The Political Economy of Poverty Reduction - Brookings Institution

WOLFENSOHN CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT

WORKING PAPER 2 | NOVEMBER 2007

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY REDUCTIONSCALING UP ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Raj M. Desai

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Author’s Note:

I thank Arntraud Hartmann, Homi Kharas, Richard Kohl, Santiago Levy, Johannes Linn, and participants at a

Brookings Institution seminar for comments on an earlier draft. Oksana Pidufala provided invaluable research as-

sistance. All errors and omissions, of course, are my own.

Raj M. Desai is a visiting fellow in the Global Economy

and Development Program at the Brookings Institution

and a professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of

Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Challenge of “Scaling Up” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Scaling up through resource mobilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Scaling up through program proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Scaling up through political bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Scaling up through institutional reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Scaling up summarized: functional vs. political-institutional perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Antipoverty Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

An overview of large-scale antipoverty programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Social assistance (unconditional cash transfers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Conditional cash transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

In-kind transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Public works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Asset improvement and accumulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

How effective are LSAPs in low-income countries? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

The Political-Institutional Determinants of Scaling Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

What explains the expansion and retrenchment of social policy in developing countries? . . . 20

Globalization and economic openness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Coalition strength and populism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Democratic politics and pro-poor policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Creating a favorable environment for antipoverty policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Overcoming fractionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Gaining public support for antipoverty programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Integrating antipoverty policy into a social-policy regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Ensuring program survival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Preventing elite capture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Annex: Large Scale Antipoverty Programs around the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY REDUCTION 1

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY REDUCTIONSCALING UP ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Raj M. Desai

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Large-scale antipoverty programs have achieved

signifi cant and positive results in many develop-

ing countries around the world in the past decade.

This paper explores the challenges of “scaling up”

small-scale antipoverty programs—taken here to mean

the processes by which successful efforts to raise the

incomes of the poorest citizens in developing coun-

ties are expanded in coverage over time and across

geography. In particular, I advocate supplementing

approaches that highlight resource and program con-

straints with an expanded focus on the political dy-

namics involved in expanding pro-poor policies. Thus,

greater emphasis should be placed on understanding

the political factors that limit the expansion and sur-

vivability of antipoverty programs. A broader view

along these lines highlights the bargaining strength of

benefi ciaries, the need to secure public support, the

potential for political misuse of antipoverty programs,

and how institutional fragilities affect their sustain-

ability. Antipoverty programs can be effectively scaled

up if attention is paid to addressing these political

and institutional challenges. An agenda for future re-

search is also identifi ed.

2 WOLFENSOHN CENTER FOR DEVELOPMENT

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been greater appreciation

of the need to “scale up” development programs

by expending greater resources to ensure that the

benefi ts of poverty reduction are widely shared (see,

e.g., Moreno-Dodson 2005; Binswanger and Aiyar

2003). For the purposes of the discussion that fol-

lows, “scaling up” is defi ned as the process by which

efforts to raise the incomes of the poorest citizens are

extended in coverage along multiple dimensions—over

time and geography, both within and across countries.1

Scaling up is central to the objectives envisaged by

the Millennium Development Goals, requiring both a

greater mobilization of resources devoted to antipov-

erty assistance as well as more ambitious antipoverty

strategies (United Nations 2000).

This paper argues that a more complete understand-

ing of scaling up will need to move beyond an em-

phasis on the “functional” characteristics of scaling

up—the (human, informational, and fi scal) resource

constraints, as well as the organizational and pro-

grammatic constraints—and address the political-insti-

tutional conditions of scaling up. Doing so requires a

sharper focus on the interactions between politicians,

program administrators, local and national elites,

and their constituents (of which the poor are but

one group). While resource and organizational con-

straints are critical, evidence from a quarter century

of analysis of comparative public policy in developing

countries suggests that these constraints are rarely

exogenously set. Rather, they are often the result of

complex bargaining between public and private ac-

tors, and are shaped by unique political processes

in which these actors are engaged. The creation and

maintenance of large-scale antipoverty programs

(LSAPs) will be affected by the political calculations

involved in conduct of social and redistributive policy

in developing countries.

This paper is organized as follows. The next section

examines the various dimensions of scaling up—from

both the functional and political-institutional perspec-

tives. Section 3 provides an overview of the main

categories of LSAPs that have been implemented in

countries around the world, and briefl y surveys some

evidence of their effectiveness in the poorest coun-

tries. Section 4 examines the problems of expanding

or maintaining redistributive programs in developing

countries, and derives some implications for scaling

up and sustaining antipoverty programs. The fifth

section concludes and identifies a future research

agenda.


THE CHALLENGE OF “SCALING UP”

“Scaling up” is a concept replete with multiple

uses and meanings. To a certain extent, this

multiplicity may be due to an inversion of the usual

relationship between concept (label) and subject.

Initially, “scaling up” became fashionable policy lan-

guage to examine how successful, limited-scale policy

experiments or development projects (microcredit,

urban renewal, rural support, infrastructure projects,

health and educational projects being among the

most common) could be enlarged without any loss of

effectiveness. Much of this was the case after disil-

lusionments in the developing world with the results

of country-wide policy reforms, and with the ability

of governments in developing countries to deliver

essential services to the poor. In the lexicon of inter-

national development, consequently, scaling up has

emerged as a concept with little agreement on its

purpose. Discussion of the “meaning” of scaling up is

akin to trying to fi nd an appropriate bottle to attach

to a label, and has had a predicable result: a prolifera-

tion of uses.

Rather than identifying different meanings of the

term scaling up, I focus below on the different di-

mensions by which limited-coverage, experimental,

or pilot programs are “scaled up” in practice. These

are not exclusive categories; scaling up often entails

movement along these dimensions in parallel. Some

are frequently found in discussions of scaling up, oth-

ers less so. Table 1 summarizes the relevant details of

these dimensions.

Table 1: Four Components of Scaling Up

How is scale achieved?

Key determinants of program effectiveness

Main obstacles to scaling up

How are programs sustained?

Resource mobilization

By increasing budget, information, and personnel to expand benefi ciary coverage of programs over time

Information-gathering and processing abili-ties of program admin-istrators; capacity of supplemental agencies and institutions

Insuffi cient resources to support expansion of program coverage and improvements to absorptive capacity of executing agencies

Fiscal commitment to antipoverty policies supporting large-scale programs without loss of effectiveness

Program proliferation

By selecting and replicating proven antipoverty efforts across geographic boundaries

Adaptability of orga-nizational capacities and practices to other contexts bases based clear counterfactuals

Incorrect combination of standardization vs. fl exibility in spread-ing programs to other regions or countries

Feedback from continuous evaluation; program modifi cations to ensure self-fi nancing, etc.

Political bargaining

By altering equilibrium that defi nes relationship between the government and key groups

Policy demands of benefi ciaries; enfran-chisement of the poor relative to the non-poor

Lack of public support for program; mobilization of opponents to pro-poor transfers

Creation of natural constituencies for antipoverty policy; support from the median voter or from critical groups

Institutional reform

By changing incentives of program adminis-trators, public offi cials, and elites

Restraints on misuse of programs for rent-extraction (including manipulation in electoral cycles)

Absence of clear delin-eation of authority; in-compatible incentives between branches or levels of government

An environment that enables programs to resist partisanship and survive changes in government or regime


Scaling up through resource mobilization

At base, scaling up involves enlarging the scope (ben-

efi ciary coverage, geographic presence) of limited in-

terventions. A key dimension of scaling up, then, is the

mobilization of fi nancial, human, and informational

resources needed to sustain expanded programs.

Financial and human resources for scaling up and for

operating at scale are rarely in place at the outset, and

old spending priorities cannot simply be replaced by

new ones. Naturally, donor funding is expected to play

a critical role in these matters. Recent analyses have

raised questions about macro- and micro-economic

consequences of increased aid fl ows to poor countries,

as well as the lack of institutional capacity to support

these fl ows. In particular, developing countries that

lack effective fi scal institutions or institutions to po-

lice the common market, regulate and administer the

distribution of public goods, are considered likely to

experience early “saturation” points after which scal-

ing up is unlikely to produce concomitant benefi ts.

While forecasts of increased-aid scenarios are beyond

the scope of this paper, these analyses have placed

the issue of “institutional” and “absorptive” capac-

ity front and center, suggesting that, in addition to

the resource constraint, developing countries may

be limited in their ability to utilize higher aid fl ows

effectively due to, e.g., skill shortages or macroeco-

nomic imbalances such as “Dutch-disease” exchange

rate appreciation (International Monetary Fund 2006;

Gupta, Powell, and Yang 2006), constraints generated

by donor fragmentation, and technical and manage-

rial defi ciencies within countries (Hanlon 2004).

The lack of informational, financial and human re-

sources commonly appear as a lack of administrative

capacity. Often the country’s bureaucracy does not

have the capability to assess and verify eligibility for

LSAPs on a wide scale, much less retain the necessary

records for large numbers of participants. Or, partici-

pating individuals or households may not have access

to supplemental institutions necessary for LSAPs to

operate—financial institutions in the case of social

insurance schemes or some types of transfers, health

and educational services in the case of conditional

programs, etc. Other programs may have a limited

impact in countries where households derive their

income from a host of informal sector activities, and

where it can be diffi cult to tailor products to meet the

needs of these households. Even in those countries

where LSAPs are administratively feasible, it may be

diffi cult to collect and maintain the amount of infor-

mation needed to apply income and means tests.

Scaling up through program proliferation

International experience suggests that resources

are a necessary but insuffi cient component of scal-

ing up. A second dimension of scaling up, therefore,

involves replicating or adapting program procedures,

conditions, or instruments to operate on an expanded

scale. The underlying assumption is that, while not

perfectly translatable, basic operational modes and

project features can be effectively and repeatedly rep-

licated elsewhere (Gillespie 2003). Scaling up along

this dimension implies that the organizational basics—

management processes, internal fi nancial practices,

linkages with donors, and rules (including benefi ciary

targeting, conditionality, instruments, etc.) must be

redesigned in order for programs to function at an

expanded scale. Some analysts have referred to this

approach as “universalist,” where experience provides

generalizations that can be duplicated, expanded, or

adapted elsewhere according to basic rules (Hancock

2003; Oudenhoven and Wazir 2003). Consequently,

one of the cornerstones of scaling up is programmatic

evaluation. A practitioner’s handbook notes:


Step 1 of the scaling up process [is to] develop a

scaling-up plan. Concrete results achieved dur-

ing Step 1 include a realistic assessment of the

prospects and parameters for scaling up and

a road map for getting to scale. This step also

includes developing the documentation and be-

ginning to build the support that will be needed

later in the scaling-up process . . . Timing is also

critically important. Often, discussion of scaling

up begins only after a pilot project is underway

or completed. These projects are often assumed

to be successful based on anecdotal evidence

rather than a thorough, evidence-based evalua-

tion of the extent and reasons for a model’s suc-

cess; an assessment of the model’s strength’s,

weaknesses, and cost-effectiveness; and a com-

parison with alternative models or mechanisms

for achieving the same goals (Cooley and Kohl

2005).

From this perspective, scaling up and evaluation

are complimentary activities, whereby evaluation

can offer valuable indications of program reliability

and translatability (Dufl o 2004; Fiszbein and Gevers

2005). In this class of approaches, interventions are

examined ex-post, and attempts are made to identify

factors affecting their effectiveness, on the basis of

which recommendations can be made for scaling up

interventions by replication.

Programs that are to be scaled up usually require

changes in design and implementation due to the ex-

panded access of program benefi ciaries to services

and markets. In Papua New Guinea, for example, a suc-

cessful pilot to extend healthcare to the countryside

was scaled up in the 1990s. Despite increasing health

expenditures signifi cantly, the scaled-up version of

the healthcare program did not prove satisfactory,

primarily due to the sparse population density, com-

bined with communications problems between health

service providers and benefi ciaries, in the countryside

(Asian Development Bank 1995). By contrast, one of

the lessons from the well-known success of the West

African Riverblindness Control effort was that, at

an expanded scale (the program was scaled up from

regional pilot to cover 11 countries between 1974 and

1990) fl exibility in program design was essential, as

was a reduced reliance on central governments (and

greater community involvement) in the management

of key partnerships, together with better harmoniza-

tion of program practices across geographic areas

(Benton et al. 2002).

Both the resource-mobilization and proliferation di-

mensions to scaling-up recognize that the poorest

tend to under-invest in health and education, and that

expanding those small-scale interventions that have

provided critical services or goods to the poor requires

both greater fi nancing and administrative capacity,

along with careful adjustments for projects to operate

in other communities, regions, or countries. But these

dimensions, taken together, are an incomplete view of

scaling up. They do not adequately address the issue

of why, if there is little uncertainty as to the benefi ts

of interventions in basic health care, education, sani-

tation, or of secure property rights or better access

to credit for the poor, governments of poor nations

have repeatedly failed to scale-up these programs on

a wider scale or sustain them. Nor do perspectives

on the need to enhance institutional capacity explain

why governments fail to build institutions to manage

public expenditures or secure contractual rights. Two

additional dimensions address these concerns

Scaling up through political bargaining

A third dimension of scaling up focuses on a particular

“demand-side” dynamic, namely, bargaining and dis-

tributional confl icts between the poor and non-poor

over antipoverty and social policy. This component of


scaling up is based on two assumptions: (i) that anti-

poverty programs remain limited in scale because of

the limited political engagement by benefi ciaries as a

coherent “interest group” in determining antipoverty

policy; and (ii) that the poor may have less access and

representation in the political system than the non-

poor. Consequently, the scaling up of antipoverty pro-

grams will depend on the bargaining strength of the

poor relative to the non-poor, as well as on the sup-

port for these programs among the non-poor.

Participatory, “bottom-up” approaches to scaling-up

became increasingly accepted by the development

community beginning in the 1980s, perhaps prompted

by the need to fi nd new, internal sources of fi nancing

and investment following the debt crisis in much of the

developing world (Uvin and Miller 1994). The poor, how-

ever, face unique barriers to collective action. Research

showing that greater intra-community inequality in-

creases the costs of collective action and marginalizes

the poor in village-level targeting, for example, indi-

cates some of the constraints to scaling up (see, e.g.,

Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet, and Romani 2004; Emmett

2000; Platteau and Abraham 2002). When faced with

the opportunity costs of participation, the poorest are

also less likely to be engaged in local government, com-

munity organizations, or civil society to the degree re-

quired for the scaling up of community-based projects

(Mansuri and Rao 2004). Civic organizations—which

could potentially fill gaps left due to the failures of

markets or governments to provide critical services for

the poorest (Devarajan and Kanbur 2005)—are often

under-developed in poor communities.

Beyond local civic engagement, for the poor there

is often a problem of broader disenfranchisement

in most political systems in that the poor are gener-

ally not well-represented in national policymaking

processes. By contrast, the non-poor—especially the

middle class—who are well-represented may oppose

long-term redistributive programs in which they do

not benefi t. Thus the central challenge to scaling up

is the need to alter the fundamental relationship be-

tween the poor and public offi cials, by overcoming

both the obstacles to collective action among pro-

gram benefi ciaries, as well as the opposition of key

political actors who set public policy agendas.2

Scaling up through institutional reform

Beyond the political weight of the poor in decision-

making processes—either directly or via represen-

tation—and their bargaining strength vis-à-vis the

non-poor, the general architecture of governance

and the division of governmental authority can have

a variety of effects on public policy, and therefore on

the scaling up of antipoverty programs. A fourth di-

mension of scaling up, therefore, involves the govern-

mental institutions required to administer and sustain

antipoverty programs on a large scale. The design and

implementation of LSAPs, as well as their re-design

and scaling up, all occur in specifi c settings defi ned

by the rules by which public offi cials, politicians, and

other elites exercise political authority over program

recipients. The formal and informal process of gov-

ernmental decision-making determines the infl uence

of public agencies and offi ce holders on the scope of

antipoverty programs. Scaling up, then, can require

certain reforms to these arrangements.

The defi ning characteristic of antipoverty programs—

which transfer goods, services, or productive assets

to the poor—also makes them politically valuable

apart from their impact on poverty. They can be used

to secure the loyalty or recipients, to buy-off dissent

or opposition, or to punish opponents by withholding

benefits. For this reason, scaling up involves some


important institutional imperatives.3 First, scaling up

requires a certain compatibility of incentives between

branches of government as well as between levels of

government. The scaling up of antipoverty programs

is subject to stalemates between legislatures and

presidents, or between central and sub-national au-

thorities. LSAPs are also susceptible to holdups where

different ministries or public agencies—responding to

different constituencies and facing different incen-

tives—fail to coordinate in program implementation.

Workfare programs, for example, are notoriously

prone to these problems, as the programs often affect

the jurisdiction of labor ministries as well as (depend-

ing on the nature of the work program) a whole host

of competing local or regional bodies. To some extent,

this may be achieved through clear separations of pow-

ers between parts of government (to avoid overlap).

Second, scaling up requires a compatibility of incen-

tives between successive governments in order to be

survive changes in governments. Program designers

would prefer to establish LSAPs that are valuable

to their political party, group, or faction, while their

opponents would prefer to design sunset-clauses or

time-limitations into these programs. These confl icts

often limit scaling up in one of two ways—either they

can produce protracted stalemates between program

advocates and opponents leading to long delays in

scaling up, or they can lead to the elimination of pro-

grams following a change of government.

Scaling up summarized: functional vs. political-institutional perspectives

Figure 1 depicts these various dimensions of scaling

up. The bottom half of the diagram—in black—indicates

the narrower, “functional” approach that focuses on

resources (human, informational, and fi scal), along

with programmatic adjustment during scaling up.

From this perspective, programs to be scaled up—

along with resource commitments—are determined

partly by domestic actors, but are potentially infl u-

enced by external actors such as bilateral or multilat-

eral development organizations, NGOs, etc. (who may

Figure 1: The Components of Scaling Up

IMPACT

RESOURCECOMMITMENTS

PROGRAMADJUSTMENTS

INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

Political bargaining

Social policy demands

Program selection

Externalactors

(donors,NGOs, etc.)

IMPLEMENTATIONREPLICATION


also commit resources). Implemented (or replicated)

programs are evaluated, and programs are adjusted

during scaling up.

The upper half of the diagram—in grey—identifi es the

political-institutional components of scaling up. Begin

with political bargaining between groups over the con-

tent and scope of antipoverty transfers. These group

dynamics produce a set of policy demands that, in

turn, infl uence the selection of antipoverty programs.

Resource commitments also infl uence program selec-

tion and implementation, but these commitments are

not exogenous. Rather they, too, are shaped by policy

demands of domestic constituencies (as well as by

potential external actor). Bargaining, the antipoverty

policy agenda, and selection of antipoverty programs,

are all influenced by the institutional context—the

incentives and capabilities of the various branches

or levels of government through which policy de-

mands are mediated and that are responsible for

program implementation. Once selected programs

are implemented, their impact will infl uence program

(re)design, as well as the processes of bargaining

and the institutional context in which key actors fi nd

themselves.


ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAMS

Over the past two decades, improvements in the

measurements of the incidence, duration, and

severity of poverty have vastly expanded our knowl-

edge of the characteristics of those living below

poverty thresholds in developing countries (see, e.g.,

Chen and Ravallion 2004). Progress has also been

made in understanding the nature of the inter-rela-

tionships among these characteristics, with recent ef-

forts made to clarify causal linkages usually obscured

by problems of endogeneity and simultaneity. In ad-

dition to better measurement, the past 15 years have

seen a proliferation of a diverse number of antipov-

erty programs in developing countries. Whereas pub-

lic offi cials in previous decades were often limited to

using national economic agencies to reform landhold-

ing, widen access to health services, education, and

credit (usually through some form of price distortion),

in the past several years development offi cials have

chosen from a widening repertoire of fee waivers and

subsidies, public works and employment programs,

cash transfers, “near cash” transfers, property rights-

based programs, micro-credit and informal insurance

programs (to name a few) directed at the poor. New

sources of information combined with advances in

evaluation methodologies, in turn, have also improved

program design and allowed for more effective policy

interventions.

More recently, development practitioners have

sought to examine how these results can be sustained

and scaled up to reduce poverty on a global scale.

Enlarging the coverage of smaller-scale interventions

and transplanting successful efforts across borders,

however, presents some important empirical lacuna

regarding the linkages between these smaller-scale

interventions and their scaled-up versions. First,

although much is known about the “profi le” of the

world’s poor as well as of the effects of different types

of programs on income and consumption poverty, on

asset accumulation, and on schooling, nutrition, child

health, infant mortality, and other human-capital out-

comes, our empirical knowledge of the effectiveness of

these different interventions across programs, across

countries, and over time, remains somewhat limited.

It is unclear, for example, whether conditional cash-

transfer programs in Latin American countries—the

successes of which have been much publicized, and

which are increasingly popular in developing coun-

tries—would have comparable effects in lower-income

countries. Preliminary comparisons, in fact, show that

conditional cash transfers fare poorly in Sub-Saharan

Africa (Kakwani, Soares, and Son 2005).

Second, we do not fully understand the differential

effects of antipoverty efforts on those who are only

occasionally poor and those who, more-or-less, are

permanently poor. A central difference noted in pov-

erty assessments is between those who are always

below the threshold and those who fi nd themselves

occasionally below—the “chronic” vs. the “transient”

poor (Chronic Poverty Research Center 2006). The

chronic poor, for example, are more likely to be mem-

bers of ethnic minorities or indigenous groups, more

likely to face discriminatory labor practices, more

likely to suffer from disabilities or “stigmatized” dis-

eases, and more likely to be female than the transient

poor. The political economy of poverty for those who

are chronically poor is, similarly, often highly distin-

guishable from that of the transient poor: larger per-

centages of chronic poor live under adverse climactic

conditions (drought- or fl ood-prone areas), in isolated

regions, in politically-fragmented communities, or in

weak or failed states. But to the extent that scaled-

up antipoverty programs would incorporate greater

numbers of the poor around the world, understand-

ing the effects of the distinctions between these two

groups on program effectiveness will be crucial, as will


be giving equal attention to preventing the downward

mobility of the vulnerable non-poor, as to lifting up the

chronic poor (De Janvry et al. 2006; Holzmann and

Jorgensen 2000).

Third, the linkages between effective LSAPs in mid-

dle-income countries and broader social policies are

poorly understood, and thus there is little comprehen-

sion of “next steps” for interventions that have proven

successful. Designers of food subsidies or service-fee

waiver programs for the poorest, for example, face

important questions as to how to incorporate these

programs into existing social-protection regimes in

their countries, or indeed, whether they should be

incorporated at all (Levy 2006). The advantages and

disadvantages of an integrated safety (including anti-

poverty efforts) are little known and have only begun

to be investigated.

An overview of large-scale antipoverty programs

For purpose of this discussion, antipoverty programs

may be considered social programs that have two

objectives: (i) to raise income levels of individuals liv-

ing below the poverty line; (ii) to protect vulnerable

individuals or households living above the poverty

line from shocks that might push them into poverty.

In addition to creating a consumption “fl oor” for poor

households, antipoverty programs can also encourage

individuals to take initiatives that incur some risks but

bring potentially higher returns. Heads of households

who participate in LSAPs may choose to grow higher

yield crops or employ modern farming methods. They

may hold more productive, but less liquid, assets

rather than cash. More recently, it has been recog-

nized that antipoverty programs can diminish the like-

lihood that households, during hard times, will engage

in behavior that is destructive over the long-term,

such as withdrawing children from school or selling

productive assets (Sinha, Lipton, and Yaqub 2002;

Vakis, Kruger, and Mason 2004).

A variety of different programs can be used to provide

assistance to households living in poverty, and to help

them deal with the impact of shocks. Figure 2 shows

the different categories of large-scale programs in a

simplifi ed taxonomy. LSAPs may be categorized ac-

cording to whether they entail transfers to the poor, or

whether they are intended to assist in the accumula-

tion or improvement of their assets. If the former, pro-

grams can be further subdivided into programs that

involve cash transfers or in-kind transfers. Cash trans-

fers can be conditional or unconditional.4 Finally, con-

ditionalities typically attached to the receipt of cash

payments can require proof of employment (or of

attempts to seek employment) or actions taken to im-

prove the health and education of children. The wide

range of antipoverty programs refl ects the fact that

households may be exposed to a variety of shocks and

risks, both temporary and permanent, idiosyncratic

(affecting specifi c households, such as illness or death

of a breadwinner) and covariate (affecting whole com-

munities or countries, such as droughts or shifts in

terms of trade), and these may need to be addressed

through different instruments.

Social assistance (unconditional cash transfers)

The provision of cash assistance to the poor or those

who face a risk of falling into poverty in the absence of

the transfer is meant to protect the incomes of vulner-

able households. Two commonly used unconditional

cash-transfer programs are general needs-based so-

cial assistance and more specifi c family allowances—

both of which comprise large portions of safety nets

in OECD countries, where approximately 8% of GDP is


allocated to such programs; by contrast, governments

allocate less than 1% of GDP to cash transfers in de-

veloping countries, and the percentage of the work-

force eligible for cash transfers is between one-half

and one-quarter of the size of the population covered

in richer nations (International Labour Organisation.

2000). General social assistance—a means-tested ben-

efi t—may be a regular or an occasional transfer, fl at

or variable, depending on the benefi ciary’s resources.

The most common cash transfers are usually com-

ponents of social insurance programs that protect

a small segment of the workforce: social pensions,

unemployment insurance, and depending on welfare

laws in each country, transfers related to death and

disability, sickness, or maternity. Family allowances in

turn may be a categorical or a means-tested benefi t

paid to families with children under a certain age, and

may be a regular or occasional transfer.5 While the pri-

mary objective of cash-transfer programs is poverty

relief, benefi ts such as the family allowance may fulfi ll

secondary objectives, such as protecting families with

children (Edmonds 2004).

The most critical design features to ensure the pro-

gram’s effi ciency and effectiveness are the choice of

the method used to select benefi ciaries, the payment

modalities chosen, and the implementing institutions

(Tabor 2002). It should be noted that once the pro-

cesses for the implementation of the program are in

place, the administrative cost of cash transfers tends

to be lower than the one of any other transfer pro-

gram (Pinto 2004). In contrast to in-kind transfers,

Figure 2: A Schematic of Basic Large-Scale Antipoverty Programs

Cash Non-cash

Conditional Unconditional

Human capitalimprovement

Employment

Conditionalcash transfers

(Health- andeducation-basedconditionalities)

Publicworks

(Urban and ruralworkfare

programs)

Unconditionalcash transfers

(Social funds,general welfareprograms, etc.)

Subsidies &fee waivers

(Food-relatedprograms, health,housing, and price

subsidies orservice-fee

waivers)

Assetaccumulation /improvement

(Microcreditprograms, land -titling programs)

Transfer-based Asset-based


cash does not require any costly transport or storage

of goods, nor does it require defraying the cost of

materials, tools, or supervision typically needed for

public works programs (Farrington and Slater 2006).

They also give recipients full discretion in choosing

how to spend the transfers. Cash-transfer programs,

fi nally, have also been privately operated, or operated

by NGOs. The most prominent examples of the former

are within-family transfers, religious-group programs,

kinship groups, and other forms of community pro-

tection that comprise large portions of antipoverty

efforts in some developing countries. An NGO-based

cash-transfer program is operated by is the Indian

Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA), whose

members are poor women who work as vendors,

home-based workers, and laborers. Among other pro-

grams, SEWA operates a cash-transfer scheme cover-

ing health, property, death, and disability insurance

(Sinha 2002; Jain 1999).

In eastern and southern Africa, unconditional cash

transfers have rapidly gained in popularity in re-

sponse to chronic poverty, food insecurity, and health

concerns in HIV-prevalent countries. Cash-transfer

schemes or pilots have been introduced in several

countries, typically with donor support. Although few

survey-based impact assessments have been con-

ducted in this region, a comprehensive qualitative re-

view of cash-transfer programs in 15 African countries

reveals the following (Devereux et al. 2005):

Target groups for cash-transfer programs tend to

be groups that are not necessarily the poorest,

but groups such as workers in the formal sector

(who receive contributory pensions), as well as

orphans, elderly, natural or humanitarian disaster

victims, disabled, and veterans. Increasingly, sev-

eral programs are beginning to target the poorest

(Botswana and Zambia currently offer schemes tar-

geted towards “the destitute”).

•

The rationales for these cash transfers, although

they are increasingly aimed at chronic poverty,

were generally designed as emergency relief pro-

grams, rather than as social programs to be de-

livered during normal times. Consequently many

of the cash-transfer programs are not predictable

protections against chronic vulnerabilities that the

poorest households face.

Cash-transfer programs with NGO/donor participa-

tion tend to operate on a smaller scale relative to

government-funded programs, but tend to have

far better targeting and monitoring. Private sector

participation in cash transfers is rare, but several

contributory schemes now involve parastatals and

are beginning to contract with the private sector for

payment delivery.

Conditional cash transfers

Although the details of program design vary from case

to case, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) require that

households, in exchange for cash, undertake mea-

sures to improve their children’s health and education

by requiring their attendance in school, or regular vis-

its to health clinics or nutrition centers. The transfer

of cash contingent on these activities, then, is meant

to promote the accumulation of human capital, limit

the propensity of households to remove children from

school or engage in other activities that increases the

likelihood of long-term poverty, and thereby prevent

the transmission of poverty across generations.

CCTs have recently gained enormous popularity

due in part to mounting evidence of their effec-

tiveness, particularly in Latin American countries.

In 1997, Mexico launched Programa de Educación,

Salud, y Alimentación (PROGRESA, now known as

Oportunidades). Shortly thereafter Brazil started

Programa Nacional de Bolsa Escola and Programa de

Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI), Colombia the

Familias en Acción program, Honduras Programa de

•

•


Asignación Familiar (PRAF), and Nicaragua Red de

Protección Social (RPS). Beginning with PROGRESA-

Oportunidades in Mexico, these fi rst-generation CCTs

have been characterized by effective implementation

with respect to targeting, general administration, and

program outcome (Levy 2006; Rawlings 2004). Well-

implemented CCT programs, designed appropriately

for their settings, have demonstrated a wide range of

favorable results: increased caloric intake and reduced

malnutrition, better use of preventive health services

(immunization, growth monitoring), improved school

enrollment, and reductions in child labor are but a few

benefi ts documented in credible impact evaluations

(see, e.g., Schady and Araujo 2006; Skoufi as and Di

Maro 2006; Gertler 2004; Bourguignon, Ferreira, and

Leite 2003).

The programs are, of course, not a panacea. Although

the available evidence is thin, important differences

between Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, for

example, in terms of quality of service provision or

capacity to implement conditionality, and the cost ra-

tio of conditionality may well make the introduction

of CCTs in Africa inappropriate (Schubert and Slater

2006). CCTs have proven less popular in countries

where the quality of essential services (health and

education) is so poor that the benefi ts of imposing

conditionality are in doubt. Recent examinations

have raised questions as to whether CCTs are the

most cost-effective mechanisms available to address

developmental bottlenecks, whether conditionality

focuses on education and health outcomes to the

detriment of poverty and food security, and whether

too much emphasis is placed on enhancing demand

by the poor for social services while too little is

placed on ensuring that their provision is adequate

(Handa and Davis 2006; Barrientos and DeJong

2004).

In-kind transfers

Unlike the case with CCTs or other types of cash trans-

fers, in-kind transfers either go to service providers

directly (in the case of fee waivers, subsidized insur-

ance, or subsidized utilities) or do not involve cash

(in the case of food subsidies). Many governments

use subsidization and in-kind transfers to meet social

protection objectives in lieu of, or in addition to, direct

income transfers. The rationale for using such subsi-

dies rather than cash transfers is based, in part, on the

potential of these instruments to shift consumption

behavior as well as on administrative considerations

(Alderman 2002b). There is substantial evidence that

price, food subsides, and food stamps encourage in-

creased consumption, possibly due to changes in the

share of resources controlled by women (Pinstrup-

Andersen 2002). On the other hand, while these sub-

sidies do lead to increased consumption towards a

commodity in keeping with policy objectives, they may

also distort production or consumption incentives.

Still, governments may also choose price subsidies

because they are easier to administer than income

transfers. In many cases they may also be politically

more tractable (Hopkins 1988). In-kind transfers, ad-

ditionally, are also more likely to be supported by tax-

payers who do not benefi t, since the transfer is both

“implicit” (rather than directly in cash), and used for

necessities.

The most common form of price subsidy is an un-

targeted direct subsidy. However, various other

means may be used to deliver price subsidies as well.

These are: exemptions on value added or other sales

taxes; untargeted indirect price subsidies (such as

for transport or storage); and dual exchange rates,

which include export taxes, producer quotas, subsi-

dies on transport and storage, and domestic sales of

a commodity below its international cost. Rationed

subsidies (quotas), which include untargeted parallel


market channels for the general population, targeted

access to subsidized goods, and coupons, vouchers,

and stamps, are also used to achieve the same social

protection objectives. Subsidies on goods available in

a rationed amount are a less costly alternative to open

ended subsidies on the entire supply of a good.

The other common form of in-kind transfer is the tar-

geted subsidy. Safety net programs that are tied to

the provision of food, either directly, or through cash-

like instruments (food stamps, coupons) that may be

used to purchase food, is a well-known example. The

most common types of food-based transfers are sup-

plementary feeding programs (which provide a direct

transfer of food to targeted households or individuals,

most commonly for maternal and child feeding), food-

for-work programs, food stamps, and consumer food-

price subsidies. In some countries—in particular, the

formerly socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the

Commonwealth of Independent States—cash transfers

are used to defray the costs of utilities, rather than

food, for poor households.

Recent evidence shows that universal subsidies tend

not to be cost-effective methods of transferring re-

sources to the poor—they are rarely progressive and

are often associated with large consumption and

production-effi ciency costs (Coady 2004; Rogers and

Coates 2002). While targeted in-kind and subsidy

programs can reduce these ineffi ciencies, they tend

to suffer from high degrees of “leakage” to the non-

poor, and signifi cant corruption (Coady, Grosh, and

Hoddinott 2002).

Public works

Workfare programs have been important counter-cy-

clical program interventions in developed as well as

developing countries for many years to counter natu-

ral and economic shocks. These programs typically

provide unskilled manual workers with short-term em-

ployment on projects such as road construction and

maintenance, irrigation infrastructure, reforestation,

and soil conservation.

Public works programs have served as useful safety

nets in middle-income countries during periods of

recession or economic crisis. Chile was the fi rst coun-

try in Latin America to successfully use workfare

programs to target poor unemployed workers and

generate employment, implemented in aftermath of

the 1982 recession. At their peak the various public

work programs employed 13 percent of the Chilean la-

bor force (Lustig 2000). Argentina introduced similar

workfare programs in response to the 1995 “Tequila”

crisis. Trabajar and similar programs are funded

through payroll taxes that are directed into the

National Employment Fund. The resources are used

to build small-scale, labor-intensive public works, in-

cluding social infrastructure, roads, and small sanita-

tion works. Workfare programs in the most successful

cases were well-targeted towards the poor and effec-

tively reduced the vulnerabilities of workers in those

countries during hard times (Ravallion 1999).

In low-income countries, however, evidence from

some public-works schemes shows a sharper invest-

ment return-poverty reduction tradeoff: the greater

the emphasis in generating high-quality investments

from public works, the harder it is for the program

to reach the extreme poor (Coady 2004). Meanwhile

many public works programs in the poorest countries

do not come with clear criteria for programmatic

changes or dissolution, and therefore tend to last well

beyond their intended lifespan. Fragmented coverage

and a weak capacity to respond in times of need un-

dermines the credibility of public works programs to

perform their insurance function for the poor in low-

income countries (Subbarao 2003; Subbarao 1997).


Asset improvement and accumulation

In addition to programs in which cash or goods and

services are transferred to the poor unconditionally,

or in exchange for using health and educational ser-

vices, or for employment in public-works projects,

there is a second class of antipoverty programs to

be considered. Unlike transfer-based programs, as-

set-based programs are intended to encourage and

support the accumulation or productive use of capital

goods that can then be transferred across genera-

tions. Certain transfer-based programs such as CCTs

or fee waivers for health and education, of course, are

linked to human capital accumulation and thus may

rightly be considered asset-based programs, but here

I limit the discussion to non-labor factors of produc-

tion, viz., physical assets such as credit and land.

To a certain degree, asset-based programs represent

a non-traditional approach to poverty reduction,

one that emphasizes relationships between assets,

risks, and vulnerability, instead of static defi nitions of

“poor” and “non-poor,” and that focuses on long-term

asset accumulation instead of the actual income of

the poor (Moser 2006). Asset-based approaches, in

particular, have also prompted reconsideration of the

usual income-poverty line measurement. The concept

of poverty, in its simplest sense, expresses a “gap”

between a minimal standard of welfare—measured as

income, consumption, or some other indicator—and

those who fall below that minimum. More recently,

however, analysts have argued for broader use of dy-

namic, asset-poverty lines and poverty traps based

on inter-generational transfers (Carter and Barrett

2006). But due to the sparseness of systematic data

on household assets in middle- and low-income coun-

tries, and due to the uncertain time horizon over which

asset-based programs are expected to reduce poverty,

analyses of the impact of asset creation and asset im-

provement are diffi cult to design and implement.

Rural credit, for example, has been widely regarded as

a key to poverty alleviation. Macroeconomic analyses

show fairly strong and robust relationships between

the depth and diversifi cation of the (formal) fi nancial

system and economic development (Beck, Demirgüç-

Kunt, and Levine 2004). But microeconomic analy-

ses are less clear. Some analyses have found, for

example, that access to credit is closely correlated

with lower rates of child participation in the labor

market (Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti 2005), as well as

increased employment and lower poverty for women

(Karlan and Zinman 2006; Khandker 2005). On the

other hand, extensive assessments of the effects of

microfi nance have found little or ambiguous impact

on health and nutrition (MkNelly and Dunford 1999),

or mixed results in terms of poverty reduction.6 There

is also evidence that household portfolio allocation is

ineffi cient, particularly in developing countries, due to

problems of poor education, a weak investor-protec-

tion regime, and a lack of trust in fi nancial intermedi-

aries. If true, the correlation between better access to

formal credit and poverty alleviation may be spurious

tenuous (Honohan 2005). A recent survey of 41 mi-

crofi nance programs that met or exceeded scale and

sustainability benchmarks, moreover, showed that

only 4 of these programs yielded credible and positive

impacts on poverty reduction (Dunford 2006).

In addition to credit, land titling is another asset-

based approach to poverty alleviation that has gained

worldwide attention in the past decade. As land scar-

city has diminished the impact of large-scale land

resettlement programs over the past fifty years,

policymakers have turned to property rights schemes

that aim to establish formal control rights over land

on which the poor may have dwelled for generations.

Among the highest-profi le programs, in recent years,

have been the land-titling efforts associated with the

work of Hernando de Soto and others. The rationale


for land titling for the poor is clear: because the poor

do not have formal title to land they occupy, they are

effectively shut out of the formal fi nancial system, un-

able to use their land as collateral (De Soto and Litan

2001).

Does land titling increase the access of the poor

to credit and capital? Because of their recent ori-

gin, there is a paucity of evaluations of land-titling

programs and completed evaluations are decidedly

mixed. Participants in a systematic land-titling in

Indonesia, for example, were 12% more likely to use

title certifi cates, once issued, to obtain credit than

control groups (SMERU Research Institute 2002). By

contrast, an evaluation of a Peruvian rural land pro-

gram is inconclusive as to the effect of program par-

ticipation on access to credit (Torero and Field 2005).

Several critics have noted that property title creates

neither a healthy real estate market nor improved ac-

cess to formal credit for the poorest (Gilbert 2002).

In some notable cases, the expectation of formal title

over land held by the poor has prompted predatory

actions by landed elites to evict squatters from land

to be titled (Durand-Lasserve 2004). Larger-scale

land-titling programs, moreover, have suffered due

to weaknesses in judicial systems and in contract en-

forcement mechanisms.

How effective are LSAPs in low-income countries?

Limited cross-national, comparative analysis has been

done on the effectiveness of antipoverty programs. A

list of programs from around the world can be found

in Annex 1. The quantitative evaluatory work on these

programs has been conducted primarily in middle-in-

come countries, with fewer assessments of programs

in the poorest countries, making comparisons prob-

lematic. From limited cross-national research, how-

ever, there are two tentative conclusions that deserve

attention: (i) antipoverty programs that have proven

benefi cial in middle-income countries have shown less

of an impact in low-income countries; and (ii) target-

ing—the main mechanism by which social programs

can be designed to benefi t the poorest—works less ef-

fectively (are more regressive) in poorer countries.

All LSAPs have costs, and all LSAPs have political

risks—namely, the risk that they will be used primarily

to reward or entice political supporters and to punish

opponents. Some of these costs and risks for the fi ve

categories of programs are described in Table 2. The

table also summarizes some potential program-based

risks in low-income countries. Less-developed infra-

structure, weak or failing states, extreme regional dis-

parities, social or political polarization (particularly in

confl ict-ridden areas), and low-growth environments

are just some of the factors that impinge on LSAP

performance in low-income countries.

These factors have consequential effects on house-

hold behavior, and are thus likely to shape the ef-

fectiveness of programs aiming to change household

incentives. Figure 3 shows the effect of CCTs on

school enrollment, given baseline enrollment rates,

across countries. In the first graph showing a set

of Latin American countries along with Bangladesh

and Cambodia—the fi gures for which are taken from

impact evaluations—CCTs have the greatest impact

where the initial enrollment rates are low. The second

panel is based on the UNDP’s International Poverty

Center (IPC) simulations showing the impact of cash

transfers on enrollment in 15 Sub-Saharan African

countries—countries which do not actually have CCTs

in place. These results are based on an ex-ante de-

fi ned model of household decision-making that does

not explicitly examine the effect of conditionality,

but that is built on the assumptions that the poor are


progressively targeted, and that the total program ex-

penditure is proportional to the degree of poverty in

each country.7 The results show a much weaker rela-

tionship between the impact of the transfer and base-

line enrollment, and a much lower overall increase in

enrollment rates, due to the low returns to education

in African countries. Indeed, the UNDP-IPC found that

even affordable programs would not have measurable

impacts on poverty, and that larger, costlier programs

would have limited effects on school attendance.

Similarly, data from South India show that while the

poor are unwilling to expend resources or effort on

ensuring their children attend schools, they spend

large relative sums of money on wedding celebra-

tions and festivals (Rao 2001). The study argues that

publicly observable celebrations serve an important

role in maintaining social reputations and, at the same

time, are forms of status-enhancing competition. In

sum, they are a more valuable investment than alter-

native investments in human capital.

One of the broader indicators of the performance of

antipoverty programs is the effectiveness of their tar-

geting. Indeed, it is frequently argued that the “best”

antipoverty programs identify who the poor are, and

Costs Potential for political misuse

Risks in low-income countries

Unconditional cash transfers

Targeting costs can be high, as can costs of distributing and monitoring receipt of payments, and monitoring benefi ciary participation.

Allocation of cash transfers to secure electoral support, political loyalty (and to punish opposition), or as reward for solidarity, rather than on the basis of need

Use of social assistance for antipoverty can create “patchwork” or fragmented social policy regimes

Conditional cash transfers

Targeting costs, along with need for effective service delivery (in health and education) as part of conditionality

Similar problems as with unconditional transfers, along with numerous opportunities to use service mechanisms as patronage

Undeveloped infrastructure, poor service-delivery, and low-returns to education can undermine willingness to participate

In-kind transfers Potentially high storage and transport costs for food programs; possible distortionary effects of price subsidies

Use of subsidies to “pacify” rural areas, prevent urban protests, political violence, etc., rather than antipoverty objectives

Program administrators may face strong pressures to use in-kind transfers as substi-tute for discretionary spend-ing, such as for emergency relief, food aid, etc.

Public employment High overhead costs of managing, training, and/or supervising benefi ciaries

High potential for misuse of employment programs for non-poverty reduction purposes

Institutional fragmentation undermines insurance function for the poor

Asset-accumulation and improvement

Budgetary impact may be limited, but may expand con-tingent liabilities for govern-ments (e.g., via guarantees for microfi nance institutions)

Politically-based allocation of credit; discriminatory land-titling

Absence of well-functioning real estate or credit markets limits ability of program participants to exercise rights over assets fully

Table 2: Characteristics of Basic LSAPs


Figure 3: Impact of Cash Transfers on School Enrollment

Source: Morley and Coady 2003), Kakwani, Soares, and Son (2005).

ensure that benefi ts are targeted towards that group.

The debate on the relative merits of targeting—in both

developed and developing nations—is well-known and

requires little summary.8 In upper-income nations, a

combination of income- and means-testing is used

to establish eligibility for participation in antipoverty

programs. Much of the information used to determine

whether or not participants are eligible comes from

tax and purchase receipts, but in many cases social

workers interview applicants individually, yielding an

administrative cost of between 7% and 11% of total

program costs (Organisation for Economic Co-op-

eration and Development 1999). Developing nations,

in contrast, have employed a variety of alternative

mechanisms to target households and individuals

that avoid these prohibitive administrative costs: us-

ing categorical indicators (gender, age, household

size, employment, or whether recipients are disabled,

widows/widowers, disaster victims) to establish proxy

tests, geographical targeting, or “community-based”

assessments in which a local authority is empowered

to select program benefi ciaries.

An assessment of the targeting effectiveness of over

one hundred antipoverty programs in almost 40 de-

veloping countries shows that means-testing is supe-

rior to alternatives such as proxy means, community

assessments, age, or other mechanisms in targeting

outcomes (Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott 2004). The

same data, however, do not show any signifi cant cor-

relation between country per-capita income and the

likelihood that means testing will be used (although

proxy means are more likely to be used in richer

countries). Yet the country-income effect on target-

ing progressivity is clear: an increase of one standard

deviation in GDP per capita increases progressivity

by approximately 10% (i.e., 10% of the benefi ts are

more likely to accrue to the poorest quintile). Figure 4

shows the estimated effect of country income on tar-

geting performance for the available sample.

To be sure, the administrative costs of targeting can

be substantial—as is the case in the richer nations.

But much of that cost is due to the informational

requirements of means testing. That the preliminary

cross-national data do not show any signifi cant effect

of national income on the likelihood of means testing

suggests that other factors are responsible for the

poor targeting performance of LSAPs in developing

nations. It has been noted that a purely technocratic

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Zambia

Uganda

Nigeria

Malawi

Mozambique

Madagascar

Kenya

Guinea

GhanaEthiopia

Cote d'Ivoire

Burkina Faso

Burundi

-0.5

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

Enrollment at baseline

Est

ima

ted

pro

gra

mim

pa

ct(%

incr

ea

sein

en

roll

me

nt)

Bangladesh

Cambodia

BrazilColombia

Mexico (urban)

Ecuador

Honduras

Nicaragua

Mexico (rural)

Enrollment at baseline (%)

Est

ima

ted

pro

gra

mim

pa

ct(%

incr

ea

sein

en

roll

me

nt)

Gambia Cameroon


approach to targeting (which takes into account con-

sumption and income levels of program recipients)

is not feasible because it ignores the distributional

confl icts inherent in the design and implementation

of antipoverty programs (Besley and Kanbur 1990).

In particular, to the extent that movement away from

non-targeted schemes (e.g., food subsidies) towards

targeted schemes entails losses to the middle and

upper classes, large-scale targeted programs may be-

come politically unsustainable, even as the technical

obstacles to effective targeting are overcome.

What are the reasons behind these correlations? The

low resource levels of these countries is a necessary

but insuffi cient explanation, at least at the program

level, since there is evidence of fully donor-funded

programs (e.g., in Tanzania, Zambia) yielding compa-

rably poor results. The conceptual approach taken

here is that antipoverty programs are a sub-set of the

overall social protection regime, and that the choice

of scope, content, and target for these programs is an

inherently political decision infl uenced by the same

factors that shape social protection. In the next sec-

tion I examine what political-economic insights can

be derived from an examination of changes in social

policy in developing countries, before turning to an

examination of how the political and institutional con-

straints to scaling up can be overcome.

Figure 4: Estimated effect of GDP per capita on targeting performance with confi dence intervals

Notes: Graph shows estimated values (dark line) based on stochastic simulation of an OLS model controlling for program type and different categories of means testing, community assessment, as well as targeting by age, geography, work, and consump-tion. Shaded lines represent 95% confi dence intervals. The data rank targeting progressivity for 86 antipoverty programs in 36 developing countries.Source: Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2004).

1

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

1.6

1.7

0 20 40 60 80 100

Voice and accountability (sample percentile rank)

Tar

get

ing

pro

gre

ssiv

ity


THE POLITICAL-INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF SCALING UP

To the extent that LSAPs represent large-scale

transfers to the poor, it is important to under-

stand the conditions under which such transfers are

politically feasible on an expanded scale. The perspec-

tive on scaling up used in this background paper is

that the principal determinant of successful, sustain-

able scaling up is a political environment that is favor-

able to pro-poor economic and social policy. In other

words, the same political dynamics that have con-

strained the ability of developing countries to provide

social protection and deliver basic services to their

poorest citizens are the same factors that will limit the

scaling up of successful interventions.

Social protection, when viewed restrictively, is some-

times considered distinct from antipoverty programs,

particularly those programs aimed at the chronic

poor. In developing countries, social protection was

often traditionally associated with a set of institu-

tions, policies, and programs in place aimed at provid-

ing benefi ts to individuals and households to enable

them to cope with short-term risks. But there is now a

greater consensus that social protection can provide

an appropriate framework for addressing transient

and chronic poverty in developing countries, one

that should not be limited to addressing short-term

vulnerabilities, but that can create conditions for the

poor to escape from poverty (Barrientos, Hulme, and

Shepherd 2005). This approach, which merges the

“social protection” and “poverty reduction” agendas,

aims at moving from a disparate set of ad hoc safety

nets and programs toward a more regularized system

that manages the risks and vulnerabilities faced by

individuals and households (see, e.g., Gentilini 2005;

Devereux 2002; Dercon 2003). In developing coun-

tries, social protection faces some specifi c challenges.

I examine some of the determinants of poor social

protection in developing countries before turning to

an examination of some specifi c factors that may pro-

mote scaling up.

What explains the expansion and retrenchment of social policy in developing countries?

The analysis of the rise and expansion of welfare

states in industrialized nations, beginning with the so-

cial and political upheavals in the late 19th century, is

one of the major subfi elds in comparative and histori-

cal political economy. By contrast, very little has been

written on the forces underlying the development and

expansion (or contraction) of welfare states in the

developing world (many of which, in relative terms,

are far richer than the OECD countries were in the

1800s). It has been long assumed, for example, that

the presumably harsher effects of structural adjust-

ment and fi scal-austerity measures on public budgets

contributed to smaller per-capita amounts of public

spending on health, education, and social protection

in poorer countries. This assumption, however, is

not supported by econometric analyses of available

panel-data from developing countries, some of which

fi nd that structural adjustment actually contributed to

an expansion in public spending (Fan and Rao 2003).

There is no consensus, moreover, for explaining how

or why long-run trends in per-capita welfare spending

in Asia, Latin America, and Africa differ from that of

the OECD countries.

What can the historical evolution of social protection

in Western Europe and the U.S. tell us about the con-

temporary problems of social protection and social

spending in the developing world? Some prominent

explanations of welfare state development deserve

examination in the developing country context. These

are drawn from a diverse literature identifying politi-

cal-institutional factors that have enabled or hindered


countries’ abilities to fashion disparate safety net and

antipoverty programs into a coherent system of social

protection. I focus on three inter-related factors: the

effects of economic openness, the bargaining ability of

domestic coalitions and constituencies supporting so-

cial spending, and the nature of the political system.

Low-income countries are unlikely to be able to re-

sist pressures to restrain social spending in the face

of increasingly global economic integration, liberal-

ization, and trade openness;

Low-income countries lack groups with suffi cient

political clout—including, but not limited to labor-

rural alliances, and other “populist” coalitions—that

can credibly demand greater provision of essential

services and social programs for the poor;

Political systems in low-income countries tend to

be “illiberal” or semi-competitive democracies, or

non-democratic, and thus do not prioritize pro-poor

spending or progressive economic policies.

Globalization and economic openness

One prominent explanation, particularly in light of

recent and on-going debates on the effects of glo-

balization, is that economic openness in developing

countries inhibits their ability to spend public funds on

health, education, and social security. One answer to

the question “has globalization gone too far?” is well-

known: neoliberal reforms have undermined the social

protections that countries were able to provide during

the era of import-substitution industrialization, and

have limited public expenditures on social protection

and poverty alleviation (Rodrik 1997). Yet, as Rodrik

himself notes, openness did not have similar effects

in high-income OECD nations where evidence consis-

tently shows that economic openness, lower poverty

levels, large public sectors, and generous welfare sys-

tems are strongly correlated (Rodrik 1999).

•

•

•

The divergence is primarily explained by two com-

peting hypotheses of the effects of globalization on

social spending (Garrett 2001). On the one hand,

openness encourages business groups and inves-

tors—newly exposed to international competition—to

push governments to lower taxes and expenditures,

and limits the bargaining ability of workers to resist

these pressures. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence

is somewhat mixed. Some cross-national evidence

for the region shows only modest cuts for health and

education in the 1980s and 1990s (Sahn, Dorosh, and

Younger 1997), while other evidence shows signifi cant

deterioration in social services resulting in lower vac-

cination and school enrollment rates (Cleaver, Kanbur,

and Rouis 1995). In the typical African state, a com-

mon response to economic retrenchment seems to

have been to protect the position of public-sector

employees while lessening its commitment to antipov-

erty programs, suggesting that globalization is an in-

suffi cient explanation for the decline in overall social

spending (Van de Walle 2001).

On the other hand, a different hypothesis holds that

countries exposed to economic and social dislocations

from trade or fi nancial liberalization are more likely

to provide transfers to key groups as an insurance

against political backlashes. This alternative hypoth-

esis seems to fi t the recent history of Latin America,

where a series of transfer-based programs were initi-

ated in the wake of economic crises consisting not

only of cash transfers to the poor, but of transfers to

rural landholders, public employment programs, and

other subsidies. One of the architects of PROGRESA

summarizes the dilemma presented to policymakers:

[A]lthough increasing the scope and coverage of

existing programs in the short run would show

that measures were being taken to protect the

poor, it would make it more difficult to phase


them out later on and would reduce the credibil-

ity of the government’s commitment to revamp

food subsidy policy; not doing so, on the other

hand, would give the impression that the govern-

ment was insensitive to the needs of the poor

(Levy 2006).

Additionally, analyses of Eastern Europe and the CIS

also describe the phenomenon of “soft budget con-

straints” for former state-owned enterprises as a de

facto form of social assistance during an era of re-

trenchment, during which implicit subsidies to fi rms

were continued mainly because much of the social

protection in these countries was handled through an

elaborate system of fi rm-owned social assets (Roland

2000; Freinkman and Haney 1997).

Economic openness and integration per se, therefore, do

not explain the variation in social spending one observes

in developing nations over the last quarter century.

Whether governments lower or increase social spending

in response to external economic factors, then is itself a

function of the means citizens have to mobilize support

for or opposition to various programs.

Coalition strength and populism

A long tradition in comparative political economy

places distributional confl icts at the center of analy-

ses of the scope and depth of social protection. In a

nutshell, the conventional wisdom is that a strong

labor movement is vital for maintaining social protec-

tion. Much of the analysis on which these conclusions

are derived from histories of welfare states in Western

Europe, where the spread of social democracy and

labor unionization coincided with expanding public

expenditures on health and education, compensa-

tory transfers to the poor, along with social insurance

(Hicks 1999; Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen 1990).

Some recent analyses have extended some of these

fi ndings to the developing world, to analyze the effect

of labor strength—or left-wing political movements

more generally—on social spending. One argument

is that labor movements in developing countries (in

the face of globalization) have found themselves in

a weaker bargaining position due to the abundance

of low-skilled workers along with larger pools of sur-

plus labor, limiting their ability to organize or act col-

lectively (Rudra 2002). Although this most clearly

pertains to the differences in strength between labor

movements in OECD countries and developing coun-

tries, it may also apply to the differences between

middle- and low-income countries in recent years. In

Latin America, for example, although trade unions

have remained historically weak (as in much of the

developing world), it is likely that populist movements

may have acted as substitutes in resisting cutbacks to

social protections or LSAPs (Stokes 2001).

A similar argument makes a distinction between

groups in sectors facing shocks—e.g., manufacturing

sectors exposed to international competition—and

those less vulnerable. In this view it is distributional

confl ict between the high- and low-risk sectors, rather

than between classes, that shapes social protection.

Workers and fi rms facing high demand volatility, con-

sequently, will favor institutions of social insurance

that compensate them for losses of income, and that

reallocate these costs across sectors; workers and

fi rms in low-risk sectors will oppose these programs

that turn them into subsidizers of high-risk sectors

(Mares 2005). The outcome of this battle turns on

(i) the relative bargaining strengths of these groups,

and (ii) the government’s ability to manage confl icts

and enforce existing policies, which can dampen the

effect of external shocks on the erosion of social

protection.


Democratic politics and pro-poor policies

The other mechanism through which the effects of

globalization are mediated is the nature of demo-

cratic politics. An axiom in debates on the politics of

social spending is that given lower rates of political

participation by the poor, social spending programs

that benefi t the middle and upper classes are more

likely to maintain support. In other words, although

the median voter may be relatively poor, their effec-

tive disenfranchisement limits their ability to pressure

policymakers.

Nevertheless, democracy does appear to be associ-

ated with greater antipoverty spending in develop-

ing countries around the world. In Latin America,

for example, studies have found that democracies

in the region were more likely to maintain social

security, health, and education expenditures in the

face of recessions in the 1980s than non-democra-

cies (Brown and Hunter 1999). Evidence from over

two decades suggests that the shift to democracy

in Latin America has a stronger (positive) effect on

health and education spending than on pensions

and other welfare transfers that tend to benefi t the

middle class (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001).

Two interpretations are possible. First, it may be

the case that democratization in Latin America is

associated with greater mobilization of the poor,

and thus democratic rulers are more likely to re-

spond with public expenditures that reach larger

portions of the poor. The study of the targeting

performance of antipoverty programs cited in sec-

tion 2 above supports this finding, showing that

“voice and accountability” in government increases

the progressivity of targeting. Another likelihood

is that some minimal transfers to the non-poor are

needed to ensure their support for those programs

targeted towards the poor, in order to enjoy sup-

port from broader segments of the public (and to

avoid “backlash” against pro-poor programs by the

middle class).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, resolving the issue of whether

democratic politics leads to more antipoverty spend-

ing is complicated by the fact that many social services

are even more inequitably distributed than they are

in other developing nations. A study of education and

health spending across several African states fi nds that

the richest citizens tended to benefi t disproportion-

ately relative to the poorest (Castro-Leal et al. 1999).

During the 1980s, moreover, prior to the emergence of

democracies in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, the spend-

ing per student on tertiary education exceeded spend-

ing on primary education by a ratio larger than for all

other regions (Pradhan 1996). Multiparty democracy in

Africa, however, has reversed some of these patterns,

with democratic governments more likely to prioritize

primary education (Stasavage 2005).

Creating a favorable environment for antipoverty policy

If antipoverty policy and social policy are jointly de-

termined by similar sets of factors, what do these fac-

tors imply for scaling up antipoverty programs in poor

countries? I identify 5 implications, as well as what

can be done to overcome these problems:

The poor are limited in their ability to exploit the

power of their numbers due to the collective action

problems they face;

There is often a tradeoff between the targeting ef-

fi ciency and political feasibility of LSAPs;

The design and institutional location of LSAPs may

be characterized by stalemates in cases where so-

cial policy is a patchwork of programs and instru-

ments, each administered by different public bodies

with different constituencies, interests, and incen-

tives;

•

•

•


The institutional arrangements of which LSAPs are a

part are sometimes designed with political objectives

trumping antipoverty objectives, making the survival

of LSAPs during political transitions doubtful;

Elites who administer LSAPs may seek rents, di-

vert assets, or otherwise collect private benefi ts

in ways that undermine the sustainability of these

programs.

Overcoming fractionalization

A wide body of evidence suggests that social and

political fractionalization in poor communities limits

the ability of the poor to engage in collective ac-

tion. Heterogeneous preferences—due to ethnic or

linguistic fractionalization, high levels of inequality,

etc.—also lower the quality of public goods. The inabil-

ity of members to impose credible sanctions in diverse

communities, the unwillingness of some community

members to fund essential services that will be used

by members of other groups, the lack of consensus

on what public goods should be demanded, and the

tendency of all groups in a diverse community to

free-ride on the efforts of others, are all cited as ex-

planations of the problem (Posner 2005; Barr 2004;

Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Consequently, the

degree of semi-permanent disenfranchisement may

be extensive. The empirical evidence supporting the

claim that public goods provision in ethnically diverse

communities suffers is overwhelming. Ethnic diversity

is associated with:

Persistent price distortions (Easterly and Levine

1997);

Lower primary school-funding and poor-quality

school facilities (Miguel and Gugerty 2005);

Lower access to functioning basic infrastructure

(Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2005; Khwaja

Forthcoming);

•

•

•

•

•

Poorer-performing microfinance institutions

(Karlan 2007);

Civil wars, communal violence, and out-migration

(Fearon and Laitin 2003; Varshney 2003);

Exclusion (via discrimination) and self-exclusion

of potential antipoverty program beneficiaries

(Platteau 2000; Castro-Leal et al. 1999).

There is also evidence of discriminatory practices

against the poor who happen to be minorities, raising

the possibility that new cleavages—between minor-

ity- and majority-group poor citizens—can be induced

by public policy. Sri Lanka’s Sumurdhi cash-transfer

program, for example, has accounted for nearly 1.5%

of GDP in recent years. Survey data indicate that the

program discriminates against minorities, as well as

those in newer settlements (Gunatilaka 2000).9 Fear

of governmental agencies among indigenous groups

has also limited the participation of the poor in an-

tipoverty programs in Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru

(Psacharopoulos 1992; Schady 2001).

The ways in which these divides of ethnicity and reli-

gion have been overcome, therefore, can potentially

instruct project design and scaling up. In particular,

nation-building and political socialization has often

created associational bonds across ethnic or reli-

gious groups, and counteracted some of the exclu-

sion brought about by ethnic diversity and exclusion.

Miguel summarizes the contrast between Kenya and

Tanzania:

Despite their largely shared geography, history,

and colonial institutional legacy, governments

in Kenya and Tanzania have followed radically

different ethnic policies along a range of dimen-

sions—most notably in national language policy,

the educational curriculum, and local institu-

tional reform—with Tanzania consistently pur-

•

•

•


suing the more serious nation-building policies

during the postcolonial period. . . The Tanzanian

nation-building approach has allowed ethnically

diverse communities in rural Tanzania to achieve

considerable success in fund-raising for local

public goods, while diverse communities in the

nearby Kenyan region typically fail. To illustrate,

while Kenyan communities at mean levels of eth-

nic diversity have 25 percent less primary school

funding per pupil than homogeneous areas on

average, the comparable fi gure for the Tanzanian

district is near zero (Miguel 2004).

Gaining public support for antipoverty programs

In addition to increasing the bargaining strength of the

poor, stronger non-poor support for antipoverty poli-

cies can remove many of the political concerns public

offi cials have in committing larger shares of resources

to scaling up antipoverty programs. How can that sup-

port be generated? Program designers face a dilemma:

since most LSAPs do not benefi t the median voter, the

median voter is less inclined to support politicians who

wish to scale up antipoverty programs; but securing

popular support for LSAPs may require that they be

less “pro-poor,” i.e., that greater shares of benefi ts go

to the non-poor. Under ideal circumstances, antipov-

erty programs would be scaled up without fundamental

changes to their (progressive) targeting. But this type

of scaling up is often politically unfeasible because

the non-poor (particularly the middle classes) do not

benefi t, and have little stake in seeing these programs

survive and expand. Consequently, semi-ineffi cient tar-

geting may be an appropriate means of securing sup-

port for scaling up.

Ineffi cient (regressive) transfers may be necessary in

situations where more effi cient targeting can jeopar-

dize crucial support from the non-poor for poverty

reduction, as political attitudes towards the size and

type of antipoverty transfers can dramatically affect

the survival of these programs. Opinion polls from

Latin America, for example, show that those countries

where the poor tend to be held partially responsible

for their own poverty are less likely to support large

antipoverty efforts (Graham 2002). Consequently

many LSAPs deliberately target middle quintiles by,

for example, tying eligibility for receipt of transfers to

formal-sector employment in order to maintain legiti-

macy in the eyes of the public (Lindert, Skoufi as, and

Shapiro 2006). Some have advocated explicitly allow-

ing “leakage” to the non-poor as means of shoring up

broader political support for LSAPs (Pritchett 2005).

Even Mexico’s PROGRESA—widely praised for its pro-

gressive targeting—began passing on more benefi ts to

less marginalized communities and urban groups over

time despite being designed to insulate decision-mak-

ers from political pressures (Levy 2006, p. 65).

It is important to distinguish between ineffi ciently-

targeted transfers, and the ineffi cient transfers them-

selves. While the former may be needed to ensure

that LSAP are politically sustainable, the latter im-

pose distortions on the economy. Pro-poor redistri-

bution sometimes takes a highly distortionary form

due to the lack of transparency in budgetary rules, or

due to high levels of discretion in spending. Some of

these extremely ineffi cient transfers to the poor are

well-known—e.g., the “urban bias” in some countries

whereby price subsidies for the urban poor (and non-

poor) are implemented at the expense of poor farm-

ers, or the use of “off-budget” funds that may have

antipoverty components, but that constitute a contin-

gent fi scal liability for governments. These distortion-

ary transfers sometimes occur as a way of “masking”

the true cost of the transfer (Acemoglu and Robinson

2001). Thus politicians rely on price subsidies rather


than lump-sum transfers, or on off-budget funds

rather than budgetary expenditures, in order to avoid

revealing the true cost of the transfer and (more im-

portantly) the political relationship between the politi-

cian and the benefi ciary group, and above all, to avoid

signaling to the median voter that the politician cares

about the poor to the exclusion of others.

Integrating antipoverty policy into a social-policy regime

As mentioned above, the poor are not monolithic. They

include urban residents and rural dwellers, young and

old, the employed and the unemployed, informal and

formal sector employees. And the poor themselves

are vulnerable due to a number of factors: health,

age, family situation, social status, or economic posi-

tion. Similarly, social policy—usually having been built

piecemeal—is often equally fragmented across pro-

grams, with each program addressing different and

often overlapping categories of recipients, funding

sources, institutions and agencies, and constituencies.

A proposed framework for Africa identifi es poor inte-

gration as a defi ning characteristic of social policy in

African nations (African Union 2005).

In scaling up antipoverty programs, important ques-

tions of institutional design and incentives need to be

addressed. LSAPs may require either a restructuring

of incentives of participating agencies, or the cre-

ation of a new agency. If the former, incentives need

to be compatible across governmental organizations

such that the benefi ts of the LSAP are “internalized”

equally across agencies (Levy 2006, pp. 148-149).

If the latter, there may be additional considerations

including potential resistance from other agencies

due to turf-battles, the appropriate mix of discretion

and rules in program administration, and the insti-

tutional fi t of the new body into the existing social

policy regime. A clear delineation of powers, including

of revenue sources and expenditure responsibilities,

combined with some system of checks and balances

can facilitate a smoother integration of LSAPs into the

existing social-program architecture.

Ensuring program survival

LSAPs can readily be employed to secure electoral ad-

vantages, a fact not lost on many politicians. The ex-

periences of LSAPs in Latin America are replete with

examples. In Peru prior to elections, Fujimori’s govern-

ment often poured money into the FONCODES public

works and antipoverty programs (Schady 2000). In

Mexico between 1989 and 1994, the national poverty-

alleviation program (and precursor to PROGRESA),

Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL) spent

1.2% of GDP annually on transfers heavily skewed

towards municipalities dominated by the governing

Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (Diaz-Cayeros

and Magaloni 2003). The fact that these programs

yielded electoral returns to the political parties that

started them did not prevent their scaling up—in fact,

their political desirability may have contributed to the

dramatic expansion of these programs. Rather, elec-

torally-driven transfers in Latin American countries

had a limited impact on actual poverty reduction;

more commonly they merely worsened countries’ fi s-

cal stances and exacerbated business cycles (Gonzalez

2002; Schuknecht 2000; Mejía Reyes 2003).

As noted above, however, some electorally-driven

transfers may be necessary to secure the public sup-

port needed for programs to be scaled up and survive.

But there is a danger where the electoral returns to

LSAPs outweigh the poverty-alleviation benefi ts, i.e.,

when LSAPs become an instrument of partisanship.

Partisanship, as already mentioned, may not limit

scaling up, but it can severely limit the sustainability


of LSAPs programs, since partisan LSAPs are typi-

cally shut down during political transitions once the

government of the program originators collapses or

is voted out.

Thus there is an argument to be made for shielding

LSAPs from political manipulation not only because

that manipulation will erode the targeting effective-

ness of these programs, but because greater parti-

sanship in the administration of LSAPs reduced their

chances of survival, since programs that are strongly

associated with a particular group of politicians or po-

litical party are not likely to outlast the tenure of the

politicians associated with the program.

Preventing elite capture

In addition to the use of LSAPs to engage in ineffi cient

transfers, LSAPs are subject to other types of abuse

by political elites. At the central-governmental level,

one type of abuse is the kind of ineffi cient transfer

mechanisms described above: where LSAP admin-

istrators allocate resources on the basis of loyalty,

ethnic or linguistic solidarity, or other factors not re-

lated to need. These forms of patron-clientelism are

well known to analysts of social service-delivery in

developing countries. But at the sub-national level a

different type of scaling-up problem has to do with the

ability of local elites who control LSAPs to use them to

extract private benefi ts.

In large part elite control over community-based

projects is often pervasive. In large countries such

as Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia, authority over

the administration of antipoverty programs is often

delegated to sub-national governments. Supporters

have argued that decentralization is better suited to

antipoverty programs for two reasons. First, better

information is available at the regional or local level

than to the center. Second, local institutions, being

closer to program benefi ciaries, are more accountable

to citizens.

Field research on community-driven projects has

shown that there does tend to be an informational ad-

vantage, but that the informational resource of locals

is not always put to best use. Researchers have found

that local community agents have better information

on household characteristics and can therefore assess

benefi ciary eligibility better than outsiders who rely

on cruder proxies (Cremer, Estache, and Seabright

1996). Among communities in Albania, for example,

those using local information that was unlikely to be

obtained on the basis of a questionnaire or formula

demonstrated better poverty targeted than those that

relying on proxy indicators alone (Alderman 2002a).

In Bangladesh, despite the claims to the contrary,

there is little evidence that the central government

targets poor villages, but rather, that pro-poor target-

ing occurs within villages due to the informational

advantages and better accountability of local com-

munity organizations (Galasso and Ravallion 2000).

On the other hand, a study of Honduran communities

questions the ability of group informants to assess

their own level of food security (Bergeron, Morris, and

Banegas 1998).

But any informational advantage of community-based

programs can be compromised by its diversion to ben-

efi t local elites. Depending on the peculiar lineages of

community power relations, local governments may

be more prone to capture (and consequently, less ac-

countable than the central government). Under these

conditions, decentralization may simply shelter local

elites, who use their position to over-provide essential

services to themselves or their families, or otherwise

expropriate wealth (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006).

The problems of elite capture, and the means to avoid


it, are increasingly important as donor agencies en-

thusiastically adopt “participatory” approaches to

scaling up.

A range of studies has revealed the number of mecha-

nisms local elites can use to divert resources from

the poor, and even engage in predatory behavior. The

implementation of community-based projects can cre-

ate an adverse-selection effect whereby those indi-

viduals who are more likely to obtain leadership roles

are precisely those who are better able to extract

rents (Gugerty and Kremer 2000), who are better able

to convince donors that their motivations are based

on the collective good of their community (Harrison

2002), or who are better able to create the façade

of community participation (Conning and Kevane

2002).10 In the words of one study, scaled up antipov-

erty projects—without fundamental changes to au-

thority relations within affected communities—often

constitute “nothing other than new ‘structures’ with

which [elites] can seek to establish an instrumentally

profitable position within the existing structure of

neo-patrimonialism” (Chabal and Daloz 1999, pp. 24-

25). The Economist noted that devolution in Indonesia

produced a system in which provincial rulers:

“[E]xercise their new administrative and fi nan-

cial clout so imperiously that locals refer to

them as ‘little kings.’ Stories abound of reckless

extravagance or outright corruption . . . fears of

decentralization run amok are beginning to re-

place fears of Indonesia’s disintegration” (quoted

in Platteau 2004).

Note that the problem of capture is not limited to case

where there is decentralization in the administration

of antipoverty programs. All of the pathologies de-

scribed above can occur with centrally-run programs.

The case of the soup-kitchens projects within the

Peruvian Food Assistance Program (PRONAA) illus-

trates what can happen.11 Although the original soup

kitchens were grassroots initiatives, the Belaunde

and García administrations in the 1980s began to

integrate the various PRONAA programs into the

structures of the state, and by 1990, all grassroots ini-

tiatives had ceased, and the soup kitchen concept had

become associated with the public sector. Secondly,

whereas original soup kitchens had provided a means

to achieve food security and secure a minimum level

of nutritional consumption, soup kitchens under

PRONAA became a means of food transfers to key

non-poor groups. Thirdly, the political apparatus of

the Fujimori regime used PRONAA for patronage: key

positions were assigned to political supporters, and

through the ruling party’s own local offi ce, authority

over individual soup-kitchen associations was passed

to party loyalists.

This is not to suggest that all local elites are oppor-

tunists eager to divert antipoverty resources from

their intended benefi ciaries, only that the nature of

power structures can diminish the impact of scaled-up

programs, particularly where signifi cant devolution is

involved.


CONCLUSION

This background paper has argued for an ex-

panded view of scaling up—one that moves be-

yond what might be called a “functional” perspective

that focuses on programmatic and resource issues

towards a perspective that encompasses the politi-

cal and institutional conditions under which poverty-

agendas are set, policies are chosen, and programs

are expanded. Examinations of the determinants of

scaling up social-protection regimes more generally

can potentially provide insights into the scaling-up

processes for antipoverty programs.

The central obstacle, from this perspective, is not

that program designers’ lack knowledge, managerial

skill, or fi scal resources, or that program adjustments

and organizational capacity may not keep pace with

program proliferation, but that the domestic politics

of developing countries can restrict the scale and du-

ration of redistributive programs. The poor may face

high collective action costs, limiting their agenda-set-

ting power. The median voter may not support pro-

grams that transfer wealth to the poor. Politicians face

strong incentives to use redistributive programs for

partisan purposes, limiting the likelihood that these

programs will survive political transitions or changes

of government. And politicians and public officials

may also be prone to create institutional mechanisms

that enable them to target different programs to spe-

cifi c groups, potentially limiting their ability to expand

in coverage and scale. These interactions between the

poor, non-poor, and public offi cials as well as the delib-

erate political calculations involved in the supply and

demand of antipoverty policies often limit the scaling

up of antipoverty programs or render them unsustain-

able. Consequently, successful scaling up will require a

better understanding of the incentives faced by those

responsible for delivering public goods, the prefer-

ences of important constituencies (including the poor

but also groups beyond the poor whose support is

necessary to sustain scaled-up interventions).

Further investigation and analysis of these political

and institutional dimensions of antipoverty programs

and policy can add to a growing body of analysis of

the determinants of poverty and poverty reduction

in poor nations, and can inform both theorists and

practitioners of the feasibility of different categories

of LSAPs, as well as of the effectiveness of different

types of programs in highly diverse contexts.


An

nex

: L

arg

e S

cale

An

tip

ove

rty

Pro

gra

ms

aro

un

d t

he

Wo

rld

Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Foo

d-f

or-

Wo

rkA

fgh

anis

tan

SFW

200

3Fo

od

su

bsid

ies

to fi

ll “

foo

d g

aps”

to

su

p-

po

rt c

on

stru

ctio

n/r

ehab

ilita

tio

n o

f co

m-

mu

nit

y as

sets

.

3,25

6,9

40

peo

ple

; to

tal o

f 78

,974

MT,

24

kg

per

per

son

Low

eff

ecti

ven

ess;

wea

k ta

rget

ing

, p

oo

r co

nn

ecti

on

wit

h li

velih

oo

d r

ecov

-er

y; la

ck o

f at

ten

tio

n t

o e

qu

ity

issu

es

in ir

rig

atio

n r

ehab

ilita

tio

n; i

nsu

ffi c

ien

t q

uan

tity

of

foo

d.

Trab

ajar

Arg

enti

na

PW

199

6-

200

2P

rovi

des

low

-wag

e w

ork

(m

in.6

ho

urs

/d

ay)

for

the

un

emp

loye

d o

n s

mal

l-sc

ale

com

mu

nit

y p

roje

cts

on

rep

airi

ng

an

d

crea

tin

g e

con

om

ic/s

oci

al in

fras

tru

ctu

re.

46

4,10

2 t

emp

ora

ry jo

bs.

Sel

f-se

lect

ion

. US

$20

0 (

199

6-

199

8);

US

$16

0 (

199

9-2

00

2)

80

% r

ecei

ved

by

the

po

ore

st 2

0%

of

fam

ilies

; ave

rag

e g

ain

is h

alf

of t

he

mea

n T

raba

jar

wag

e; n

o s

ign

ifi ca

nt

inco

me

gai

n; l

ow c

ost

eff

ecti

ven

ess;

sh

ort

-ter

m u

nem

plo

ymen

t re

du

ctio

n

on

ly.

Lo

cal p

olit

ical

eco

no

my

ten

ds

to p

rote

ct p

rog

ram

al-

loca

tio

ns

to n

on

-po

or

area

s w

hen

pro

gra

m c

on

trac

ts.

Pro

gra

ma

Nac

ion

al

de

Bec

as

Est

ud

ian

tile

s

Arg

enti

na

CC

T19

96

Tran

sfer

s to

po

or

stu

den

t at

ten

din

g p

ub

-lic

sec

on

dar

y sc

ho

ols

wh

o a

re a

t ri

sk o

f d

rop

pin

g o

ut;

co

nd

itio

nal

on

sch

oo

l at-

ten

dan

ce a

nd

an

nu

al g

rad

e p

rog

ress

ion

.

350

,00

0 p

er y

ear.

You

th 1

3-1

9

in p

ub

lic s

cho

ols

fro

m lo

w

inco

me

fam

ilies

; $6

00

sch

ola

r-sh

ip/y

ear.

Ad

equ

ate

targ

etin

g; s

ign

ifi ca

ntl

y in

-cr

ease

d s

tud

ent

atte

nd

ance

; red

uce

d

gra

de

rep

etit

ion

; im

pro

ved

aca

dem

ic

per

form

ance

; no

sig

nifi

can

t im

pact

on

d

rop

-ou

t p

roba

bili

ty.

Pla

n F

amili

asA

rgen

tin

aC

CT

200

6A

ims

to r

edu

ce in

terg

ener

atio

nal

tra

ns-

mis

sio

n o

f p

over

ty b

y ex

pan

din

g a

nd

co

nso

lidat

ing

a p

rog

ram

of

subs

idie

s fo

r p

oo

r, ch

ildre

n, a

nd

th

ose

see

kin

g f

orm

al

emp

loym

ent.

Co

nd

itio

nal

up

on

co

mp

li-an

ce w

ith

hea

lth

an

d e

du

cati

on

req

uir

e-m

ents

.

45

0,0

00

fam

ilies

. Po

or

fam

i-lie

s w

ith

min

. 2 c

hild

ren

un

der

19

, an

d/o

r d

isab

led

; mu

st n

ot

hav

e co

mp

lete

d s

eco

nd

ary

sch

oo

l. 15

6 p

eso

s p

er f

amily

.

Jef

es d

e H

og

arA

rgen

tin

aP

W20

02

Tem

po

rary

em

plo

ymen

t fo

r u

nem

plo

yed

h

ead

s of

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds;

tra

nsf

ers

con

dit

ion

al o

n la

bo

r su

pp

ly a

nd

sch

oo

l at

ten

dan

ce. A

imed

at

pre

serv

atio

n o

f ed

uca

tio

nal

hu

man

cap

ital

an

d h

ealt

h.

1,3

41,2

58

(20

06

). U

nem

plo

yed

h

ead

s of

ho

use

ho

ld 6

0+

, or

wit

h d

epen

den

t ch

ildre

n o

r d

isab

led

. US

$5

0/m

on

th.

Go

od

cov

erag

e; p

rog

ress

ive

targ

etin

g;

rela

tive

ly h

igh

un

it t

ran

sfer

s; p

rovi

ded

n

eed

ed s

ervi

ces

and

sm

all i

nfra

stru

c-tu

re; r

edu

ced

pov

erty

an

d in

equ

alit

y;

insu

ffi c

ien

t to

pu

ll h

ou

seh

old

s ab

ove

the

pov

erty

lin

e; f

rau

d p

rove

n in

15

,00

0 c

ases

.

Pro

ble

ms

wit

h im

ple

men

ta-

tio

n a

nd

su

per

visi

on

; re-

po

rts

of f

avo

riti

sm. M

inis

try

of E

du

cati

on

imp

rove

d

des

ign

an

d im

ple

men

tati

on

af

ter

eval

uat

ion

.

Pro

gra

ma

Jov

enA

rgen

tin

aP

W19

94

Off

ers

14-2

0 w

eeks

lon

g jo

b t

rain

ing

fo

r yo

un

g m

ales

an

d f

emal

es a

nd

inte

rn-

ship

s in

fi r

ms

to f

acili

tate

lab

or

inse

rtio

n

of t

he

trai

nee

s in

to t

he

form

al la

bo

r m

arke

t.

You

ng

un

emp

loye

d p

eop

le

(16

-24

) fr

om

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds.

Tr

ain

ing

, tra

nsp

ort

atio

n a

nd

lu

nch

su

bsid

y, in

sura

nce

.

Sig

nifi

can

t im

pact

on

ear

nin

gs

for

you

ng

mal

es a

nd

ad

ult

fem

ales

on

ly;

sig

nifi

can

t im

pact

on

em

plo

ymen

t fo

r ad

ult

fem

ales

on

ly; e

ffec

tive

sel

f-ta

r-g

etin

g; h

igh

co

st (

$1,0

00

per

gra

du

-at

e); c

om

plic

ated

co

ntr

ol m

ech

anis

m;

exce

ssiv

e ce

ntr

aliz

atio

n.

Req

uir

es a

n e

nvir

on

men

t w

ith

str

on

g e

con

om

ic

gro

wth

an

d jo

b c

reat

ion

; te

mp

ora

ry in

terv

enti

on

o

nly

; lac

k of

fu

nct

ion

al li

nks

w

ith

loca

l lab

or

auth

ori

ties

.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Nat

ion

al B

ols

a E

sco

laB

razi

lC

CT

199

5-

200

3C

ash

tra

nsf

ers

to p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n o

f sc

ho

ol a

ge

con

dit

ion

al o

n

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

. Aim

s to

incr

ease

ed

u-

cati

on

al a

ttai

nm

ent,

alle

viat

e sh

ort

-ter

m

pov

erty

, an

d r

edu

ce c

hild

lab

or.

In 2

00

3,

Bo

lsa

Esc

ola

bec

ame

part

of

the

Bo

lsa

Fam

ilia

pro

gra

m.

5,5

45

mu

nic

ipal

itie

s, 8

.2m

ch

ildre

n (

200

2).

Geo

gra

ph

ic

targ

etin

g o

f p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n 7

-14

. R$

15 –

R$

45

(U

S$

6-1

9)

per

fam

ily.

Sch

oo

l att

end

ance

rat

es h

as r

isen

by

0.4

%; n

o s

tro

ng

evi

den

ce o

f re

du

ced

ch

ild la

bo

r; li

ttle

impa

ct o

n p

over

ty

and

ineq

ual

ity

du

e to

th

e sm

all t

ran

s-fe

r am

ou

nt;

tra

nsp

aren

t b

enefi

cia

ry

iden

tifi

cati

on

an

d s

elec

tio

n.

Lo

cal g

over

nan

ce a

nd

p

olit

ics

has

str

on

g e

ffec

t o

n

imp

lem

enta

tio

n.

Var

iati

on

in

th

e ex

iste

nce

an

d e

f-fe

ctiv

enes

s of

so

cial

co

ntr

ol

cou

nci

ls; v

aria

tio

n a

cro

ss

mu

nic

ipal

itie

s in

reg

istr

a-ti

on

pro

cess

es.

Bo

lsa-

Fam

ilia

(fo

rmer

ly B

ols

a E

sco

la)

Bra

zil

CC

T20

03

Cas

h t

ran

sfer

s co

nd

itio

nal

on

sch

oo

l at-

ten

dan

ce a

nd

hea

lth

ch

eck-

ups

; aim

ed a

t in

crea

sin

g h

um

an c

apit

al. C

om

po

nen

ts:

no

n-w

age

inco

mes

, pro

mo

tio

n o

f f

am-

ily a

nd

loca

l co

mm

un

ity,

inst

itu

tio

nal

st

ren

gth

enin

g.

11.2

mil

fam

ilies

(20

06

). V

ery

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds

(1)

and

mo

d-

erat

ely

po

or

wit

h c

hild

ren

(2

).

R$

50

/mo

nth

plu

s R

$15

per

ch

ild (

1); R

$15

per

ch

ild (

2).

Pro

ven

effi

cie

ncy

gai

ns;

eff

ecti

ve

targ

etin

g; c

on

trib

uti

on

to

imp

rove

d

edu

cati

on

ou

tco

mes

; po

siti

ve im

pact

o

n c

hild

ren’

s g

row

th, f

oo

d c

on

sum

p-

tio

n, a

nd

die

t q

ual

ity;

60

% o

f p

oo

r 10

-15

-yea

r o

lds

pre

vio

usl

y n

ot

enro

lled

, en

roll

in s

cho

ol;

0.1%

red

uct

ion

in

pov

erty

.

Wea

knes

ses

in t

he

targ

et-

ing

mec

han

ism

an

d in

th

e m

on

ito

rin

g o

f co

nd

itio

nal

i-ti

es. F

urt

her

mo

re, t

her

e is

th

e is

sue

of m

igra

tio

n f

rom

p

revi

ou

s p

rog

ram

s.

Bo

lsa

Alim

enta

ção

Bra

zil

CC

T20

01

Tran

sfer

s to

ver

y lo

w in

com

e fa

mili

es

wit

h p

reg

nan

t an

d la

ctat

ing

wo

men

, an

d/o

r yo

un

g c

hild

ren

un

der

6 t

o r

edu

ce

infa

nt

mal

nu

trit

ion

an

d m

ort

alit

y an

d

incr

ease

hea

lth

car

e u

sag

e. C

on

dit

ion

al

up

on

hea

lth

car

e u

sag

e.

1.7 m

il fa

mili

es (

200

3).

C

hild

ren

6-1

5 f

rom

po

or

fam

i-lie

s. M

ax. R

$4

5 p

er m

on

th p

er

fam

ily.

Incr

ease

d c

alo

ric

con

sum

pti

on

an

d

die

tary

div

ersi

ty; i

ncr

ease

d m

arg

inal

p

rop

ensi

ty t

o c

on

sum

e fo

od

; no

im

pro

vem

ent

in v

acci

nat

ion

cov

er-

age

(it

was

alr

ead

y 9

8%

); s

mal

l bu

t si

gn

ifi ca

nt

dec

line

in t

he

age-

adju

sted

w

eig

ht

for

child

ren

un

der

24

mo

nth

s.

Ch

ild L

abo

ur

Era

dic

atio

n

Pro

gra

mm

e (P

ET

I)

Bra

zil

CC

T19

96

Tran

sfer

to

ho

use

ho

lds

wit

h c

hild

ren

of

sch

oo

l ag

e w

ork

ing

in h

azar

do

us

or

deg

rad

ing

occ

upa

tio

ns,

an

d f

un

din

g t

o

sch

oo

ls o

ffer

ing

an

ext

end

ed s

cho

ol

day

pro

gra

m. C

on

dit

ion

al o

n s

cho

ol

atte

nd

ance

an

d a

fter

-sch

oo

l pro

gra

m

part

icip

atio

n.

86

6,0

00

ch

ildre

n (

200

2).

G

eog

rap

hic

tar

get

ing

of

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds.

US

$11

-17/

child

per

m

on

th p

lus

sch

oo

l lu

nch

.

Red

uce

d in

cid

ence

of

child

lab

or

fro

m

19.6

% in

19

92

to

12

.7%

in 2

00

1; in

-cr

ease

d s

cho

ol e

nro

lmen

t an

d s

cho

ol-

ing

co

mp

leti

on

; lo

wer

ed p

roba

bili

ty

of c

hild

ren

wo

rkin

g in

ris

ky jo

bs; n

o

chan

ge

in p

roba

bili

ty o

f w

ork

ing

ove

r 10

ho

urs

; lac

k of

un

ifo

rmit

y in

incl

u-

sio

n c

rite

ria,

insu

ffi c

ien

t fo

cus

on

p

oo

rest

mu

nic

ipal

itie

s.

So

me

mu

nic

ipal

itie

s ex

-cl

ud

ed f

rom

th

e p

rog

ram

d

ue

to b

ud

get

co

nst

rain

ts.

Ch

ild la

bo

r is

mo

re d

iffi

cult

to

tar

get

in u

rban

are

as

bec

ause

occ

upa

tio

ns

are

mu

ch m

ore

het

ero

gen

eou

s th

an i

n r

ura

l are

as.

Ben

efi c

io d

e P

rest

açao

C

on

tin

uad

a/

Dis

abili

ty a

nd

E

lder

ly P

ensi

on

Bra

zil

UC

T19

93

Gra

nts

to

eld

erly

65

+ f

rom

ru

ral o

r u

rban

are

as a

nd

to

dis

able

d u

nab

le t

o

wo

rk. A

ims

to r

edu

ce p

over

ty a

nd

vu

l-n

erab

ility

of

po

or

old

er p

eop

le e

xclu

ded

fr

om

so

cial

insu

ran

ce s

chem

e.

2 m

il (2

00

4).

Ind

ivid

ual

s 6

5+

liv

ing

in p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s.

US

$5

5 (

200

2)

per

mo

nth

.

Fair

ly w

ell t

arg

eted

on

po

ore

r h

ou

se-

ho

lds;

po

siti

ve e

ffec

t o

n p

over

ty a

nd

vu

lner

abili

ty r

edu

ctio

n a

mo

ng

old

er

peo

ple

exc

lud

ed f

rom

so

cial

insu

ran

ce

and

th

eir

dep

end

ants

.

Fem

ale

Sec

on

dar

y S

tip

end

P

rog

ram

(FS

SP

) an

d F

emal

e S

eco

nd

ary

Sch

oo

l A

ssis

tan

ce

Pro

ject

Ban

gla

des

hC

CT

199

4-

200

1P

ay s

cho

ol a

nd

exa

m f

ees

and

a s

tip

end

to

all

gir

ls in

sec

on

dar

y sc

ho

ol c

on

di-

tio

nal

up

on

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

, exa

m

per

form

ance

an

d o

n t

he

ben

efi c

iary

re

mai

nin

g u

nm

arri

ed. A

ims

to in

crea

se

gir

ls e

nro

llmen

t an

d r

eten

tio

n in

sch

oo

l an

d im

pro

ve q

ual

ity

of e

du

cati

on

.

4 m

il b

enefi

cia

ries

(20

01)

. Fe

mal

e st

ud

ents

en

rolle

d o

ut-

sid

e th

e m

etro

po

litan

are

as.

Mo

nth

ly t

ran

sfer

s of

US

$3

-6;

bo

ok

allo

wan

ce a

nd

exa

m f

ee.

Incr

ease

d g

irls

’ en

rolm

ent

at t

he

sec-

on

dar

y le

vel (

by 2

.5 t

imes

du

rin

g 1

99

1-20

01)

; cre

ated

mo

re p

osi

tive

att

itu

de

tow

ard

s fe

mal

e ed

uca

tio

n; l

ower

ed

dro

p-

ou

t ra

tes

du

e to

mar

riag

e; s

ligh

t re

du

ctio

n in

sch

oo

l per

form

ance

; ca

ses

of o

verw

riti

ng

in s

cho

ol r

egis

-te

rs; i

nfl

ated

mar

ks a

nd

att

end

ance

fi

gu

res.

Co

nce

rns

over

th

e su

s-ta

inab

ility

giv

en e

nd

ing

of

do

no

r su

pp

ort

; gen

der

eq

uit

y is

sues

; co

mm

un

ity

invo

lvem

ent

is e

ssen

tial

fo

r en

han

cin

g p

roje

ct e

ffec

tive

-n

ess.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Pri

mar

y Ed

uca

tio

n

Sti

pen

d P

roje

ct

(PE

SP

)

Ban

gla

des

hC

CT

200

2C

ash

tra

nsf

er t

o p

oo

r fa

mili

es t

o k

eep

ch

ildre

n in

pri

mar

y ed

uca

tio

n, c

on

-d

itio

nal

up

on

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

an

d

per

form

ance

. Aim

s to

incr

ease

pri

mar

y sc

ho

ol e

nro

lmen

t an

d a

tten

dan

ce;

red

uce

th

e d

rop

ou

t ra

te; e

nh

ance

th

e q

ual

ity

of e

du

cati

on

; red

uce

ch

ild la

bo

r.

65

,00

0 s

cho

ols

, 5.5

mil

stu

-d

ents

(20

02

). T

he

po

ore

st

40

% o

f st

ud

ents

en

rolle

d in

p

rim

ary

sch

oo

l in

ru

ral a

reas

. U

S $

1.45

-1.8

per

mo

nth

per

fa

mily

.

Co

rru

pti

on

in t

he

man

agem

ent

and

ad

min

istr

atio

n o

f th

e p

rog

ram

; stu

-d

ents

fro

m p

oo

rer

fam

ily b

ackg

rou

nd

s re

ceiv

e sm

alle

r st

ipen

d t

han

oth

ers;

pa

rtic

ipat

ion

sel

ecti

on

bia

s; a

lter

atio

n

of s

cho

ol r

eco

rds

to m

eet

elig

ibili

ty;

leak

age

issu

es.

Targ

etin

g m

eth

od

olo

gy

is

no

t su

ffi c

ien

tly

wel

l-d

efi n

ed;

pri

mar

y sc

ho

ol a

dm

issi

on

co

sts

are

a ba

rrie

r; w

eak

mo

nit

ori

ng

sys

tem

; exc

es-

sive

am

ou

nt

of p

aper

wo

rk

and

bu

reau

crat

ic d

eliv

ery

mec

han

ism

.

Ch

alle

ng

ing

th

e Fr

on

tier

s of

Pov

erty

R

edu

ctio

n/

Targ

etin

g t

he

Ult

ra P

oo

r (C

FPR

/TU

P)

Ban

gla

des

hA

BP/

S

FW20

02

Bu

ilds

up

th

e as

set

base

of

the

po

or-

est

(mai

nly

wo

men

) th

ou

gh

tra

nsf

er

of in

com

e g

ener

atin

g a

sset

s, h

ealt

h

and

ed

uca

tio

n s

up

po

rt, t

rain

ing

, so

cial

d

evel

op

men

t an

d la

ter

inte

gra

tin

g w

ith

m

icro

cred

it p

rog

ram

s.

25,0

00

(20

05

).G

eog

rap

hic

al

and

ind

icat

or

base

d t

arg

etin

g.

US

$ 4

00

-50

0 p

er h

ou

seh

old

(2

00

5).

Incr

ease

d a

nd

mo

re d

iver

sifi

ed n

utr

i-ti

on

; in

crea

sed

fo

od

sec

uri

ty a

nd

h

ealt

h s

tatu

s; in

crea

sed

inco

me;

h

igh

ly e

ffec

tive

tar

get

ing

; lar

gel

y co

st

effe

ctiv

e; r

edu

ced

sev

ere

mal

no

uri

sh-

men

t am

on

g c

hild

ren

un

der

5.

Hig

h c

ost

per

ho

use

ho

ld

pre

ven

ts p

rog

ram

fro

m

ach

ievi

ng

nat

ion

al c

over

age

in t

he

med

ium

ter

m, d

esp

ite

go

od

tar

get

ing

; co

nti

nu

ed

soci

al e

xclu

sio

n.

Foo

d f

or

Edu

cati

on

(FF

E)

Ban

gla

des

hS

FW19

93

-20

02

Mo

nth

ly g

rain

rat

ion

s to

dis

adva

nta

ged

fa

mili

es c

on

dit

ion

al u

po

n s

cho

ol a

tten

-d

ance

. Des

ign

ed t

o c

om

bat

pov

erty

an

d

mal

nu

trit

ion

by

dev

elo

pin

g lo

ng

-ter

m

hu

man

cap

ital

.

2 m

il fa

mili

es (

200

0).

Po

or

ho

use

ho

lds

wit

h p

rim

ary-

sch

oo

l ag

e ch

ildre

n w

ith

low

lit

erac

y ra

tes.

Fre

e m

on

thly

ra

tio

n o

f fo

od

gra

ins.

Incr

ease

d p

rim

ary

enro

llmen

t an

d a

t-te

nd

ance

rat

es (

enro

llmen

t in

crea

se

gre

ater

fo

r g

irls

); r

edu

ced

dro

po

ut

rate

s; h

igh

leve

ls o

f le

akag

e; h

igh

co

st

(16

-20

%);

so

me

issu

es w

ith

tar

get

-in

g; l

ack

of t

each

ers

as e

nro

llmen

t in

crea

sed

; cla

ss s

ize

had

no

eff

ect

on

st

ud

ent

acad

emic

ach

ieve

men

t.

Incr

ease

d e

nro

llmen

t le

d

to o

verc

row

din

g o

f cl

ass-

roo

ms,

bu

t cl

ass

size

had

no

ef

fect

on

stu

den

t ac

hie

ve-

men

t; is

sues

wit

h d

istr

ibu

-ti

on

th

rou

gh

pri

vate

dea

lers

ra

ther

th

an t

hro

ug

h s

cho

ol

man

agem

ent

com

mit

tees

.

Cas

h f

or

Edu

cati

on

(p

revi

ou

sly

FFE

)

Ban

gla

des

hC

CT

200

2C

ash

tra

nsf

ers

to h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n in

po

or

area

s co

nd

itio

nal

up

on

sc

ho

ol e

nro

llmen

t an

d a

tten

dan

ce. A

ims

to in

crea

se p

rim

ary

sch

oo

l en

rollm

ent

and

att

end

ance

, red

uce

dro

po

ut

rate

s,

and

en

han

ce t

he

qu

alit

y of

ed

uca

tio

n.

2.1

mil

(20

00

). G

eog

rap

hic

an

d c

ateg

ori

cal t

arg

etin

g.

Co

mm

un

ity

sele

ctio

n. M

on

thly

15

-20

kg

of

gra

ins

per

ho

use

-h

old

($

2.4

0 v

alu

e).

Incr

ease

d e

nro

llmen

t ra

te b

y 9

-17%

; n

earl

y fu

ll at

ten

dan

ce a

mo

ng

ben

efi -

ciar

ies;

imp

rove

d lo

ng

-ter

m o

pp

ort

u-

nit

ies

for

child

ren

; red

uce

d in

cid

ence

of

ch

ild la

bo

r am

on

g b

oys

(gir

ls)

by

1/4

(1/

8);

40

% o

f b

enefi

cia

ries

are

n

on

-po

or;

life

tim

e ea

rnin

g e

stim

ated

to

incr

ease

by

up

to

25

%.

Lim

ited

rea

ch t

o t

he

ex-

trem

e p

oo

r; d

ue

to s

mal

l si

ze o

f tr

ansf

er r

elat

ive

to

tota

l exp

end

itu

re (

4%

) an

d

limit

ed c

over

age,

th

e p

ro-

gra

m a

lon

e w

ill n

ot

sig

nifi

-ca

ntl

y re

du

ce p

over

ty.

Vu

lner

able

G

rou

p F

eed

ing

(V

uln

erab

le

Gro

up

D

evel

op

men

t (V

GD

) si

nce

19

87)

Ban

gla

des

hS

FW19

75-

198

7Fo

od

sec

uri

ty in

terv

enti

on

th

at p

ro-

vid

es in

-kin

d w

hea

t tr

ansf

er t

o e

n-

able

des

titu

te r

ura

l wo

men

to

imp

rove

th

eir

eco

no

mic

an

d s

oci

al c

on

dit

ion

. A

cco

mpa

nie

d b

y h

ealt

h a

nd

nu

trit

ion

ed

uca

tio

n, l

iter

acy

trai

nin

g, s

avin

gs,

an

d

sup

po

rt in

lau

nch

ing

inco

me-

earn

ing

ac

tivi

ties

.

575

,00

0 h

ou

seh

old

s.

Geo

gra

ph

ic t

arg

etin

g, t

hen

b

enefi

cia

ry s

elec

tio

n b

y lo

cal

com

mit

tees

. Fre

e m

on

thly

w

hea

t ra

tio

n o

f 31

.25

kg

fo

r tw

o y

ears

.

Sig

nifi

can

tly

incr

ease

d w

hea

t co

n-

sum

pti

on

– b

y 70

% f

or

VG

D h

ou

se-

ho

lds

com

pare

d t

o 1

3.9

% f

or

its

cash

-bas

ed e

qu

ival

ent

tran

sfer

s, g

en-

erat

ing

a g

reat

er c

alo

rie

impa

ct o

n it

s ta

rget

gro

up

(16

%)

than

an

eq

uiv

alen

t ca

sh a

lloca

tio

n (

10%

); n

o n

oti

ceab

le

imp

rove

men

t in

nu

trit

ion

al s

tatu

s of

p

re-s

cho

ol c

hild

ren

.

Ap

pro

xim

atel

y 30

% t

o 5

0%

of

gra

in is

so

ld r

ath

er t

han

co

nsu

med

; 15

% o

f g

rain

did

n

ot

reac

h in

ten

ded

ben

efi -

ciar

ies.

Hig

h c

ost

of

ben

efi t

d

eliv

ery.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Inco

me

Gen

erat

ion

fo

r V

uln

erab

le

Gro

up

D

evel

op

men

t P

rog

ram

(I

GV

GD

)

Ban

gla

des

hS

FW19

87

An

inte

gra

ted

pac

kag

e of

fo

od

dis

trib

u-

tio

n, s

avin

gs,

mic

ro-c

red

it p

rovi

sio

n,

soci

al a

war

enes

s-b

uild

ing

an

d s

kill

de-

velo

pm

ent

trai

nin

g a

nd

hea

lth

car

e in

ter-

ven

tio

ns;

see

ks t

o e

xten

d t

he

ou

trea

ch

of p

over

ty-r

edu

ctio

n in

itia

tive

s to

th

e “e

xtre

mel

y p

oo

r”.

200

,00

0 in

20

00

. Th

e p

oo

rest

an

d m

ost

vu

lner

able

hea

ds

of h

ou

seh

old

s. In

itia

l lo

ans

of

US

$5

0 t

o fi

nan

ce in

com

e-g

en-

erat

ion

act

ivit

ies.

Su

cces

sfu

l an

d e

ffec

tive

in t

arg

etin

g

the

ult

ra-p

oo

r; r

each

ed 1

.6 m

il d

es-

titu

te w

om

en s

ince

ince

pti

on

, 2/3

of

thes

e pa

rtic

ipan

ts “

gra

du

ated

” fr

om

ab

solu

te p

over

ty; i

ncr

ease

d in

com

es

and

mat

eria

l ass

ets

and

dec

reas

ed

beg

gin

g; i

ncr

ease

d q

ual

ity

of li

fe a

nd

h

igh

er le

vels

of

con

fi d

ence

an

d w

ell-

bei

ng

.

Sca

ling

up

th

e p

rog

ram

wit

h

po

or

infr

astr

uct

ure

an

d

wea

k co

mm

un

icat

ion

sys

-te

m p

rove

d t

o b

e d

iffi

cult

.

Ru

ral

Mai

nte

nan

ce

Pro

gra

mm

e (R

MP

)

Ban

gla

des

hP

W19

83

Aim

ed t

o e

stab

lish

a s

yste

m t

hro

ug

ho

ut

rura

l Ban

gla

des

h w

her

eby

farm

-to

-mar

-ke

t ro

ads

rece

ive

year

-ro

un

d, r

ou

tin

e m

ain

ten

ance

, an

d t

o p

rovi

de

stab

le

emp

loym

ent

and

inco

me

to t

he

mo

st

dis

adva

nta

ged

an

d h

ard

-to

-rea

ch g

rou

p,

des

titu

te w

om

en.

90

% o

f ru

ral d

istr

icts

.10,0

00

p

er y

ear.

Des

titu

te w

om

en,

wh

o a

re s

ole

su

pp

ort

ers

of

dep

end

ents

an

d t

hem

selv

es.

Tk.

43

wag

e p

er d

ay.

Ver

y lo

w le

akag

e ra

te; i

mp

ort

ant

lon

g-

term

eco

no

mic

an

d s

oci

al d

evel

op

-m

enta

l im

pact

; in

tro

du

ctio

n o

f ba

nk

acco

un

ts f

or

po

or

wo

men

fac

ilita

ted

sa

vin

gs

beh

avio

r (

req

uir

es s

avin

gs

of

1/4

of

the

wag

e); p

rovi

ded

acc

ess

to

form

al fi

nan

cial

inst

itu

tio

ns;

60

% r

e-m

ain

mem

ber

s of

NG

Os

3 y

ears

aft

er

gra

du

atio

n.

Ru

ral

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Pro

gra

m (

RD

P),

p

revi

ou

sly

know

n a

s Fo

od

-fo

r-W

ork

Ban

gla

des

hS

FW19

75In

itia

ted

in 1

975

aft

er f

amin

e; n

ow a

n

inte

gra

ted

ru

ral d

evel

op

men

t p

rog

ram

. P

rovi

des

wag

es in

-kin

d (

usu

ally

wh

eat)

to

ru

ral l

abo

rers

fo

r p

ub

lic w

ork

s (w

ater

, ro

ads,

fo

rest

ry, fi

sh

ery)

du

rin

g t

he

dry

se

aso

n. A

imed

at

foo

d in

secu

rity

red

uc-

tio

n.

4 m

il p

er y

ear.

Geo

gra

ph

ic a

nd

se

lf-t

arg

etin

g o

f lo

w-i

nco

me

ben

efi c

iari

es, m

ost

ly m

en.

US

$4

.5 p

er p

erso

n.

Su

cces

sfu

l in

rea

chin

g la

nd

less

or

nea

r la

nd

less

po

or;

30

-35

% le

ak-

age

rate

s to

th

e n

on

-po

or;

hig

h

cost

s -

US

$2

.1 to

tra

nsf

er U

S$

1; 8

5%

of

pro

gra

m r

eso

urc

es u

sed

du

rin

g

Dec

emb

er-M

ay d

ry s

easo

n; l

arg

e in

-cr

ease

in f

oo

d c

on

sum

pti

on

an

d c

alo

-ri

e in

take

; im

pro

vem

ents

in h

ou

seh

old

n

utr

itio

n, b

ut

no

sig

nifi

can

t im

pro

ve-

men

t in

nu

trit

ion

al s

tatu

s of

pre

sch

oo

l ch

ildre

n.

Old

Ag

e A

llow

ance

S

chem

e an

d

Ass

ista

nce

P

rog

ram

fo

r W

idow

ed a

nd

D

esti

tute

W

om

en

Ban

gla

des

hU

CT

199

7C

ash

tra

nsf

er t

o p

oo

rest

old

er p

eop

le

and

to

des

titu

te w

idow

s to

red

uce

pov

-er

ty a

nd

des

titu

tio

n a

mo

ng

th

em.

0.7

mil.

Ext

rem

ely

po

or

and

d

esti

tute

. Mo

nth

ly U

S$

2 t

o 1

5

old

est

and

po

ore

st m

emb

ers

of e

ach

war

d o

f th

e u

nio

n.

Pro

gra

ms

hav

e b

een

wel

l rec

eive

d

by lo

cal c

om

mu

nit

ies

and

th

ey a

re

reas

on

ably

wel

l tar

get

ed; i

nsu

ffi c

ien

t to

cov

er a

ll th

e p

oo

r g

rou

ps t

arg

eted

; al

low

ance

to

o s

mal

l to

pu

ll b

enefi

cia

-ri

es a

bov

e th

e p

over

ty li

ne.

No

eva

luat

ion

of

the

pro

-g

ram

is a

vaila

ble

.H

elp

Ag

e In

tern

atio

nal

is

gat

her

ing

info

rmat

ion

fro

m

loca

l net

wo

rks

to a

sses

s p

rog

ram

imp

lem

enta

tio

n.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

BO

NO

SO

L

(Bo

no

S

olid

ario

)

Bo

livia

UC

T19

97-

199

8,

200

1

Un

iver

sal c

oh

ort

res

tric

ted

no

n-c

on

trib

u-

tory

pen

sio

n t

o e

lder

ly p

eop

le w

ho

are

o

uts

ide

the

form

al p

ensi

on

sys

tem

. Aim

s to

dis

trib

ute

th

e p

rofi

ts o

f th

e p

riva

tiza

-ti

on

pro

gra

m a

nd

to

red

uce

pov

erty

.

Un

iver

sal.

Cat

ego

rica

l tar

get

-in

g o

f el

der

ly 6

5+

. US

$24

8 p

er

per

son

per

yea

r.

Sig

nifi

can

t ef

fect

s o

n p

over

ty a

nd

liv

elih

oo

ds

in r

ura

l are

as, t

hro

ug

h

lifti

ng

cre

dit

an

d li

qu

idit

y co

nst

rain

ts;

sig

nifi

can

tly

incr

ease

d f

oo

d c

on

sum

p-

tio

n r

elat

ive

to t

ran

sfer

siz

e (9

.6%

p

er m

on

th)

in r

ura

l ho

use

ho

lds;

sm

all

incr

ease

s of

exp

end

itu

res

on

med

ical

se

rvic

es.

Po

litic

ized

des

ign

an

d

imp

lem

enta

tio

n; t

he

fun

d

mig

ht

run

ou

t of

fu

nd

ing

ea

rlie

r th

an e

xpec

ted

giv

en

curr

ent

rate

of

tran

sfer

am

ou

nt;

mig

ht

no

t b

e th

e m

ost

effi

cie

nt

use

of

fun

ds

giv

en la

rge

inco

me

dis

pari

ty.

Pri

ori

ty A

ctio

n

Pro

gra

m (

PA

P)

Cam

bo

dia

SFW

200

0P

arti

ally

co

mp

ensa

tes

sch

oo

ls f

or

the

rem

oval

of

reg

istr

atio

n, m

ater

ials

, an

d

test

fee

s, e

spec

ially

at

the

pri

mar

y le

vel.

Th

ere

are

12 P

AP

s in

to

tal.

Aim

s to

re

du

ce t

he

cost

bu

rden

on

th

e p

oo

rest

fa

mili

es a

nd

to

incr

ease

sch

oo

l en

roll-

men

t.

Nat

ionw

ide

cove

rag

e of

24

p

rovi

nce

s an

d 1

83

dis

tric

ts.

Imp

rove

d p

rim

ary

net

en

rolm

ent

rate

s; e

ffec

tive

nes

s h

as b

een

red

uce

d

by p

aym

ent

del

ays

fro

m t

he

pro

vin

-ci

al t

reas

ury

; sch

oo

ls r

epo

rt a

lack

of

fl ex

ibili

ty in

usi

ng

fu

nd

s to

ad

dre

ss

loca

l nee

ds;

stu

den

ts r

ecei

ved

20

-25

% m

ore

inst

ruct

ion

du

rin

g a

sch

oo

l ye

ar; r

edu

ced

dir

ect

ho

use

ho

ld c

ost

s;

imp

rove

d a

vaila

bili

ty o

f cl

assr

oo

m

mat

eria

ls.

Nee

d t

o e

stab

lish

ing

a

mo

re e

ffi c

ien

t d

isb

urs

e-m

ent

syst

em f

rom

nat

ion

al

to p

rovi

nci

al/d

istr

ict

leve

ls,

imp

rove

pre

dic

tab

ility

an

d

relia

bili

ty o

f ca

sh r

elea

ses,

an

d s

tren

gth

en fi

nan

cial

ac-

cou

nti

ng

an

d in

tern

al a

ud

it.

Fam

ilias

en

Acc

ión

(F

amili

es in

A

ctio

n)

Co

lom

bia

CC

T20

00

Cas

h t

ran

sfer

to

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds

wit

h

child

ren

co

nd

itio

nal

on

sch

oo

l att

en-

dan

ce a

nd

use

of

pri

mar

y h

ealt

h c

ente

rs.

Aim

s to

red

uce

pov

erty

; rai

se s

cho

ol

enro

lmen

ts; a

nd

pro

vid

e a

safe

ty n

et.

Par

t of

th

e R

ed d

e A

poy

o S

oci

al (

So

cial

S

up

po

rt N

etw

ork

, RA

S).

9 m

il fa

mili

es (

200

5).

G

eog

rap

hic

an

d p

roxy

-mea

ns

targ

etin

g o

f p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n.

Ed

uca

tio

n: p

ri-

mar

y sc

ho

ol U

S$

6, s

eco

nd

ary

- U

S$

12 p

er c

hild

per

mo

nth

; H

ealt

h: U

S$

20 p

er f

amily

per

m

on

th.

Red

uce

d n

utr

itio

nal

, hea

lth

an

d

edu

cati

on

al r

isks

; go

od

tar

get

ing

; co

n-

sum

pti

on

incr

ease

d b

y 15

%; c

hro

nic

m

aln

utr

itio

n o

f ch

ildre

n 0

-2 d

rop

ped

by

10

% in

ru

ral a

reas

; gro

wth

an

d

dev

elo

pm

ent

chec

k-u

ps a

tten

dan

ce b

y ch

ildre

n in

crea

sed

fro

m 4

2%

to

54

%;

rais

ed in

cid

ence

of

imm

un

izat

ion

s;

sig

nifi

can

tly

red

uce

d c

hild

lab

or

in r

u-

ral a

reas

; rai

sed

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

by

13%

in u

rban

an

d 5

% in

ru

ral a

reas

.

Req

uir

emen

t fo

rcin

g h

ou

se-

ho

lds

to c

ho

ose

bet

wee

n

rece

ivin

g t

he

nu

trit

ion

su

b-

sid

y an

d s

end

ing

ch

ildre

n t

o

day

car

e ce

nte

rs s

ho

uld

be

re-e

xam

ined

sin

ce t

hey

are

n

ot

dir

ect

subs

titu

tes.

Th

e E

mp

leo

en

Acc

ión

(E

mer

gen

cy

Em

plo

ymen

t P

rog

ram

) -

part

of

RA

S

Co

lom

bia

PW

200

0P

rovi

des

tem

po

rary

em

plo

ymen

t to

p

oo

r, u

nem

plo

yed

, low

-ski

lled

wo

rker

s by

em

plo

yin

g t

hem

in la

bo

r-in

ten

sive

so

-ci

al a

nd

eco

no

mic

inve

stm

ent

pro

ject

s.

Aim

ed a

t in

crea

sin

g t

emp

ora

ry e

mp

loy-

men

t an

d in

com

es o

f th

e p

oo

r an

d c

re-

atio

n o

f in

fras

tru

ctu

re. P

art

of t

he

Red

d

e A

poy

o S

oci

al (

So

cial

Saf

ety

Net

).

67,

00

0 w

ork

ers

(20

03

).

Un

emp

loye

d a

du

lts

no

t pa

rtic

i-pa

tin

g in

trai

nin

g p

rog

ram

s, f

rom

th

e p

oo

rest

20

% o

f th

e p

op

ula

-ti

on

. $U

S 8

4.6

6 (

200

0).

Wel

l des

ign

ed t

o r

each

po

or

area

s an

d in

ten

ded

ben

efi c

iari

es; i

nef

fec-

tive

sel

f-ta

rget

ing

du

e to

th

e le

gal

o

blig

atio

n t

o p

ay m

inim

um

wag

es;

39%

inco

me

incr

ease

fo

r pa

rtic

ipan

ts

and

36

% in

crea

se in

th

eir

lab

or

sup

-p

ly, b

ut

part

icip

atio

n d

id n

ot

dis

-p

lace

oth

er p

rod

uct

ive

acti

viti

es; 9

%

incr

ease

in h

ou

seh

old

co

nsu

mp

tio

n;

no

mea

sura

ble

hea

lth

or

edu

cati

on

ef

fect

s.

Su

bseq

uen

t ch

ang

es in

ev

alu

atio

n m

eth

od

olo

gy

an

d u

nfo

rese

en b

ud

get

ary

chan

ges

; no

n-p

rio

rity

pro

j-ec

ts r

ecei

ved

mo

re f

un

din

g;

lon

ger

ave

rag

e p

roje

ct

cycl

es; s

ho

rter

du

rati

on

of

jobs

; gre

ater

nu

mb

er o

f b

enefi

cia

ries

per

pro

ject

.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Jov

enes

en

A

cció

n (

Jo

b

trai

nin

g

pro

gra

m)

- pa

rt

of R

AS

Co

lom

bia

PW

200

1A

tra

inin

g/a

pp

ren

tice

ship

pro

gra

m f

or

you

ng

ad

ult

s ba

sed

on

co

mp

etit

ive

bid

-d

ing

am

on

g p

riva

te fi

rm

s an

d p

ub

lic

enti

ties

. In

clu

des

cla

ss b

ased

tra

inin

g (

3

mo

nth

s), a

nd

an

ap

pre

nti

cesh

ip w

ith

par

-ti

cipa

tin

g fi

rm

s (3

mo

nth

s). P

art

of R

ed

de

Ap

oyo

So

cial

pro

gra

m.

35,0

00

(20

02

). C

entr

al s

elec

-ti

on

of

you

th 1

8-2

5 f

rom

po

or

fam

ilies

. Tra

inin

g p

acka

ge,

tr

ansp

ort

atio

n a

nd

sn

ack

sub

-si

dy,

co

llect

ive

insu

ran

ce.

Ad

equ

ate

self

tar

get

ing

; pro

gra

m

capa

ble

to

be

imp

lem

ente

d c

ou

nte

r-cy

clic

ally

pro

tect

ing

min

imu

m c

on

-su

mp

tio

n le

vels

du

rin

g a

tim

e of

cri

sis;

p

rese

nts

a s

oci

al a

ssis

tan

ce a

lter

na-

tive

to

th

e N

atio

nal

Tra

inin

g S

ervi

ce,

SE

NA

tra

inin

g in

stit

ute

th

at d

oes

no

t h

ave

a so

cial

ass

ista

nce

man

dat

e.

Pro

gra

m is

op

erat

ing

in

para

llel t

o N

atio

nal

Tra

inin

g

Ser

vice

inst

itu

te, w

hic

h

nee

ds

to b

e ad

dre

ssed

if t

he

you

th t

rain

ing

pro

gra

m is

co

nti

nu

ed.

Pro

gra

ma

de

Am

plia

ció

n d

e C

ob

ertu

ra d

e la

Ed

uca

ció

n

Sec

un

dar

ia

(PA

CE

S)

Co

lom

bia

SFW

199

2-19

97

Sec

on

dar

y ed

uca

tio

n v

ou

cher

s su

bsid

iz-

ing

sch

oo

l fee

s fo

r ch

ildre

n f

rom

low

-in

com

e h

ou

seh

old

s u

sed

to

cov

er t

he

cost

s of

pri

vate

sch

oo

ling

in t

he

6th

an

d

hig

her

gra

des

. Aim

ed a

t ra

isin

g s

cho

ol

enro

lmen

ts a

mo

ng

low

inco

me

gro

ups

in

pri

vate

sch

oo

ls.

Tota

l of

125

,00

0 v

ou

cher

s.

Geo

gra

ph

ical

tar

get

ing

of

stu

den

ts a

bo

ut

to e

nte

r se

c-o

nd

ary

sch

oo

l; fi

nal

sel

ecti

on

th

rou

gh

lott

ery.

$19

0 v

ou

cher

p

er w

inn

er.

Win

ner

s sh

owed

0.8

ad

dit

ion

al y

ears

of

sch

oo

ling

co

mpa

red

to

no

n-l

ot-

tery

win

ner

s an

d t

hei

r p

roba

bili

ty o

f re

pea

tin

g a

gra

de

was

5-6

% lo

wer

; w

inn

ers

show

ed h

igh

er m

ath

emat

ical

, re

adin

g a

nd

wri

tin

g t

est

sco

res;

th

ey

had

sig

nifi

can

tly

low

er r

ates

of

earl

y m

arri

age;

incr

ease

d h

ou

seh

old

exp

en-

dit

ure

on

ed

uca

tio

n.

Th

e p

oo

rest

stu

den

ts w

ere

ofte

n e

xclu

ded

fro

m p

ar-

tici

pati

on

as

mu

nic

ipal

itie

s b

ette

r se

rved

by

pri

vate

sc

ho

ols

wer

e m

ore

like

ly t

o

part

icip

ate

in t

he

pro

gra

m

Su

bsid

ized

h

ealt

hin

sura

nce

p

rog

ram

(S

UB

S)

Rég

imen

S

ubs

idia

do

Co

lom

bia

SFW

199

3S

ubs

idy

inte

nd

ed f

or

low

-in

com

e fa

mili

es

un

able

to

pay

into

th

e co

ntr

ibu

tory

re-

gim

e. M

un

icip

alit

ies

sele

ct b

enefi

cia

ries

an

d c

on

trac

t p

riva

te h

ealt

h in

sura

nce

co

mpa

nie

s to

pro

vid

e a

det

erm

ined

h

ealt

h p

acka

ge

cove

rin

g p

rim

ary

and

ba

sic

ho

spit

al c

are

and

insu

ran

ce f

or

se-

lect

ed c

atas

tro

ph

ic il

lnes

s fo

r th

e fa

mily

.

18 m

il (2

00

5).

Pre

gn

ant

wo

men

, ru

ral r

esid

ents

. Pro

xy-

mea

ns

test

ing

. A s

ubs

idy

of

US

$6

7 p

er y

ear

per

fam

ily.

Incr

ease

d m

edic

al c

are

uti

lizat

ion

am

on

g t

he

po

or

and

un

insu

red

; do

es

no

t st

imu

late

inef

fi ci

ent

use

of

hea

lth

ca

re s

ervi

ces;

ho

use

ho

lds

face

sm

alle

r fi

nan

cial

bu

rden

in t

erm

s of

low

er

exp

end

itu

res

for

med

ical

co

nsu

lta-

tio

ns

and

med

icin

e; in

effi

cien

t ta

rget

-in

g m

ech

anis

m; l

ow t

ake-

up

rat

es b

y th

e p

oo

r an

d in

clu

sio

n o

f w

ealt

hie

r h

ou

seh

old

s.

Req

uir

ed c

oo

rdin

atio

n

of a

ll th

ree

gov

ern

men

t le

vels

lead

s to

gre

ater

in-

stit

uti

on

al c

om

ple

xity

an

d

del

ays,

esp

ecia

lly w

ith

th

e tr

ansf

er o

f fu

nd

s; f

urt

her

ex

pan

sio

n h

amp

ered

by

dif

-fi

cult

ies

in r

estr

uct

uri

ng

of

pu

blic

ho

spit

als.

Foo

d S

ecu

rity

P

roje

ct in

N

ort

her

n G

uér

a (P

SA

NG

)

Ch

adS

FW19

91-

200

0L

oan

s an

d c

ash

tra

nsf

ers

for

imp

rov-

ing

fo

od

acc

essi

bili

ty a

nd

sta

bili

ty f

or

vuln

erab

le in

div

idu

als

and

ho

use

ho

lds,

in

a p

ost

-co

nfl

ict

con

text

. Inv

olv

es t

he

set-

tin

g u

p o

f fo

od

sec

uri

ty f

un

ds

and

ru

ral

infr

astr

uct

ure

; mic

rofi

nan

ce s

ervi

ces;

an

d c

reat

ion

of

a fo

od

sec

uri

ty a

sso

cia-

tio

n m

ade

up

of

rep

rese

nta

tive

s of

vil-

lag

e g

rou

ps a

nd

NG

Os.

15 0

00

ho

use

ho

lds

du

rin

g 2

nd

p

has

e. V

uln

erab

le a

nd

dis

ad-

van

tag

ed h

ou

seh

old

s, f

arm

ers

(esp

ecia

lly f

emal

e), l

ives

tock

b

reed

ers

and

no

mad

s.

Rea

ched

so

cial

ly a

nd

eco

no

mic

ally

m

arg

inal

ized

gro

ups

in t

he

No

rth

ern

G

uér

a R

egio

n; i

mp

rove

d f

oo

d s

e-cu

rity

fu

nd

s an

d r

ura

l inf

rast

ruc-

ture

; bo

tto

m-u

p a

pp

roac

h, a

imed

at

inco

rpo

rati

ng

lo

cal k

now

-how

an

d

tech

no

log

ies,

th

at s

ou

gh

t th

e d

irec

t in

volv

emen

t of

new

par

tner

s su

ch a

s N

GO

s, w

ork

ed w

ell.

Th

e “g

rou

p a

pp

roac

h” f

or

the

esta

blis

hm

ent

of IG

As

was

no

t th

e m

ost

su

it-

able

, esp

ecia

lly f

or

you

ng

w

om

en, g

iven

th

eir

tim

e co

nst

rain

ts.

Pro

gra

mas

d

e E

mp

leo

D

irec

to (

Dir

ect

Em

plo

ymen

t P

rog

ram

s)

Ch

ileP

W20

01

Ob

ject

ives

incl

ud

e te

mp

ora

ry e

mp

loy-

men

t an

d in

fras

tru

ctu

re c

reat

ion

an

d

imp

rove

men

t of

qu

alit

y of

life

am

on

g t

he

com

mu

nit

y.

Un

emp

loye

d w

ork

ers

reg

is-

tere

d a

t m

un

icip

al e

mp

loy-

men

t in

form

atio

n o

ffi c

es.

Go

od

tar

get

ing

- 75

% o

f jo

bs c

reat

ed

by t

he

pro

gra

m w

ere

take

n b

y u

nem

-p

loye

d.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Su

bsid

io

Un

itar

io

Fam

iliar

(U

nit

ary

Fam

ily

Su

bsid

y)

Ch

ileC

CT

199

8E

stab

lish

ed in

19

81

to s

erve

as

a fa

mily

su

bsid

y fo

r m

oth

ers

in e

ligib

le f

amili

es

wit

h s

cho

ol-

age

child

ren

, or

wh

o w

ere

pre

gn

ant,

or

wer

e ca

rin

g f

or

dis

able

d.

Th

e ed

uca

tio

n s

ubs

idy

cove

rs c

hild

ren

u

p t

o a

ge

18. A

sep

arat

e su

bsid

y is

in

pla

ce f

or

the

new

ly b

orn

, fo

r p

reg

nan

t w

om

en w

ith

CA

S c

ard

s, a

nd

fo

r in

valid

s.

5.5

6 m

il (1

99

9).

Nat

ion

-wid

e co

vera

ge,

par

tici

pati

on

is

volu

nta

ry. I

n t

he

subs

idy

to

po

or

fam

ilies

,$6

0 p

er y

ear

per

p

reg

nan

t w

om

an. I

n f

amili

es

wit

h C

AS

car

ds,

$6

per

mo

nth

p

er c

hild

.

Go

od

tar

get

ing

per

form

ance

- 9

0%

of

ben

efi t

s g

o t

o t

he

bo

tto

m 4

0%

of

the

po

pu

lati

on

; su

bsid

ies

incr

ease

d t

he

inco

me

of t

he

po

ore

st 2

0%

by

84

%

and

red

uce

d t

he

rati

o o

f th

e in

com

e of

th

e to

p t

o t

he

bo

tto

m q

uin

tile

fro

m

15.5

tim

es t

o o

nly

8.5

tim

es.

Ch

ile S

olid

ario

Ch

ileC

CT

200

2B

rin

gs

inte

gra

l so

cial

ser

vice

s to

fam

i-lie

s in

ext

rem

e p

over

ty (

psyc

ho

-so

cial

su

pp

ort

, cas

h s

ubs

idie

s, a

cces

s to

ski

ll d

evel

op

men

t, w

ork

an

d s

oci

al s

ecu

rity

p

rog

ram

s). M

ust

mee

t 5

3 m

inim

um

co

n-

dit

ion

s se

en a

s n

eces

sary

to

ove

rco

me

extr

eme

pov

erty

.

165

,00

0 p

oo

r fa

mili

es w

ith

sc

ho

ol a

ge

child

ren

, in

ru

ral

and

urb

an a

reas

. So

cial

su

p-

po

rt, s

olid

arit

y su

pp

ort

, mo

n-

etar

y su

bsid

y.

Go

od

ver

tica

l effi

cie

ncy

an

d c

over

age;

17

.5%

of

targ

ets

had

bee

n a

chie

ved

an

d 1

.7%

of

ho

use

ho

lds

had

ove

rco

me

extr

eme

pov

erty

by

200

2; s

mal

l pro

g-

ress

in t

erm

s of

a s

ucc

essf

ul e

xit

rate

; h

igh

co

mp

lian

ce w

ith

th

e m

inim

um

co

nd

itio

ns.

Pro

ble

ms

wit

h im

ple

men

ta-

tio

n; e

xclu

sio

n o

f el

igib

le

fam

ilies

; so

cial

wo

rk t

ech

-n

iqu

es t

hat

may

no

t b

e ap

pro

pri

ate

for

bo

th u

rban

an

d r

ura

l set

tin

gs.

Ch

ile J

oven

, P

rog

ram

a d

e C

apac

itac

ión

N

acio

nal

de

Jó

ven

es

Ch

ileP

W19

91

Trai

nin

g p

rog

ram

fo

r lo

w-i

nco

me

un

em-

plo

yed

yo

uth

th

at c

om

bin

es a

sch

ol-

arsh

ip f

or

clas

sro

om

tra

inin

g w

ith

a

3-m

on

th p

aid

ap

pre

nti

cesh

ip in

a p

riva

te

fi rm

.

164

,45

6 (

199

1-20

01)

. Low

-in

-co

me

un

emp

loye

d y

ou

th 1

6-2

4.

Free

co

urs

es, t

ran

spo

rtat

ion

/ lu

nch

su

bsid

y, in

sura

nce

, to

ols

.

Pro

bab

ility

of

emp

loym

ent

incr

ease

d

by 8

-13%

; 50

% f

ou

nd

jobs

aft

er t

he

pro

ject

; hig

hly

co

nce

ntr

ated

tar

get

ing

w

ith

70

% o

f pa

rtic

ipan

ts in

18

-24

ag

e g

rou

p, 6

3% f

rom

low

-in

com

e h

ou

se-

ho

lds,

40

% w

ith

co

mp

lete

sec

on

dar

y ed

uca

tio

n.

Do

es n

ot

hav

e an

exp

licit

g

end

er f

ocu

s; 3

7% o

f th

e pa

rtic

ipan

ts d

id n

ot

bel

on

g

to lo

w-i

nco

me

fam

ilies

, 49

%

hav

e co

mp

lete

d h

igh

sch

oo

l.

Pro

gra

ma

de

Pen

sio

nes

A

sist

enci

ales

Ch

ileU

CT

1975

A n

on

-co

ntr

ibu

tory

pen

sio

n p

rog

ram

su

pp

ort

ing

old

or

dis

able

d in

div

idu

als

wit

ho

ut

oth

er s

ou

rces

of

inco

me.

Th

e g

oal

is t

o r

edu

ce p

over

ty a

nd

vu

lner

abil-

ity

amo

ng

old

an

d d

isab

led

po

or.

358

,813

(20

00

). C

ateg

ori

cal

targ

etin

g o

f p

oo

r in

div

idu

als

65

+, o

r d

isab

led

ag

ed 1

8+

. U

S$

60

per

mo

nth

per

ben

efi -

ciar

y.

Sig

nifi

can

t im

pact

on

pov

erty

red

uc-

tio

n; s

ub

trac

tin

g p

ensi

on

inco

me

fro

m

ho

use

ho

ld in

com

e an

d r

ecal

cula

tin

g

pov

erty

inci

den

ce w

ou

ld r

aise

ext

rem

e p

over

ty (

ind

igen

ce)

by 7

.5%

fro

m a

ba

se o

f 12

.8%

, an

d p

over

ty b

y 2

.5%

fr

om

25

% b

ase.

Rat

ion

ing

of

entr

y in

to

the

pro

gra

m b

ased

on

a

bu

dg

etar

y ca

p r

edu

ces

the

insu

ran

ce p

rop

erti

es o

f th

e p

ensi

on

pro

gra

m.

Min

imu

m

Liv

ing

Su

bsid

y S

chem

e

Ch

ina

UC

T19

93

Pay

s th

e d

iffe

ren

ce b

etw

een

th

e m

on

thly

in

com

e of

po

or

ho

use

ho

lds

and

a m

ini-

mu

m le

vel s

et a

t th

e ci

ty le

vel.

Aim

ed

at a

ssis

tin

g p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s in

urb

an

Ch

ina,

esp

ecia

lly in

th

e co

nte

xt o

f st

ruc-

tura

l ad

just

men

t. S

cale

d u

p t

o c

over

all

citi

es in

20

00

.

2.4

4%

cov

erag

e in

20

01

and

4

.05

% in

20

04

. Mea

ns

test

ta

rget

ing

. Ben

efi t

s va

ry b

y b

enefi

t li

ne

(pov

erty

lin

e) a

nd

by

dep

th o

f p

over

ty.

Th

e ra

tio

of

ben

efi t

rec

ipie

nts

to

th

e n

um

ber

s es

tim

ated

to

be

po

or

ran

ges

fr

om

4.9

% in

Sh

and

on

g t

o 9

2.1%

in

Tib

et, w

ith

17.

9%

fo

r th

e co

un

try

over

-al

l. M

LS

S is

an

inco

me

sup

ple

men

t p

ub

lic a

ssis

tan

ce p

rog

ram

, bu

t th

e in

tro

du

ctio

n o

f u

ser

char

ges

in e

du

ca-

tio

n a

nd

hea

lth

an

d t

he

fact

th

at t

hes

e ar

e n

ot

incl

ud

ed in

th

e ca

lcu

lati

on

of

the

ben

efi t

lin

es s

ug

ges

ts t

hat

oth

er

imp

ort

ant

defi

cit

s ar

e n

ot

add

ress

ed.

Dec

entr

aliz

ed im

ple

men

ta-

tio

n i

s es

sen

tial

giv

en t

he

het

ero

gen

eity

of

soci

al

eco

no

mic

co

nd

itio

ns

in

Ch

ina,

bu

t th

is a

lso

imp

lies

ineq

ual

itie

s in

ass

ista

nce

ba

sed

on

loca

l fi n

anci

al

capa

city

; pro

ble

ms

wit

h

syst

ems

of r

egis

trat

ion

an

d

revi

ew o

f th

e m

ean

s te

st.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Pro

gra

ma

Su

per

émo

nos

(Let

’s

Ove

rco

me)

Co

sta

Ric

aC

CT

200

0P

rovi

des

fo

od

co

up

on

s to

po

or

fam

ilies

, co

nd

itio

nal

up

on

a c

om

mit

men

t of

th

ese

fam

ilies

to

en

roll

all t

hei

r ch

ildre

n in

sc

ho

ol;

do

es n

ot

hav

e as

an

exp

licit

go

al

the

red

uct

ion

of

child

lab

or.

12,2

34

fam

ilies

(20

01)

. Po

or

fam

ilies

wit

h c

hild

ren

an

d a

do

-le

scen

ts 7

-18

, att

end

ing

sch

oo

l. M

ean

s-ba

sed

tar

get

ing

. U

S

$30

co

up

on

per

mo

nth

.

Su

cces

sfu

l in

incr

easi

ng

sch

oo

l att

en-

dan

ce-

ben

efi c

iari

es a

re 3

- 8

.7%

mo

re

likel

y to

att

end

sch

oo

l; n

o e

vid

ence

of

child

lab

or

dec

reas

e; 2

.4-5

% in

crea

se

in a

tten

dan

ce f

or

stu

den

ts 1

3-

16.

Tarj

eta

So

lidar

idad

(S

olid

arit

y)

Do

min

ican

R

epu

blic

CC

T20

05

To h

elp

elim

inat

e th

e in

ter-

gen

erat

ion

al

tran

smis

sio

n o

f th

e ca

use

s w

hic

h g

ener

-at

e an

d in

stil

pov

erty

, by

imp

rovi

ng

th

e in

vest

men

t by

po

or

fam

ilies

on

ed

uca

-ti

on

al, h

ealt

h a

nd

fo

od

inta

ke a

spec

ts.

Co

nd

itio

nal

up

on

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

an

d

hea

lth

ch

eck-

ups

. Un

ifi es

th

e “C

om

er e

s p

rim

ero”

an

d “

Fich

a IL

AE

” p

rog

ram

s.

230

,00

0 f

amili

es (

200

6);

P

op

ula

tio

n li

vin

g in

ext

rem

e p

over

ty. F

oo

d in

com

e co

mp

o-

nen

t: $

17, s

cho

ol a

tten

dan

ce

ince

nti

ve: $

9 f

or

1-2

ch

ildre

n,

$14

fo

r 3,

$19

fo

r 4

+.

No

t ye

t av

aila

ble

.

Tarj

eta

de

Asi

sten

cia

Esc

ola

r (T

AE

),

now

Ince

nti

vo

a la

Asi

sten

cia

Esc

ola

r

Do

min

ican

R

epu

blic

CC

T19

92

Des

ign

ed t

o im

pro

ve c

hild

ren’

s sc

ho

ol

atte

nd

ance

an

d r

eten

tio

n r

ates

. In

20

04

tr

ansf

orm

ed in

to S

cho

ol A

ssis

tan

ce

Ince

nti

ve (

Ince

nti

vo a

la A

sist

enci

a E

sco

lar)

.

100

,00

0 e

xtre

mel

y p

oo

r fa

mi-

lies

wit

h c

hild

ren

6-1

2. R

D$

300

p

er h

ou

seh

old

per

mo

nth

.

Favo

red

po

ore

r in

div

idu

als;

3.4

% o

f h

ou

seh

old

s d

id n

ot

hav

e an

y m

emb

ers

in t

he

age

ran

ge

of 1

-25

; cov

erag

e ra

tes

hig

her

fo

r p

oo

r q

uin

tile

s; m

ore

ef

fect

ive

reac

h o

f p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s th

an m

od

erat

ely

po

or;

neg

ativ

e re

dis

-tr

ibu

tive

effi

cie

ncy

.

Incr

ease

d s

avin

gs

and

wel

-fa

re g

ain

s co

uld

be

ach

ieve

d

by im

pro

vin

g t

arg

etin

g a

nd

d

ecre

asin

g le

akag

es.

Pro

gra

ma

de

Alim

enta

ció

n

Esc

ola

r (P

AE

),

Sch

oo

l Lu

nch

P

rog

ram

Do

min

ican

R

epu

blic

SFW

199

2N

atio

nwid

e sc

ho

ol l

un

ch p

rog

ram

fo

r ch

ildre

n 5

-14

in p

ub

lic p

re-s

cho

ol a

nd

ba-

sic

edu

cati

on

sch

oo

ls. A

ims

to in

crea

se

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

, red

uce

dro

p o

ut

rate

s, in

crea

se c

om

mu

nit

y pa

rtic

ipat

ion

in

sch

oo

l act

ivit

ies,

an

d im

pro

ve n

utr

i-ti

on

an

d li

vin

g c

on

dit

ion

s.

Ab

ou

t 1,6

00

,00

0 s

tud

ents

per

ye

ar. F

ree

lun

ches

(R

D$

152

.7

valu

e p

er p

erso

n p

er m

on

th)

Go

od

tar

get

ing

; cov

erag

e ra

tes

are

hig

her

fo

r p

oo

r q

uin

tile

s th

an r

ich

er

qu

inti

les;

rea

ch p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s m

ore

ef

fect

ivel

y th

an t

he

mo

der

atel

y p

oo

r;

po

siti

ve r

edis

trib

uti

ve e

ffi c

ien

cy.

Incr

ease

d s

avin

gs

and

wel

-fa

re g

ain

s co

uld

be

ach

ieve

d

by im

pro

vin

g t

arg

etin

g a

nd

d

ecre

asin

g le

akag

es.

Bo

no

So

lidar

io

(Bo

no

de

Des

arro

llo

Hu

man

o s

ince

2

00

4)

Ecu

ado

rC

CT

199

8D

irec

t m

on

thly

ben

efi t

s to

po

or

ho

use

-h

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n, e

lder

ly a

nd

dis

able

d

to b

road

en h

um

an c

apit

al a

nd

avo

id

inte

r-g

ener

atio

nal

tra

nsf

er o

f p

over

ty,

con

dit

ion

al o

n in

vest

men

ts in

ed

uca

tio

n

and

hea

lth

car

e.

1,06

0,4

16 h

ou

seh

old

s (2

00

6).

M

ean

s te

sted

tar

get

ing

. $15

p

er m

on

th t

o m

oth

ers,

$11

.50

to

eld

erly

/dis

able

d.

2/3

of

ben

efi c

iari

es f

aile

d t

o m

eet

ho

use

ho

ld in

com

e m

ean

s te

st; p

oo

r ta

rget

ing

- 1/

2 o

f p

ote

nti

al b

enefi

cia

-ri

es d

idn’

t re

ceiv

e th

e tr

ansf

er; 1

0%

im

pro

vem

ent

in s

cho

ol e

nro

lmen

t;

17%

red

uct

ion

in c

hild

lab

or;

no

sig

-n

ifi ca

nt

imp

rove

men

ts in

nu

trit

ion

al

stat

us;

go

od

per

cep

tio

n o

f p

rog

ram

by

ben

efi c

iari

es.

Hel

ps t

o c

lose

th

e sc

ho

olin

g

gap

bet

wee

n c

hild

ren

fro

m

the

rich

an

d p

oo

r h

ou

se-

ho

lds.

Mek

et

Liv

elih

oo

ds

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Pro

ject

(M

LD

P)

Eth

iop

iaS

FW20

03

Cas

h r

elie

f to

vu

lner

able

ho

use

ho

lds

to

hel

p t

hem

mee

t es

sen

tial

fo

od

exp

en-

dit

ure

an

d t

o in

vest

in a

sset

s. G

oal

s:

div

ersi

fi ca

tio

n o

f liv

elih

oo

d o

pti

on

s,

enh

ance

men

t of

co

mm

un

ity-

leve

l ass

ets,

an

d s

tim

ula

tio

n o

f ru

ral e

con

om

y.

46

,60

0, a

pp

rox

50

00

rece

ive

cash

rel

ief.

Foo

d in

-se

cure

ru

ral h

ou

seh

old

s. U

S

$3.

50

/per

son

per

mo

nth

; sea

-so

nal

tra

nsf

er.

En

able

d h

ou

seh

old

s to

bu

y se

eds

or

lives

tock

fo

r th

e fa

rmin

g s

easo

n a

nd

ke

ep t

hei

r as

sets

; hel

ped

div

ersi

fy

inco

me

sou

rces

; mo

re f

req

uen

t an

d

div

ersi

fi ed

nu

trit

ion

fo

r ch

ildre

n; i

n-

crea

sed

acc

ess

to h

ealt

h c

are.

Th

is s

ub

-dis

tric

t N

GO

pilo

t ai

ms

to e

ng

age

wit

h a

nd

in

fl u

ence

a n

atio

nal

sch

eme

– th

e P

rod

uct

ive

Saf

ety

Net

P

rog

ram

.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Pu

blic

Wo

rks,

Fo

od

Aid

an

d

Foo

d f

or

Wo

rk

Eth

iop

iaP

W19

93

Pro

vid

e u

nsk

illed

wo

rker

s w

ith

sh

ort

-te

rm, l

abo

r-in

ten

sive

em

plo

ymen

t o

n

com

mu

nit

y d

evel

op

men

t p

roje

cts.

80

%

of f

oo

d a

id is

dir

ecte

d t

o f

oo

d f

or

wo

rk

part

icip

ants

, 20

% -

to

th

ose

wh

o a

re n

ot

able

to

wo

rk.

60

0,0

00

(20

02

).

Ad

min

istr

ativ

e ta

rget

ing

, sel

f-ta

rget

ing

, co

mm

un

ity-

base

d

targ

etin

g. 1

5 k

g o

f fo

od

per

p

erso

n p

er m

on

th.

Red

uce

d v

uln

erab

ility

; im

pro

ved

nu

-tr

itio

nal

hea

lth

an

d c

hild

gro

wth

; wid

e g

ap in

mal

e an

d f

emal

e pa

rtic

ipat

ion

ra

tes-

wo

men

acc

ou

nte

d f

or

26%

of

the

emp

loym

ent

in p

ub

lic w

ork

s p

roj-

ects

, wh

ile t

hey

wer

e ta

rget

ed in

43%

of

th

e vi

llag

es.

Lac

k of

dat

a an

d m

eth

od

ol-

og

y fo

r ta

rget

ing

; low

fe-

mal

e pa

rtic

ipat

ion

; nee

d f

or

imp

rove

d c

om

mu

nic

atio

n

bet

wee

n W

FP, n

atio

nal

an

d

loca

l gov

ern

men

ts.

No

n-e

mer

gen

cy

foo

d a

id a

nd

fo

od

-fo

r-w

ork

Eth

iop

iaS

FW19

80

sFo

od

sec

uri

ty p

rog

ram

wit

h a

wo

rk c

om

-p

on

ent.

Pro

vid

ed f

oo

d e

ith

er a

s an

un

-co

nd

itio

nal

tra

nsf

er o

r as

a c

ash

tra

nsf

er

con

dit

ion

al o

n w

ork

.

20%

of

ho

use

ho

lds

rece

ived

ei

ther

fo

od

-aid

or

part

icip

ated

in

fo

od

-fo

r-w

ork

. Cat

ego

rica

l ta

rget

ing

. 3kg

of

wh

eat/

day

.

80

% o

f h

ou

seh

old

fo

od

sec

uri

ty

ben

efi t

s w

ere

in c

erea

ls (

199

2 -1

99

5);

h

igh

leak

age

(78

%)

and

low

cov

erag

e (4

9%

) ra

tes

for

foo

d a

id; p

oo

r ta

rget

-in

g, h

igh

per

cen

tag

e of

th

e p

oo

r d

id

no

t re

ceiv

e fo

od

aid

.

Po

or

targ

etin

g m

ay r

efl e

ct

hig

h c

ost

of

sett

ing

up

p

rog

ram

s in

fac

e of

sh

ifti

ng

sp

atia

l dis

trib

uti

on

of

inse

-cu

rity

ove

r ti

me.

Cas

h f

or

Wo

rk

in N

ort

h a

nd

S

ou

th G

on

der

Z

on

e

Eth

iop

iaU

CT/

P

W20

02

Pro

vid

es c

ash

to

ho

use

ho

lds

in n

eed

, ei

ther

as

un

con

dit

ion

al t

ran

sfer

or

wit

h

wo

rk r

equ

irem

ent,

to

red

uce

pov

erty

th

rou

gh

ass

et-c

reat

ion

an

d im

pro

vin

g

foo

d q

uan

tity

an

d q

ual

ity.

13,0

00

rec

ipie

nts

. Ho

use

ho

lds

in n

eed

.C

ost

-eff

ecti

ve; o

ver

65

% o

f pa

rtic

i-pa

nts

pre

ferr

ed c

ash

to

fo

od

; cas

h

paym

ent

pro

mo

ted

hig

her

par

-ti

cipa

tio

n in

em

plo

ymen

t sc

hem

es;

incr

ease

d a

sset

cre

atio

n; i

mp

rove

d

qu

anti

ty a

nd

qu

alit

y of

fo

od

co

nsu

mp

-ti

on

; no

mis

use

of

cash

; no

eff

ect

on

m

arke

t p

rice

s.

Urb

an F

oo

d f

or

Wo

rk (

UFF

W)

Eth

iop

iaP

W19

97

Pro

vid

es s

ho

rt-t

erm

un

emp

loym

ent

and

ba

sic

road

s an

d la

trin

es t

o r

esid

ents

of

mar

gin

al u

rban

co

mm

un

itie

s in

Ad

dis

A

baba

; en

han

ces

com

mu

nit

y pa

rtic

ipa-

tio

n in

sel

f-h

elp

act

ivit

ies.

Un

emp

loye

d u

nsk

illed

wo

rker

s in

ext

rem

ely

po

or

com

mu

ni-

ties

. Pai

d w

ith

fo

od

bas

ed o

n

pro

du

ctiv

ity.

A r

elie

f ra

ther

th

an a

dev

elo

pm

ent

pro

gra

m; n

ot

effe

ctiv

e as

a s

afet

y n

et;

imp

rove

d m

ob

ility

fo

r re

sid

ents

; fo

od

pa

ymen

ts r

edu

ced

fo

od

inse

curi

ty;

lon

g-t

erm

eff

ects

are

lim

ited

, pro

gra

m

faile

d t

o p

rovi

de

lon

g t

erm

pov

erty

al-

levi

atio

n o

r fo

od

sec

uri

ty.

Ch

ild S

urv

ival

P

roje

ct,

Ses

ame

Gro

wer

s’

Ass

oci

atio

n

Inst

itu

tio

nal

S

tren

gth

enin

g

Pro

ject

Gam

bia

SFW

199

0s

CG

A: a

dd

ress

es a

cces

s, a

vaila

bili

ty a

nd

u

tiliz

atio

n o

f fo

od

by

pro

mo

tin

g s

esam

e as

a c

ash

cro

p f

or

wo

men

; CS

P: f

ocu

ses

on

imp

rovi

ng

hea

lth

an

d n

utr

itio

n.

Imp

rove

d m

ater

nal

an

d c

hild

hea

lth

ca

re a

nd

nu

trit

ion

; red

uce

d c

hro

nic

m

aln

utr

itio

n; m

ore

wo

men

rec

eive

d

iro

n d

uri

ng

pre

gn

ancy

, att

end

ed a

n-

ten

atal

co

nsu

ltat

ion

s, a

nd

co

nsu

med

m

ore

nu

trit

ion

al f

oo

d; i

ncr

ease

d

awar

enes

s of

hea

lth

issu

es.

Pro

gra

ma

de

Asi

gn

ació

n

Fam

iliar

PR

AF

II (F

amily

A

llow

ance

P

rog

ram

)

Ho

nd

ura

sC

CT

199

0C

ash

tra

nsf

ers

to p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s co

nd

itio

nal

on

inve

stm

ent

in h

ealt

h a

nd

ed

uca

tio

n; s

up

po

rts

inst

itu

tio

nal

an

d

fi n

anci

al p

rovi

sio

n o

f ed

uca

tio

n a

nd

h

ealt

h. B

on

o E

sco

lar

for

fam

ilies

wh

o

sen

d t

hei

r ch

ildre

n t

o s

cho

ol;

Bo

no

Sal

ud

fo

r ch

ildre

n u

nd

er 5

an

d p

reg

nan

t/la

c-ta

tin

g w

om

en.

4.7

% o

f p

op

ula

tio

n.

Geo

gra

ph

ic t

arg

etin

g o

f p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

ch

ildre

n 0

-3

and

6-1

2. H

ealt

h: $

34

-136

an

d

edu

cati

on

$24

-96

per

ho

use

-h

old

; $6

0/p

reg

nan

t w

om

an.

Pro

tect

ed p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s’ w

elfa

re

du

rin

g c

offe

e cr

isis

; si

gn

ifi ca

ntl

y af

-fe

cted

th

e la

bo

r al

loca

tio

n d

ecis

ion

of

cre

dit

co

nst

rain

ed c

offe

e fa

rmer

s w

hile

pro

tect

ing

ch

ildre

n; a

dd

itio

nal

liq

uid

ity

allo

wed

fam

ilies

to

kee

p

child

ren

in s

cho

ol,

wh

ile in

crea

sin

g

the

tim

e d

edic

ated

by

adu

lts

to c

offe

e fa

rmin

g.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Jaw

ahar

Ro

jgar

Yo

han

a (J

RY

) In

dia

PW

198

9C

reat

es s

up

ple

men

tary

em

plo

ymen

t o

pp

ort

un

itie

s fo

r th

e ru

ral p

oo

r d

uri

ng

ag

ricu

ltu

ral c

risi

s p

erio

ds;

imp

rove

s ru

ral

eco

no

mic

infr

astr

uct

ure

, cre

ates

co

m-

mu

nit

y an

d s

oci

al a

sset

s. R

estr

uct

ure

d

to J

awah

ar G

ram

Sam

rid

hi Y

oja

na.

1678

mil

per

son

day

s of

em

-p

loym

ent.

Geo

gra

ph

ic, d

emo

-g

rap

hic

an

d s

elf-

targ

etin

g.

31%

of

ben

efi c

iari

es w

ere

po

or

in 1

98

7

and

24

% in

19

93

; att

ract

ed n

on

-po

or

bec

ause

of

hig

her

th

an t

he

mar

ket

wag

e ra

te. 4

3% o

f b

ud

get

wen

t to

p

oo

r ru

ral h

ou

seh

old

s; h

igh

co

st

(US

$1.8

7 t

o t

ran

sfer

US

$1

in 1

99

1); r

e-d

uce

d t

ota

l un

der

emp

loym

ent

by 1

/3;

mo

des

t im

pact

on

ho

use

ho

ld le

vel.

Nat

ion

al O

ld-

Ag

e P

ensi

on

S

chem

e (N

OA

PS

)

Ind

iaU

CT

199

5P

rovi

des

cas

h p

aym

ents

to

des

titu

te

eld

erly

ho

use

ho

ld.

To p

rovi

de

secu

rity

to

eld

erly

an

d d

esti

tute

ho

use

ho

lds

thro

ug

h a

cas

h t

ran

sfer

s

1/4

of

all e

lder

ly. C

ateg

ori

cal

and

info

rmal

ind

ivid

ual

ass

ess-

men

t. U

S$

1.5 p

er m

on

th.

Po

or

un

der

stan

din

g o

f el

igib

ility

cri

te-

ria;

co

mp

lex

reg

istr

atio

n a

nd

sel

ecti

on

p

roce

sses

; err

atic

del

iver

y of

ben

efi t

s;

do

es m

ake

a si

gn

ifi ca

nt

dif

fere

nce

to

th

e liv

es o

f p

oo

r p

eop

le.

Cas

h li

mit

s o

n f

un

din

g

pro

vid

e a

dis

ince

nti

ve f

or

offi

cial

s to

pu

blic

ize

the

pro

gra

m.

Mah

aras

htr

a E

mp

loym

ent

Gu

aran

tee

Sch

eme

(ME

GS

)

Ind

iaP

W19

73G

ainf

ul e

mp

loym

ent

to a

ll ad

ult

s 18

+

in r

ura

l are

as a

nd

mu

nic

ipal

co

un

cils

in

Mah

aras

htr

a, w

illin

g t

o u

nd

erta

ke

un

skill

ed m

anu

al w

ork

to

bu

ild r

ura

l in

-fr

astr

uct

ure

. T

he

lon

g-t

erm

co

mp

on

ent

faci

litat

es a

sset

cre

atio

n, e

xpan

sio

n o

f jo

b o

pp

ort

un

itie

s, a

nd

pov

erty

alle

via-

tio

n.

100

-18

0 m

il p

erso

n d

ays

of

emp

loym

ent

per

yea

r. S

elf-

targ

etin

g.

Incr

ease

d e

arn

ing

s of

po

or

by 1

8 -

4

0%

an

d n

on

-po

or

18-3

3%; c

on

trib

-u

ted

to

gen

eral

po

litic

al a

ctiv

ism

an

d

coal

itio

n b

uild

ing

am

on

g t

he

po

or;

in

corp

ora

ted

gen

der

sp

ecifi

c d

esig

n

feat

ure

s; la

ck o

f d

ata

on

dir

ect

impa

ct

in t

erm

s of

loca

lized

em

plo

ymen

t cr

e-at

ed; f

aile

d t

o p

rovi

de

job

tra

inin

g.

Fully

su

pp

ort

ed b

y th

e st

ate

gov

ern

men

t an

d in

volv

es a

ll le

vels

of

soci

ety;

co

mp

li-ca

ted

reg

istr

atio

n p

roce

-d

ure

; del

ays

in p

aym

ents

; ra

mpa

nt

corr

up

tio

n.

Ku

du

mba

shre

e (K

DB

) p

over

ty

alle

viat

ion

p

rog

ram

Ind

ia, K

eral

aA

BP

199

8A

mu

ltis

ecto

ral p

rog

ram

bas

ed o

n v

il-la

ge-

leve

l mic

ro p

lan

nin

g, t

he

form

atio

n

of —

thri

ft a

nd

cre

dit

so

ciet

ies,

mic

roen

-te

rpri

se, a

nd

wo

men

‘s e

mp

ower

men

t th

rou

gh

so

cial

mo

bili

zati

on

an

d g

rou

p

form

atio

n

Invo

lvem

ent

of s

tate

an

d lo

-ca

l gov

ern

men

t in

des

ign

ing

th

e p

ilots

was

co

nsi

der

ed

on

e of

th

e m

ost

imp

ort

ant

det

erm

inan

ts f

or

scal

ing

-up

th

e C

DS

ap

pro

ach

.

Sch

ola

rsh

ips

and

Gra

nts

P

rog

ram

me

(SG

P)

Ind

on

esia

SFW

199

8S

cho

lars

hip

an

d g

ran

ts a

re d

istr

ib-

ute

d t

hro

ug

h p

ost

offi

ces

to

kee

p p

oo

r ch

ildre

n in

sch

oo

l an

d t

o k

eep

sch

oo

ls

op

erat

ion

al t

hro

ug

ho

ut

the

cris

is.

4 m

il. P

oo

rest

dis

tric

ts

thro

ug

h p

over

ty in

dic

es a

nd

a

com

po

site

fo

rmu

la. U

S$

16-4

0

per

stu

den

t p

er y

ear,

dep

end

-in

g o

n g

rad

e.

Red

uce

d le

akag

e an

d b

enefi

t t

ran

sfer

ti

me;

po

ore

st r

ecei

ved

a g

reat

er t

han

p

rop

ort

ion

al s

har

e of

sch

ola

rsh

ips;

6

3% c

om

e fr

om

fam

ilies

in t

he

low

est

two

exp

end

itu

re q

uin

tile

s, 1

8%

fro

m

the

hig

hes

t tw

o q

uin

tile

s; e

nro

lmen

t ra

tes

rem

ain

ed t

he

sam

e; lo

w c

over

-ag

e d

uri

ng

init

ial i

mp

lem

enta

tio

n.

Co

ord

inat

ion

an

d c

oo

p-

erat

ion

bet

wee

n d

on

ors

an

d g

over

nm

ent

agen

cies

co

ntr

ibu

ted

to

pro

gra

m

succ

ess.

So

cial

P

rote

ctio

n

Sec

tor

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Pro

gra

m

Ind

on

esia

UC

T19

98

Incl

ud

es w

ork

cre

atio

n p

rog

ram

s, s

ubs

i-d

ized

ric

e, f

ree

hea

lth

car

e, h

ealt

hca

re

subs

idie

s, c

om

mu

nit

y an

d s

cho

ol g

ran

ts,

edu

cati

on

sch

ola

rsh

ips.

Po

or

ho

use

ho

lds.

Em

plo

ymen

t o

pp

ort

un

itie

s, s

ubs

idiz

ed r

ice,

fr

ee s

cho

ol,

and

hea

lth

car

e.

On

ly h

alf

the

fun

din

g d

irec

tly

ben

-efi

ted

th

e p

oo

r; t

arg

etin

g p

rob

lem

s,

lack

of

tran

spar

ency

; unf

air

ben

efi t

al-

loca

tio

n; l

eaka

ge

to n

on

-po

or

or

un

der

co

vera

ge.

Imp

lem

enta

tio

n o

f th

e p

ol-

icy

com

po

nen

t w

as s

low

er

than

exp

ecte

d; d

ecen

tral

-iz

ed im

ple

men

tati

on

led

to

ad

min

istr

ativ

e p

rob

lem

s an

d c

apac

ity

con

stra

ints

.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Kar

tu S

ehat

P

rog

ram

Ind

on

esia

SFW

199

4D

istr

ibu

tes

card

s en

titl

ing

rec

ipie

nts

to

fr

ee h

ealt

h c

are

serv

ices

. A s

ing

le c

ard

p

er e

ach

rec

ipie

nt

fam

ily, u

p t

o e

igh

t fa

mily

mem

ber

s ca

n b

e lis

ted

on

th

e ca

rd.

Aim

s to

cov

er a

ll p

oo

r fa

mili

es.

Pri

ori

ty is

giv

en t

o p

oo

rest

vi

llag

es.

Pro

ble

ms

of u

sag

e an

d q

ual

ity;

car

d

ho

lder

s p

erce

ive

the

care

rec

eive

d

thro

ug

h t

he

hea

lth

car

d t

o b

e of

a

low

er q

ual

ity.

Lac

k of

info

rmat

ion

by

con

sum

ers,

pro

vid

ers,

an

d

gov

ern

men

t of

fi ci

als

as w

ell

as in

suffi

cie

nt

trai

nin

g. T

he

pu

blic

hea

lth

fac

iliti

es m

ust

b

ear

the

mai

n c

ost

s.

Inp

res

Des

a Te

rtin

gg

al (

IDT

)In

do

nes

iaU

CT

199

4-

96

Pro

visi

on

of

smal

l-sc

ale

cred

it t

o p

oo

r h

ou

seh

old

s in

th

e p

oo

rest

or

mo

st n

e-g

lect

ed v

illag

es. P

arti

cipa

tin

g v

illag

es

rece

ived

a b

lock

gra

nt

to b

e u

sed

as

a ba

se f

un

d f

or

smal

l-sc

ale

revo

lvin

g

cred

it a

vaila

ble

to

sel

ecte

d g

rou

ps f

or

self

-em

plo

ymen

t ac

tivi

ties

.

2-st

age

geo

gra

ph

ic t

arg

etin

g

of 2

0,0

00

po

or

villa

ges

. Rp

20

m

illio

n p

er v

illag

e.

Pov

erty

inci

den

ce d

ecre

ased

by

4.4

%

a ye

ar (

199

3-1

99

6);

low

tar

get

ing

ef-

fect

iven

ess;

incr

ease

d t

ota

l per

cap

ita

exp

end

itu

re, a

lth

ou

gh

no

t o

n h

ealt

h

care

; po

siti

ve im

pact

on

em

plo

ymen

t;

smal

l po

siti

ve im

pact

on

sch

oo

l att

en-

dan

ce; s

ucc

essf

ul i

n fi

sca

l dec

entr

al-

izat

ion

; po

siti

ve im

pact

on

red

uci

ng

re

gio

nal

dis

pari

ties

.

Allo

cati

on

invo

lved

po

litic

al

con

sid

erat

ion

s; c

oo

rdin

a-ti

on

pro

ble

ms

bet

wee

n

dep

artm

ents

; lac

k of

cap

ital

, lim

ited

par

tici

pati

on

by

wo

men

.

PD

M-D

KE

(E

mp

ower

ing

th

e R

egio

ns

to O

verc

om

e Im

pact

of

Eco

no

mic

C

risi

s)

Ind

on

esia

Pu

blic

w

ork

s19

98

-20

00

Pro

vid

es b

lock

gra

nts

th

rou

gh

a d

ecen

-tr

aliz

ed d

isb

urs

emen

t p

roce

ss f

or

eith

er

pu

blic

wo

rks

or

revo

lvin

g c

red

it f

un

ds

to p

oo

r an

d u

nem

plo

yed

to

su

pp

ort

in-

com

e-g

ener

atin

g s

mal

l-sc

ale

acti

viti

es.

Geo

gra

ph

ic t

arg

etin

g. F

rom

R

p10

mil

to R

p1

bil,

dep

end

ing

o

n s

ize

and

nu

mb

ers

of p

oo

r an

d u

nem

plo

yed

.

Ser

iou

s ta

rget

ing

issu

es; m

any

of t

he

sele

cted

infr

astr

uct

ure

pro

ject

s d

id

no

t p

rovi

de

ben

efi t

s to

th

e p

oo

rest

; la

rge

sum

s d

iver

ted

into

mat

eria

ls a

nd

eq

uip

men

t in

stea

d u

sed

fo

r la

bo

r.

Alle

gat

ion

s of

co

rru

pti

on

an

d “

mo

ney

po

litic

s”.

Pro

gra

m o

f A

dva

nce

men

t of

Hea

lth

an

d

Edu

cati

on

(P

AT

H)

Jam

aica

CC

T20

02

Aim

s to

incr

ease

ed

uca

tio

nal

att

ain

men

t an

d im

pro

ve h

ealt

h o

utc

om

es o

f th

e p

oo

r; in

crea

sin

g t

he

valu

e of

tra

nsf

er;

red

uce

ch

ild la

bo

r; s

erve

as

a sa

fety

n

et f

or

fam

ilies

in t

he

even

t of

ad

vers

e sh

ock

. Co

nd

itio

nal

on

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

an

d h

ealt

h c

hec

k-u

ps.

195

,00

0 (

200

5);

Isla

nd

-wid

e ta

rget

ing

via

pro

xy-m

ean

s te

st o

f m

ost

vu

lner

able

po

or.

Ed

uca

tio

n: U

S$

9 p

er c

hild

m

on

thly

; Hea

lth

: US

$9

per

m

emb

er m

on

thly

.

Bri

ng

s to

get

her

sep

arat

e p

over

ty

pro

gra

ms

con

sid

ered

to

be

un

der

per

-fo

rmin

g (

foo

d s

tam

ps, o

utd

oo

r p

oo

r re

lief,

and

old

ag

e in

capa

city

); d

elay

s in

reg

istr

atio

n; l

ack

of c

on

dit

ion

alit

y m

on

ito

rin

g.

A k

ey e

lem

ent

of t

he

gov

ern

men

t’s

init

iati

ve t

o

crea

te a

fi s

cally

so

un

d a

nd

m

ore

effi

cie

nt

syst

em o

f so

-ci

al a

ssis

tan

ce f

or

the

po

or

and

vu

lner

able

by

imp

rovi

ng

ta

rget

ing

mea

sure

s.

Ko

rea

Pu

blic

W

ork

s P

rog

ram

Ko

rea

PW

199

8P

rog

ram

to

su

pp

ort

th

e u

nem

plo

yed

. C

on

dit

ion

al o

n p

arti

cipa

nts

wo

rkin

g 8

h

ou

rs p

er d

ay 5

day

s a

wee

k, a

nd

ava

il-ab

le f

or

3 m

on

ths

on

ly.

795

,00

0 in

20

00

.P

rovi

ded

an

eff

ecti

ve s

ho

rt t

erm

sa

fety

net

fo

r sk

illed

wo

rker

s af

fect

ed

by t

he

cris

es; w

ell m

anag

ed a

nd

su

b-

ject

to

loca

l ove

rsig

ht;

hig

h a

pp

lican

t re

ject

ion

rat

e -

40

% w

ere

reje

cted

in

199

8-9

9; d

ura

tio

n o

f th

e p

roje

cts

is

too

sh

ort

.

In 1

99

9 a

sco

re s

yste

m w

as

intr

od

uce

d t

o d

eter

min

e p

rio

rity

fo

r se

lect

ion

.

Nat

ion

al O

ld

Ag

e P

ensi

on

L

eso

tho

UC

T20

04

Pu

blic

pen

sio

n p

rog

ram

to

pro

vid

e fi

nan

cial

su

pp

ort

to

old

er p

eop

le; n

ot

inte

nd

ed t

o s

up

po

rt ‘A

IDS

orp

han

s’ a

nd

o

ther

vu

lner

able

ch

ildre

n.

69

,04

6 in

div

idu

als;

nat

ion

al

cove

rag

e. O

ld p

eop

le o

ver

70.

US

$25

per

mo

nth

.

Imp

rove

d h

ou

seh

old

fo

od

sec

uri

ty

thro

ug

h in

crea

sed

fo

od

co

nsu

mp

tio

n

for

ben

efi c

iari

es a

nd

ch

ildre

n li

vin

g

wit

h t

hem

; sta

bili

zed

acc

ess

to f

oo

d;

imp

rove

d q

ual

ity

of f

oo

d a

nd

nu

tri-

tio

n.

Gen

erat

ed e

nti

rely

by

a d

om

esti

c p

olit

ical

eco

no

my

agen

da,

an

d fi

nan

ced

ou

t of

d

om

esti

c re

sou

rces

.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Imp

rovi

ng

L

ivel

iho

od

T

hro

ug

h

Pu

blic

Wo

rks

Pro

gra

mm

e (I

LTP

WP

)

Mal

awi

PW

200

3O

pp

ort

un

itie

s fo

r vu

lner

able

gro

ups

; in

-cl

ud

ing

sav

ing

s m

ob

iliza

tio

n, g

rou

p f

or-

mat

ion

tra

inin

g, p

rom

oti

on

of

eco

no

mic

ac

tivi

ties

, cap

acit

y b

uild

ing

fo

r D

istr

ict

Ass

emb

lies.

Gu

aran

teed

min

.10 m

on

ths

of e

mp

loym

ent.

Pilo

t d

istr

icts

of

Lilo

ng

we,

D

owa,

Ntc

his

i an

d S

alim

a.

Wea

lth

ran

kin

g a

nd

map

pin

g

exer

cise

. Ave

rag

e w

age

3,9

20-

6,6

57

K.

Low

wag

e ra

te a

nd

del

ays

in p

ay-

men

ts; g

rou

p f

orm

atio

n t

rain

ing

did

n

ot

effe

ctiv

ely

faci

litat

e co

mm

un

ity

base

d g

rou

ps d

evel

op

men

t; s

avin

gs

use

d f

or

foo

d a

nd

du

rab

les;

po

or

qu

al-

ity

of b

uilt

ro

ads;

po

siti

ve e

ffec

t o

n

soci

o-e

con

om

ic s

tatu

s.

Lim

ited

Dis

tric

t A

uth

ori

ty

capa

city

led

to

pro

ble

ms

wit

h r

epo

rtin

g t

o C

AR

E a

nd

M

AS

AF,

an

d t

imel

y pa

ymen

t of

wag

es a

nd

sav

ing

s.

Ded

za S

afet

y N

ets

Pilo

t P

roje

ct

(DS

NP

P)

Mal

awi

UC

T/

SFW

200

1-20

02

Th

e p

ilot

pro

gra

m w

as d

esig

ned

to

tes

t a

syst

em o

f d

irec

t ca

sh, v

ou

cher

s, o

r in

-kin

d g

oo

ds

tran

sfer

s to

th

e w

ork

-co

n-

stra

ined

ru

ral p

oo

r to

imp

rove

fo

od

-se-

curi

ty.

7,15

0 p

eop

le in

38

6 v

illag

es.

Wo

rk c

on

stra

ined

an

d d

is-

adva

nta

ged

peo

ple

. Cas

h,

vou

cher

or

in-k

ind

tra

nsf

er o

f M

K5

50

/per

son

per

mo

nth

Pro

ble

ms

wit

h t

ran

sfer

s’ d

eliv

ery;

ef

fect

ive

in p

reve

nti

ng

ext

rem

e fo

od

in

secu

rity

; eas

y an

d c

hea

p t

o a

d-

min

iste

r; 6

0%

of

bu

dg

et t

ran

sfer

red

d

irec

tly

to b

enefi

cia

ries

; sea

son

al

vari

atio

n o

f tr

ansf

er v

alu

e in

co

mm

od

-it

y te

rms;

vo

uch

ers

wer

e le

ss e

ffec

tive

an

d m

ore

exp

ensi

ve a

nd

co

mp

lex

to

adm

inis

ter.

Lo

gis

tics

of

the

vou

cher

s ar

e m

ore

co

mp

licat

ed t

han

o

ther

typ

es o

f tr

ansf

er, e

s-p

ecia

lly f

or

scal

ing

up

; lac

k of

ret

aile

rs w

ho

fu

lfi lle

d t

he

req

uir

emen

ts t

o p

arti

cipa

te

in a

vo

uch

er s

chem

e.

Sta

rter

Pac

k P

rog

ram

Mal

awi

SFW

199

8S

ubs

idiz

ed m

aize

pro

du

ctio

n t

hro

ug

h

the

dis

trib

uti

on

of

“sta

rter

pac

ks”

con

-ta

inin

g h

ybri

d m

aize

see

d, f

erti

lizer

, an

d

gro

un

dn

uts

or

soyb

ean

s to

fi ll

in t

ran

si-

tory

fo

od

gap

s, p

rom

ote

cro

p d

iver

sifi

ca-

tio

n a

nd

so

il fe

rtili

ty im

pro

vem

ents

.

2.7

mil

ho

use

ho

lds

(19

99

-20

01)

. All

farm

ing

ho

use

ho

lds.

S

ince

20

00

- g

eog

rap

hic

al

and

co

mm

un

ity

targ

etin

g.

Fert

ilize

r, m

aize

see

d a

nd

le-

gu

me

seed

s w

ort

h U

S$

15.

Inef

fect

ive

targ

etin

g; i

mp

rove

d f

oo

d

secu

rity

(ad

dit

ion

al 1

00

-15

0kg

of

mai

ze p

er p

ack)

; no

su

bsta

nti

al c

on

-tr

ibu

tio

n t

o n

atio

nal

fo

od

sec

uri

ty o

r su

stai

nab

le a

gri

cult

ure

; cro

wd

ed o

ut

pri

vate

su

pp

lies;

did

n’t

add

ress

pri

or-

ity

nee

ds

of p

oo

r fa

rmer

s; p

rob

lem

s w

ith

ben

efi c

iary

iden

tifi

cati

on

an

d

sele

ctio

n; s

om

e le

akag

e an

d “

do

ub

le-

dip

pin

g”;

hig

h c

ost

.

Fun

din

g w

as b

ein

g c

on

-st

antl

y re

neg

oti

ated

; fe

rtili

zer

and

see

d w

ere

inap

pro

pri

ate

for

loca

l cro

p-

pin

g;

faile

d t

o r

each

a c

riti

-ca

l mas

s. S

cale

d d

own

to

a

pov

erty

-tar

get

ed s

afet

y n

et

in 2

00

0.

PR

OC

AM

PO

(P

rog

ram

me

of D

irec

t P

aym

ents

to

th

e C

ou

ntr

ysid

e)

Mex

ico

SFW

199

4C

om

pen

sate

d lo

w-i

nco

me

farm

ers

for

anti

cipa

ted

neg

ativ

e ef

fect

of

NA

FTA

on

th

e p

rice

of

basi

c cr

ops

wit

h fi

xed

pay

-m

ents

per

hec

tare

of

basi

c cr

ops

ind

e-p

end

ent

of p

rod

uct

ion

levi

es. D

esig

ned

as

a 1

5-y

ear

tran

siti

on

tow

ard

fre

e tr

ade.

3 m

ln p

rod

uce

rs p

er y

ear.

Par

tici

pati

on

of

elig

ible

ho

use

-h

old

s is

alm

ost

un

iver

sal.

875

P

eso

s p

er h

ecta

re.

Incr

ease

d t

ota

l co

nsu

mp

tio

n a

nd

ca

lori

c in

take

(la

rger

impa

ct o

n

mea

t an

d v

eget

able

s co

nsu

mp

tio

n);

incr

ease

d f

oo

d s

ecu

rity

an

d d

iver

sity

; p

oo

r su

bsis

ten

ce f

arm

ers

rece

ived

th

e sa

me

amo

un

t, p

er h

ecta

re, a

s w

ealt

hy

mo

der

niz

ed f

arm

ers.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

PR

OG

GR

ES

SA

-O

po

rtu

nid

ades

Mex

ico

CC

T19

97

Su

pp

ort

to

fam

ilies

in e

xtre

me

pov

erty

to

dev

elo

p t

hei

r p

ote

nti

al a

nd

exp

and

th

eir

op

tio

ns,

hen

ce le

adin

g t

o b

ette

r le

vels

of

wel

l-b

ein

g, t

hro

ug

h im

pro

ved

ed

uca

tio

n, h

ealt

h a

nd

fo

od

inta

ke.

Co

nd

itio

nal

up

on

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

an

d

hea

lth

ch

eck-

ups

.

5 m

il fa

mili

es in

20

05

. G

eog

rap

hic

tar

get

ing

an

d

pro

xy m

ean

s te

st. U

S$

12.5

p

er f

amily

fo

r co

nsu

mp

tio

n;

max

. US

$75

per

ho

use

ho

ld

per

mo

nth

fo

r ed

uca

tio

n; a

vg.

ben

efi t

is 2

1% o

f h

ou

seh

old

co

nsu

mp

tio

n.

Mo

re e

ffi c

ien

t an

d c

ost

-eff

ecti

ve t

han

p

revi

ou

s fo

od

su

bsid

y p

rog

ram

s; g

oo

d

targ

etin

g; i

ncr

ease

d c

on

sum

pti

on

an

d

mo

re d

iver

sifi

ed n

utr

itio

n; i

ncr

ease

d

use

of

pre

ven

tive

hea

lth

ser

vice

s,

sch

oo

l att

end

ance

, an

d h

ou

seh

old

p

urc

has

ing

pow

er; i

mp

rove

d s

cho

ol

per

form

ance

; red

uce

d d

epth

an

d s

e-ve

rity

of

pov

erty

an

d g

end

er in

equ

al-

ity

and

mat

ern

al a

nd

ch

ild m

ort

alit

y ra

tes;

may

be

trig

ger

ing

per

man

ent

chan

ges

in t

he

inco

me

earn

ing

cap

a-b

iliti

es; i

ncr

ease

d p

ote

nti

al f

or

init

iat-

ing

mic

ro-b

usi

nes

s ac

tivi

ties

.

Pro

gra

m’s

po

siti

ve im

pact

s h

elp

ed p

rom

pt

its

expa

nsi

on

in

to u

rban

are

as. M

ore

over

, th

e p

rog

ram

has

co

nti

nu

ed

wit

h r

elat

ivel

y fe

w a

lter

a-ti

on

s d

esp

ite

a ch

ang

e in

g

over

nm

ent.

Pro

gra

ma

de

Em

ple

o

Tem

po

ral (

PE

T)

Mex

ico

PW

199

6In

itia

ted

aft

er t

he

199

5 c

risi

s; p

rovi

des

sh

ort

-ter

m e

mp

loym

ent

up

to

88

day

s at

90

% o

f m

inim

um

wag

e o

n p

ub

lic p

roj-

ects

in p

oo

r ru

ral a

reas

.

1 m

il p

eop

le (

200

0).

81.0

5$

(2

00

4).

Po

ore

st p

op

ula

tio

n

in r

ura

l are

as w

ith

less

th

an

250

0 in

hab

itan

ts.

Alle

viat

ed u

nd

erem

plo

ymen

t; 6

0%

of

par

tici

pan

ts e

nd

ed u

p a

bov

e th

e ex

trem

e p

over

ty t

hre

sho

ld; n

o e

vi-

den

ce o

f ef

fect

s o

n in

com

e in

lo

ng

te

rm; g

oo

d b

uff

er a

gai

nst

off

-sea

son

ru

ral u

nem

plo

ymen

t; g

oo

d t

arg

etin

g;

part

icip

ants

are

po

ore

r th

an n

on

-par

-ti

cipa

nts

; did

no

t re

ach

sm

alle

st r

ura

l co

mm

un

itie

s.

Cas

h P

aym

ents

to

War

-d

isp

lace

d

Urb

an D

esti

tute

H

ou

seh

old

s (G

AP

VU

)

Moz

amb

iqu

eU

CT

199

0-

199

7L

aun

ched

aft

er t

he

civi

l war

to

su

pp

ort

d

esti

tute

gro

ups

in u

rban

are

as; a

ims

to

rais

e co

nsu

mp

tio

n t

o 1

700

cal

ori

es p

er

day

fo

r h

ou

seh

old

s w

ith

mal

no

uri

shed

ch

ildre

n u

nd

er fi

ve,

pre

gn

ant

wo

men

, an

d e

lder

ly a

nd

dis

able

d.

80

,00

0 h

ou

seh

old

s (1

99

6).

C

ateg

ori

cal t

arg

etin

g. $

US

1.14

p

er m

on

th, d

epen

din

g o

n t

he

ho

use

ho

ld s

ize.

Po

siti

ve im

pact

on

red

uci

ng

urb

an

pov

erty

; lar

ge

leak

age

rate

s (o

nly

31%

of

tra

nsf

ers

go

to

th

e p

oo

r); b

enefi

ts

rece

ived

are

33%

less

th

an e

nti

tle-

men

ts; r

edu

ced

pov

erty

hea

dco

un

t fr

om

71%

to

66

%.

Exc

lusi

vely

urb

an c

over

age,

w

her

eas

85

% o

f p

op

ula

tio

n

and

th

e va

st m

ajo

rity

of

the

po

or

live

in r

ura

l are

as.

INA

S F

oo

d

Su

bsid

y P

rog

ram

Moz

amb

iqu

eU

CT

199

7T

he

mo

nth

ly c

ash

tra

nsf

er is

inte

nd

ed

to b

e u

sed

by

po

or

Moz

amb

ican

s to

bu

y fo

od

. It

aim

s to

su

pp

ort

en

titl

emen

ts t

o

foo

d t

hro

ug

h r

aisi

ng

ho

use

ho

ld in

com

e.

69

,09

5 d

irec

t, 9

1,411

ind

irec

t b

enefi

cia

ries

(20

05

). O

lder

p

eop

le u

nab

le t

o w

ork

wit

h

no

inco

me;

sic

k; p

reg

nan

t w

om

en. U

S$

3-6

per

mo

nth

per

h

ou

seh

old

.

Incr

ease

d p

urc

has

ing

pow

er, p

ro-

mo

ted

inve

stin

g in

loca

l sav

ing

sc

hem

es d

uri

ng

th

e h

arve

st s

easo

n;

very

low

tra

nsf

er v

alu

e; li

mit

ed c

ov-

erag

e d

ue

to a

nd

cap

acit

y/fu

nd

ing

co

nst

rain

ts; l

imit

ed im

ple

men

tati

on

ca

paci

ty o

uts

ide

of u

rban

cen

ters

; co

r-ru

pti

on

an

d f

rau

d.

Fin

ance

d e

nti

rely

th

rou

gh

th

e st

ate

bu

dg

et; i

mp

le-

men

tin

g M

inis

try

for

Wo

men

an

d S

oci

al A

ctio

n

is w

eak

and

has

lim

ited

ba

rgai

nin

g p

ower

wit

h t

he

Min

istr

y of

Fin

ance

.

Res

ettl

emen

t G

ran

t fo

r Fl

oo

d A

ffec

ted

R

egio

ns

Moz

amb

iqu

eU

CT

200

0-

200

1P

rovi

sio

n o

f ti

me

limit

ed c

ash

tra

ns-

fers

to

ho

use

ho

lds

affe

cted

by

fl o

od

s in

19

99/

200

0 t

o r

ecov

er t

hei

r liv

elih

oo

ds.

106

,00

0 r

ura

l ho

use

ho

lds.

Ta

rget

ing

bas

ed o

n lo

cati

on

an

d d

amag

e to

ho

me

and

cr

ops

. US

$9

2 p

er h

ou

seh

old

.

Un

cert

ain

ty o

ver

tim

ing

an

d s

ize

of

tran

sfer

s d

elay

ed p

lan

nin

g a

nd

imp

le-

men

tati

on

; hel

ped

sta

bili

ze h

ou

se-

ho

lds

affe

cted

by

the

fl o

od

s, a

nd

ju

mp

-sta

rt e

con

om

ic a

ctiv

ity.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Pen

sio

n

Pro

gra

mN

amib

iaU

CT

194

9O

ld-a

ge

un

iver

sal p

ensi

on

to

pre

ven

t p

over

ty a

mo

ng

old

er p

eop

le.

96

,76

7 (

200

1).C

ateg

ori

cal

targ

etin

g o

f in

div

idu

als

60

+.

US

$26

per

mo

nth

.

95

% o

f el

igib

le p

eop

le r

ecei

ved

pen

-si

on

in 2

00

1 (4

8%

in 1

99

3-9

4);

low

er

cove

rag

e in

rem

ote

no

rth

ern

pro

v-in

ces;

50

% o

f el

igib

le in

div

idu

als

are

no

n-p

oo

r; c

ost

ly; c

om

plic

ated

acc

ess

to p

ensi

on

s; c

on

stit

ute

s 14

% o

f ru

ral

and

7%

of

urb

an in

com

es.

Leg

isla

tio

n t

o m

ake

pen

-si

on

s m

ean

s te

sted

has

b

een

ap

pro

ved

bu

t th

e G

over

nm

ent

has

no

t im

ple

-m

ente

d it

.

Red

de

Pro

tecc

ión

S

oci

al “

Mi

Fam

ilia”

Nic

arag

ua

CC

T20

00

Ince

nti

ves

for

hu

man

-cap

ital

acc

um

ula

-ti

on

am

on

g c

hild

ren

fro

m p

oo

r fa

mili

es

in e

du

cati

on

, nu

trit

ion

an

d h

ealt

h; f

ocu

s o

n im

pro

vem

ent

of w

elfa

re o

f ex

trem

ely

po

or

seg

men

ts. C

on

dit

ion

al u

po

n s

cho

ol

and

hea

lth

cen

ters

att

end

ance

.

35,0

00

to

tal.

Ch

ildre

n 0

-13

fr

om

po

or

fam

ilies

; mu

st b

e re

gis

tere

d in

sch

oo

l. H

ealt

h,

edu

cati

on

an

d f

oo

d b

on

use

s (c

ash

tra

nsf

ers)

.

Incr

ease

in s

cho

ol e

nro

lmen

t ra

tes,

sa

me

for

boy

s an

d g

irls

, gre

ater

am

on

g p

oo

rer

and

yo

un

ger

fam

ilies

; 5

% c

hild

lab

or

red

uct

ion

(7-

13 y

ears

);

incr

ease

in im

mu

niz

atio

n le

vels

by

30%

; bu

t n

o r

edu

ctio

n in

an

emia

; im

pro

ved

an

d m

ore

var

ied

die

t; 5

5%

re

ceiv

ed b

y p

oo

rest

20

%, 8

1% b

y p

oo

rest

40

%.

Fon

do

de

Inve

rsio

n S

oci

al

Nic

arag

ua

PW

199

0C

om

pen

sati

on

of

the

impa

ct o

f st

ruc-

tura

l ad

just

men

t p

rog

ram

s an

d t

em-

po

rary

em

plo

ymen

t. C

om

po

nen

ts:

edu

cati

on

al in

fras

tru

ctu

re, h

ealt

h, s

oci

al

assi

stan

ce, w

ater

an

d s

ewag

e, m

un

icip

al

and

co

mm

un

ity

serv

ices

, env

iro

nm

enta

l im

pro

vem

ent.

A T

raba

jar

Per

uP

W20

02

Tem

po

rary

em

plo

ymen

t fo

r lo

w in

com

e p

eop

le a

ffec

ted

by

eco

no

mic

rec

essi

on

.

Pak

ista

n B

ait-

ul-

Maa

l (P

BM

) P

akis

tan

UC

T/

SFW

199

2T

he

pro

gra

m is

a c

om

bin

ed f

oo

d s

ub

-si

dy

(Fo

od

Su

bsid

y S

chem

e) a

nd

cas

h

tran

sfer

(In

div

idu

al F

inan

cial

Ass

ista

nce

S

chem

e). A

ims

to im

pro

ve t

he

wel

fare

of

wid

ows,

orp

han

s, d

isab

led

, nee

dy

and

p

oo

r.

5,0

00

un

der

IFA

(19

97-

98

),

240

,00

0 u

nd

er F

SS

. Dis

able

d,

wid

ows,

orp

han

s, h

ou

seh

old

s liv

ing

bel

ow p

over

ty li

ne.

R

s20

0/f

amily

per

mo

nth

.

Rea

ched

on

ly a

min

ori

ty o

f ta

rget

p

op

ula

tio

n; h

igh

leak

age

rate

; t

ime

con

sum

ing

an

d c

om

plic

ated

ben

efi t

ap

plic

atio

n p

roce

du

re;

lim

ited

cov

er-

age;

po

or

tran

spar

ency

; mis

allo

ca-

tio

n o

f fu

nd

s; v

ery

smal

l im

pact

on

p

over

ty.

Th

e P

rim

e M

inis

ter

and

o

ther

hig

h-l

evel

fu

nct

ion

ar-

ies

can

san

ctio

n a

mo

un

ts

in p

ub

lic g

ath

erin

gs

or

else

wh

ere

for

ind

ivid

ual

fi

nan

cial

ass

ista

nce

.

So

cial

Pen

sio

nS

ou

th A

fric

aU

CT

199

0s

Old

-ag

e p

ensi

on

fo

r w

om

en o

ver

60

an

d

men

ove

r 6

5; e

xten

ded

to

bla

ck p

op

ula

-ti

on

in 1

98

0s

and

19

90

s.

1.9 m

il (2

00

2).

Mea

ns-

test

ed

cate

go

rica

l; al

mo

st u

niv

ersa

l. U

S$

75 p

er m

on

th (

200

0)

Red

uce

s p

over

ty; i

mp

rove

s n

utr

itio

n

and

hea

lth

sta

tus;

fac

ilita

tes

ho

use

-h

old

inve

stm

ent;

imp

rove

s sc

ho

ol

enro

lmen

t; r

edu

ces

child

lab

or;

co

stly

d

istr

ibu

tio

n t

o r

emo

te a

reas

; len

gth

y re

gis

trat

ion

pro

cess

; wel

l ad

min

is-

tere

d; s

ign

ifi ca

nt

impa

ct o

n p

over

ty

amo

ng

Afr

ican

s; im

pro

ved

inco

me

red

istr

ibu

tio

n.

Th

e m

ean

s-te

st e

xclu

des

m

ost

of

the

eld

erly

Wh

ites

(o

nly

16

% o

f w

hit

es r

ecei

ve

pen

sio

n) a

nd

a v

ery

smal

l p

rop

ort

ion

of

the

eld

erly

B

lack

(9

0%

).

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Nat

ion

al P

ub

lic

Wo

rks

Pro

gra

m

(NP

WP

)

So

uth

Afr

ica

PW

199

4G

ener

ates

inco

me

and

pro

du

ctiv

e in

fra-

stru

ctu

re t

hro

ug

h jo

b p

rovi

sio

n. A

ims

to c

reat

e an

d m

ain

tain

infr

astr

uct

ure

; re

du

ce u

nem

plo

ymen

t an

d p

rovi

de

trai

n-

ing

; em

pow

er c

om

mu

nit

ies.

Ch

ron

ical

ly u

nem

plo

yed

po

or

in r

emo

te r

ura

l are

as, f

ocu

s o

n

wo

men

.

83

-92

% o

f p

roje

cts

ou

tper

form

ed a

n

un

targ

eted

tra

nsf

er s

chem

e; 3

9%

of

job

wen

t to

wo

men

an

d 1

2%

to

yo

uth

; p

oo

r ta

rget

ing

; wo

men

go

t m

ore

m

enia

l jo

bs, l

ower

ave

rag

e w

ages

, an

d

wer

e em

plo

yed

fo

r sh

ort

er p

erio

ds

than

men

; 37%

of

men

an

d 3

2%

of

wo

men

rec

eive

d t

rain

ing

.

Pro

ject

des

ign

an

d m

anag

e-m

ent

is c

om

plic

ated

by

the

invo

lvem

ent

of n

um

ero

us

acto

rs; m

ult

iple

ob

ject

ives

co

mp

licat

e ta

rget

ing

.

Ch

ild S

up

po

rtG

ran

tS

ou

th A

fric

aU

CT

199

8C

ash

ben

efi t

fo

r p

oo

r ch

ildre

n b

etw

een

th

e ag

es o

f 0

an

d 1

4 y

ears

, lo

cate

d in

th

e p

oo

rest

pro

vin

ces.

7 m

il. M

ean

s-te

sted

tar

get

-in

g. R

110

per

ch

ild p

er m

on

th

(20

02

).

Imp

lem

enta

tio

n is

no

t co

nsi

sten

t w

ith

in a

nd

acr

oss

pro

vin

ces;

par

ents

of

ben

efi c

iari

es a

re m

ore

like

ly t

o b

e u

nem

plo

yed

an

d le

ss e

du

cate

d t

han

th

ose

no

t re

ceiv

ing

th

e g

ran

t; g

irls

are

n

ot

at d

isad

van

tag

e fo

r a

gra

nt;

ch

il-d

ren

wh

o d

o n

ot

co-r

esid

e w

ith

th

eir

mo

ther

s ar

e at

ris

k fo

r n

ot

rece

ivin

g

the

gra

nt.

Ad

ult

mu

st a

pp

ly a

nd

co

l-le

ct t

he

gra

nt;

val

ue

is in

-su

ffi c

ien

t to

cov

er t

he

basi

c co

sts

of c

hild

care

.

Gu

nd

o L

ash

u

(Lim

po

po)

So

uth

Afr

ica

PW

200

0Fo

cuse

s o

n b

oth

em

plo

ymen

t cr

eati

on

an

d t

he

trai

nin

g o

f co

ntr

acto

rs a

nd

co

n-

sult

ants

in la

bo

r-in

ten

sive

ro

ad r

ehab

ili-

tati

on

. Em

plo

ymen

t la

sts

-4 m

on

ths.

170

0 la

bo

rers

. Un

emp

loye

d

or

un

der

emp

loye

d w

om

en,

fem

ale-

hea

ded

ho

use

ho

lds,

yo

uth

, dis

able

d. R

30.3

6 w

age

per

day

.

On

aver

age

51%

of

wor

kers

hav

e be

en

wom

en, 5

8%

you

th a

nd 1%

dis

able

d;

cont

ribu

ted

to p

over

ty g

ap r

educ

tion

; 79

% u

sed

earn

ings

for

food

pur

chas

e,

50

% fo

r cl

othi

ng, 4

0%

on

tran

spor

t;

36%

rep

orte

d in

crea

sed

fi na

ncia

l ass

ets.

Foo

d s

tam

psS

ri L

anka

SFW

1979

Foo

d a

nd

ker

ose

ne

stam

ps t

o s

ubs

idiz

e co

nsu

mp

tio

n o

f ba

sic

go

od

s fo

r p

oo

rest

h

ou

seh

old

s.

Ext

ensi

ve c

over

age

and

hig

h

valu

e of

ben

efi t

s. M

ean

s te

sted

ta

rget

ing

. Eq

uiv

alen

t to

15

% o

f p

er c

apit

a ex

pen

dit

ure

s of

th

e p

oo

rest

qu

inti

le (

198

2).

Rea

ched

th

e p

oo

rest

, fo

od

sta

mp

s co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o c

alo

ries

is 1

1.6%

fo

r th

e lo

wes

t q

uin

tile

an

d 0

.7%

fo

r th

e h

igh

est;

wel

l tar

get

ed; f

oo

d s

tam

p

rece

ipts

are

pro

gre

ssiv

e; v

ery

cost

ly-

take

s U

S$

2.5

to

tra

nsf

er U

S$

1; o

per

a-ti

on

al a

bu

ses;

par

tly

resp

on

sib

le f

or

ineq

ual

ity

red

uct

ion

.

Low

Inco

me

Car

d S

chem

e (L

ICS

)

Th

aila

nd

SFW

1975

Qu

alifi

ed b

enefi

cia

ries

are

giv

en a

ben

-efi

cia

ry c

ard

val

id f

or

thre

e ye

ars,

wh

ich

sp

ecifi

es o

ne

or

two

des

ign

ated

hea

lth

fa

cilit

ies

usu

ally

loca

l hea

lth

cen

ters

or

dis

tric

t h

osp

ital

s.

Tota

l 37%

of

po

pu

lati

on

; C

om

mu

nit

y-ba

sed

iden

tifi

ca-

tio

n o

f p

oo

r el

der

ly, c

hild

ren

b

elow

12

, vet

eran

s, h

and

i-ca

pp

ed, m

on

ks.

Lim

ited

cov

erag

e an

d h

igh

leak

age;

p

oo

r ta

rget

ing

- o

nly

55

% o

f b

enefi

cia

-ri

es w

ere

po

or;

neg

ativ

e p

erce

pti

on

of

pu

blic

ser

vice

qu

alit

y by

th

e p

oo

r an

d

by h

ealt

h w

ork

ers;

lim

ited

hea

lth

car

e ex

pen

ses

of t

he

po

ore

st a

nd

pro

vid

ed

a sa

fety

net

fo

r h

igh

er in

com

e g

rou

ps.

No

tes:

UC

T =

un

con

dit

ion

al c

ash

tra

nsf

er; C

CT

=co

nd

itio

nal

cas

h t

ran

sfer

; SFW

= s

ubs

idy

or

fee

wai

ver;

PW

= p

ub

lic w

ork

s; A

BP

= a

sset

-bas

ed p

rog

ram

.


Pro

gra

mC

ou

ntr

yTy

pe

Yea

rO

bje

ctiv

e/ C

on

dit

ion

alit

yS

cale

Imp

act

Po

litic

al, i

nst

itu

tio

nal

, o

pe

rati

on

al is

sues

Co

nd

itio

nal

C

ash

Tra

nsf

erTu

rkey

CC

T20

01

Pro

vid

es in

cen

tive

to

th

e p

oo

r to

kee

p

thei

r ch

ildre

n in

sch

oo

l by

cove

rin

g t

he

ou

t-of

-po

cket

exp

ense

s in

th

e sh

ort

-te

rm; t

o g

et a

deq

uat

e h

ealt

h c

are

and

n

utr

itio

n s

ervi

ces

for

child

ren

0-6

to

re-

du

ce in

fan

t m

ort

alit

y ra

te a

nd

dis

ease

s;

and

to

pre

ven

t p

reg

nan

cy r

isks

th

rou

gh

ch

ecku

ps, v

acci

nat

ion

s, b

irth

an

d p

ost

-tr

eatm

ents

.

2 m

il b

enefi

cia

ries

. Th

e p

oo

r-es

t 6

%; p

roxy

mea

ns

test

. E

du

cati

on

: US

$13

-28

; hea

lth

: $

12/c

hild

per

mo

nth

, $12

per

m

on

th d

uri

ng

pre

gn

ancy

, $39

fo

r b

irth

giv

ing

Imp

rove

d a

sset

acc

um

ula

tio

n a

nd

w

ell-

bei

ng

; eff

ecti

ve t

arg

etin

g; t

ran

s-pa

ren

t id

enti

fi ca

tio

n o

f th

e p

oo

r;

hel

ped

po

or

mee

t im

med

iate

nee

ds

du

rin

g fi

nan

cial

str

ess;

incr

ease

d

enro

llmen

t ra

tes

and

hel

ped

kee

p

child

ren

in s

cho

ols

; nar

row

ed d

evel

op

-m

ent

gap

bet

wee

n r

ich

er a

nd

po

ore

r re

gio

ns;

imp

rove

d a

cces

s to

hea

lth

an

d e

du

cati

on

.

Ug

and

a N

utr

itio

n a

nd

E

arly

Ch

ildh

oo

d

Dev

elo

pm

ent

Pro

ject

(N

EC

DP

)

Ug

and

aU

CT

199

8A

imed

at

hal

vin

g m

aln

utr

itio

n a

mo

ng

p

resc

ho

ol c

hild

ren

, rai

sin

g p

rim

ary

sch

oo

l en

rollm

ent,

red

uci

ng

dro

po

ut

and

re

pet

itio

n r

ates

, im

pro

vin

g p

sych

o-s

oci

al

and

co

gn

itiv

e d

evel

op

men

t, a

nd

incr

eas-

ing

th

e n

um

ber

of

mo

ther

s p

ract

icin

g

app

rop

riat

e ch

ildca

re.

8,0

00

co

mm

un

itie

s. F

amili

es

wit

h c

hild

ren

un

der

6.

Imp

rove

d c

hild

nu

trit

ion

an

d h

ealt

h-

mal

nu

trit

ion

am

on

g c

hild

ren

0-3

6

mo

nth

s w

as r

edu

ced

by

30%

; eff

ec-

tive

del

iver

y of

ser

vice

s; in

crea

sed

d

eman

d f

or

de-

wo

rmin

g m

edic

ine

and

vi

tam

in A

; in

crea

sed

sch

oo

l en

roll-

men

t, p

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rog

ram

.


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ENDNOTES Defi nitions of “scaling up” range from simple “ex-

pansion” in membership, participants, or targeted

individuals, to more diverse meanings covering

organizational complexity, expanded functional-

ity, and “intensifi cation” of activities regardless

of size. The defi nition adopted here—of expansion

as well as transferability to other contexts—is ad-

opted for the reason that it encompasses much

of what is being debated within the international

development community, e.g., of enlarging small-

scale programs or of transplanting large-scale an-

tipoverty programs across geography.

Note that the effect of political regime-type on

pro-poor mobilization is unclear. Political-eco-

nomic models of democratic decision-making,

for example, assume that voters behave indepen-

dently (in spatial-voting models) or in groups (in

interest-group models), and politicians compete

for offi ce by offering policies or public goods (see,

e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981; Persson and Ta-

bellini 2000). As such, it is commonly believed

that the poor may be better represented in de-

mocracies than non-democracies where politi-

cians do not compete for offi ce. Yet recent work

has demonstrated that the relationship between

democratic governance and pro-poor representa-

tion is not straightforward (Diamond 2004). In

non-competitive political systems, politicians also

secure their tenure with policies and public goods

targeted towards strategic individuals or groups

(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Populist dicta-

torships, for example, rely heavily on the mobili-

zation of the rural and urban poor for support.

That antipoverty programs can be politically mis-

used, however, does not constrain scaling up as

much as the effectiveness of LSAPs—in fact, that an-

tipoverty programs can yield political rewards may

encourage policymakers to increase their scale.

In-kind transfers could also be further divided be-

tween conditional and non-conditional programs.

1.

2.

3.

4.

There are some programs in which in-kind trans-

fers require recipients to undertake other actions

(e.g., part of the original PROGRESA program in-

volved nutritional supplements—an in-kind trans-

fer—in return for having children regularly attend

health clinics). Additionally, there are food-for-

work programs. All subsidies and fee-waivers, of

course, require individuals to consume specifi ed

goods (e.g., one cannot use food-stamps to pay

utility bills) in exchange for in-kind payments, but

these do not impose ex ante requirements on the

recipients.

For a summary of the role of cash transfers in so-

cial protection, see Tabor (2002).

Extensive reviews of the impact of microfi nance

operations can be found in Armendariz de Aghion

and Morduch 2005, Morduch, Hashemi, and Lit-

tlefi eld 2003, and Goldberg 2005.

These results are based on a probit model of

school attendance, assuming that cash trans-

ferred is pooled within families and distributed to

each member. Note that these simulations also

assume that low school attendance is a demand-

side problem, not a supply-side problem.

For a review, see e.g., Garfi nkel 1982; Kanbur 1987;

Sen 1995.

The Sri Lankan cash-transfer program also il-

lustrates some of the other failures cited in this

paper: Sumurdhi administrators have used the

program to create 36,000 patronage jobs for

their political supporters, and the program fails to

reach approximately 40% of the eligible poor.

Conning and Kevane note the staging of rallies,

the showcasing of labor-intensive activities, and

the use of resources to build “Potemkin” commu-

nity centers, all designed to mask the true inten-

tions of the elites involved.

Much of the following description is taken from

Mendizabal and Lavado 2005).

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Selected photos courtesy of the World Bank: cover left to right: (#4) Ami Vitale, (#6) John Isaac

The views expressed in this working paper do not necessarily refl ect the offi cial position of Brookings, its board or the advisory council members.

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