The Origin of Terrorism in Muslim History

8/10/2019 The Origin of Terrorism in Muslim History

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Here we will give quick reading intervals where we briefly read the Islamic History from a

geographic or a Najd perspective:

1.In "Najd" extremism began early, when it was the main center of the apostasy movement, In

those plains of Hanifa, Musaylimah the liar appeared and allied with Sajah of Tamimah, but

let us remember that in the same Hanifa Plains, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, later the

father of Wahhabism was born and lived. The Glorious Quran has described most of the

Arabs that they are the most disbelieving and hypocrite (Al-Tawbah 9: 97).The Arabs have

submitted to Muslims force and made peace with them, although Islam did not enter their

hearts yet (Al-Hujurat 49: 14.) When Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him died and Abu-

Bakr took over, they rebelled against the state in a huge military movement with Najd as its

center and they attacked Al- Medina, it is not true that Abu-Bakr fought against the

apostates, the truth is that it was the apostates who started the fight against Abu-Bakr and

Muslims. After the suppression of apostasy movement with great difficulty Abu-Bakr saw

that it was best to get rid of Najd Bedouins by exporting their military power abroad towardsnorthern Najd, so the movement of the Arab conquests started to the north first in Iraq, then

Syria and Iran. And the armies of the conquests were formed of the majority of Arabs

(previously apostates) under the leadership of the Quraish Umayyad (Previously opponents)

because the Umayyad saw that their own political and social benefit makes it imperative for

them to enter into the new religion, and hastened to be in the front rows in the conquests

with their war experience, roads knowledge and their close links to other Arab tribes in the

Levant and on the trade routes. The conquests ended by finding the Umayyad ruling Syria,

Iraq, Egypt and North Africa in the name of Islam. During the succession of Osman, they

took control of him and through him they took revenge against their former enemies in

Islam, such as Ammar and Ibn-Masood, and it was easy to bypass all this ordinarily exceptthat the Umayyad in the succession of Osman clashed with the Najd Bedouins and the great

strife came to existence, the strife which we are still walking through its dark tunnel till now.

1.The case of "Sawad" was the beginning of great strife. Sawad is the agricultural land located

between Najd and Iraq, the Najd Arabs were looking forward to owning Sawad because it is

closest to their home, where they used to attack it before Islam and dream of owning it, but

the Umayyad did not allow them to do so and considered the "Sawad" to be the " Quraish

orchard" revolution was inflamed, and the Najd rebels killed Osman after surrounding him,and appointed "Ali" as the Caliph. The civil war erupted and the Najd Arabs were the

backbone of Alis army, but it was not long before they turned on Ali and killed him, they

were known as Al-Khawarej, which means the outlaws.

With this the Najd Arabs were transformed from Muslims in the time of the Prophet (In spite of

Quraish) to apostates (after Quraish embraced it), and then Muslims for the second time (after


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rebels killed thirty thousand people when they seized the city of Al-Ablah in Iraq in 256 AH.

In the following year the leader of Zinj entered Basra after he gave the promise of safety to its

people, but he reneged on his promise, killed its people and enslaved its women and

children, and burned the mosque down. Among those enslaved were woman of Al-Ashraf

whom he distributed among his Zinj foot soldiers. They were sold in is his camp for two and

three Dirhams per woman. When one of them asked the Zinj leader for refuge from her Zinj

owners harshness he said to her: "He is your Lord and the first for you over others." (Hisory

of Al-Tabari: 9, 472, 481, and Al-Msooudy: Gold Promoter 4: 146).

And soon after we find that the Najd Arabs inflamed a new huge revolution under the name of

Qaramita and with an invitation where Shiism was mixed with other ideologies. Their raids

stretched into Iraq, Syria and the Egyptian borders, and the Kaaba was not spared from their

destruction. They have preceded the Mongols in the scorched earth policy, or the extermination of all

neighborhoods in cities that they seized. Al-Tabari the historian witnessed a side of their atrocities

and recorded it in the tenth and final part of his history between 286 and 302 H. Their atrocitiescontinued after Al-Tabari for almost two centuries until they were beaten by the Arabs of Muntafiq.

The Qaramita were more brutal in their bloodshed and symptoms, and from a stand of an eye

witness Al- Tabari included some news of their leader, including that he assigned a boy of his, only

to kill Muslim captives, and that he eradicated all of the people of Humah and Maarrat Nooman,

killing women and children in both cities, then marched to Baalbek and killed its people, and

marched to Salmeyah promising them safety and security, and when they opened its doors, he

started by killing people of Bani-Hashim and then killed the rest of its population including little

boys in Quranic schools, and then went out of the city without a blinking eye left in it, and wreaked

havoc and bloodshed in the surrounding villages. As for what he did in the Kaaba and the killing of

pilgrims and dumping the bodies in the well of Zamzam, and the uprooting of black stone, there area lot of elaborated news. This brutal killing of innocent people was based on the intellectual

approach referred to by Al-Nowiri when he spoke of Intellectual Education of young Qaramitah, as

referred to by Al-Tabari in the realistic story for a young man who was convinced by Qaramitah

religion and he abandoned his mother and his family convinced of the new religion believing in

lawfully shedding the blood of others. (News of Qaramitah in History of Al-Tabari: 10, 71, 77, 86, 94,

99, 107, 115, 116, 121, 128, 130, 135 & 148. And in The End of Arb by Al-Nowiri: 25, 195-227 and

after).

4 - After Qaramita, the Najd Arabs returned to their custom of highway banditry on pilgrims and

fighting among themselves, this kept on happening until that Muhammad bin Abdul-Wahhab

appeared from them with his religious calling and his alliance with Ibn Saud. The most important

article in their alliance was their oath of (blood, blood, demolition demolition), Ibn Abdul-Wahhab

gave Ibn Saud the legislation of lawful Allowance after accusing all of the other Muslims of being

infidels and made that accusation a religious justification for the invasion and expansion, and thus

the first Saudi state was established. Looting and bloodshed spread in the Arabian Peninsula and

around the Gulf and in Iraq and the Levant, which forced the Ottoman Empire to seek the help of its


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Vice-Sergeant in Egypt, "Mohammed Ali Pasha " who finished off the Saudi state and destroyed its

capital" Dareyah " in the year 1818.

In essence, the massacres by Al-Khawarej, Zinj and Qaramita - do not differ from those massacres

carried out by Wahhabi and Saudis of Najd to establish their first Saudi state, and the third current

Saudi State. Their massacres have reached Iraq, Syria and the Sacred House and other cities of Hijaz,

most of their victims were women, children and the elderly.

The school of thought, which was used by Qaramita to brainwash their youth doesnt differ from the

intellectual thought which was prepared by Wahhabi Scholars for young Arabs of Najd in the second

decade of the twentieth century, which turns young Bedouin into a stubborn combatant when he

sees Jihad in the Allowance of killing anyone who is not Wahhabi, and through this cultural setting

the "Brothers" emerged, they were the tough soldiers of Abdul Aziz Al Saud who founded the

current Saudi state. Their reputation of murder and destruction terrorized villages of Syria and Iraq.

Their intellectual preparation is no different from the cultural setting carried out by the Brothers

groups and the rest of the overt and covert organizations in our contemporary history. This

transforms the pacifist young Egyptian into a terrorist who easily allows himself to bomb streets and

buildings believing that it is jihad in the name of God. It is also not so different from the tremendous

brutality by which extremists in Algeria dealt with members of the peaceful people of women and

children, and the Taliban movement is not so far off, they were soaked with the Salafi Wahhabi

ideology.

First Wahhabi Saudi state (1745 to 1818)

Here we give some quick historical details:

The first Saudi state was based on the alliance between Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdul-

Wahhab and Prince Muhammad bin Saud of Dareya, a forgotten city in the desert of Najd.

This alliance took place in 1158 H (1745), and with it Ibn Abdul-Wahhab gave Bin Saud a

legitimate justification to invade other countries and regions and occupy and kill their

peoples after accusing them of blasphemy and coercing them into accepting Wahhabism as

Islam, claiming that this is the Jihad, who was carried out by Prophet Muhammad peace be

upon him.

With this alliance the first Saudi state came to life from 1745 to 1818, and killed hundreds of

thousands of peaceful population of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Syria. Saudis began byoccupying all of Najd then they took over Al-Ahsaa and expanded their raids to reach Qatar,

Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, then they took over Hijaz, and fought Yemen. They looked forward

to the occupation of Iraq and the Levant, and their expansion linked to massacres and

destruction led to the compulsion of the Ottoman Empire to use their strong War- Lord in

Egypt, its governor (Muhammad Ali Pasha), who sent two campaigns to Hijaz to restore it


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from the Saudi Wahhabi in 1811 and the war between him and them continued until the

Saudi capital of Dareyah was destroyed in 1818.

The blood of peaceful Muslims shed into rivers by those Saudi Wahhabi raids committed by

the First Saudi State, we will suffice with what (Othman Ibn Bishr Al-Nagdy), the historian of

the first Saudi state in his book (The Glory Address in the History of Najd) regarding theevents of the massacre of Karbala in the year 1216 H: And therein Saud walked (Meaning

Saud bin Abdul-Aziz Bin Mohammed Bin Saud) with his victorious armies and the old

famous horses from all the cities and deserts of Najd towards the land of Karbala in the

month of Zulqidah. He surrounded the city by Muslims who climbed its walls and forced

themselves inside it. They killed most of its people in marketplaces and houses and

destroyed the dome which was thought to be on the tomb of Hussein. They took what was in

the dome and around it and took the tombstone which was paved with emeralds, rubies and

gemstones and took all what they found in the country of the types of funds, weapons,

clothing, furniture, gold, silver and precious Qurans, and other things which cannot be

counted). The brutality of the Saudi Wahhabi in the massacre of Karbala lead to panic of the

people of Iraq and the death of ruler of Iraq Suleiman Pasha due to anguish in the same year

(1216 H 1801). The Shah of Irans threat to invade Iraq to protect Shiite holy sites in it did not

prevent the continuation of the Saudi Wahhabi raids into Iraq which was transformed by

their hands to chaos and destruction. And Othman Ibn Bishr Al-Nagdy proudly responded

to criticism of Muslims for what the Wahhabi have done to the people of Karbala by saying:

(And your saying that we took Karbala and slaughtered and took its people? then praise be

to Allah Lord of the two worlds. We do not apologize for that and say: And to the

Unbelievers the same ". He says in another place: And westayed in it for ten days and

slaughtered and destroyed what have reached you of knowledge . Reasoning here is clear;he considered the Wahhabis to be the only Muslims, and so he always described them alone

with this description (Muslims) while making others including Shiites as infidels Allowing

to kill them all and plunder their wealth in accordance with the decision of Sheikh

Mohammed bin Abdul-Wahhab in his letters.

The same historian describes another battle where the victims were the Bedouins of the Sons of

Khalid when the same Prince Saud led a surprise attack on them while they were watering their

animals from a water spring at Al-Gahra area in the year 1207 H. Ibn Bishr says in the same book:

The Muslims jumped on them while riding or walking and they couldnt hold on for one hour. So

the Sons of Khalid were defeated. The Muslims followed their trail killing and looting and theyeradicated those groups .

Second Saudi State (1821-1889)

The Islamic world was relieved by military elimination of the Saudi state. But confronting the state

ideology is not done by merely eliminating it militarily since it must be addressed intellectually from


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within the religion itself, and this is what was not done by Mohamed Ali Pasha or the Ottoman

Empire. This was not done either by Abdul-Nasser in his battle with the Muslim Brothehood who

are the Egyptian edition of the Bedouin Najd Wahhabi.

This lack of intellectual confrontation of Wahhabism lead to its increased spread. During the

absence of the Saudi state Wahhabism gained more power, especially that the Wahhabi had a strong

argument against Sufis and Shiites in their sanctity -given to shrines and divinity given to the dead.

The first Saudi state lived for nearly a century (1745-1818), so it was not expected that the Wahhabi

calling would end after the fall of its first Saudi state and the destruction of its capital Dereya, and

the killing of its ruler in Asitana. The momentum of this calling managed to give the people of Najd

recognition by others, they considered other Muslims to be infidels who worshiped shrines and

idols, so it was easy for the Wahhabi calling to establish the second Saudi state quickly, but the feud

among Saudi princes made this second state limited in its impact and at the end it fell.

The establishment of the third current Saudi state (1902, 1925) by efforts of Najdi Brothers:

In a nutshell: The young man Abdul-Aziz bin Abdul-Rahman bin Faisal Al Saud (known historically

as Ibn -son of- Saud) managed to establish the third Saudi State which still exists till now spreading

its Wahhabi doctrine all over the world as Islam, and with it spreads terrorism in the name of Islam.

Abdul-Aziz faced huge difficulties in retrieving the kinghood of his fathers, after he seized Riyadh in

1902, the worked on resettlement of young Bedouins in colonies or nomads, most important of them

were Al- Artawiyah and Al-Ghutghut where Wahhabi teachers teaching Wahhabism as Islam, and

it was easy for them to convince Najd Bedouin of Wahhabism, not only because its roots wereconcentrated in the Najdi desert and others, but because Wahhabism give those Bedouin warriors an

opportunity to continue their normal lives based on looting, murder and highway robbery by

making murder, looting, bounty gathering as jihad, then promising them Heaven if killed .

With the Brothers, Abdul-Aziz was able to annex Al-Ah-saa, and open Haael and Shammar and

defeat Al-Rasheed clan, the seizure of Asir, the seizure of Hijaz, with the continuation of the attack

on Kuwait, Iraq, and Transjordan.

But the Najdi Brothers opposition to Abdul-Aziz started early, dispute raged between them about

conquering Haael in the year 1915, and then on unemployment and employment so the conferenceof scholars was held in 1919, Al-Artawyah conference in 1924 to liquidate differences, but they broke

out again while invading the Hijaz, because of massacres committed by the Brothers in Taif.

After annexation of Hijaz, Abdul-Aziz returned the Brothers to Najd. Hijaz people were terrified of

them. Abdul-Aziz entered in final attempts to heal the rift between him and them and several


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conferences were held: Al-Artawyah Conference: in December 1926, and the Riyadh conference:

January 1927, then the General Assembly or the General Conference in Riyadh 05/11/1928.

After the failure of those conferences military confrontation became a must between Abdul-Aziz and

his Najdi Brothers in the battle of Siblah, and that was the beginning of the end of the Najdi Brothers

between 1928 and 1929.

The role of the Najdi Brothers in strengthening the State of Ibn Saud ended early without them

knowing that their shrewd leader had planned their early retirement early after they opened Hijaz

with their swords in the year 1925, as he thought of forming new Brothers in Egypt who are the

Muslim Brothers, to spread the Wahhabi ideology and to be more subtle than the Najdi Bedouin

Brothers famous for their harshness, crudity and candor.

The roots of terrorism ideology of the Najdi Brothers

Here well have a detailed stop with the roots of terrorism ideology of the Najdi Brothers in

accordance with what they have learned at the hands of the Wahhabi sheikhs. These foundations can

be summarized in the following elements: hatred of the other, Takfeering him (Considering him an

infidel or Kafer), and legitimizing the shedding of his blood and plundering his wealth.

1.Hatred of the other:

Qur'an speaks about hatred of the infidel aggressors who forced Muslims out of their homes

,plundered their wealth, hurt and fought them because they chose a religion different from their

forefathers (Al-Baqarah 2: 217) (Al-Tawbah 9: 8, 15,23-24) (Al-Anfal 8: 30, 38-40) (Al-Mujadalah 58:

20-22) (Al-Momtahinah: 8-9) In other words, the measure of hatred is aggression and injustice,

which means that the Associator(The one who associates others with God) who does not transgress

or oppress others, there is no reason for hating or abusing him and therefore, fighting is in response

to comparable assault and not to attack the peaceful (Al-Baqarah 2: 190-194) and on this basis that is

how the real life of the Prophet was lived in the Holy Quran if we read it objectively and according to

its terminology.

But the biography which was scripted in the Abbasid age reflects their perception of the Prophet

from the reality of the religious state ideology. This perception was connected by development and

frequency to Ibn Abdul-Wahhab via fanatic Sunni Jurisprudence established by Ibn Hanbal in the

third Hijri century, then Ibn Taymiyyah in the eighth century H. Ibn Abdul-Wahhab inherited this

hard-line jurisprudence and dyed it with the Najdi nature so Wahhabism in its theoretical

foundations and its practical applications turned out to be the most horrible ideology produced in

the Arabian Peninsula and applied to non-Wahhabi Muslims and non-Muslims.

Definition of Terrorism


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"the unlawful use of -- or threatened use of -- force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidategovernments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."

-- U.S. Department of Defense publication

In the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S., the threat of militantIslamic terrorism -- rooted in the Middle East and South Asia -- has taken center stae.

!hile these e"tremel# $iolent reliious e"tremists represent a minorit# $iew, their

threat is real. As pointed out %# &A'()s *ruce +offman, in 10 two out of /

roups were cateoried as larel# reliious in moti$ation in 1 almost half of the

identified roups, 2 out of , were classified as reliiousl# moti$ated the ma3orit#

of these espoused Islam as their uidin force.

4o %etter understand the roots and threat of militant Islam, here)s a closer look at how

modern terrorism has e$ol$ed in the Middle East and South Asia.

4he colonial era, failed post-colonial attempts at state formation, and the creation of

Israel enendered a series of Mar"ist and anti-!estern transformations and

mo$ements throuhout the Ara% and Islamic world. 4he rowth of these nationalist

and re$olutionar# mo$ements, alon with their $iew that terrorism could %e effecti$e

in reachin political oals, enerated the first phase of modern international terrorism.

In the late 10s 5alestinian secular mo$ements such as Al 6atah and the 5opular6ront for the 7i%eration of 5alestine 856759 %ean to taret ci$ilians outside the

immediate arena of conflict. 6ollowin Israel)s 1: defeat of Ara% forces, 5alestinian

leaders realied that the Ara% world was una%le to militaril# confront Israel. At the

same time, lessons drawn from re$olutionar# mo$ements in 7atin America, 'orth

Africa, Southeast Asia as well as durin the ;ewish strule aainst *ritain in

5alestine, saw the 5alestinians mo$e awa# from classic uerrilla, t#picall# rural-

%ased, warfare toward ur%an terrorism. &adical 5alestinians took ad$antae of modern

communication and transportation s#stems to internationalie their strule. 4he#

launched a series of hi3ackins, kidnappins, %om%ins, and shootins, culminatin in

the kidnappin and su%se


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oraniations. *# the end of the 1:0s, the 5alestinian secular network was a ma3or

channel for the spread of terrorist techni1?is a Mar"ist-7eninist roup founded in 1:

%# @eore +a%ash. 4he roup was aainst the 1 (eclaration of 5rinciples

participation in the 57= was also suspended. 5articipated in meetins with

Arafat)s 6atah part# and 57= representati$es in 1 to discuss national unit#

%ut continues to oppose neotiations with Israel. Bommitted numerous

international terrorist attacks durin the 1:0s, has alleedl# %een in$ol$ed in

attacks aainst Israel since the %einnin of the second intifadah in Septem%er

2000. S#ria has %een a ke# source of safe ha$en and limited loistical support.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-

GC):4his roup, led %# Ahmed ;i%ril, split from the 5675 in 1, wantin to

focus more on terrorist than political action $iolentl# opposed to the 57= and

is closel# tied to S#ria and Iran. 4he 5675-@B conducted multiple attacks in

Europe and the Middle East durin the 1:0s and 10s. Uni


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!hile these secular 5alestinians dominated the scene durin the 1:0s, reliious

mo$ements also rew. 4he failure of Ara% nationalism in the 1: war resulted in the

strenthenin of %oth proressi$e and e"tremist Islamic mo$ements. In the Middle

East, Islamic mo$ements increasinl# came into opposition with secular nationalism,

pro$idin an alternati$e source of social welfare and education in the $acuum left %#

the lack of o$ernment-led de$elopment -- a ke# e"ample is 4he Muslim*rotherhood. Islamic roups were supported %# anti-nationalist conser$ati$e reimes,

such as Saudi Ara%ia, to counter the e"pansion of nationalist ideolo#. et political

Islam, >2?more open to proressi$e chane, was seen as a threat to conser$ati$e Ara%

reimes and thus support for more fundamentalist -- and e"tremist -- roups occurred

to com%at %oth nationalist and political Islamist mo$ements.

Meanwhile, in Iran, a turn to re$olutionar# Shia Islam under the leadership of

A#atollah Chomeini further eroded the power and leitimac# of the U.S.-%acked

authoritarian 5ahle$i reime, settin the stae for the Shah)s downfall.

4he #ear 1: was a turnin point in international terrorism. 4hrouhout the Ara%

world and the !est, the Iranian Islamic re$olution sparked fears of a wa$e of

re$olutionar# Shia Islam. Meanwhile, the So$iet in$asion of Afhanistan and the

su%se


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Ira< and S#ria were hea$il# in$ol$ed in supportin $arious terrorist roups, with

*ahdad usin the A%u 'idal =raniation on se$eral occasions. State sponsors used

terrorist roups to attack Israeli as well as !estern interests, in addition to domestic

and reional opponents. It should %e noted that the American polic# of listin state

sponsors was hea$il# politicied, and did not include se$eral countries -- %oth allies

and opponents of !ashinton -- that, under U.S. o$ernment definitions, were uilt#of supportin or usin terrorism.

Key Radical Religious Groups

(descriptions taen directly from the U.S. State Department publication "!atterns of lobal #errorism, $%%%"&

ezbollahG &adical Shia roup formed in 12 in 7e%anon. Stronl# anti-

!estern and anti-Israeli. Blosel# allied with, and often directed %#, Iran %ut

ma# ha$e conducted operations that were not appro$ed %# 4ehran. Cnown or

suspected to ha$e %een in$ol$ed in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks,

includin the suicide truck %om%in of the U.S. Em%ass#and U.S. Marine

%arracks in *eirutin =cto%er 1 and the U.S. Em%ass# anne" in *eirutin

Septem%er 1/. Elements of the roup were responsi%le for the kidnappin

and detention of U.S. and other !estern hostaesin 7e%anon. 4he roup also

attacked the Israeli Em%ass# in Arentina in 12 and is a suspect in the 1/

%om%in of the Israeli cultural center in *uenos Aires. =perates in the *ekaa

Dalle#, the southern su%ur%s of *eirut, and southern 7e%anon. +as esta%lished

cells in Europe, Africa, South America, 'orth America, and Asia. &ecei$essu%stantial amounts of financial, trainin, weapons, e"plosi$es, political,

diplomatic, and oraniational aid from Iran and S#ria.

!g"ptian #slami$ %ihad (!#% - Al-%ihad& %ihad Group& #slami$ %ihad)G

E#ptian roup acti$e since the late 1:0s. 4he EI; is apparentl# split into two

factionsG one led %# A#man al-Hawahiri - who currentl# is in Afhanistan and is

a ke# leader in the Usama %in 7aden 8U*79 network - and the Danuards of

Bon


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rather than a cohesi$e roup. 4he 5I; focus is the destruction of Israel and the

creation of a 5alestinian Islamic state. (ue to !ashinton)s support of Israel,

the 5I; has threatened to strike American tarets the 5I; has not Fspecificall#F

conducted attacks aainst U.S. interests Ara% reimes deemed as un-Islamic

are also threatened. 4he roup has stated its willinness to hit American tarets

in ;ordan. 5I; cadres reportedl# recei$e fundin from 4ehran and loisticalsupport from S#ria.

#slami$ 'esistan$e oement (AA*):Emerin from the Muslim

*rotherhood durin the first 5alestinian intifadah 81:9, +AMAS has %ecome

the primar# anti-Israeli reliious opposition in the occupied territories. 4he

roup is mainl# known for its use of suicide %om%ers and is loosel# oranied,

with centers of strenth in @aa and certain areas in the !est *ank. +AMAS,

while condemnin American policies fa$orin Israel, has not tareted the U.S.

directl#.

Al-Gamaat Al-#slami""a (#G - the #slami$ Group& al-Gama+at& #slami$

Gama+at& !g"ptian al-Gama+at al-#slami""a& G#):4he I@, %eun in the

1:0s, is the larest of the E#ptian militant roups. Its core oal is the

o$erthrow of the Bairo reime and creation of an Islamic state. 4he I@ appears

to %e a more loosel# oranied entit# than the EI;, and maintains a lo%all#

present e"ternal win. I@ leadership sined Usama *in 7adin)s 6e%ruar# 1

anti-U.S. fatwa %ut has denied supportin U*7. Sha#kh Umar A%d al-&ahman

is al-@ama)at)s spiritual leader, and thus the U.S. has %een threatened with

attack. 6rom 1 until the cease-fire, al-@ama)a launched attacks on tourists in

E#pt, most nota%l# the attack in 'o$em%er 1: at 7u"or that killed forein tourists. Also claimed responsi%ilit# for the attempt in ;une 1 to

assassinate E#ptian 5resident +osni Mu%arak in Addis A%a%a, Ethiopia. +as a

worldwide presence, includin Sudan, the United Cindom, Afhanistan,

Austria, and emen. 4he E#ptian @o$ernment %elie$es that Iran, *in 7adin,

and Afhan militant roups support the oraniation.

4he disinteration of post-Bold !ar states, and the Bold !ar leac# of a world awashin ad$anced con$entional weapons and know-how, has assisted the proliferation of

terrorism worldwide. Dacuums of sta%ilit# created %# conflict and a%sence of

o$ernance in areas such as the *alkans, Afhanistan, Bolom%ia, and certain African

countries offer read# made areas for terrorist trainin and recruitment acti$it#, while

smulin and dru traffickin routes are often e"ploited %# terrorists to support

operations worldwide. !ith the increasin ease of transnational transportation and


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communication, the continued willinness of states such as Iran and Ira< to pro$ide

support, and dehumaniin ideoloies that ena%le mass casualt# attacks, the lethal

potential of terrorist $iolence has reached new heihts.

4he reion of Afhanistan -- it is not a countr# in the con$entional sense -- has,

particularl# since the 1 So$iet withdrawal, emered as a terrorist trainin round.5akistan, strulin to %alance its needs for political-economic reform with a

domestic reliious aenda, pro$ides assistance to terrorist roups %oth in Afhanistan

and Cashmir while actin as a further transit area %etween the Middle East and South

Asia.

Since their emerence in 1/, the 5akistani-supported 4ali%an militia in Afhanistan

has assumed se$eral characteristics traditionall# associated with state-sponsors of

terrorism, pro$idin loistical support, tra$el documentation, and trainin facilities.

Althouh radical roups such as the E#ptian Islamic ;ihad, =sama %in 7aden)s Al

aeda, and Cashmiri militants were in Afhanistan prior to the 4ali%an, the spread of4ali%an control has seen Afhan-%ased terrorism e$ol$e into a relati$el# coordinated,

widespread acti$it# focused on sustainin and de$elopin terrorist capa%ilities. Since

the mid-10s, 5akistani-%acked terrorist roups fihtin in Cashmir ha$e

increasinl# used trainin camps inside 4ali%an-controlled areas. At the same time,

mem%ers of these roups, as well as thousands of #ouths from 5akistan)s 'orthwest

6rontier 5ro$ince 8'!659, ha$e fouht with the 4ali%an aainst opposition forces.

4his acti$it# has seen the rise of e"tremism in parts of 5akistan neih%orin

Afhanistan, further complicatin the a%ilit# of Islama%ad to e"ert control o$er

militants. Moreo$er, the intermi"in of 5akistani mo$ements with the 4ali%an and

their Ara%-Afhan allies has seen ties %etween these roups strenthen.

Since 1 the increasin willinness of reliious e"tremists to strike tarets outside

immediate countr# or reional areas underscores the lo%al nature of contemporar#

terrorism. 4he 1 %om%in of the !orld 4rade Benter, and the Sept. 11, 2001,

attacks on the !orld 4rade Benter and 5entaon, are representati$e of this trend.

Key Groups in the New Phase of Militant Islamic Terrorism

(descriptions taen directly from the U.S. State Department publication "!atterns of lobal #errorism, $%%%"&

Al-,aeda (he .ase):Esta%lished %# Usama *in 7adin 8U*79 circa 10, Al

aeda aims to coordinate a transnational mu3ahideen network stated oal is to

Freesta%lish the Muslim StateF throuhout the world $ia the o$erthrow of

corrupt reimes in the Islamic world and the remo$al of forein presence -

primaril# American and Israeli - from the Middle East. U*7 has issued three


15/73

anti-U.S. fatwas encourain Muslims to take up arms aainst !ashinton)s

Fimperialism.F Al aeda pro$ides financial, manpower, transportation, and

trainin support to e"tremists worldwide. In 6e%ruar# 1 %in 7adin issued a

statement under the %anner of F4he !orld Islamic 6ront for ;ihad Aainst 4he

;ews and Brusaders,F sa#in it was the dut# of all Muslims to kill U.S. citiens,

ci$ilian or militar#, and their allies. Alleedl# orchestrated the %om%ins of theU.S. Em%assies in 'airo%i, Cen#a and (ar Es Salaam, 4anania, on Auust :,

1. Blaims to ha$e %een in$ol$ed in the 1 killin of U.S. ser$icemen in

Somalia and the (ecem%er 12 %om%ins aainst U.S. troops in Aden, emen.

Al aeda ser$es as the core of a loose um%rella oraniation that includes

mem%ers of man# Sunni Islamic e"tremist roups, includin factions of the

E#ptian Islamic ;ihad 8EI;9, the @ama)at al-Islami##a 8I@9, and the +arakat

ul-Mu3ahidin 8+UM9. 4he roup is a prime suspect in the Sept. 11 attacks as

well as the U.S.S Bole %om%in.

Armed #slami$ Group (G#A):+a$in initiated terrorist acti$ities in 12

followin Aliers refusal to accept a democraticall# elected Islamist

o$ernment, the @IA has conducted multiple mass killins of ci$ilians and

assassinations of Alerian leaders. !hile present in areas such as emen, the

@IA reportedl# does not taret the U.S. directl#. +owe$er, it is possi%le that

@IA splinter mo$ements or personnel ma# %ecome in$ol$ed in anti-U.S. action.

Aden-Ab"an #slami$ Arm" (AA#A):4he Aden-A%#an Islamic Arm# is

alleedl# affiliated to the emeni Islamic ;ihad and has %een implicated in acts

of $iolence with the stated oal to Fhoist the %anner of al-;ihad, and fiht

secularism in emen and the Ara% countries.F Aden-A%#an Islamic Arm#

leader Hein al-A%ideen al-Mehdar was e"ecuted for participatin in the(ecem%er 1 kidnappin of 1 !estern tourists. 6our of the hostaes were

killed and another 1 hostaes were freed when emeni securit# forces

attacked the place where the hostaes were %ein held. In March 1 the

roup warned the U.S. and *ritish am%assadors in emen to lea$e immediatel#.

ara/at ul-u0ahidin (1):6ormerl# part of the +arakat al-Ansar

8+UA9, the 5akistani-%ased +UM operates primaril# in Cashmir. 7on-time

leader of the roup, 6alur &ehman Chalil, in mid-6e%ruar# stepped down the

popular Cashmiri commander and second-in-command, 6aroo< Cashmiri,

assumed the reins. Chalil, who has %een linked to *in 7adin and sined hisfatwa in 6e%ruar# 1 callin for attacks on U.S. and !estern interests,

assumed the position of +UM Secretar# @eneral. 4he +UM is linked to the

militant roup al-6aran that kidnapped fi$e !estern tourists in Cashmir in ;ul#

1 one was killed in Auust 1 and the other four reportedl# were killed

in (ecem%er of the same #ear. Supporters are mostl# 5akistanis and Cashmiris


16/73

and also include Afhans and Ara% $eterans of the Afhan war. 4he +UM

trains its militants in Afhanistan and 5akistan.

%aish-e-ohammed (Arm" of ohammed):4he 5akistan-%ased ;aish-e-

Mohammed 8;EM9 has reatl# e"panded since Maulana Masood Ahar, a

former ultra-fundamentalist +arakat ul-Ansar 8+UA9 leader, formed the roupin 6e%ruar# 2000. 4he roup)s aim is to unite Cashmir with 5akistan. It is

politicall# alined with the radical, pro-4ali%an, political part#, ;amiat-i Ulema-

i Islam 8;UI-69. 4he ;EM maintains trainin camps in Afhanistan. Most of the

;EM)s cadre and material resources ha$e %een drawn from the militant roups

+arakat ul-;ihad al-Islami 8+U;I9 and the +arakat ul-Mu3ahedin 8+UM9. 4he

;EM has close ties to Afhan Ara%s and the 4ali%an. Usama *in 7adin is

suspected of i$in fundin to the ;EM. @roup %# this name claimed

responsi%ilit# for the USS Bole attack.

Lash/ar-i-aiba (L) (Arm" of the 'ighteous):4he 74 is the armed win ofthe 5akistan-%ased reliious oraniation, Marka-ud-(awa-wal-Irshad

8M(I9--a Sunni anti-U.S. missionar# oraniation formed in 1. =ne of the

three larest and %est-trained roups fihtin in Cashmir aainst India, it is not

connected to a political part#. 4he 74 leader is M(I chief, 5rofessor +afi

Mohammed Saeed. Almost all 74 cadres are foreiners--mostl# 5akistanis from

seminaries across the countr# and Afhan $eterans of the Afhan wars. 4he 74

trains its militants in mo%ile trainin camps across 5akistan-administered

Cashmir and Afhanistan.

>1?Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Al Fatah

4he 57= was founded in 1/ as a 5alestinian nationalist um%rella oraniation

committed to the creation of an independent 5alestinian state. After the 1: Ara%-

Israeli war, militia roups composin the 57= $ied for control, with Al 6atah -- led %#

asser Arafat -- %ecomin dominant. Al 6atah 3oined the 57= in 1 and won the

leadership role in 1. In 1 Arafat assumed the position of 57= E"ecuti$e

Bommittee chairman, a position he still holds. Al 6atah essentiall# %ecame the 57=,

with other roups) influence on 57= actions increasinl# marinalied. Al 6atah and

other 57= components were pushed out of ;ordan followin clashes with ;ordanianforces in 1:0-:1. 4he Israeli in$asion of 7e%anon in 12 led to the roup)s dispersal

to se$eral Middle Eastern countries, includin 4unisia, emen, Aleria, Ira


17/73

and African terrorist and insurent roups and carried out numerous acts of

international terrorism in !estern Europe and the Middle East in the earl#-to-middle

1:0s. Arafat sined the (eclaration of 5rinciples 8(=59 with Israel in 1 -- the

=slo Accords -- and renounced terrorism and $iolence. 4he oraniation framented

in the earl# 10s, %ut remained the leadin 5alestinian political oraniation.

6ollowin the 1 =slo Accords, the 57= -- read Al 6atah -- leadership assumedcontrol of the nascent 5alestinian 'ational Authorit# 85'A9.

>2?Politi$al ersus Fundamentalist #slam

5olitical Islam, as opposed to fundamentalist or neo-fundamentalist Islam, posits a

world$iew that can deal with and selecti$el# interate modernit#. In contrast,

fundamentalist Islam calls for a return to an ontoloical form of Islam that re3ects

modernit# roups such as Al aeda and the E#ptian Islamic ;ihad are representati$e

of fundamentalist Islam.

>?A Note on *tate *ponsors of 'eligious error GroupsUnlike the FsecularF national, radical, anarchist terrorism sponsored %# states such as

7i%#a, S#ria, Ira


18/73

Mumbai in 2008 resulted in over 160 deaths. A bomber attempted to set off a car bomb in New York Citys Times

Square in 2010.

In a 1998 interview, Osama bin Laden called Americans the worst thieves in the world today and the worst terrorists .

. . . He went on to say that, We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned,

they are all targets. He justified targeting Americans in the name of Islam. He said: The terrorism we practice is of

the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of God . . . .

The U.S. State Department maintains a list of terrorist groups. Included on the list are, to name a few, Lebanons

Hizbollah, Palestines Islamic Jihad and Hamas, Uzbekistans Islamic Movement, the Philippines Abu Sayyaf, and

Pakistans Jaish-e-Muhammad (Army of Muhammad) as foreign terrorist groups. Unlike Al Qaeda, most of these

groups do not commit terrorism internationally. Instead, they use terrorism to help overthrow the regimes in control of

their countries.

Although their goals differ, all these groups want to set up Islamist states, based on Islamic fundamentalism. (The

political form of Islamic fundamentalism is sometimes called Islamism.) The vast majority of Islamic fundamentalists

are not terrorists, but their teachings have been adopted by terrorist groups to justify their actions.

Islamic fundamentalism calls for a society ruled by Islamic law. It rejects most things Western (except technology).

Islamists believe their culture has been infected by Western ideas and practices, which must be rooted out. They want

a more equal society with less division between the rich and poor. They want women to return to their traditional role

and dress. This can mean women taking care of the family, staying out of the political and business worlds, wearing a

veil, and even dressing in garments that cover them completely. Fundamentalists call for a return to a strict, pure

Islam as practiced in the seventh century by the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, the first four

caliphs.

But theEncyclopaedia of the Orientstates that:

. . . there are no Muslim sources indicating that the Islam of the Golden Age was as strict and conservative as the

Islamists believe. All indications show that it was the liberal Islam that paved the ground for cultural, social and militaryachievements of those daysvalues foreign to all major Islamist groups. Hence, there is reason to say that the

Islamist idea of the Golden Age is a dramatic falsification of history.

Islamist terrorists, like Al Qaeda, view themselves as following Muhammads example. Muhammad in A.D. 622 had to

flee from Mecca with a small band of followers. Yet in 630, he returned with an army of followers to conquer Mecca

and then spread Islam throughout the Arabian Peninsula. The terrorist groups see themselves as small bands that will

lead Islam to victory.

But terrorist tactics run against the basic teachings of Islam. The Koran, the holy scripture of Islam, set strict rules

against suicide and killing women, children, and old people in battle.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims deplore terrorist attacks and view them as violating theKoran.Even many

fundamentalist Muslims believe terrorism violates Islamic law. Nonetheless, Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist

groups draw their supporters from the ranks of Islamic fundamentalists.

Secular States After World War II


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Islam is the religion of more than 80 percent of the people in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Islamic

empires controlled these areas for more than a thousand years. The last great Islamic empirethe Ottoman Empire

finally collapsed after World War I. During the 200 years it was crumbling, European nations were busy adding most

of the heavily Islamic areas of North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia to their empires. Following World War I,

they carved up most of the remaining parts of the old Ottoman Empire.

European control ended state by state. Most countries in this heavily Islamic area gained their independence shortly

after World War II. Almost all the new leaders who emerged in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Egypt chose to follow a

secular model of government pioneered by Turkey after World War I. Many adopted European or American legal

systems and other Western ways, forcing Islamic law and culture into the background.

The most significant leader of the era was Egypts Gamal Abdel Nasser. In 1952, he led a group of Egyptian military

officers in overthrowing Egypts weak monarchy, which was supported by the British. Nasser set Egypt on a secular

path and tried to unify his people by promoting loyalty to the nation. Islam would remain important, but no longer

dominate government, the law, and education.

Egypt under Nasser adopted a socialist economic system and an authoritarian government with close links to the

military. For a while, Nasser was an inspiration and hero to many Egyptians and others in the region. But poormanagement and corruption in the Egyptian government resulted in massive unemployment, increased poverty, and

political repression. The same was true of most of the other newly independent states.

The Jewish State and the PLO

In 1948, the United Nations, with the strong support of the United States, partitioned the land then called Palestine

into Jewish and Arab states. The surrounding Arab countries, however, rejected this partition and attacked Israel.

They viewed the partition as another case of European colonialism, with Jews displacing Arabs and taking land that

they had occupied for more than a thousand years. But Israel defended its new borders and even gained territory.

In 1967, Nasser asked the U.N. to remove its troops along the Egypt-Israel border, and he blockaded the Straits ofTiran to prevent goods from reaching Israel. When Egypt and Syria mobilized their troops in preparation for war, Israel

attacked. This war lasted a mere six days and resulted in Israel occupying Egyptian land all the way to the Suez

Canal as well as Jordans West Bank, Syrias Golan Heights, and East Jerusalem. In 1973, Egypt and Syria

attempted to defeat Israel in yet another war, but failed again.

The failures showed that the Arab states were too weak to overcome Israel, which was far more advanced

economically and militarily. A new entity, the nationalistic Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), stepped in to take

up the war against Israel. Founded in 1964 by Arab states, the PLO was set up as an umbrella organization to bring

together the many Palestinian groups that had formed in Arab lands. The PLO set two goals: destroying Israel and

establishing a secular, democratic state in its place. It never favored an Islamist state. Initially, the PLO launched

guerilla attacks on Israeli military targets. But then factions of it started using terrorismkidnappings, shootings,

bombings, and hijackings. The two most notorious attacks were probably the hostage-taking and murder of 11 Israeli

athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics and the 1985 hijacking of the Italian cruise shipAchille Lauroand murder

of a disabled American tourist on board. In 1988, the PLO renounced its goal of destroying Israel. (The PLO has

consistently denied it was ever involved in terrorism.)

The Rise and Spread of Islamic Fundamentalism


20/73

For many years, two main forces have worked to spread Islamic fundamentalism. One is a grassroots, non-

governmental effort. The other is sponsored by the government of Saudi Arabia.

One of the primary grassroots efforts has been through the Muslim Brotherhood (the Society of Muslim Brothers).

Today, this organization exists in more than 70 nations in the world. It was founded in 1928 in Egypt, during British

colonial rule. An Egyptian named Hasan al-Banna wanted to create an ideal government, based on Islamic law and

society of the seventh century. Before this ideal Islamist state could be achieved, he argued, the Muslim masses

would have to be gradually brought back to a fundamentalist Islam that was unpolluted by Western ideas.

Al-Bannas Muslim Brotherhood preached self-help, generosity, family values, and restricting women to their

traditional role in the home. The Brotherhood also worked to provide hospitals, schools, and other services for the

poor that the secular government was failing to provide.

In the 1940s, Al-Banna created a secret organization within the Brotherhood that took part in attacks on police and

British officials. In December 1948, a member of this group assassinated Egypts prime minister. Al-Banna had not

known about the plan and quickly denounced the killing. But the government retaliated by murdering Al-Banna two

months later.

The Brotherhood splintered between those who advocated violence and those who wanted to work non-violently for

an Islamist society. The same process has repeated itself in other countries, with the Brotherhood starting as a

peaceful organization and sometimes splitting into more radical factions.

A second powerful force pushing fundamentalism has been the Saudi Arabian government. The home to about one-

fourth of the worlds known oil reserves, Saudi Arabia produces great wealth. The Saudi government supports a

fundamentalist Islam called Wahhabism, named after a Muslim named Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab who lived in

the 1700s. Wahhab led a religious movement to restore the purity of Islam in Arabia, the Muslim holy land where the

Prophet Muhammad lived and died. Wahhab believed in the strict literal reading of theKoran. His movement became

the model for many Islamic fundamentalists today.

Wahhab joined with the Saudi family of Arabia to violently suppress all Arab Muslims who resisted his fundamentalistversion of Islam. After about two centuries of conflict, the Saudis and their Wahhabi allies established the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia in 1932.

Since the founding of the kingdom, the Saudi royal family has handed over control of religious, moral, educational,

and legal matters to the Wahhabi clergy. Wahhabi Saudi Arabia has no elected government, and it allows no other

religion and few human rights. The hands of thieves are still cut off as they were in Muhammads time. Women have

virtually no public life. They are even forbidden to drive automobiles.

Wahhabism is the basis for the Saudi education system. The curriculum and textbooks refer to infidels (unbelievers in

Islam) as the enemy and promote the hatred of Jews, Christians, and Muslims who reject Wahhabi beliefs. (In 2002,

the Saudi government promised to remove these passages and promote tolerance in its schools.)

The Saudi government has used money from its oil revenues to fund Wahhabi missionaries, mosques, and schools

and to promote Wahhabism in dozens of countries, including the United States.

The Revolution in Iran


21/73

Two events beginning in 1979 promoted the spread of radical Islamism. The first took place in Iran. That years Iranian

Revolution, which overthrew the shah (king), electrified the Muslim world. Many Muslims viewed the shah as a despot

who had been put in power by the United States and Great Britain. Fundamentalists saw him as a Westernizer and

traitor to Islam. During the turmoil that took place during the revolution, radical Muslim students seized the U.S.

embassy and held American diplomats hostage for more than a year.

The galvanizing leader of the Iranian Revolution was a Shiite Muslim, Ayatollah (a religious title) Ruhollah Khomeini.

(Shiite Muslims are a small minorityabout 15 percent of all Muslimsbut they constitute the majority in Iran, Iraq,

and Bahrayn and are about 40 percent of the population in Lebanon.) A fundamentalist, Khomeini seized power over

other factions and created an Islamist state headed by a Supreme Religious Leader. Rejecting Western culture, he

installed a political system with him as leader for life surrounded by other religious leaders. The new government did

hold popular elections for other positions and even allowed women to vote and hold public office. But Shiite religious

leaders control the military, law-making power, courts, education system, and all matters of public morality, which are

enforced by a morals police.

Iran has also become a central source for arming and financing radical Islamist groups like Lebanons Hizbollah

(Party of God). In the 1980s in Lebanon, Hizbollah kidnapped a number of Westerners and was also responsible for

the bombing that killed 241 U.S. Marines, sailors, and soldiers. Hizbollah also led an 18-year guerilla campaignagainst Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which caused Israel to remove its troops in 2000.

But the Iranian Revolution has not improved the lives of many Iranians. Iranians are increasingly demanding

democratic reforms.

From the Soviet War in Afghanistan to 9/11

The second event in 1979 that promoted Islamist radicalism was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a remote,

mountainous, landlocked country with Muslim inhabitants. The Soviets invaded to help Afghan communists who had

seized power. Muslims from around the world called for a jihad, or holy war in defense of Islam, to free the Muslim

country from the invaders. Thousands from many countries volunteered to bemujahedeen, holy warriors. Saudi-funded religious schools (known asmadrasas) in neighboring Pakistan produced many volunteers for the jihad.

Money poured in. The Muslim Brotherhood contributed heavily. But the two biggest backers of the jihad were Saudi

Arabia and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The Saudis sent many volunteer fighters and spent untold millions of

dollars. The CIA contributed more than $3 billion, supplied more than 1,000 small, portable Stinger missiles (for

shooting down helicopters and low-flying airplanes), and trained themujahedeen. Afghanistan had become a

battleground in the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.

One of the Saudi volunteers was 25-year-old Osama bin Laden, a member of a wealthy Saudi family. He had

attended Wahhabi schools and completed college studying engineering and public administration. In college, he had

grown increasingly religious and had come in contact with radical elements of the Muslim Brotherhood. For the

Afghan jihad, he raised money through his family connections, set up training camps, and commanded mujahedeen

in battle against the Soviets. He also organized his fighters into a network that became known as Al Qaeda (the

base). After the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan in 1989, Bin Laden returned home to Saudi Arabia

as a Muslim hero.

But in 1990, Iraq (led by Saddam Hussein) invaded Kuwait. Fearing that Iraq would next invade Saudi Arabia, Bin

Laden offered to bring mujahedeen from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia to help defend it from attack. Instead, Saudi


22/73

King Fahd decided to rely on American military forces to defeat Iraq, and he allowed them to set up bases in the

Muslim holy land.

The stationing of non-Muslim troops on Saudi Arabias holy soil transformed Bin Laden. He viewed King Fahd as a

traitor against Islam. From this point, Bin Laden became an outspoken enemy of the Saudi ruling family and its

American defenders.

Saudi Arabia expelled Bin Laden in 1991. He went to Sudan, a country south of Egypt with a strict Islamist

government. He took with him an estimated $250 million, part of which he spent to fund terrorist training camps.

Outraged with what he was doing, the Saudi government revoked his citizenship, froze his assets remaining in Saudi

Arabia, and reportedly even tried to assassinate him in Sudan.

Back in Afghanistan, civil war raged among Muslim warlords, producing chaos and great loss of life. Then, in 1996, a

group of formermadrasastudents, the Taliban, seized power and imposed a strict Wahhabi Islamist regime. (In

Arabic,talibmeans student.)

Bin Laden had become an international outlaw, and Sudan, under pressure from the United States and Saudi Arabia,

expelled him in 1996. The Taliban offered him sanctuary in Afghanistan where he provided the regime with financialaid and fighters. He also created training camps for his growing Al Qaeda terrorist network.

In 1998, Bin Laden proclaimed his jihad against Americans and Jews. He declared that since the Gulf War against

Iraq in 1991, the United States is occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of its territories, Arabia, plundering its

riches, overwhelming its rulers, humiliating its people, threatening its neighbors. He also charged that the United

States was destroying the Iraqi people with crippling economic sanctions and supporting Israels occupation of Arab

Palestine.

All of these acts, Bin Laden argued, added up to a clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, His

Prophet, and the Muslims. Therefore, he concluded, Jihad becomes a personal duty of every Muslim.

A short time later, Bin Laden issued a "fatwa." This a legal opinion issued by a Muslim religious authority. Since Bin

Laden is not a religious authority, only his followers would take his fatwa seriously. Nonetheless, Bin Laden decreed

that it was the duty of every Muslim to kill Americans. After Bin Laden issued his fatwa, Islamist terrorists began to

strike American targets. In 1998, two U.S. embassies were bombed in Africa. In 2000, suicide bombers attacked

theU.S.S. Colewarship off the coast of Yemen. In 2001, terrorist airplane hijackers killed almost 3,000 people in the

United States.

The Hunt for Osama bin Laden

The United States responded to the September 11, 200l, attacks by declaring a war on terrorism. U.S. troops invaded

Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. In 2003, the United States and allies invaded Iraq and toppled the regime of

Saddam Hussein, a brutal dictator, though not associated with Islamist ideas. By 2011, U.S. forces remained in both

those countries.

Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama vowed to capture or kill Bin Laden. Obama made it a significant

part of his 2008 presidential campaign and, in 2009, shifted military forces to Afghanistan in part to accomplish it.

During these presidencies, U.S. forces and intelligence agencies were successful in targeting and killing numbers of

Al Qaeda leaders, but Bin Laden remained elusive.


23/73

From time to time, Al Qaeda released video or audio recordings of Bin Laden to the news media. In these he taunted

the U.S. or called on Muslims to attack Americans. In the meantime, a few reports surfaced that Bin Laden was either

dead or dying, but his hateful messages continued. It was widely believed that he was hiding in the complex network

of caves in the mountains on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Questions arose in recent years about how much actual control Bin Laden still exercised over Al Qaeda. The

movement itself was decentralized and multinational, working through affiliates in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and

elsewhere. To the world, however, Osama bin Laden remained Al Qaedas figurehead and inspiration.

In August 2010, U.S. intelligence focused on a possible compound deep in Pakistan that had links to the terrorist

leader. After months of information-gathering, more evidence suggested that this was Bin Ladens refuge.

On April 29, 2011, after numerous briefings and security meetings, President Obama gave the order for Navy SEALs

(Sea, Land, and Air team) to move in on the compound. On Sunday, May 1, they attacked and killed Bin Laden. In the

firefight, four others were killed, including Bin Ladens son, one of his wives, and two other men. Upon hearing the

news, President Obama reportedly said, We got him. A ten-year hunt had ended.

Rejecting Terrorism

The overwhelming majority of Muslims reject terrorism and Bin Ladens call for a war on America. They view his

beliefs as a perversion of Islam.

Bin Ladens only appeal was to those few who believe the United States is the enemy. In the last 25 years, Islamic

fundamentalism has gained many adherents. It has attracted the poor, the unemployed and underemployed, and

frustrated young people. Most of the states in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central Asia have failed to improve

the lives of their citizens. Some are brutally oppressive, and Islamist groups came to be seena s an alternative to the

rulers.

Still there are signs that Islamist influence may be weakening. The uprisings in countries during the so-called Arab

Spring have largely been led by those advocating secular-based, democratic reforms. It remains to be seen what role

the Islamists will play and how Bin Ladens death may affect the situation.

For Discussion and Writing

1. What are Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism?

2. In 1929, British historian Arnold Toynbee wrote, If you looked in the right places, you could doubtless find

some old fashioned Islamic Fundamentalists still lingering on. You would also find that their influence was

negligible. Why do you think that was true then and no longer true today?

3. What do you think accounts for the rise of Islamist terrorist groups?

4. What effect do you think Bin Ladens death will have on Al Qaeda and Islamist terrorism?

5. Some Americans have said that the killing of Osama bin Laden strengthens the case for withdrawing U.S.

troops from Afghanistan. Do you agree? Why or why not?

For Further Reading


24/73

Esposito, John L.Unholy War, Terror in the Name of Islam.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

"Hunting Bin Laden." Frontline (PBS). 2001.

Lewis, Bernard.The Crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror. New York: The Modern Library, 2003.

Wilson, Scott, Craig Whitlock, and William Branigin. Osama bin Laden Killed in U.S. Raid, Buried at

Sea.Washington Post, May 2, 2011.

A C T I V I T Y

Islamist Terrorism: What Should We Do About It?

Although Osama bin Laden is dead, the United States still faces the dangers of Islamist terrorism. What should we do

about this?

1. Below are listed some policies that the United States might adopt to try to counter Islamist terrorism. Form

small groups to discuss these policies.

2. Each group should choose what it considers to be the most important policy for the United States to adopt

now. Groups may develop their own policy choice if they wish.

3. Each group should then defend its policy choice before the rest of the class.

Proposed Policies

1. Remove all American military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan.2. Remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop democracy as a model for other Muslim countries.

3. Encourage and support secular democratic movements in such countries as Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and

Libya.

4. Provide foreign aid to Muslim countries in order to reduce unemployment and poverty.

5. Give foreign aid to countries that curb Islamists.

6. Work to achieve security and justice for Israel and Palestine.

7. Lessen our dependence on Mideast oil.


25/73

'ac to home page

ISRIssue 52 March!"pril 2##$

Islam and Islamopho%ia

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#/ course of $%%0, the attacs on +uslims and the vilification of 1slamhas been relentless. 2hen +uslims protested the cartoons that caricatured

1slam published in the Danish newspaper 3yllands-!osten in September $%%4,

they were denounced for not appreciating 2estern values of 5free speech.62hen a United )rab mirates company was to tae over the running of si7 U.S.ports from a 'ritish company in early $%%0, the Democrats and epublicans

whipped up a 7enophobic fren8y. )fter /e8bollah defeated 1srael in the 9ebanonwar, 'ush referred to /e8bollah as an 51slamofascist6 organi8ation, and stated

that 51slamic fascism6 was the biggest threat facing the United States.:#ony'lair taled about an 5arc of e7tremism ;in a< specifically +uslim version6

stretching across the +iddle ast. #hen the !ope suggested that 1slam wasviolent and that 5reason6 was more at home in the 2est. 'ritish =abinet

+inister 3ac Straw advised +uslim women not to wear veils because thepractice had 5implications of separateness6 which creates 5parallel

communities.6 )nd right behind him came #ony 'lair himself, blithelysupporting his bigoted minister.

1n his address to the nation on September ::, $%%0, !resident 'ush>s

arguments revealed the perverse logic of 1slamophobia today?

Since the horror of @A::, we>ve learned a great deal about the enemy. )nd wehave learned that their goal is to build a radical 1slamic empire where women

are prisoners in their homes, men are beaten for missing prayer meetings, and
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terrorists have a safe haven to plan and launch attacs on )merica and other

civili8ed nations. #he war against this enemy is more than a military conflict. 1tis the decisive ideological struggle of the $:st century, and the calling of our

generationB. #his struggle has been called a clash of civili8ations. 1n truth, it isa struggle for civili8ation. 2e are fighting to maintain the way of life enjoyed by

free nations.$

#he common thread that ties together all these attacs on 1slam is a polari8ed

view of the world. n one side are the values of freedom, democracy,rationality, women>s rights, liberty, and civili8ationC all associated, furthermore,

with =hristianity. n the other side are a people who are irrational, evil,barbaric, and uncivili8edC who hate freedom and democracy and want to

create, according to 'ush, an 1slamic empire stretching from urope to Southast )sia.

2hat is striing about this characteri8ation of 5the 2est6 and 51slam,6 is notonly the degree of hyperbole but the fact that it finds resonance within the

wider culture. #oday, it has become commonplace for media pundits, not only

on o7 but also on =EE, to call for the racial profiling of )rabs and +uslims./ollywood has churned out a steady stream of films that portray )rab +uslimseither as terrorists incapable of being reasoned with, or as sheis and belly-

dancers.FDisney>s )lladin, for instance, begins with a song that describes )rabsociety in the most stereotypical terms and then concludes? 51t>s barbaric, but

heyGit>s home.6 2hen the !ope issued a statement e7pressing regret over+uslim reactions to his comments, but not directly apologi8ing for eHuating

1slam with violence, a poll found that two-thirds of )mericans believed that the

!ope had done enough to apologi8e to +uslims.I

Significant minorities of )mericans hold negative views of 1slam. 1n a U.S.)

#odayAallup !oll conducted in late 3uly, F@ percent of )mericans admitted to

feeling some prejudice against +uslims. )bout the same percentage favoredreHuiring +uslims, including U.S. citi8ens, to carry a special 1D 5as a means of

preventing terrorist attacs in the United States.6 Eearly one in fourG$$percentGsaid they wouldn>t want to have +uslims as their neighbors.4

1n short, 1slamophobia today has wide resonance. /owever, these attitudes andideas are not new, and they were not developed from scratch by the 'ush or

'lair administrations. ather, 1slamophobia in its current form derives from abody of nowledge nown as 5rientalist6 thought, which came into being in

the late eighteenth century, and it is here we must turn in order to understandthe roots of 1slamophobia.

&rientalist roots

)s Spain, !ortugal, 'ritain, rance, and other imperial nations embared on amission of colonial e7pansion, they developed ideologies to justify conHuest. 1n

the si7teenth and seventeenth centuries, coloni8ers justified the slaughter and

e7ploitation of the 1ndians in the Eew 2orld by arguing that the 1ndian5savages6 were wild animals, idolaters whom od had ordained to be enslaved

by =hristians.0#he enslavement of )fricans was similarly justified through the

boo of enesis. 1t was argued that )fricans were a cursed people (drawn fromthe myth of the =urse of /am or =anaan& whose sin color had blacened to


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mar the curse. #hus, even after the )frican slaves converted to =hristianity

they could be retained as slaves.J

#he shift from religious to 5scientific6 justifications too place in the eighteenth

century in the conte7t of the nlightenment and the growth of science.thnologists such as =arolus 9innaeus and 3ohann riedrich 'lumenbach

divided human beings into various races with distinct characteristics. Eotsurprisingly, the logic that flowed from this classification was that white

uropeans were superior and other 5darer, colored peoples6 were both 5ugly6and at best 5semi-civili8ed.6Kacism, as an ideology to justify slavery and

conHuest, grew up around this time.@

1n the late nineteenth century, when the 'ritish poet udyard *ipling wrote5#he white man>s burden6 he was simply reinforcing an idea that was by then

widespread. *ipling wrote of the inherent superiority of the 2est and their

5burden6 to civili8e and tame the peoples of the ast. =haracteri8ed as 5half

devil, half child,6 the coloni8ed were seen as both evilAbarbaric, but alsochildlie and therefore in need of protection. riginally published in :K@@,*ipling used the subtitle 5#he United States and the !hilippine 1slands,6 as a

way to urge the U.S. to tae on the same responsibilities as the 'ritish.:%::$

#he encounter with the peoples of the +iddle ast and Eorth )frica too a

similar form. 2hen Eapoleon invaded gypt in :J@K he too with him not onlysoldiers, but an army of scientists, botanists, biologists, architects, etc. all with

the goal of producing a 5scientific6 survey of the country that was designed foruse not by the gyptians but by the rench.::arious imperial nations

commissioned scholars to develop nowledge about what they called the5rient6 in order to better control their subjects.

#he body of rientalist thought that emerged from this process has a few

characteristic features. irst, it draws on a 5civili8ational6 view of historyGtheidea that civili8ations come into being, prosper, and then go into decline. Sucha view of history assumes that civili8ations are distinct entities, which e7ist in

isolation from each other, and which have a core set of values that drive them.reedom, law, rationality, science, progress, intellectual curiosity, the spirit of

invention, and so on, were seen as the core values of the so-called 2est, thus

constructing the 2est as a uniHue civili8ation with its roots in ancient reece.very other civili8ation was then defined in relation to this notion of a superior

2est. !redictably, the world of 1slam was characteri8ed as despotic, static,undemocratic, and rigid.:$

1n addition to civili8ational theories, the rientalists drew on the theories of

race discussed above that placed uropean =aucasians at the top of the racialhierarchy and coloni8ed peoples close to the bottom. +a7ime odinson

describes the origin of race-based understandings of +uslims as follows?

#he riental may always have been characteri8ed as a savage enemy, but

during the +iddle )ges, he was at least considered on the same level as hisuropean counterpartB. 1n the nineteenth century, however, he became

something Huite separate, sealed off in his own specificity, yet worthy of a ind


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of grudging admiration. #his is the origin of the homo islamicus, a notion widely

accepted even today.:F

1n sum, rientalists argue that the 2est is a dynamic, comple7, and everchanging society, while the rient, and particularly the world of 1slam, is static,

barbaric, and despotic, and therefore in need of 2estern intervention to bring

about progressive change.1f these ideas served to justify rench and nglish conHuest of the +iddle ast

and Eorth )frica in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they are still verymuch in vogue today. 'oos lie afael !atai>s #he )rab +ind, which was used

by the U.S. military to devise the torture techniHues used in )bu hraib andelsewhere, are a reassertion of homo islamicus. +odern-day rientalists lie

'ernard 9ewis and Samuel /untington have argued that the conflict betweenthe U.S. and the +iddle ast is a 5clash of civili8ations.6 )ccording to

/untington, who has done much to populari8e this notion, 52estern ideas ofindividualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, eHuality, liberty, the

rule of law, democracy, free marets, the separation of church and state, oftenhave little resonance in 1slamic societies.6:I

2hile these ideas remained on the margins during the :@@%s, when the =lintonadministration preferred the language of 5humanitarian intervention6 to justify

U.S. imperialism, they have now assumed center stage after @A::, with boththe epublicans and Democrats eHually comfortable with this rhetoric. #he end

result is a political climate in the U.S. where 1slamophobic ideas are largelytaen for granted. So much so that, as 1 have argued elsewhere, large sections

of the 9eft have internali8ed the 5clash of civili8ations6 thesis.:42hen 9ewis>s

essay on the rise of 1slamic 5fundamentalism,6 5#he oots of +uslim age,6 waspublished in the )tlantic +onthly, the cover featured an angry, bearded,

turbaned man. 1n ctober $%%4, when the !rogressive ran an article by Sasha

)bramsy that internali8es the clash argument, the cover featured a bearded,turbaned man brandishing a scimitar.

1n what follows, 1 begin by laying out the +ar7ist approach to religion and thendebun five inter-related myths about 1slam and the 2est that are in play

today?

:. 1slam is a monolithic religionC

$. 1slam is a uniHuely se7ist religionCF. #he 5+uslim mind6 is incapable of rationality and scienceC

I. 1slam is inherently violentC4. #he 2est spreads democracy, 1slam spawns terrorism.

Mar'ism and religion

/istorically, rientalist scholars were philologists, and as philologists, they drewtheir conclusions about how different societies functioned simply by e7amining

written te7ts. #he rientalist /.).. ibb, who moved from 7ford to /arvardUniversity in :@44, wrote about the unchanging 5)rab mind6 based on his

readings of classical 1slamic te7ts.:01magine if scholars had similarly attemptedto deduce observations about contemporary =atholics based on readings of the

Eew #estamentC they would surely have been scoffed at and derided. Let, when

it comes to learning about +uslims and )rabs such research methods are seen


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serfdom 5unless it be shown from the ospel that we are serfs.6 9uther, a

defender of property against the peasantry, insisted that those who diedfighting rebellious peasants were 5true martyrs for od.6$$During the various

revolutionary wars, the bourgeoisie was animated by an e7plicit opposition toreligious dogma. /owever, once in power, the bourgeoisie brought religion bac

as a bulwar of established order.$F

1n short, the role of religion in any society is best understood by e7amining the

specific historical conditions that constitute that society. )ll the major religionsof the world have undergone transformations in order to adapt to changing

circumstances. 1n some instances, religion has played a progressive role and inothers a reactionary one. 1n still others, it has simply adapted to new

conditions in order to retain its mass appeal.

Myth () Islam is a monolithic religion

#he idea that 1slam is a monolithic religion is not only false but functions as thebasis for all the other myths. or it is only by denying the diversity of 1slamic

history and practices that one can then argue that it has certain inherent,unchanging characteristics that render it anti-democratic, violent, bacward-

looing, etc.

1slam is practiced in do8ens of countries around the world. )ccording to U.S.State Department figures, nearly:.4 billion people around the world are

+uslimsGK4 percent are Sunni and :4 percent are Shiites.$I2ithin these twomain denominations, there are many more branches.

#here are several countries and regions which have majority +uslimpopulations, and they span the globe from 1ndonesia, to 'angladesh, to several

central )sian countries, the +iddle ast, and Eorth )frica. 1slam loos very

different in each of these regions and countries largely because as the religionspread it adopted the customs and traditions of the people of various lands.#hus, Sufi 1slam practiced in Eorthern 1ndia is Huite different from

2ahabiASalafi 1slam practiced in Saudi )rabia, which is in turn different fromthe type of Shiism practiced in 1ran. #he claim that 1slam is a homogenous and

monolithic religion is therefore ludicrous, given the diversity of 1slamic practices

in nations that run the gamut from secular democracies (such as 1ndonesia& todictatorships (such as Saudi )rabia&.

+uch of the current 1slamophobic rhetoric sees to demoni8e )rabs in

particular. /owever, all +uslims are not )rabs, and all )rabs are not +uslims.)rabs are people who spea )rabic, share certain common cultural traditions,

and claim a common )rab identity.$4

eographically, the )rab world hastraditionally been divided into two parts (east and west of the river Eile&? the

+aghreb or the 2est, which includes +orocco, 9ibya, )lgeria, #unisia, Sudanand so on, and the +ashreH or the ast, which includes gypt, Syria, 9ebanon

and all the countries to the east up to, but not including, 1ran. 'ecause oflinguistic and cultural differences, 1ranians and #urs are not considered )rabs.

9ie all religions, 1slam has adapted. eligious te7ts may be more or less fi7ed,


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but the ideas and practices they are made to justify are ever-changing, based

on historical transformations that are independent of religious ideology. )s=hris /arman notes,

1slam is no different to any other religion in these respects. 1t arose in oneconte7t, among a trading community in the towns of Jth century )rabia, in the

midst of a society still mainly organi8ed on a tribal basis. 1t flourished withinthe succession of great empires carved out by some of those who accepted its

doctrines. 1t persists today as the official ideology of numerous capitalist states(Saudi )rabia, Sudan, !aistan, 1ran etc&, as well as the inspiration of many

oppositional movements.

1t has been able to survive in such different societies because it has been ableto adapt to differing class interests. 1t has obtained the finance to build its

mosHues and employ its preachers in turn from the traders of )rabia, the

bureaucrats, landowners and merchants of the great empires, and the

industrialists of modern capitalism. 'ut at the same time it has gained theallegiance of the mass of people by putting across a message offeringconsolation to the poor and oppressed. )t every point its message has

balanced between promising a degree of protection to the oppressed andproviding the e7ploiting classes with protection against any revolutionary

overthrow.$0

Myth 2) Islam is a uni*uely se'ist religion

1slam is uniHue in its se7ist approach to women, goes an oft-repeated

argument, and therefore, +uslim women need to be rescued by white men intheir pith helmets and jodhpurs. #his was one of the arguments that the 'ush

administration used to justify its war on )fghanistan. )nd more recently, rance

passed a ban on the hijab (couched as a ban on all religious symbols inschools& and many argued that this would 5liberate6 +uslim women. #he realityis that neither )fghan nor rench +uslim women have been liberated by these

actions. #oday )fghan women are no better off than they were before thewar.$J1f anything, as the documentary )fghanistan Unveiled captures Huite

well, in the rural areas conditions have only deteriorated.$K#he rench ban

represents an attac on all visible e7pressions of 1slam, and therefore arestriction of religious rights. 1t does not represent a step forward for women,

which would have entailed allowing women to choose whether or not to wearthe hijab.$@

#his argument about women>s liberation has a long history. #he 'ritish used a

similar justification when they invaded and occupied gypt in :KK$. 9ord=romer, who oversaw the occupation, viewed gyptian society and 1slam as

follows? 51slam as a social system has been a complete failureBthe degradationof women in the ast is a caner that begins its destructive wor early in

childhood, and has eaten into the whole system of 1slam.6F%#he solution wasthat +uslims 5be persuaded or forced into imbibing the true spirit of 2estern

civili8ation.6F:or =romer there was no contradiction between championingwomen>s rights in gypt while trying to curtail them at home. )s a colonial


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appropriately described as a patrilineal society where polyandrous practices,

combined with substantial social roles for women, prevailed in certainregions.F0#he !rophet +uhammad>s first wife *hadija was a wealthy women

who at age forty, proposed to the twenty-seven-year-old +uhammad. )nd

while *hadija was +uhammad>s only wife at the time, she had severalhusbands. )fter her death, +uhammad practiced polygamy and married severalwomen.

)s 1slam spread, it adopted the cultural practices of various empires, includingthat of the neighboring !ersian and the 'y8antine empires. )mong the

=hristians who populated the +iddle ast and the +editerranean there weremore rigid customs associated with women. 1n the =hristian 'y8antine mpire,

the se7es were segregated, women were not supposed to be to be seen inpublic, they had to be veiled, and were given only rudimentary education. )s

the e7panding 1slamic empire incorporated these regions, it also assimilated

these cultural and social practices.FJ1n short, the particular misogynisticpractices that 1slam came to adopt were largely inherited from the religious

customs of the neighboringNand conHueredN=hristian and 3ewish societies. #hesignificant point here is that se7ist attitudes towards women, far from being

uniHue to 1slam, were prevalent among =hristians and 3ews as well.

/owever, this was not the first time that the women of this region saw a furthercurtailment of their rights under 2estern influence. ) similar fate had befallen

gyptian women when the rees conHuered gypt around FFF '=.FK1ncontrast to ree society, where women led segregated lives, where their

prime role was to care for children, and where the law considered a wife to be a5veritable child,6 in gyptian society women, especially upper-class women, had

a high status. 1n the period of the Eew *ingdom (:4J%N@4% '=&, gyptianwomen and men were considered eHuals under the law. 2omen had the right

to inherit property and to own and manage it, marriage laws were egalitarian,women could move freely in society and weren>t secluded. #his is not to

suggest that se7ism didn>t e7ist. 1t was still very much a male-dominatedsociety, but the systematic oppression of women of the ind found in ree

society didn>t e7ist until ree conHuest of gypt. 1n fact, the reephilosopher )ristotle believed that the male 5is by nature superior, and the

female inferior, and the one rules and the other is ruled.6F@1n short, the great5liberal6 2estern tradition is not only mired in se7ism, but as the case of gypt

shows, it has even played a part in curtailing women>s rights in other societies.+oreover, it is crucial to remember that the rights that women do enjoy

anywhere in the world today are the result of struggles waged by women (and

men& for those rights. 1t too no less than a hundred years of bitter strugglesfor women to win the right to vote in the United States.

Myth +) The ,Muslim mind- is incapa%le of science rational thin.ing

and reason

n September :$, $%%0, when !ope 'enedict O1 gave his now-infamousspeech, he eHuated =atholicism with reason and 1slam with violence and the

lac of reason. !araphrasing a fourteenth century 'y8antine emperor, he statedthat when a religion (lie 1slam& is spread through violence it goes against


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reason, and also against nature, for 5not to act in accordance with reason is

contrary to od>s nature.6I%1n maing this argument, the !ope joined a longline of rientalists who have argued that reason, rationality, and science are

alien to the world of 1slam.

rnest enan, who championed science and reason, in an essay published in

:KKF titled 51slam and Science6 stated? 5arly 1slam and the )rabs whoprofessed it were hostile to scientific and philosophic spirit.6I:1n a lecture at the

Sorbonne, he said?

)nyone with any nowledge of current affairs can see Huite clearly the actual

inferiority of the +uslim countries, the decadence of the states governed by

1slam, the intellectual barrenness of the races that derive their culture andeducation from that religion alone. )ll those who have traveled to the ast or to

)frica have been struc by the totally narrow mind of the true believer, the ind

of iron band around his head that closes him off completely from science and

him Huite incapable of learning anything or opening his mind to any newideas.I$

#oday, the so-called debate on whether 1ran should be allowed to have nuclear

weapons draws from these arguments. #he mainstream media faithfullyreproduce the line of the political elites and don>t raise the Huestion of why it is

legitimate for the U.S. to police other nations, especially when it is the onlycountry to have ever used nuclear weapons. 1ran is represented, at best, as a

petulant child incapable of responsibly handling nuclear technology, and atworst, a demonic force that must be vanHuished. 9ittle time is devoted to

shedding light on why 1ran, as a rational political actor, might want to acHuirenuclear weapons. )fter all, 1ran is surrounded by states that possess nues

such as 1ndia, !aistan, =hina, ussia, and 1srael, not to mention by U.S. basesin Patar, 1raH, #urey, U8beistan, and )fghanistan, which might have nuclear

weapons.

#here are many ways to debun this myth about 1slam, science, and rationality.

1 will focus on the hidden history of 1slam and science. #he important pointhere is that the 2est would not have

The Origin of Terrorism in Muslim History

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