The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center...

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The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October 26, 2017 Anat Admati Stanford Graduate School of Business Governance Questions For All Institutions Who makes decisions on behalf of institutions? What information and constraints do/should they have? What are/should be their motivations? Is the outcome “socially efficient?”

Transcript of The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center...

Page 1: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

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The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL)

Stanford UniversityOctober 26, 2017

Anat AdmatiStanford Graduate School of Business

Governance Questions For All Institutions

Who makes decisions on

behalf of institutions?

What information and constraints do/should they

have?

What are/should be their

motivations?

Is the outcome “socially efficient?”

Page 2: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Corporations: Key Features

Abstract legal entities

Separate from stakeholders

Derive existence and legal rights from governments

Property rights“Locked in” capitalLimited liabilityPolitical speech (?)Religious (?)

Some History

17th -18th centuriesDutch East India (VOC) (inc.1602), British East India, French Mississippi Company

End of 19th century US

Infrastructure projects

Banks were late to become limited liability

corporations

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Corporations “owned” by shareholdersStandard View of Corporate Governance

Main governance challenge: Align managers with shareholders+ Financialized compensation

Stock valueAccounting profitsReturn on Equity,

+ Takeovers (“market for control”)+ Board role+ Shareholder activism

“ The social responsibility of managers is to make as much money as possible while conforming to

the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.

Milton Friedman, 1970

Page 4: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“In theory, the goal of the firm should be determined

by the firm’s owners…. shareholders agree they are better off if managers maximize the value of

their shares.Corporate Finance, Berk and DeMarzo, 2016

I fell into the rabbit hole of banking.

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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Trilli

on p

ound

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Total Liabilities and Equity of Barclays 1992-07

Hyun Song Shin, “Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium,” IMF Annual Research Conference, November 10-11, 2011; Figure 22.

EquityOtherLiabilities

Total MMFFunding

CustomerDeposits

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Ultimate Provider of

Funds

$

$

$

$

$$$

$ $ $

$

$$$

$ $$

$ $$$$

$

UltimateUser

of Funds$$ $

Financial Innovation in Recent Decades

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Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky, 2010

“Shadow Banking” (Partial Picture!)

JP Morgan ChaseDec. 31, 2011 (in Billions of dollars)

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126

Market Equity

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Large Banks are Opaque

“Banking remains too much of a black box... for many

investors scarcely an investible proposition.”

Andrew Haldane, BoE, Nov 2011

“Investors can’t understand the nature and quality of the assets and liabilities... The disclosure obfuscates more

than it informs.”Kevin Warsh, Jan. 2013

“The unfathomable nature of banks’ public accounts make it impossible to know which are actually risky or sound.

Derivatives positions, in particular, are difficult for

outside investors to parse.”Paul Singer, Jan. 2014

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'No crisis' banks'Crisis' banks8% thresholdLehman failure 15 Sep 08

“Tier 1” capital ratios: What crisis?

Regulatory Measures were Uninformative

Market-based measures

From: Andrew Haldane, “Capital Discipline,” January 2011)(See also “The Law of the Opposite: Illusionary Profits in the Financial Sector,” Godron Kerr)

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'No crisis' banks'Crisis' banks5% thresholdLehman failure 15 Sep 08

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The Mantra in Banking

“Equity is Expensive”To whom?

Why?Only in banking?

Unable to raise equity “Gamble for resurrection”Anxious to take cash outAvoid equity Sell assets, even at fire-sale pricesUnderinvest in worthy “boring” assets Try to hide insolvency in disclosuresLobby policymakers for supports

Zombie (Insolvent) Banks: Opaque and Dysfunctional

Page 17: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Basel Capital Regulation(No Science, manipulable measures)

Basel II Basel III“Common equity Tier 1 capital” to

risk-weighted assets: 2%

“Tier 2” Loss-absorbing debt

“Common Equity Tier 1 Capital” torisk-weighted assets (RWA): 4.5%» Plus 2.5% conservation buffer» Plus 1.5% “Tier 1” to RWA

Leverage Ratio: “Tier 1” to total » Basel III: 3%» US: 5-6%

“Tier 2”/TLAC loss-absorbing debt.

The Awful Case of GreeceBad Regulations Matter

BIS (2014), Company Data, EBA (For 2010-11 Greece Exposure Data), German Bankers Association, Morgan Stanley Research

Greek debt restructuring

Swiss banks retreat

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1st Bailout 2st Bailout

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FinlandAustria

BelgiumUKUS

NetherlandsECBIMF

SpainItaly

FranceGermany

EU bailout loans Private banks Other

Leading creditors (in euros)

Who Owned Greek Government Debt, July 2015

Source: Open Europe, BIS, IMF, ECB

68.2bn43.8bn

38.4bn25bn

21.4bn18.1bn

13.4bn11.4bn

10.8bn7.5bn

5.9bn3.7bn

Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulations: Why Bank Equity is

Not Socially Expensive

August 2010

(revised 2013)

The Leverage Ratchet Effect

2013

(Forthcoming, Journal of Finance)

Anat Admati, Peter DeMarzo, Martin Hellwig and Paul Pfleiderer

https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/excessive-leverage

Page 19: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“US banks forced to hold $68

billion in extra capital.Financial Times, April 8, 2014

“US banks forced to hold $68

billion in extra capital.Financial Times, April 8, 2014Telegraph.

cash.

Page 20: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“US banks forced to hold $68

billion in extra capital.Financial Times, April 8, 2014Telegraph.

cash.

, April 88888888888888888888888888888888888888888,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 2222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222222014TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeelllllllegraph.

“The Lobbying Cry

This rule will keep billions out of the Economy

Tim Pawlenty, Financial Services Roundtable, July 2015

Page 21: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“The Lobbying Cry

This rule will keep billions out of the Economy

Tim Pawlenty, Financial Services Roundtable, July 2015

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“ From Banking Textbook

Bank capital is costly because, the higher it is, the lower will be the return on equity for a

given return on assets.- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2013, The Economics of Money,

Banking and Financial Markets, 3rd Edition, p. 227

Page 22: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“ From Banking Textbook

Bank capital is costly because, the higher it is, the lower will be the return on equity for a

given return on assets.- Frederic S. Mishkin, 2013, The Economics of Money,

Banking and Financial Markets, 3rd Edition, p. 227

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“ Is Basel III “Tough?”

Tripling the previous requirements sounds tough, but only if one fails to realize that tripling almost nothing

does not give one very much.

Martin Wolf, Financial Times, Sep 13, 2010

Page 23: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“ If at least 15% of banks’ total, non-risk-weighted, assets were funded by equity, the

social benefits would be substantial. And the social costs would be minimal, if any.

Anat R. Admati, Franklin Allen, Richard Brealey, Michael Brennan, Markus K. Brunnermeier, Arnoud Boot, John H. Cochrane, Peter M. DeMarzo, Eugene F. Fama, Michael Fishman, Charles Goodhart , Martin F.

Hellwig, Hayne Leland, Stewart C. Myers, Paul Pfleiderer, Jean Charles Rochet, Stephen A. Ross, William F. Sharpe, Chester S. Spatt, Anjan Thakor

Financial Times, November 9, 2010.

An open letter to JPMorgan Chase Board of DirectorsAnat Admati, Jun 14, 2011

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“How much capital? Enough so that it

doesn't matter

John Cochrane, Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2013

“Because we have substantial self-funding with consumer deposits,

we don’t have a lot of debt…John Stumpf, Wells Fargo Bank CEO, 2013

Page 26: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“Because we have substantial self-funding with consumer deposits,

we don’t have a lot of debt…John Stumpf, Wells Fargo Bank CEO, 2013

“ It is difficult to get a man to understand somethingwhen his salary depends on not understanding it.

Upton Sinclair, author

Page 27: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“ It is difficult to get a man to understand somethingwhen his salary depends on not understanding it.

politician

campaign contribution

“ It is difficult to get a man to understand somethingwhen his salary depends on not understanding it.

politician

campaign contribution

regulator

future job

Page 28: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“ It is difficult to get a man to understand somethingwhen his salary depends on not understanding it.

politician

campaign contribution

regulator

future job

journalist

access to news

“ Just about whatever anyone proposes…the banks will claim that it will restrict

credit and harm the economy…. It’s all bullshit

Paul Volcker to Senator Ted Kaufman, 2010

Page 29: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

» Too much or too little in boom, bust, crises

»

»

»Credit booms are main predictors of bust and crises

Wasteful investments in boom

Debt overhangs in busts exacerbates recession

Is More “Credit” Always Good for the Economy?

“Lobbying Cry Continues

This rule will keep billions out of the Economy

Tim Pawlenty, Financial Services Roundtable, July 2015

Page 30: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“Lobbying Cry Continues

This rule will keep billions out of the Economy

Tim Pawlenty, Financial Services Roundtable, July 2015

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Where is the Courage to Act on the Banks? Anat Admati, October 12, 2015Bloomberg View

Page 31: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

FEBRUARY 14, 2016by: John Vickers

The Bank of England must think again on systemic risk

Sir John Vickers: ‘Bank of England stress tests not tough enough’10 January, 2017

“ Key Person on Economic Policy (ex Goldman Sachs COO)

Banks are forced to hoard money because they are forced to hoard capital and they

can’t take any risks.. Dodd Frank prohibits them from lending.

Gary Cohn, Director of National Economic Council, February 3, 2017

Page 32: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“ Key Person on Economic Policy (ex Goldman Sachs COO)

Banks are forced to hoard money because they are forced to hoard capital and they

can’t take any risks.. Dodd Frank prohibits them from lending.

Gary Cohn, Director of National Economic Council, February 3, 2017

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» “National champions” » “Banks are where the money is”

Politics of Banking

» Central banks support governments and private banks

» Guarantees appear free, invisible social cost, willful blindness

Symbiosis and “bargains” banks-governments

» Banks seem sources offunding, not risk

Banks get away with inefficient recklessness.

Page 33: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

“Banks are still the most powerful lobby on Capitol Hill. And they

frankly own the place.Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill), 2009

Willful blindnessMany enablers

Misleading narratives

“It Takes a Village to Maintain a Dangerous Financial System,”Anat Admati, in Just Financial Markets: Finance in Just Society, Lisa Herzog (ed.) OUP, 2017

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Corporate Governance and Political Governance

Page 35: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Who are shareholders? what do they want?

Individuals or institutions?

What are their other investments?

Also employees or customers?

Ultimately citizens and taxpayers?ShareholdersSh h ld

IgnoresThe messy process of writing and enforcing contracts and rules The role of corporations in shaping rules and enforcementDiffuse corporate responsibilityGovernance problems in government institutions, even in democracies.

AssumesAll markets are “free and competitive”Contracts, “rules of society” andethics protect non-shareholders+ Employees+ Customers+ Creditors+ The public

The Standard Approach to Corporate Governance…

Page 36: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

FraudVolkswagen, Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, KPMG, Madoff, Wells Fargo

Governance-Related Inefficiencies

Other Law EvasionTaxes, discrimination, environment

DeceptionTobacco, sugar, financial advisors, “fake news”

EndangermentGM, Takata, Japanese nuclear industry, children’s products (US), banking, Equifax

Monopoly RentsPharmaceuticals (US), auditing, rating agencies, tech

The inefficiencies cause real economic and other harm.

One Address in Delaware; 285,000 Corporations

Page 37: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

GM and the Flint Water Crisis

Grenfell Fire, London, June 14, 2017

Page 38: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Crisis was avoidable

Widespread failures in financial regulation

Breakdown in corporate governance

Explosive and excessive borrowing, lack of transparency

Government ill-prepared; responded inconsistently

Widespread breaches in accountability at all levels.

Page 39: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Political Discourse

Meaningless distinction Proper questionsAre cost and benefits private or social?Are rules and their enforcement • fair? • cost-beneficial?

Laws“essential”

Regulations“costly”

“Those pontificating CEOs will bring back the iron fist of government bureaucrats.

Milton Friedman, 1970

Page 40: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Proper questions

Which activities are best done by private sector vs public sector?

How do we ensure that governments +enable productive markets forces

+address market failures

+design and enforce effective rules

+ promote fairness and justice

Friedman’s False Contrast

Governments “vs” Markets?

Market Government

Page 41: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October
Page 42: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Create independent sources of information, effective whistleblower programs, etc.

Improving (Corporate) Governance: The Challenge

Early intervention to prevent endangerment

Analog of traffic rules

Ensure competitionMarket power means rent

extraction and recklessness

Laws and enforcement tools for more individual accountability

Public awareness and understanding

Political accountability to prevent abuse of power in all institutions

Confusions and Politics: The Toxic Mix

Page 43: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

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Page 44: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

A version for undergraduates (cross listed with four departments)Cross-Disciplinary Education: GSB Finance 332

This interdisciplinary course explores how market and non-market forces shape the financial system and, through this system, affect the broad economy and society.

Page 45: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October
Page 46: The Political Economy of Corporate Governance1 The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Center on Democracy, Development, andthe Rule of Law (CDDRL) Stanford University October

Corporations and Society 2017-18 Visitors

Kara Stein Bethany McLean Fiona Scott Morton Franklin Foer

Peter Georgescu Lee Drutman Jerry Davis Luigi Zingales

A Collective Action Problem

Role for Stanford? … through individual constituents? … as an institution?“Corporation and Society” proposal to university+ Break disciplinary silos in law, business, social

sciences+ Enhance research and teaching on governance

issues