The Ontology of the Middle Way Studies of Classical India Editors Bimal K. Matilal Spalding Professor ofEastern Religions &Ethics,Oxford University,United Kingdom Editorial Board: R. P. Goldman, Daniel H. H.Ingalls, and A. K. Ramanujan The aimof thisseries is to publish fundamentalstudies concerning classical Indiancivilization.Itwillconcludeeditionsof texts,translations,special-ized studies, and scholarly worksof moregeneral interest related tovarious fieldsof classicalIndianculturesuchasphilosophy,grammar,literature, religion, art, and history. Inthiscontext,theterm'ClassicalIndia',coversavastareaboth historicallyandgeographically,andembracesvariousreligionsand philosophicaltraditions,suchasBuddhism,Jainism,andHinduism,and manylanguagesfromVedicandEpicSanskrittoPali,Prakrit,and Apabhramsa.Webelievethat ina profoundlytraditionalsocietylikeIndia, the study of classical culture is always relevant and important. Classical India presentsaninteresting recordof deephumanexperience, thoughts,beliefs,andmyths,whichhavebeenasourceof inspirationfor countless generations .. We are persuaded of its lasting value and relevance to modem man. Byusingextensiveandforthemostpartunexploredmaterialwith scientificrigorandmodemmethodology,theauthorsandeditorsof this serieshopetostimulateandpromoteinterestandresearchinafieldthat needs to be placed in its proper perspective. Volume11 The Ontology of the Middle Way by Peter Fenner Deakin University,Gee/ong, Australia KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS DORDRECHT/BOSTON/LONDON Library of Congress Cataloging inPublication Data Fenner,PeterG.,1949-Theontologyofthemiddleway/byPeterFenner. p.cm,/-- (Studiesof.classlcalIndia;v.11> IncludesatranslationoftheMadhyamakavatarabyCandraklrti. Basedontheauthor'sthesis(Ph,D.)--UniversltyofOueensland. Includesbibliographicalreferences(p.). ISBN0-7923-0667-8(U.S.:alk.paper) 1.Candraklrtl.Madhyamakavatara.2.Madhyamlka(Buddhism) I.CandrakTrti.Madhyamakavatara.English.1990.II.Title. III.Series. B02910.M367F451990 294.3'85--dc20 ISBN 0-7923-0667-8 Published by Kluwer Academic Publishers, P.O. Box17,3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers incorporates the publishing programmes of . D. Reidel, Martinus Nijhoff, Dr W. Junk and MTP Press. Sold and distributed in the U.S.A. and Canada by Kluwer Academic Publishers, 101Philip Drive, Norwell, MA 02061, U.S.A. Inall other countries, sold and distributed by Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, P.O. Box 322, 3300 AH Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Printed on acid-free paper All Rights Reserved . 1990 by Kluwer Academic Publishers 90-4080 No part ofthe material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or utilized in any formor by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permissionJrom the copyright owner. Printed in The Netherlands This book is dedicated to my daughters Tahli, Yeshe and Brooke. CONTENTS FOREWORD .....XI ABBREVIATIONS ....XIII INTRODUCTION ..... 1 Notes ..... 8 CHAPTER ONE:THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MAl AND ITS RELIGIOUS CONTENT ..... 9 1 2 2.1 2.2 2.3 3 3.1 3.2 4 Chandrakirti and the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl..... 9 Three Systems of Thought that can be Isolated in the Introductiontothe Midtlle Way[MAl ..... 11_ The System of Insight and its Development .....15 The Bodhisattvas' Development and their Deeds (carya)..... 15 The Characterised Madhyamika ..... 17 The Context of the Introductionto the MiddleWay[MAl ..... 19 Knowledge (jnana)Yoga ..... 21 The Transference of Insight ..... 25 The Profound and Extensive Contents ..... 26 Notes ..... 29 CHAPTER TWO: THE PROFOUND VIEW ..... 35 1The Cognitive Basis of Madhyamika Soteriology ..... 35 2The Philosophy of Emptiness (sunyavada)..... 37 2.1The Descriptions of Emptiness ..... 38 2.2Different Types of Emptiness ..... 40 2.3Twenty Emptinesses ..... 40 viii 2.4Intrinsic Existence (svabhava)as what is Negated by E m p ~ n e s s..... 42 3Madhyamika Analyses ..... 44 4Analysis of Phenomena (dharma)..... 45 4.1Birth from Self ..... 46 4.2Birth from Other ..... 48 4.3Birth from both Self and Other ..... 51 4.4Birth from no Cause ..... 51 5Analysis of the Person (pudgala)..... 54 5.1The Self or Person Negated ..... 54 5.2Seven-Sectioned Analysis ..... 57 5.3The Self is not Different from the Psycho-physical Organism ..... 59 5.4The Self is not the Same as the Psycho-physical Organism .....60 5.sRefutation of a Substantial Self ..... 64 5.6The Self is not the Same as the Collection ..... 67 5.7The Self is not in the Psycho-physical Organism and Vice Versa ..... 70 5.8The Self does not have the Psycho-physical Organism ..... 70 5.9The Self is not the Shape of the Psycho-physical Organism ..... 71 6Critique of Buddhist Phenomenalism (vijnanavada)..... 73 6.1Refuting the Non-extemality of Sense Objects .....75 6.2The Failure of Mental Potentials to Account for Sensory Experience ..... 77 6.3Counter-examples ..... 79 6.4Refutation of a Self-reflexive Consciousness (svasamvedana)..... 80 7Some Meta-logical Observation ..... 82 8The Middle Path and Relational Origination ..... 85 9The Profound Path Structure ..... 86 Notes ..... 89 CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS AND INSIGHT ...99 1Westernof the Problem ..... 100 2Chandrakirti's Statement on the Relationship ..... 101 3The Structural Foundations of Analysis ..... 105 3.1Entity Discrimination (samjna)and Predication ..... 105 3.2The Principle of Definition Through Logical Opposites ..... 107 3.3Dichotomisation .....109 3.4The ParadoxicalStructure of Predication ..... 111 3.5The Destructuring of Conceptuality ..... 115 4Patterns of Analysis in the Introductionto the Middle Way[MAl ..... 122 4.1The Introduction to the Middle Way's [MAl Proofs and Categories of Analysis ..... 122 4.2. The Introduction's [MAl Analyses and the Core Structure ..... 127 4.3The Introduction's[MAl Contradictions ..... 4.4Category Restricted and Unrestricted Analyses ..... 134 4.5Abstract and Instantiated Analyses ..... 135 4.6Interpretation of Diagram 3.1as a Flow-chart ..... 136 4.7Modal Analysis and Substantive Bi-negative Conclusions ..... 141 4.8Implicative and Non-affirming Negations ..... 143 5Logical and Experiential Consequences ..... 146 6Contingency and Necessity in Consequential ,Analysis ..... 148 Notes ..... 151 CHAPTER FOUR: INSIGHT AND EXTENSIVE DEEDS ... 159 1Common-sense World-view ..... 160 1.1Instruments of Valid Conventional Cognition ..... 160 1.2Subjective Determinants of Cognition ..... 162 ix x 1.3The Common-sense World ..... 162 2The Yogin's Practices ..... 164 3The Bodhisattvas' Path ..... 165 3.1The Bodhisattvas' Compassion ..... 167 4The Buddha-nature ..... 170 4.1Interpretative Teaching ..... 173 5The Relations between the Profound and Extensive Contents ..... 179 5.1Emptiness and Conventions ..... 180 5.2The Relations between the Two Realities ..... 183 5.3Emptiness and Valid Conventions ..... 185 6Insight and the Fully Evolved Mind ..... 186 6.1Insight and Compassion ..... 187 6.2Insight and the Fully Evolved Mind (bodhicitta)..... 191 Notes ..... 194 CONCLUSION .205 APPENDIX ONE: A TRANSLATION OF THE VERSES OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MAl .... 209 APPENDIX TWO: TSONG KHA PA'S SECTION HEADINGS IN THE DBU MA DGONGS PA RAB GSAL (Trans. with Michael Richards) ..... 303 BIBLIOGRAPHy .... 323 INDEX .333 FOREWORD This study is mainly the outcome of work completed asa PhD. thesIs at the University of Queensland.However, it has been revised in many ways since its preparation in dissertation form. Many people have contributed tothestudy and Iam concernedthat Imay failtomentioneveryonewhohasassistedme.MyfirstintroductiontoThe IntroductiontotheMiddleWay(Madhyamakavatara)carnethroughacourseI attendedataBuddhistCentreinQueenslandcalledChenrezig Institute.The course wasgiven byYen.GesheLoden,originallyof SeraMonastery inIndia, and wastranslated by Yen.ZasepTulku.Besidesparticipating in thiscourseI also attended a number of other courses on Madhyamika presented by these and other lamas in Australia and in Nepal.I was also fortunate to spend a semester attheUniversityofWisconsin- MadisonstudyingwithProfessorGeshe Lhundup Sopa. AtdifferenttimesIhadtheopportunitytodiscuss,inpersonorthrough correspondence,aspectsofthestudywithanumberofleadingscholars. ProfessorsJ.W.deJong,RobertThurman,JeffreyHopkinsandPaulWilliams gave freelyof their expertise although in some cases I know that Iwas unable to takefulladvantageoftheirsuggestions.Specialmentionandthanksgo Professor Fred Streng who supported the study and gave most graciously of his time. InAustraliaIwouldliketothankmyadvisersattheUniversityof Queensland, Drs. Ross Reat, Arvind Sharma and Richard Hutch. Finally,IwishtoacknowledgeMichaelRichardswhowentoverthe translationoftheversesoftheMadhyamakavatarawithgreatcareandmade manysuggestionswhichhaveimprovedtheaccuracyofthetranslation. Together weprepared thetranslationofthe section heading of Tsong kha pa's which appears as a second appendix.I only regret that I did not have the time to refer to that text in the body of the study. Some sectionsof thisstudy haveappeared in various journalsand Iwould liketothank PhilosophyEastandWest,Journalof theInternationalAssociationfor BuddhistStudiesandtheJournalof IndianPhilosophyforpermissiontopublish reworked versions of my essays. ABBREVIATIONS AK'Abhidharmakosa (Collection on the Higher Sciences)ofVasubandhu BCABodhicaryiivatiira (Introductiontothe Evolved lifestyle) of Santideva CSCatu(lsatakaSastrakiirikii (Commentary on the four HundredStanzas)of Aryadeva DsDe dge edition DSDasabhumika-satra (TenLevelsSatra) JIABSJournal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies j1PJournal of Indian Philosophy LSLailkiivatiira-siitra (Decentinto Lailkii Satra) LMSTheLiterature of the MadhyamakaSchool of Philosophy in India by David Seyfort Ruegg LSNPDrang nges rnam 'byed legsbshadsnying po(Essence of True Eloquence)of Tsong kha pa MAMadhyamakiivatiira (Introduction of the Middle Way) of CandrakIrti MABhMadhyamakiivatiira-bhii'!Ya(CommentaryontheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay)of CandrakTrti'. ME MK MN MSA MY N P PEW PP PPS PVT RSM Meditation on Emptiness by Jeffrey Hopkins MUlamadhyamakakiirikii (PrincipalStanzas on the Middle Way)of Nagarjuna Majjhima-nikiiya (Middle Length Discourses) Mahiiyiinasufriilmikiira (Ornament of the Universal VehicleSatra) of Asanga Mahiivyutpatti (Great Nikiiya(Pali Discourses) Peking edition Philosophy East andWest Prasannapadii (Clear Words)of CandrakTrti. Paficavimsatisiihasrika-prajfiiipiJramitii-siltra(PerfectInsightinTwenty-FiveThousandStanzas Satra). Pramii1Jllviirttika (Compendiumon Epistemology) of DharmakIrti dBumala'jugpaibstanbcoskyidgongsparabtugsalbaimelong(MirrorofComplete Clarification)of dGe 'dun grub xiv RARatniivaTi(Precious Jewel)of Niigiirjuna SNSarrzyutta-nikaya(CollectedDiscourses) VPVallee Poussin's edition VPTdMadhyamakavatiira, Introduction au Traite duMilieu by Louis de la Valhfe Poussin. VPVVallee Poussin's variant VVVigrahavyiivartan7 (Repudiation of Criticism)of Nagiirjuna For full details see Bibliography INTRODUCTION Therelationshipsbetweenreason,spiritualinsightorintuition,andthe fullerdimensionsofreligiousitysuchashumanloveandsocialactionare matters of concern to many philosophers of religion investigating many different religioustraditions.InrationalfaithslikeBuddhismandHinduAdvaita Vedantatherelationshipbetweenthesedifferentyetessentialfacetsofeach religioustraditiontakeonaspecialsignificance,andinthecaseofareligio-philosophicaltraditionlikeMadhyamikaBuddhism- wherethefacultyof reason isexplicitly linked to the insight of an ultimate reality and where insight is subsumed into a more overarching religious awakening such aswe see in the universal vehicle or Mahayana- the relationships and problems associated with them become particularly pronounced. InthecaseofMadhyamikaBuddhism,andeasternreligionsand philosophiesingeneral(perhapslesssointheSemiticfaiths),theissuesand problems that stem from a study of these relationships are largely hermeneutical incharacterfortheyariseinthecontextofcontemporaryinvestigationsof religio-philosophicalsystemsthatrepresent'another'paradigmintermsof orientation to theory,intellectualpresuppositions,standardsofreasoning,and criteriaofmeaning,relevancy,value,andintelligibility.Thesedifferencesin intellectual paradigms,issueforthin western scholarshipastheposing of new questions totraditional materialsthat requireanswersand information that are oftentimesquitedifferentfromthosewhichthetraditionalmaterialswere originally designed and intended to answer. Inotherwords,inthetaskofcomprehendingtraditionalideasfroma modern framework,thecontemporarycross-culturalinquiryinevitablycreates newfociofattentionthatformgenuineandlegitimateareasofconcernand inquiry;areasandissueswhicharebroachedinMadhyamikaliteratureonly obliquelyandindirectly.Problemsthusemergeasperceivedareasof opaqueness, lack of detail, ambiguities, and omissions in Madhyamika texts. Whycertainareasofinquiryareneglectedinthetraditionalmaterialswe can only hazard aguess, but presumably their paucity of detail in certain areas, such asa lack of attention to "relationships" and "explanatory details" in general, liesnodoubtinpartwiththepracticalorientationofIndianMadhyamikas. Manyimpliedbutomitteddetailswereprobablyintendedtobeclarified through oral instruction, debate, and contemplation.Others doubtless represent afailuretoseesuchomissionsasproblematic.Whateverthereasonsare, Madhyamikatextsbyandlargetendtodescribeonlytheconstituentsof their religio-philosophicalsystemwithoutexplainingtherelationshipsandinternal 2REASONING INTO REALITY dynamics that underpin the interactions and dependences between the different. aspects of theoverall system of philosophy and doctrine.In thecontemporary westerncontext,on theotherhand,understanding issoughtthroughdetailed explanationandclarificationsof thevarioussortsofrelationshipsthatobtain between theco-actingaspectsof areligiousunderstanding,andhenceit isjust theseaboveareas,whichfigureasthemostprominentrelationshipsinmany religious traditions, that require an elucidation. The above relationships are - aswe have said - especially significant yet also problematicforcontemporaryMadhyamikascholarship.Thoughthisisnot withoutgoodreason,itistruetosaythatalthoughwesternMadhyarnika scholarship hasprogressed forseveral decadesand on several fronts, utilising a variety ofmethodsof scholarshiprangingfromformaltextualexegesistofree interpretationcarriedoutinthefieldsofphenomenologyandhistoryof religions,comparativephilosophyandlogicalphilosophy,theserelationships are unclarified,and the problems associatedwith them unresolved.Thus, they constitute an ongoing concern for many scholars. Theaim' ofthisstudyistoinvestigatetherelationshipsbetweenreason, insight, and the awakening of a fully evolved mind in the Madhyamika tradition withaviewfirsttoclarifyingtheissuesinvolvedintheirinvestigationand secondtoofferingsomesuggestedresolutionsoftheproblems.Itseeks clarificationandresolutionataphilosophicalandpsychologicallevelasthe problems - at least in the Madhyarnika - are mainly in thearea of philosophical-psychology.This, of course, is not to deny that historical issues bear upon these problems,especiallyinrelationshiptothedoctrinaldevelopmentofthe Madhyamika, or that suchproblemsmay bearonthephilosophicalproblems. Thedecisionheretofocusonthephilosophicalandleaveasidethehistorical issues.isanexpedientofmanageabilitywhichleavesworktobedone. Hopefullyithelpstoprovidethephilosophicalanddoctrinalbasisforsuch needful work. Hopefully also,the study may be valuable and useful for similar discussions being carried out in other traditions if forno other reason than that the problems areexplicit,pronounced,andabletobefullyexposedintheMadhyamika. Hence though this study isnot linked specifically to other religious traditions it may be that it provides some insights that are helpful in resolving those issues in thecross-culturalreligiouscontextandindicatesomeavenuesforgrappling with them. Inthisstudywewillbeconcernedwithinvestigatingrelationshipsimd problemsassociatedwith themthatcrystalisearoundthreemainareas,which we will define. 1.Problemscenteringon therelationships betweenreason(tarka)- asabasic facultyof rationality;analysis(vicara)- in the sense of logicalinvestigation andparticularlyconsequential(prasanga)analysis;emptiness(sunyata); reality(tattva);andliberation(nirvana),ProfessordeJonghascalled INTRODUCTION 3 attentiontothisareaandespeciallytherelationshi:pbetweenreason, intuition and wisdom Cprajna).1The 'principal problems In this area concern the placeand function of consequential ana1ysis in meditation and the extent towhichsuchanalysisplaysaroleintheacquisitionofinsightinto emptinessasconceived bythePrasangikaMadhyamika.Thecentral issue that hasarisenforcontemporary Madhyamikascholarshipiswhetherthe Madhyamika philosophical analysis isintended asapreparatoryexercisefor meditationorwhetheritsroleismoreintegral,assomehowbeingan efficient cause for insight. 2.Thenextareaofinquiryisconcernedwiththerelationshipsbetweenso-calledtechniqueCupaya)andinsight.Ofthethreeareastnisistheleast problematicandthatwhichhasreceivedmoreattentionthantheothers, frequently as a discussion of the relationship between the 'two realities'. 3.The third set of problems focuseson the relationshipat a philosophical and doctrinal levelbetween Madhyamikaphilosophy and the universal vehicle formofBuddhismingeneralandisspecificallyconcernedtoclarifyand elucidatetherelationsandinteractionsthatobtainbetweeninsight, compassion Ckaruna),and the fully evolved mind Cbodhi). TheaboveproblemsarepresentinallBuddhisttraditionsbutare particularly pronounced in the Madhyamika due to its claims that reason may be used forsoteriological ends, and itsdistinctionat thelevelof doctrine between liberation and full evolution Cbodhi). Of theproblems mentioned, those in the first area, centering on the relation betweenanalysisand insight,attractthegreatestattentionandhermeneutical rigourfortheyaretheperennialconcernofMadhyamikascholars.Thetwo other areas are pursued as subsidiary to this central concern. That theproblemsaregenuine isdemonstrated by thecontinued effortsof scholarslikeMurti,Streng,Inada,Sprung,Ichimura,Thurmanandothersto elucidatetheproblemsandaclearlack ofagreement andconcurrenceintheir response tothem.That they areurgent problems isevidenced by thefactthat thepresentstateofresearch,withtheexceptionofsomerecentworkby Gangadean and Ichimura, is in something of a still-water. In approaching these problems this study focuseson a different textual basis thanthatusedinotherstudies.Accordingtotheapproachhere,the investigation of the relationshipsis best accomplished by atwo staged process: the first involving atextual reconstructionof relevant materials and the second, amakingofreasonedinferencesandextrapolationsonthebasisofthe reconstructed material. Giventhetrenchancyoftherelationshipsinquestions,andproblemsand unclaritiesthat surround them,thechoiceof textsand hermeneuticaltoolsisa singly important factor, and it is to these I now direct our attention. The corpusof Madhyamika literatureisvast and varied, spanning over six hundredyearsinIndiaandmorethanthatinTibet.It includestheoriginal 4 REASONING INTO REALITY Madhyamika of N agarjuna and its subsequent developments into the Prasangika and the two schools of Svatantrika Madhyamika.The bulk and diversity of that literaturemakesit importantfromthepointofviewofexpediencytohavea researchfocus,thatistosaYia:setoftextsthroughwhichtoinvestigatethe relationships, and within these a text singled out as a bench-mark in virtue of its exemplifyingaroundedandcoherentexpressionof theMadhyamika.Given, also,that most Madhyamika texts broachtheserelationshipsonly obliquely the choice of texts itself is a crucial decision. This study draws on the works of Nagarjuna and Shantideva and spotlights on Chandrakirti's Introductiontothe MiddleWay(MA)as a natural, and arguably thebestresearchfocus.ThereasonsforchoosingtheIntroduction[MA]asa bench-mark are several. With respect to the original expression of the Madhyamika the Introductionto theMiddleWay[MAlencapsulates itscentralcharacteristics.LikethePrincipal StanzasontheMiddleWay(Mulamadhyamakakarika)andAvertingArguments (Vigrahavyavartani),theIntroductionincludesstatementsofthepure consequential(prasanga)dialectic- theleitmotif of thePrincipalStanzas[MK]-and also raises the meta-epistemological analyses of the Averting Arguments (VV) (albeit without analysing the variety of phenomena and pramanas that N agarjuna does).ThePrincipal Stanzas[MK]and Precious Jewel(Ratnavali)are Chandrakirti's ownsourcesfortheMadhyamikaandbotharequotedfrequentlyinthe Introduction.For our purposes, then,wherethestructural nature of reason and analysisismoresignificantthanthevariabilityintheirdeployment,the Introduction[MAlisequallyasserviceableastheworksof Nagarjuna(infact moreso,aswewillsee).ThisholdsalsoforChandrakirti'sClearWords (Prasannapada)whichtendstoduplicatetheinsightmadeearlierinthe Introduction[MAl.Thereisnoevidenceofanyfundamentalchangein Chandrakirti's philosophy between the Introduction[MAl and ClearWords[PPl. Hence,withrespecttothefirstsetofproblemsconcernedwiththe relationshipbetweenanalysisandinsight,theIntroduction[MAltendsto replicate the earlier Madhyamika texts.Thus, unless one is concerned to explore these relationships solely on the basis of the original Madhyamika of Nagarjuna, thentheIntroduction[MAlisanobviouschoiceoftext.Withrespecttothe relation between thought and reality and the Madhyamika theory of perception, theIntroduction[MAlisaninformativetextthatimplicitlyraisestheproblem throughitscritiqueoftheVijnanavadaschoolandstatesadeveloped Madhyamika response to it.. Thechoice,though, becomeseven moresignificant inview of thefactthat the Introduction[MAl gives voice toa Madhyamika praxis where earlier textsdo not.It doesthisintwo ways:directlyandindirectly.Thedirectway isby includinginformationabouttheproceduresandassumptionsthatunderpin analysis.TheanalysesfoundintheIntroduction[MAl,forexample,aremore INTRODUCTION 5 stylised than those occurring in the Principal Stanzas[MKland are a precursor in fact toa later meditative formulation of the same analyses. Equallyassignificant,though,isanimpliedand,asit were,betweenthe lines description of Madhyamika praxis, that can be inferred from its format and explicitcontextualisationwithinthereligio-philosophicalmilieuof~ e v e n t h centuryIndia.Bywritinginresponsetoawiderangeofphilosophical viewpoints and presumed religious mentalities, Chandrakirti infusesa vibrancy and dynamism into the Introduction[MAlthat conveys the flavour and life of the Madhyarnikaasapracticalsystemof interpersonaldebateandcontemplation. Fromthisonecanextrapolatetotheproceduresandformal' structuresthat undergird Madhyamika praxis. Inrelationshiptothesecondarea,concerningtherelationshipbetween methodandinsight,theIntroduction[MAlisstructuredaroundthereligious practices of the perfections (paramita).In this respect, and also in relationship to its discussion of the two realities, it issimilar to the IntroductiontotheEvolved Life Style(Bodhicaryavatara).It ismoreinformative,however,initsdiscussionsof valid conventions(tathya-samvrti) ,distribution between' interpretative-definitive (neyartha-nitartha)and in its relating the practice to insight. Withrespecttothethirdareaofconcern:therelationbetweenthe Madhyamikaandtheuniversalvehicleingeneral,theIntroduction[MAlis clearlyakeytextfortworeasons.One,itgivesexpressiontoamoreformal universalvehicledoctrinalstructurethananyotherdevelopedMadhyamika texts,and,two,it integratesandcreativelysynthesizestheMadhyamikaand universal vehicle into an overriding and comprehensive religious philosophy.A finalpointisthattheIntroduction[MAlissuppliedwithChandrakirti'sown extensive commentary, the Madhyamakavatara-bhasya[MABhl., In summary, the Introduction[MAl, when it isstudied with acognisanceof theworksofNagarjuna,isanidealtextthroughwhichtoaddressthe hermeneuticalproblemsabove.Infact,itissurprisingandremissof Madhyamika scholarshipto haveneglectedsuchasignificanttext uptillnow. HaditbeenaccordedtheattentionthatthePrincipalStanzas[MKlandClear Words[PPlhave attracted,Madhyamika scholarshipand interpretation may be different today from what they are,and in part this thesis hopes to rectify what canbeviewedasafairlynarrowviewoftheMadhyamikaasdescribedby Nagarjuna, and to enhance a broader appreciation of the system. The selectivity with which the Introduction[MAldescribes the Madhyamika-universal vehiclesystem and itsgeneral sparsenessofdetailin just thoseareas wearelookingat,makestheselectionof hermeneuticaltoolsascrucialasthe selectionoftextualmaterials.Consideringthatthehermeneuticalexerciseis essentiallyoneofclarifyingwhat theIntroduction[MAlsaysandthenfleshing outsomedetailsbyfurtherinferences,thehermeneuticaltoolsshouldboth exposethe relationships,particularlysoastodraw out theproblems,and guide 6 REASONING INTO REAUTY the extrapolations and directthe formation of hypotheses that attempt to explain the workings and dynamics of the relationships in question. Where in the past the hermeneutical exercise has proceeded by the methods ofcomparativephilosophy(Murti,Thurman),phenomenologyofreligion (Streng), western philosophy (Sprung),and logical philosophy (Gangadeanand Ichimuru), this thesis comesat the problems from a new angle. It does this by (1) introducingadifferentmethodof textualreconstructionand(2)by utilisinga psycho-philosophicalframeworkforanalysisratherthanthemorestrictly philosophicalperspectivethathasbeenusedinotherstudies.Thechangeof approach ismade with the. specific intention of highlighting and explaining the relationships. Themethodof reconstructiondiffersfromthemoreusualoneof givinga runningversebyversephilosophicalexegesisorglossoftheargumentsand doctrinesofatext,andinvolves,instead,structurallyreorganisingthe Introduction[MAlsoastoisolateand juxtapose the different sets of arguments and doctrinalpositionsthatare important to thequestionsweareaddressing. Hence thetext asa wholeaswellasitsarguments, arereconstructed.In some casesthe reorganisation involvesdrawing together acommon topic-matter that is scattered throughout the Introduction[MAl(such as,itsdepiction of an insight path-structureandspecificationofavalidworld-view).Inothercasesit proceedsbyphilosophicallyreconstructingasetofversesthatdisplaya consistency of subject-matter (asin the caseof the Introduction's[MAldialectical analysesand critique of the Vijnanavada).In some cases, also, certain materials thatareextraneousforourpurposesherehavebeenculledfromthe Introduction's[MAlanalyticalcontentinanefforttoclarifythestructureof certain arguments. The actual arrangement of the verses in terms of their sequential appearance in thethesis isguided by the order in which we previously listed the problems, andwithaviewtoplacingtherelationshipsintheirproperperspectiveby seeinghowtheIntroduction[MAlleadsintothemandplacesthemwithinan overarching system.The juxtapositioning of the different sets of ideas and trains of thought that areexpressed intheIntroduction[MAlisdesigned to bring into full focusboth the tensions and dovetailing that occurs between different aspects of the overall philosophy and doctrine. Inconcludingthisintroductionit.isusefultoindicatesomeprocedural details about the development of the chapters and also to sketch their contents. The first two substantive chapters: chapterstwo and three;address themselves tothefirstproblemarea.Theprocedurehere- whichisroughlyrepeatedin discussing thesecond and third setsof problemsalso- isto firstlypresent and reconstruct the Introduction's[MAlown arguments and doctrines relevant to the setofquestionsathand,andthentotakeuptheseproblemsforamore systematic investigationin thefollowingchapter.Hencechaptertwoaddresses itselftotheIntroduction's[MAlanalyses,andconceptionofinsightand INTRODUCTION 7 liberation,andchapterthreelooksattherelationshipbetweenanalysisand insight.Doing thingsthiswaygivesfullexpression tothe Introduction's[MAl doctrine and argument without any drastic interruption to its internal continuity and coherency. Chapter fourfollows basicaliy the same procedure.The first sections exegete andreconstructtheso-calledextensiveandformostpartuniversalvehicle contentoftheIntroduction[MAlandthefinalsections- drawingonallthe preceding material in the study - address the second and third sets of problems, concerned with the relationships between method and insight, the Madhyamika and universal vehicle, and liberation (nirvana)and full evolution (bodhi). As thechaptersarefairlydense, and some issues and doctrines recurrent, it isusefultobrieflysketchthecontent ofeachchapterand weaveacontinuity through their sequential development" ChapteronebrieflydescribesthecontentoftheIntroduction[MAlthen outlines itshistorical context in theIndian monastictraditionand placement in the meditative discipline of knowledge yoga. Chapter twoisolates and philosophically reconstructs the theory of emptiness (sunyavada);theIntroduction's[MAldialecticalanalysesthatpurportto demonstrate the emptiness of phenomena (dharma)and the personality (pudgala); Chandrakirti's critiqueof Vijnanavada idealism;and the structure of the srunts path vis-a-visthe development of im;ight.In sodoing this chapter discusses the so-called profound (zabpo)content of the Introduction,asdistinguished from the extensive(rgyacheba)content.Theprofoundpathincludesallthatpertains directly to the insight of emptiness and correlates with the arhat-yana and its fruit (phala)of nirvana.The extensive content include all elsein the Introduction[MAl and most significantly the altruistic feature of the bodhisattva career. Chapterthreeutilisestheforegoingreconstructionand attemptstoteaseout theIntroduction's[MAlownexplicitandimpliedpositionontherelationship between analysis and insight. Thefirsthalfofthechapterdetailsthelogicalprinciplesutilisedin consequential analysisand describesthe rudimentary structure of such analysis andreasonsforitsclaimedsalvificutilityinhaltingconceptualproliferation. Thesecondhalf of thechapterembeds theforegoingrudimentarystructurein theIntroduction's[MAlanalysesanddescribessometechnicalfeaturesofthe Introduction's[MA]analyses.The finalsections of this chapter raise the question of the relationship between logical consequences and their supposed experiential correlates. Chapterfourisconcernedwith therelationshipbetweentheprofoundand extensivedoctrinesin theIntroduction[MAl.InthefirsthalfIreconstructthe extensivecontentoftheIntroduction[MAlbylocatingcertainstructural distinctionsanddynamicprocesseswithinthatcontent.Theprocedureisto dividetheextensivecontent into twoaspects.(1)Themethods(upaya)asthey relate tothe liberativeorarhatspath,and(2)themethodsasthey figurein the 8 REASONING INTO REAUTY bodhisattvas' and buddhas' deeds of working for thewelfare of others.The first sense of themethodsincludesadiscussionof theirrelationshiptoinsight,the world-viewbeingputforwardintheIntroduction[MA],andthefactors determining theveridicalperceptionofthat world-view.Thesecondsensein whichthemethodscanbeunderstoodincludesadiscussionofaltruism,the bodhisattvas'andbuddhas'pathof development,andtheirpedagogicalskills and cognitive achievements. The second half of this chapter focuses on the relationship between different aspects of the profoundand extensive paths.It isdivided intosections that try and get some resolutionon the relationships between insight andtheso-called method perfections;the relationship between the 'two realities' and the unifying roleofthedoctrineof'relationalorigination';therelationshipbetween emptinessandthe'knowledgeof allfacets';therelationsbetweenemptiness andaltruismoruniversalcompassion(mahafaruna);andlastlylooksatthe concept of a single vehicle. AnappendixgivesaTibetantransliterationandEnglishtranslationof the Stanzas onthe Introductionto the MiddleWay. NOTES 1.T.W.de Tong, "Emptiness", JIP, 2 (1972), 11 CHAPTER ONE THE INTRODUCTION TOTHE MIDDLE WAY [MAl AND ITS RELIGIOUSCONTEXT 1CHANDRAKIRTI AND THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MAll ThefulltreatiseoftheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay(Madhyamakavatara) consists of a set of verses, known asthe Madhyamakavataraor Madhyamakavatara-karika,andChandrakirti'sowncommentaryontheseknownasthe Madhyamakavatara-svavrtti or Madhyamakavatara-bhasya.It does not survive in its original Sanskrit,having been lost,aswere so many Buddhist scriptures in the Muslim persecution of Indian Buddhism.It existsnow in its Tibetan translation which wasmade in the firstcase by the Indian Tilaka-kalashawith the Tibetan Nyirnagrags,andrevisedandimprovedsometimeafterbytheIndian Kanakavarma working with the same Tibetan translator. Itsauthor,Chandrakirti,isknowntousasarenownedBuddhistmonk, yogin, and philosophical psychologist.He lived in the seventeenth century2 and istheauthor ofanumberof works,3mainlycommentaries to earlierBuddhist treatises of which the most famous is his ClearWords[PP], atext elucidating the PrincipalVersesontheMiddleWay[MK]of the second-century saint Nagarjuna. According tothe hagiographiesof Buston4andTaranatha5,Chandrakirti was born at Samana in the south of India.He became learnedin the fullcorpusof Buddhistscriptures,bothsutrasandtantras,andwasordainedasamonk (bhiksu).According to Taranatha6 he subsequently became abbot (upadhyaya)of the great N alanda monastery (mahavihara),at that time India's foremost Buddhist seat of learning7 and was respectedasa"master-scholar among scholars".8By contemporary western scholars, Chandrakirti is regardedasaleading expositor of Madhyamika-Buddhist thought and,alongside Buddhapalita, Aryadeva, and Shantideva,asoneoftheprincipalformulatorsofthePrasangikaor ConsequentialformofMadhyamikaphilosophy.ContemporaryTibetandGe lugsscholarsregardtheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA]astheforemost 10 REASONING INTO REALITY Buddhist insight text.IntheTibetan colleges(grvatshang)it is.. memorised and then studied and debated over a period of five years.9 TheIntroduction[MAlisbasedontheseminalthoughtofNagarjuna,the initiatoroftheMadhyarnikaasaformalsystemofthought.Chandrakiiti acknowledges this several times in the Introduction [MAl .. He writes, for example (6.3):"Justasthese[bodhisattvaslcomprehendthehighlyprofoundteaching (gambhira-dharma)throughscriptures(agama),andlisteningthroughreason (yukti),soIwillexplainfromSaintNagarjuna'stextsinaccordancewithhis systemofpresentation."IntheconcludingsectionstotheIntroductiontothe MiddleWay[MA: Cll he shows his indebtedness particularly to the Treatise of the Middle Way(Madhyamaka-sastra), i.e.the Principal Stanzas onthe MiddleWay [MK], stating that the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay"is related in accordance with that treatise."According todGe 'dun grub(RSM,f.2bl)it isan introduction to the PrincipalStanzasontheMiddleWay[MKl(Mula-prajna).Inthattraditionof MadhyarnikaliteraturetheIntroductiontotheMiddleWayisconcernedwith establishingtheviewpointofemptinessasthefinalandultimaterealityof things, and with the salvific nature of knowing emptiness. EvensotheIntroduction[MAldifferssignificantlyfromNagarjuna's treatises.Whereas Nagarjuna'sworks10 exclusively discussemptiness or meta-theoretical issuespertaining toemptiness,the Introduction[MAlhasthisasjust partofitssubject-matter,thoughasubstantialandcrucialpartatthat.The Introduction[MAlisdivided into twelvechapters.Each of the first ten chapters isdevotedtooneof thetenso-calledstepsorlevels(bhumi)thatauniversal vehiclesaintissaidtotraverseenroutetoachievingthefullevolutionofa buddha. 11ForthisinfrastructuretheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlis indebted totheTenLevelsSutra[DS],whichitquotesfrequently.Theseten levels,andhence firstten chaptersalso,arefurthercorrelatedwith ten special practicesthattheuniversalvehiclesaint accomplishesduring hispath.These are the ten perfections (paramita).As the perfection of insight (prajna)is the sixth ofthetenperfectionsthebulkoftheIntroduction's[MAldiscussionof insight andhence of emptiness, occurs in the sixth chapter.This chapter isconsiderably longerthananyoftheothersandaccountsfor226oftheIntroductiontothe Middle Way's[MAl 330verses.The remainder of the subject-matter of these first tenchaptersis,then,thedevelopment of the nineremaining accomplishments; namely, theperfections of giving (dana),good conduct (sila),endurance(ksanti), enthusiasm(virya),meditation(dhyana),therapeutictechniquesmeans(upaya), powerful capacities(bala),resolution(pranidhana)and knowledge (jnana).Inan eleventh chapter titled" The Individual Qualities of theLevels"the Introduction [MAlsummarisesthecharacteristicsandachievementsof the saints on each of the ten levels, asexpounded in the previouschapters, and in afinruchapter of 42 verses describes "The Qualities at the Level of Buddhas" This additional content iscollected under the rubric of "extensive content" as opposed tothe "profound" and so Chandrakirti sees the Introductiontothe Middle INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY 11 Way[MABh:409]as clarifyingboththeprofoundandextensiveways. Chandrakirti'ssourcesfortheextensivematerial,whichforthemostpartis universal vehicledoctrine,comesmainlyfromsutras.dGe'dun grub(RSM,f. 261-2)speaksof Chandrakirtiascomplementingorfillingout(khabskang)the profoundcontentofthePrincipalStanzasontheMiddleWay[MK]with Nagarjuna's own oral teaching (upadesa)on the extensive path. This fact has lead JeffreyHopkinstorenderavatarainthetitleofthetextas"Supplement".12 Interestingly hedoes not quote from the treatises of Maitreya-Asanga, though it seemslikelyhe must have known ofthem.13Likewise, he was probably aware ofthevariousPerfectInsightSutras(Prajnaparamita-sutras)14andtheGreat Commentary on Perfect Insight (Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra)which detail the various universal vehicle theories and schemas that the Introduction[MA] utilises. In summary,theseadditionalchapters,describingthesaints'practices and levelsofaccomplishmentmaketheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAla significantlydifferenttextfromtheearlierexpositionsofMadhyamika thought.15Effectively,inonetexttheIntroduction[MAldescribestheinsight philosophy of the Madhyamika and important details of its method and practice. Where, for example, the PrincipalStanzasonthe MiddleWay[MK]of Nagarjuna is textuallycategorisedasconcernedonlywiththeinsightcomponent(darsana-bhaga)ofBuddhistthought theIntroduction[MAlissaidtobeconcernedwith bothinsightandthepracticalcomponent(carya-bhaga).16 Thisbreadthofthe IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlanditsincorporationofMadhyamika philosophywithinapathstructuremakeit aninterestingtexttoreconstruct. Thepracticalcomponent,contributing,asitdoes,adiachronicelement tothe Introduction[MAladdstothevalueofthisworkinsortingoutthesalvific function of logical analysis. 2THREE SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT THAT CAN BE ISOLATED IN THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MAl Given thattheaimof thisstudy istoinvestigatetherelationships between variousaspectsoftheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAl,itisusefulbefore beginning theactual reconstructionand inquiry to isolatetheIntroductiontothe MiddleWay's[MAl main doctrinal and philosophical structures for they serve to directthemethodforreconstructingthetext,inthatcertainofthestructures haveprovidedafairlynatural way of breaking up chaptersand of developing them internally. Before isolating thedifferent doctrinal structures it is significant to note that the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlalignsitselfwiththeuniversalvehicle theory of a singlevehicle(ekayana).Thisholdsthat the Buddha personally held, andonoccasionstaught- insomeuniversalvehiclesutras- thatinthefinal analysis there is just one spiritual career leading to one finalgoal.The one goal is that of buddhahood (buddhatva)or fullmental and physical evolution (bodhi)as 12 REASONING INTO REALITY distinguished from the individual vehicle goal of arhatship (arhattva).According to the doctrine of a single vehicle the goal of arhatship(actually thetwo goals of thedisciples(sravaka)and self-evolvers(pratyekabuddhaisnot afinalterminus tothe saint's career but merely a' point of progress enroutetothe fullyevolved stateofabuddha.Hence,althoughtheIntroduction[MA]describesvarious aspectstothebodhisattvas'actions,meditations,attainments,etc.andon occasionsisolatesvarious featuresof thepath tofullevolution,it understands that theseare all integrally related to the goal of achieving afully evolved state. Thusinthe finalanalysistheyaretheoretically meant to beassimilatedwithin the overarching concept of a single spiritual career.This is important to bear in mindwhenitcomestostudyingtherelationshipbetweenthedifferent theoreticalanddoctrinalstructureswithintheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay [MA], The Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl says that the state of full mental and physical evolutionisaresult ofthreerelativelydistinct processesof conscious mental development.At the very beginning of the Introduction[MAl, in making his praises, Chandrakirti says (1.1)that the buddhas arise from bodhisattvas - in the evolutionary sense that without saints following the bodhisattvas'career the goal of buddhahood couldn't be gained.In their turn the bodhisattvasare said toariseindependenceonthreethings,(1)thecompassionatemind,(karuna-Gitta),(2)anon-dualisticintellect,(advaya-matz),and(3)thespirittobecome evolved,(bodhi-citta).CompassionisdefinedintheCommentary[MABh:6]as love and the non-dualistic intellect as"the insight that isfree fromthe extremes [of positing] things and non-things, etc."The bodhicitta or fully evolved mind is definedbyChandrakirti(MABh:6-7)throughaquotationfromanunknown sutra, theOmnipresentDoctrineSutra(Aryadharmasamgitisutra,tib.'Phagspachos kunbgro bai mdo).It says: Thebodhisattvacomprehendsallphenomena(sarva-dharma)with the fully evolved mind (bodhicitta). All phenomena are equal within the sphere of truth (dharmadhatu). As much as he realises that all phenomena arise adventitiously and arenon-abiding,therealiserwillfullyunderstandbyjustthat much, that thisisdue to[their being]empty(sunya),andhewill think thus,"Livingcreaturesshould fullyunderstand thisquality of truth(dharmata)likethis."Having thought this, themind thus born inthe bodhisattva is referred to asthe fullyevolved mind of the bodhisattva. [It is]themindthat benefitsand[brings]happinesstoallliving creatures, thesuperlative mind, the mindthat istender with love, INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY themindthat doesnot avert fromcompassion(karuna),themind that doesnot regret [giving]joy, the mind that is unchanging with respect to emptiness, the mind that is not obscured with respect to signlessness(animitta),andthemindthatisnon-abidingwith wishlessness (apranihita). 13 Besides reiterating (MABh: 7)the aforementioned three mental qualities that aretheprinciplecausesforthebodhisattvas, theextractdefinesthreequalities that characterisethe fullyevolved mind.(1)It cogniseseverything.This isthe universalvehiclebelief inthe buddhas'ability tocomprehendallperspectives [onreality](sarvakara-jnana).(2)It knowsemptiness.(3)It hasproducedan active compassion that isconcerned and caring for the welfare of all creatures. Thus we can make out three streams orcurrents of qualities within the one streamthataresaidtobedevelopedbythebodhisattvas.Theydevelopthe insightintoemptiness,developanattitudeofgreatcompassionthatseeksto removethesufferingofallcreatures,andincreasetheirperceptionsof phenomena tothepoint where they are said tobe aware of everything.These three aspects to the bodhisattvas development are each treated systematically in the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAJ.The insight of emptiness isexpounded mainlyinthesixthchapter.Thedevelopmentandtypesofcompassion particularlyinthefirstchapter,andthecognitiveabilitiesof thebodhisattvas and buddhasaremainlyexplained in thetwo finalchapters.Theconcept of a fullyevolvedmind(bodhi-citta)isdifferentfromamongthesequalitiesforit defines not only themind of the buddhas but denotealsoawish or inspiration . that functionscausally in the development of bodhisattvas.Theevolved mind, refersbothtoaspirit ofaspiration that aimsor isdirected towardsgaining the state ofacompleteand perfect evolution, (samyaksambodhi)i.e.thestatewhere the insight of emptiness, active compassion, and knowledge are fully developed, and tothe resultant state itself.In thisthe evolvedmind (bodhi-citta)isamind that(1)isawaketothepossibilityof becomingperfect,(2)actuallyaspiresto reach that state, and (3)isalso the state it aspires for.In that it is a motivation to consciouslydevelopanevolvedmindandthefullyevolvedmind,itself,it signifies ateleological processthat isbound to itsown growth ordevelopment into a psychologically and cosmically perfect state. The term bodhicitta can thus betranslatedasthe"spirittobecomeevolved"orthe"fullyevolvedmind", depending on whether it is referring to a causal or a resultant mind respectively. Within thethree aspectsthat definethe currentsof development within the universalvehiclesaint,notallareexclusivetotheuniversalvehiclesaint, for Chandrakirti considersthat theinsight of emptiness isgained by the individual vehicle saintsaswell.What marks the buddhas off from the disciples and self-evolvers, accordingto theCommentary[MABh:4]isthe latter saints lackof(the vastnessofthebodhisattvas)collectionsof merit and knowledge,(punya-jnana-sambhara),ofgreatcompassion,andthecomprehensionofallperspectiveson reality.The insightof emptinessisthusconsidered to becommon toboth the REASONING INTO REALITY individual vehicleand universal vehicle saints.Theimpressiqn one gains from this is that the insight into emptiness isenvisaged in the Introduction[MA] asa quitedifferent spiritual realisationand processof development than eitherthe developmentofcompassionortheexpansion(vistara)ofcognition,and considering that it can be deveioped without the other two aspects, it must also bethoughtofasarelativelyautonomoussystemofmentaldevelopment. Further more,themotivationbehinddevelopinginsightisdifferentfromthe other evolvingfeaturesofthebodhisattvas'development forinsight couldbe construed (and seemsto be by the universalvehicle practitioner when viewing the narrow vehicle saints) as a practice designed for self liberation.The result is thus restrictedto the individual who practices and perfects insight. Thus, in the bodhisattva-vehicle, in the first instanceat least, insight releases from suffering justthebodhisattvasthemselves.Thereismoretothis,though,aswillbe explained later. Thecultivationofcompassionandthedevelopmentofthebodhisattvas' cognitiveskillsandlevelsof interactionwiththeir environment aregenuinely altruisticfeaturesandcanbeusefullyconsideredtogetherinthattheyrelate specificallytothebodhisattva-vehicle,whereasthedevelopmentofinsight relatestoboththebodhisattvaanddiscipleandself-evolvervehicles.The developmentofcompassionandincreasedlevelsofcognitionthatthe bodhisattvas are said togain arealso related to eachother, fortheactivation of their compassion in the actual removalof creatures' suffering dependson their knowingthepredispositions,psychicmake-up,etc.ofcreatures.The maximisation of their altruismwould depend in the long run on their knowing everything,andhen,cetheirconcernforhelpingistherationalebehindtheir supposed acquisition of super-sensitive cognitions, and the fantastic and magical qualitiesofthe,buddhas'andbodhisattvas'behaviour.Compassionand knowledge (jnana),then, relate very closely to each other, and more so, on first sight at least, than insight relates to these.. Thereisathirdquitespecifiableandverysignificantaspecttothe Introductiontothe MiddleWay's[MA]doctrinal and philosophical fabric that I've termed the "characterised Madhyamika".This isa featurethat one findsin the developedMadhyamika textsof philosophers likeChandrakirti' and Shantideva. It accountsforthedialecticcontent of theIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA] that isdirected towardsrefuting quitespecificdoctrinalstancestakenby other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools.It is unclear exactly how this third feature of the Introduction[MA] relates to the previous strands of thought although I will make some suggestions in the fourth chapter. It isusefultobrieflydescribethethreemaincurrentsofthoughtinthe Introductiontothe MiddleWay [MAJ.Namely, (1)the system of thought involved withtheinsightintoemptinessanditsdevelopment.(2)Thecompassionate deeds,andthedevelopmentofthebodhisattvasandbuddha,and(3)the "characterisedMadhyamika".Althoughthesearecoordinatedinacreative INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY15 synthesis in the Introduction[MA]under the .over arching idea of a single vehicle tofull" evolution,theydisplayacertaindegreeofautonomyintermsof their definitionanddynamicassumptions.Theyarealsousefullyspecified individuallysincecontemporaryscholarshipontheMadhyamikaphilosophy hasinvariouswaysconfoundedorfailedtonoticetheseparabilityofthese relatively autonomoussystems.Together, thesethree systemsgiveabasically exhaustive account of the Introduction's[MAl subject-matter. 2.1THE SYSTEM OF INSIGHT AND ITS DEVELOPMENT. The firstsystem of thought isdescribedinthesixthchapter on insight.It consists of proofs forand expositions of emptiness (sunyata).For the main this is establishedby furnishingrefutationsagainsttheviewthat phenomena(bhava, dngospo;dharma,chos;vastu,ngobo)andapersonality(pudgala,gangzag;atma, bdag)have an intrinsic nature (svabhava). Thisisaccomplishedbyanalyses(vicara)basedontheexposureof logical consequences(prasanga).Thefruitionofthissystemisperfect insight(prajna-paramita), this being defined as insight into emptiness.Insight into emptiness in tum givesayoginpersonal liberation(pratimoksa)(MA:6.117-19,165and 179). Thissystemofthoughtcanbecalledtheprivateaspectorcomponentofthe Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MA].This system is effectively the one described by Nagarjuna in histreatises generally and especially in thePrincipalStanzason the Middle Way[MK], with the difference that in the Introductiontothe MiddleWay [MA]Chandrakirti imposes aschematic rigour that tendstoalign his text with meditationsonemptinessratherthanpostulatedproofsforitsfacticity.The Introduction[MA]doesthisbyfacilitatorsthatfirstlydivideobjectsintotwo categories, the person and other phenomena.He then stylises hisanalyses with respect to both of these.This first system is genuinely Madhyamic. 2.2THE BODHISATTVAS' DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR DEEDS (CARYA) The second system of thought we can isolate is that which isdescribed in the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlbyitssystematicpresentationofthe bodhisattva levels,fromthefirstlevelup tothetenth leveland culminating in theachievementof becomingabuddha.Withinthissystemthebodhisattva, spurred on by his great resolve to see all living creatures liberated, produces the spirit tobecomeevolved(bodhi-citta)asacauseforbecomingabuddha(MA: 1.1 cd).AccordingtotheIntroduction[MAl(l.4cd):"Whoeverhasthe~ i n dof these victors'children generates the power of compassion in order to completely liberatecreatures."Todescribethissystemintermsofthebodhisattva's compassion, i.e.his motivating thought (cifta-utpada),istodescribe theaffective and volitionalvectorsofthissystem.Theaffectiveandvolitionalcomponents 16 REASONING INTO REALITY areaccompaniedbyacognitiveone.Thecognitivecomponentofthe bodhisattva'spathandfinalgoalisdescribedintheIntroduction[MA]bythe variouscognitivecapacities and powers that the bodhisattva comes to realise in his path,and whichculminate in hisknowledgeof allperspectives[onreality] (sarvakarajnata)at the level of buddhahood.Thiscapacity for knowing all facets of thingsisdescribedin theIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA:12.19-31]by a facilitatorknownasthe"tencapacities"(dasa-bala).Theproductionofa knowledge of all perspectives on reality is viewed not asa mere epiphenomenon to the condition of buddhahood but as an integral, in fact necessary condition for fullevolution(sambodhi),forthereasonthatbuddha-activity(karitra) presupposesafullyevolvedcognitivecapacity.Thisistosaythatthe therapeuticandpedagogicalskill(upaya-kausalya)ofbuddhas,asisenjoined uponthembytheirvastcompassion,necessitatesamaximisationoftheir knowledgewithrespecttothecauseswithinlivingcreatures,whichbindand constrictthem.ThustheIntroduction[MA:12.10]speaksofbuddhasas "knowing the higher and lower faculties[of people]and the paths which lead to all[theirgoals]".Thisiswhatwemaytermthepublicfacetofabuddha's evolution. It consists of a buddha's knowledge of allperspectives on reality and theknowledgeof howtoimpartwhateverisof benefittothosewhoareless evolved.Consequentlywehavehereaverydynamicsystem,andonethatis environmentallyconditioned.Inmanyrespectsthissystemissimilartothe panentheisticandprocesstheologicalconceptionsofabeingwhohas unsurpassedcapacitiesforcreativeexpression.17 Fromacognitiveviewpoint, thebuddhas'knowledgeandunderstandingcontainsallpossibleviewpoints, perspectives, and perceptions of things, and yet thebuddhas are not personally committed to one view as being intrinsically more preferable, truer or better than any others.18K.V.Ramanan, for example, speaks of the "ultimate view" as"not anydefiniteviewexclusiveofalltherest",butas"theallembracing comprehension which is inclusive of all specific views".19 The first system, of cognitive expansion, the extension of the scope of action andvolitionandthecomprehensionofallviewsofrealityisnot exclusively Madhyamika. Hencethe IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA],whendescribing theseprocessesandattainments,doesnotdistinguishitself fromthereligious thought oftheuniversalvehiclegenerally.Nordoesit distinguishitself from withintheuniversalvehicleinregardingtheseasrealhumanpossibilities.It does,however,distinguishitselffromsometraditionswithintheuniversal vehicleintermsof theextensivenesswithwhichitregardscognitiveexpansion andknowingeverythingasrealratherthanideationalpossibilities.The Introduction[MA:12.36d], aswe have said, asserts that Buddha related avehicle unequal andundivided (thegpamimnyam dbyermed)and thus aligns itself with the doctrine of one vehicle (ekayana).20On this view all living creatures have the propensitytobecomebuddhasandwillinfactdoso.Thisdiffersfromsome Phenomenalists(Yogacharas)who upheldthedoctrineofthreepaths(triyana). INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY17 On this view, living creatures belong to different lineages (gotra)such that not all have the propensities to become buddhas. Hence one has pathsthat terminate at arhathood(arhattva),. namelythedisciples(sravaka)andself-evolvervehicles (pratyeka-buddha-yana),and buddhahoodi namely the bodhisattva vehicle.21 2.3THE CHARACTERISED MADHYAMAKA Within the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl,and alongside,in factoften interspersed and embedded within its description of the first system of thought, we can locate a third. This system expresses itself in the Introductiontothe Middle Way[MAlwithChandrakirti- inthenameoftheMadhyamikaphilosophy-commenting upon and engaging in dialogueand disputation with various non-Madhyamikaphilosophicalsystems.The.philosophiesmentionedby ChandrakirtiareBuddhistandnon-Buddhist.Theyrepresentthereligio-philosophicalmilieuofseventhcenturyIndia.TheBuddhistexpounders mentioned in the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlare the Vaibhashikas(Bye brag smras ba), Sautrantikas(mDo sde Pa), Sammitiyas(Mang pos bkur ba pa), andVijnanavadinsorPhenomenalists(rNamparshespasmraba).Non-Buddhistphilosophers(tirthika)mentionedaretheSamkhyas(Granscan pa), Vaisheshikas (Bye brag pa), Jainas (Tshig gal gnyis su smra ba) and Charvakas or Lokayatas('Jigrten rgyang phen pa).Someofthesearementioned in passing, such as the Jaina, others like the Samkhya and Buddhist schools are the objects of sustainedrefutationsin regardtotheirtenets.22 ThoughtheIntroductiontothe MiddleWay[MAldoes not mention the Svatantrika branch of theMadhyamika by name,it distinguishes itself fromthis branch both by itsuse of consequences andrejectionof Svatantrikaviewpoints,amajoronebeingitsrejectionof the Svatantrika view that things exist intrinsically on the conventional level of truth (samvrti-satya).23Ofcourse,intheClearWords[PPlChandrakirtimentions Bhavaviveka by name andconcertedly refuteshisinterpretation of Nagarjuna's PrincipalStanzason the MiddleWay[MKl. Philosophicallythesephilosophiesrepresentavarietyofpositions: materialism, realism and phenomenalism, and together they account formost of the systems of thought that were influential in India at the time of Chandrakirti. Theargumentationengagedinby theMadhyamikasintheIntroductiontothe MiddleWay[MAlisnot merely counter-refutation of objectionsdirected against emptiness by other philosophies but arguments by theIntroductiontothe Middle Way[MAl,in its own right, against specificviews of other philosophies. In some casestheseviews have to do with topicsother than emptiness.Indoing so, the Introduction[MAlestablishestheMadhyamika,implicityandexplicity,asa system withtenetsorpostulates(siddhanta).TheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay [MAlmakes its refutations and establishments by a variety of techniques.It uses consequential arguments (prasanga)selectively, inasmuch asthese are applied by way of refuting specifically chosen viewpointsand tenets.Thisis to say that the 18REASONING INTO REALITY IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlrefrainsfromconsequential refutations toward particular theses that it otherwise could have refuted. Instead Chandrakirti affirminglynegatesonlykeythesesfromvarious other schools, for example,thepurushaoftheSamkhyas,theselfoftheSammitiyas,andthe source-consciousness(alaya-vijnana)ofthePhenomenalists.Suchselective negations involvea 'partisan application' of consequences. This differs from the alternativeprocedure- andoneemployedintheclassicalMadhyamikaof Nagarjuna - of directing consequential arguments against any and allthesesand viewpoints, and in practice having an acknowledged policy of not excluding any formalisedthesisorphilosophicalsystemasasubjectforconsequential analysis.24 Besides a selective application of consequences, the Introductionto the MiddleWay[MAl,inthecourseofrefutingtheviewpointofothers,andin establishing and supporting its own tenets, uses self-styled (svatantra)arguments (e.g.6.48-52),analogy(6.18-19,27-29,40,53,110,113,122,135,174-75),and argumentsbasedon thecommon(laukika)viewsofordinarypeople(6.12,32). This third system in which the Madhyarnika isspecified as a system of tenets we may call the characterised Madhyamika.25 Betweenthesethreesystemsthatwehavejustmentionedthereare importantdynamicrelationships.Fromoneviewpointtherearealsocertain tensions.Perhaps themost important dynamic isthat functioningbetween the firsttwosystems,andwithinthat,therelativeinfluencesthatcognitive expansion and cognitions of emptiness have on each other.The tensions, which may be obvious, obtain between the last system and the preceding two.That is, thecharacterisedMadhyamika,withitsassentiontocertainphilosophical viewpoints, isdiscordant withboth theomni-perspectival viewof buddhas, in the first system, and the viewlessness of yogins in the second system.Both these systemsareunbbundedbyanyoneandanysystemoftenetsrespectively, whereas the characterised Madhyamika isrestricted in the sense that some tenets or theoriesare true whereas other tenets are seen as fallacious.The Introduction tothe Middle Way[MA]itself doesnot directly elucidate the dynamics or resolve these apparent tensions.FoT that matter it doesnot delineateor assimilatethe systems that we have isolated.And forthis reason they will become focal points in this study and areas that our reconstruction will concentrate on. In summary to this section, what we are presented with in the Introductionto the MiddleWay[MA]is a text purporting to describe an aeonian path of religious understanding and psychological development that has the fully evolved state of buddhahoodasitsresult.It isaself-directedandevolvingdevelopmentin which consciousness isthe predominant factor.Hence it isa teleological system. The causesand conditions fortheeduction and propelling of thisdevelopment aredescribedtogetherwithprofilesandworld-viewsatvariousstagesof the pathofreligiousdevelopment.Thetextisoperationalanddescriptiveasit outlinesboththetechniquesandmethodsforyogicdevelopmentandthe purportedresultsoftheseproceduresastheattainmentsaregained.The JNTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY19 Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl, as we have mentioned, expounds mainly the (right)view(drstJ).Assuchitsmainthrustisindelineatingasystemof philosophicalandcognitivedevelopmentandexpression.Thoughthisisits major thrust, the IntroductiontotheMiddle Way[MA]also considers affective and volitionalsystemsandtheirrelationshipswithandbearingoncognitive concerns.Thatistosay,theIntroduction[MAldiscussesthreemutually interactivesystems,thecognitive,affectiveandvolitional,withconcernand focusmainly on the cognitive system.These above fociof the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl will thus be ours also. 3THE CONTEXT OF THE INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY [MAl The milieu in which the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlwas written, of whichitisaproductindeed,andthecontextinwhichitwassubsequently studied differsignificantly,aswe havesaid, fromthemethodsusedandaims assumedbycontemporaryscholarshipwheninvestigatingandassessingany traditionalreligiousliterature.Thesedifferences,wehavenotedalso,are partiallyresponsibleforcertainincommensurabilitiesofmeaningthatobtain between thetraditionalliteraturesand themodern methodsof studyingthem. Thesedifferences alsoaccountfortheinterpretativeorientationofrecent Madhyamika studies. Someinsightintothetraditionalcontext,andmorespecificallyintothe function and role of texts in that context, is useful if we are to fully appreciate the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay's[MAlcontent,inthat such insightshelp one to penetratealittledeeperintowhattheIntroduction[MAldescribesandwhyit uses the schemas it does and a dialogical form of presentation. The context of relevance to a text like the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl includes not only thecultural conditionsobtaining in seventh century India but theverymethodsforstudyingaliterature:theacceptedmodesof comprehension, i.e.the epistemological and methodological presuppositions and proceduresusedinstudyingatraditionalliterature.Inthecaseofthe IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlthesepresuppositionsand proceduresare significantintwoways.FirstlytheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAlitself presupposes acertain methodology as being integral tothedevelopment of the bodhisattvas that it describes.Although it formallybeginsitsdiscussionof the bodhisattvas' path at the saintly (arya)stage - a point at which bodhisattvas have already made very substantial progress in their meditations - and so it presumes the completion of certain practices begun much earlier. It also presumes, though doesn'tdescribe,certainotherprinciplesthatundergirdthebodhisattvas' practices fromtheir beginning toend.Secondly, to whatever extent theIndian monastic communitiesweretryingtoemulate the bodhisattva idealand follow theverysame pathdescribedintheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAl,they 20REASONII\JG II\JTO REALITY will have brought to bear those same or similar methodologi\Cal procedures and techniques on the IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MAl.That isto say, the Indian monkswhostudiedtheIntroduction[MAlwouldhavedonesowithina frameworkof praxis that aimed, however feasibleor otherwise, at leading them towards the universal vehicle goal of full mental and physical evolution. In the case of a philosophical literature like the Introductiontothe MiddleWay [MAltheideal model of comprehension used by both theMadhyamika yogins described in the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAland the scholar-monks who studied it,isthemodel formalisedwithin thetheory and practice of the gnostic or knowledge (jnana)yoga, for this, as opposed to the bhakti and karma formsof yoga, was thought toprovideamethod attuned tothe genuinely religiousand henceliberativeconcernsofIndian philosophyin which the summombonumof all study was torealiseexistentiallytherealities,valuesandattitudesthat the religious literatures described. Though the compounded term jnana-yoga26 or the delineation of a structure ofdifferenttypesofyogaandcorrespondingpaths(marga)suchasbhakti, karma,andrajaisnotfoundinBuddhism,asitisinHinduism,Buddhist literature parallels exactly the procedures assumed in Hindu jnana yoga.In this thejnanayogicpraxisrepresentsagenuinelypan-Indicidealof philosophical study. Jnana yoga,or theyogaaimedat unionwith knowledgeorgnosis,hasits origins in the Upanishadswhere through rigorous yogic exercises coupled with intellectual speculation the Hindu saints gained an intuition (darsana)27 of reality (Brahman).Thisrationalistictradition reached its fullHindu expression in the AdvaitaVedantaandinBuddhismwiththeuniversalvehicletraditionsof Northern Indian monasticism. Anumberofformulationsandschemas- someofthemcommonto HinduismandBuddhism- servetodescribethegeneralproceduresofjnana yoga.The threetrainings(trisiksa)involving thepractice of good conduct (sila), mental integration(samadhi),andinsight (prajna)isoneschemacommontoall schools of Buddhism, and the perfections (paramita),which order the chapters of the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAl, are another specifically universal vehicle formulation.28 Inbothof theseaseriationisimplied withtheearlieraspects being foundational to the latter. However, the really distinctive formulation, which emphasises the epistemic natureofthejnanayogamethodofinvestigationandcomprehension,is containedinatripartiteschemathatinbroaddetailsiscommontoboth HinduismandBuddhism.Thisisthemethodofhearing,thinkingand meditation.In Hinduismthesearetraditionallylistedasshravana(hearing), manana(pondering),andnididhyasana(constantmeditation),29,andin Buddhismasshruta(tib.thos),chinta(tib.bsam),andbhavana(tib.sgom).30 According to the Commentary[MABh: 2]these are practised serially and for each JNTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE WAY 21 onethereisan(MABh:1)accompanyinginsight(prajna)withanunalloyed gnosis said to come only with the insight gained from meditation. ForthemostpartHinduandBuddhisttraininginknowledgeyogatook placeinmonasticinstitutions.InHinduismtheashramasandmathasandin Buddhism the smaller provincial viharas and the handful of maha-viharas .such as Nalanda, VikramashiIa,and OdantapuriofBiharandBengal.InBuddhismit was clearlythegreat monasteriesthat werethemost important institutions for scholastic study as can be gauged from the luminaries who studied and taught at them.For example, Nalanda has been home to Dignaga, Vasubandhu, Asanga, Dharmakirti,Shantideva,KamalashiIa,Shantarakshita,Naropa,andofcourse Chandrakirti who,aswehave mentioned,wasat onetimeabbot.31 Atishais thought to have been ordainedat Nalanda, abbot at Vikramashila,and tohave attended all of the major institutions.32 WeexpectthenthatajnanicallyinclinedBuddhistwouldhaveentereda monastery,preferablyoneofthemainones,receivedhismonk'sordination (firstlytheshramanera,andthen thebhikshu vows)thereby embarking on the practice of good conduct (sila)and thus beginning the first of the three trainings (siksa).This would consist in the observance of rules that functionally served to inducewholesomeattitudesandactions.Suchactionsareencapsulatedina schema referredto in theCommentary[MABh:42-43]calledtheten wholesome actionpaths(dasa-kusala-karma-patha)andconsistofmodificationstomotor (kaya),vocal(vak),andmental(manas)actions.Theyaretonot kill,not steal, have no (illicit)sex,not lie,not slander, speak nodivisive words, not to chitter-chatter, not to covet,not tohate, and to havenowrong views.33Therationale forinducingwholesomeactionsandattitudeswouldbetofreethemonks' minds from emotional entanglements that would act as hindrances to their study and meditation.They would make the monks fit vessels or receptacles(bhajana) foraccommodatingandassimilatingtheknowledgethattheir. teachers imparted.34 The next chronological step for monkswas to enter into arelationshipwith oneormorefriendlyguides(kalyana-mitra)who woulddirectand guidetheir scholasticstudiesandmeditativepractice.Thoughpersonalpreferencemay have had some bearing in the students' choices of teachers,35 certain guidelines wereprovidedtoexpeditetheirchoiceand ensurethelocationof high quality teachers.TheOrnamentfortheUniversalVehicleSutras[MSA:18.10]advised monks that:"One adheres to a friend(mitra)who isdisciplined, calm, appeased, superiorinvirtue(guna),diligent,richininstruction(agama),fully understanding reality, skilful in speech, of kind nature, and tireless."36 3.1KNOWLEDGE (JNANA) YOGA Having chosen suitable teachersthe studentswould have begun by reciting (vacana)and memorising (udgrahana)37the core(mula)textsthat comprised their 22 REASONING INTO REALITY curriculum.What those texts were in the great Buddhist monasteries we cannot be certain.We have every indication though to believe they were texts authored by the seminal thinkersin thedifferent philosophicaltraditions:such namesas wehavealreadymentioned:Nodoubtthecurriculiweremodifiedand expandedatvarioustimesinthehistoryofthegreatmonasteries; . probably becomingconsolidatedaroundtheninthortenthcenturies,i.e.sometime shortly aftertheir peakofactivityandcreativity.Naropa(1016-1100A.D.)we know wasabbot of Nalanda38 and while therestudied the fivemethod texts of Maitreya-Asanga and the six insight t r e a t i s ~ sof Nagarjuna.39 We may suppose he alsostudied theIntroductiontothe MiddleWay[MA].Atisha(980-1052A.D.) was similarlyconversant with the works of the major thinkers forhetranslated textsofNagarjuna,Aryadeva,Vasubandhu,Asanga,andChandrakirtiinto Tibetan.40 Thetextsthatwepresumemusthavebeen studiedwouldthereforehave coveredallaspectsofuniversalvehiclethought:Madhyamika,Yogachara, Abhidharma, epistemology and logic (pramana).From these texts students were advised to rely on texts of explicit or definitive import (nitartha)rather than those having an equivocal or interpretativemeaning (neyartha).41Thesedistinctions, according tothe IntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA],aremadeonthe basisof whether or not texts teach about emptiness.We are told (6.97b-d) that: Sutrasthatexpoundsubjectmattersthatarenot[directlyabout] reality(tattva)[Le.emptiness]aresaidtohaveaninterpretable meaning(neyartha),andonunderstandingthisoneshould interpret them [as a provisional doctrine].[Those sutras that] have emptinessastheirsubjectshouldbeunderstoodashavinga definitive meaning (nitartha). If thisadvice was in factfollowed it means that texts likethe Introductionto the MiddleWay[MA]and Nagarjuna's treatises were studied and practised with aspecial emphasisand discipline, because emptinesswastheliberativereality, andhenceinthesoteriologicalcontextitwouldbethemostrelevantand immediate concern. Atthisfirststageoftheknowledgeyogapath,studentswereprimarily concerned with unmistakenly recognising the words (vac,tshig)in the texts being studied and as commented on by their teachers.Study and hearing (sruta), then, wasbasedonanon-distortedapprehensionof thespokenandwrittenword. Essentially it was a linguistic achievement arrived at when students gained a full competenceandmasteryofphonetics,grammar,andsyntax.Thesesubjects along withetymology, poetics, metrics,etc.in factconstituteone branch of the fivesecularknowledges(vidya)studiedinHinduandBuddhistmonasteries alike.42 Theypreparedmonksforthesecondstepoftheirpractice,namely thinking about what they had heard. TO THE MIDDLE WAY 23 Whereashearingischaracterisedasadisciplineinlinguistics,thinking (cinta) isessentiallythestudyofsemantics,foritinvolvesdeterminingthe conceptualmeanings' thatareimplied bytextualmaterials.Thediscoveryof meaning (artha,don)was facilitated by receiving oral commentaries(upadesa)to thecoretextsandthenexploringtheintricaciesofmeaningbyusingthe ,techniquesofdebate,logicalanalysis,andlinguisticanalysis.Inthecaseof philosophicaltexts,thinking presumably entailed both reflecting on experience by way' of imbuing the texts with meaning, and then comprehending the formal and factual logic involved in the inferential presentations that occurred in them. The Mirrorof CompleteClarification[RSM)of dGe 'dun grub, forexample, gives a clear indication of how philosophical textswere debated.Thetext,whichisan interlinearcommentaryto theversifiedportion of the IntroductiontotheMiddle Way[MAl,iscomposedalongthelines of adebateand isused right up tothe present in Tibetan dGe lugs colleges as a facilitator fordebate.Thecommentary .structures the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MA)around the formal procedures usedinTibetancollegedebateswherediscussionproceedssystematically through threesteps thus:1.notificationof the subject being debated(rtsodgzhi chos),2.qualities of the object of establishment ('grubbyachos)and3. statement of areason(rtags).Thereason servesto placeor establishthequalitieson the subject.In the Mirror of Complete Clarification[RSM)the sentences ending with te, etc. indicate 2., Le.they state the qualities applied toa subject, and the sentences closing with ...balphyir give 3., the reason.The second step can be construed as either a thesis proffered or a question depending on the content. Anassumptionthroughoutthismethodisthatmeaningisempirically derived, and hence that the requisiteand appropriateexperienceswereneeded on behalf of students in order tomake senseof thetextsthey studied.Asanga saysforexamplethat:"Ifthemeaningwereseenjustbylistening,then meditation wouldbemeaningless[Le.otiose)".43Henceif ameaning was not graspedornotforthcomingwecanassumethatastudentwouldgoabout meditatively trying to gain experiences that made the text(s)intelligible.In this respect the traditional methods of study make a significant and major departure fromwhatwearefamiliarwithforstudentswereexpectedtoacquire experiential correlates to the referential terms occurring in their texts.A reliance (pratisarana)stipulatesthat students should rely on meanings (artha)rather than onthesymbols(vyanjana)themselves.44 Thisemphasisonmeditative experienceisof courseconsonant withtheexperientialnature of Buddhism as advocated bytheBuddhahimself whencharacterising histeachingasa"come see"(ehipasyika)philosophy, orinotherwordstobetestedsolviturambulando, that is,by practicalexperiment.Hence, throughouttheknowledgepath,even fromthestageofmemorisation,monkswouldhavebeenengagedinthose meditativepracticeswhichgavethemaccess(inhoweveradilutedor adulterated aform)tothe religiousexperiences that their textseither described or assumed a prior knowledge of. 24 REASONING INTO REALITY Morespecificallytheywould havepractisedserenity(samatha)andmental integration (samadhi)exercises as subject-neutral instruments forpenetrating the inner textualmeanings.Thepracticeof tranquillity issaid toremoveaffective andunwantedconceptualconcomitants,andwasviewedasthebasisfor achievingconcentrationorthecollectionandfocusofmentalattention.The Ornament fortheUniversalVehicleSutras[MSA:15.11-14]speaks of nine stages in the development of serenity and mental integration, beginning at a point when a mindcanfirstbecomefixedonameditativeobject,thisiscalledthestageof interiorisation or placing the mind on the object,and culminating in an effortless and prolonged mental integration. 45With these mental powers asa foundation studentsofthetraditionalpathwouldideally havedevelopedthemeditative absorptions(dhyana).Inasensethesewouldgivethemtheresearchtoolsfor practising meditation (bhavana). In summary,thestageof thinking(cinta)wasabridgingandtransitional activitybetweenafocusonsymbolsinthefirststageandtheirreferentsin meditation.It wasthelexical-cum-symbolicandsemantic-cum-experiential work of correlating words and meanings. Thefinal,46andfromacontemporary viewpoint,clearlymostdistinctive stepwithintheknowledgeyoga pathwasthesupposedacquisitionof adirect non-conceptualcomprehensionoftextualreferentsthroughthepracticeof meditation.This last stage would be distinguished from the previous one by an increasing emphasis on meanings and ade-emphasis on symbol systems.47 The transition fromsymbolstotheirexperientialreferentswas presumably thought to be gradual, taking place through a number of meditative stages.The Tibetan traditionofmeditation,whichclaimsindebtednesstoandafaithfulaccuracy with IndianBuddhism,andwhichattemptstoreplicatetheseIndianpractices right upto the present day,distinguishesthreemain typesof meditation.The first is glance or perusal meditation (shar sgom).As the name indicates, this form ofmeditationinvolvesgoing overanentirebodyoninstruction,writtenand oral, in order tobecome familiar with itscontents.The second isexamination or analyticalmeditation(dpyadsgom).Thistypeconsistsofinvestigative contemplations which, based on reasoning and experience,produce logicaland experientialconsequencesof akindthat confirmandconsolidatetheimport of philosophical texts.The most important form of confirmational reasoning is that basedonthefunctionalability(krta-krtya)oftextualformulationstobeacted uponandcausechange.Thisinvolvesastudentcheckinginhisorherown experienceandamonghiscontemporaries,toseeiftheresultssaidto 'accrue from practising meditation and acting on the basis of textual formulationsdo in factaccrue.Thisformoftestingisbasedonthecriterionofthepowerof intentional action (arthakriya-sakti).48 Once textshave beentestedtothe satisfactionof studentstheymay begin thepracticeofformalorcessationmeditation('jogsgom).Thisisthepoint at whichthepracticeofmeditation becomestrulydistinguished.It isbased ona TO THE MIDDLE WAY 25 'development of serenity and mental integration,and in Buddhism consistsof a "special disce:mment (vipasyana)meditation that claims to penetrate tothe core of 'philosophers alike, either negate the self with insufficient subtlety and precision i (and hence failtoremove theconception of intrinsic existence)or, in the caseof Hindu philosophies, (wrongly) establish that it has an intrinsic nature. 5.2SEVEN-SECTIONED ANALYSIS56 Allwrongconceptionsoftheperson- coarse,subtle,Buddhistandnon-'Buddhist - are claimedin the Introductiontothe MiddleWay[MAlto benegated by an analysis that comprises seven sections.In refuting these falseview-points theanalysisestablishes theemptinessor non-self of theperson.Chandrakirti's sourcefortheanalysisdatesatleasttoNagarjunaforitisanextensionofa "briefer analysisused in the PrincipalStanzasonthe MiddleWay[MKl57 and cited in theCommentary[MABhl.58 Nagarjuna'sanalysisin turn isforeshadowedin thePalisuttas,andthese maybe hisinspiration forin theSuhrllekha(bShespai spring yig)(vs. 49)he quotes a passage from the Collected Discourses [SN]which is it summary conclusion to his own analysis.59 Theanalysisis based on refuting seven relationships that can beposited as relatingthepersonandthepsycho-physicalorganism.Eachsectionofthe a.nalysisfocuseson onerelationship.The relationshipsrefuted are summarised at verse 6.151.This verse instantiates a carriage and its parts as relata, as this is a substitutionChandrakirtimakesforthepersonandthepsycho-physical organism part way through the analysis.60 This substitution is said tofacilitate theexpositionoftheanalyses61 andtheanalogyiswellknownfromPali literature.62 It isclearly citedasanexample(6.162)andit isunderstoodthat yogins would in practice be analysing themselves.The verse reads: Likewise,worldlyconsensusalsomaintainsthat[thereislaself [designated]independence onthepsycho-physicalorganism, the basic constituents (dhatu)and the six sense-bases (ayatana),and that it alsoisanacquirer.[Thereisapresentationin our systemthat says:] acquisition is thus, action is thus, and the agent isthus. For the relata intended then, the seven relationships are these: 1. 2. 3. The self is not different (gzhan)from the psycho-physical organism. The self is not the same as the psycho-physical organism. The self does not have (ldan)the psycho-physical organism. 58 4. 5. 6. 7. REASONING INTO REALITY The self is not in (la)the psycho-physical organism.. The psycho-physical organism is not in the self. The seIf is not the collection ('dusor tshog, sangha)of the psycho-physical constituents. Theselfisnottheshape(dbyibs,samsthana)ofthepsycho-physical constituents.. ThecognateanalysesinthePrincipalStanzasontheMiddleWay[MK] comprisefivesections,thefirstfivecitedabove.Therelationsof"beingthe collection", and "having the same shape" are Chandrakirti's own contribution. Four(andperhapsfive)ofthesewronglyconceivedrelationshipsare mentioned (though not analytically refuted) in the Middle-lengthDiscourses[MN: 1.300](and Collected Discourses[SN: III.114-115]as just noted).There the Buddha explains that those without any training in the dhamma view each of the psycho-physical constituents, i.e.the physical body, feelings,perceptions, impulses, and consciousness, as the self,'the self as having these, these as in the self and self as in these.These, thus,account forthe two relations of containment, of identity, and possession.A fifthisperhapsincluded asthe "self as thephysical body (rupa)" maybethesameasitbeingtheshape(samsthana)ofthepsycho-physical organism.It isthrough these misconceptions, theBuddha says, that one comes to have a wrong view about the body. The firsttwo relationshipsare generic asthey specify the most rudimentary or fundamentalways in which the self and the psycho-physical organism could berelated.Thefollowingfiveareeachaspeciesofrelationshipinthatthey isolate specific ways in which the self and the psycho-physical organism may be related.Theyarethoughttobetypicalwaysinwhichordinarypeople misconceive a relationship between the self and the psycho-physical organism. TheIntroductiontotheMiddleWay[MA]refuteseachoftheseven relationshipsinturn.Theseareintroducedandessentiallydiscussedserially though inan orderthat differsinthreeplacesfromthat summarised at6.151. TheorderthatcanbestbeestablishedfromtheVerses(karika)isdifference, sameness,collection,thetworelationsofcontainment,possession,andshape. Oftentimesversesdiscussmorethanonerelationwithintheoneverseand Chandrakirtialsomovesfairlyfreelybetweentherefutationsrelevanttoeach relationship.Here, though,forthesake ofclarification and structure, they are presented in a more separate and serial order. Thesectionheadingsthatfollowstatetherelationshipsas'whatisbeing established'by Chandrakirti'sanalyses.Thethesesbeingrefutedarethusthe negationsof what isestablished,e.g.inthefirstcasethat 'theselfisdifferent from the psycho-physical organism'. rim PROFOUND VIEW ,5.3 THE SELF IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM' 59 Writinginrefutationoftranscendentalconceptionsoftheself- i.e.those which posit that the self is a completely different entity from the psycho-physical organism - the Introduction tothe MiddleWay[MA:6.124]says: Aselfthatis[intrinsically]differentfromthe organism(slamdha)cannotexistbecausetheapprehension[ofa self]cannot be established independently of [i.e.without reference to]the psycho-physical organism.We do not assert [the self]as the basisofworldly,egocentriccognitions,because[such]viewsare totally inappropriate. Theargument hereisthat if theselfwerenot included within the psycho-physicalorganismitwouldbequiteunknown,fortheselfisalwaysand necessarily establishedonly on the basisof the psycho-physical organism.(The psycho-physical organism we recall iscomposedof allthephysical and mental .constituentsoftheperson.)Forexample,ourknowledgeofsomeoneis necessarilymadewithreferencetotheirpsycho-physicalbeing,i.e.physical .appearance,affectivetraits,mentalqualities, etc.Without suchareferencethe .location ofapersoncouldneverbemade.Thisisalsothecaseof firstperson analyses,forallknowledgeabout one'sself ismediatedbyaconsciousnessof one'sself,andconsciousness(vijnana)isincludedwithinthepsycho-physical organism. Onthispoint, Murtiiswrong when hesaysthat theself whichisdistinct from the body and its states(i.e.different fromthe psycho-physical organism) is a"separaterealityasconsciousness",itssimplicityas pureawarenessits immortality as not being composite ... "63and so on, for the point isthat outside of the mind aself cannot beknownand henceonecannot with even theslightest foundation say anything about it.This is to say that Murti's "self asdistinct from thebodyanditsstates ... "isrightlyincludedwithinthepsycho-physical organism and not separate from it. The point forChandrakirti isthat the self can only be known with reference tothepsycho-physicalorganismviz.one'sbody,feelings,discriminations, drivesorimpulses,andmind.Asaknowledgeandsolocationof theselfis mediated byand madewithreferenceto theset or asubset of elements of the psycho-physicalorganismtheselfcannotbeindependentofandcompletely different fromthe psycho-physical organism.64 Were it to be, it could be known independentlyofthepsycho-physicalorganismandthisiscontingentlyand necessarilyimpossible.Itisnecessarilyimpossibleforaswehavesaid, knowledge isafunctionofthe psycho-physical person.Hencethe Introduction concludesthat,thoughaself-conceptionandgraspingtoitcanbe 60 REASONING INTO REAUTy prod'Uced, itsbasis or support can not be a transcendent self ,for the existence of such is quite unascertainable. Chandrakirti exemplifieshisanalysiswith an example intended to establish themerelyintellectualand- speculative(parikalpita)natureoftranscendent conceptions of a self, and to show why they cannot be the basis for an innate self-conception and self-grasping.He writes (6.125): Similarly,anunproducedandpermanent[self]isnotperceived even bythosewho,asanimals,havebecome stupifiedformany aeons.But[animals]clearly do still haveasenseof egoism,and thereforetheselfisnotdifferentfromthepsycho-physical organism. The argument here is that an attitude of self-grasping or egoism(such asis necessarily basedonaselfconception)can beobservedin animals.Animals, though,areunabletoconceiveofthepermanent,independent,etc. transcendentalselfofthe(Hindu)philosophersand so thatinnateconception cannot be based in or supported by the acquired view of a self. Havingrefutedthattheselfcanbeanentityutterlydifferentfromthe psycho-physical organism Chandrakirti turns his attention to the basis of innate conceptionsoftheselfinwhichtheselfisidentifiedwithratherthan differentiated from the psycho-physical organism. 5.4THE SELF IS NOT THE SAME AS THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL ORGANISM Chandrakirti begins (6.126): [The Vaibhashika Buddhist:]Because the self cannot be established as something different fromthe psycho-physical organism, the self isonlythepsycho-physicalorganism,thereferential-support (alambana)forthe view [of individuality].Some[of the Sammitiya Buddhists] maintain that [all]fivedivisions of the psycho-physical organism[namely,thebody,feelings,perceptions,drives,and consciousness,constitute]thebasisforour view of the self,while others maintain that the mind (citta)alone [provides the basis]. Asfromtheforegoing,noproofcanbemadeforagenuinedifference betweentheselfandpsycho-physicalorganism.Assuch,certainBuddhist philosophiesnotablyheretheVaibhashikas,65concludethattheselfmustbe merelythepsycho-physicalorganism.AccordingtoChandrakirtisome Vaibhashikas considered that allfivepsycho-physical constituents werethe self whereas othersconsidered it wasonly theconsciousnessconstituent.The latter view was held by the A vantakas. 'THE PROFOUND VIEW 61 Severallogicalconsequencesissuefromthisidentificationof theselfwith ~ i t h e rallof the psycho-physical constituents or consciousness alone.The logical basisfortheseconsequencesisstatedby Leibniz's"principleoftheidentityof indiscernibles".It saysthat"tosuppose twothingsindiscernibleis to suppose thesamethingundertwonames".66Inthecaseathandthen,onehastwo things, self and psycho-physicalorganism, of which it is said they are the same. Yet "to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense".67Hence the wedge theMadhyamikadrivesinthepositionoftheVaibhashikas,(andallother opponents) exposes in thiscase a stated unity of two things yet an instinctive and sometimesdoctrinalseparationofthetwo.TheMadhyamikapointstoa confoundingofqualitiesinwhichoneorotheroftwoentitiesmaybe characterised by a set of qualities, but not both. The refutation opens (6.127): Ifthepsycho-physicalorganismistheself,thenbecause[the psycho-physicalorganismiscomposedof]many[parts,Le.the body, feelings,and so on] there would also be many selves.[Also] the self would be substantial, and thus, the view of [individuality] wouldtakeasubstantialthing[asitsobject]andwouldnotbe mistaken[giventheVaibhashikadefinition of theveridicamessof substance-based sense perception]. .Three separateconsequences aremade here.The first isthat if the self and the psycho-physicalorganism arereally the same thentheunity of the self will belostfortheselfmustnecessarilybifurcateintofiveselves,asthisisthe primary number of psycho-physical constituents.In fact the self would multiply beyond fivefor therewould be asmany selves asthere aredistinct parts of the body, real aspects to feelings, etc.Moreover, even if the self is asserted to be just theconsciousnessconstituent, itsintegrity islost forthere arevisual,auditory, olfactory, etc.consciousnesses.68 If, in the light of such consequences one were tomaintaintheonenessoftheself,thenthedivisionsbetweenthepsycho-physical constituents must collapse also.In other words, the unity of the self can onlybemaintainedattheexpenseofdenyingthatform,feeling,etc.are substantially different. Thesecondpointtobemadeisthatif theselfandthepsycho-physical organismarethesamethenjustasthepsycho-physicalorganismis(forthe Vaibhashikas)substantiallyexistent,thentheselfmust bealso.This,though, contradictstheVaibhashikas'ownphilosophy whichholdsthattheself isnot substantial but existsdependent on a mental label(savikalpa).Finally, if the self is substantial then the self would be freefrom error with respect to its cognition, and moreoverit would then bequiteunnecessary togiveup attachment to the psycho-physical organism for the purpose of achieving liberation. Furthering his refutation Chandrakirti (6.128)wr