The People's Liberation Army of China: Its Raison D'etre, Current State and Trajectory

7/26/2019 The People's Liberation Army of China: Its Raison D'etre, Current State and Trajectory

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A

PEOPLESLIBERATIONARMYOF CHINA:

Itsraison dtre,

current statetrajectoryand

THE

9.4VOLUME

PAPEROCCASIONAL


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With the growing presence and inuence of the

Peoples Republic of China (PRC) as an economic

heavyweight and polit ical leader in the regional and

global arenas, Filipino academics and policymakers

are beginning to cultivate a keen interest in the

Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) as Chinas hard

instrument of national power. Since its inception in

1927, the PLA has arguably become a stabilizing

force for China after its so-called Century of

Humiliation; the PLA has played the pivotal roles ofliberating the country from Western and Japanese

imperialism and of perpetuating the one-party rule

of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However,

the growing tension over the territorial and maritime

disputes in the South China Sea and East China

Sea in recent years lead one to question whether or

not the PLA, with its rapidly expanding regional and

global footprint, is going to be a destabilizing force to

the international liberal order. This strategic research

paper sheds light on the PLAits raison dtre,

current state and trajectoryto gain a balanced

perspective on the said military organization and

help Filipino academics and policymakers criticallyassess whether continuously tilting towards the

US (and allies) and balancing against China is

the best way forward for the Philippines.

* The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily

PEOPLESLIBERATIONARMY OF CHINA:

Itsraison dtre,current state

trajectoryand

THE

C 2016ADRiNSTITUTEfor Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

OCCASIONAL PAPER APRIL 2016

02

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The guard of honor of the Ch inese People's L iberation Army's Three Services

participates in a rehearsal for the military parade in commemoration of the70th anniversary of end of World War II in Tiananmen Square, Beijing.


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A Close Examination of thePeoples Liberation Army

The PLA is the armed forces of China which is under the

direct control of the ruling CPC.1 The PLA is tasked to

help advance the so-called six (6) core national interests,

namely: (a) state sovereignty; (b) national security; (c)

territorial integrity; (d) national reunication; (e) Chinaspolitical system established by the Constitution and

overall social stability; and (f) basic safeguards for

ensuring sustainable economic and social development.2

Given these core interests, one may conclude that China

through the PLA hopes to achieve the following strategic

objectives: (a) maintaining a stable political and security

environment conducive to continued economic growth;

(b) securing trade routes transiting the region; (c) gaining

access to regional energy resources (i.e. oil and natural

gas) and raw materials; and (d) gaining inuence

to defeat perceived attempts at strategic

encirclement or containment.

Founded in Nanchang, Jiangxi Province on 1 August

1927, the PLA is currently the largest military in the world,

with a total troop membership of around 2.3 million as of

June 2015.3 In contrast to the militaries of other countries

in the world such as the US whose allegiance lies in the

State and the Constitution, the PLA is beholden to the

Party which, under the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist political

ideological framework, is the sole representative of

the people. Hence, the PLA within the Chinese

party-state system is the military wing of the CPC

and the guarantor of its one-party rule.4

A. Armed Forces Division

In Chinese military parlance, the so-called PLA force providers are the

PLA Army (PLAA), the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF),

and the PLA Second Artillery Force (PLA SAF). The Paramilitary and

reserve forces are also included as force providers.5 Based on the2006 National Defense White Paper, PLA forces have undergone

drastic downsizing since mid-1980s.6 The PLAAs share in the total

force structure went down from 77% in 1985 to 69% in 2014. 7

Conversely, PLAN grew from 8.6% in 1985 to 10% in 2014, the

PLAAF from 12% to 17%, and the PLA SAF from 2% to 4%.8

FIGURE 1. ACTIVE AND RESERVE PERSONNEL BY SERVICEIN THE PLA IN 2014

Source: CHINESE S TRATEGY AND MILITARY POWER IN 2014, P.163



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Distribution of the armed forces throughout t he Chinese mainland

Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The PLA is composed of 2,285,000 active troops and 510,000 reserve forces, which far surpasses US military

troop numbers.9 According to the 2013 Defense White Paper, PLAN accounts for 235,000 troops and the

PLAAF for 398,000 troops.10 The PLAAs mobile operational units comprise 850,000 troops of an estimated

total of 1.6 million PLAA troops. The PLA SAF accounts for about 100,000 personnel.11 Interesting ly, Chinas

paramilitary forces, such as the Peoples Armed Police (PAP), has a total strength of 660,000 sta as well as the

militia.12 Since its activation in 1983, the PAP was primarily tasked to address internal security challenges, such

as natural disasters and ethnic and social unrest,especially in the restive regions of Xinjiang and Tibet.13

B. Organizational Structureand Command Chain

Distributed into seven (7) military regions, the P

as force employers, namely: Shenyang, Beiji

Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Chengdu.14

overseen by four (4) general departments, nam

General Sta Headquarters, the General Politic

the General Logistics Department, and the Ge

Department.15 The PLAN, PLAAF and PLA SA

have separate headquarters.16

FIGURE 2. THE PLAS STRUCTURE AND COM

Source: UNDERSTANDING CHINAS POLITICLA SYSTEM, MARCH


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Under the Chinese command chain, the CMC plays a crucial roleit

exerts direct organizational control over the PLA. The CMC oversees

military and defense aairs and is a high-prole party body, through

which the CCP exerts control over the PLA since the 1930s.17 The

Ministry of National Defence is subordinated to the State Council and

is outside the PLAs direct command structure. It serves as a liaison

oce with foreign militaries. Meanwhile, the PAP being an auxiliaryforce to the PLA and law enforcement body is subject to a dierent,

dual command structure18it is both under the supervision of the

CMC and the State Council through the Ministry of Public Security.

On 26 November 2015, Chinese President Xi Xinping announced

the comprehensive reorganization and overhaul of the current

military administration structure and command system of the PLA.19

According to Beijing-based military expert Song Zhongping, the new

military structure will unburden the theater commands of personnel

management and administrative responsibilities and allow them to

focus mainly on war-ghting.20 Said overhaul comes as a

response to growing geopolitical tensions vis--vis the

globalization of its security and developmental interests.21

Under the new structure, the CMC will now administer both the PLA

and the PAP, while the battle zone commands will focus on combat

operations.22 Said reform will institutionalize a three-tier CMC-battle

zone commands-troops command system and an administration

system that runs from CMC through dierent services down to the

troops.23 Furthermore, the armed forces will be more professionally

and eectively managed by int roducing modern management

techniques, reducing its troops by 300,000, and downsizing its

administrative and non-combatant personnel.24 Lastly, to ensure

party loyalty and curb corruption, a new discipline inspection

commission will be established within the CMC to conduct regular

disciplinary inspections to CMC departments and zone commands.25

PLAs Seven Old Military Regions

Source: US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE


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The new theater commands are generally

patterned after former area commands,

with a more enhanced command and

logistics support functions.26

The ve(5) new theater commands will be the

following: Eastern Theater Command (to

be headed by commander Liu Yuejun

and political commissar Zheng Weiping);

Southern Theater Command (commander

Wang Jiaocheng and political commissar

Wei Liang); Western Theater Command

(Zhao Zongqi and political commissar

Zhu Fuxi); Northern Theater Command

(commander Song Puxuan and political

commissar Chu Yimin); and Central

Theater Command (commander Han

Weiguo and political commissar YinFanglong).27Said theater commands

will be run by the joint battle command

system and be responsible for addressing

the security threats within their respective

strategic scopes, maintaining peace,

containing or winning wars, and

safeguarding the countrys overall national

security and military strategies.28Source: The STRAITS TIMES

PLAs Five New Theater Commands


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C. Defense Budget

The Chinese defense budget has been on a

constant, upward trajectory.29 Between 1998 and

2007, military expenditure went up by almost 16%

on average, year on year.30 This is comparable to

the surge in the annual state expenditure by about

18%, and the PRCs average annual GDP growth of

roughly 12%.31 In 2014, PLA defense budget was

registered at US$132 billion, which was a 12.2%

increase over the preceding year. On March 4,

2015, China announced that it would further raise

its defense budget by approximately 10%.32 While

this raise is lower than the previous years 12.2%

increase, the budget nonetheless reects the fth

consecutive year with a double digit increase in

ocial military spending.33 This would then

translate to roughly $US145 billion.34

The PLAs defense budget composition is as follows:

personnel expenses, mainly including pay, food

and clothing of military and non-military personnel;costs for maintenance of activities, mainly including

military training, construction and maintenance

of facilities and running expenses; and costs for

equipment, including research and experimentation,

procurement, maintenance, transportation and

storage.35 These expenditures include militia and

reserve requirements.36 A large amount of spending

is devoted to fund activities associated with social

welfare, mainly pensions for some of the retired

ocers, schools and kindergartens for children of

military personnel, training personnel competent

for both military and civilian services, supporting

national economic construction, and participation inemergency rescues and disaster relief eorts.37

Summary of Military Budget of the Peoples Liberation Army 38


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D. Doctrine and Strategy

Chinas national objectives and strategic interests

serve as the bases for its military doctrine and

strategy. Dubbed as Active Defense/Active Oshore

Defense,39 the objective of the PLA is to ght local

wars under high-tech conditions.40 Said objective

requires smaller, more specialized rapid-reactionforces, possession of a limited oensive and

force projection capability, and the option

of preemptive military action.41

For the PLAN, in particular, the Active Defense/

Active Oshore Defense strategy entails an

evolutionary shift from its Static Coastal Defense

role to Active Oshore Defense. Through this

shift, Chinese naval assets are employed for both

tactical and strategic purposes in asserting control

of coastal economic regions and maritime interests,

and for optimizing the Navys operations for national

defense. Said Chinese maritime strategy is crediteddirectly or indirectly to General Liu Huaqing, PLAN

head from 1982 to 1987 and CMC vice chairman

from 1988 to 1997.42 He advocated for the

expansion of PLAN navys operations from coastal

defense to oshore active defense.43

At the heart of the Active Oshore Defense

doctrine is the so-called Two-Island Chain or

Leap East strategy which denes the geostrategic

theaters in East Asia that the PLA aspires to control:

This rst island chain area encompasses the

Yellow Sea, facing Korea and Japan; the western

East China Sea; and the South China Sea,

extending deep into Southeast Asia. It addresses

many of Chinas maritime national i nterests: the

concentration of economic investment along

the coast, oshore territorial claims, oceanic

resources, and coastal defense. It is ambitious

in scope, extending from approximately 200 to

700 nm from the mainland, to include Taiwan and

the South China Sea land features claimed by

Beijing as sovereign territory. The second island

chain bounds Lius second strategic maritime

area: a north-south line from the Kuriles through

Japan, the Bonins, the Marianas, the Carolines,and Indonesia. This is a much more ambitious

goal than that implied by the rst island chain,

since it encompasses

approximately 1,800

including most of the

Asian SLOCs. The thi

maritime strategy pos

force built around airc

the middle of the 21st

imply a PLAN many t

capable than Chinas

however, global naval

in a eet of ballistic m

capable of launchingmissiles (ICBMs) and

cruise missiles.44

Chinas Two-Island Chain or Leap East Strategy

Source: BBC.CO.UK


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E. Force Modernization Goals and Trends

The modernization of the PLA was kick-started in

the late 1970s and had three major goals: First,

under the political leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the

military sought to clarify its relationship with the civilian

branch of government.45 The PLA gradually returned

to its pre-Cultural Revolution relationship with the

CPC and became disengaged from civilian politics.46

Deng reasserted civilian control over the military by

undertaking the following measures: (a) appointment

of his supporters to key military leadership positions;

(b) reduction of the scope of the PLAs domestic

nonmilitary role; and (c) revitalization of the

party political structure and ideological

control system within the PLA.47

Second, modernization required the reform of military

organization, doctrine, education and training, and

personnel policies to improve combat eectiveness in

combined-arms warfare.48

To achieve organizationalreforms, the Chinese government created the CMC,

reduced and streamlined the PLA forces, civilianized

many of the PLA unit s, reorganized military regions,

formed group armies, and enacted the new Military

Service Law in 1984.49 Doctrine, strategy, and tactics

were revised under the rubric of peoples war based

on the contemporary security environment, which

envisaged a forward defense at selected locations

near Chinas borders, to prevent attack on Chinese

cities and industrial sites, and emphasized operations

using combined-arms tactics.50 Furthermore, reforms

in education and training gave strong emphasis on

improving the military skills and raising the educationlevels of ocers and troops and conducting combined

arms operations.51 New personnel policies fostered the

upgrading in the quality of PLA recruits and

ocer candidates, thereby improving their conditions

of service, changing promotion practices to

stress professional competence, and

providing new uniforms and insignia.52

The third goal of military modernization was the radical

transformation of the whole defense establishment

into a system capable of i ndependently maintaining

a modern military force.53 As military expenditures

remained relatively constant, reforms focused on

the reorganization of the defense research-and-

development and industrial base to better integrate

civilian and military science and industry more closely.54

Foreign technology was used selectively in the

upgrading of weapons.55 Defense industry reforms also

transformed the Chinese defense economy from being

import-driven to export-driven, thereby allowing its full

entry into the international arms market and paving

the way for the increased production of civilian goods

by local defense industries.56

The scope of PLA localeconomic engagements was reduced, but the military

continued to participate in infrastructure development

projects and initiated a reintegration program to provide

demobilized soldiers with technical skills deemed

benecial in the civilian economy.57

The latest Chinas Military Strategy dated May

2015 is a pertinent document that sheds light on the

PLAs modernization trends based on the countrys

framing of the national security situation. From

the Chinese perspective, the US rebalancing and

Japans normalization, both fostered by the shift in

the economic and strategic center of gravity towardsthe Asia-Pacic, are some of the latest security

developments to pose a direct threat to Beijings

Comparison of PLAs old and new force struct

Source: South China Morning Post


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Image Credit: xinhua

sovereignty and territorial integrity.58 These developments transpire against the

backdrop of Chinas growing economic and strategic interests abroad

in accordance with its New Silk Road Strategy.59 As a response to

the changing security situation, the PLA seeks to implement the

military strategic guideline of active defense.60

The South China Morning Post recently published an infographic thatencapsulates the present as well as possible future force structure and troop

strength of the PLA based on the latest military strategy. The PLA will then

undergo professionalization through internal rebalancing of it s major service

branches, with the navy and air force assuming equal status as that of the

army.61 Meanwhile, a national guard will replace the Peoples Armed Police.62

President Xi arms the envisioned force restructuring: During the 02 September

2015 PLA military parade in commemoration of 70 years of end of World War II,

he announced that he would reduce the countrys military personnel by 300,000

until 2017, thereby shrinking the military forces to roughly 2,000,000 personnel.63

This is an integral part of the accelerated modernization of the PLA which

would shift spending from the traditional land forces to more advanced

sea and air forces.64 Said shift would require fewer but higher-skilledmilitary personnel and pave way for the development of more

technologically sophisticated oensive/defensive capabilities.65

Similarly, Yang Yujun, spokesperson for Chinas Ministry of National Defense,

explained that through the cut of troops number, Chinas military will further

adjust and optimize its scale and structure, make its troops more capable and

its structure more scientic, and construct a modern military force system with

Chinese characteristics.66 He further remarked that cutting the number of

troops is conducive to pooling resources, speeding up the pace

and improving the quality of informatization construction.67

As of writing, the latest development within the PLA is President Xis assumption

of the new title, Commander in Chief of the joint battle command center of the

PLA.68 According to You Ji, overseer of the Department of Government and Public Ad

University of Macau, the new title symbolizes that Xi will exert a more direct role in the

control of the joint battle command systems with the aim of strengthening inter-servic

coordination and raising the prospects of mili tary victory.69


10


Dressed in combat fatigues, Ch

military officers in the Central Military Cthe newest and highest


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2015 PLA Capabilities and Trajectories

Source: US Department of Defense 2015 Annual Report to Congress70


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Critical Analysis

Overall, the PLA under Xi is undergoing radical

force restructuring, transforming from an army-

centric to a navy/air force-centric military with

a greater qualitative edge at an unprecedented

pace. This restructuring can be explained byrecent developments in Chinas domestic, regional

and global strategic and economic landscapes.

Domestically, the relatively stable internal security

situation, the civilianization of law enforcement

agencies and the looming cost of maintaining huge

personnel disincentivize the PLAs sustainment of

massive ground forces. Regionally, the perception of

containment by the US and its network of security

allies in the Asia-Pacic regionthe Philippines

includednecessitates the PLA to strengthen its

naval and aerial capabilities for better deterrence

and force projection. Globally, the internationalization

of its developmental interests as shown in One Belt-

One Road Initiative (OBOR) creates the imperative

for the PLA to develop more advanced capabilities

to protect Chinas sea lanes of communications

(SLOCs) and transcontinental roads and railways.

It is highly unlikely, however, that the PLA will be

able to proceed smoothly with it s radical force

restructuring in the coming years. Internally, the

ongoing anti-corruption campaign of Xi in the military

is opening up a Pandoras box that could create

more instability within Chinas defense and security

establishment. The arrest last year of Xu Caihou,former general of the PLA and vice-chairman of

the CMC, amid allegations of accepting bribes for

promotion as well as the punishment of more than

200 ocers of lieutenant-colonel rank and above

since 201371 has not only sent a strong message

against other military personnel who are embroiled

in various corruption activities. Over and above, the

arrest has raised the question on what constitutesthe threshold for labeling certain activities as corrupt

and how loyalty to Xi could factor in into

the determination of that threshold. Nevertheless,

once Xi overplays his scare tactics, the PLA may

soon nd itself deeply polarized as the beneciaries

of the old military command structure may

opt to band together to protect their

vested interests and reputations.

Externally, the convergence of territorial and

maritime disputes between China and its

neighboring ASEAN countries, on the one hand,

and the growing concern of extra-regional powers,

namely the US, Japan, South Korea, and Australia

to preserve freedom of navigation, on the other

hand, is further raising the risk calculus for the

PLAalong with China maritime coast guardto

achieve uncontested supremacy over Chinas near

seas. In the foreseeable future, the PLA will

then have to contend with three (3) major

challenges in line with Chinas bid for regional

supremacyand global presence:

(a) On the legal front, the much-anticipated United

Nations (UN) arbitral tribunal ruling expectedfor May 201672 is highly likely to undermine the

principle of 9-dashed li

of ownership over the e

well as raise Chinas re

compliance.

(b) On the political fron

Abe (Japan),73 reappoTrong (Vietnam),74 and

(Taiwan)75 raises the

convergence of the

policies which, in turn, w

security pacts with the

(c) On the military fro

its allies, Japan and

likely to up the ante on

operations (FONOPS)76

commons.

Tightening Grip within tAlliance: Is this the Bes

The massive withdrawal o

forces from Subic Bay nav

in 1992 brought the Philip

position within the US-led

been sheltered by the US

and dragged into low-leve

operations from within thr

the Armed Forces of the P

lagged behind vis--vis its

region in fully developing i


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Im

defense capabilities. This has rendered Manila highly

vulnerable against gradual Chinese assertion of

sovereignty over West Philippine Sea which began

with the occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995

and intensied with the seizure of Scarborough

Shoal in 2012 as well as island construction

in Spratlys from 2014 up to present.

With the growing militarization of the West

Philippine Sea, the AFP is currently fast-tracking

its modernization program to achieve minimum

credible defense posture vis--vis the PLA which is

tantamount to an eective force present inside the

Philippines and its exclusive economic zone with

exhibited competence to defend the country and

protect its national interests if the need arises.77

As a US treaty ally, however, such modernization

program may be viewed as a bid to better augment

the Allied Forces in preserving the current US-

dominated regional security architecture.

Amidst the brewing great power rivalry, what then

are the advantages and disadvantages for the

Philippines next administration in adopting Benigno

Aquino III administrations balance-of-power

logic by tilting towards the US (and allies)

and balancing against China?

In continuing the Aquino administrations policy, the

Philippines will become better integrated with the

US as well as Japan, South Korea and Australia

within the American security umbrella. In this regard,

the Philippines will be able to increase its overall


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deterrence capability as it simultaneously pursues

internal and external balancing: Internally, as the

AFP is undertaking force restructuring and strategic

reorientation from internal security towards territorial

defense, closer military ties with the US (and

allies) will allow Manila greater preferential access

to Western armaments, capital, technology andinteroperability training to accelerate its capability

upgrade programs and possibly pump prime its

defense manufacturing industry. Externally, the

enhancement of formal alliance with Washington

and informal military alliances with Tokyo, Canberra

and Seoul will signicantly raise the risk calculus

for the PLA to assert full sovereignty over the West

Philippine Sea and disrupt freedom of navigation

and overight which is the shared interest

among all members of the alliance.

Over time, the Philippine national interest to

defend its territories in the disputed waters and USnational interest to defend freedom of navigation

and overight would see greater convergence. The

ongoing militarization of Chinas articial islands in

the Kalayaan Island Groupconstruction of network

of airstrips, deep-water ports and other military-

capable infrastructureis necessitating the US

Seventh Fleet to raise the quantity of its naval and

aerial assets as well as increase the frequency of

its patrol activities of in West Philippine Sea. This is

providing a stronger impetus for Japan and Australia

to take a more proactive stance in jointly supporting

the US in protecting the sea lanes of communication

(SLOCS). In the short- and medium-term, the

formation of a triangulated defense of SLOCS

(de facto US-Japan-Australia alliance) will provide

a rm layer of external deterrence for the

Philippines while the latter is boosting itscoast guard and naval capabilities.

On the other hand, putting all eggs in Washingtons

basket risks diminishing Manilas foreign policy

exibility in exploring alternative avenues for long-

term political resolution of the territorial and maritime

disputes in West Philippine Sea. By invoking greater

US as well as Japanese and Australian milit ary

presence in the contested seas, the Philippines

could contribute to China hardening its antagonistic

stance toward the Philippines at a time when

Chinas foreign policy thrust is otherwise that of

improving relations with its neighbors. By furtherdrawing the US (and allies) into the equation, Manila

may narrow the space for China to be able to

exercise pragmatismwhich it showed when it

agreed to pull out the Haiyang Shiyou-981

oil rig last year after erce stando

and mass protests in Vietnam.

In the long-term, however, the prevalence of such

defense posturing by the US, Japanese and

Australian armed forces vis--vis the PLA could

render the resolution or s

maritime disputes betwee

China much more dicult

China rejects external inte

what it perceives as bilate

disputes, the Philippines

re-explore critical areas osocio-cultural cooperatio

mutual trust and conden

Gloria Arroyo and Hu Jint

could also narrow the win

greater military-to-military

the AFP and PLA, especi

assistance and disaster re

(HADRO), peacekeeping

and internal security oper

Continued deterioration o

bilateral relations could w

institutions and frameworChina and the ASEAN Re

The Philippine governme

this further contribute to a

prospect for the formation

arrangement that include

new regional security arch


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Conclusion

The Peoples Liberation Army has gone a long way from being a

small ragtag guerrilla force in Nanchang into the Communist Party

of Chinas colossal modern armed forces, promoting the security

and developmental interests of the worlds nascent economic

and political power, the Peoples Republic of China. The PLAsgrowing regional and global footprint is, in eect, altering threat

perceptions, the regional balance of military power, and risk

calculi in the greater geopolitical game. For this reason, it is

imperative for the Philippines to transcend the amorphous China

threat metanarrative that has dominated the political-security

discourse in the Philippines and objectively re-examine

what the PLA is, why it exists and where it is headed.

By comprehensively reviewing the multifaceted aspects of the PLA

as a military organization (i.e. organization, chain of command,

budget, doctrine and strategy, and modernization goals and

trends), one may conclude that the PLA is the new indispensable

factor in the Philippines security equation. The PLA deservesserious attention in national security policy formulation and

military strategy-making. Finally, an unadulterated picture of the

PLA as Chinas hard power instrument in pursuing its objectives

should lead key stakeholders in the Philippine government and

academia to the naked realization that adherence to the Aquino

administrations balancing strategy will have positive and negative

consequences well within and beyond the military realm.


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Endnotes:

1 Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the Re-public of India, White Paper: Chinas Peaceful Development,2011, Chinese Government.

2 Ibid.3 Grieger, Gisela, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service, 29 June2015, accessed 26 October 2015, http://www.europarl.

europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/564375/EPRS_BRI(2015)564375_EN.pdf.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.6 Ibid.7 Ibid.8 Chinese Strategy and Military Power in 2014, op. cit.,p. 162.9 The Military Balance, International Institute of Stra-tegic Studies, 2013, p. 287, cited in Chinese Strategy andMilitary Power in 2014, op. cit, p. 159.10 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.11 D.J. Blasko, The 2013 Defense White Paper in Per-

spective, China Brief, Vol. XIII, issue 9, 25 April 2013, pp.6-10.12 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.16 Ibid.17 J.C Mulvenon and N.D. Yang, The Peoples Liber-alization Army as Organization, RAND National SecurityResearch Division, 2002, pp. 45-121.18 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.19 Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural re-form, Xinhuanet, 26 November 2015, accessed 09 Feb-ruary 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/26/c_134859089.htm.20 Teo Cheng Wee, Military rezoning shows Chinas

focus is on winning wars, The Straits Times, 03 February2016, accessed 09 February 2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/military-rezoning-shows-chinas-focus-is-on-winning-wars.21 Ibid.22 Xi urges breakthroughs in military structural reform,

Xinhuanet.

23 Ibid.24 Ibid.25 Ibid.26 Chinas military regrouped into ve PLA theatercommands, Xinhuanet, 01 February 2016, accessed 09February 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-02/01/c_135065429.htm.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Gisela Grieger, The Role of the Army in Chinas Poli-tics, European Parliamentary Research Service.30 Ibid.31 Ibid.

32 Chinas Defense Budget, GlobalSecurity,org, ac-cessed 27 October 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm.33 Ibid.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Ibid.38 Ibid.39 Bernard Cole, The PLA Navy and Active Defense,Global Security.org, accessed 06 May 2015, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/pla-china_transition_11_ch07.htm.40 Ibid.41 Ibid.42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.45 China Military Organization, The Library of CongressCountry Studies and CIA World Factbook in Photius.com,accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.photius.com/countries/china/economy/china_economy_military_organi-zatio~7400.html.

46 Ibid.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 Ibid.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 Ibid.55 Ibid.56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.58 Chinas Military Strategy, Ministry of National De-fense: The Peoples Republic of China, May 2015, accessed27 October 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/White-Papers/.59 Ibid.60 Ibid.61 How China will rebuild its Peoples Liberation Army,South China Morning Post, 02 September 2015, accessed27 October 2015, http://www.scmp.com/infographics/article/1854629/infographic-how-china-will-rebuild-its-peo-ples-liberation-army?comment-sort=recommended.62 Ibid.63 Edward Wong, Jane Perlez and Chris Buckley, Chi-na Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military ParadeShowing Its Might, The New York Times, 02 September2015, accessed 27 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html?_r=0.

64 Ibid.65 Ibid.66 Shannon Tiez300, 000 Troops, Tcessed 27 October the-real-reason-chin67

Ibid.68 Austin Ramzya New Title: Comm21 April 2016, accescom/2016/04/22/wmander.html?_r=0,69 Ibid.70 US Departmegress: Military and Peoples Republic o71 Charles Clovecorruption purge, F28 October 2015, h2eb8-11e5-91ac-a572 Patricia Lourdpines vs China decisDecember 2015, acphilstar.com/headlin

issue-philippines-vs73 Shinzo Abe reNews, 24 Decembehttp://www.bbc.com74 Mike Ives, VGuard Leader a New27 January 2016, acnytimes.com/2016/party-nguyen-phu-t75 Tsai Ing-wen BBC News, 17 Januhttp://www.bbc.com76 Dan de Lucewarship to challengeicy, 26 October 201foreignpolicy.com/2challenge-chinas-fa77 Bong Lozadature, Inquirer.net, 2http://newsinfo.inqdefense-posture.


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is an independent international and strategic researchorganization with the principal goal of addressing theissues affecting the Philippines and East Asia

Stratbases Albert Del Rosario Institute

9F 6780 Ayala Avenue, Makati CityPhilippines 1200

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ABOUT

Mark Davis M. Pablois a Research Analyst at the ADR Institute. He graduated CumLaude from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2012 with abachelors degree in Political Science and Philosophy. Prior tojoining the ADR Institute, Mr. Pablo specialized in Stra tegic Studies.He began his career as a Defence Researcher/Analyst in theOfce for Strategic Studies and Strategy Management (OSSSM),the think tank of the General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the

Philippines (AFP) from 2013 to 2015. During his two-and-a-halfyear stint, he engaged in strategic research, analysis andassessment, policy formulation, event organizing, academiclecturing, and public relations for the armed forces. His elds ofinterest include: Chinas defence and foreign policy; South ChinaSea conict; maritime security; ASEAN multilateral securityand defence cooperation; and terrorism and politicalviolence in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

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The People's Liberation Army of China: Its Raison D'etre, Current State and Trajectory

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