The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sierra...
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GOVERNANCE & INSTITUTIONS The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sierra Leone: moving from analysis to operations VIVEK SRIVASTAVA AND MARCO LARIZZA PE COP WORKING SEMINAR SERIES, MAY 31, 2011
Transcript of The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sierra...
GOVERNANCE & INSTITUTIONS
The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sierra Leone: moving from analysis to operations
VIVEK SRIVASTAVA AND MARCO LARIZZA PE COP WORKING SEMINAR SERIES, MAY 31, 2011
Outline of the presentation
• Motivation for the analysis
• PE study: Design, data and methodology
• Findings and strategic implications: the benefits of
going local
• The PE of decentralization: key drivers and trajectories
• The “Paradox of success”: managing risks
• Implications for sectors and projects
Why doing PEA in Sierra Leone: a problem-driven approach
• Despite significant progress since end of civil war in
2002, performance in critical sectors (infrastructure, social) remain poor
• Lack of progress on critical dimensions of governance are potentially binding constraints for growth and human development – “Governance and Corruption are major challenges
in this fragile state, still battling legacies of civil war preceded by decades of mismanagement, a culture of patronage politics and the negative influences of the diamond wealth.” (J/CAS)
Sierra Leone Governance in Comparative
Perspective
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5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Voice andAccountability
Political Stability
GovernmentEffectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption
Percentile Rank SierraLeone (0-100)
Percentile Rank AfricaRegion (0-100)
What, why and how: Designing a multilevel PE analysis
• What specific PE factors account for limited success in reform efforts?
• Why such factors persist despite technically sound interventions?
• How these factors might be addressed by the Bank and DPs in order to (i) change the ‘political equilibrium’/ ‘operating environment’; and (ii) ‘navigate the environment’, when change is not feasible/possible?
Ultimate goals: Promote constructive policy dialogue with GoSL,
successfully implement reform, foster development and improve aid effectiveness.
Design, data and methodology
• Team of researchers (local + international experts) to carry out a multi-level study (national, sub-national, road & power sector)
• Desk-review and field work (3 missions over 12 months period) to collect data/evidence
• Participatory approach (20 focus groups including Chiefs, Councilors, civil society communities)
• 2 Validation workshops with country team and Development Partners
Emerging “Big Story”: The Political equilibrium is
unlikely to change significantly in the medium term….
• Informal patronage networks remain the key strategy to access and exercise power
• Ethnic identities shape party system and drive electoral politics, reducing role of elections as mechanism of accountability
• Violence (or the threat of it) is used to ensure social control and political survival for the elites
• The 2012 elections might generate new strategies but it is not clear whether these will supplant (or simply co-exist with) patrimonial politics.
Temne/Limba (APC)
Mende (SLPP/PMDC)
Temne/Krio ‘swing voters’
… Opportunities exist to ‘navigate’ within the current
environment by supporting decentralization
Key Strategic implication: Support the process of
decentralization by re-allocation of resources to the sub-national level where this is technically feasible (i.e. feeder roads). This is because:
– Barriers to collective action might be easier to overcome at
local level
– Local politicians likely to have fewer incentives to act in a patrimonial fashion as ethnicity does not play a key role in local elections
– More resources will make LC less dependent on the center and make decentralization sustainable in the long run
Understanding the Political Economy of Decentralization: why did it happen?
• Interest of national actors (SLPP leadership)
was crucial in the decision to decentralize
• Normative arguments (equity/efficiency) played a marginal role in SLPP strategy
• 2004 institutional forms reflected a desire to follow a ‘divide and rule’ strategy with both LC and PC
A closer look at decentralization in SL: historical trajectories
• Local Government Act 2004:
– Local governments as the highest political authority in the jurisdiction
– Partial administrative decentralization – Devolution of functions (ongoing); and a “first generation”
(simple, easily understood, formula based) intergovernmental system for grants for recurrent expenditures
• Donor support:
– IRCBP supported by IDA, EU and DFID (USD 42.0 m) • TA and capacity building for PFM, HRM, intergovernmental fiscal
arrangements, general capacity development for councilors and capital grants
– DSDP • Supplement the grants plus some capacity building
Mapping results: decentralization as a “success story” • New generation of leaders whose interests
are naturally aligned with the survival of decentralization
• Local politics appears to promote greater participation among citizens (including women) and increase power sharing across ethnic groups
• Improved local governance and transfer of resources is correlated with improvements in service delivery (NPS data)
• Promising level of popular legitimacy and sense of ownership among local communities
Number of Local Councils Meeting Minimum Conditions, 2006 and 2008
Source: CLoGPASS 2006,2008
Budgeted and Actual Transfers to Local Councils, 2005-2010
Local Council Own Revenues as Share of Total Revenues, 2005-2010
Women participation higher at local level
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national elections local elections
perc
enta
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f tot
al c
andi
date
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Female candidates (registered)
Female candidate (elected)
Source: NEC (2008b). Note: “National elections” refers to 2007 parliamentary elections; “local elections” refers to 2008 local elections (councilors and major).
Quality of Service Delivery - Household Survey data 2005-2008
Education 2005 2008
Access to school within 30-minute walking distance 68.3 74.3
Satisfaction with primary schools 87.7 90.3
Health Satisfaction with health clinic 81.0 90.6
Agriculture Spoke to an extension worker in past year 23.0 9.0
Access to sufficient storage space (farming households only) 8.4 14.3
Water
Water source within 15 minutes 61.0 80.9
Note: Percent of respondents
Citizens’ Trust in Public Institutions, 2007 and 2008 (percent of respondents)
2007 2008
Justice sector
Police 36 38 Local court 41 45 Magistrate court 34 37 Central Political authorities
Central government 42 44 Sub-national political authorities Chiefdom Local Council
47
33
51
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The Paradox of Success: the risks of changing
PE dynamics
1. Risks ‘internal’ to sub-national authorities: •Channeling more resources to LC might modify the incentives and behavior of local politicians, decreasing quality of leadership and generating “political resource curse”
•Greater resource flows could mobilize what are now ‘minor’ ethnic groups generating new cleavages and jeopardizing post-war stability
•Capacity of LC continues to be weak across critical dimensions
The Paradox of Success: the risks of changing PE
dynamics (1)
2. Risks ‘external’ to sub-national authorities. There are signs of a ‘containment strategy’ put in place by the central government to influence and control local politics in light of 2012 elections
•Decision to re-appoint district officers (December 2011)
•LC are not any more ‘the highest political authority’ in the new Decentralization Policy, rather ‘the highest developmental authority’
How to manage risks: strategic and operational implications • strategic choices:
•DSDP (going into a second phase) •Health (ongoing) •Roads (new feeder roads policy - May 2011 – approves devolution opening up opportunities) • Power (restructuring of power sector formally approved in December 2010) – possibility of investing in micro/mini off grid solutions through LCs and CBOs.
•Operational implications:
• Advocacy/dialogue with GoSL to be strengthened •Enhance donor coordination and harmonization (DSDP II provides an example)
•Capacity-building at sub-national level remains a priority •Move to second-generation grants to strengthen fiscal autonomy of LC is an important example
•Promote participation and access to information at national and sub-national level (critical for elections)
Thank you for your time and
attention
