Bengal, 183-96Supreme Court judgement and,

262-316Govemment of India Act 1935,47,

Index 335

99-100, 104,231,235 Kaka Kalelkar Commission, 30, 48-Gowda, Nagana, 111, 118, 121 51, 56, 165, 175, 2'0.3, 257, 265,cujarat, 287,292

development profile, 199-200 Kalelkar, Kaka, 30, 48-51, 56, 165,

literacy in,207-08 175, m3,257,265reservation policy and system, 198- Kamath, H.V., 2

219 Kania,296workers by industrial categories in, Kamataka,

213 govemment service,Gujarat Karamchari Utkarsh Mandal, caste and communities rcpresen-

214 tation in, 143-45

Gujaiat Khet Vikas Parishad,2i3 population,GujaratKshatriyaSabhu2o6,2I2,2lT caste-wise, 115-25

Gujarat Panchayat Actof 1961,2O2 pmjected caste wise, ll8-21,cujarat Rajya Karamchari 156-59

Mahamandal, 21I,215 relative share, 122-24Gujarat Vali Mahamandal, 21 I share oi OBCs, SCVSTS, I 15-

Guruswami. Narain. 35 25reservation policies for SCs/STs

Haimendorf, 104 and OBCs in, 108-59

Harijan,36 extent of, l3z1-41

Harijan Sevak Sangh, Ranchi,36, 168 evaluation of, 143-48

Harijan3,98-99 income criterion applicability,Harper, A. Edwin,250 141-43Hartog Committee,gg percentage of reservation rec-Havanur, L.G., 57, ll2-14, 147 ommended, 13G37Havanur Commission, 57-58, 112-15, population, 115-25

ll8,121-22,130-31,133-34,136- recommendation of Commis-37,142, 147,150, 152-53, 155 sions, 125-34

composition, 150 socio-political background of,duration, 155 108-15recommendations, 130-31 Krishna Iyer, 279-81,286, 3O7

term of reference, 152-53 Krishnamachari, T.T.,46Higher education, pattern of,76 Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha, 173

Holdemess, 99Holmes, Sherlock,29l Lal, Guru Sahay, 174

Hutton,99-100, 102 Lal, Jagat Narain,45Lal, Mungeri, 165

Inamdari system, I 1 I kgislation and Cases on Unnuchabil-Indian Express,Z90 ity and Scheduled Castes in India,Iyengar, M.C. Ranga, 128 34

Literucy rate,76Jeewan Reddy, 296-97,3Ol,3O5 Lohia, Ram Manohar, 18,31Job seekers, registration with Employ- Lokhitwadi, 35

ment Exchanges, 77 Lokur Committee,92, lO5,203

336

Madhusudhan Reddy, K., 32Mandal, B.P., 173, 176-77,287Mandal Commission, 31, 48-51, 54,

56, 58-61, 65-66, 70-71, 78-79,r77 . r85 . 257 -58and Supreme Court judgement,

262-3r6critgria for determination of back-

wardness, 292-93Mandal. Ras Bihari. 173

Mandal, Shiva Nandan, 175

Manu, 4-5Manusmriti, 4Mayawati, 5Mehta, Haroobhai, 202Meston, 39Miller Comminee, 40, 109, lll,ll5,

125 -28, 135, 137, 1 42, 1 4647, 1 49,152, 155composition of, 149duration, 155recommendations, 1 25-28term of reference, 152

Miller, Lesley, 40Miller. Leslie C.. 109

Mishra, Ranganath, 292Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 39Mookherjee, 2Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909, 96Mudaliar Committee, 99

Mudaliar, Ramaswamy, 41

Mukherjee, N., 250Mungeri Lal Commission, 165-67

Musahar Seva Mandal. Rosera. 168Mysore case.27'7

Nagana Gowda Committee, 17, 1l l-15, 118, 121-22, t28-30,135, 137 ,

142, 146, 149, 152, 155

composition, 149duration, 155

recommendation, I 28-30term of reference, 152

Naicker, Ramaswami, 35Naik, S.C., 215

The Politics of Backwardne ss

Nair Committee, 99Nama Sudra Andolan, 35Narayan, Jaya Prakash, 176

Naroji, Dadabhai, 97National Backward Classes Commis-

sion, 3lNavrachna Jagritikaran Paglam Samiti,

211Nehru, Jawaharlal, 30, 43, 56, 141,

265,267,273,284-85Nijalingappa, S., I l2

Other Backward Classes (OBCs)

classificati on of, 47-74income criteria fot, 7 l -7 3

reservation policy for, 29-82constitutional provisions, 41 46fu ture perspectives, 72t82in Bihar, l6l-82in Gujarat, 198-219in Kamataka, 108-59in West Bengal, 183-96national consensus on, 29-37non-Brahmin movefienL 37 -42see also, Reservation Policy

see also, Scheduled Castes, Sched-uled Tribes and OBCs

Pai Panandiker, V.A., IPandian, 296, 304, 306, 309Pantulu, B., 35Patel. Birchand. 175

Patel, Hasmukb, 202Patel. Sulekha- 56Parel, vallabhbhai, 2Patil. M.S.. 129Patil. Veerendra. 1 12

Permanent Settlement, Bengal, 37Philanthropy, politics of, 95-96Phule, Jyotiba, 35, 94Pillai, Muniswami. 2Planning Commission, 9Poona Pact, 99Population,

Bihar, 162-64, l8l-82

Index 5.J1

caste and traditional ocorpation- suggesdons, 237-39

wise, 62-63, 115-25, 156-59, Supreme Court judgement and,

t96,218 262-316classification, 50-51 uneven distribution of benefits of,growth,54-55 252-53

Gujarat, 218 Resemation Policy in India,32indicators of classification, 61-62, Risely, 99

292-93 Ritual disability, 101-02job seekers, 77 Rudolph, L.1., 162

Kamataka, 115-25, 156-59 Rudolph, S.H., 162

literacy rate,76 Ryotwari setdement, 37

variations in', 52-53West Bengal, 185, 196 Sadhwani Committee, 212,215

Positive discrimination, principle of, Sahai, 296-98, 302, 306-0719 Sahay, K.B., 175

Prasad, R.N., 35 Sanjeeviah, D., 243

Premchand, Munshi,35 Sanskritization process, 8

Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, Santal Pahariya Seva Mandal, Deoglar,83-84.223.242 169

Sawant, 296RadhakrishnanCommission,250 Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes

Rai, Daroga Prasad, 176 and OBCs,Ramchander, N.,32 changing parameters of,9l-92Ranade, M.G., 95, 97 definition of, 88-106Rane, C.V.,206 initial acceptance, 90-91

Rane Commission , 29, 206, 2O9 need to deschedule,92-93Reservation policy, politics of evolution of, 93-94

appraisal, 256-61 Presidential Order, 103

consequences of provisions in Constitution, 89

Govemmentemployment,244- reservationpolicyfor,49 appraisal, 256-61

meritandefficiency,249-51 consequences,240-53political, Ul-44 evabation,221-39

Constitutional provisions, 22, 30, in Bihar, 162-82

42-44, 46, 67,79-80, 92, 129- in Gujarat, 198-219

32. 134-36, 141, 23O-3'l, 262- in Kamataka, 108-59

316 in West Bengal, 183-96evaluation, 221-39 Supreme Courtjudgernent,262-in Bihar, 162-82 316in Guj arat, 1 98-2 1 9 Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

in Kamataka, 108-59 Lists (Modification) Order 1956,

in West Bengal, 183-96 47major issues,228 Second Backward Classes Commis-perfornance, 224-27 sion, J?e, Venkataswamy Commis-rationale,222-24 sion

338

Second Backward Classes Committee,Karnataka, sae, Nagana GowdaCommittee

Secular disability, l0l -02S*gopta Rathin, 195

Servants of Untouchables Society, 36Shah, Ghanshyaq 240Shah, Vimal P., 210Sharma, B.A.V., 32Sharma. G.S., 34Sharp, Henry, 99Sheth, D.L., 23-25,221Shri Prakash, 2l , 23 , 29 , 198Silver Blaze,291Simon Commission. 98-99Singh, Charan, 19

Singh, Dasu, 174

Singh, Deo Saran, 174Singh, Kuldip, 296, 3O2, 3O5 -WSingh, V.P.,3-5, 257-58, 288-89, 298,

310. 313-15Sinha, Mahamaya Prasad, 175Sinha, Sajivan Lal, 173

Smith. D.E.. 162

Socially and Educationally BackwardClasses Commission, Gujarat, 69

Solanki, Madhavsinh, 2Ul, 209, 21 4Srinivas, M.N., 8State economies, of lndia,77-82Subba Rao, 271, n8,282, 301Sultan, Tipu, 110

Tebhaga agltatons, 193Thakkar. Amridal V.. 36Thakur, Karpoori, 165, 175-76, ?MThimmaiah. G.. 16-17Thomas case, 280, 286, 300-01, 3 12Thommen, 296, 30O, 302, 3O7

Titrles of India,83Tribals. 103-04Triveni Sangh, 174

Untouchable. 9+98. 100-01political leverage from, 96-98

The Politics of Backw ardness

Untouchability, 33, 83-84Untouchability Offences Act of 1955,

223,242Urs, Devraj, 31, 66, 112-13,204

Velasker, Padma Ramkrishna, 251

Venkatachaliah, 296Venkataswamy, T., 57 , 122Venkataswamy Commission, 31, 57-

61, 65, 67, 70, 8r, 122, 131-34,140, 137-38, 150-51, 153-55

composition, 150-5 iduration of, 155

recommendation, 131-34term of reference, 153-54

Venkatraman. R.. 35

Verghese, B. George, 11, 256Verma. K.K.. 173

Visveswaraya, M., 109-10

Vivekananda, Swami, 35

Wanchoo, 277Weiner, Myron, 172

West Bengal,development profi le, 1 99-200reservation policy, 183-96

actual position of, 188-91

impact of, 191-92

mechanics of, 185-88political framework, I 92-94report on, 195-96

West Bengal Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Reservation Va-cancies in Services and Posts) Actt976, 186, r95

World Bank, 56

Yadav. Laloo Prasad, 5

Yadav, Mulayam Singh, 5

Yadav, Ram Lakhan Singh, 175

Yunus, 174

Zachariah. K.C.. 56

The Politics of Backwardness

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