The Political Economy of Teachersin South Asia

Monazza Aslam, Shenila Rawal, and Geeta Kingdon

ContentsIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Teachers: Critical Inputs in Global Education Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Teachers: Largest Expenditure Item for Governments in the South Asia Region (SAR) . . . . . . . 5Teachers: Key Stakeholders and Political Players in Education Systems in the South AsiaRegion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Teachers: Key Stakeholders and Critical Political Players . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10The Extent of Teacher Politicization in the SAR: Examples from Bangladesh, India,and Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Engaging Teachers Is Critical for the Success of Education Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20Cross-References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

AbstractThis chapter focuses on teachers in South Asia recognizing the crucial role thatthey play not only in delivering a quality education but also in implementingeducational reform. Teachers in the South Asia Region constitute the largestfinancial component of the education budget. They are also the key, and moreorganized, stakeholders (as compared to parents and students who are the ultimatebeneficiaries of education) and can actively shape the education environment

M. Aslam (*)University of Oxford, Oxford, UKe-mail: monazza.aslam@wolfson.oxon.org

S. RawalOxford Partnership for Education Research and Analysis, Berkshire, UKe-mail: shenilarawal@aol.com

G. KingdonInstitute of Education, University College London, London, UKe-mail: g.kingdon@ioe.ac.uk

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020P. M. Sarangapani, R. Pappu (eds.), Handbook of Education Systems in South Asia,Global Education Systems, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3309-5_20-1

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through their associations and even through their direct participation in politics.Teacher unions and organizations provide an important forum for matters relatingto the betterment of the profession but also the advancement of the educationenvironment and ultimately the quality of learning. Using examples fromBangladesh, India, and Pakistan, the chapter highlights how teacher unions andassociations in these contexts have championed or hindered the education reformprocess. The chapter concludes that a collaborative and inclusive policy dialogueensures that key stakeholders are engaged in the reform process from the incep-tion stage and that they are motivated, rally around, and appropriately implementagendas that improve the quality of learning for students.

KeywordsTeachers · Salary expenditure · Politics · Education reforms · South Asia

Introduction

There is no denying the gains in schooling access that have been achieved across theSouth Asia Region. All the countries in the region have invested heavily in educationin the past several years to reach ambitious universal primary education targets set bythe Millennium Development Goals and have shown substantial efforts aimed nowat achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. These investments and efforts haveshown positive results with the net enrolment rate in South Asia’s primary schoolsincreasing from 75% in 2000 to 89% in 2010, bringing the region closer to LatinAmerican and Caribbean and East Asian averages (94% and 95%, respectively,according to the World Bank in 2014)1.

However, the South Asia Region is incredibly diverse consisting of large andvaried countries with huge disparities within the countries as well as across them.Some countries within the region have fared significantly better than others.Bangladesh, for example, saw net enrolment rates at the primary level increasefrom 50.9% in 1970 to 90.5% in 2010. India has also witnessed similar improve-ments (an increase from 61.4% in 1971 to 92.3% in 2013). Pakistan, on the otherhand, was reporting net enrolment rates at the primary level of only 77.8% in 2016(according to World Bank statistics, 2018). This increased enrolment, however, hascome at a price with a worrying lack of improvements in learning outcomes acrossthe entire region. Various yearly reports assessing basic literacy and numeracyoutcomes nationally for school-age children in India (since 2005) and Pakistan(since 2010) have lamented the persistently low or declining levels of basic learningoutcomes among children attending schools in these countries (similar assessmentshave been piloted in Nepal and in Bangladesh). Other, small-scale efforts have

1http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/06/30/poor-quality-education-holding-back-south-asia

2 M. Aslam et al.

reported similar findings. ASER Pakistan (2017)2, for instance, reports that 54% ofchildren in rural areas in class 5 could not read a class 2-level story in their locallanguage of instruction in school as compared to 50% children in 2013.

It is clear that the challenges of providing a quality education to the largepopulation of school-age children in the region are immense. Several parts of theregion also face further, more serious challenges, in the form of an untrained orill-equipped teaching cadre, with poor content and subject knowledge (Kingdon andBanerji 2009; Dundar et al. 2014) facing low accountability and poor incentives toexert effort with many regular teachers in government jobs enjoying “jobs for life”(Kingdon et al. 2014; Muralidharan and Kremer 2008). Teachers, therefore, play acomplex role as critical stakeholders in education policy reform. The most criticalinstitutional input in a child’s educational experience, the costs that are associatedwith teachers (in terms of teachers’ recruitment, their initial training and develop-ment over the course of their career, and the remuneration costs associated withthem), represent the largest component of most countries’ educational expenditures.The South Asia Region is no different. Where teachers constitute such a large shareof education budgets, even small gains in their effectiveness have the potential totranslate into substantial gains for the education systems (Raju 2016 in Sri Lanka).

However, teachers do not operate in a vacuum and education reforms, focused onteachers, or, otherwise, do not occur in isolation of the world around them. Mostefforts targeted at teachers will be influenced by the broader macro governanceenvironment as well as the incentives and actions of key players who operate withinand outside the educational realm. Even the most well-intentioned policy reformswith the best design features will fail when faced with unfavorable political economyconditions. Conversely, favorable political economy conditions can result in thesuccess of even the most complex of reform efforts (Aslam et al. 2016b; Kingdonet al. 2014). Teachers are not only critical stakeholders but also important politicalplayers in many education systems including those of South Asia. They can beorganized into formal groups (associations and unions) and are able to voice theirconcerns through collective action. In some instances, they are tremendously pow-erful, coercive, and disruptive. In others, they are capable of pushing for initiativesfor the betterment of their cadre as well as those that might benefit their students’learning. This chapter makes the case that effective policy and reform efforts in theSouth Asia Region need to better incorporate teachers as frontline service deliveryagents.

This chapter discusses the recent evidence from three countries in the South AsiaRegion – Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan – on the extent to which teachers engagein organized activity through association and unions to voice their concerns (polit-icization). It makes a case for focusing on teachers’ substantial power, specifically incertain contexts, while also recognizing the importance of engaging with teachers toensure key schooling reforms are well-designed and appropriately implemented bythem. The chapter will discuss how anecdotal, and more recent, empirical evidence

2These findings are based on a sample of over 250,000 children across all rural districts on Pakistan.

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 3

in parts of the South Asia Region points to significant political penetration byteachers through formal well-structured unions – as in India and to some extent inPakistan – or much weaker, though still organized, presence through associations asin Bangladesh. In many parts of the region, teachers are also organized into vocaland sometimes disruptive unions or associations or backed by powerful politicianswhich can make the reform process sluggish and sometimes impossible (Kingdonand Muzammil 2013; Béteille 2009). Given these challenging situations, the moti-vation of teachers to rally for agendas that relate to the betterment of learningoutcomes is often weak and sometimes nonexistent but much needed. The followingsection sets the stage for this chapter by emphasizing the crucial role of teachers inglobal education systems.

Teachers: Critical Inputs in Global Education Systems

There is a strong and robust evidence base from across the globe that unequivocallyrecognizes the importance of teachers in children’s education. Many researchersbelieve that teachers play the most important institutional role in determining studentoutcomes (Hanushek 2011). This is the case in both developed and developingcontexts including within the South Asia Region (Aslam et al. 2016a; Azam andKingdon 2015; Bau and Das 2017; De Talancé 2017). Despite this, extensivedeliberations still continue on what constitutes and defines an effective teacher andhow such a person can be recruited, trained, and motivated to perform as effectivelyas possible.

The evidence base examining the role of teachers in improving student outcomeshas grown in the South Asia Region. The quantitative literature in particular hasaimed at measuring “teacher quality” and tried to identify the characteristics of ateacher and their teaching practice that makes one teacher more effective thananother. Using an “education production function” approach, some studies haveexamined the correlation between measurable teacher characteristics and pupilachievement, while “controlling for” (or holding constant) a range of other schooland family inputs. Results from these kinds of analyses have led to a near consensusthat the standard observable teacher characteristics such as years of experience andcertification (such as pre-service training and educational qualifications) do notmatter substantially for pupil achievement (Azam and Kingdon 2015 in India;Aslam and Kingdon 2011 in Pakistan; Bau and Das 2017 in Pakistan; De Talancé2017 in Pakistan). However, these résumé style characteristics are often the basis onwhich teachers are recruited and remunerated, and, therefore, these findings are ofcritical policy concern. More recent evidence taking a different tack measuresteacher quality by considering those teachers as “high-quality” teachers whosesuccessive batches/cohorts of students display larger achievement gains than otherteachers; here teacher quality is measured as a “teacher fixed effect” in a regressionof “change in student achievement” using data from successive cohorts of students.This evidence shows that teacher quality defined in this way varies a lot acrossteachers within a school, that it is a strong predictor of student achievement, and that

4 M. Aslam et al.

teachers’ resume characteristics, i.e., training, qualifications, and experience, are notgood predictors of (this measure of) teacher quality, in the same way that they werenot good predictors of student achievement (Azam and Kingdon 2015). More recentevidence from Pakistan finds that while teacher fixed effects are highly significantpredictors of student achievement, having more qualified teachers is also associatedwith greater pupil progress (when measured as a value added, i.e., learning gainsover time)3.

There is an increasing body of global evidence examining not only what teachersare but also what they do in determining pupil outcomes. For example, examiningthe “black box” of teaching through classroom observation and linking this data tostudent learning have provided further evidence on teacher and teaching quality. Theuse of classroom observations in the South Asian context is nascent but growing.There is some evidence from studies in South Asian countries (Dundar et al. 2014 inIndia; Rawal and Kingdon 2010 and Rawal et al. 2013 in India and Pakistan; andAslam and Kingdon 2011 for Pakistan) that indicates that differential teachereffectiveness can stem from differences in how teachers actually teach within theirclassrooms including aspects such as use of time, pedagogical methods, etc. Anotherpiece of evidence from India suggests that most of the interactions between theteacher and the taught are characterized by teacher-centered activities and rotelearning (e.g., Sankar and Linden 2014) which in turn can affect how effectivethese teachers are.

Teachers: Largest Expenditure Item for Governments in the SouthAsia Region (SAR)

Although most countries in the region have seen expansion in private provision ofeducation, the government remains the largest provider and employs the significantmajority of teachers in most countries in the region. In a world of constrainedbudgets, expenditure is at the forefront of policy discussions.

In fact, teacher salary constitutes the vast bulk of total recurrent educationexpenditure in most countries in the region. According to Atherton and Kingdon(2014 Mimeo), averaging across primary and secondary schooling, 98.5% of therecurrent education expenditure in Bangladesh is taken up by salaries (according todata from 2004 to 2005). This amounts to 96% in India (data from 1996) andbetween 85% and 90% in Sri Lanka (data from 2003 to 2004). In Pakistan, wheredata are only available at the primary level, salary expenses constitute 96.5% of total

3While previous literature from Pakistan has found that teacher qualifications do not necessarilypredict pupil learning or gains in learning, this new piece of evidence is nevertheless important froma policy perspective (see Aslam et al. 2018).

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 5

recurrent education expenditure (data from 2008 to 2009), and this is 90% in Nepalat the primary level (based on data from 2006 to 2007). The key takeaway is thatacross the region, high proportions of expenditure are being devoted to teachersalaries which consequentially leave limited resources for other school expenditures.

The reform of a salary structure is arguably one of the most important policylevers in the recruitment, retention, and incentivization of an effective workforce.Paying teachers better cannot only attract a more superior cadre of candidates butmay also raise teacher effort; however, as per efficiency wage theory in laboreconomics, for a salary increase to elicit greater effort, the threat of dismissal mustbe credible if the employee is found shirking (e.g., found to be chronically absentee).As we stated earlier, the strength of teacher unions and the educational governanceenvironment in some South Asian countries is such that public sector teachers arerarely disciplined or sacked – for example, Muralidharan and Kremer (2008) reportthat in their survey of 3000 public schools across 20 major Indian states, principalsreported only 1 case of the sacking of a teacher ever, even though in these samesample schools, the teacher absence rate was extremely high at 26%. In such anenvironment of lack of teacher accountability, it is perhaps not surprising that whenthe Indian government doubled the salaries of public sector teachers in 2009following its Sixth Pay Commission’s recommendations, student learning in publicschools (which at least partly reflects teacher effort) did not rise; indeed it fellsubstantially and steadily over the period 2008 to 2014, as per the Annual Statusof Education Report (ASER Trends 2015). In other words, generous public sectorsalary increases need to be introduced concomitantly with acceptance of greateraccountability by the public sector teacher unions.

Examining the social and economic gap between teachers and students, as well asbetween teachers and the wider working population, can provide useful insights intothe dynamics of teacher politics. Research examining this has been conducted in theregion, and the evidence has shown that where there is a wide gap in terms of botheconomic and social factors between the teachers and the children they teach, thiscan result in potentially detrimental effects on the outcomes of their pupils (Rawaland Kingdon 2010 in India; Dee 2007, USA). The differential between teachersalaries and other occupations can be investigated through comparing teachersalaries to those of other equivalent occupations, as well as by comparing teachersalaries with per capita GDP. This has been done by Dundar et al. (2014) and Aslamet al. (2016b). The figures below show that teacher salaries exhibit heterogeneity inthese comparisons across as well as within the three countries of India, Pakistan, andBangladesh.

Figure 1 illustrates that on average in Pakistan and Bangladesh, teachers are notvery different (in terms of salary) to other comparable professions although they aremarginally better than some of the other nonteaching occupations.

It is clear from Fig. 1 that teachers are paid several times more than the averageperson with similar qualifications (aged 18 or more, wage workers with at least

6 M. Aslam et al.

10 years of schooling4) in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Figures 2, 3, and 4, in particular,show teacher salary as a multiple of the country’s per capita income and, therefore,provide a reflection of how well or poorly teachers are paid as compared to theaverage per capita income in the country. Among the countries in the SAR, Pakistanappears to have the highest average multiple of teacher salaries as compared to percapita GDP (5.2), followed by India (4.2), and then by Bangladesh (2). As men-tioned, this economic distance has been shown to be negatively related to studentoutcomes in the region. However, there are large disparities within countries. Biharin India provides one such example where a teacher earns nearly 12 times as much asthe average person5 (Fig. 3). Similarly, an average teacher in Balochistan province inPakistan can earn six times as much as an average person (Fig. 4).

Table 1 below is an updated analysis of public sector teacher salaries, per capitaGDP, and teacher salaries as a multiple of per capita GDP in India in 2014. This tableillustrates the effect of the Sixth Pay Commission in India which was implemented in

Source:Source: Aslam et al. (2016Aslam et al. (2016bb))

00

0.20.2

0.40.4

0.60.6

0.80.8

11

1.21.2

1.41.4

1.61.6

1.81.8

Bangladesh 2005Bangladesh 2005

Pakistan 2008Pakistan 2008

Fig. 1 Ratio of teacher salary to salary in other occupations: Bangladesh (2005), Pakistan (2008).(Source: Aslam et al. 2016b)

4These calculations are based mainly on Labour Force Survey data. The sample was restricted towage workers aged 18 or more and with at least 10 years education in order to capture youngteachers with at least 10 years of schooling (especially in poorly resourced rural areas).5The multiple varies much across states because although teacher salaries across the Indian statesare similar (being based on the recommendations of a Central Pay Commission), per capita incomevaries enormously across states. For example, Bihar has by far the lowest per capita income amongall the states of India.

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 7

2009 and which virtually doubled teacher salaries in public schools. Figures from2008 shown previously show teacher salaries as a multiple of GDP estimated ataround 4.2. These later figures estimate the multiple to be in the order of seven forprimary education and nine for upper primary education.

Despite the fact that in many South Asian countries, such as India, teachers areperceived as being relatively well paid, salary still tends to top the lobbying agenda

Source: Aslam et al. (2016b)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Teacher salary as multiple of per capita income (Rupees, 2008)

Fig. 3 Teacher salary as a multiple of per capita income – India (2008), by state. (Source: Aslamet al. 2016b)

Source: Aslam et al. (2016b)

00.5

11.5

22.5

3

Teacher salary as multiple of per capita income (Takas, 2002)

Fig. 2 Teacher salary as a multiple of per capita income – Bangladesh (2002), by district. (Source:Aslam et al. 2016b)

8 M. Aslam et al.

Source: Aslam et al. (2016b)

01234567

Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Pakistan

Teacher salary as multiple of per capita income (Rupees, 2008)

Fig. 4 Teacher salary as a multiple of per capita income – Pakistan (2008), by province. (Source:Aslam et al. 2016b)

Table 1 Govt. primary and junior school teachers’ mean salary as a multiple of state per capitaGDP, 2014–2015

Govt. primaryschool

Govt. juniorschool

StateDomesticProduct percapita(2014–2015)

Primaryteachersalary asamultipleof statepercapitaincome

Juniorteachersalary asamultipleof statepercapitaincomeState

Take-homesalarypermonthJuly2014

Take-homesalaryperannumJuly2014

Take-homesalarypermonthJuly2014

Take-homesalaryperannumJuly2014

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) = b/e (g)= d/e

TamilNadu

28,660 343920 48,750 585000 128366 2.7 4.6

Karnataka 28,148 337776 37,298 447576 101594 3.3 4.4

Jharkhand 41,520 498240 58,842 706104 52147 9.6 13.5

Odisha 26,659 319908 37,806 453672 59229 5.4 7.7

UttarPradesh

39,683 476196 47,716 572592 40373 11.8 14.2

Punjab 59,654 715848 67,480 809760 99578 7.2 8.1

Simplemean

6.7 8.7

Source: Kingdon (2017)Note: A junior school is one which has classes from grades 6 to 8 (typically catering 11–13 yearsold children). It is also called middle school to distinguish it from primary schools (grades 1–5) orsecondary schools and senior secondary schools (grades 9–12)

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 9

of most unions and one of the top concerns reported in satisfaction surveys (seebelow). Additional evidence from the region also indicates teachers’ concern withthe decline in the occupational status of teaching as a profession and the growingrecruitment of unqualified and untrained teachers as undermining the profession(e.g., in Pakistan).

While better salaries would attract more able individuals into the profession,unless appropriate accountability measures are in place, this higher salary wouldnot necessarily translate into higher effort when there is no incentive for chroniclaxity in work. For example, evidence from SchoolTELLS survey in India notesthat despite being paid four times as much, regular teachers are less motivated,i.e., apply less effort, than contract or “para” teachers: their absence rate of 25%(1 out of every 4 school days) is double the para teachers’ absence rate of 12%, andtheir self-reported teaching time on a typical day is 75% rather than 83% for parateachers. Other studies also report substantially higher absence rates for regular thanpara teachers (EdCil 2008; NCAER 2008; Sankar 2009). This also highlights theneed to look at nonfinancial motivations such as autonomy, responsibility, workingconditions, nonteaching and administrative workload on teachers, and transparency.Fundamentally, there is a need for more longer-term systematic change of the imageand the respect that is accorded to the teaching profession within the region.

In summary, the government remains the dominant provider of education in mostcountries in South Asia, and teachers constitute the bulk of government educationexpenditures in the region. There is also evidence to suggest that state schoolteachers in at least three countries of the region – India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh– are relatively well paid. Given these facts, even small gains in teacher effectivenesshave the potential to result in large efficiency gains for the system. With publiceducation systems grappling with optimal levels and compositions of public spend-ing, some argue that improving public sector inefficiencies within education budgetsrather than increasing spending might be the appropriate strategy. Muralidharan et al.(2017) make a convincing case for this by assessing a critical cause of public sectorinefficiency in India – high teacher absence among state school teachers – and findthat a policy alternative to hiring more teachers (and increased public spending) isa reduction in teacher absence through increased teacher monitoring. This, theyargue, could be over ten times more cost-effective at reducing the “effective” teacherratio (net of teacher absence) than hiring additional teachers and increasing publicspending on education.

Teachers: Key Stakeholders and Political Players in EducationSystems in the South Asia Region

Teachers: Key Stakeholders and Critical Political Players

While there are a number of stakeholders within the education system, teachers aretypically the best organized and most vocal among all these stakeholder groups.As a result, they are more likely to have the power to influence the education policy

10 M. Aslam et al.

agenda as well as the implementation of key reforms. Institutionally, as discussedabove, teachers have the most influence on their pupils’ outcomes, and these out-comes are for a large part a reflection of that teacher’s effectiveness. Given this andtheir insights into the education process as well as their knowledge of the childrenthey teach, their incentives should be aligned with those of other stakeholders withinthe education system also aiming for the ultimate goal of improving pupil outcomes.Therefore, teachers can provide a very useful and informed partner to the govern-ment in the design and successful implementation of good education policy. In theseinstances, engaging teachers early in the reform process can prove a crucial drivingforce behind the ultimate success of that reform. However, in some instances,a teacher’s own incentives and agenda may not be aligned with the needs of thechildren and, therefore, may result in them attempting to hinder the reform process.In these instances, teachers can become a barrier to change within that country. Thereare, however, examples of situations where teachers have resisted reform, and thishas ultimately benefited the target population because that reform was not necessar-ily in the best interest of the pupils such as the introduction of English-mediuminstruction in Punjab, Pakistan, where a majority of the population’s mother tongueis different and where teachers are not trained to teach in English. This reform effortwas resisted by teachers in the province. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that anyteacher efforts to hinder or promote reform are necessarily positive or negative andwill be dependent on the context and reform in question.

It is also worth noting that teachers’ political activity is not homogenous, equallystrong, or similar in nature or strength across various contexts. Organized groups ofteachers are not always ubiquitously perceived as interfering with school reformprograms by prioritizing their own interests over those of their students. For exam-ple, in some countries, teachers’ unions have played crucial roles in the developmentof their research capacities for the betterment of their members. Some of theliterature also finds that teacher unions cooperate with government educationreforms. Languille and Dolan (2012) identify the constructive role of the TanzaniaTeachers’ Union (TTU) as one of several potential “drivers of change.” In thiscontext, teachers’ unions have been seen to have played a mainly facilitative rolein the education reform process. Similarly, it has been noted by Mulkeen (2010) thatdespite the widespread criticism of teacher unions in their demands for better payand conditions for teachers, unions are also responsible for engaging teachers inother activities such as policy analysis and advocacy for improved educationalquality and global education campaigns. Mulkeen (2019) notes that teacher unions’advocacy work was a crucial component of their agenda across eight Anglophonecountries they studied (Eritrea, Gambia, Malawi, Uganda, Zanzibar, Lesotho,Liberia, and Zambia), although it took different forms in each country. Even whereteacher unions are perceived to have deep-rooted vested interests (e.g., UttarPradesh, India), there is evidence that teacher unions have also helped addressedimportant grievances for their members (Kingdon and Muzammil 2010).

Teachers in the public sector may nevertheless be engaged in rent-seeking(an attempt to gain economic gains by influencing policies or their implementation)or patronage politics (where support is provided to specific groups, for instance,

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 11

through rewarding individuals or organizations for their support to specific politicalparties). Patronage politics may result in access-based policies (which requirebuilding more schools and hiring more teachers) to take precedence over qualityimprovements (e.g., which might involve fixing existing inefficiencies in the systemthrough changing governance systems or incentives), and this might align with thevested interests of teachers but may be to the detriment of pupil learning. Béteille(2009) highlights the extent of rent-seeking and political influence among teachers indeveloping countries with discretionary as well as patronage-based appointments(see also Iyer and Mani 2008; Park and Somanathan 2004; Sharma 2009;Ramachandran et al. 2015; Wade 1985). There is evidence from the South Asiancontext that shows the existence of strong and endemic patron-client relations whichresult in a lack of transparency in teacher transfers with powerful politicians andbureaucrats favoring teachers in transfer decisions rather than basing them on merit(Sharma 2009 in India).

Instances of corrupt and unethical practices exist in most developing countries,and South Asia is no exception. It is understood that in many countries in the region,teaching jobs are “sold” to gain political favor. Better connections rather than betterqualifications are used to appoint and recruit individuals in coveted permanent jobs.In such a situation, the system as a whole and education officials in particular are ina weak position to insist on greater teacher accountability. As a result, the excessivepoliticization of public education has had a profound impact on levels of teacheraccountability in many education systems in South Asia. Empirical evidence fromIndia in particular has found not only that teachers in Uttar Pradesh are highlyunionized but also that this unionization has had a significantly negative impact onstudent learning (Kingdon and Muzammil 2009, 2010). Kingdon and Teal (2010)measure the impact of teacher union membership on student learning in UP using apupil fixed effects method and find that union membership lowers student achieve-ment by 0.10 standard deviations.

The presence of established and powerful unions in the government school sectorleads to collective bargaining, which leads to higher than market-clearing wages.Over time, depending on the strength, militancy, and political muscle of the teacherunions, these bureaucratically determined government school wages can becomemuch higher than the market-clearing wage. This wage, which private schools giveto their teachers (albeit less qualified ones as compared to their government coun-terparts), depends on the forces of demand for and supply of persons. In India,for example, high graduate unemployment keeps the market-clearing wage low, i.e.,graduates are willing, and private school managers are able to hire graduates at lowwages. One of the consequences of large salary increases seen by civil serviceteachers and the extremely low wages paid to teachers especially in the low-feeprivate schools’ sector is the resultant discontent among teachers in the latter. Thelarge economic disparity created by high government teacher salaries as comparedto the salary of other teachers (contract or para teachers within government schools,or private school teachers) has led to discontent and protests across the region amongthe latter groups, especially since there is evidence that suggests that they are oftenmore effective in imparting learning and at significantly lower cost than their

12 M. Aslam et al.

government school counterparts (Kingdon 2010; Atherton and Kingdon 2010). Highwages without effective accountability measures may also negatively influencestudent outcomes. Large civil service rents can also result in the emergence ofa market for these coveted teaching jobs where politicians appoint candidates aspolitical favors, and these teachers subsequently exert far less effort than if they hadbeen competitively selected (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2013). Moreover,teacher politicization may also negatively impact student learning when politicalactivity impacts school functioning by keeping teachers away from their regularteaching duties and results in ill-functioning schools.

The Extent of Teacher Politicization in the SAR: Examples fromBangladesh, India, and Pakistan

Evidence suggests that teacher organizations in some of the countries in the SARregion are highly structured, are well-organized, and have substantial clout inpushing forward their demands through political action. The organization of theteaching cadre into influential groups is not inherently problematic if these organi-zations use their significant political clout in lobbying for reforms that are aimed atimproving teacher quality and the education system at large and at improving thelearning outcomes of the children they teach. However, if teacher unions pursueagendas that only advance their own self-interest and oppose reforms that are notadvantageous to them, the political penetration of teachers cannot only be disruptivebut may also be detrimental to effective school functioning. The following sectionsdiscuss the extent of teacher politicization in three countries: Bangladesh, India, andPakistan.

BangladeshWhile trade unions are common among industrial workers in Bangladesh, schoolteachers in the country do not have a formal union. Nevertheless, most of thembelong to one of several associations (e.g., (a) Bangladesh Primary Teachers Society,(b) Bangladesh Primary School Teachers’ Association, (c) Bangladesh GovernmentPrimary School Assistant Teachers’ Association, and (d) Primary School AssistantTeachers’ Forum) (see Aslam et al. 2016b). There is no formal evidence on thestructure and history of these associations, but anecdotal evidence suggests thatteachers typically group into various associations primarily to voice grievancespertaining to employment conditions and salary rather than for professional devel-opment or teacher training. Some teachers’ associations are also believed to belinked with political parties in the country.

However, when compared to some other countries in the region, the extent ofteacher politicization in Bangladesh is relatively limited with teacher organizationsmore fragmented than, say, in India. Two governance and institutional factors withinthe country can potentially explain the limited scope for more organized politicalactivity among primary school teachers in Bangladesh. The first is related to thepluralistic structure of Bangladesh’s primary education system where multiple

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 13

providers are responsible for education provision. This is likely to have reduced thescope for group mobilization (Aslam et al. 2016b). Because Bangladesh’s educationexpansion was achieved with the government partnering with more than 12 differentnon-state providers, the resultant heterogeneous nature of governance across theseproviders in the primary education sector may have reduced the scope of extensivemobilization and collective bargaining. Another factor that is likely to have contrib-uted to the lack of political coordination and mobilization across the ranks ofgovernment school teachers in the country is the relatively superior pay of teachersin the state sector as compared to those in the nongovernment (non-NGO) primarysector. It has been reported that before the recent pay rise and the nationalization ofnongovernment schools in Bangladesh, government primary school teachers earnedalmost twice the average monthly salary of their counterparts in registerednongovernment primary schools. Government primary school teacher pay was also16% higher than that of secondary teachers (Rashid and Ritu 2013). As financialgrievances are the most usual underlying reasons for collective action, the relativelyhigh pay of government sector employees has been cited as one factor that may haveweakened the political clout of teachers in the country.

However, there is evidence that suggests that teachers in Bangladesh have madedemands through organized activities which have resulted in strikes and generalunrest. For example, it has been noted that the government of Bangladesh’s approvalof the 8th national pay scale gazette for civil servants (including relatively well-paidgovernment and government-aided school teachers) which became effective fromJuly 2015 and resulted in a salary hike of nearly 100% across the entire cadre ofprofessions could have been due to sustained campaigns by teacher associationsdemanding higher salaries (Aslam et al. 2016b).

IndiaThe political landscape for teachers in India is different from that of their counter-parts in Bangladesh. Teachers in India are politically powerful, organized intohundreds of unions (some registered with the state governments and others withthe central government), and able to influence agendas and exercise power not onlythrough their union and their leaders at the state level but in some cases in moreextensive ways through direct participation in politics (as teacher legislatorswith influence over legislation related to education)6. The authors additionally notesubstantial heterogeneity in union membership rates across states with somereporting under 10% membership and others over 75%. According to the authors,the majority of the unions are not formally aligned with any political party.

There is evidence of both teacher resistance in order to maintain status quo butalso of a lack of consultation of teachers even when teachers are the direct recipientsof that change. On the one hand, teachers in the Indian context have been reported tohave vested interest in the status quo and, through political maneuvering and otherstrategies, are able to influence the school governance environment in ways which

6Beteille et al. (2016)

14 M. Aslam et al.

enable them to achieve their vested interests, and this, the authors argue, has crucialimplications for student outcomes. However, on the other hand, it has also beensuggested that there have typically not been any systematic procedures for consul-tation with unions on education-related issues even when the reforms have directlyimpacted teachers themselves. When they have occurred, the consultations havebeen ad hoc. There is also evidence that teachers in India have actively resistedseveral reforms particularly when they related to democratic decentralization and thelocal hiring of teachers. This was the case, for example, in Madhya Pradesh wherelocally hired teachers were being employed on contracts rather than “jobs for life”which resulted in strong resistance from teachers manifesting in protests and legalchallenges to the policy process (Beteille et al. 2016). The Sarva Shiksha Abhiyanprovides another example of a critical reform that was resisted by teachers (who hadnot been consulted) who lobbied extensively at the state and national levels andsubstantially influenced the shape the final policy took.

Within India, organized teacher unions have also directly or indirectly impactededucation policy and practice. Their political influence in this regard has been shapedby the strategies they have adopted including representation in the upper house in thestate, use of credible threats during election time, organized strikes, court cases, andmore direct involvement in politics. Using one or more of these strategies, teacherunions in the Indian context have lobbied, often actively and sometimes aggres-sively, for or against key education reforms in the country including successfullydemanding increased salaries; thwarting measures to ensure a code of conduct forteachers; opposing decentralization; strongly opposing teacher transfers to adjuststudent-teacher ratios; regularization of contract teachers; freeing up teachers fromnonacademic work; and strongly argued against the Teacher Eligibility Test as onemechanism for recruitment of teachers into the cadre (Beteille et al. 2016; Aslamet al. 2016b).

Therefore, unions provide an important mechanism through which teachers canvoice concerns and alleviate them either through collective action which can take theform of protests or lobbying. There is surprisingly limited empirical evidence onteacher unions across the South Asia Region, and India is no exception. In recentyears, some efforts have been made to collect more information on the extent ofpoliticization through unionization and determine what agenda items typicallyconcern unionized teachers most.

Kingdon (2009) provides some initial work in this regard in collecting uniquedata from a survey of 1220 teachers in 258 schools (government and aided andunaided private schools at the primary and secondary level) in two Indian states –Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Kingdon (2009) notes that Uttar Pradesh and Bihar arebicameral states with an upper and lower legislative house. The two houses presenttwo types of political connections between teachers and politicians – those betweenMembers of the Legislative Council (MLC) and those with the Members of theLegislative Assembly (MLA). Using data from her survey, the author notes thata vast majority of teachers in government- or private-aided schools (i.e., paidthrough the state exchequer) report being members of a union (e.g., 71% of primarygovernment school teachers and 87% of secondary government school teachers and

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 15

100% of private-aided secondary school teachers in Bihar reported belonging toa union; 85% of all interviewed teachers, both primary and secondary, in governmentand aided private schools in Uttar Pradesh also reported being unionized). Theauthor also notes that secondary school teachers (at least in these two states) aremore likely to be politically connected than primary school teachers as they form theElectoral College from which teacher politicians (Members of the LegislativeCouncil) are chosen. Kingdon (2009) also notes that being more “politicallyconnected” can prove beneficial for teachers in that in her data they seem to, onaverage, be paid more, are more likely to have received a requested transfer toa convenient posting, or have achieved grievance redressal without filing any courtcase as compared to teachers who report not being politically connected.

There is also evidence that indicates that unionized teachers in some areas of Indiapush mainly for salary-related agendas through their unions. Kingdon (2009) foundthat among unionized teachers, the most common agenda item teachers wishedtheir unions to take up (as reported by the teacher themselves) was salary-related –demanding higher salary or the timely payment of salaries. About two-thirds of theteachers in the survey wished their union to campaign for salary-related issues, andonly a quarter of the teachers in Bihar and about 14% in Uttar Pradesh cited more“benevolent” agenda items (such as improved student facilities). Other issues thatthe teachers reported as important for their union’s agendas included improvementsin working conditions, nonteaching duties, infrastructure, as well as increases in thenumber of teachers, transfers, and promotions, among others. A more recent surveyof 50 teachers in Tamil Nadu (ABLTeachers’ Survey 2015; Aslam et al. 2016b) alsocorroborates the earlier findings from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. In Tamil Nadu,almost half of the sampled teachers reported salary increments as the primaryconcerns for their unions followed by 19% complaining about nonteaching obliga-tions and 11% reporting dissatisfaction with their work environment. Gupta (2013)shares the views that teachers and their unions in India have tended to advocate forinput-focused reforms (such as more infrastructure, budgetary allocations, etc.)and have resisted efforts that impact the status quo of teachers (e.g., opposingpublic-private partnership schemes). The author notes, however, that unions andassociations in the country have the potential to influence education in positive waysif this influence is used in a constructive manner (e.g., by unions/associationsmonitoring their teacher members and creating incentives for teachers to performthrough negotiations with the government).

PakistanWhile there is substantial anecdotal evidence on the politicization of the teachingcadre (specifically government school teachers) in Pakistan, empirical evidence onthe strength and influence of unions is more limited. Newspaper articles are rife withaccounts of teacher protests, strike action, and demonstrations relating to salary rises,grievances related to working conditions, or vehement opposition to the privatizationof education in the country.

Political interference is one of the main drivers of weak deployment and ineffi-ciencies in teacher resource delivery. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that

16 M. Aslam et al.

there is significant political penetration by teachers in Pakistan as in the rest of SouthAsia. The extent of politicization of teachers is evident through newspaper reports ofstrike actions and political lobbying by teachers in the country. The Punjab TeachersUnion in Pakistan claims a strength of almost 350,000 government teachers acrossthe province covering 63,000 schools in 36 districts7. This is equivalent toalmost 100% union membership of all government school teachers in Punjabprovince alone.

When asked what percentage of teachers at the school are members of a teachersunion, SchoolTELLS data (collected in April–May 2011 with World Bank funding,covering 20 villages in each of the 3 districts of Faisalabad, Mianwali, and RahimYar Khan and a sample of 120 schools) revealed that in rural Pakistan, only 5%primary school teachers reported being members of a union, while as many as 85%stated that no one is a member of a teacher union. This illustrates reluctance to revealunion membership which may be linked to the motives behind joining unions. Whenasked if unions can help teachers in transfer-related problems, 35% of teachersanswered in the affirmative suggesting that teachers recognize and possibly utilizetheir unions in getting transfers. Sixty-four per cent teachers in the sample alsobelieved that paying a bribe was an effective method of accomplishing a transfer.Moreover, 43% of the teachers in the sample claimed that their transfer to the currentschool was a “routine” transfer; up to 44% acknowledged that their position in thecurrent school was due to “personal requests” and efforts. One teacher even admittedthat she had paid an official bribe to obtain a transfer into her current position. Theextent of politicization of the teaching profession in Pakistan is reflected in the roleof the bureaucracy and politicians in providing political favors in the form of transferand postings in exchange for votes. When asked to what extent it is helpfulfor teachers in the district to engage with Nazims/MNAs/MPAs and ministers fortransfers and postings, almost 60% of the teachers in the sample suggested that thesepersons can prove somewhat or very helpful in achieving transfer postings.

Well-documented empirical evidence on the politicization of teachers in Pakistanin more recent years also comes from a report by Alif Ailaan (2015) and from thework reported by Aslam et al. (2016b). These reports note the existence of between25 and 30 active teacher unions and associations in Pakistan, with 2 teacher asso-ciations working at the national level, with an estimated 60% government schoolteachers reported as members within them. As in Bangladesh and India, severalteacher organizations function as teachers’ wings of major political parties with theAlif Ailaan report noting that while some party-based associations provide the spacefor teachers to lobby for key education policy and curriculum reforms, many othersprovide the space for patronage to party loyalists or vehicles for opposition toopposing governments.

The evidence also suggests that the general climate between the government andteacher organizations is one of mutual suspicion (Alif Ailaan 2015). There appears tobe a general lack of cooperation between the two rather than efforts at working in

7On their website (http://www.punjabteachersunion.pk/index.php as on 29 October 2018).

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 17

coordinated and collaborative ways to achieve key outcomes. Notably, while stron-ger and older teachers’ bodies appear to have some bargaining legitimacy with thegovernment, this is not the case with many other associations and unionsrepresenting the teachers. This climate of suspicion has often meant that teacherorganizations and the government find themselves in conflict on matters relating toteacher transfers, deployment, and dismissal. In some instances, the teachers arewronged due to outdated legislation and the power of district officials. For example,the Alif Ailaan (2015) report notes that due to outdated legislation, teachers havebeen dismissed for negligence of duty often at the whim of district officials whichhas resulted in tensions between the teachers and their employers.

As is the case in India and Bangladesh, most teacher organizations in Pakistanalso put forward grievances that relate to the betterment of their working conditions,higher salary demands, a lack of investment in teacher capacity, excessive non-teaching duties, staff rationalization, issues relating to privatization, monitoring,corruption, and political patronage and interference (Aslam et al. 2016b). Liketheir counterparts in India and Bangladesh, teacher organizations in Pakistan havesuccessfully waged campaigns to get better salaries with the result that between 2008and 2011, government teacher salaries were revised by about 40% (Alif Ailaan2015), and while these organizations have been fragmented in several issues, theyhave tended to agree on core issues with salary hikes being one of those demandsaround which consensus is reached.

Bari et al. (2013) ethnographic research in rural Punjab, Pakistan, also revealsa unanimous acknowledgment by government officials and teachers alike that theimplementation of teacher policies is marred by political factors. In particular,the discretionary power accorded to middle men in the education system (clerksand personal assistants) emerges as a key factor that generates political interferenceand nepotism in teacher recruitment, transfer, and deployment decisions.

Engaging Teachers Is Critical for the Success of EducationReforms

Most reforms aimed at improving the learning environment and school qualitydirectly or indirectly impact teachers, e.g., pedagogic changes, curricular changes,changes in incentives or in the governance environment of the schools or broadereducation systems, etc. Therefore, engaging teachers from the outset may provecrucial in the success or failure of a reform. The paradigm alterations brought aboutby a reform tend to require not only specific adjustments to curricula but alsomodifications in the behavior of teachers. When reforms require a substantialdeparture from the status quo and where teachers vested interested are aligned inensuring the status quo prevails, gaining their buy-in becomes even more critical inensuring success.

Teachers are also the agents for the delivery of most reforms at the classroomlevel and may be able to provide valuable insights into the efficacy of any givenreform. Not engaging teachers as key stakeholders can be a flawed strategy for

18 M. Aslam et al.

governments. An example of this is presented by a controversial reform initiatedby the Government of Punjab, Pakistan, in 2009 that related to the medium ofinstruction in government primary schools. This radical reform introduced Englishas the medium of instruction in all public schools from almost immediate effectimmediately (with instruction of mathematics, science, and computer science fromgrade 1 to be done in English). However, this reform was hotly contested andresisted by teachers with the result that in 2014, the Government had to backtrackon this decision to some extent. In a country where teachers have been found to lackeven basic knowledge of English, expecting such a radical reform to yield positiveresults was a mistake. This example also highlights the critical need to garner teacherviews during the design phases and to equip teachers with the necessary tools (suchas effective training) once reform decisions have been made rather than placingunreasonable expectations on them without the training or resources necessary foreffective implementation of the reform (Aslam et al. 2016).

The Activity Based Learning (ABL) reform from India, on the other hand,provides an example of a pedagogical innovation that, despite being a majordeparture from the status quo, was accepted and supported by all stakeholders,most crucially by teachers who had to make the greatest behavioral and pedagogicalshifts in delivering this innovation at the classroom level. This reform has been citedas one of the most lauded efforts of the government of India’s flagship Sarva ShikshaAbhiyan (SSA) program. It reorganized the physical classroom space but morecrucially required teachers to make a critical pedagogic shift that allowed them todeal with large class sizes and to allow children to take control of their own learningand benefit more from peer-to-peer learning (Singal et al. 2018).

What has caught academics and policymakers’ attention is how it took rootthrough fairly modest beginnings in only 13 schools in Chennai in 2003 and wassubsequently rolled out, in a phased manner, across the entire state of Tamil Nadu(which is larger than some countries in the world) for all children studying in grades1 to 4 in all private- and government-aided schools. ABL has also subsequentlyemerged in other Indian states and spread to other countries (e.g., Ghana,Bangladesh, Ethiopia) in various guises (Aslam and Rawal, 2016; Bedi and Kingdon2016; Singal et al. 2018).

In many ways, ABL broke with tradition and was a significant departure fromconventional practices and required modifications from all actors involved in theeducation system, perhaps most importantly the teachers. What is interesting is thatteachers had a lot to gain in resisting this particular reform. The fact that they did notresist it and in fact seemed to embrace it presents itself as an “anomaly from thepolitical economy lens” (Bedi and Kingdon 2016, p. 9). Bedi and Kingdon (2016)note that not only was ABL effectively designed but the reform was also successfullyimplemented and scaled up as per the design, albeit with some resistance. Thiseducational change also further progressed by a smooth system-wide change andthrough support in terms of teacher training and curriculum change. It was alsoaccepted and upheld by critical stakeholders especially teachers. To add to this, theABL reform has withstood the test of time, being sustained over the past severalyears, even with the state government changing several times in the given period.

The Political Economy of Teachers in South Asia 19

Bedi and Kingdon (2016) describe several underlying factors for the success ofthis reform in Tamil Nadu. These include the existence of fertile ground, in the formof a strong Gandhian philosophy for improvements in the quantity and qualityof education, and a variety of pre-existing heterodox experiments in educationfrom the early 1970s onwards; existence of a key catalyst for change in the formof a dynamic senior administrative officer who carried the initial ideas through andwas capable of mobilizing teachers to be part of the design and initial testing process;management of effective relationships with both internal and external interestgroups, e.g., through engagement of teachers through teacher training programs;and creating a sense of ownership among teachers. The latter, in particular, wasachieved by engaging teachers very early on in the design and subsequently in theimplementation stages with teachers observing the original pedagogy in its fullestform, recognizing the value of the approach, gaining a deep sense of ownership, andsubsequently becoming powerful agents of change for this intervention.

While the Tamil Nadu context provides an example in India where teacher unionsare relatively weak, it nevertheless offers interesting lessons on how engagingteachers in the design process of key reforms, handling resistance through negotia-tion and cooperation, and providing the key actors – teachers – with a sense ofownership can lead to effective implementation of complex pedagogic reforms thatmay require an escalation in effort from teachers (Bedi and Kingdon 2016).

Conclusions

This chapter examined recent evidence from three countries in the South AsiaRegion – Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan – on aspects of the politicization andunionization of teachers, and in doing so, it showed that teachers are not and shouldnot be passive recipients of the political economy characterizing the educationsystem of their country. Teachers can actively shape education through their associ-ations with, and even through their direct participation in, politics.

Teacher unions and organizations provide a crucial voice and forum for teachersto air their concerns and push for the betterment of their profession. Teacherorganizations can also be champions of pro-quality reforms in education. However,some of the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that in India and Pakistan,where teachers have been more strongly unionized (e.g., than in Bangladesh), theeffects have been rather less sanguine, in the sense that the strength of teacherorganizations and their political muscle appear to have been used more often forrent-seeking, convenient but non-meritocratic transfers, resistance to reform andcollective bargaining manifesting in disruptive strikes and lobbying. This hasdriven teacher salaries to several multiples of per capita income of their respectivecountries, without always yielding higher teacher effort or better student learningoutcomes; rather student achievement appears to have stagnated or even fallen insome parts of the region.

However, this chapter has also highlighted that whenever teachers and theirorganizations are engaged in the reform process, they can be instrumental partners

20 M. Aslam et al.

in championing those reforms. This underscores the need for collaborative andinclusive policy dialogue that engages all stakeholders – even those who may nothave an organized voice of their own. This important theme of engaging particularlywith teachers ensures that they are made collaborators in the formulation of anyschooling reform from its inception, in order to motivate and rally teachers foragendas that relate to the betterment of learning outcomes. Such engagement willbe more likely to ensure that reforms are appropriately implemented by teachers andachieve the desired outcomes.

Cross-References

▶Regional Imbalances in Provisioning and Participation in Education in India andPakistan

▶ Private Schooling and Tutoring at Scale in South Asia▶Teachers in Policy and Public Discourse▶Teachers as Agents and Policy Actors

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