The Organization and Activities of the US Army Signal...

* This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2013S1A5B5A07046398).

Kang Sung Hyun ([email protected]) is an HK Research Professor at the Institute for East Asian Studies, SungKongHoe University; Jung Keun-Sik ([email protected]) is a Professor in the Department of Sociology, Seoul National University.

Seoul Journal of Korean Studies 27, no. 2 (December 2014): 269–306.© 2014 Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies

The Organization and Activities of the US Army Signal Corps Photo Unit: Perspectives of War Photography in the Early Stages of the Korean War*

Kang Sung Hyun and Jung Keun-Sik

In research on the history of photography related to the Korean War, only a small number of studies have focused on the organization, activities and visual features of war photography of the Korean War. In particular, the organization and activities of the military photographers have hardly been examined. It is virtually unknown that Sgt. Charles R. Turnbull, Private First Class (PFC) Ronald L. Hancock and Cpl. Robert Dangel, who were the military photographers for General Douglas MacArthur, were immediately sent to Korea just after the outbreak of the Korean War to carry out their mission. They belonged to A Company (Photo), 71st Signal Service Battalion, which was attached to the Photo Division, GHQ-FEC (General Headquarters, Far East Command). The existing wartime photographs from the period June 28 to July 5, 1950 were mostly produced by these three men, along with Lt. F.J. Winslow, photo officer in the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). They carried out their activities until the end of July 1950, moving freely between the wartime front and rear, photographing American, South and North Korean troops, and civilians. Their work reflects the chaos of the times and displays conflicting viewpoints, a reality made possible by the fact that there was comparatively little censorship in the early stages of the war. This study focuses on the perspectives of these four military photographers, which differed greatly from the perspectives of later Korean War photographers, who tended to reflect the official position of the US Army.

Keywords: Korean War, 71st Signal Service Battalion, military photographers, combat photography, viewpoints, perspectives

270 Kang Sung Hyun and Jung Keun-Sik

Introduction

Seeing is believing. This phrase emphasizes the “directivity” and “first-handness” of the visual sense. And photography shows the “directivity” of sight more than any other communicative medium. Photography is “transferred” mechanically through a camera, and photography’s directivity of sight makes one believe in the objective “truth” of photography. In this sense, through photography the non-spectator can approach the subject as a “witness” and comes to believe the truthfulness of what he or she sees. For this reason, photography is considered a faithful depiction of reality, and is used to establish the proof of historical facts.

However, photography should be understood as showing only a part of the entire reality—a particularly selected part, itself a reflection of the photographer’s specific viewpoint. In other words, photography implies the existence of a “blind side,” and those blind (or veiled) sides constitute the other side of reality that effectively disappears. Here, the “seen side” and the “blind side” are systematically decided by the position of the photographer who captures the moment. In particular, in the case of combat photography, the photographer’s position is often limited by wartime lines of combat. Originally, the purpose of war photography was to archive the reality of the event—the war; yet during the process of that archiving and constructing, some of that event is visualized while other sides are left blind (Jung 2010).

As is commonly known, many photographers from the civilian press corps were active in World War II and the Korean War, two wars that delivered the era of photo-journalism. But there were also many military-trained photographers and army photographers such that the combined number of official wartime photographers was very large. In addition, many non-journalist civilians and amateur photographer-soldiers also took pictures from the battlefield. Civilian and military photographers differed in what they did and did not photograph, establishing their own subjective positions. The “we” and “they,” “my side” and “the other side”—in effect the “seen side” and “blind side”—are inevitably differently expressed among civilian and military photographers.

In terms of research, combat photography during the Korean War is very important within the larger field of research on wartime photography. This importance is due to the sheer volume of that photography, its representative images of warfare, the diversity of the photographers and their subjective viewpoints, and the resultant differences in their visual language. However, thus far research on the wartime photography and photographers during the Korean

The US Army Signal Corps Photo Unit 271

War has lagged behind. In the case of research outside Korea, most examinations have concerned themselves with the perspective of official wartime history according to the US Army’s point of view, and have used the photographs more as visual aids rather than as objects of research in their own right. Representative published works in this category include those by the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (1951), the United States Army Center of Military History (1989), and Goldstein and Maihafer (2000). Even among academic research, the study of Lewinski (1978) only partially covered the Korean War and its photographers, while other studies have usually focused on the activities and perspectives of civilian photographers like David D. Duncan. In Korea, since the 1990s serious research on the photography and photographers of the Korean War has been undertaken by scholars in the fields of photography, journalism and communication, art, and sociology. In the field of photography, the photography and photographers of the 1950s have been approached from the angle of “life-oriented realism” (Pak 2000; Ji 2005). In the field of journalism and com-munication, an interesting approach has combined research on memory and media photography, analyzing the photography collections and exhibitions around the Korean War, and then tracking the stream of official memory on the Korean War (Kim 2006). In the field of art, research has delved into subjects such as the gap between the producer of the image and the image’s reproduction, and the resultant divergences in reception and interpretation (Kim 2009; Pak 2009; Kim 2011). And in the field of sociology, the research of Jung Keun-Sik (2010) has tracked memory based on the viewpoint of “us” versus “them,” and its impact on nation-making, by reviewing the photography collections of Korea, the United States Armed Forces (UN Forces), and China.

While there has been much research on Korean War photography, the depth and range of that research on the activities and the perspectives of the photographers is still at a rudimentary level. A great deal of photography of the Korean War was created and recorded by civilians working as combat photographers for major magazines and press agencies;1 but the existing research on wartime photographers during the Korean War is limited to a handful of the best-known civilian combat photographers. Korean civilian

1. Among the foreign war photographers active during the Korean War, David D. Duncan, Margaret Bourke-White, Karl Mydans, Hank Walker, John Dominis, Howard Sochurek, and Michael Rougier reported for Life magazine; Burt Hardy was from the Picture Post; Max Desfor from the Associated Press (AP); Horace Bristol reported for Fortune magazine; and Werner Bischof was from Life while also a member of Magnum Photos, the international free association of documentary photographers. In addition, many civilian combat photographers were involved in the Korean War as members of Agence France-Presse (AFP), Reuters and other major press syndicates.


photographers in wartime have been examined in research in Korea from the point of view of the “life-oriented realism” of the 1950s; but the research subjects here were also limited to a small number of individuals. The most neglected area, however, has been the organizational layout of the military photography units and military photographers active during the Korean War. Some initial research has only recently begun on the Armed Forces Information and Education Division (Jeonghunguk; hereafter AFIED) of the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (Gukbangbu), but there remains much to be learned regarding the enormous number of photographs taken by units of the US armed forces as well as about the photographers who took them.

Any analysis of a photograph without information about the photographer and contextual details is limited to an analysis of the superficial scene represented by the photographic image itself. This is why thus far photography of the Korean War has been effectively decontextualized, and photographic details have even been distorted and misinterpreted. The most urgent questions facing the researcher are: who took those photographs and what were the contextual details surrounding them?

Based on the problematic issues discussed above, this study focuses on the enormous body of photographs taken by military photographers, in particular photographers from the US Army Signal Corps.2 The following section will analyze the organization and personnel of A Company (Photo), 71st Signal Service Battalion, which performed photographic duties at the onset of the Korean War. For this, this study shows the relationship between the GHQ-FEC Signal Section Photographic Division and A Co., 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. based on an understanding of the traditional management of a photo unit of the US Army, and reviews the organization, functions, and activities of its main personnel. The next section covers the activities of four military photographers, Sgt. Charles R. Turnbull, PFC Ronald L. Hancock, Cpl. Robert Dangel, and KMAG Lt. F.J. Winslow, who entered the wartime theater with Supreme Commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur soon after the war’s outbreak on the first inspection of the frontline, and analyzes the visual features of the photographs taken by them. Their photographs were not affected by censorship, and as a result their

2. This was not the first time a United States military photography unit was active in Korea. In September 1945, after the arrival of the US Army XXIV Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. John R. Hodge, south of the 38th parallel, US Army and Navy photographers began their activity. Among them, still picture teams of the 123rd Signal Service Detachment and 502nd Signal Photo Detachment were the most active military photographers. After the reduction in US military forces in 1949, a few military photographers attached to KMAG continued to be active (Headquarters XXIV Corps, Office of the Signal Officer, Production of Korean Newsreel, NARA, RG 554, Entry A1 1378, Box 19).


point of view is very different and chaotic relative to other military photographers that would follow.

This paper will adopt a positivist analysis using a wide range of photographic images, captions, and textual records found in the National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Maryland, USA). This study analyzes the contextual details and visual features of the photographs taken by the military photographers. Other points of analysis regarding the photographs are as follows: What was the implied message of the main subject of the photograph? In considering the intended view point, what is the “blind side” of that reality depicted by the photograph? Through an analysis of the caption, what is the narrative represented by the photograph? The images taken by military photo-graphers contain not only the image and narrative caption, but also details regarding production date, press release, organization, photographer, and class number of the production organization. Any analysis of a photographic image and its visual features will realize a synergy effect only when it takes into consideration the aforementioned details of production. With this additional information, this study undertakes a cross-analysis of the historic facts as they relate to the contents of the photograph (or the scene of the photograph) in question. Through this effort, this study seeks to evaluate and analyze the visual features of Korean War photographs comprehensively, and by an analysis of the image date, subject matter, and the intention behind its production, to suggest a photographic viewpoint and reveal the “blind side” of the Korean War.

Organization and Personnel: GHQ-FEC Photographic Division and A Company (Photo), 71st Signal Service Battalion

The US military produced a wartime record of all the political and military aspects of World War II in the form of still and motion pictures. Broad coverage was afforded to the combat and occupation activities of the American military in the Pacific War, with a particularly good record made of the battle for Okinawa, the occupation of Japan and Korea, the resulting military government, civil affairs, and the daily routines of both occupier and occupied. Responsibility for coverage fell to the Signal Section Photographic Division of the General Headquarters, United States Armed Forces Pacific (USAFPAC GHQ). The Photographic Division was responsible for the production, storage, and maintenance of the still and motion pictures in the Signal Section; its headquarters were located in the Teikoku Building in downtown Tokyo near the Dai-Ichi Building, location of the General Headquarters.


General MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was a keen practitioner of psychological warfare and propaganda and he always had military photographers present at official events to ensure a photographic record was made, with himself at the center. Accordingly, the Photographic Division consulted the schedule of General MacArthur, and kept abreast of upcoming visits to Japan by allied VIPs by attending weekly staff meetings, and sent its photographers to every official event. Thanks to this effort, Division photographs captured scenes of General MacArthur’s reception of Emperor Hirohito, his meeting with the Commanding General, EUSA (Eighth US Army), Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger and his spouse, his consultations with his advisers, as well as his appearance at various official events. Looking at the subjects of the photographs, it is clear that some were taken not at official events, but simply to record things that interested the individual photographer. They went everywhere, enjoying every level of access—they even took pictures of sites off limits to civilian photographer: prisons, lockups at the police station, or the inside of the grand safe of the Bank of Japan—reflecting their identity as an army of the dominant power, the occupation force (Hiratsuka 2007).

The GHQ Photographic Division was not the only US military unit engaged in photographic activity. There were military photographers assigned to units under the EUSA. During the occupation period, the reassignment of these photographic units was undertaken in order to centralize photographic resources and to lend it an overall order. A Company (Photo), 71st Signal Service Battalion (hereafter, simply A Company) was the result of this reorganization.3

A Company undertook tasks throughout the entire occupation zone of the GHQ-FEC, including Korea. It made a visual record of events surrounding the US occupation of Japan, and the daily routines of occupier and occupied, and preserved and managed these records and provided them for use. In addition, it not only supported the photographic activity in areas occupied by US forces—like Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines—but also collected and stored the records centrally in the GHQ Photo Division. The Laboratory

3. A Company was composed of more than simply a photographic unit; it also included a headquarters unit and a signal facilities and system set-up and maintenance unit commanded by a signal officer from Headquarters, 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. At that time, the photo unit had ten officers and 84 enlisted, while the maintenance unit was larger, with six officers, 149 enlisted. In this regard, A Company cannot be said to have specialized solely in photography (71st Signal Service Battalion Headquarters and Service Command, Command Report for the period 1951–1953, NARA, RG 407 Series: Command Reports, compiled 1945–54, Entry 429A, Box 5403–5404, 6382–6385). To identify the organization and personnel of the photo unit of A Company, this study relied on captions attached to command reports and photographs.


Branch of the Photo Division labeled and archived the first-hand produced photographs. The labeled captions would include first, the name of military photographers, followed next by further details. It would then provide the photographs for use elsewhere.

It is interesting to note that considering the wide area of A Company’s photo section’s activities, the scale of its organization, functions, and personnel was quite humble relative to other units. The photo section, just one section of A Company, did not have its own organization and functions for photographic processing or equipment repairs, very essential elements for an independent photography unit. This was because the photo unit of A Company fell under the GHQ-FEC Signal Section Photographic Division. All essential organization and functions to support photograph activities were provided from the Photographic Division. In other words, in terms of its formal status, the photo unit was part of A Company, but in actuality it fell under the GHQ-FEC Photo Division (see Figure 1). When the Korean War broke out, military photographers were deployed to the frontlines to produce a photographic record of the wartime activities of US forces; these were the military photographers of A Company.

As can be seen in Figure 1, the Photographic Division of GHQ-FEC was organized by function into a Still Picture Branch, Motion Picture Branch and Photo Lab Branch for developing the images. Mirrored at the lower levels, the Still Picture Team and Motion Picture Team of A Company were not so

GHQ-FEC Signal SectionPhotographic Division

Still Picture Branch Laboratory Branch Motion Picture Branch

assigned

Photographic Section,A Co., 71st Sig. Svc. Bn.

Still Picture Team Motion Picture Team

Figure 1. Organizational layout of A Company (Photo), 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. under GHQ-FEC Signal Section Photographic Division.


different in their functions. However, it should be noted that these two sections, the Still Picture Team and Motion Picture Team, functioned as a single collaborative team.

In October 1950, the director of the Photographic Division was Maj. Angus J. Walker. As subordinate personnel, Capt. C.G. Welcher and Capt. Blomquist occupied the positions of chiefs of the Still Picture Branch and Motion Picture Branch, respectively. There is no clear record of who was the chief of the Laboratory Branch, but the position might have rotated among officers of the Still Picture Team. Table 1 is a list of the main officers of the Photographic Division while Images 1–4 are photographs of some of those individuals.

The main officers of GHQ-FEC Photographic Division performed diverse activities, including numerous visits to the wartime frontline in Korea to direct and support the photographic activities of A Company. The most important of these tasks was to organize photographic units directly beneath the Eighth US Army in Korea (EUSAK) and to support the organization of photo units assigned to each corp and division. From Tokyo it would have been too difficult to cover the battlefields of the Korean War and so military photographers of A Company were attached to corps and divisions in need of photo units. Particularly after the recapture of Seoul in late 1950, and the breakthrough at the 38th parallel that followed, there was a strong need for military photographers to record in the rear, including Seoul. In response to the Korean War, the photo units of the US Army were divided along operational lines: A

Table 1. Main Officers of the Photographic Division, Signal Section, GHQ-FEC

Name

Commander, Signal Section Brigadier General George I. Back

Director, Photographic Division Major Angus J. Walker

Chief, Still Picture Branch Captain C.G. Welcher

Chief, Motion Picture Branch Captain Harry E. Blomquist

Chief, Laboratory Branch (Unidentified)

Executive officers Captain Clarence W. Huff Captain Robert L. Porter

Supply officer Captain James J. Daly

Still picture photographer Lieutenant Robert L. Strickland

Motion picture cameraman Captain Andrew G. Burt

Interpreter Captain Han U Lee


Image 1. (L. to R.) Executive Officer Capt. Huff, Motion Picture Cameraman Capt. Blomquist, Director of GHQ Photo Div. Maj. Walker congratulate Capt. Burt following his promotion to the rank of captain at the Teikoku Bldg. in Tokyo (10 Oct. 1950) (SC 352486).

Image 2. Maj. Walker Director of GHQ Photo Div. pins newly acquired captain’s bars on 1st LT Robert W. Porter, acting executive officer, GHQ Photo Div. Looking on are Capt. Huff (left) and Capt. C.G. Welcher (right) (27 Oct. 1950) (SC 352510).


Company concentrated on strategic photographic activities; while photo units attached to corps and divisions under the EUSAK performed tactical photographic activities (see Figure 2). To facilitate this, Maj. Walker, the director of the Photographic Division, visited Korea many times and held coordination sessions with officers of photo units at each of the corps and divisions of EUSAK.4

Regardless of the nominal positions of the officers of the Photo Division, the most important figure in terms of the support and management of the photographic activities seems to have been Capt. Huff, the executive officer. His active participation in photographic activities is attested by his appearance in many photographs. Image 3 was taken by the Motion Picture Team of A Company at the time of their interview of South Korean President Syngman Rhee. At that time, the Motion Picture Team made photographic records of the

4. Picture no. SC 356183 clearly captures these consultations. Due to space restrictions it is not reproduced here.

GHQ-FEC Sig. Section Photo Div.

assigned

Alpha Co. (Photo), 71st Sig Svc. Bn.

EUSA

167th Sig. Co. (Photo)304th Sig. Op. Bn. (Photo

Platoon)

I Corps IX Corps X Corps

51st Sig. Bn. 101st Sig. Bn.4th Sig. Bn.

226th Sig. Svc. Co.

1st Cavalry Division

24th Infantry Division

2nd Infantry Division



13th Sig. Co. 24th Sig. Co. 2nd Sig. Co. 25th Sig. Co. 7th Sig. Co.

Figure 2. Organization of the US Army Signal Corps Photo Unit during the Korean War.


Image 3. President Syngman Rhee (center) of the ROK joins US Army SC photo officers after making a motion picture interview in the garden of his home in Seoul (L. to R.: Capt. Huff, Capt. Burt, Miss Lee, President Rhee, Miss Kwan, Lt. Strickland, Maj. Schieber) (8 Nov. 1950) (SC 352690).

Image 4. (L. to R.) Capt. Daly, Maj. Schieber, and Capt. Huff confer in Seoul on photographic activities in Korea (4 Nov. 1950) (SC 352271).


major South Korean politicians, in particular for the series of interviews known as “Three Months under Enemy Rule.”5 Image 4 was taken on October 4, 1950 by the 167th Signal Photographic Company attached to EUSAK, as the part of project 50-240 titled, “South Korean Army CIC, Activities.” Here, Capt. Huff, Capt. Daly, and Maj. Schieber are in discussions about photographic activities in Korea.

Military photographic activities were undertaken from the aspect of documentation. Not only politico-military activities, but also scenes of daily routines on and around military bases were documented. While most photographs depict official events, many contain scenes that are clearly unofficial in nature, reflecting the personal interest or amusement of the military photographers. But these wartime images were not just archived as historical documentation remote from the ongoing social-political situation. Some were selected and utilized in psychological warfare or propaganda. Further, some of these wartime images were produced with an intentional purpose and from a premeditated angle. These photographs were released to civilian press channels for public consumption as propaganda and psychological warfare targeting the wartime rear. For example, photographs printed in Parachute News, Weekly Free World, and Stars and Stripes often served such a role. These photographs, on the one hand, encouraged morale and boosted enthusiasm for victory; on the other hand, they played the role of discouraging the enemy and destroying their unity. Not only still pictures, but motion pictures too were produced and utilized to this purpose. In particular, the interviews for “Three Months under Enemy Rule,” which recorded major South Korean politicians, though primarily intended for historical documentation also served as materials for educational films or psychological warfare to blackwash the evil deeds of the enemy. This film was targeted at the free world, and from this process, it became a piece of functional media helping to maintain the Cold War.

Wartime Photographic Activities and Perspectives of Military Photographers Assigned to A Company

In the early days of the Korean War from June 28 to July 1950, all the US military photographs taken during the retreat and along the wartime front were

5. The Motion Picture Team of the 167th Signal Photographic Company attached to EUSAK produced motion pictures in various genres and formats, from documentaries to movies depending what was required.


the work of photographers from A Company. Among these photographers, the earliest in Korea were Sgt. Charles R. Turnbull, PFC Ronald L. Hancock, and Cpl. Robert Dangel. With the sole exception of the photographs taken by KMAG Lt. F.J. Winslow, during this early period from June 28 to July 5, 1950, every US military wartime photograph in Korea was produced by these three photographers. After that date, from July to August 1950, forty military photographers from A Company, including Lt. Robert L. Porter, Cpl. Altee E. Lemasters, Sgt. J.C. Stewart, Sgt. Riley, and Sgt. Richard J. Girard, arrived in Korea and undertook photographic activities while attached to either the US Army’s 24th Infantry Division or 1st Cavalry Division. This study focuses on the photographic activities and viewpoints of those who arrived first.

1. Sgt. Turnbull

Sgt Turnbull entered Korea through Suwon airfield on the afternoon of June 28. The day after, Supreme Commander MacArthur was to inspect the front line with his advisors, Maj. Gen. C. A. Willoughby (G-2, GHQ-FEC) and Maj. Gen. E. M. Almond; he probably arrived in advance to document the supreme commander’s visit. Sgt Turnbull captured the scene of a burning transport plane C-54, which had been attacked by a North Korea fighter just after its arrival, and this photograph (Image 8) is the most well-known among the wartime

Image 5. Sgt. Charles R. Turnbull (7 July 1950) (SC 342949).

Image 6. Cpl. Robert Dangel (31 Oct. 1950) (SC 351694).


Image 7. (Left) PFC Ronald L. Hancock (20 Sep. 1950) (SC 348699).

Image 8. An American C-54 military aircraft burns on a South Korean landing strip after being strafed by communist North Korean fighters (28 June 1950) (SC 342707).


photographs from the initial period of the Korean War.6 The war photographer of Life magazine, David D. Duncan, captured the same scene, but from a different angle (Duncan 1951).

When Bataan, the exclusive aircraft of Supreme Commander MacArthur, arrived at Suwon Airfield on the morning of June 29, 1950 the American C-54 aircraft still sat burning on the tarmac, a scene that well reflected the urgency of the moment. A period account described how “at the moment the visiting party was getting into a car to depart the airfield, two Yak [Yakovlev] fighters began firing into the party’s location” (Joongang Ilbo 1983, 235). This photograph was used frequently to emphasize the mounting crisis of those days. Assigned to MacArthur’s visiting party, Sgt. Turnbull produced many photographs from his hour-and-a-half inspection tour with MacArthur and his staff along the Han River defensive line.

Image 9 captured the operational meeting between MacArthur, his advisors, and South Korean officers as he inspected the status of the wartime frontline along the Han River. Present are Maj. Gen. Charles Willoughby to MacArthur’s left and Maj. Gen. Edward Almond to his right. The one speaking to MacArthur is Harold J. Noble, the First Secretary at the American embassy in South Korea. At the time, MacArthur thought it possible to defend South Korea by mobilizing just two divisions from US forces then in Japan; certainly a misjudgment. Image 10 captured an interview scene between MacArthur and Marguerite Higgins, foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune. She arrived in Seoul on June 27 via Gimpo Airfield to report from the war’s frontline. After the blowing up of the Han River bridges at dawn on June 28, she made a perilous journey to join up with KMAG, then crossed the Han on a small boat to escape Seoul. After a return to Itazuke Air Base in Japan to file her stories, Higgins returned to Suwon where she seized the chance to interview MacArthur, then returning from his inspection of the front (Higgins 1951, 25–30).

After general commander MacArthur and his party had returned to Japan, Sgt. Turnbull, PFC Hancock, and Cpl. Dangel remained in Korea to undertake their mission—wartime photographic activities. They began relocation to Daejeon via Suwon Station on July 1. Sgt. Turnbull moved northward with advance Task Force Smith of the US 24th Division (1st Bn., 21st Reg.),

6. In the photographic collection published by the American Association of War Veterans in 1951, the airstrip is erroneously given as “Gimpo Airport,” an error repeated in virtually all subsequent research. Originally, no specific information regarding the airfield appeared in the caption, but close analysis of all available sources reveals it is Suwon airfield rather than Gimpo.


Image 9. General MacArthur, members of his staff, and South Korean Army officers discuss the situation developing from the communist invasion (29 June 1950) (SC 342712).

Image 10. Miss Marguerite Higgins, foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, interviews General MacArthur in South Korea. The General flew from his Tokyo Headquarters to appraise the situation arising from the communist invasion (SC 342846).


approaching Daejeon on July 2.7

Image 11 shows the troops under Col. Smith emerging from Daejeon Station in a photo that was taken by him. This image captured the scene of the Task Force’s disembarkment from the train that had brought them from Busan after their transport there by C-54 from Japan. The photograph reveals the dynamism and mobility of troops brimming with confidence at the outset of the war. After this, Smith’s Task Force moved north by cars to build up the defensive line at Jukmiryeong Hill, where they soon engaged North Korean troops and were defeated on July 5.

Following this, Sgt. Turnbull went on to conduct photographic activities throughout the operational area of the US Army’s 24th Division. On July 7, he captured the scene of Maj. Gen. William F. Dean and American Ambassador John J. Muccio welcoming Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, EUSA Commanding General, and their subsequent briefing and tactical coordination meeting (Image 12). At that time, Maj. Gen. Dean was having trouble formulating a strategy for the Pyeongtaek-Anseong frontline with the 34th Regiment in the wake of Col.

7. On July 5, Col. Smith and his troops met total defeat at the hands of the 4th Division and the 105th Tank Brigade of the North Korean Army around Jukmiryeong (between Suwon and Osan) and retreated.

Image 11. The first units of US Army ground forces to arrive debark from trains somewhere in South Korea (2 July 1950) (SC 342731).


Smith’s quick defeat due to lack of preparation. Sgt. Turnbull was also assigned to the 34th Regiment, 24th Division, along

the defensive line at Cheonan, following the US Army’s retreat from Pyeongtaek-Anseong. On the way, Turnbull captured in photos the operational status of the US Army in Korea, its weapons and equipment (105mm Howitzers, mortars, antitank mines, heavy 50-caliber machineguns, etc.), the retreating South Korean troops, and the southward movement of refugees. On July 13, he captured American soldiers of the 34th Regiment, blowing up the Geumgang River Bridge while building a defensive line along the Geumgang River towards Gongju. On July 19, he also captured poignant images of civilians being interrogated at military police (MP) headquarters in Daejeon (Image 13).

The man in Image 13 is supposed to be one among a group of suspected communists captured in a village near Daejeon by American forces of the 34th Regiment, 24th Division. He is being interrogated by South Korean MPs, and appears very intimidated. Whether this prisoner was formally accused of being a communist or a member of the North Korean Army is not important. He has already been recognized as a communist enemy from the perspective of the US and South Korean forces—and that was all that mattered. Sgt. Turnbull’s own viewpoint, as reflected in his photograph, reveals some confusion and uncertainty

Image 12. (L-R) Mr. Muccio, Lt. Gen. Walker, and Maj. Gen. Dean confer at the Taejeon [Daejeon] AFB upon Walker’s arrival at the airfield (7 July 1950) (SC 342955).


regarding this prisoner’s identity—civilian or enemy combatant. This is also revealed in the photo’s classification as “restricted security information” and “not released,” a classification produced during a period without censorship.

After this, Turnbull’s duties involved joining the 24th Division in its defense of Daejeon. From July 20, the Battle for Daejeon began. Maj. Gen. Dean soon ordered the retreat from Daejeon, though Turnbull remained on the battlefield until early on July 21, a day after photographing American soldiers in battle. Image 14 shows the ferocity of this “delaying action” at Daejeon. Maj. Gen. Dean had committed only a single regiment—two battalions—to hold the defensive line against a fierce converging attack by three North Korean divisions. In this picture, a helmetless American soldier fires his Browning at the enemy. When he shot the photograph, Sgt. Turnbull was himself on the firing line.

Following this, Cpl. Turnbull’s military photographic activities in the Korean War temporarily ceased. He escaped the battlefield at Daejeon and was evacuated to Japan, returning to the war in Korea in late August 1950.

2. PFC Hancock and Cpl. Dangel

PFC Hancock photographed a variety of subjects as he waited for the transport

Image 13. Cowering North Korean prisoner is questioned at South Korean MP headquarters in Taejeon, Korea (19 July 1950) (SC 343797).


train at Suwon Station en route southward to Daejeon on July 1. In his photographs is reflected the real situation at Suwon Station that day: assembled South Korean soldiers and police being forced to the frontlines, thousands of young political prisoners being transferred to another prison, many refugees, and American soldiers (presumably the KMAG) taking a rest from their retreat south from the Han River.

In Image 15, a small group of patients, as well as soldiers, police, and civilians, rest in the shade of a tree in front of Suwon Station. Beyond the tree is a fuzzy scene of assembling military and police. Though the situation was desperate as the South Korean forces struggled to regroup after a string of defeats and a dispirited retreat across the Han River to Suwon, what one sees in this image are figures that, though showing signs of fatigue and a grim silence, do not appear to have abandoned hope. This was because they had already heard the news of US Army’s engagement in the war. It can also be discerned in the eye contact made between one Korean soldier and the photographer, PFC Hancock.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of Hancock, they were a ragtag bunch; a motley and disorganized assembly of armed forces consisting of soldiers, police and civilians being deployed urgently to the front. Image 16 also reflects

Image 14. US infantry soldier fires Browning rifle during heavy street firing during evacuation of Taejeon by US Troops (21 July 1950) (SC 343819).


Image 15. Wounded soldiers of the South Korean army are assisted by their buddies before evacuation southward (1 July 1950) (SC 343049).

Image 16. A group of South Korean soldiers moving up. As is not uncommon in the orient, a few have their families with them (1 July 1950) (SC 343044).


Hancock’s recognition of the Korean soldiers as disorganized and lacking leadership. At the photograph’s center is what appears to be a police chief, while elsewhere the photographer’s view captures what appear to be family members of the police officers with their backs to the camera. Hancock noted in the photo’s caption, “As is not uncommon in the orient, a few have their families with them.” Considering the context with the subsequent photographs, the civilians in this image were likely saying their farewells to family members among the police force about to be sent to the front.

In Image 17, South Korean military police look with hostility at civilians with shaved heads. The building on the left is a police box of the Suwon police, with Suwon Station visible in the background. According to his caption, Hancock regarded them as North Korean prisoners of war. However, they were likely juveniles accused of political offenses who were being transferred from juvenile detention facilities in Incheon and Chuncheon to other prisons (likely Daejeon Prison). However, there is no record of these transfers. This absence of any reference to their transfer in the historical record may imply that they were executed. Even if they were transferred to another prison, their fate was likely similar to what happened in the mountain valley of Gollyeonggol in the vicinity of Daejeon.8 Hancock’s perspective was based on his misunderstanding of them

8. The official American view on the executions at Gollyeonggol can be found in the report

Image 17. North Korean prisoners of war grouped together and guarded by South Korean soldiers (1 July 1950) (SC 343052).


as North Korean prisoners being evacuated. After their movement into Daejeon, PFC Hancock and Cpl. Dangel took

many photographs of the soldiers, weaponry and equipment of the 34th Regiment as it moved towards the city. The scene around Daejeon Station on July 5 as captured by PFC Hancock is dynamic and frenetic. The weapons and equipment transported via the northbound train from Busan were deposited at Daejeon Station in order to fortify the Daejeon defensive line. The empty northbound freight cars were then filled with soldiers and weapons of the 34th Regiment, which then departed for the next station and the nearby front.9

Image 19 depicts South Korean soldiers assisting in the unloading of Howitzers for their movement to the front lines. It is not hard to discern emotions of relief and even joy in the smiling faces of the Korean soldiers, since the US Army’s engagement was in full swing at the time. It is also clearly an

“Execution of Political Prisoners in Korea” by Lt. Col. Bob E. Edwards, administrative officer at the US Embassy in South Korea. An alternative view can be found in the article about the massacre by Alan Winnington that appeared in the August 9, 1950 edition of the Daily Worker, a communist press organ in the United Kingdom.

9. The 34th Regiment arrived at Daejeon on July 3, and then headed north to Pyeongtaek-Anseong. Meanwhile, freight cars of 105mm Howitzers were arriving and unloading at Daejeon Station around the clock.

Image 18. North Korean prisoners of war guarded by soldiers of the South Korean Army (1 July 1950) (SC 343053).


intentionally captured scene by Hancock, as an American military photographer. At this moment, news of the defeat of Smith’s Task Force had not yet arrived.

On the other hand, there were many refugees in southbound trains out of Suwon. In one photograph (Image 20), they appear anxious as they crowd a departing train that has halted temporarily. The station platform looks chaotic with large crowds of refugees and South Koreans welcoming American troops (Image 21), while the atmosphere around Daejeon Station is one of optimism and relief in anticipation that the US Army might turn the tides of war.

On July 6, Hancock and Dangel moved to Pyeongtaek, attached to the 34th Regiment. It was during this period that they photographed Pyeongtaek Station, destroyed by the strafing actions of North Korean Yak fighters. On July 7, they moved on to Cheonan with the 34th Regiment. There, Hancock and Dangel documented the situation in that city, capturing images of the 7th Division of Korean Brig. Gen. Yu Jaeheung, the 34th Regiment fortifying the defensive line, as well as of northbound refugees.

In a scene captured by Dangel at a crossroads near Cheonan, American and South Korean soldiers together with refugees move southward (Image 22). At the same time, Hancock left a still picture record of an encounter between American and South Korean soldiers, which he captioned, “US Army and South Korean Army are welcoming each other” (SC 342962); in reality, they are likely

Image 19. US 105mm Howitzers are unloaded and made ready for movement to the front by South Korean soldiers (6 July 1950) (SC 342948).


exchanging updates on the war situation. In Image 23, Brig. Gen. Yu Jaeheung (identified as Yu Jae Heung in the caption) of the South Korean 7th Division is issuing operation orders to his advisors, presumably concerning the organization of the retreat and building up of the defensive line. Gen. Yu’s 7th Division was then in retreat following its rout at the Battle of Uijeongbu on June 26.

On July 8, Hancock and Dangel moved to the north of the town of Jochiwon, the operational area of the American 21st Regiment, 24th Division. Here, Hancock photographed the scene of an M-24 tank of the 21st Regiment, the fist appearance of an American tank in the photographic record of the Korean War.

In Image 24, South Koreans welcome the fist allied tank. Unfortunately, these light tanks arrived too late to engage at Cheonan. Meanwhile, the 34th Regiment fell into a trap and lost its commander. Thus, on July 8, Cheonan was occupied by the enemy. In fact, for the most part these light tanks were of little help to the allied struggle. Compared to the enemy’s T-34 tank, the M-24 had poor firepower and was lightly armored, so that it was impossible for it to prevail in the armored struggle. Concerning the inferiority of the M-24, one US infantryman grumbled, “Them American tanks ran out on us the minute they

Image 20. Refugees from the communist-led invasion of South Korea crowd available trains in an effort to reach safety from the raging battle (5 July 1950) (SC 343099).

Image 21. A northbound transport train for Cheonan carrying soldiers and equipment of the 34th Regiment awaits departure, while South Koreans welcome the train with South Korean flags [author’s explanation, not original caption] (FEC-50-3724).


Image 22. South Korean evacuees move to the south to escape the invading North Korean Army (7 July 1950) (SC 342961).

Image 23. Korean Brig. Gen. Yu Jae Heung, commander of a Korean division, gives an order to one of his chiefs of staff (7 July 1950) (SC 342965).


heard the Russian babies coming round the corner” (Higgins 1951, 87–88). As evident by this episode, the weaponry captured by the military photographers was insufficient for boosting morale during this initial stage of the US Army’s engagement.

On July 10, the photographers recorded the first evidence of atrocities on the part of the North Korean Army towards American soldiers. On one hand, the enemy as war criminal and the enemy’s cruel and merciless acts were captured as part of the photographic war “record” itself, on the other hand, these photographic subjects served to demonize and dehumanize the enemy in a formula of psychological warfare. For this, even though the photograph at first seems proof of objective reality, in fact it strongly reflects qualities of psychological warfare. Image 25 should be understood in this context.10

This photograph was taken by Cpl. Dangel on the night of July 9, and it captured the scene of four American soldiers of the 21th Regiment, 24th Division after their execution. Their hands were secured and they were shot behind the head. The photographers found these four dead bodies at a spot, “midway between the forward observation post and the actual front line” as

10. While the photographers made captions for their pictures in the field, these were retyped or edited behind the frontlines or at headquarters in Japan. The caption here was clearly redacted in Japan, but refers to the cameraman’s original caption.

Image 24. South Koreans greet American soldiers as they move to the frontlines in American light “M-24” tanks, somewhere in Korea (8 July 1950) (SC343254).


recorded in the photo’s caption. But to be more precise, the location was around the villages of Jeonuimyeon and Jeondongmyeon.11 This photograph of these dead American soldiers found its way into media worldwide on July 12 and 13.12 Indeed, this photograph clearly and visually manifested not only the cruelty of the enemy, but also the death of allied soldiers. In particular, the American public received a tremendous shock. Images of such deaths on a larger scale could turn American opinion against the war. After this, photographs depicting dead American soldiers came under censorship and were not released.

11. Im Insik, a first lieutenant with AFIED, Ministry of National Defense, also captured the image of a dead American soldier at the same time and place. His photograph was reprinted in many newspapers around the world via Sin Hwabong, reporter for the AP. It became the front page image of the Indianapolis News for July 12. On the other hand, a very similar photograph was posted on the front page of the Asahi Shimbun on July 13. That picture’s subject and location were identical with Im’s photograph. In the caption of the Asahi Shimbun photo was the credit, “Cooperatively Provided by US Army & AP.” Based on this caption, Kim Yunjeong (2009) has suggested the photograph was taken by Im Insik. However, it was in fact the photograph taken by Cpl. Dangel (Image 25).

12. This event triggered war crimes investigations of the North Korea Army ordered by General MacArthur, after which a war crimes research group was organized with broad powers.

Image 25. One of four American soldiers of the 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, Company unknown, found midway between the forward observation post and the actual frontline. The cameraman’s caption states that the men were probably captured the night of July 9, and then shot.10 Most of them were shot thru the head with their hands tied behind their backs. Along with them was a variety of burned and destroyed equipment.


PFC Hancock and Cpl. Dangel acted as military photographers throughout the operational area of the 24th Division centered on Daejeon. After July 17, PFC Hancock joined the 1st Cavalry Division heading north from Pohang, while Cpl. Dangel joined the 25th Division. The press conference of General MacArthur at 5th Air Force Headquarters in Daegu on July 26 was the last photograph they took in Korea before their evacuation to Japan (Image 26). They both later returned to Korea with the 1st Marine Division on September 15, 1950 for the Battle of Incheon.

Image 26 is one of the photographs taken at MacArthur’s press conference on July 26. It is very clear why he had again visited Korea; this image could serve to boost the morale of an American military burned out by repetitive retreats while, on the other hand, communicating a message of the will to defend South Korea by building up the Nakdong River defensive line. In the press conference scene can be found Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commander of Ground Forces in Korea to MacArthur’s left, and on the opposite side, Sin Seongmo, acting prime minister of South Korea, a deliberate and symbolic arrangement. In fact, MacArthur acted out a scene of personally consoling Sin Seongmo before the assembled reporters.

Image 26. Douglas MacArthur gives a press conference at 5th AF HQS, Taegu [Daegu], South Korea, just before leaving for Tokyo. Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commander of Ground Forces in Korea, looks on.


3. Lt. Winslow

There were American military photographers active in Korea prior to the arrival of Sgt. Turnbull and his party from the 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. to cover the Korean War.13 These were Lt. Winslow and Cpl. Anderson of KMAG; and this final part focuses on the photographic activities and perspective of Lt. Winslow.

There were 60 soldiers of the US Army left at KMAG headquarters in Seoul, including Lt. Winslow, at the time the Han River bridges were detonated at dawn on June 28. The members of KMAG barely managed to cross the Han River by boat and then proceeded towards Suwon via Gimpo Airfield on foot along mountain roads, a scene Lt. Winslow captured with very clear intentions since it was the first retreat of the US Army. Image 28 is a scene from those moments. If one examines it more closely, one sees Marguerite Higgins, foreign correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune, marching with Colonel Wright at the end of the procession.

The next day, Winslow undertook the mission of photographing the visit of MacArthur, after hearing news that MacArthur’s party would arrive at Suwon Air Base for a tour of inspection of the situation south of the Han River. One interesting point of this activity is the photograph that captures Sgt. Turnbull (Image 29). This image depicts the arrival at Suwon Air Base of President Syngman Rhee, just prior to the landing of the Bataan carrying MacArthur. In this scene, Sgt. Turnbull (seen in the left foreground) is taking a photograph of Brig. Gen. John H. Church welcoming President Rhee and councilor at US Embassy in Korea Everett F. Drumright.

On June 30, Lt. Winslow moved southward via Suwon Station. In Suwon he took Images 30 and 31 from almost the identical perspective as Image 17, taken by PFC Hancock on July 1. This means the eyes of Winslow and Hancock captured the same subject from the same spot but a day apart.

And to compare the captions of these two photographs (Images 17 and 30), the former identified the subjects as “prisoners of the North Korea Army” while the latter as “South Korean civilians” awaiting southbound trains as refugees. Winslow was relatively more accurate, in that he recognized them not as military prisoners but as civilians; but why did he identify them as refugees? Could he, as somebody residing in Korea, have misjudged the identity of these

13. Before the outbreak of the Korean War, there were a few professional still photographers, including Winslow and Hendsbee, at work in Korea; but at the immediate outset of the war, the only photographic activities thus far verified have been those of Winslow and Anderson.


Image 27. Lt. F.J. Winslow, KMAG Photo Officer, photographs war activities near the front lines, somewhere in Korea (1 Aug. 1950) (SC 345029).

Image 28. Members of KMAG who evacuated Seoul, Korea, on 27 June 1950, were forced to cross the Han River by means of small boats. They then marched sixteen miles to Kimpo [Gimpo] Airbase (28 June 1950) (SC342706).


people, who were clearly captive and being forced to relocate somewhere, watched over by police as can be seen in Image 31? This study postulates that Winslow’s description was a form of self-censorship; the image’s stamp of “not released” would seem to support this.

Following this, Lt. Winslow moved southward earlier than Sgt. Turnbull and the members of 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. to carry out photographic activities in the rear, since his primary mission was to record the activities of the KMAG. Those photographs taken around Daegu and Pohang, mainly in the Gyeongsang-bukdo area, are produced from his photographic activities from July to August. During that time, his lens captured diverse subjects—not only the US Army but also war refugees, orphans, and destroyed city scenes. Here, Lt. Winslow’s perspective reveals itself as somewhat different from that of other military photographers. His photographs captured not only the war’s tragedies, but also the power of life, through a viewpoint rooted in humanism.

In Image 32, a Korean infant cries as she gazes into the camera. Not very far off from where the image was captured, a parapet was burning after an artillery attack from which this child was the only one rescued. Next to the child is some food given by the American soldier who had rescued her. At the moment the image was being taken a Korean farmer was passing along the road. In the photograph, the contrast between the rescue by the American soldier and the indifference of the Korean farmer was strongly manifested. Image 33 captured the landscape of Pohang, completely destroyed after a series of air strikes and

Image 29. President Syngman Rhee of the ROK is greeted by Brig. Gen. John H. Church, Commander, Forward Echelon in Korea, upon his arrival (30 June 1950) (SC 342872).


fire fights on August 23. Worth noting in this photograph is the presence of the woman at its center. Even though her entire world has been destroyed, she gazes directly and resolutely into the camera; her appearance reflects the power of life overcoming the tragedy of war. Like the previous image, the viewpoint of Winslow here expresses the reality of war but based on his own humanism and through a photography that went beyond the superficial viewpoint of war documentation.

The military photographs depicting scenes of war functioned not only to reveal the war, but also to make the viewer believe in and remember the reality

Image 30, 31. South Korean civilians wait at a railroad station for transportation while fleeing the advance of the North Korean Army (30 June 1950) (SC 342857).


Image 32. Naked and abandoned, a Korean child sits bewildered on a roadside somewhere in Korea as an unconcerned farmer passes by (American soldiers rescued the youngster and took care of her personally for several days until a Korean family was found who agreed to be responsible for her care) (8 Aug. 1950) (SC 345449).

Image 33. Scene of Pohang, on the east coast of Korea, after artillery duel and air strikes (23 Aug. 1950) (SC346886).


of those images. The military photographic activities of Sgt. Turnbull, Cpl. Dangel, PFC Hancock and Lt. Winslow, were, on the one hand, meant to document and record the events of the war. But on the other hand, they were also exercises in psychological warfare intended to make the viewer believe the events and scenes shown in the photographs were the real side of the war. However, at the same time, it is very remarkable that these military photographers maintained the diverse, complicated and confused viewpoints regarding what constitutes “our side” (us), the enemy (them), and civilians (us and them). This was possible because that period—the very early stages of the war—was virtually free of institutional censorship. The fractured and disparate viewpoints expressed in the military photographs from the early days of the Korean War were obviously different from the clear and homogenous viewpoint that emerged after the recapture of Seoul in late 1950. Thus, those viewpoints of the above four military photographers has many implications.

Conclusion

Just after the outbreak of the Korean War, Sgt. Turnbull, Cpl. Dangel, and PFC Hancock, the military photographers for General MacArthur were sent to undertake photographic activities at the developing wartime front. These three military photographers were assigned to A Company, 71st Sig. Svc. Bn. under the Photographic Division of the Signal Section of GHQ-FEC. The existing war photographs taken during the period from June 28 to July 5, 1950 were almost exclusively taken by these three military photographers along with Lt. Winslow of KMAG.

The subjects of their photographs were mainly military ones. They captured scenes in very diverse settings: press conferences, operational meetings, battles, mobilizations of troops and equipment, while occasionally breaking from military subjects to focus on portraying ordinary people. Their subjects also included the materials and landscapes of the battlefield: weapons systems, transport and provisions, electrical facilities, signal operations, transportation, harbors and landscapes destroyed by fighting.

Sometimes the enemy became their subject. In this, they captured scenes of subversive activities and sabotage, with particular emphasis on wartime atrocities. The photographers of the US Army captured these scenes and then recorded detailed information for each image. However, they remained blind to the violent and merciless acts of themselves and their allies. For example, the political prisoners accused by the South Korean Army and police, the massacre


of suspected collaborators, and the bombing and strafing of civilian villages by the US military, are left out of their perspective. In so far that this blind spot is revealed, it is only in cases when “our side” cannot be differentiated and the destruction and death can be regarded as something inflicted by “the other side.”

Just as often as the military, the photographic subjects were civilian Korean of all ages and sexes. Here, the interesting point is the divergent perspectives of the American military photographers who captured the scenes and faces of ordinary Koreans. In the case of the refugee, the viewpoint of the photograph reflects a confused understanding of them as either (demilitarized) civilians, “impure elements” or hidden “communists.”

From the above examination, the US Army photographers engaged in the Korean War during the initial days of the war had very confused viewpoints, as articulated in the diverse subjects of their photographs: allies, enemies, and civilians. This was possible only in this initial stage, as the opening period of the war was relatively unhindered by official censorship. As the war went on, the perspective of the military photographers became more homogeneous in response to the official position of the American military. Therefore, and ironically, the confused viewpoints that the three military photographers—Sgt. Turnbull, Cpl. Dangel, PFC Hancock—along with Lt. Winslow manifested in their wartime images are valuable for the study of the realities of the Korean War.

This study is the first to focus on the wartime photographic activities of the military photographers of the US Army Signal Corps during the Korean War. It has attempted to present an analysis of the images and perspectives, along with image information, of the US military photographers, and through a cross analysis of their activities with the historical facts known about the Korean War, it has tried to offer another side of the Korean War, one that is not described in the official military history.

At the same time, there is still a task before us. We are in need of further analysis into what aspects of the war were visualized and what were left behind as the “blind side.” Further, we also need to uncover and study those wartime photographs captured by the South Korean Army. For a long time, the viewpoint of the US Army was internalized as “our” viewpoint in South Korea. Even until very recently, there have only been scant indications of a differentiating approach towards viewing the activities of the US army as the acts of “them” not of “us.” It will be a significant task for the future—an in-depth analysis of the organization, activities and viewpoints of the Armed Forces Information and Education Division (AFIED) of the South Korean Army, approaching their


viewpoint as “our” viewpoint.

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