The Origins 4 the Fedeyeen in NdsJer’s Elt-olitik: Prelijde to the Sijez Er

BY JOHN ZIMMERMAN*

HE breakdown in Egyptian-Israeli relations which led to the Suez War of 1956 has been attributed to policies pursued by both parties following a raid by Israel into the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955. However, this study will show that the

seeds of the Suez War were sown in the months preceding the raid, a period which has gone largely unnoticed. Attention will be focused on Egypt’s policies and their effect on Israel’s political direction.

The overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy on July 23, 1952, by the Free Officers, led by General Mohammed Naguib and Colonel Gamal Nasser, was destined to change the face of Middle Eastern politics as well as the scope and nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But before the new regime could pursue an activist foreign policy, it had to consoli- date its own power and persuade the British, by whatever means, to evacuate their eighty thousand troops from the Suez Canal Zone.

The new governing institution was called the Revolutionary Com- mand Council (RCC), and it was totally controlled by the Free Officers. In January 1953, the RCC decreed that all political parties be banned. This stratagem was intended to implement the army’s hold over the country, since its most popular political party was the civilian-con- trolled Wafd. The political apparatus to replace the parties was to be called the Liberation Rally, which would be dominated by the Free Officers. Naguib was soon ousted by Nasser, who moved to take com- plete control of the government.

Widespread discontent with the ban began to manifest itself. Even though the opposition press was silenced, pressure was brought to bear on Nasser. The dissident elements rallied behind Naguib, and Nasser was forced to reinstate him in February 1954. Nasser promised that elections would be allowed and that the country would be permit- ted to return to parliamentary government. On March 20, Nasser said that he was a revolutionary, not a politician, and therefore would not run for office. On March 25, the RCC stated that it would transfer power to an elected assembly in July. However, four days later, RCC spokesman, Saleh Salem, announced that all elections were canceled.

T

*The author is a research analyst in Middle Eastern affairs and a journalist. ‘Middle Eastern Affairs, May 1954, 177-78 (hereafter cited as MEA).

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The Historian On September 1, the only two civilian ministers in the Egyptian gov- ernment were ousted and replaced by members of the RCC. The most profound change occurred in respect to the Cabinet. In 1952, the Cabinet was totally civilian-controlled, but by September 1954, its composition, for the first time, was more than 50 percent military. Within a few months, Naguib was totally banned from all political activity;2 thus the final hope for parliamentary democracy and civilian rule had been destroyed. Two observers friendly to the new regime wrote that

it might be said that Egypt is not a state with an army, but an army with a state. . . . In Nasser’s Egypt it has become “a good thing” to be an army officer, and fathers now seek them as sons-in-law. Even the common soldier benefits from the glory of the military order.3

T o persuade the British to leave the Suez Canal Zone, the new regime enlisted the aid of the United States. A trip to the Middle East in May 1953 by Secretary of State Dulles appears to have convinced him that Britain must be persuaded to agree to withdraw its troops. In a “Personal and Private” memo written by Dulles after he returned from his trip, he described the Free Officers as “almost pathological” on the British question; they “would rather go down as martyr[s], plunging Egypt into chaos than agree to anything which [the] public could call infringement on Egypt’s sovereignty.” Dulles found that

loss of respect for the United States varies almost directly with the near- ness of the respective Arab State to Israel. The Israeli factor, and the association of the United States in the minds of the people of the area with French and British colonial imperialistic policies, are millstones around our neck.

Dulles strongly believed that the Arabs must be assured of Ameri- can sympathy with their concerns, including the problem of colonial- ism. This could be partly accomplished by convincing the British to relax their position on the Canal Zone.4 President Eisenhower was apparently convinced by these arguments, and he encouraged the

*MEA, October 1954, 334; Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir (Albany, N.Y., 1971), 174-75; Mideast Mirror (Beirut), 4 September 1954 (hereafter cited as MM). On the differences between Naguib and Nasser and the latter’s consolidation of power, see Enver Koury, The Pattem of Mars Movements in Arab-Revolutionaty Progressive States (The Hague: Mouton, 1970), 150-60.

3Jean and Simone Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York, 1958), 194-95. For excellent discussions, see also Keith Wheelock, Nmser’s New Egypt (New York, 1960). 4 7 4 8 ; PJ. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington, Ind., 1961), 84-86; and Amos Perlrnutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New Brunswick, N.J., 1974). chaps. 3 ,4 , and 5. See also Earl Berger, The Covenant and the Sword (London, 1965), 176.

‘From a typed, two-part, undated memo in the Dulles Papers, Box 73, Princeton University (hereafter cited as Dulles Papers).

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Nasser and Suez British “gradually to evacuate the 80,000 troops still stationed there.”5 Egypt and Britain reached an agreement on withdrawal in July 1954, and the last British soldier left in June 1956.

Dulles was told by Naguib that Egypt could take steps on the question of peace with Israel once the British question was solved. But the secretary was not totally convinced. He rhetorically asked, “How much of this is window dressing for our present support?”6 Dulles’s suspicions turned out to be well-founded. As will be shown later, the Suez agreement actually made Egypt more militant on the Israeli ques- tion.

Soviet A m for Egypt No sooner had the Free Officers seized power than they began to

seek arms. In September 1952, General Naguib secretly approached the American embassy in Cairo with a proposal to cooperate with the United States in the participation of a Middle East defense organiza- tion in return for economic and military aid.’ Two months later an Egyptian mission went to the United States to seek arms.8 The out- going Truman administration agreed to economic assistance but de- cided to leave the matter of military aid to its successors.~ One rea- son for American reluctance was the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, signed by the United States, Britain, and France, which agreed in principle to maintain an arms balance between Israel and the Arabs . l o

From the Soviet perspective, Egypt’s search for arms offered an excellent opportunity for penetration into this strategic area. Russia had staunchly supported the establishment of Israel in 1948 and had used Czechoslovakia to make sure that the Jewish state would receive adequate arms supplies during the first Arab-Israeli war. Soviet sup- port continued for the next few years,” but in April 1953 a Soviet

5Dwight Eisenhower, Wagrng Peace (New York, 1965), 23. 6Dulles memo cited above in n.4. One month before the Dulles visit, Naguib, who

was considered moderate, was saying that Israel was a “cancer endangering all Arab countries” and that the “Palestine cause belongs to all Arabs.”Jewkh Obsmer and Middle Emt Review (London), 24 April 1953 (hereafter cited as JOMER).

7Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York, 1969), 566-67. *Mohammed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents (New York, 1973). 37. gAcheson, Present, 567. 1OText in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (Princeton, 1956), 2:

308-9. 11See Arnold Krammer, Thr Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-

1953 (Chicago, 1974); Yaacov Roi , “Soviet-Israeli Relations, 1947-1954,” in The U.S.S.R. in the Middle East, ed. Shimon Shamir and Michael Confino Uerusalem: Hal- stead, 1973). 12341. See also Surendra Bhutani, fsraeli Soviet Cold War (New Delhi: Parnassus, 1975), chap. I . One reason for Soviet support for Israel during the 1948 war was that the Arabs were being diplomatically, economically, and militarily sup-

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The Historian publication noted Egypt’s strategic and economic significance as com- pared with Israel’s.12 Soon the Russians began to support the Arab position in the United Nations. The infamous Soviet anti-Jewish Doc- tors Trial of 1953 also strained Israeli-Soviet relations.

The turning point in Soviet-Arab relations came in 1955 with the conclusion of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal. Czechoslovakia was used to effect the agreement for the Soviet Union. The traditional version of the arms deal places Soviet-Egyptian negotiations at a date after the Israeli raid into the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955. According to this version, Nasser suddenly had a heightened realization of Egypt’s weakness and felt he needed arms for defensive purposes. It should be noted, however, that this version, accepted by many, originated with and was promoted by Nasser and his minister for national guidance, Saleh Salem. Others have maintained that Nasser’s motives were only partially influenced by the Gaza raid. Yet this view also accepts the traditional chronology that places negotia- tions after the Gaza raid.

In 1969, Professor Uri Ra’anan was able to produce convincing evidence that the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal was secretly con- cluded in mid-February 1955, two weeks before the Gaza raid. Specifi- cally, he was able to cite (1) reports from Turkey early in 1955 stating that Egyptian and Soviet ambassadors were holding clandestine meet- ings; (2) a speech by Nasser in 1962 identifying 1954 as the year when Egypt attempted to break the Western arms monopoly in the Middle East, thus contradicting his earlier statements giving May 1955 as the period of the first contacts; (3) a report by the Agence France Presse on February 14, 1955, stating that “Czechoslovakia is ready to exchange heavy arms for Egyptian cotton”; and (4) an article appearing in the Soviet journal International Afairs in 1965 stating that “Nasser’s gov- ernment concluded in February 1955 a commercial agreement with Czechoslovakia for the delivery of arms.”13

What emerges as particularly striking is that virtually all Nasser’s recent biographers14 and most of the studies published on Egyptian-

ported by Britain. See John Zimmerman, “The Clayton Pact,” New Middle East, May 1972, 42-43, and the ensuing exchange of letters in the June, September, and No- vember issues.

‘ZNovye Mir, cited in Yaacov Ro’i, From Encroachment to Involvement: The Soviet Union in the Middh East, 1945-1973 (Jerusalem: Halsted, 1975), 1 1 1 n. 1. After Stalin’s death, there was a revived interest in Oriental studies. See Walter Laquer, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (London, 1956), 262, and Wayne S. Vucinich, “Soviet Studies on the Middle East,” in The Souiet Union in the Middle East, ed. Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford, Cal.: Hoover Institute, 1974), 180-81.

Wri Ra’anan, U S S R A m and the Third World (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 42,69435. “Heikal, Cairo Documents; Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir; Robert Stephens, Nasser:

A Political Biography (New York, 1971); Anthony Nutting, Nasser (New York, 1972); Jean Lacouture, Nasser (New York, 1973); Facts on File, Egypt and Nasser, 1952-1956, 3 vols.

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Nasser and Suez Soviet relations15 since Ra’anan’s work appeared have ignored his findings and continue to adhere to the traditional version-perhaps because it is easier to write the standard version than to explore the implications of Nasser seeking an unusually large quantity of Soviet arms at a time when he did not feel any threat from Israel. Prior to the Gaza raid, Nasser told British Labour Party member of Parliament, Richard Crossman, that Israel did not present a military threat to Egypt.16

The idea of seeking Soviet arms for Egypt had been considered by the Free Officers even before the coup ofJuly 1952. One year before seizing power, they had issued a proclamation stating, “We demand arms for the army from all countries which will sell us weapons either from the East or West.”17 A significant clue as to when Egypt first began to seek Soviet arms is provided by Nikita Khrushchev, then Soviet prime minister, who wrote in his memoirs that soon after the Free Officers seized power “Nasser’s representatives came to us with a request for military aid.”18 Unfortunately, Khrushchev does not pro- vide us with any more details. But as was noted earlier, it was at about this time that Egypt was seeking American arms.19

(New York, 1973). vol. 1; Shirley Graham Dubois, GamalAbdel-Nasser: Son of the Nile (New York, 1972).

Weorge Lenczowski, Soviet Advances in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: Ameri- can Enterprise Institute, 1972); Yair Evron, The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and War (New York, 1973); Oles Smolansky, The Sovict Union and the Arab East under Khruscheu, I952I964 (Lewisburg, Penna., 1974); Tarun Bose, Superpowers and theMi&le East (New York, 1972); Jon Glassman, A m f o r the Arabs (Baltimore, 1975); An Nahar Arab Report, The Dragon and the Bear (Beirut, 1973); PJ. Vatikiotis, “The Soviet Union and Egypt,” in Soviet Union, ed. Lederer and Vucinich, 121-33.

R.D. McLaurin writes that it is difficult to determine the immediate origins of the arms deal. He does cite Ra’anan in a note but makes no mention of his findings. McLaurin, The Middle East in Soviet Poluy (Lexington, Mass., 1975). 20. Similarly, Robert Freedman cites Ra’anan in a note but evades the origins of the arms deal. Freedman, Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since I970 (New York, 1975), 10.

On the other hand, Arnold Horelick argues that “for a broad understanding ofSoviet policy” it is not important to know when the deal was concluded. Horelick, “Soviet Policy in the Middle East,” in Political Dynamics in the Mi&le East, ed. Paul Hammond and Sidney Alexander (New York, 1972), 567. But the wider implications concern Egyptian, not Soviet, policy, and the implications concerning the strains in American-Egyptian rela- tions aresignificant indeed. SeeRa’anan, U S S R A m , 54-57,132-37.

‘=New Statesman and Nation, 22 January 1955, 95. Crossman was impressed with Nasser. In fact, he was “certain” that “Egypt will remain a factor for peace and social development.” Ibid., 96.

“Eliezer Be’eri, A m y Oj5cers in Arab Politics and Society (New York Praeger, 1970). 93. The same warning was given by the Voice of the Arabs on August 1, 1954.

‘*Nikita Khrushchev, Khwhcheu Renumbers (Boston, 1970). 433. ’*However, Acheson, as will be recalled, wrote that Naguib had approached the

American embassy whereas Khrushchev cites “Nasser’s representatives.” At the time,

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The Historian In August 1953, the Egyptian Cabinet approved a trade agreement

with the Soviet Union and called for an exchange of Egyptian cotton for Soviet war materials and oil. In December, Egypt’s deputy minister of war was sent on a three-month tour of Eastern Europe, two of which were spent in the Soviet Union.20 In March, shortly after his return, Egypt and the Soviet Union exchanged embassies and the first Soviet- Egyptian trade agreement was reached. Egypt’s largest newspaper, A1 Ahrum, lauded the agreement.21 In the same month, Nasser ousted Naguib and seized power.

There is even evidence to show that Egypt first secured Soviet bloc arms as early as 1953. A completely unnoticed but significant fact is a revelation made in 1960 by Keith Wheelock, who had gone to Egypt in 1954 to do a study on the new government. In an interview with Nasser in August 1954, Wheelock was told that Egypt had secured arms from East Germany in July 1953.22 On February 2, 1953, Egypt and East Germany concluded an agreement for the exchange of goods worth $1 1,200,000. Among the items Egypt would receive was “agri- cultural machinery.” On February 18, a trade agreement was an- nounced under which trade between the two countries was to be in- creased, and on March 7 a one-year bilateral agreement was signed.23 In 1953, under the heading of “agricultural machinery,” the Egyptians included arms.** Similarly, in the March 1954 agreement with the Russians, there was a provision to sell Egypt agricultural machinery.25 Naguib and Nasser shared power, and this may give an insight as to which superpower each favored. In the absence of any further evidence (there have been no documents concerning these contacts published by Egypt or the Soviet Union), it is difficult to assess whether any significance can be attached to this.

ZORo’i, Encroachment to Involvenient, 1 1 1 ; David Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy aJer Stalin (New York, 1961). 389. Ro’i writes (144) that the arms deal “was almost certainly concluded by mid-February 1955.”

*IFaiz Abu Jaber, “Origins of Soviet-Arab Cooperation,” M z a n (London), Juiy/August 1969, 217. See also, Mi;an, November/December 1968, 212.

ZZWheelock, Nasser> New Egypt, 228. In July 1953, the Egyptian minister of war wrote that in two years Egypt would be able to export arms and ammunition and in three years it would be exporting warplanes in the Middle East. Al Ahram (Cairo), cited in JOMER, 24 July 1953. Egypt received its first arms from the February 1955 deal in July 1955. Ra’anan, USSR A m , 33; D.A. Farnie, East and West of Suez (Oxford, Eng., 1969). 713.

43Menahem Mansoor, Political and Diplomatic Histoty of the Arab World: A Chronological Study, 1900-1967 (Madison, Wisconsin, 1972). vol. 3. References in this compilation appear in chronological order, and pagination is omitted.

*4Dallin, Soviet Foreign Pohcy, 389. On East German-Egyptian commercial relations in 1954, see Walter Laquer, The Soviet lhion and the Middle East (New York, 1959),

Z5Boris Guriel, “The Ideological Origins of the Soviet-Egyptian Alliance,” New Middle East, February 1970, 21. In the fall of 1953, the Soviet press, in a volte face, asserted the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s policy in the Arab world and its desire

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195-96.

Nasser and Suez The amount of arms covered by the February 1955 agreement

between Egypt and the Soviet Union was astounding. No Third World country had ever contracted for such a quantity; the figure of $250 million is often quoted as the value.46 However, Terence Robertson, who had access to a good deal of inside information, and Humphrey Trevelyn, Britain’s ambassador to Egypt at the time the deal was an- nounced in September 1955, have both given the figure of $450 mil- lion.*’ It would appear that $450 million was the figure actually con- tracted for while $250 million most nearly reflects the amount of arms received from July 1955 to the outbreak of the Suez War in October 1956. In September 1956, reports from Washington and London stated that the value of Soviet arms which had reached Egypt was in excess of $250 million.48

As previously mentioned, Nasser attempted to use Israel’s raid of February 28, 1955, on the Gaza Strip as the reason for seeking Soviet arms. According to Nasser, the raid showed how weak Egypt was militarily as compared with Israel. Privately, however, Nasser was of a different mind. Before the first arms shipment of the Czechoslovak- Egyptian deal reached Egypt in July 1955, Nasser told a meeting of Arab prime ministers in Cairo in a secret stenographic report that “Egypt alone is superior in strength to Israel.”~g A comparative analy- sis of Egyptian and Israeli military strength shows that Nasser had good reason for voicing such optimism. By mid-1955 Egypt possessed two hundred tanks, eighty jet fighters, and twenty older bombers. Part of the armored strength consisted of more than forty centurion tanks and a number of Sherman (MK 111) tanks. The jet fighter force was composed of Meteors, Vampires, and Fury night fighters. In 1953, Egypt had received six hundred military vehicles from the United States.30 “Even Iraq, an ally of the West, did not receive more favor-

to improve relations with the Arabs. There were also repeated assurances of good will in early 1954, and especially in September 1954. Oles Smolansky, The Soviet Union and theArab East, 1947-1957 (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1959). 117-19, 197-99. See also Ro’i, Encroachment to Involvement, 11 1-14; and John Swanson, “The Soviet Union and the Arab World,” W e s h Political Quarterly, December 1974, 64344. On the other hand, the Soviet press could also be critical of the Egyptian regime. See Aryeh Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Misror Uerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), 34-39.

*6It might be worth noting, though it is often forgotten, that Syria began receiving Soviet arms in 1954. Tabitha Petran, Syria (New York, 1972). 110; Arslan Humbaraci, Mi& East Indictment (London, 1958), 201; Laquer, Soviet Union andtheMidd& East, 214. Syria had hinted at rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1950. Ro’i, Encroachment to Involvement, 79-8 1.

Z’Terence Robertson, Ctisis: The Inside Story of the Sum Conspiracy (New York, 1965), 48; Humphrey Trevelyn, The Mi&& East in Revolution (Boston, 1970). 42.

**Mansoor, vol. 3,3 September 1956. See also Wheelock, Nasser‘s New Egypt, 241. ZgRobert St. John, The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser (New York, 1960), 205. SoIsrael received no American arms until after the June 1967 war.

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The Historian able treatment during the period in question.”31 By mid- 1955, Israel had acquired two hundred tanks-but, unlike Egypt, had been refused Centurions-and fifty jet fighters.

Egypt was also due to acquire large amounts of military supplies as a result of the 1954 agreement with Britain on the evacuation of Suez. Some $250 million in arms was left by the British, including fifty thousand tons of ammunition, two thousand motor vehicles, and suffi- cient equipment to outfit fifty thousand troops.32

One of Nasser’s reasons for seeking Soviet arms was a proposed Western defense alliance scheme. Britain and the United States had been attempting to induce Middle Eastern countries to join the Bagh- dad Pact, which would take effect in February 1955. If Arab countries decided to join this alliance, Nasser’s influence would be curtailed in the region and his pan-Arab dreams would be shattered.33 Egypt began to show concern over the issue in June 1954 when rumors appeared to the effect that Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon were considering joining the pact because the question of arms had become a burning issue. In June and July, Saleh Salem, Nasser’s chief spokesman, went on a tour of the countries in question. The principal reason for the trip appears to hme been to dissuade Arab governments from joining any Western-sponsored alliance.34

It was at this time that Egypt sought to convince other Arab coun- tries that it would be in a position to supply them with arms. In August 1954, Egypt’s minister of war said that in a few years his country would be exporting arms to neighboring Arab countries. In fact, both Nasser and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces stressed that Egypt was rapidly building up its armament production.35 However, these references to an increased build-up of weaponry dealt yith domestic production, and Nasser knew that this source alone would not be sufficient for exports.

Pan-Arabism and Pabtine In 1953, Nasser wrote The Philosophy of the Revolution in which he

envisaged three circles: Arab, African, and Islamic. Egypt formed the intersection of these circles. Nasser saw a “role in search of a hero!” The hero would be the leader of the circles. Even though he did not

SlRa’anan, USSR A m , 45-50; see also Geoffrey Kemp, “Strategy and Arms Lev- els,” in Soviet-Amm’can Riualty in the Middle East, ed. J.C. Hurewitz (New York, 1969), 24.

,*Jon Kimche, The Second Arab Awakening (New York, 1970). 89. See also Ra’anan, USSR A m , 50; and Humbaraci, MiaW East, 233. Anthony Nutting, No End of a Lesson (New York, 1967), 148.

Wee below, pp. 108-10. Iraq was the only Arab country to join the pact. W e e MM, 12, 19, and 26 June and 3 and 10 July 1954. ”MM, 24 July and 28 August 1954; British Broadcasting Corporation, Summaty of

World Broadcasts, part 4, 1954, no. 487, p. 41 (hereafter cited as SWB).

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Nasser and Suez specifically say so, there has never been any doubt that Nasser saw himself as the hero. However, by 1954 it had become apparent that the African and Islamic circles covered too much territory and were too far beyond his reach. He decided, therefore, that it would be more prag- matic to concentrate on pan-Arab unity.

There were two issues which could command the emotional re- sponse of all Arabs. The first and foremost was Palestine. All Arabs experienced a deep sense of frustration and humiliation at their defeat by Israel. The second issue was the West. The Arabs were resentful of years of Western domination, and they blamed the West (Britain and the United States) for the establishment of Israel. Anti-Westernism became a major basis of pan-Arabism.36 Since these two issues tran- scended the many differences which separated various Arab countries, Nasser knew that he could strike a favorable response to his pan-Arab views by posing as the hero who would rid the Arab world of the evils of Zionism and imperialism.

On March 4, 1954, Nasser told a group of Egyptian officers, “If we go to battle again we can retrieve all that we lost. The time for action and not words is approaching.” Four days later, he told a gathering of Egyptian officers that “you must be ready for the great battle of Pales- tine. Make yourselves ready for the jihad [holy war] in Palestine.”37 In June, Nasser told a Lebanese newspaper, “Nobody can force the Arabs to accept peace with Israel or recognize her as an established state. We believe that we can reverse the position in Palestine and return the land to its people and owners.”3*

July 1954 was the crucial month in determining Egypt’s future relations with Israel. On June 30, the Revolutionary Tribunal ended its work after ten months of purge trials used to discredit the monar- chy. Having solidified his position, Nasser was now ready to take the initiative in the Arab world. For the first time, he officially designated Egypt as “Arab Egypt,”39 thus announcing his country’s pan-Arab ideology. Prior to this, Egypt had sought to differentiate itself from the Arab world. But Nasser was not ready to move on the Palestine ques- tion until an agreement was reached with Britain on the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone. Early in July, the Egyptian minister of national guidance and official government spokesman, Saleh Salem, had said, “We cannot fight in Palestine with British troops at our back.” He

~6Malcolm K e n , The Arab Cold Wur, 1958-1967 (London, 1967). 2; Miles Cope-

37St. John, The Boss, 188-89. 3sAl Hayat (Beirut), quoted in JOMER, 1 1 June 1954, 3. Wee Be’eri, Army Ofjtcers, 383; Copeland, Game, 196. See also Albert Hourani,

“The Middle East Crisis of 1956,” St. Anthony’s Papers, no. 4 (London, 1958). 24-25, explaining Nasser’s pan-Arabism and his advocacy of the Palestine question in terms of the Suez agreement freeing Egypt to do as it pleased.

land, The Game of Nations (New York, 1969). 130-31.

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The Historian added that Egypt was ready to teach Israel “a lesson it would not soon f~rget.”~O Following Egypt’s agreement with Britain on the Suez Canal on July 27, Cairo radio’s Voice of the Arabs asked, now that Britain is leaving Egypt, “When will the shadow of the imperialist depart from the land of Palestine?”41

Origns of the Fedeyeen The fedeyeen42 were paid saboteurs whose purpose was to infil-

trate Israel from the Egyptian-occupied Gaza Strip. As with the Cze- choslovak-Egyptian arms deal, it has been commonly held that the fedeyeen were established in response to Israel’s raid into the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955. The date of their first operation was supposedly August 3 1, 1955, when they were formally acknowledged by Radio Cairo,43 following several days of violent warfare along the Israeli-Gaza border. Several observers of the period have written that the fedeyeen were established in 1954, but none has made more than a passing reference to this.44 However, one of Nasser’s more recent biographers who was in Egypt in 1954 records that eight months before the Gaza raid “the Cairo government had made a serious deci- sion,” authorizing the Gaza refugees to form commando groups to harass Israeli territory, “a gesture which passed almost unnoticed, but which that most perceptive dean of French correspondents in Cairo, Gabriel Dardaud, considered the beginning of a new Israeli-Arab war.”45

The Israeli-Gaza border had remained fairly quiet until the summer of 1954. In May, Egyptian spies were caught inside Israel recording army movements. The feeling in Israel at the time was that Egypt might be trying to start an incident. On May 27, the Is- raeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC) approved a res- olution stating that three attacks had been made by armed Arab civilians into Israel and requesting the Egyptian authorities to pre-

“OJOMER, 9 July 1954, 4. See also Berger, Covenant, 176. 41Voice of the Arabs, 28 July 1954. All references to radio broadcasts are taken

‘SThe term means self-sacrificers. 43However, this broadcast referred to the fedeyeen as Egyptian commandos. An-

nouncements on the organizing of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip in 1954 referred to Palestinian commandos. See below, pp. 11 1-12.

“Laquer, Soviet Union and the Mi&& East, 214; M.A. Fitzsimmons, Empire by Treaty (Notre Dame, Ind., 1964). 138; Howard Sachar, A Hirtory of Israel (New York, 1976), 475, 481; Yigal Allon, “The Soviet Involvement in the Arab-Israel Conflict, in IISSR, ed. Shamir and Confino, 149; Herman Finer, D u b over Suer (Chicago, 1964). 27; Berger, Covenant, 172, 179. Berger, however, gives more background on this period.

from SWB unless otherwise indicated.

45Lacouture, N a m , 275.

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Nasser and Suez vent such acts.46 Early in June, Egypt was condemned by the MAC for twice firing on an Israeli patrol and censured for mining a com- mand car. Egypt was again condemned for an incident occurring two days later.47

It is forJuly that evidence can first be found to show that a sabotage organization was being formed in Gaza. In a speech on July 23, the commander-in-chief of the Egyptian armed forces announced that in the coming battle the nation’s army would not be fighting alone. “They will be backed by 3000 commando youth who are full of ardour and zeal for the day of sacrifice.” These would be joined to the army to form a single fighting force, “acting in accordance with a military plan which has been drawn up after months of study and continuous work to meet all eventualities of the struggle.”4* A few days later, Egypt established the “Palestine Corner,” a radio program regularly broad- cast over Cairo’s Voice of the Arabs.49 The corporation which moni- tored the broadcasts observed that after the initialing of the Anglo- Egyptian agreement on July 27, there was an intensification of anti-Israel propaganda of which the “Palestine Corner” played a prominent role. The first broadcast was on July 29; it carried a feature entitled “Do Not Forget Palestine,” which contained a message from the Municipal Council of Gaza congratulating Egypt’s leaders on the Suez agreement and reminding them that they “had promised to solve the Palestine question and restore the refugees to their homeland.”50

On August 5, the Voice of the Arabs announced that the Egyptian administration was training refugee youths in the use of firearms for guarding the frontier.51 The inevitable consequences of arming embit- tered refugees along the border could hardly have been obscure to the administration, and since this act coincides with the beginning of a virulent anti-Israel campaign, there can be little doubt that these “refu- gee youths” were in fact the first trained fedeyeen. Prior to this broad-

46Middle Earl Journal, 1954, 334 (hereafter cited as MEJ); JOMER, 7 May 1954,4. The MAC was composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli representatives with the chairman, a UN appointee, holding the tie-breaking vote. Its purpose was to deal with complaints of border violations.

47MEA, August-September 1954, 302; MEJ, 1954, 456. 48Text in SWB, no. 487, 40-43. 49The Voice of the Arabs was established in July 1953. Its specific function was to

promote pawArabism, Nasser, and anti-Western sentiment. It became notorious for its anti-lsraeli tirades. Later it began calling for the overthrow of pro-Western Arab govern- ments. For more on radio broadcasts, see John Zimmerman, “Radio Broadcasts in the Arab-Israeli War, 1948,” Wiener Libraty Bulbtin (London), 1973/74,2-8; A. Loya. “Radio Propaganda of the United Arab Republic-An Analysis,” MEA, April 1962,98-110; and New York Times, 22 August 1977.

50SWB, no. 541, 8 February 1955, appendix. 5’The armistice agreement allowed only regular army forces to patrol the frontier.

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The Historian cast, the mayor of Gaza had praised the Egyptian decision to form local contingents as a prelude to the recovery of Palestine;52 it would appear that the refugees being armed were the contingents to which the mayor referred.

In mid-July, an official source in Beirut said that when the Arab League met in Cairo on August 14, a proposal would be submitted for the formation of an army of Palestine refugees.53 At about the same time, Nasser had started a Palestinian Club. Over the entrance of the pavilion was the slogan “We are returning.” At the opening of the club, there were a number of speeches pledging vengeance, and it was announced that the work of the new organization must “consist of action” not words.54 On August 1, the Voice of the Arabs announced that Egypt had prepared a “basis law” for the Gaza Strip “SO that people can control their own affairs in preparation for the hour of victory.”

In August, Saleh Salem said that the question of Israel depended on a strong Arab front. While in Jordan on September 3, Salem stated that the Palestine question was just as important to Egypt as the Suez agreement. “Palestine can only be recaptured by the sword and Arab unity.”55 Four days later a tractor driver was killed in Israel and a water pipeline blown up. Egypt was condemned by the MAC on September 13 for sabotage conducted by a “well-trained and organized group of four” from Egyptian-controlled territory.56 Two days later the Arab News Agency quoted Salem as saying that “it is impossible for Egypt to think of the word peace with . , . Israel.”

On September 26, the Voice of the Arabs said that it supported the idea of arming Palestinian units. On the same day, Israel radio broad- cast a peace proposal in Arabic to the Middle East. It announced that Israel was prepared to grant the Arabs free transit and port facilities in the coastal city of Haifa and that Israel would allow the Arab states to use its territory as a land link among each other, providing they did not impinge upon Israel’s sovereignty; further, it made a specific offer of compensation to the Palestinian refugees. Two days later Israel sought to test Egypt’s response to the proposals by sending a ship named the Bat Galim through the Suez Cana1;57 the ship and its crew

%WB, no. 489, 33. 53MM. 24 July 1954. 5Woice of the Arabs, 19 July 1954. 55MM. 21 and 28 August and 11 September 1954. 56MEA, October 1954, 340; Report of the United Nations Truce Supervision

Organization (UNTSO) in UN document S/3319, 1 I November 1954. 57Egypt had illegally prevented Israeli and Israel-bound shipping from passing

through the canal in contravention of a 1951 Security Council resolution. See Simcha Dinitz, “Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal,” Georgetown Law Journul45, no. 2: 16699; Leo Gross, “Passage through the Suez Canal of Israel Ships,”

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Nasser and Suez were seized by Egyptian authorities, and Salem stated that Egypt and Israel were in an official state of war.58

In October, sabotage missions were carried out against Israel, re- sulting in a number of water pipelines being blown up and in the theft of Israeli property. The Israeli press began to threaten retaliation if the incidents did not stop. The chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTS0)-the umbrella organization for the four Mixed Armistice Commissions5Q-E.L.M. Burns, then sug- gested that joint patrols of Israeli and Egyptian forces be stationed along the demarcation line; that a local commanders’ agreement be established to handle unimportant incidents; that barbed wire be erected along certain parts of the border; and that outposts be estab- lished by Israeli and Egyptian regular forces only. The Egyptians op- posed erecting barbed wire along the frontiers because they feared that this would imply permanent boundaries. Egypt also rejected the joint patrol proposal. Burns was told by the director of Palestine affairs in the Egyptian Ministry of War that joint patrols had been tried in the past but that Egypt had withdrawn “mainly because the Israelis had made propaganda use of the arrangement; in particular, they had circulated photographs of the joint patrols showing Israelis and Egyp- tians together and implying that they would soon be on the road to peace negotiations.”60

Problems along the border continued. In November, the UNTSO reported that a number of incidents “mostly in Israel-controlled terri- tory, and some of them of a serious nature, indicates that vigilance should not be relaxed.”61 But in the following month, Salem an- nounced that Egypt would not make peace with Israel even if that country were to execute all United Nations resolutions on the refugees and partition.62

On January 21, 1955, an Egyptian military patrol attacked three Israelis, killing one and wounding two. On the same day, infiltrators attacked two Israelis, killing one. This latter attack, according to the

American Journal of International Law, July 1957,530-68. For Arab-inclined views, see T.F. Huang, “Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal Question,” ibzd., April 1957, 277-307; and Majid Khadduri, “Closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli Shipping,” in The Middle East Crisis: Test of Inhxutional Law, ed. John W. Halderman (New York, 1969).

5’3MM. 2 October 1954. For Israel’s proposals, see MEJ, 1955, 63. 59Along with Egypt, Israel had also signed armistice agreements with Syria, Jordan,

6OE.L.M. Bums, Between Arab and Israeli (London, 1962), 70-7 1. 61UN document S/3319,15. enMansoor, vol. 3, 28 December 1954; MM, I January 1955; JOMER, 7 January

1955. Egypt interpreted these resolutions as meaning Israel’s return to the boundaries of the 1947 partition plan and the repatriation of all Palestinian refugees to Israel.

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and Lebanon.

The Historian UNTSO report, “created much emotion in Israel.” The MAC called upon the Egyptian authorities “to terminate immediately these aggres- sive actions by Egyptian military patrols and the continuous infiltration into Israel.”63

This deteriorating situation began to enter its crucial phase with the reemergence of David Ben-Gurion as defense minister in Febru- ary. Ben-Gurion was known as a staunch advocate of retaliation. Radio Damascus (February 18) warned that the Israelis expected Ben-Gurion to follow a hard-line policy on borders. On the following day the Voice of the Arabs announced that “the Arabs welcome this Israeli man of the sword to a second round in Palestine.” On February 25, an Israeli cyclist was murdered and Egypt was condemned by the MAC for the incident. Three days later, Israel launched its raid into the Gaza Strip killing thirty-six soldiers and wounding twenty-nine.

In the period from September 1954 to February 28, 1955, Egypt was condemned fourteen times by the MAC and Israel six. Moreover, a chronological examination of UNTSO reports for this period shows that each of the six times Israel violated the armistice came only after an Egyptian provocation.64 Israel was condemned for the Gaza raid in a strongly worded resolution by the Security Council on March 29. However, the following day, in a reference to Egypt, the Council called upon both parties to cooperate with the chief of staff of UNTSO, E. Burns, noting that in his opinion, “infiltration could be reduced to an occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties on the lines he has proposed.”65

The Negev A strategic piece of territory as far as Nasser was concerned was the

Negev, the desert area comprising the southern part of Israel. Pan- Arabism could only be achieved if Egypt could acquire a land link to neighboring Arab countries, and only the Negev could provide Egypt with such a link.66 Nasser’s refusal to agree to Burns’s proposals for fenced-off boundaries can be attributed, in part, to his reluctance to recognize any permanent boundaries between the Gaza Strip and the Negev. T o do so would preclude any chance of acquiring this land link

6sErnest Stock, Israel on the Road to Sinai (Ithaca, 1967), 71; UN document S/3373,

64UN document S/3319, Annex, 20-28; S/3373, Annex 4, 71-88. 65S/3374, 30 March 1955. For Burns’s proposals, see p. 113. 66Egypt wanted the Negev in 1949 as a means of persuading the British to leave

the Suez Canal Zone. Britain was ready to leave the zone providing it could have an alternate base in the Negev. Israel, however, was unwilling to cede any territory. C. Ernest Dawn, “Pan-Arabism and the Failure of Israeli-Jordanian Peace Negotiations,” in Islam and its Cultural Divergence, ed. Girdhari Tikku (Chicago, 1971). 30, 31, 40, 42. On Arab territorial desiderata in 1948, see Zimmerman, “Clayton Pact.”

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17 March 1955, 36.

Nasser and Suez to other Arab countries. Nasser had hoped, no doubt, that the sabo- tage incidents directed at the Negev beginning in the summer of 1954 would discourage Israelis from settling there.

After the meeting with Naguib in 1953, Dulles recorded that he would “insist . . . on a corridor arrangement linking Egypt with other Arab States.”67 Not surprisingly, it is in July 1954 that Egypt began to press the issue of the Negev; in the same month, it will be recalled, the doctrine of pan-Arabism was becoming more sharply defined and the formation of guerrilla contingents in Gaza was announced. On July 25, the Voice of the Arabs asserted that the Negev was part of the territory extending from North Sinai (in Egypt) to the Euphrates and noted the fact that it linked the Arab countries.68 On September 13, Radio Damascus quoted Nasser as saying that Israel must evacuate the Negev, which divides the Arab world in two parts. “In his belief,” the broadcast went on, “Egypt and the other Arab States must recover this area.” Shortly afterwards, Radio Cairo said that international opinion must convince Israel to abandon the Negev.69

Although Egypt was adamantly opposed to any Arab country join- ing a Western defense pact, it was willing to use the idea of such an alliance to bring pressure on Israel to cede the Negev. Saleh Salem stated that the Negev was Egypt’s price for joining a defense pact. There was no United States response, and Salem denied that he had made the statement; however, he omitted any reference to the Negev in his denial, so Egypt’s position was understood on this point.70

In speeches given in August and November 1955, Dulles and Brit- ish Prime Minister Anthony Eden gave strong hints that Israel should abandon the Negev.7’ Some light on Dulles’s private views on this issue is shed in a letter to Bernard Katzen, a close personal friend of his, from the secretary’s special assistant, John W. Hanes, Jr. Hanes wrote that Dulles believed that “probably the principal obstacle” to the solution of the boundary problem was Egypt’s seeking “a substan- tial part of the Negev so as to have common boundaries with Jordan and Saudi Arabia.”72

In September 1955, after Egypt began receiving Soviet arms,

67Dulles Papers, Box 73. 68Ironically. Israel was often accused by the Arabs of wanting to expand from the

69Radio Cairo, 24 September 1954. See also Berger, Covenant, 172-73. ‘OJOMER, 25 March and 1 April 1955; MEJ, 1955,3 18. See also MM, 18 December

7’Text of speeches in Hurewitz, Diplomacy, 2: 395-98, 413-15. 74Letter dated 25 August 1955 in the Dulles Papers, Box 93. When Dulles came

under fire for making a controversial statement about American Jews and the Republi- can Party, it was Katzen who, after meeting with the secretary, issued an explanation to the press. Text of statement issued on 29 June 1953 in Dulles Papers, Box 73.

Nile to the Euphrates.

1954, 21.

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The Historian Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Two months later David Ben-Gurion reassumed the office of prime minister and ad- vanced a plan to seize the Sharm-el-Sheikh, the strip of land in the Sinai Peninsula which overlooks the entrance to the Gulf. Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan approved the plan. He was convinced that the blockade of the Gulf “is part of an overall plan to seize the Negev.” The plan was rejected by the Cabinet until circumstances should be more favorable.73

The View from Israel Israel’s policy of reprisals against neighboring Arab countries had

been established well before the Gaza raid. After a series of sabotage incidents directed against Israel, a massive retaliation would be launched.74 One of the chief architects of this policy was David Ben- Gurion, Israel’s prime minister from the founding of the state in 1948 until he resigned in November 1953. Ben-Gurion resigned over the issue of retaliation but hoped to return once his view had prevailed.75 He was succeeded by Moshe Sharett, Israel’s foreign minister.

Ben-Gurion believed that “defense considerations must determine foreign policy.” In his view, security took preference over foreign affairs. Sharett’s emphasis, however, was on diplomatic relations. His widely acclaimed diplomatic successes enabled him to become prime minister and to retain the position of foreign minister as well. Ben- Gurion and his coterie saw the security situation as deteriorating from 1954 onward, and thus “the clash between the two approaches in- creased in intensity.”76

Amidst clamors for a tougher policy toward Egypt, Sharett ap- peared before Israel’s Knesset (Parliament) in January 1955 to an- nounce his opposition to an activist line. He argued that Israel must be a “state of law or of piracy.” A few days later Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon rebuked Sharett by saying that Israel must be a state of “law and self-defense.”77

7SMoshe Dayan, Diary ofthe Smai Campaign (London, 1966), 12-15. Shortly before Egypt announced the blockade of Aqaba, a publication of the Arab News Agency re- ported that Egypt was planning a land link to other Arab countries. However, the publication discussed only a project for a ferry which would link the Sharm el Sheikh with Aqaba and Jordan, MM, 13 August 1955.

74Moshe Brilliant, ‘‘Israel’s Policy of Reprisals,” Harpers, March 1955, 68-73: Michael Handel, Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass., 1973), 2 1.

75Amos Perlmutter, Military and Politics in Israel (London, 1969), 85. 76Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel (New Haven, 1972). 379-91,

and chapter 12 on the differences between the two men. See also Peter Medding, M a p i in Israel (Cambridge, 1972). 215-16; Perlmutter, Military and Politics, 84; and Stock, Israel,

“Stock, Israel, 123. Sharett later said that had it not been for the Gaza raid, “Nasser 124-26.

might not have been forced into the Czech deal.. . .” Brecher, Foreign Policy System, 287.

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Nasser and Suez Sharett made an attempt to warn Nasser of what might happen if

sabotage from the Gaza Strip continued. The message was carried by Turkish journalist Arslan Humbaraci, who traveled back and forth between Israel and Egypt during this period. He told Egyptian officials of the problems Sharett was having.

Sharett was being severly criticized for his moderation and there were extremists arguing that it paid no dividends. . . . I was asked to tell the Egyptians not to persist in their blindness and to make allowances for the internal developments in Israel. Any gesture of appeasement, however symbolic, would help to maintain Sharett’s position. The alternative was “real trouble and raids on a hitherto unknown scale.” I passed the mes- sage to one of Nasser’s right-hand men.’*

In November 1954, Sharett sent British Member of Parliament Maurice Orbach on a secret mission to Egypt. Orbach met with Nasser on two occasions and consulted with Egyptian officials in the period from November 1954 to January 1955.79 Orbach told Nasser that Israel was ready to enter into a confidential agreement to include the cessation of interference with Israeli and Israel-bound cargoes through the Suez Canal; release of the But Calim, the Israeli ship seized by Egypt (see above); an end to border incidents, hostile anti-Israeli propaganda, and the Arab economic boycott; and secret high-level exchanges to discuss the future of relations between the two countries. Of special concern to Sharett was the trial of thirteen Jews in Cairo on espionage charges. He feared that excessively harsh penalties would stir Israeli passions. Nasser did not comment on the proposals beyond saying that he would discuss them with his colleagues. Instead, he turned the discussion to his problems with Syria.

Nasser’s reply came from Ali Sabry, wing commander of the Air Force, who told Orbach that Nasser would try to see that no inflamma- tory sentences were passed on the Jews being tried for espionage; attend to the release of the But Galim; refrain from hostile propaganda if Israel did the same; take measures to tighten the border against incursions; and investigate the possibility of high-level secret contacts.

Nothing, however, came of these guarantees. Only the crew of the But Galim was released. Of the thirteen Jews on trial, two died in prison, two were executed, and the rest were given harsh prison sen- tences. This greatly aggravated the already tense situation along the Israeli-Gaza border and probably played a role in Israel’s decision to launch the Gaza raid. A confidential letter to Orbach from Israel’s Foreign Ministry stated that Nasser and his representatives had given

78Humbaraci. Middle Emf, 198-99. See also Berger, Covenant, 180-81. 79This account is taken from Orbach’s hitherto secret report to Sharett on the

results of his contacts. It was published in Nnu Outlook (Tel Aviv), October, November, and December 1974 and January 1975.

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The Historian “explicit promises and implicit assurrances . . . to a great variety of public and private personalities or directly to representatives of Israel to the effect that moderation will prevail in regard to the sentences.”80

A security mishap involving Israel’s defense minister, Pinhas Lavon,81 paved the way for the return of Ben-Gurion, which “signaled an end to the experiment in moderation attempted by Sharett.”8* Three of the Western world’s leading pro-Arab spokesmen-Kennet Love, Erskine Childers, and Maxime Rodinson-have, in various de- grees, observed Sharett’s moderation.83 Even Radio Cairo said that the Egyptians had maintained a feeling of favor for Sharett while he was in office.84 Although Sharett remained prime minister until November 1955, it was the Ben-Gurion school of thought which was now ascend- ant.

Conclusion Britain’s decision in July 1954 to sign an agreement to evacuate the

Suez Canal Zone allowed Nasser to turn his attention to Israel. For it is in July that we find Egypt announcing its pan-Arab policy, reopening the Palestine question, and pressing Israel to cede the Negev. The decision to seek Soviet arms was inspired, no doubt, by the belief that they would help Nasser in his pursuit of the above objectives. Conse- quently, a whole new era in Arab-Israeli relations was about to begin.

The Israeli activists led by Ben-Gurion used Egypt’s new hardline policy to discredit the moderate approach by Sharett. Ben-Gurion’s ascendance as defense minister in February 1955 marked the end of the influence over the government held by what might be called the doves in the Mapai, the ruling governmental party to which Sharett and Ben-Gurion belonged.

The period immediately preceding the Gaza raid is probably the most important in post-1948 Arab-Israeli relations. For it was here that Egypt and Israel85 developed and became locked into policies which would lead them through two ruinous wars (1956 and 1967) and end- less border clashes.

soLetter of 8 February 1955 in New Outlook, January 1975, 19-20. S1The scandal known as the Lavon affair plagued Israel for ten years. See Michael

WStock, Israel, 126. ssKennet Love, Suez: The Twice Fought War (New York, 1970). 48; Erskine Childers,

The Road to Suez (London, 1962), 130; Maxime Rodinson, Israel and the Arabs (London, 1968). 69. Love and Childers are staunch Nasser-supporters.

Bar Zohar, Ben Cunon: The Anned Prophet (New Jersey, 1968). 177-85.

s4Radio Cairo, 12 June 1956, quoted in Love, Suez, 122. S5Perlmutter writes that the years 1953-55 saw great institutional changes in Is-

rael’s military “where crucial political decisions were taken, determining Israel’s defense policies for a decade.” Militaty and Politics in Israel, 83.

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