The Ontological Arugment

7/27/2019 The Ontological Arugment

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maximally excellent being that exists in every possible world there is no possible world in which this

being could not exist.13 Therefore, God is a being that has maximally excellent properties and exists in

every possible world, including our own. The ontological argument avers nothing less than this. Thus,

Plantingas argument proceeds as follows:

1. It is possible that a maximally great being exists.2. If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in

some possible world.

3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possibleworld.

4. If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.5. If a maximally great being exists in the actually world, then a maximally great being exists.6. Therefore, a maximally great being exists.14Since Plantingas argument is the most sophisticated and advanced ontological argument to

date, it is best to use this model as a test for logical consistency. To that we now turn.

Is the Ontological Argument Logically Sound?

Due to the simple elegance and yet profound claims of the ontological argument, there have

been thousands of people who have studied and critiqued it and many have put forth criticisms and

rebuttals. Due to limited space, we will only consider the most common objections:

Gaunilos Conceptual Object ion. Gaunilo was a monk who lived as a contemporary ofAnselm. In his book, In Behalf of the Fool, Gaunilo argued that God was so great that he was beyond

human conception. If this were true, then premise (1) of both Anselms and Plantingas arguments

would fail since a human concept of God would not even be possible.15 Plantinga admits that

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz was right when he pointed out that the ontological argument assumes that

God can be comprehended by man and that the concept of God is coherent.16 Still, Plantinga believes


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this to be a valid assumption that does not threaten the argument. However, due to recent

philosophical work on positive arguments for theism, the idea that God is incomprehensive to

humanity seems highly unlikely. Arguments from cosmology, morality, and design (teleological)

strongly indicate that an accurate understand of God is firmly within our reach.17

Kants Predicate Object ion. Immanuel Kant was an eighteenth century philosopher whocriticized Anselms argument in The Critique of Pure Reason.18 Kants main objection was that existence

was not a perfection, meaning that existence could not function as a real attribute of God. Anselms

first argument was that one of the greatest conceivable beings properties was existence, making it a

predicate of God (stated as God is existent or more simply, God exists). Kant reasoned that the

idea of existing added nothing to the concept of God and therefore was not a genuine predicate. If this

were true, then Anselms argument would fail since he is arguing for the very concept and existence of

God in the first place.19 However, philosopher Douglas Groothuis disagrees. Gods existence cannot

be assumed or presupposed (as in many possibly existing things in this world) since that is what is being

questioned in the first place. It is possible that God does not exist, and thus positing existence as a

legitimate predicate of God is appropriate and does not invalidate the argument.20 Kants objection

really only applies to Anselms first form of the argument anyway, since Plantingas argument does not

presuppose that existence is a property of God. In Plantingas argument, Kants objection can be easily

sidestepped.21

Richard Dawkins . In his popular best selling book, The God Delusion, Richard Dawkins, aprominent biologist and flag bearer for the New Atheists, attacks the ontological argument in an effort

to disprove it. He utterly and miserably fails. After ridiculing the argument extensively by translating it

into playground language, calling it machist trickery, and dialectical prestidigitation (logical magic

tricks), Dawkins presents a reverse argument to prove that God does not exist.22 His main assertion is

that the greater disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement and

suggests that being a non-existent creator would be the most challenging handicap of all. Since an


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existing God is not greater than a non-existing God who creates everything, that means an existing God

does not exist (since he is lesser).23 However, this idea is absurd because it is a contradiction in terms!

How can a non-existing God create anything if he does not exist? As Craig puts it, there is no

possible world which includes a non-existent being which creates the world.24 Since Dawkins

argument is logically inconsistent it can be dismissed as worthless and thus presents no threat to the

ontological argument.

Incoherency and Begging the Question. As Dr. William Lane Craig points out, mostphilosophers believe that premises (2)-(5) of Plantingas argument are valid.25 Therefore, atheist in

general must attack premise (1) and argue that the idea of a maximally great being is incoherent. At one

point in his book Dawkins attempts to do this. He claims that omniscience and omnipotence are

mutually incompatible because if God is omniscient he must know how he is going to intervene in

history using his omnipotence; yet this means that God is not able to change his mind about when and

how he intervenes, which means he is not omnipotent.26 However this brings up a host of problems,

such as: does God really intervene in human history and how does one know?; does God operate in

space time as humans do and therefore have a future?; and why would a omniscience, morally perfect

God want to change his mind about his interventions when they were perfectly formulated in the first

place? Such a maximally great being has no plan B and he does not react to human whims and

decisions. Conversely, Dr. Craig sees nothing inherently incoherent in the concept of maximally great

being.27

In a similar vein many people have claimed that the ontological argument simply begs the

question. Begging the question is when one only accepts a premise in an argument afterthe conclusion

has already been accepted. This results in circular reasoning and argumentation. In this case, begging

the question means that the reason one thinks that it is possible that a maximally great being exists, is

that one has good reasons to think that a maximally great being does exist.28 The real question here is

whether one has sufficient reason for believing the first premise; put another way, is maximal greatness


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exemplified?29 The confusion is due to the fact that the conclusion is logically equivalent to premise (1)

and therefore some people mistakenly believe they are synonymous. However, they are not

synonymous; the logical equivalence of the conclusion simply proves that the argument is a valid

deductive argument that successfully exemplifies premise (1).30 Begging the question has nothing to do

with it.

Quasi-maximal Beings . By far the most difficult and formidable objection to the ontologicalargument is the idea of a quasi-maximal being. Some people have objected that premise (1) could also

read something like, it is possible that a quasi-maximally great being exists. A quasi-maximally great

being would be defined as a being that is maximally excellent in every way except one area, say,

imperfect omniscience.31 Why is it not plausible to think that such a being exists? Craigs response is

that if a quasi-maximally great being is likely to exist, than a maximally great being is also just as likely to

exist and these two cannot coexist.32 If it is possible for a maximally great being to exist, then this being

does actuallyexist as the ontological argument proves. Since a maximally great being is one that has the

maximally excellent quality of omnipotence, this omnipotence would conflict with a quasi-maximally

great beings property of necessary existence (required of maximally great being).33 As an omnipotent

being, nothing at all can exist apart from the maximally great beings creative abilities. Yet a quasi-

maximally great being would have to exist necessarily and thus independently of the maximally great

beings omnipotence. This cannot be since it is a contradiction.

It is possible for a quasi-maximally excellent being (less than perfect attributes) to exist in many

worlds, because the maximally great being had created it in those worlds. But since the maximally great

being is able to freely choose notto create anythingin a given world (the maximally great being would

exist alone), then the quasi-excellent great being would lack the property of necessary existence and

thus would not be maximally great.34 In sum, if it is likely that a quasi-maximally great being exists, then

it is just as likely that a maximally great being exists, and since these two beings have been shown to be

incompatibly coexistent, only the maximally great being can actually exist.35


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Other Possible Object ions. There are two other objections that one could possibly think ofagainst the ontological argument.36 The first attacks premise (1) and how one is to properly define

God. The idea of a maximally excellent and great being is not considered incoherent, just incorrect.

God is in fact nota maximal being, but is a less than maximal being (similar to the quasi-maximally great

being objection above). Anselms entire argument revolves around him defining God as a being than

which nothing greater can be conceived.37 But what if this is not the correct understanding of God?

Ask yourself the question, where did Anselm get his idea of God? Undeniably, he was already a

Christian and thus the biblical Scriptures had previously informed him of who God was and what

attributes He possessed. If Anselms concept of God as the greatest conceivable being was exclusively

shaped by the Bible, then we would have to say that the ontological argument is no longer a priori, but

a posteriori. This does not necessarily make the argument invalid, it just redefines it categorically. Here

is another question: if the Christian Scriptures (Old and New Testament) had never been revealed to

humanity, would we still have this concept of God being a maximal or greatest conceivable being? A

quick survey of world religions throughout history suggests that we might not as most religions believe

in a God(s) who is greater than humanity, and yet often imperfect.38 These God(s) can be exploited

and manipulated to achieve human goals. What other God(s) besides the Hebrew and Christian

Yahweh is believed to be maximally great?

The other is an attack on premise (3) that states that if a maximally great being exists in some

possible world, then it exists in every possible world. But could there be a possible world where God

does notexist and yet still be maximally great? If such a world exists, then God could not exist there;

of course this then would mean that God is not maximally great because such a beings greatness is

defined as being able to exist in every possible world. However, what if there was a possible world W1

where by the laws of logic in W1 the concept of God was incoherent? Thus, God existing in world W1

would violate the laws of logic ofW1 and so it would be greater for God not to exist in this world. For

it is greater for God not to exist in a world where it is logically incoherent for God to exist.39 Still, this


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Bibliography

Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. 3rd ed. Wheaton: Crossway, 2008.

Craig, William Lane. Q & A Archive, Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?,Reasonable Faith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8139

(accessed October 31, 2011).

Craig, William Lane. Q & A Archive, Dawkins Critique of the Ontological Argument, ReasonableFaith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6831 (accessedOctober 31, 2011).

Craig, William Lane. Q & A Archive, Necessary Existence and the Ontological Argument,Reasonable Faith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7841(accessed October 31, 2011).

Craig, William Lane. Q & A Archive, The Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6155 (accessed October 31,2011).

Craig, William Lane. Q & A Archive, Two Questions on the Ontological Argument, ReasonableFaith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8715 (accessedOctober 31, 2011).

Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006

Groothuis, Douglas. Christian Apologetics. Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2011.

Himma, Kenneth Einar. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Ontological Argument,http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/ (accessed October 31, 2011).

Oppy, Graham. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Ontological Arguments,http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/ (accessed October 31, 2011).

Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974.


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Endnotes

1. Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, (Downers Grove, IL.: InterVarsity Press Academic, 2011), 187; Stanford

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Ontological Arguments.

2. William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics, 3rd ed. (Wheaton: Crossway, 2008), 24; Groothuis,Christian Apologetics, 172, 183.

3. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 95.

4. Ibid., 95.

5. Bertrand Russell echoed these same sentiments in his reflections on the ontological argument.

6. Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 188; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Ontological Argument.; Alvin Plantinga,The Nature of Necessity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 198. There are multiple versions and ways of statingAnselms argument, but they are all conceptually the same. One source outlined a taxonomy of the ontological argument

and came up with eight different kinds (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. Ontological Arguments.).

7. Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 677. In fact, the conclusion in a deductive argument is really hidden away within thepremises; all one must do is flush out the premises to reveal the conclusion (William Lane Craig. Q & A Archive, Does theOntological Argument Beg the Question?, Reasonable Faith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8139 (accessed October 31, 2011)).

8. Ibid.,189.

9. Ibid., 171.

10. William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, Dawkins Critique of the Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6831 (accessed October 31, 2011).

11. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 183; Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 199. This is my best understanding of a possible worldwithout having read or studied it further; it can be somewhat of an illusive concept.

12. Plantinga,Nature of Necessity, 214; Craig, Reasonable Faith, 184.

13. Ibid.

14. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 184-185; Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 199-200.

15. Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 189.

16. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 183. In other words, the ontological argument does not try to prove that the concept of Godis possible; it just assumes that it is.


18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 190-191.

20. Ibid., 192-193. Plantingas argument deals exclusively with the second form of Anselms argument. For Anselmssecond form, see Groothuis, Christian Apologetics, 195.


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21. William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, Dawkins Critique of the Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6831 (accessed October 31, 2011).

22. Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), 80-81, 84.

23. Ibid., 83. Dawkins is not the first to postulate such a ridiculous idea; apparently the Australian philosopher Douglas

Gasking was the first to come up with this negative proof.

24. William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, Dawkins Critique of the Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6831 (accessed October 31, 2011).

25. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 185.

26. Dawkins, God Delusion, 77-78.

27. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 185. To believe that God would need to change his mind about predetermined interventionsis to misunderstand Gods character and ascribe to him a flaw he does not have. Craig goes into greater depth regarding ourunderstanding of metaphysical and epistemic possibilities. A discussion on this would further clear up any confusion aboutGod being incoherent, but space does not permit this (unfortunately).

28. Ibid., 188.

29. William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, Does the Ontological Argument Beg the Question?, Reasonable Faith,http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=8139 (accessed October 31, 2011).

30. Ibid.31. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 186. Yet this being would still exist in every possible world since it is maximally great.32. William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, The Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6155 (accessed October 31, 2011).33. Necessary existence is a undeniable property of a maximally great being since if such a being did not necessarily

exist, it would be less than maximal, and thus not the greatest conceivable being.34. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 186; William Lane Craig, Q & A Archive, The Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith,

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6155 (accessed October 31, 2011). I must admit thatthis concept is difficult to comprehend and it is entirely possible that I have misrepresented it here.

35. Dr. Craig points out that this appeal is made on the basis of human modal intuitions alone (William Lane Craig, Q& A Archive, The Ontological Argument, Reasonable Faith, http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=6155 (accessed October 31, 2011).

36. I have not seen these arguments anywhere else and as far as I know they are my own. However, since I am hardlythe first person to try to dislodge the ontological argument, I imagine that somewhere someone else has thought of theseideas before me.


38. Since I am not a world religions expert, I can not say definitely that no other religions believe in maximally excellentand great Gods.

39. I suppose this could also be reversed: it would be greater for a maximal God who exists in every other possibleworld except world W1, to exist in W1 (where it is logically incoherent for God to exist), because then it would be shownthat the laws of logic in W1 are false. However, this seems to me to be a contradictory stand-off. There cannot both be aworld W1 where the existence of God is incoherent, while at the same time God exists in every other possible world (where


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his existence is not logically incoherent). A maximally great God must either exist in every possible world or no worlds atall. And if he existed in no worlds then he would not be maximally great; nay, he would not even exist at all!

40 In this world W1where the laws of logic are different than our own, a square triangle or unmarried married manwould be possible. This bends out minds, but only because we cannot think outside of our own logical laws.

41. I have not exhaustively read Plantingas idea of possible worlds and I suspect that my definition of a possible worldis invalid.

42. Craig, Reasonable Faith, 195-196.43. Dr. Groothuis uses the ontological argument as a prerequisite to the other a posteriori arguments; Dr. Craig uses

the ontological argument last after defending the other arguments. I suspect Dr. Craig does it this way because he isshowing that the other a posteriori theistic arguments give us a valid reason to believe that we can rightly conceive of God,which is what the ontological argument assumes (in a sense, combating Gaunilos conceptual objection).

The Ontological Arugment

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