European Master’s Degree inInternational Humanitarian Assistance

Ruhr-University of Bochum, Academic Year 2005/2006

The politicization ofhumanitarian aid and its

effect on the principles of humanity,impartiality and neutrality

Submitted by: Thorsten Volberg

Supervisor: Dennis Dijkzeul

2

Contents Page

I. List of acronyms 4

II. Abstract 5

1. Introduction 6

1.1. Introduction to the topic 6

1.2. Methodology 8

1.3. Setup of paper 8

2. The humanitarian sphere 10

2.1. Humanitarian threats 10

2.1.1. Natural disasters 12

2.1.2. Complex emergencies 14

2.2. Environment of humanitarian response 15

2.3. Principles and standards 18

2.3.1. The ‘Red Cross Code of Conduct’ 18

2.3.2. The ‘Sphere’ project 19

2.3.2.1. ‘Sphere’ minimum standards 21

2.3.2.2. ‘Humanitarian Charter’ and humanitarian principles

23

3. The political environment of humanitarian aid 26

3.1. Western humanitarian aid 27

3.1.1. Influence of Western foreign policy 27

3.1.2. Perception of Western NGOs 29

3.1.3. Faith based NGOs 31

3.2. External involvement 33

3.2.1. Donor influence on humanitarian aid 33

3

3.2.1.1. Donor activities and ‘Sphere’ 35

3.2.1.2. Bilaterization of humanitarian aid 37

3.2.2. Responsibilities of host governments 40

3.2.2.1. Host governments and ‘Sphere’ 41

3.2.2.2. Difficulties of governmental interaction 43

3.2.3. Conflict regions 44

3.2.3.1. Humanitarian agencies in conflict regions 46

3.2.3.2. Local armed forces 47

3.2.4. Military involvement 48

4. Humanitarian principles in a political environment 51

4.1. Humanity 51

4.2. Impartiality 52

4.3. Neutrality 54

4.3.1. Controversies surrounding neutrality 55

4.3.2. Neutrality and local politics 56

4.4. Ambiguous approach of principles 57

4.4.1. Afghanistan 58

4.4.2. Serbia 58

4.4.3. Iraq 59

4.5. Solidarity 60

5. Conclusion 63

6. Annex 69

7. Bibliography 76

4

I. List of acronyms

ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability andPerformance in Humanitarian Action

CAP UN’s Consolidated Appeal Process

CIMIC Civil-military Cooperation

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DHA UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs

ECHO European Community Humanitarian AidDepartment

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IRC International Rescue Committee

IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks

MDG Millennium Development Goals

MSF Médecins Sans Frontiéres

NGHA Non-governmental Humanitarian Agency

NGO Non-governmental Organization

NPA Norwegian People’s Aid

OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAssistance

ODA Official Development Assistance

ODI Overseas Development Institute

PMF Private Military Forces

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNU United Nations University

USAID United States Agency for InternationalDevelopment

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II. Abstract

The humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality provide

an ethical framework that defines and delineates the humanitarian space within

which relief agencies are supposed to operate. Current experiences, however,

show that these traditional principles were not designed to cope with the de-

velopment underlying the increasing merging of humanitarian aid and politics.

To avoid political manipulation, relief organizations must rethink these tradi-

tional principles and face the responsibility of getting more involved in the

broader political arena to be able to take appropriate action, and to avoid long-

term damages on a society.

The ‘Sphere’ project, which was launched to improve the quality of humani-

tarian action and to put relief aid on a legal basis as set forth by international

law, acknowledges the dependence of humanitarian aid on external political

decisions. Still, it emphasizes traditional principles and expresses agencies’

commitment to act in accordance with them. ‘Sphere’s actual value must there-

fore be seen in defining a common basis around which agencies, donors and

governing authorities can potentially agree on. It provides a basis for defining

core humanitarian responsibilities that recognizes the limits of humanitarian

action, while setting an agenda for individual and collective action.

Even though the attempt to define humanitarian principles that serve as blue-

prints in every global emergency for all humanitarian organizations does not

seem to be achievable, the importance of ethical guidelines and benchmarks

still exists. The heterogeneity of relief work is just a phenomenon, which is

based in the nature of humanitarianism and this will always put a stamp on at-

tempts to find common standards, principles and codes.

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1. Introduction

“To what extent do you justify sacrificing the humanitarianimperative to long-term political strategy? We are not de-bating this — it is in the “too difficult” tray.” (MichaelMoller, Department of Political Affairs, in: HumanitarianPolicy Group Report 8, ODI, London)

1.1. Introduction to the topic

The past two decades have seen a significant increase in frequency and intensity

of complex emergencies and natural disasters, leading to a rapid transformation in

the policy and the institutional context of humanitarianism. Humanitarian assis-

tance, which once covered a very narrow set of basic relief activities carried out

by a small group of relatively independent actors, has expanded significantly to an

ever-widening and much more complex range of rehabilitation work. This in-

cludes the definition of aid as being a starting-point for addressing poverty or be-

ing a tool for peace-building in internal conflicts. A growing diversity of “non-

humanitarian” actors in the field, such as various profit agencies, governmental

and non-governmental armed forces, also changed the picture of humanitarian aid

and the perception of its character. This transformation has created a broad variety

of standards for performance in the field, and led to increasing uncertainties on the

quality of humanitarian responses and its accountability.

Humanitarian catastrophes, like the Rwandan genocide, finally forced humanitar-

ian agencies to think beyond traditional relief assistance based on the delivery of

food, shelter or basic health care, and take a deeper reflection on how they actu-

ally perceive their own role and accountability in the humanitarian sphere. In

1997, the ‘Sphere’ project was launched to develop inter alia a so-called ‘Hu-

manitarian Charter’, which tries to put relief aid on a legal basis provided by in-

ternational law. It emphasizes humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality and

impartiality and expresses agencies’ commitment to act in accordance with them.

These principles provide an ethical framework, which defines and delineates the

humanitarian space within which NGOs are supposed to operate. ‘Sphere’ and its

commitment to these traditional principles have both supporters and critics within

the humanitarian system, especially when it comes to its usefulness in addressing

the complexity of political factors surrounding an emergency situation.

7

Humanitarian assistance has always been a highly political activity, as it involves

engaging authorities in conflict-affected countries or relying on financial support

that can be driven by a donor’s political considerations. Nowadays, relief organi-

zations seem to remain even less in control of their working environment due to

expanding peacekeeping and “military-led” missions of the United Nations, re-

gional organizations or major Western powers in armed conflicts. Furthermore,

they are confronted with a growing scale of human rights abuses and the targeting

of civilians, including humanitarian workers. However, the necessity to interact

with armed groups started to blur the line between military policies and relief mis-

sions, making humanitarian action appear to be increasingly tied to the overall

political response of donor countries to complex emergencies. This working envi-

ronment is making it difficult for relief organization to maintain their neutrality

and to avoid political manipulation.

For humanitarian workers, it is a moral obligation to provide aid wherever it may

be needed, and the alleviation of suffering in humanitarian crises is supposed to be

the basic motivation in this context. Despite the pronouncements and practices of

relief actors to ensure that their actions confer no military advantage and that they

are driven solely on the basis of need, the humanitarian principles of neutrality

and impartiality are under constant assault. Several developments, most impor-

tantly the fact that in many current wars belligerents reject the very notion that

war has limits and attacks on civilians and other abuses of International Humani-

tarian Law (IHL) is part of a deliberate strategy, have led to the question whether

this ethical framework is still achievable in practice.

This paper examines the difficult realities in a heterogenic humanitarian environ-

ment, by addressing all the complex legal and political issues surrounding an

emergency, including the impact of external actors like donors, host governments,

and armed forces. It therefore provides a realistic understanding of the possibili-

ties and limits of traditional principles, rethinks their value in current crisis re-

sponses, and delineates the attempt to create and clarify new ones. In this regard,

the paper further analyzes the ‘Sphere’ process, which commits participating

agencies to act in accordance to these principles, on how far it is taking political

8

influences on humanitarian aid into consideration, and can thus actually be seen as

a reasonable guideline for relief organizations in the 21st century.

1.2. Methodology

The research for this master’s paper delves into contemporary literature regarding

the topic of how traditional humanitarian principles cope with current political in-

fluences on humanitarian aid. During the course of this study, a broad variety of

literature resources have been analyzed, including publications from multilateral

institutions like the UN, editorials from humanitarian experts in different aca-

demic institutions or NGOs, to field reports from local practitioners. A wide spec-

trum of opinions is covered in this paper, with the call for extreme political domi-

nance over humanitarian issues at one end, to pure humanitarianism, with its em-

phasis on neutrality and independence, at the other. Publications and research pa-

pers published by the ‘Humanitarian Practice Network’ (HPN), an independent

policy research group, have served as a very competent source throughout my

work on this topic. HPN is part of the ‘Overseas Development Institute’ (ODI),

Britain’s leading independent think-tank on international development and hu-

manitarian issues.

The ‘Sphere’ process has been integrated into this paper by analyzing how it actu-

ally has been aware of the phenomenon of humanitarian aid becoming increas-

ingly politicized. In preparation for this paper, I appreciated the opportunity of

interviewing Alison Joyner, Sphere project manager; and Veronica Foubert,

Sphere Materials and Training Support Officer, at the ‘International Committee of

the Red Cross’ (ICRC) headquarters in Geneva. Both have been very helpful in

clarifying the actual meaning of the ‘Sphere’ process, which supported the aim of

giving a comprehensive analysis on this project through robust literature reviews

and various sources of information.

1.3. Setup of paper

After this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the working field

in which humanitarian action is taking place, especially the impact of natural dis-

asters and man-made complex emergencies on societies. It further focuses on the

attempt to find international humanitarian standards to consolidate and regulate

9

humanitarian action, taking the ‘Sphere’ process as the recently most prominent

example. The main focus here resides less on the agreement of certain minimum

standards, which aim to put a theoretical foundation into practice, but more on

‘Sphere’s ‘Humanitarian Charter’ and the leading humanitarian principles of

humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Chapter 3 gives an overview on the context

and scenario of the political environment, which both influences humanitarian

work and sometimes even dominates the perception of relief aid in recipient

states. This section also points out the geopolitical trends in aid policy and the

extremely complex realities that put humanitarian actors in danger of being

misused to assert political, military or strategic objectives. Chapter 4 focuses on

the limits of traditional humanitarian principles in terms of recent political

developments and strategic choices that occurred. It also gives new perspectives

on how NGOs can reinterpret these principles without limiting their ethical value.

Finally, Chapter 5 provides overall conclusions and recommendations.

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2. The humanitarian sphere

2.1. Humanitarian threats

Since the end of the Cold War, an increasing occurrence of natural and human-

caused disasters, including armed conflicts, has become a central issue for the in-

ternational community. These humanitarian emergencies have led to an extensive

loss of life, damage to property, and the long-term destruction of the environment.

Many times, disasters have forced countries to postpone national development

programs and exasperated already difficult social, economic, and environmental

conditions, particularly in human settlements.

Even so, every single emergency is accompanied by a high amount of human

casualties, with over 1.5 million people being killed by natural disasters in the past

two decades. The destructiveness of extreme natural events usually depends more

on the number of vulnerable people impacted in the disaster region than on the

magnitude of the event per se. Annually, drought affects some 220 million people,

flooding 196 million, cyclones 119 million, and over 130 million people live in

earthquake risk zones (UNDP, 2004: 1-8).1

Figure 2.a. Economic losses caused by natural disasters, 1950-2002

1 It is important to note that the numbers of people killed by natural disasters is decreasing, in partdue to better satellite forecasting, improved early warning systems, and improved community pre-paredness in some countries such as India and Bangladesh, apart from 2004 when numbers soaredbecause of the tsunami effect (Oxfam, 2000: 2).

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Figure 2.b. Number of fatalities (2002)

An additional 31 million people are affected by conflict, leading to approximately

2.3 million casualties between 1991 and 2000, leaving 4.400 people dead every

week (Oxfam, 2000: 2). The number of people actually “of concern” to the

‘United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) rose up by 6 per-

cent to 20.8 million, from the 2005 total, which already saw an increase by 13

percent from 2004:2

Figure 2.c. Persons of Concern to UNHCR – by Region

Source: http://www.unhcr.org.

This increase reflects differing patterns of movement among the various groups

assisted by the agency, including refugees, civilians who have returned home but

2 See Annex 10: ‘Refugees and total population of concern to UNHCR 1981-2006’.

Region Jan 2005 Jan 2006

Asia 7,230,100 8,603,600Africa 4,855,200 5,169,300Europe 4,426,400 3,666,700Northern America 853,300 716,800Latin America & 2,070,800 2,513,000CaribbeanOceania 82,600 82,500

TOTAL 19,518,400 20,751,900

Source: Benson, C., Clay, E. (2004) Beyond the damage: probing the economic and financialconsequences of natural disasters, in: HPN Humanitarian Exchange 27, ODI, London, pp. 44-45.

12

still need help, persons displaced internally within their own countries, asylum

seekers, and stateless people.3

2.1.1. Natural disasters

Natural disasters exist in great variability and can have a severe impact and inher-

ent risk on a society and its development process; as a civic leader in Bangladesh

pointed out: “We have floods most every year. This year’s floods, however, have

been more damaging than most, setting the whole country back by a full decade.”4

Figure 2.d. Number and Cost of Weather-Related Disasters, 1980-2003

Source: The Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004: 13.

Although natural disasters like floods, droughts, volcanic eruptions, wildfires,

earthquakes and tsunamis exist in both developed and developing countries, the

poorest and most marginalized urban and rural societies will be least likely to re-

cover livelihoods and rebuild assets quickly. Several reasons have led to this weak

coping capacity, which puts large populations of the poorest inhabitants chroni-

cally at risk. Often research and investigations carried out to identify and under-

stand the risk zones in these countries are usually insufficient, leading to a frag-

mentary local knowledge on possible preventive measures, like land use planning,

appropriate building codes, safety regulations and response plans. But even if the

expertise in risk reduction exists in local institutes and universities, an appropriate

3 The global refugee population has dropped for the fourth consecutive year. Over the period end-2000 to end-2004, the global refugee population has fallen by 2.6 million or 21 per cent. By theend of 2004, the global number of refugees reached an estimated 9.6 million persons.(http://www.unhcr.org).

4 Civic leader in Bangladesh paraphrased from BBC broadcast on August 2 nd 2004 (The FeinsteinInternational Famine Center, 2004: 12).

13

financial mechanism is often not used and therefore necessary steps are not taken

(UNU-EHS, 2005: 9).

This lack of knowledge, or at least the lack of competent action, has resulted in a

visible increase of hazards, which are influenced by human activities. For in-

stance, the devastation from flooding is often compounded by preexisting envi-

ronmental conditions such as deforestation or farming on steep hillsides, which

can lead to mudslides, causing many additional deaths and injuries.5 In particular,

population pressure and poverty have been identified as key aggravating factors,

leaving people in subsistence economies no other option then to exploit their envi-

ronment (UNU-EHS, 2005: 9-10).

Future predictions, driven principally by climate change, unsustainable land use,

and improved technological means of exploitation posit an increase in the fragility

of the environment and a growing number of natural disasters.6 Furthermore, the

distribution of populations, primarily in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia, has its

influence on global scenarios. The UN estimates that by 2025 half of the world’s

people will live in areas subject to major storms and excessive flooding, leading to

even more communities not able to cope with that fragility (The Feinstein Interna-

tional Famine Center, 2004: 11-14).7

5 The flooding of the Yangtze River in China in 1998, which displaced over 200 million people,has been officially blamed on deforestation in the highlands of Sichuan by the Chinesegovernment. The typhoon that swept across southern Africa in 2000, producing flooding thatdisplaced millions especially in Mozambique and Madagascar, triggered destruction that wasexacerbated by land use changes and deforestation.

6 Especially the global warming issue tips the delicate balance between incoming and outgoingenergy of the earth and leads to more frequent extremes, to more floods and more severe droughtsand therefore to higher death tolls (Ginkel, 2005: 2).

7 Population growth outside the ‘Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’(OECD) region, primarily in Africa and parts of Southeast Asia, will make up practically the entirepopulation growth from 1995 to 2020, during which time global population numbers will increasefrom 5.6 to about 7.6 billion. This increase over 25 years corresponds to almost the entire globalpopulation in 1950 (2.5 billion). Africa, China, and India should each have populations between1.3 and 1.4 billion (United Nations, 2001: 12); see Annex 1: ‘World Population Growth byRegion’.

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2.1.2. Complex emergencies

In some regions of the world, deformed and failed processes of modernization and

transformation have caused a fundamental development crisis. Ethnic struggles,

failing states, and social processes of chaos lead to warlike conflicts and political

structures have to be installed while the economy and the society are influenced

by force. The ‘Inter-Agency Standing Committee’ (IASC)8 defines a complex

emergency as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is

total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external

conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the man-

date or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country

program” (McHugh, 2006: 7). With a focus on, often only formally existing,

states of Sub-Saharan Africa, a World Bank Discussion Paper even describes the

current status of many of these countries as a “stable situation of instability”

(Michailof, 2001: 3). A situation that often leads to so-called “political economies

of threat and combat,” includes a growing number of people who have an interest

in the maintenance of the conflict and a high propensity to violence. The past dec-

ade has seen a frightening persistence and intensity of conflicts and half the wars

that were thought to have ended have since resumed (World Bank, 2004: 4).

The nature of war is also changing as conflicts become increasingly inter-related

(whether at local, national, or regional levels) and the means of warfare evolves,

including the deliberate targeting of civilians and the waging of war for specifi-

cally economic motives. More and more conflicts involve the targeting or forced

displacement of civilians, as warring parties fight over territorial control as a

means to weaken enemy forces by targeting host or supportive communities or ac-

cess to natural resources. The parties involved are changing and proliferating, in-

cluding non-state actors with uncertain chains of command that make dialogue

and negotiation difficult and dangerous (OCHA, 2003: 2).

8 The IASC is a mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. Its foruminvolves the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. It was established in June 1982 inresponse to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening ofhumanitarian assistance.

15

Figure 2.e. Wars and Armed Conflicts, 1950-2003

Source: The Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004: 53.

The reality of contemporary warfare is that more than 90 percent of the victims

are innocent civilians who are often targeted because of their ethnic or religious

background. As a consequence, a large number of the affected population flee

their home and their community, and this forces humanitarian organizations to op-

erate in war-torn societies where conflicting parties are often openly contemptu-

ous of fundamental humanitarian norms (United Nations, 2002: Report of the Sec-

retary-General).

2.2. Environment of humanitarian response

Complex emergencies and to a lesser degree natural disasters have a large impact

on countries and people, like hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and net de-

creases in Gross National Product, which usually lead to a macro-economic col-

lapse. People face episodic food insecurity, which frequently deteriorates into

mass starvation, followed by movements of displaced people and refugees escap-

ing conflict or searching for food. Finally, both central government authority and

at least parts of civil society deteriorate or even collapse completely (Dijkzeul

2005: 15). Jose-Miguel Albala-Bertrand, Senior Lecturer on the Political

Economy of Development at the Queen Mary University of London sees the

fundamental difference between natural and politically induced disasters in the

way institutions are affected:

16

“In natural disasters, there can be some significant interference withsociety and therefore institutional change arising from both the impacteffects and the responses, but this is infrequent, mostly incidental and notnormally widespread or long-term. In complex emergencies, mostaspects of the impact and effects have deliberate institutional aims andovertones. Likewise, the response to this type of calamity is also bound tocause significant interference with society, which may be intense, long-term and mostly deliberate” (Albala-Bertrand, 2000: 215).

Parameters of complex emergencies are characterized by:

Source: Weller, 2005: 41; Janz, 2000: 2.

While traditional responses to natural disasters generally occur in stable working

environments and lead to a rapid return to normal conditions, experiences of hu-

manitarian crises during the 1990s have changed the humanitarian endeavor sig-

nificantly. Humanitarian actors were forced to think beyond traditional relief as-

sistance based on the delivery of food and shelter, and basic health care, and had

to recognize the root causes of vulnerability and strife. A development in hu-

manitarian action that made social, cultural, and especially political constraints

and complexities increasingly viewed as a real and vital aspect of any response. In

crisis regions, it became an important challenge to the international community to

provide aid in these settings without worsening the current conflict situation

(IRIN, 2006: 6). This, in turn, led to an increasing complexity of aid services that

put humanitarian organizations in the dilemma to act in an external environment

over which it has little control. Faced with these conflicting trends, agencies have

been “reassessing the processes that shape the nature and impact of their inter-

• Refusal or inability by governments (or other effective authorities, rebelmovements etc.) to comply with their humanitarian relief responsibilities inrelation to populations under their control through their own relief action.

• Refusal to grant humanitarian access to international humanitarian reliefagencies.

• Multiple factions – weak or dissolving government structures may requirenegotiation with numerous factions making it impossible to obtain centralizedand authoritative consent for relief action.

• Ongoing internal armed conflict which contributes to the humanitarianemergency or even generates it indirectly.

• Armed campaigns to obtain political benefit by inflicting horrendous humansuffering upon civilian populations as part of that armed campaign.

• Ethnic and/or religious factors that led to forced displacement (ethnic cleansing)or even genocide.

• Potential to increase suffering through inappropriate or misused aid assistance.

• Increased competition for limited resources.

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ventions” (United Nations, 2000: Report Secretary General). Notably, the geno-

cide in Rwanda9 in 1994 increased awareness among aid agencies for more

professionalism regarding evaluations, operational research, training, and im-

provement in systems. Since then, open debates and the exchange of experiences,

both within and between agencies, have become integral parts of the relief sphere

and have allowed discussion and thinking on the accountability of aid agencies

(Dufour, 2004: 124).

The humanitarian sector became actively concerned about the quality of humani-

tarian interventions, even though tensions between “conviction-driven social ac-

tion and studied professionalism with its standards, systems and accountabilities”

has energised humanitarianism since its founding years (Walker, 2004: 101). Ox-

fam realized as early as the 1980s that competition between agencies could lead to

lower standards, and a number of initiatives have been launched internally within

the sector that aimed to enhance the quality of humanitarian work and the ac-

countability of humanitarian organisations (Vaux, 2006: 246). European non-gov-

ernmental organizations (NGOs) in particular, were concerned that if they did not

take the lead in implementing their own system of standards and accountability,

they would find themselves forced to accept systems defined by their govern-

mental donors (Walker, 2004: 101). A process was initiated to target the “percep-

tions of weakness and inconsistency of the humanitarian enterprise” and to search

for an agreement on common principles based on international law and strategies

to build capacity to respond to the changing humanitarian context effectively, in-

cluding its social, economic, political, technological, environmental, and legal is-

sues (The Feinstein International Famine Center, 2004: 2).

9 The Rwandan Genocide was the massacre of an estimated 800,000 to 1,071,000 Tutsis andmoderate Hutus. It stands out as historically significant, not only because of the sheer number ofpeople murdered in such a short period of time, but also because of how inadequately the UnitedNations failed to respond. (Recommended literature: Melvern, Linda (2004) Conspiracy toMurder: The Rwanda Genocide and the International Community; Gourevitch, Philip (1998) WeWish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families.)

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2.3. Principles and standards

2.3.1. The ‘Red Cross Code of Conduct’

In the beginning of the 1990s, humanitarian agencies tried to summarize decades

of practical experience by codifying what they had learned and use it to influence

new agencies that were constantly forming. This process led to the ‘Red Cross

Code of Conduct’, published in 1994. This code put up a framework in which

“saving lives”, the basic aim of relief aid, was seen as the immediate need, but not

as the sole objective of emergency operations anymore. A “developmentalist po-

sition” was adopted by supporting local capacities, reducing future vulnerabilities,

and involving those affected by a crisis in the decision making process (Vaux,

2006: 240-47).

Source: The Sphere Project, 2003: 317-320.

Although the ‘Code of Conduct’ was envisaged primarily as relating to relief in

natural disasters, it has always been viewed as applying to NGO humanitarian

work in armed conflicts too.10

10 The first four articles of the ‘Code of Conduct’ are key restatements or re-workings of the firstfour principles of the Red Cross. The last six articles are more in the nature of statements of goodpractice in relief methodology (The Sphere Project, 2003: 312-322).

The Code of Conduct -

Principles of Conduct for the ‘International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement’and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes:

1. The humanitarian imperative comes first.

2. Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients andwithout adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on thebasis of need alone.

3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

5. We shall respect culture and custom.

6. We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management ofrelief aid.

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well asmeeting basic needs.

9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those fromwhom we accept resources.

10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognisedisaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.

19

The ‘Code of Conduct’ was soon criticized for “consisting principally of abstract

statements about the aims of humanitarian relief” and not addressing in any way

the critical issue of how to protect vulnerable populations and aid activities. Donor

governments and NGOs appeared to be addressing humanitarian issues in a “pi-

ous and abstract manner far removed from the harsh dilemmas resulting from

wars” (Roberts, 1996: 60-61). Further, the critics argued that no mechanism was

set up for monitoring compliance, for interpreting the code, and for making it

widely known among decision-makers and practitioners. So the ‘Code of Con-

duct’ had little practical impact and was almost immediately overtaken by the

genocide in Rwanda, which is seen nowadays as one of the defining events of 20th

century humanitarianism. Although aid agencies were present in Rwanda at that

time, they had shown little awareness of the tensions building up in the region and

that genocide was being planned. The response of the international humanitarian

community was not only chaotic and competitive, with hundreds of organizations

pouring into the camps in eastern Zaire, but also too late. Furthermore, the UN

gave mandates to small organizations with no significant experience, causing un-

necessary deaths of refugees (Vaux, 2006: 240-47).

2.3.2. The ‘Sphere’ project

Faced with such an unparalleled crisis in Rwanda, agencies came together to pro-

duce a joint evaluation and to document the failures that occurred in detail. There-

fore, the ‘Sphere’ initiative was launched in 1997, with the participation of over

700 individuals from over 200 organizations in over 60 countries, including the

‘Red Cross and Red Crescent movement’ (ICRC). The aim was to find a way to

combine practical humanitarian work with the body of International Law and to

clarify what it actually means to live a ‘life in dignity’, which Article 1 of the

‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ assures: “All human beings are born

free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and

conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”

(http://www.un.org).

The participating agencies came up with a technical elaboration of the ‘Code of

Conduct’ and a ‘Humanitarian Charter’ to reassert the so-called ‘humanitarian im-

perative’: the right to receive humanitarian assistance and to provide it wherever it

20

is needed, to all citizens of all countries (Slim, 2002a: 4). ‘Sphere’ was supposed

to be “a tool for humanitarian agencies to enhance the effectiveness and quality

of their assistance, and thus to make a significant difference to the lives of people

affected by disaster” (The Sphere Project, 2003: 14). The agencies committed

themselves to be held accountable against specified levels of good practice and, in

a broader sense, the entire international community against sufficient support in

financial and political ways (Vaux, 2006: 247).

Figure 2.f. The ‘Sphere’ diagram

The ‘Sphere’ project contains three things: “a handbook, a broad process of col-

laboration and an expression of commitment to quality and accountability” (The

Sphere Project, 2003: 5). It was built on the existing humanitarian foundation and

combined current best practices and existing universal standards, whether they

were from Unicef, Oxfam or ‘Médecins Sans Frontiéres’ (MSF) publications.11

11 When the concept of a broad NGO-led standards project was first mooted in early 1996, at leasteight other similar initiatives were going on. For example, MSF had taken a lead in developing‘Standard Response Packages’; Oxfam and UNHCR had been developing standards in water andsanitation; within the ‘Development Assistance Committee’ (DAC) of the OECD there are moves

The Humanitarian Charter

StandardsCommon to All

Sectors

MinimumStandards in

Water Supply,Sanitation and

HygienePromotion

MinimumStandards in

Food Security,Nutrition and

Food Aid

MinimumStandards in

Shelter,Settlement and

non-FoodItems

MinimumStandards in

HealthServices

Minimum standards

Key indicators

Guidance notes

International Humanitarian Law

International Human Rights Law

International Refugee Law

21

An agreement was found on Minimum Standards in regard to peoples’ need for

water, sanitation, nutrition, food, shelter and health care,12 following the aim to

"quantify the requirements given by the Humanitarian Charter for sustaining the

lives and dignity of those affected by calamity or conflict” (The Sphere Project,

2003: 16).

2.3.2.1. ‘Sphere’ minimum standards

The Standards, as they appear in the handbook, are general statements that define

the minimum level to be attained in a given context, and the indicators act as ‘sig-

nals’ that determine whether or not a standard has been attained. The Standards

further meant to describe dilemmas, controversies, or gaps in current knowledge

on humanitarian practice and to offer advice on priority humanitarian issues or

help to tackle practical difficulties. The ‘Sphere’ committee advises users of the

handbook to strive to meet these standards as well as they can and to use ‘Sphere’

as a starting point or as benchmarks. Most of the standards and the indicators are

not new, but consolidate and adapt existing knowledge and practice (The Sphere

Project, 2003: 6-14). However, the attempt to “cloth technical standards in the

language of humanitarianism and international law” seems to be a general vul-

nerability and led to concerns that ‘Sphere’ is promoting a picture of humanitarian

aid that is limited to providing water, food, health services and shelter in emer-

gency situations (Dufour, 2004: 139).13

to develop common financial reporting standards for humanitarian agencies (Walker, 2004: 101-2).

12 The focus on food, nutrition, water, health and shelter and their linkage to the HumanitarianCharter were not a foregone conclusion. There was robust discussion early on over whether asection on education should be included, with staff from UNHCR, Unicef and SCF arguing thatthe provision of education in refugee and IDP camps, on the edges of conflict zones, was anessential conflict-prevention measure and thus also an urgent life-saving provision (Walker, 2004:109).

13 ‘Sphere’ nevertheless took this critique during the revision process for the 2004 edition of thehandbook into account, which now includes important issues that are relevant to all sectors, likeChildren, Gender, HIV/AIDS or Protection. These particular issues were chosen on account oftheir relation to vulnerability, and were the ones most frequently raised in feedback from users of‘Sphere’ in the field. This also led to a new section in the handbook dealing with ‘Food Security’and an additional chapter, which details a number of process standards common to all sectors,including participation, assessment, response, targeting, monitoring, evaluation, staff competenciesand management (The Sphere Project, 2003).

22

MSF, and in particular MSF-France, were extremely cautious of the ‘Sphere’

process and concept. They criticized ‘Sphere’ for not taking into account that hu-

man crises happen across such a wide range of environments, economies, and

cultures that would make it impossible to set meaningful global standards. Fur-

thermore, it has been argued that in the initial phase of an emergency response, or

in a volatile context like an ongoing displacement, aiming ‘Sphere’s ‘Minimum

Standards’ is “above and beyond” everything that can be achieved and only pos-

sible if unhindered access to an affected population and adequate resources were

given (Tong, 2004: 182-3). Sphere’s technocratic approach was therefore seen as

a “strain jacket” that would pull MSF and others away from being “a value-

driven to a more supply driven business”, which could be provided by govern-

ment donors to constrain agencies action (Walker, 2004: 106).

‘Sphere’ nevertheless outlines that it is clearly intended to be more than just a

manual of good humanitarian practice and that it should not be reduced to its

technical issues. In contradiction to all the criticism on ‘Sphere’s allegedly limited

perspective, it does not dictate to any organisation what decisions to make, or to

use their recommendations as an imperative or blueprint (Lowrie, 2001: 37-38).

Instead it acknowledges that it is impossible to standardize the different ap-

proaches among humanitarian agencies on how to carry out relief activities be-

cause of their different identities, mandates and capabilities (The Sphere Project,

2003: 7). It also points out that in some instances, local factors may make the re-

alisation of all standards and indicators unattainable, including a lack of access or

security, insufficient resources, the involvement of other actors and non-compli-

ance with international law (The Sphere Project, 2003: 14).

The project sought a common format and rationale for standards, covering mini-

mum and relative essential goods and services, implementation of assistance and

stakeholder accountability. Additionally, donors were suppose to take responsi-

bility in order to provide adequate resources for future humanitarian operations

and to force them to connect their “high statements of ideal”; they have signed up

to international conventions, right down to what it practically means in the field

(Walker, 2004: 101-5).

23

2.3.2.2. ‘Humanitarian Charter’ and humanitarian principles

The ‘Humanitarian Charter’ is the analytical foundation upon which the rest of the

‘Sphere’ handbook rests. It tries to clarify what the humanitarian identity actually

is by providing some sort of moral and legal imperative behind the work that is

done in relief assistance.

“It’s only three pages long and it could easily just be flipped through andpassed over. But I think what’s contained in those two or three pages isprofound and it goes back to the legal framework in which we work andgives not just a moral and ethical legitimacy we base a lot of our workon. It gives us a legal legitimacy.”14

The ‘Humanitarian Charter’ is unique in that it combines human rights law, inter-

national humanitarian law and refugee law:

Source: The Sphere Project, 2003: 313.

14 Taken from ‘The Sphere Project DVD: An Introduction to Humanitarian Challenge, OxfamPublishing’, 2004.

Legal Instruments underpinning the ‘Sphere’ Handbook:

• Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.

• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.

• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966.

• Int. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1969.

• The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977.

• Convent. relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 & the Protocol relating to the Status of

Refugees 1967.

• Convent. against Torture & Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

1984.

• Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948.

• Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.

• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979.

• Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1960.

• Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998.

24

The charter emphasizes that all possible steps should be taken to alleviate human

suffering and affirms the fundamental importance of:

1. The right to life with dignity, which reflects the legal measuresconcerning the right to life, to an adequate standard of living and tofreedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

2. The distinction between combatants and non-combatants, whichunderpins the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocolsof 1977. Non-combatants are protected under international humanitarianlaw and are entitled to immunity from attack.

3. The principle of non-refoulement says that no refugee shall be sent(back) to a country in which his or her life or freedom would bethreatened.15

The ‘Humanitarian Charter’ further expresses agencies’ commitment to act in ac-

cordance to the principles of the ‘Code of Conduct’ (see Chapter: 2.3.1. The ‘Red

Cross Code of Conduct’), including the core principles that govern humanitarian ac-tion and that are classified as humanity, impartiality and neutrality.16

• Humanity: Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found,with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such aschildren, women and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all victimsmust be respected and protected.

• Impartiality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided withoutdiscriminating as to ethnic origin, gender, nationality, political opinions,race or religion. Relief of the suffering must be guided solely by needsand priority must be given to the most urgent cases of distress.

• Neutrality: Humanitarian assistance must be provided without engagingin hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious orideological nature (McHugh, 2006: 25).

These principles provide an ethical framework, which defines and delineates the

humanitarian space within which NGOs operate, since declarations like the ‘Ge-

neva Conventions’17 do not address humanitarian agencies and therefore confer no

15 See Annex 2: detailed description of the principles of the ‘Humanitarian Charter’.

16 Additional principles complementing these three core tenets of humanitarian action include:Dignity; Respect for Culture and Custom; “Do No/Less Harm”; Operational Independence;Sustainability; Participation; Accountability; Transparency; and Prevention. These principles aredrawn from: The Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief (1999) and OCHA documents on principles andpolicies for humanitarian engagement (Macrae, 2000a: 11).

17 The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977 are the mainhumanitarian treaties. The four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol apply to conflict

25

rights or impose obligations upon them. Although the Red Cross principles are not

prescribed by the Geneva Conventions, and established rather by the Red Cross

Conferences, these are also recognized and given a certain status in international

humanitarian law (Mackintosh, 2000: 4-7).18 Relief organizations are bound by

these principles, especially in conflict situations, foregoing political engagement

in order to safeguard access for humanitarian assistance. The nature of this is

captured in the idea that once humanitarian workers have established their non-

aligned role in situations of violence, they will be able to protect the humanitarian

space required by agencies in order to assure the safety and well-being of civilians

(and other categories of 'protected persons') (OCHA, 2003: 3).

The idea of humanitarian principles is an acceptance that war has limits; it as-

sumes that belligerents are concerned with political legitimacy, and that all states

have an interest in preserving respect for International Humanitarian Law (Leader,

2000: 2-3). However, the concern over the possibility of independent humanitar-

ian work based on neutrality and impartiality arises given the increasingly

politicized environment for aid work, where attacks on civilians and other abuses

of IHL become a deliberate strategy; military forces expand their range of tasks

onto humanitarian fields; and donor’s foreign policy has a growing influence on

relief agencies’ perception.

between States. Additional Protocol II and Article 3, common to all four Geneva Conventions, areapplicable to internal conflicts.

18 The content of these principles is fleshed out to some extent by legal doctrine. One of the mostauthoritative sources of this is the official ICRC Commentary to the Conventions, published in1958.

26

3. The political environment of humanitarian aid

“The relationship between humanitarian aid and politicalaction has always been ambiguous. The moment that po-litical forces are absent or not coherent we ask for politi-cal action. The moment they get too involved, we ask themto stop.” (Jacques de Milliano, former Director, MSF-Holland, in: Humanitarian Policy Group Report 8, ODI,London)

Humanitarianism has always been affected by political trends and therefore cannot

be understood or evaluated without analyzing the politics surrounding an inter-

vention. On a global level, donor states might channel huge financial sums into

aid because of national security reasons, or to strengthen domestic economies by

reinforcing trade and export ties (Harmer, 2005: 2).19 On a local level, on the other

hand, importing significant resources into poor and politically charged environ-

ments creates a concentration of power, which makes humanitarian aid a preferred

target for non-humanitarian misuse in recipient states (Curtis, 2001: 11). Further-

more, traditional relief organizations are no longer seen as the only actors in the

humanitarian sphere that engage in reducing human suffering, especially in

prominent crises. Potential partners, like military forces and private providers,

have increasingly emerged in the humanitarian enterprise and are active in policy

areas of humanitarian interest (Macrae, 2003a: 1). This leads to a wide range of

activities that are now carried out under the banner of humanitarian action or re-

lief, some of which run counter to traditional ideas about humanitarianism, in-

cluding the basic principles of independence, impartiality and humanity. In south-

ern Sudan, for instance, observers have noted a wide range of nongovernmental

actors with different religious, political and economic motivations, including

profit-making corporations, all describing their work as humanitarian. Francoise

Bouchet-Saulnier, legal counsel of ‘Medecins Sans Frontieres’ describes this de-

velopment as:

19 In the 1990s, concerns for Balkan stability were important in starting aid programs for CentralEuropean states such as Slovenia. For South Korea and China on the other hand, security factorsrelated to North Korea have always been large.

27

“Today, the word humanitarian is a label that tends to be used for a widevariety of activities undertaken by actors who do not meet the humanitar-ian law concept of an 'impartial humanitarian organization'… operatingunder very different forms and legal conditions" (OCHA, 2003: 4-5).

Moreover, humanitarian aid is seen by governments as part of a coherent strategy

of conflict reduction, which mitigates the effects of political and military action

undertaken by donor governments themselves.20 While policymakers, therefore,

incorporate humanitarian assistance into a political strategy to prove humanitarian

credentials to their own domestic audience, and for those in conflict-affected

countries to legitimize international military and political interventions, humani-

tarian actors fear losing humanitarian space and being reduced to a component of

foreign policy (Macrae, 2002: 8).

3.1. Western humanitarian aid

The political framework within which humanitarian workers are active has be-

come more dominant at the present time as a result of the current geopolitical and

security impact on the humanitarian enterprise underlying the ‘global war on ter-

rorism’. This war, which for many is actually seen “as an international vehicle for

prosecuting US defense and foreign policy”, not only reinterpreted the interna-

tional legal framework regarding the use of force, but in understanding the IHL

system in general, in which humanitarian aid policy will be defined and imple-

mented (Macrae, 2003a: 2). Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier even describes this war as

“a non-existing body of law, that creates an empty space, rather than creating a

framework for this action" (OCHA, 2003: 4).

3.1.1. Influence of Western foreign policy

Since the 2001 terror attacks, the lines between political, military and humanitar-

ian actors have been blurred as never before, representing a whole new level of

exploitation of relief. After the humanitarian community was reaching consensus

on the failure of political cooperation in aid response and the importance of rein-

forcing the principle of neutrality, discussions on how humanitarian workers

20 Thus, for example, in Serbia, the ‘Education for Democracy’ (EfD) project grew out of a need toquell anxiety among southern EU member states regarding the impact of sanctions. In Macedonia,the outpouring of aid sought to salve the costs of the NATO-hastened mass expulsions of KosovoAlbanians (Macrae, 2000: 51).

28

should interact with states have since been revitalized (Macrae, 2003a: 2). This is

particularly due to situations of political transition, like in Afghanistan, where the

provision of relief and reconstruction support was of vital political importance.21

Two years later, aid was already part of the coalition’s political project and has

been strongly demanded by the US government and the State Department.

Thereon the ‘United States Agency for International Development’ (USAID) de-

pended upon NGOs to such an unprecedented degree that some agencies have

been more or less degraded to contractors, who provide services to the Iraqi

population and have added to the already existing difficulties for local people to

distinguish between neutral aid workers and personnel attached to the occupying

powers (Stoddard, 2003a: 5).22

Instead of focusing solely on legal obligations to meet the basic needs of the

population, the US government is clearly seeking to meet political objectives. For

example, the contract awarded by USAID to a private company for the rehabilita-

tion of the education sector aims both to get children back to school, and to “lay a

foundation for democratic practices and attitudes among children” (Nickolls,

2003: 8). This is a governmental policy which violates one of the basic principles

of the ‘Code of Conduct for the ICRC and NGOs’ which underlines the independ-

ence of relief agencies and rejects any attempt to manipulate and employ humani-

tarian aid for the goals of national foreign policies:

21 One particularly example was the attempt by US forces to win Afghans’ “ hearts and minds”through food drops and the deployment of special military units in civilian clothes for bridgebuilding and digging wells (Vaux, 2006: 240).

22 The strategy of the US-led coalition in Iraq included among others to get NGOs into thepolitically-important city of Basra in southern Iraq, because there was, according to the military-run ‘Humanitarian Affairs Coordination Centre’ in Jordan, “a need to show people quickly that lifewould get better now that Saddam Hussein had gone”. The desire to use assistance as part of apolitical and military strategy in Iraq is not limited to the military. In May 2003, Andrew Natsios,the Administrator of USAID, explained to NGOs that they were an arm of the US government:“we need to show the people of Iraq an improvement in their standard of living in the next year ortwo” (Nickolls, 2003: 8).

29

Source: The Sphere Project, 2003: 318.

In light of the new US foreign policy, the neutrality question has “suddenly be-

come less academic”, and forced US NGOs to make some very difficult choices

regarding their operating policy in Iraq.23 Despite reservations about launching

operations in this country and to refuse funding from the US military controlled

local authority, nearly all have accepted financial support in one way or another

(Stoddard, 2003a: 7).

3.1.2. Perception of Western NGOs

One of the difficulties to integrate humanitarian action within international politics

is that relief organizations reflect the cultural, religious and political values of the

societies and communities of which they are part of, even if they are neutral, im-

partial and ‘non-governmental’ (Macrae, 2003a: 1). This puts NGOs at risk of

being intimately associated with the powers and forces that many in the recipient

state might see as the actual cause of their rather humiliating position; making for

rather difficult circumstances for agencies to work in, especially in environments

where international humanitarianism is mainly seen as funded by a “small club of

Western donors”, making it just “the latest in a series of impositions of alien val-

ues, practices, and lifestyles” (Donini, 2004: 193).

23 In May 2003, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios scolded NGOs for not clearly andconsistently identifying their aid activities in Afghanistan as funded by the US government, andadmonished them that they needed to demonstrate measurable results if they wanted to continue toreceive USAID funding in the future. Shortly after the speech the website ‘NGO Watch’ waslaunched by conservative think-tanks - the ‘American Enterprise Institute’ and the ‘FederalistSociety for Law and Public Policy Studies’. The US NGO community suspects this project asbeing a tool for the administration to intimidate non-compliant NGOs (Stoddard, 2003a: 5).

Code of conduct (Article 4)

We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy

NGHAs are agencies, which act independently from governments. We therefore formulateour own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy ofany government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We willnever knowingly – or through negligence – allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used togather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments orother bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, norwill we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We will use the assistancewe receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need todispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor.We value and promote the voluntary giving of labor and finances by concerned individuals tosupport our work and recognize the independence of action promoted by such voluntarymotivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon asingle funding source.

30

Western donors who are mainly represented in the ‘Development Assistance

Committee’ (DAC) have never enjoyed a monopoly on humanitarian action, but

they are a dominant force. Over the past few years however, the visibility of a

number of non-DAC donors has increased, especially in the development of aid

partnerships or regional cooperation. Nevertheless, in international forums where

aid policy is discussed and decisions are made, non-DAC donors are still under-

represented, and the actual number of non-DAC agencies remains low in compari-

son to Western NGOs (Harmer, 2005: 1); the ‘UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Assistance’ (OCHA) currently registers 260 Western NGOs and

NGO consortia engaged in international humanitarian assistance.24 While the US

is home to the largest single number of these organizations, with around 90,

Europe though combined accounts for a bigger overall share of international

NGOs (Stoddard, 2003: 25):

Figure 3.a. Operational humanitarian NGOs based in industrialized states

Source: Stoddard, 2003: 25.

Within this very large group of international players, a relatively small number

dominates humanitarian action. UNHCR estimates that some 20 European and

North American NGOs receive approximately 75% of all public funds spent in

emergencies (Macrae, 2002: 15). This might be one of the reasons for ‘Sphere’s

image in parts of the humanitarian world of being a “Western top-down idea”,

24 These numbers exclude development-only organizations and the numerous ‘briefcase’ NGOsthat spring up in response to specific emergencies. In total there may be between 3,000 and 4,000international NGOs in the Northern industrialized states, including development, relief and socialorganizations.

57% ≈ 160 NGOs

33% ≈ 90 NGOs

10% ≈ 25 NGOs

Europe USA Other

31

which just reflects the concerns, priorities and logic of certain industrialized

countries with their own cultural and financial specificities. According to the 2004

evaluation report, ‘Sphere’ remains “outside for many in India and South Asia”,

since for example, the living conditions of half of the population of Calcutta

would not meet the minimum standards, even in ‘normal’ times (Dyke van, 2004:

41).

‘Sphere’ however tries to counter this perception by committing themselves to a

diverse representation, which is supposed to reflect the global scope of the pro-

ject.25 The ‘Sphere’ Board, which is responsible for the project oversight, cur-

rently is comprised of 15 members, representing relief agencies in Europe, the

United States, Africa and Latin America. Still, 10 out of 15 are European, with six

of them based in Geneva.26

3.1.3. Faith based NGOs

Humanitarianism in Islam often seems to reflect a wider and more complex inter-

pretation of the term as it does for Western cultures. In particular for Gulf States,

the charitable obligations of Islam are a strong driver of assistance, and Islamic

solidarity has been an important factor in aid allocations (Barasi, 2005: 41-43).

Since, according to their understanding, the idea of relief is suppose to “include

those things which are needed to fulfill a person’s religious obligations and sus-

tain their spiritual life”; it might lead to significant divisions between Western

and Islamic traditions, especially if it comes to a more secular understanding of

providing aid (Harmer, 2005: 2). These fundamental differences, as well as devel-

opments in the humanitarian sphere since the terrorist attacks, have complicated

humanitarian collaboration. Western governments have been creating a climate of

deep suspicion towards organized, nongovernmental Islam, accusing Islamic

NGOs of being “hot-beds of terrorism”, while Christian NGOs operating in Mus-

lim countries must struggle with local worries that they “spread their religion to

25 ‘Sphere’s ‘Guiding Principles for the New Governance Structure’, in: www.sphereproject.org.

26 Members of the ‘Sphere’ Board: Action by Churches Together & World Council of Churches(Geneva), CARE International (Geneva), Caritas Internationalis (Vatican), Christian Relief andDevelopment Association (Ethiopia), InterAction (Washington, US), Int. Council of VoluntaryAgencies (Geneva), IFRC (Geneva), Lutheran World Federation (Geneva), Mercy Corps(Portland, US), OXFAM GB, Save the Children UK, Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation inEmergencies (Brussels), Action Aid (South Africa), Comision Cristiana de Desarrollo (Honduras).

32

create a bulwark against Islam”. According to OCHA Middle East Managing

Editor Abdel-Rahman Ghandour, a few Islamic NGOs actually did stray into

militant political extremism, where violence was accepted as another way of ‘de-

fending’ Islam, while the majority however remains genuinely focused on purely

humanitarian objectives (Ghandour, 2003: 14). Christian NGOs, on the other

hand, have undergone a substantial revival in power and influence since the end of

the 1990s, especially in Central Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America, where

they support among others education, development or medical aid programs, often

accompanied by religious instruction.27

US policy has sought to avoid combining government programs and religious

proselytizing for decades, to respect the Constitution's prohibition against a state

religion and to ensure that aid recipients don't forgo assistance because they don't

share the religion of the provider (Stockman, 2006, Boston Globe). This policy

has been changed tremendously by the current US government, raising the budget

for faith-based groups from US$ 250 million in 2001 to more than US$ 1.7 billion

in 2005, making USAID a growing source of funds for Christian groups and

shifting US humanitarian policy into faith-centered aid (Stoddard, 2003: 7). This

shift in aid policy has been caught up in a virulent anti-American sentiment in

Muslim countries, caused by the war in Iraq and the detention of Muslims at

Guantanamo Bay.

For locals it is extremely difficult to separate between policies on an international

level that they vehemently oppose, from activities of Christian aid groups in their

own country, even if faith-based groups may not tie assistance to religious partici-

pation (Milligan, 2006, Boston Globe). In such a precarious environment, symbols

and religious tracts, in hospitals or schools for instance, are already enough to

provoke discomfort in many Muslims, who are deeply resistant to conversion.

Nevertheless, the reproach of following missionary purposes gets reinforced by

the fact that US faith-based initiatives overseas are almost exclusively a Christian

27 Thousands of Christian NGOs and consortia operate across the globe; Caritas for instance is oneof the largest Christian networks with 154 Catholic agencies. It is based in the Vatican, receivesfunding from the Catholic Church and applies Vatican policies in its work. The ‘Love of ChristBrigade’ on the other hand deployed the largest resources of all NGOs during the response toHurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 (Ghandour, 2003: 14).

33

domain, receiving not only 98.3 percent of all such funds, but out of nearly 160

faith-based organizations that have received prime contracts from USAID in the

past five years only two are Muslim, while another two are Jewish.28 Even in the

case of the devastating 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, no Muslim organization

has been awarded a prime USAID award for relief work in Indonesia, the largest

Muslim country in the world (Stockman, 2006, Boston Globe).29

3.2. External involvement

The humanitarian response to an emergency situation should seek to alleviate suf-

fering of the ones in most need. For that reason, the ‘Sphere’ project encourages

relief agencies to design their response programs and projects by aiming to actu-

ally close the gap between existing living conditions for humans in distress and

their suggested minimum standards. Nevertheless, the Handbook points out that

an agency cannot expect to bring this about single-handedly (The Sphere Project,

2003: 13). In particular, the critical roles of donor and host governments in pro-

viding not only financial and material resources, but also ensuring access to the af-

fected population and providing a reasonable security environment, has been em-

phasized quite frequently (The Sphere Project, 2003: 34).

3.2.1. Donor influence on Humanitarian aid

In order to meet the ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs),30 some donors

have increased their ‘Official Development Assistance’ (ODA), which also affects

the amount of funds going into humanitarian assistance, making roughly 10% of

the total ODA since 1999 (i.e. in 2003: total ODA US$ 69 billion; total humani-

tarian assistance US$ 6.9 billion - excluding Iraq) (Oxfam, 2005: 2).

28 See Annex 6: ‘USAID contracts with faith-based organizations’.

29 According to records obtained by the ‘Freedom of Information Act’ USAID spent US$ 57million from 2001-2005 (out of a total of US$ 390 million to nongovernmental agencies) to fundalmost a dozen projects run by faith-based organizations in Pakistan, Indonesia, and Afghanistan.Only 5 percent of that sum went to a Muslim group, the ‘Aga Khan Foundation’ of the USA,which was given approximately $3.5 million for projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Milligan,2006, Boston Globe).

30 The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) – which range from halving extreme povertyto halting the spread of HIV/AIDS and providing universal primary education, all by the targetdate of 2015 – form a blueprint agreed to by all the world’s countries and the entire world’sleading development institutions (http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/).

34

Figure 3.b. Humanitarian aid as a share of total ODA, constant (2000) prices

Figure 3.c. Total humanitarian aid per capita from DAC countries

Source: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ghafr2003.htm.

International assistance is often closely related to foreign policy and security ob-

jectives and reflects wider political and ideological interests or concerns. Aid is

for that reason allocated in accordance to a range of political and economic, stra-

tegic and religious factors, than to the actual needs of affected communities - a

phenomenon, which is visible both with DAC and non-DAC donors (Harmer,

2005: 1-3).31 The Asian tsunami in 2004 moreover demonstrated, because of its

massive public response, that a high media profile also determines donors’ and

even agencies’ decisions to act.

Tsunami projects have since totally dominated the budgets and activities of sev-

eral aid agencies, even though the needs of the tsunami survivors are nevertheless

not exceptional compared to conditions such as those in Sudan and the Congo that

31 In some protracted crises, such as the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), North Korea, Iraqand Afghanistan, non-DAC donors exert both financial and policy influence. As a proportion oftheir national income, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia provided the largest volumes of humanitarianassistance amongst non-DAC donors in 2003, at 0.062% and 0.027% respectively.

35

have a low political and media profile (Oxfam, 2005: 3).32 After all, many or-

ganizations are quite aware of the paradoxical situation in their relationships to

donors: they limit NGOs autonomy in organizing and managing relief programs

because of the influence they have through their funding, though they only have a

very limited knowledge of what actually happens in the field (Dijkzeul, 2003:

222). Donor influence is particularly tangible in the following areas:

Source: Caverzasio, 2001: 110-111.

3.2.1.1. Donor activities and ‘Sphere’

Donor themselves are also impelled to caution, facing a proliferation of organiza-

tions of sometimes questionable quality, who all seek funding from them. This

leads from donor’s side almost automatically to a precautious selection of part-

ners, raising agencies concern that ‘Sphere’ could be used as a tool for that; for

32 One indicator of whether global humanitarian needs are being met is the UN’s ConsolidatedAppeal Process (CAP) that launches appeals in response to complex humanitarian emergencies. In2004, less than two thirds of the UN’s CAP requirements were met, with a shortfall of US$ 1.36billion out of the US$ 3.4 billion requested (Oxfam, 2005: 3). In 2005, only the 22% of the DRCshuge unmet humanitarian needs were funded; in Somalia barely 8%; and in the Central AfricanRepublic only 6% (Egeland, 2005: 55).

1. Country selection:

Non-governmental organizations are often over-dependent on the governments of theirrespective countries, i.e. government preferences disproportionably determine the situationsin which they involve themselves. During the summer of 1999, for example, there were 350organizations working in Kosovo. During the same period, only a handful were active inAngola, though the situation there equally deserved attention.Particular difficulties can be encountered in fund-raising for protection work: Some countriesare positively perceived by donors for political reasons. Although they may present seriousproblems in terms of protection, it may be difficult to obtain support for activities specificallyrelated to protection. In other cases, it is the other way around: if a country is considered aninternational pariah, it may be difficult to raise funds for humanitarian aid there.

2. Visibility:

Both private and public donors need to have their beneficiaries in the public eye. This exertspressure on organizations to increase their field presence and thus obtain a higher mediaprofile as a means of influencing public opinion and generating more funding. As a result,some human rights organizations are under pressure from their donors to be seen workingin the field in order to enhance their credibility. However, high visibility can jeopardizetraditional advocacy work.

3. Disproportionate interest in different categories of victims:

The tendency of certain donors to select their own criteria also applies to the way in whichthey determine which categories of beneficiaries should be assisted. This problem was saidto be more acute for non-governmental organizations than for United Nations agenciesbecause the latter have stricter international mandates. There is, for example, strong donorinterest in programs to reintegrate child soldiers into society but far less interest in fundingactivities that could help prevent them from becoming soldiers in the first place.

36

instance, by holding international agencies accountable for resources to the level

of ‘Sphere’ indicators. This has not been the case after all, according to the

evaluation report, except in extreme circumstances. On the contrary, it seems that

most governments of the nine visited by pilot implementation teams actually un-

derstood that achieving standards is a joint responsibility that can be constrained

by resources (The Sphere Project, 2002: 14-24).33

Some donors also tend to set their own standards, based on unclear criteria, for

identifying “good” and “bad” implementing organizations (Caverzasio, 2001:

110-111). ‘Sphere’ has picked up this point of influence and has taken agencies’

concerns into account by providing donor governments recommendations on how

to interact with relief agencies:

Source: The Sphere Project, 2003: 323 (Annex II).

These recommendations are meant to set a framework as well as limits on donor

interference in relief activities, once they have agreed on support, and seek to se-

cure agencies’ flexibility to respond to changing needs on the ground. This appeal

has been picked up by the UN Secretary-General who also called for more pre-

33 Donors support for ‘Sphere’ however appears to be rather inconsistent. In the experience of pilotagencies, some donors have required agencies to plan projects drawing on ‘Sphere’ and expect‘Sphere’ indicators to be used and monitored through logical frameworks. Other donors haveargued it is not always necessary to meet these indicators and have discouraged their use,especially with large populations where the total cost of projects would be beyond available funds(The Sphere Project, 2002: 14-24).

Recommendations to donor governments

1 Donor governments should recognize and respect the independent, humanitarian and im-partial actions of NGHAs

NGHAs are independent bodies whose independence and impartiality should be respected by do-nor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs to further any political or ideologicalaim.

2 Donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational independence

NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same spirit as theyrender it to disaster victims; one of humanity and independence of action. The implementation ofrelief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHA and will be carried out according to thepolicies of that NGHA.

3 Donor governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining access todisaster victims

Donor governments should recognize the importance of accepting a level of responsibility for thesecurity and freedom of access of NGHA staff to disaster sites. They should be prepared to exer-cise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if necessary.

37

dictable and flexible funding based on needs, referring to principles as articulated

for instance in the 2003 ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative’ (Egeland,

2005: 54).

The ‘Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative’ was launched at an international

meeting in Stockholm, hosting sixteen of the world’s largest humanitarian donors,

including representatives of donor governments, UN agencies and the Interna-

tional Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Its main purpose was basically to

reflect on donor behavior, to analyze challenges in the humanitarian system and to

commit themselves to the implementation of 23 principles essential to being a

‘good humanitarian donor’.34 These principles include among others an increase in

timeliness of aid and providing it according to need (Macrae, 2003: 10). As the

tsunami crisis demonstrated, however, there is still a far way to go in putting these

principles into practice. Donors’ unprecedented response to the tsunami in some

cases exceeded humanitarian needs on the ground, and NGO capacity to absorb

the money (Oxfam, 2005: 2).

3.2.1.2. Bilaterization of humanitarian aid

Within this very complex and heterogenic system of international relief,35 it has

long been clear that NGOs play a critical role in humanitarian assistance - both in

delivery and in raising public awareness and support. Their financial capabilities

are growing and some NGOs control a larger share of humanitarian resources than

ever before. Data from twelve official donors show bilateral humanitarian assis-

tance spending in the form of direct grants and contracts to NGOs worth over US$

1 billion in 2001:36

34 See Annex 3: ‘Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship’.

35 See Annex 7: ‘Resource flows within the International relief System’.

36 In addition, UN agencies fund NGOs to deliver their humanitarian assistance. In 2000 forinstance, UNHCR spent US$ 311 million of its US$ 706 million income through NGOs(http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ghafr2003.htm).

38

Figure 3.d. Official humanitarian assistance spent through NGOs in 2001

Source: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ghafr2003.htm.

Since the twelve ‘bilaterals’ above exclude some major donors such as Japan,

Germany and the Netherlands, it is clear that well over US$ 1.5 billion in official

humanitarian assistance is channeled through NGOs. Taking official and volun-

tary estimates together, it is likely that in 2001, NGOs managed between US$ 2.5

billion and US$ 3 billion of global humanitarian assistance, which makes the in-

come of some NGOs larger than total ODA from some DAC donors. This finan-

cial background puts them in the position to be active in more countries than many

bilateral donors and being at least as influential as many OECD development

ministries in their abilities to command public and political attention.37

Nevertheless, the increase of governmental funding channeled bilaterally, instead

of through the UN multilateral mechanism, brings donors nearer to operational

decision-making and involvement in agencies coordination and negotiation. This

tendency weakens the independence of humanitarian action and undermines the

global capacity of the multilateral system (Macrae, 2000: 5).

37 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ghafr2003.htm (10. November 2006).

39

Figure 3.e. Bilateral humanitarian assistance from DAC donors 2002 and 3003

Source: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/ghupdate190.pdf.

In particular, the United States seems to have overcome the “perceived con-

straints of international decision-making” by working through a set of bilateral

relationships rather than through a single multilateral body such as NATO or the

United Nations (Macrae, 2003a: 2). This leads to a strong reliance of some hu-

manitarian organizations on the government and puts them at risk of losing their

ability of deciding independently on how and where to run certain projects. The

major secular US NGOs could not operate at their current level without funding

from the US government: CARE and ‘Save the Children US’ receive close to half

of their funding through the US government; over 70% of the International Rescue

Committee (IRC)’s funding comes from public sources. To be able to regularly re-

fuse government support, these agencies would have to radically reduce the size

of their organizations (Stoddard, 2003: 29).38

38 The private funding raised by ‘Save the Children US’, for example, would not be sufficient tosupport significant programming by any one of its individual country field offices if its publicfunding were to disappear. During the 1990s, this dependence was expressed geographically, asthe headquarters of major NGOs like CARE and CRS relocated from New York to cities closer toWashington. In Europe, and indeed for the US components of European NGOs, the picture is verydifferent. Oxfam US is three-quarters privately funded, and Oxfam GB takes only about a quarter

40

Figure 3.f. Public versus private funding for six major NGOs

Source: Stoddard, 2003a: 6.

It is important to note that because of the global effects of the war on terror, gov-

ernments and populations in developing countries are demanding increasingly to

know where particular NGOs get their monies from and sometimes questioning

the political motivations of their actions (The Feinstein International Famine

Center, 2004: 77-78). Therefore, donor governments still continue to rely on mul-

tilateral channels for humanitarian action, especially when it comes to difficult

political conditions in complex emergencies (Macrae, 2000: 5).

3.2.2. Responsibilities of host governments

Governments hold the primary responsibility to ensure the safety of their citizens.

They are most likely to have the resources and capacity to undertake large-scale

multi-disciplinary initiatives, and a mandate to direct or coordinate the work of

others. Governments also create the policy and legislative frameworks within

which risk reduction can be accomplished. During civil wars, they are required to

educate and control the conduct of all armed forces on their territory and to pro