THE OLYMPIC BRIBERY SCANDAL - LA84...

THE OLYMPIC BRIBERY SCANDALBy Dr Bill Mallon

U ntil 24 November 1998, all seemed to be

well at the IOC headquarters along the

shores of Lake Geneva. There had been

few recent political problems, revenues from

fund-raising and television were at all-time highs,

and the most recent Olympic Games had been

highly successful.

But on that day the Salt Lake City (Utah) television

station, KTVX, reported that the Salt Lake Olympic

Organizing Committee for the Olympic Winter

Games of 2002 (SLOC) had been paying for Sonia

E s s o m b a t o a t tend Amer ican Univer s i ty inWashington.1,2,5,11,17 The announcement by itself

seemed innocent enough, but it had far reaching

repercussions, and what eventually transpired

threatened the entire existence of the International

Olympic Committee.

Sonia Essomba was the daughter of René Essomba,

the late IOC member (1978-98) to Cameroon. The

payments, it would be revealed, were part of a larger

scheme set up by SLOC to award scholarships to the

family members and friends of IOC members in an

effort to win their votes to become the Host City

The scholarship program had its start when Salt Lake

City was bidding to win the 2002 Olympic Winter

Games. Within a few days after the revelation of the

Essomba “scholarship” the media reported that,

beginning in 1991, shortly after Salt Lake City had lost

the 1998 Winter Olympic bid to Nagano, 13 individuals

had received scholarship assistance worth almost

$400,000 from the Salt Lake Bid Committee or SLOC.

Of these 13 individuals, at least six were close

relatives of IOC Members.4

The International Olympic Committee Executive

Board had a scheduled meeting in Lausanne shortly

after these announcements. But even before that

meeting, on 1 December, IOC President Juan

Antonio Samaranch requested the IOC Juridical

Commission to review the issue of the alleged

scholarship. The Executive Board meeting began on

12 December 1998, but at the close of the meeting,

Swiss IOC Member Marc Hodler spoke openly to the

press, stating that at least 5-7% of IOC members had

taken or solicited bribes by bid cities. He described

corruption in the bidding system and stated that

agents existed who, for a significant price, would

attempt to deliver IOC votes to the various cities

bidding for the Olympic Games and Olympic Winter

Games.11

Within a few days, all manner of revelations were

published by the media, which descended like sharks

on a feeding frenzy. Among other announcements,

Intermountain Health Care in Salt Lake City

announced that it had provided free medical care to

three people connected to an IOC member, which

amounted to $28,000 worth of care for hepatitis,

cosmetic surgery, and a total knee replacement. On

16 December, Salt Lake City mayor Deedee Corradini

said that the city had hired the son of IOC Member

David Sibandze as an intern. Bruce Baird, formerly

the leader of the Sydney 2000 bid for the Olympic

Games, announced that he had been approached by a

non-IOC member who stated that, for the right price,

he could deliver African IOC votes.1,2,4,5,11,17

Shortly before Hodler’s interview. upon the

recommendation of the Juridical Commission,

Samaranch had already formed an ad hoc commission

to look into the allegations and accusations made

against the host cities and bid cities.11 Canada’s Dick

Pound was named to head the inquiry, usually called

the Pound Commission.11 But Samaranch himself did

not escape unscathed, when the press published

reports in early January 1999 that he had been given

expensive guns as gifts from Salt Lake City.

Samaranch noted, however, that he had not kept the

gifts for himself but had donated them to the

Olympic Museum.2,17

Salt Lake City was not the only bid or Host City

involved in the bribery scandal and efforts to

investigate the Nagano bid committee began in

earnest, as those Games had just ended in February

1998. It was reported in the Japanese media that the

11JOURNAL OF OLYMPIC HISTORY - MAY 2000

THE OLYMPIC BRIBERY SCANDAL

12

Nagano bid committee spent an average of $22,000

o n 6 2 v i s i t i n g I O C m e m b e r s . B u t f u r t h e r

investigational efforts were forestalled when it was

discovered that Nagano had destroyed all the records

of their bid committee. If they had a smoking gun, it

had been put out. Samaranch attempted to elicit

information on other bid committees by writing to

each bid committee or relevant National Olympic

Committee going back to 1990, and requesting

evidence of IOC Member wrongdoing2,17

At the beginning of 1999, investigating the IOC and

the bid city process seemed to be all the rage. In

addition to the Pound commission, the SLOC formed

its own Board of Ethics to investigate its own

practices. The United States Olympic Committee

(USOC) also formed a panel to investigate the IOC,

its administrative processes, and the selection of

Olympic host cities. Headed by the former U.S.

Senator from Maine, George Mitchell, its formal title

was the Special Bid Oversight Commission of the

United States Olympic Committee, but this group

became known a s the Mitche l l Commis s ion .

Concurrently, t h e F B I ( F e d e r a l B u r e a u o f

Investigation) began its own inquiry into the SLOC to

determine if any federal laws were violated relating to

bribery and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Of

note , on ly the Pound Commiss ion ac tua l ly

interviewed the IOC Members under investigation,

allowing them a chance to answer the charges before

them.

New announcements from Salt Lake City appeared in

the press almost daily in January 1999. On 7 January

the Associated Press reported that IOC Member

Jean-Claude Ganga of the Republic of the Congo had

earned a $60,000 profit on a land deal arranged by a

member of SLOC.2 On the same day, the first ripples

that Salt Lake City and the Olympic Movement might

be hit in the pocket book appeared when US West

Airline, a major sponsor of the 2002 Olympic Winter

Games, said it would withhold $5 million in payments

until SLOC could answer question’s about the

a l l e g a t i o n s . 2 S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , D a v i d F .

D’Alessandro, President of John Hancock Financial

Services announced that, until the IOC cleaned up its

act, his company would withhold payments to the

Olympic Movement,

On 8 January 1999, the President and CEO of

SLOC, G. Frank Joklik, resigned, as did his Senior

Vice-President, Dave Johnson.15 Joklik gave a press

confe rence a t which be made the fo l lowing

statements:

“I have an announcement to make that

saddens me greatly. For the better part of the

last decade, I have been intensely involved,

along with some of the finest people I know,

in bringing the 2002 Olympic Winter Games

to Salt Lake City. T h i s h a s b e e n a

tremendously successful effort so far and will

be the most successful Olympic Games in

history. I plan to help make it so.

“In the last six weeks I have been deeply

dismayed by the facts that have come forth

concerning behaviour by certain individuals

acting for the Bid Committee during the

process of winning the right to stage the

Games. I have been reluctant to comment or

take any action with regard to these charges

because of my deep concern that we should

be sure before we speak or act.”

After Joklik described some of the transgressions of

the bid committee and SLOC, he said, “Therefore, I

have today obtained the resignation of David

Johnson, who was a vice-president of the Bid

Committee, and has been acting as Senior Vice-

President of the Organizing Committee until today. I

have recommended the appointment of a new Chief

Operating Officer. The other two principal members

of the Bid Committee, Tom Welch, who was Chief

Executive Officer and Craig Peterson, who was the

Chie f Admini s t ra t i ve Of f i ce r , a r e no longer

employees of the corporation. ... Finally, to ensure

that the Games go immediately forward, I must take

steps of my own. Although I had no knowledge of

these improper payments during my tenure as the

volunteer Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the

Bid Committee, in order to assure the people of Salt

Lake City, the State of Utah, and the world that the

Organizing Committee is distinct from the bid

committee and is off to a fresh start, I have tendered

my resignation today.”15

Tom Welch was the main impetus behind the Salt

Lake City bid to host the 2002 Winter Olympics.

Though no longer in an administrative position with

SLOC, he was on their payroll as a consultant when

the scandal hit. Joklik stated that Welch’s consulting

JOURNAL OF OLYMPIC HISTORY - MAY 2000

agreement was terminated as of his announcement.15 On 23 January, the IOC Executive Board met in

Over the next few months, Welch was a marked man, Lausanne to discuss the preliminary findings of the

and a reclusive one, who made no public statements Pound Commission and make some early decisions.

but spoke only through his lawyers. He has been a At the end of the meeting, Samaranch announced

figure in the FBI investigation of the Salt Lake Bid that the IOC had made mistakes, that they were

Committee (SLBC), and his lawyer, Tom Schaffer, responsible, and that it must never happen again. Six

revealed later in 1999 that Welch denied any IOC Members were suspended, pending the final

wrongdoing, but the Associated Press reported that Pound Report, with a vote to be taken on their

he would consider testifying against members of the possible expulsion at the special IOC Session in

IOC in exchange for immunity from prosecution.16 March.

On 14 January 1999 USOC official Alfredo La Mont

resigned amidst allegations that he had worked with

SLOC to secure information concerning Latin

American IOC Members. The next day, Samaranch

called for an extraordinary IOC Session to be held in

Lausanne on 17-18 March, but he also stated that he

would not resign, despite

The six IOC Members suspended (and eventually

expelled) were Lamine Keita of Mali, Agustin Arroyo

of Ecuador, Charles Mukora of Kenya, Zein El-

Abdin Mohamed Ahmed Abdel Gadir of the Sudan,

Serg io Santander Fant in i o f Chi l e , and the

aforementioned Jean-Claude Ganga. A third member

resigned voluntarily, David

frequent calls in the media for

him to do so. One break for The IOC was once broke,SLOC occurred at this time as

US West gave the committee and it was only in the 1980sthe promised $5 million which

it had been holding until all that it began to achieveinformation was available.1,2,3,17

On 19 January Finnish IOC financial independence. ButMember Pirjo Häggmann

resigned. She was one of the all this happened quickly, toofirst two female members of

the IOC, having served since quickly for the IOC to adjust.1981. But her “crime” was

tha t her ex -husband had

worked for the Salt Lake City bid committee and had

also worked for the Toronto Bid Committee when

that city bid to host the 1996 Olympics.1,2,5,17

The second IOC member to resign was the Libyan,

Bashir Mohamed Attarabulsi, who did so on 22

January. It was revealed that his son had attended an

English language center at Brigham Young University

in Salt Lake City, with tuition paid by SLOC and the

son was provided with $700/month by the organizingcommittee.1,2,5,17

The Sydney bid for the 2000 Olympics, to this time,

had been relatively unscathed. But on the same day

that Attarabulsi resigned, John Coates, who had

headed the Sydney bid, admitted that he had made

last-minute offers of $70,000 to two African IOC

officials, but said the action was legitimate.1,2,5,17

Sibandze of Swaziland, while

investigations continued into

the status of three other

members - Korea’s Kim Un-

Y o n g , R u s s i a ’ s V i t a l y

Smirnov, and Louis

Guirandou-N’Diaye of Côte

d ’ Ivo i r e . Dutch member

Anton Geesink, a former

gold medalist in judo, had

been investigated, but was

exonerated, and given only a

warning.14

Then came the reports. The

first commission to formally issue its findings was the

Board of Ethics of the Salt Lake Organizing

Committee for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002.

This was a five-member commission chaired by The

Honorable Gordon R. Hall, former Chief Justice of

the Utah Supreme Court. Their report was issued to

the SLOC Board of Trustees on 8 February 1999.4 It

was scathing.

It began by noting that the Board of Ethics had been

formed on 10 April 1997 but the SLOC had asked it

in December to expand its role in response to “certain

allegations of wrongdoing or improper activity ...

during the bid effort.” The SLOC Executive

Committee had asked the Board of Ethics “to

conduct an independent and thorough investigation

...” This investigation stated that Salt Lake City

believed that it had lost the bid for the 1998 Winter


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Olympics to Nagano because of the extreme

measures taken by the Nagano bid committee to

“befriend” IOC Members. Of note, shortly before

the IOC Meeting at which Nagano was chosen,

Japanese companies made large donations, possibly in

excess of $15 million, to the IOC Museum in

Lausanne. It should be noted, however, that Olympic

Winter Games in Salt Lake City in 1998 would have

followed the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996, and

the IOC no longer usually awards both Games

consecutively to the same nation.

With this in mind, the Salt Lake City bid committee,

led by Tom Welch, revealed its new mission statement

in October 1991. The mission for International

Relations was to “plan and implement a campaign to

secure the winning number of IOC member votes for

Salt Lake City in Budapest in 1995.”4 To that end, the

following goals, among others, were established:

. ‘Establish and maintain long-term, vote influencing

relationships with IOC members.

. Establish and maintain long-term relationships with

other key people of the Olympic Family. A key

person is one who would influence an IOC

member’s vote.

. Establish and maintain long-term, vote influencing

relationships with the USOC.4

The Board of Ethics report then described a litany of

indiscretions by the bid committee and SLOG. These

included:

. Bid and organizing committee payments to Sibo

Sibandze, son of Swaziland IOC Member David

Sibandze, totalling $111,389.12, ending in October

1996.4

. The existence of the “scholarships program” which

assisted family members or friends of IOC Members

with payments to universities or other educational

opportunities.4

. The employment of John Kim, son of IOC Member

Kim Un-Yong, by Keystone Corporation, after Tom

Welch had interceded on his behalf. Keystone was

re imbursed the fu l l co s t s o f John Kim’s

employment, estimated to be between $75,000 and

$100,000. (The Pound Report later noted”... the

Commiss ion cons ider s tha t there was an

arrangement between SLBC [Salt Lake Bid

Committee] and Keystone under which SLBC was

P a y m e n t s t o consultants whose pr imary

responsibility seemed to be to facilitate introductions

between IOC Members and bid committee

members. These consultants and their payments are

listed as follows in the report: Mahmoud El-

Farnawani, a consultant based in Toronto

special izing on I O C M e m b e r s f r o m t h e

Mediterranean region, was paid $148,260 over three

years; Muttaleb Ahmad, Director-General of the

Olympic Council of Asia, was paid $62,400 from

June 1994-June 1995; “Citius” - a consulting

contract which was traced back to an association

with Alfredo La Mont, USOC Director of

International Relations and Protocol, and which was

paid $25,714.35 between March 1990 and May 1991;

ARCA - another entity affiliated with Alfredo La

Mont, which was paid $18,185.90; and the earlier

described association with Bjarne Häggmann,

husband of Pirjo Häggmann.4

Payment of rent, tuition, and expenses for Sonia

Essomba, which began the scandal’s revelations, to

the tune of $108,350.4

The Board of Ethics did not stop with the above, and

it noted that “Many witnesses before the Board of

Ethics described Mr. [Jean-Claude] Ganga as the IOC

member who most took advantage of the Bid

Committee’s and the community’s generosity.” The

report noted that Ganga visited Salt Lake City on six

occasions. During those visits he was treated for

hepatitis, his mother-in-law underwent total knee

replacement surgery, and his wife bad cosmetic

surgery, all on the dole of the Salt Lake City bid

committee. It was estimated that travel expenses for

Mr. Ganga and his family alone exceeded $115,000.4

In addition, the report stated, “There is no personal

relationship between a Bid Committee official and an

IOC member that appears more improper than the

business dealings between Mr. Welch and Mr. Ganga.”

Specifically, in May 1994, Welch and Ganga formed a

partnership called “Claudet Investments,” whose

purpose was listed as to “invest in real and personal

reimbursing Keystone for John Kim’s salary.“)

Payment of living expenses in Salt Lake City from

June 1992 to 1995, totalling nearly $21,000, for

Nancy Rignault Arroyo, daughter of IOC Member

Agustin Arroyo. (The Pound Report later estimated

these benefits at $10,468.83.)


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property.“ Ganga was also assisted by SLOC Trustee

Bennie Smith, Jr. in the purchase of land in the

Ogden, Utah area, with Ganga realizing a profit of

$60,000, when the land was quickly re-sold. There

were also unexplained direct payments from the bid

committee to Ganga totalling $70,010.4

The Board of Ethics report revealed further

payments. Charles Mukora, the Kenyan IOC Member

was paid $34,650 directly, purportedly for a Kenyan

NOC program. Sergio Santander Fantini, Chilean

IOC Member and President of the Chilean NOC, was

paid directly and it is noted that, “both checks,

totalling $20,050, lack proper documentation.”

Further direct payments were requested from one of

the consultants, Muttaleb Ahmad, to Zema Gadir,

who was said to be the daughter of the Sudanese IOC

Member, General Zein El-Abdin Mohamed Ahmed

Abdel Gadir. But it was discovered that General

Abdel Gadir has no daughter. (Note Abdel Gadir’s

initials - Z.E.M.A. Abdel Gadir!)4

And so it went, through 57 pages of revelations of

various indiscretions. The Board of Ethics Report

concluded with nine recommendations, as follows:

1. The IOC should promulgate and enforce rules

governing interactions between bid cities and IOC

members.

2. The IOC should require bid cities to file periodic

reports detailing all expenditures on behalf of IOC

members.

3. The IOC and the USOC should prohibit bid cities

from participating in NOC assistance or Olympic

Solidarity programs during the bid process.

4. The USOC should promulgate and enforce rules

governing interactions between U.S. bid cities, the

USOC and the IOC.

5. SLOC should monitor the ongoing efforts of the

IOC and the USOC to promulgate rules governing

interactions with IOC members, and should

establish supplementary policies as necessary.

6. SLOC should create an ombudsman position to

provide an avenue for employees to communicate

their concerns to the Board of Trustees.

7. SLOC should seek Board of Ethics review prior to

making decisions that raise ethical concerns.

8. SLOC’s Executive Committee should conduct semi-

annual reviews of all material expenditures by SLOC.

9. SLOC should undertake a thorough review of its

policies to ensure that appropriate direction is given

to management and the Board of Trustees in

conducting their business.4

The IOC could barely catch its breath over these

revelations when the Mitchell Commission released

its report on 1 March 1999.19 The Mitchell

Commission did note that its sources were documents

from SLOC and the USOC, as well as media reports.

I t d i d n o t i n t e r v i e w I O C M e m b e r s u n d e r

investigation nor did it review IOC documents. It

interviewed the two IOC Members to the United

States, Anita DeFrantz and James Easton, as well as

Frank Joklik. It was unable to interview Tom Welch

and Alfredo LaMont, both of whom declined

interview requests upon advice of counsel.

The Mitchell Report was more encompassing, dealing

with several arms of the Olympic Movement. It

looked at the bidding process, the IOC structure, and

the USOC itself. Its 50 pages of documentation

ended wi th seven pages o f conc lus ions and

recommendations.19 However, these were summarized

early in the document as follows:

In our report, we make a Series of

recommendations. principal among them are:

1. Bid cities should be prohibited from giving to

members of the USOC or the IOC anything more

than nominal value, and from directly paying the

expenses of members of the USOC or IOC. Travel

to bid cities and other expenses should be paid out

of a central fund administered by the USOC in the

selection of a United States candidate city, and out of

a central fund administered by the IOC in the

selection of a host city.19

2. The USOC must strengthen its oversight of the site

selection process by:

a. establishing an independent Office of Bid

Complaints;

b. prohibiting bid and candidate cities from having

or participating in any international assistance

program;



c. strictly applying the criteria for the award and

administration of its International Assistance

Fund; and

d. strengthening its Bid Procedures Manual and its

Candidate City Agreement.19

3. The IOC must make fundamental structural changes

to increase its accountability to the Olympic

Movement and to the public:

a. a substantial majority of its members should be

elected by the National Olympic Committees for

the country of which they are citizens, by the

International Federations, and by other

constituent organizations. The athlete members

should be chosen by athletes. There should be

members from the public sector who best

represent the interests of the public.

b. its members and leaders should be subject to

periodic re-election with appropriate term limits;

c. its financial records should be audited by an

independent firm, and the results of the audit

disclosed publicly, at least yearly; and

d. appropriate gift giving rules, and strict travel and

expense rules should be adopted and vigorously

enforced.19

4. The USOC should request the President of the

United States to consider, in consultation with other

governments , naming the IOC a “publ i c

international organization” within the meaning of

the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as amended.19

But the Mitchell Commission, unlike the Pound

Commission for the IOC, the Board of Ethics

Commission for SLOC, and the FBI investigation,

had no real power, and had primarily only a

consultative role. But the IOC was listening.

An important recommendation made by the Mitchell

Commission was to have the IOC and USOC “take

the necessary steps to designate the IOC as a ‘public

international organization’ pursuant to the OECD’s

[Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development] Recommendation on Combating

Bribery in International Transactions, and pursuant to

the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.” The IOC

attempted to do this but in early December 1999,

Donald J. Johnson of the OECD replied, “The IOC

does not correspond to the definition of a public

international organization in the meaning of Article I,

Paragraph 4 of the convention, and that, as a result,

its members could not be regarded as foreign public

officials in the meaning of the convention. ... I have

asked the secretariat, in the context of this work, to

put to the working group the idea of the convention

possibly covering the officials of non-governmental

international organizations such as the IOC.”26

In April U.S. Congressman Henry A. Waxman (D-

California) introduced legislation to prohibit

American corporations, including the television

networks, from providing any financial support to the

IOC until it instituted the reforms recommended by

the Mitchell Commission. He later noted in House

Subcommittee testimony that “It was a tough bill, a

controversial one, but a necessary piece of legislation.

It was also a bill with bipartisan support from

members with very different political views.”26

The next published report after the Mitchell Report

was the Sheridan Report, produced by Mr. Tom A.

Sheridan, former Auditor General for Australia.18

Entitled Examination for SOCOG: Review of

Records of the Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd by

Independent Examiner, the report was produced in

conjunction with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

(auditors) and Clayton Utz (lawyers). Sheridan’s

report investigated only the Sydney bid for the 2000

Olympic Games. Although it reached a number of

conclusions, Sheridan was very careful not to make

unwarranted assumptions. He noted, “I am reporting

factual material which has not been tested and the

accuracy and correctness of which has not been

evaluated. Affected persons have not, in most cases,

had an opportunity to comment or to rebut the

material.” We stated further, “It is important to note

that my powers in obtaining evidence outside the Bid

Company records were limited to the co-operation

that individuals or organisations saw fit to provide.”

This is a problem inherent in most of the reports, as

their commissions do not have subpoena power, nor

can they act with policing authority to investigate

crimes.18

A much milder report than either the Mitchell or the

Salt Lake City report, the Sheridan Report was

criticized in the Australian media as being too “kind”

to the Sydney bid committee. But Sheridan did point

out several instances in which he considered either

the bid committee or IOC Members to have breached

16 JOURNAL OF OLYMPIC HISTORY - MAY 2000

the standards of conduct outlined by the IOC.

Among other items, he reported that:

There were several breaches of guidelines related to

gift giving to IOC members, in excess of the $200

(US) limit.18

Two IOC Members had trips to European sporting

events paid for by the Sydney Bid Committee,

outside of IOC guidelines - Niels HØlst-SØrensen

(DEN) and his wife attended the 1993 French Open

tennis final; and Kevin O’Flanagan (IRL) and his

brother attended the 1992 Wimbledon tennis final -

both on the Sydney Bid Committee tab.18

Several visits to IOC members in other nations made

by Sydney Bid CEO Rod McGeoch were breaches of

IOC guidelines. These national visits were noted to

be to Mongolia, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela,

Mexico, and India.18

Although not considered by Sheridan as a strict

breach of IOC guidelines, he stated that the

Sydney Bid Committee e m p l o y e d t w o

professional lobbyists - Mahmoud El-Farnawarni

and Gabor Komyathy - whose charge was to

travel extensively, visit IOC Members, and lobby

them on Sydney’s behalf. They were paid

AUD $180,000 and AUD $200,000 respectively.18

There were f ew apparent breaches o f the

guideline relating to IOC Member trips to visit

Sydney.18

The IOC extraordinary session was planned for 17-18

March. Before this meeting the Executive Board met

again and Dick Pound released the “Second Report of

the IOC ad hoc Commission to Investigate the

Conduct of Certain IOC Members and to Consider

Possible Changes in the Procedures for the Allocation

of the Games of the Olympiad and the Olympic

Winter Games.”14

The Pound Report began with a short description of

the conclusions of the Board of Ethics Report and

the Mitche l l Repor t . I t then made i t s f ina l

r ecommendat ions near the beg inning o f the

document, although these recommendations were

supported by almost 50 pages of documentation

describing the transgressions of certain IOC

Members14

The repor t r ecommended expe l l ing s i x IOC

members: Agustin Arroyo, Zein El-Abdin Mohamed

Ahmed Abdel Gadir, Jean-Claude Ganga, Lamine

Keita, and Sergio Santander Fantini, who were all

mentioned in the preliminary Pound Report, and Paul

Wallwork of Samoa. Charles Mukora, whose

expulsion had been recommended earlier, had since

resigned.14

Nine IOC members had been investigated, but were

given only warnings with no recommendations of

expulsion: Phill ip Coles of Australia, Louis

Guirandou-N’Diaye o f C ô t e d ’ I v o i r e , W i l l i

Kaltschmitt Lujan of Guatemala, Kim Un-Yong of

Korea, Shagdarjav Magvan of Mongolia, Anani

Matthia of Togo, Vitaly Smirnov of Russia, and

Mohamed Zerguini of Algeria. Three members had

been investigated, but it was recommended that they

should be fully exonerated of the allegations made

against them, as follows: Henry Edmund Olufemi

Adefope of Nigeria, Ashwini Kumar of India, and

Ram Ruhee of Mauritius. Austin Sealy of Barbados

was originally given a warning but was later fully

exonerated.14

After describing its recommendations concerning the

IOC Members, the Pound Report made several

conclusions. It noted that the IOC must take action

to correct the problems within its membership, and it

must implement reforms to be certain these problems

could never occur again. The Commission also noted

that the IOC should have done more to avoid the

problems concerning Salt Lake City’s candidacy.”

The Pound Report answered the critics of the IOC,

however, in its next few statements. It noted that the

suggestion that the IOC had fostered or encouraged a

climate of corruption was neither fair nor true, giving

three examples why this was not so: First, the IOC

set guidelines as early as 1988 for bid cities to follow

concerning gifts to IOC Members but that bid cities

had resisted these guidelines from the outset. Second,

as soon as the evidence of improper behaviour by

IOC members was made public in late November

1998, the IOC took action, and ordered the first

inquiry into the problem on 1 December 1998, before

any such investigation by the SLOC or USOC. Third,

the Commission strongly stated that the IOC was

prepared to take decisive action to prevent a future re-

occurrence of the problem.14

The Pound Report then reaffirmed endorsement of

recommendations it had made in its initial report of


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24 January, which included:

Adoption of significant changes in the host city

selection process. These changes must be made with

an eye to eliminating even an appearance of conflict

of interest among those who decide where the

Olympic Games are to be hosted.14

Limitations on travel by IOC members to bid cities.14

The creation of a permanent, independent Ethics

Commission charged with developing a Code of

Ethics and appropriate enforcement mechanisms.

This Commission should be composed of

outstanding senior persons from nations around the

globe, a majority of whom will be independent,

outside members.14

The IOC met in full session a few days later. It voted

to expel the members as recommended by the Pound

Report, meaning that fully 10 members of the IOC

lost their position in the scandal. But more

importantly, the IOC voted to form two new

commissions to help reform the structure of the IOC

and the Olympic Movement and to ensure that such

problems would never happen again.8,11

The two commissions were the Ethics Commission

and the IOC 2000 Commission. The Ethics

Commission’s function is described above, but the

IOC 2000 Commission may have had a more

important role. It was charged with reforming the

entire structure of the Olympic Movement into the

next millennium to help prevent such ethical breaches

in the future.8,11

The IOC 2000 Commission was made up of 82

members, with less than half of them IOC Members,

and with an Executive Board of 26 members, of

whom 13 were IOC Members. The commission

produced an intermediary report in June 1999 and

their final report was released in November 1999,

although early leaks of information were available.

Altogether the IOC 2000 Commission studied more

than 100 possible ideas concerning reform of the

Olympic Movement, and eventually made 50 separate

recommendations to the IOC.

The Ethics Commission’s primary focus was to

address the responsibilities of the IOC and oversee

the selection process of host cities.8 The Ethics

Commission consisted of eight members - three IOC

Members (Chairman Judge Kéba Mbaye, R. Kevan

Gosper, and Chiharu Igaya), and five independent

members. The independent members were chosen

for their backgrounds as follows:

Howard Baker - former White House Chief of

Staff, former majority leader of the United States

Senate

Javier Perez de Cuellar - former United Nations

Secretary-General

Robert Badinter - former President of the French

Constitution Court

Kurt Fürgler - former President of the Swiss

Confederation

Charmaine Crooks - five-time Olympic runner

from Canada”’

The Ethics Commission produced an IOC Code of

Ethics, in the spring of 1999, which reads as follows:”

I. Dignity9

1 Safeguarding the dignity of the individual is a

fundamental requirement of Olympism.

2 There shall be no discrimination between

participants on the basis of race, sex, ethnic

origin, religion, philosophical or political

opinion, marital status or other grounds.

3 No practice constituting any form of physical or

mental injury to the participants will be tolerated.

AU doping practices at all levels are strictly

prohibited. The provisions against doping in the

Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code shall be

scrupulously observed.

4 All forms of harassment against participants, be

it physical, mental, professional or sexual, are

prohibited.

5 The Olympic parties shall guarantee the athletes

conditions of safety, well-being and medical care

favorable to their physical and mental

equilibrium.

II. Integrity9

1 The Olympic parties or their representatives

shall not, directly or indirectly, solicit, accept or

offer any concealed remuneration, commission,

benefit or service of any nature connected with

the organization of the Olympic Games.


.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

2 Only gifts of nominal value, in accordance with

prevailing local customs, may be given or

accepted by the Olympic parties, as a mark of

respect or friendship Any other gift must be

passed on to the organization of which the

beneficiary is a member.

3 The hospitality shown to the members and staff

of the Olympic parties, and the persons

accompanying them, shall nor exceed the

standards prevailing in the host country.

4 The Olympic parties shall avoid any conflict of

interest between the organization to which they

belong and any other organization within the

Olympic Movement. If a conflict of interest

arises, or if there is a danger of this happening,

the parties concerned must inform the IOC

Executive Board, which will take appropriate

measures.

5 The Olympic parties shall use due care and

diligence in fulfiling their mission. They must

not act in a manner likely to tarnish the

reputation of the Olympic Movement.

6 The Olympic parties must not be involved with

firms or persons whose activity is inconsistent

with the principles set out in the Olympic

Charter and the present Code.

7 The Olympic parties shall neither give nor accept

instructions to vote or intervene in a given

manner within the organs of the IOC.

I I I . Resources9

1 The resources of the Olympic parties may be

used only for Olympic purposes.

2 The income and expenditure of the Olympic

parties shall be recorded in their accounts, which

must be maintained in accordance with generally

accepted accounting principles. These accounts

will be checked by an independent auditor. They

may be subjected to auditing by an expert

designated by the IOC Executive Board.

3 The Olympic parties recognize the significant

contribution that broadcasters, sponsors,

partners and other supporters of sports events

make to the development and prestige of the

Olympic Games throughout the world.

However, such support must be in a form

consistent with the rules of sport and the

principles defined in the Olympic Charter and

the present Code. They must not interfere in the

running of sports institutions. The organization

and staging of sports competitions is the

exclusive responsibility of the independent

sports organizations recognized by the IOC.

IV. Candidatures9

The Olympic parties shall in all points respect the

IOC Manual for cities bidding to host the Olympic

Games. Candidate cities shall, inter alia, refrain from

approaching another party or a third authority, with

a view to obtaining any financial or political support

inconsistent with the provisions of such Manual.

V. Relation with States9

1 The Olympic parties shall work to maintain

harmonious relations with state authorities, in

accordance with the principle of universality and

of political neutrality of the Olympic Games.

However, the spirit of humanism, fraternity and

respect for individuals which inspires the

Olympic ideal requires the governments of

countries that are to host the Olympic Games to

undertake that their countries will scrupulously

respect the fundamental principles of the

Olympic Charter and the present Code.

2 The Olympic parties are free to play a role in the

public life of the states to which they belong

They may not, however, engage in any activity or

follow any ideology inconsistent with the

principles and rules defined in the Olympic

Charter or set out in the present Code.

3 The Olympic parties shall endeavor to protect

the environment on the occasion of any events

they organize. In the context of the Olympic

Games, they undertake to uphold generally

accepted s tandards for env i ronmenta l

protection.

VI. Confidentiality9

The Olympic parties shall not disclose information

entrusted to them in confidence. Disclosure of

information must not be for personal gain or benefit,

nor be undertaken maliciously to damage the

reputation of any person or organization.



VII. Implementation9

1 The Olympic parties shall see to it that the

principles and rules of the Olympic Charter and

the present Code are applied.

2 The Olympic parties shall notify the Ethics

Commission of any breach of the present Code.

3 Each year, the Ethics Commission will submit to

the IOC President and Executive Board a report

on the application of the present Code, noting

any breaches of its rules. The Commission will

propose to the IOC Executive Board sanctions

which might be taken against those responsible.

4 The Ethics Commission may set out the

provisions for the implementation of the

present Code in a set of bye-laws.

As 1999 wore on, news about the investigations and

the scandal was less common. But on 3 August the

first criminal indictment related to the scandal

occurred when David Simmons, former chief

executive of Keystone Communications, pleaded

guilty to a federal misdemeanor tax charge, admitting

in a statement that he had employed John Kim, son of

Kim Un-Yong, as part of a scheme to help him obtain

permanent resident status in the United States. He

also admitted that he bad entered into false

agreements to conceal chat Kim’s salary was actually

funded by the Salt Lake City Olympic Bid Committee.

The U.S. Justice Department’s criminal information

noted that “the payments were made under a sham

employment arrangement designed to enable the IOC

relative to attain lawful permanent resident status,”

and “for the purpose of influencing his father’s vote

in favor of awarding the Olympic Winter Games to

Salt Lake City.”16

On a related note, in early September John Kim was

indicted on 17 felony charges of fraudulently

obtaining a permanent U.S. Visa, or Green Card, and

using it to travel frequently to the United States. Kim

had returned to Korea prior to the indictments. The

FBI investigation is ongoing2

During the year, the United States Congress also

began hearings into the conduct of the IOC, although

it is difficult to understand how they have oversight

power on an international sports organization

headquartered in Switzerland. On 14 April 1999, the

Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing to focus

20

on the Salt Lake City bid and the actions taken by

both the IOC and the USOC in an effort to prevent a

recurrence. The two IOC Members to the United

States, Anita DeFrantz and James Easton, both

appeared before the Congressional hearing, as did

USOC representatives and members of the Mitchell

Commission were also called upon to testify21

The House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight

and Investigation requested an investigation into the

Atlanta Bid for the 1996 Olympic Games.3 This was

assigned to the Atlanta law firm of King & Spaulding,

and was headed by former U.S. Attorney General

Griffin B. Bell. This committee issued a preliminary

report in June 1999, but its final document, termed

the Bell Report, was released on 15 September 1999.3

The Bell Report listed detailed and factual accounting

of all gifts worth more than $100 given to IOC

Members from Atlanta officials. The June report

noted that 38 gifts exceeded the IOC guidelines of a

$200 limit on gifts by bid committees, but the

September report turned up further evidence.3

Bell noted, “This is not a corrupt system, but it is

subject to abuse. We had a couple of cases where we

gave gifts of $1,000 and given all the people fighting

for the same thing, I’m amazed it didn’t go higher.”3

Two scholarship offers were made to relatives of IOC

Members. Former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young,

who co-chaired the bid committee, offered a Georgia

Tech scholarship to the daughter of Major General

Henry Edmund Olufemi Adefope, IOC Member to

Nigeria. The other offer was a tennis scholarship to

the University of Georgia made to the daughter of

Pál Schmitt, IOC Member to Hungary. Both

scholarship offers were declined.3

In the report, Bell noted that three favors to IOC

Members may have been illegal. Gifts to IOC

Members to Cuba and Libya may have violated a

United States embargo on trade with both countries.

In addition, two Atlanta officials carried cash into the

country for a Jamaican member, and the cash was

split between them to avoid having to declare it at

customs. The money was later returned to the

delegate’s American business in the form of a

cashier’s check.3

The most salacious revelation of the Bell Report was

that of the series of dossiers that the Atlanta Bid

Committee kept on IOC Members. These dossiers


purported to document various preferences of IOC

Members, which would allow Atlanta officials to make

the proper enticements to help win their vote. One

report said, “... gifts are OK. Gift of female OK.”

Another noted, “... will sell his vote, and. will do so

openly.” Other examples are as follows: “... Likes

pretty women. Likes to talk about Nigeria and going

on safari.” “Does accept gifts. His wife is influential

with him. Gift for his wife may be useful....” and

“Lives in a palace. Did accept two ladies from

Barcelona.”3,6

On 14 October 1999, the House Commerce

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a

hear ing to focus on the

has led to a major re-writing of the Olympic Charter.

A summary of the recommendations is as follows:12-13

1. Members: The maximum IOC membership should

be 115, with 15 active athletes (defined as having

taken part in the Olympic Games or Olympic Winter

Games within four years of their membership), 15

IF Presidents, 15 Presidents of NOCs or

Continental Associations, and 70 members elected

on an individual basis.

2. Procedure for Selecting Candidates and Electing

Members: Proposed forming a Nomination

Committee. Each of the above four classes of IOC

members may propose candidate members. The

Nomination Committee will

“Unfortunately, while the consist of seven members,

including at least one athlete,

elected for a four-year period.

The Nomination Committee

wi l l be cons i s t o f three

members elected by the IOC,

three by the Ethics

Commission, and one by the

Athletes Commission. The

Nomination Committee will

evaluate prospective members

revelations documented by

the Bell Report. Again, both

DeFrantz and Easton testified

before the Congressional Games evolved, our [IOC]Commit tee , a s d id IOC

Director François Carrard, organizational structure didrepresentatives of both the

U S O C a n d t h e A t l a n t a not keep up with theOlympic Committee, Dr.

Henry I&singer, a member of pace of change.”the IOC 2000 Commission,

and Kenneth Duberstein, aIOC Director-General, François Carrard

member of the Mitchell Commission.22-24who will be voted upon by the

full IOC Session.

The IOC met in Extraordinary Session in Lausanne

on 11-12 December, to vote on the recommendations

made by the IOC 2000 Commission. At this historic

session, the IOC voted to enact all the

recommendations made by the commission. The

most important changes implemented were: 1) an age

limit of 70 for IOC Members, 2) term limits of eight-

years for most IOC Members, 3) creation of four

categories of IOC Members - a) athletes, b) NOC

Presidents, c) IF Presidents, and d) individual

members; 4) eliminating visits by IOC Members to

the bid cities, 5) a complete change in the process of

selecting host cities, 6) opening IOC Sessions to the

media via closed-circuit television, and 7) much more

transparency in the financial transactions of the IOC,

the bid cities, and the OCOGS.12-13

The IOC 2000 Commission made 50

recommendations to the IOC in its Final Report, with

recommendations made by each of the working

groups. At the IOC Session in December 1999, the

IOC approved all 50 of the recommendations, which

3. Nationality: One member per nation for members

chosen on an individual basis; one member per

nation among the athletes; one member per nation

among NOC Presidents; no restrictions on

nationality among IF Presidents.

4. Terms of Office: Term limit of eight years renewable,

with re-election to follow the same procedure as

election. Athletes’ members term limit of four pars.

5. Age Limit: 70 years of age for all members and all

functions. However, current members will be

“grandfathered” to follow the limit of 80 which

existed prior to this vote.

6. Rights and Responsibilities of Members: When a

vote concerns a country of a member, the member

may not take part in the vote.

7. Honorary Members: Awarded to members of 10

years’ standing and for exceptional services. The

current rule to remain in force through 31 December

2001.



8. Executive Board: Increase number of members to

15, with four Vice-Presidents. Four-year term limits

on the Board.

9. President: Elected for an eight-year term; may be re-

elected one time for a four-year second term of

office.

10. Current Members: Current members will be

“grandfathered” in place for eight years, at which

time they will be subject to re-election as will all new

members.

11. Transition Period: During the transition period, to

conclude 1 January 2001, the number of IOC

Members may be greater than the recommended

115.

12. Entry into Force: The new rules will come into force

on 1 January 2000, with an implementation period of

one year allowed.

13. Programme and Participatian: 13.1 The obligation

of each NOC to participate in the Games of the

Olympiad will be added to the Olympic Charter -

somewhat of an “anti-boycott” clause. All NOCs

will be allowed to enter six athletes in the Games of

the Olympiad, even if they do not meet the

minimum qualification standards. 13.2 sports

Programme: A maximum of 280 events is

recommended for future Games of the Olympiad.

Events included in world championships programs

do not necessarily need to be included in the

Olympic Games. Significant discussion followed this

vote, as there will be 300 events at Sydney in 2000

and 14 sports are currently applying for admission to

the Olympic Program. President Samaranch

suggested that the IOC Sports Commission study

this proposal and make recommendations to the

next IOC Session.

14. Finance: The IOC will transfer knowledge

concerning licensing programs to future UCOGs.

The IOC will also provide guidelines and

recommendations concerning ticketing and pricing

to the OCOGs.

15. Paralympics: The Paralympics must be held in the

same city as the Olympics, following the Games.

The IOC will formalize its relationship with the

International Paralympic Committee.

16. Management of the Olympic Games: The IOC will

establish an operational structure to transfer

22

knowledge and expertise from one edition of

Olympic Games and Olympic Winter Games to the

n e x t .

17. Athletes (1): Defined an active Olympic athlete as

one who is still competing or has participated in the

most recent edition of the Olympic Games.

18. Athletes (2): Athletes should be represented at all

levels of the Olympic Movement.

19. Athletes (3): The Athletes Commission should be

represented on the IOC Executive Board, and

recommends the same for IFS, NOCs, and NGBs.

20. Athletes (4): OCOGs must include an athlete on

their boards.

21. Athletes (5): The IOC Athletes Commission must be

allocated a budget for its operation.

22. Athletes (6): During the Closing Ceremony of the

Olympic Games and Olympic Winter Games, the

elected athletes will be recognized by their peers and

the Olympic Family.

23. Role of Olympic Solidarity Olympic Solidarity

should act as the coordinator of development

programs for all members of the Olympic

Movement.

24. Decentralized Programs: Olympic Solidarity must

provide support to Continental/Regional Games

under IOC Patronage and will also help develop

Regional and Sub-regional Sports Training Centers.

25. Humanitarian Projects: These will be pursued and

reinforced if they relate to members of the Olympic

Movement and the development and practice of

sport.

26. Information Transfer: Olympic Solidarity will ensure

that all NOCs have access to the technology

necessary for information transfer between sectors

of the Olympic Movement.

27. Education: Proposed that NOCs include a session in

all Olympic Solidarity-funded programs to educate

the participants concerning the Olympic Movement.

28. Regional Information Centers: Proposed that

Olympic Solidarity set up Regional and Sub-regional

Sports Information Centers to help disseminate

information on the Olympic Movement and sports

administration.


between the IOC departments and an improved

auditing procedure of Olympic Solidarity will be

implemented.

30. Education and Culture (1): Merge the Cultural and

I O A / E d u c a t i o n C o m m i s s i o n s i n t o a s i n g l e

Commission on Education and Culture. Create a

new department of Education and Culture within

the IOC. Hire additional professional staff for the

Olympic Studies Centre at the Olympic Museum.

31. Education and Culture (2): Multiple

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o s p r e a d t h e m e s s a g e o f

Olympi sm to appropr i a t e r eg iona l s t ruc tu r e s ,

including publishing the Olympic Reviews and the

Official Reports of the Olympic Games on the

Internet.

32. Education and Culture (3): Creation of a traveling

exhibit of the Olympic Movement and Olympic

History to be set up in host cities, with a clause

added to the host city contract.

33. Education and Culture (4): Greater recognition of

the IOC on the educational importance of the flame

relay and participation by the IOC Executive Board

in the f l ame- l i gh t ing c e r emon ie s a t Olympia . .

(Approved 93-5)

34. Doping (1): The Athletes’ Oath will be amended to

include a statement concerning drug-free sport.

35. Doping (2): Implementation by the World Anti-

Doping Agency (WADA) of an athletic passport

concerning the athlete’s health, allowing doping

controls to be carried out and to monitor the

participant’s health.

36. Doping (3): The IOC will conduct out-of-

competition drug tests beginning at the time of

accreditation of athletes at the Olympic Games and

Olympic Winter Games.

37. Doping (4): In the event of an appeal against

sanctions, the “B” sample should be tested by a

different laboratory than the one that tested the “A”

sample. (Approved 93-0)

38. Doping (5): Sports not conforming to the Olympic

Movement Ann-Doping Code and who do not

perform out-of-competition drug testing will be

d r o p p e d f r o m t h e O l y m p i c P r o g r a m . I O C -

Recognized sports not conforming to this code will

29. Evaluation/Accountability: Better coordination lose their recognition.

39 R e l a t i o n s w i t h G o v e r n m e n t s a n d N o n -

Governmental Organizations (NGO) (1): The IOC

will provide more assistance to the NOCs to develop

closer relationships with their respective local

governments.

40 Relations ... (2): The passage of the United Nations’

Olympic Truce could be supplemented by similar

declarations from world leaders and other NGOs to

support the Olympic Truce.

4 1 . Relations ... (3): The Olympic Truce will be given

greater prominence. Six months prior to the

Olympic Games or Olympic Winter Games, the IOC

President will contact the protagonist nations in

major internal and international conflicts and ask

them to observe the Olympic Truce for the duration

of the Games. During the Opening Ceremony, the

IOC President will refer to the Olympic Truce and

will note that it is a first step toward lasting peace.

42. Internal Communications: Internal communications

within the Olympic Movement must be open,

substantive, two-way and timely

43. External Communications: An IOC spokesperson

will be appointed to support the IOC President and

other IOC Executives. The Communications

Department of the IOC will develop a pro-active

approach to media relations. IOC Sessions will be

open to the media on closed-circuit television.

44. Transparency (1): The flow of IOC funds for each

Olympiad wil l be disclosed beginning with the

cur r en t Olympiad , v i a independent , e x t e rna l

auditors.

45. Transparency (2): The IOC will disclose the

allocation of funds to each NOC and IF and each

entity of the Olympic Movement will submit to the

IOC an accounting of its expenditure of funds

provided by the IOC.

46. Transparency (3): The IOC will seek a more

transparent disclosure of fund distribution to be

phased in over future Olympiads.

47. Transparency (4): Each bid city must disclose the

source of funding for bid expenditures, which will be

audited at the conclusion of the bid process.

48. Transparency (5): The IOC will encourage NOCs

and IFS to disclose their sources and uses of funds.



49. Role of the NOCs in the Bid Process: The NOC

should be involved in any Olympic candidature as a

full partner with the bid committee and should take

responsibility for the Olympic bid to the IOC.

50. New Candidature Procedure: A new bid acceptance

p h a s e w i l l b e i n s t i t u t e d , w i t h m u l t i p l e

recommendations as follows:

50.1 Strict minimum technical requirements will be

applied to the selection of a bid city

50.2 A new bid acceptance process in which

representatives of the IOC, IFS, NOCs, athletes

and external experts will examine the proposed

bids and recommend to the IOC Executive

Board which cities should be accepted as

candidate cities.

50.3 The IOC will enter into a contractural

agreement with the NOC and the Bid

Committee.

50.4 The IOC will issue candidate city manuals and

prepare candidature files.

50.5 An Evaluation Commission will be formed to

visit each of the candidate cities.

50.6 Selection of final candidate cities, if necessary.

The Executive Board may reduce the number of

candidates by selecting a limited number of

cities.

50.7 It is not considered necessary for IOC Members

to visit the candidate cities nor for the

representatives or candidate. cities, or third

parties acting on their behalf (“agents”), to visit

IOC Members.12-13

In the end, all 50 recommendations of the IOC 2000

Commission were a p p r o v e d , m o s t o f them

unanimously. The main points of contention were

the age limit, which bad eight dissenting votes, and

Recommendation 50.7, which eliminated IOC

Members’ visits to candidate cities, but even these

passed with over 90% of the vote.12-13

After the implementation of the numerous IOC

reforms, IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch

testified before the House Commerce Subcommittee

on Oversight and Investigations on 15 December

1999.26 It was a somewhat contentious appearance as

the m e m b e r s o f the Subcommittee were

underwhelmed by the IOC’s reform process. Rep. Joe

Barton (R-Texas) asked him to resign on the spot, “I

would like for you to announce today that you will

resign. I think you have done many good things, but

I don’t think the good things you’ve done overwhelm

the bad practices that have developed. And I think

it’s t ime for some new blood and some new

leadership. And this would be a great venue for you

to be a true statesman of sport and announce that.”26

The Subcommittee also questioned the power and

independence of the IOC Ethics Commission. After

the December IOC Session, the media questioned the

Ethics Commission structure when it was announced

that they would not be pursuing further investigations

relating to the scandal, unless new related evidence

appeared. Congressmen and the media also voiced

concerns about the Ethics Commission’s

independence since three of its eight members were

also IOC Members. However, in a classic example of

the pot calling the kettle black, it should be noted that

the Senate Select Committee on Ethics has only six

members, all Senators, and at Samaranch’s December

testimony, both Congresswoman Diana DeGette (D-

Colorado) and Rep. Fred Upton (R-Michigan) did

note, “The U.S. Congress has a self-policing ethics

Committee.”26

Perhaps the tenor of the hearing can be found in the

opening statement of Upton, Chairman of the

Subcommittee, prior to any statements by the

wi tnes se s , inc lud ing Samaranch . His r a ther

inflammatory remarks included, “The record is

riddled with evidence of over a decades worth of

blatant abuse which was ignored by those who

consistently, arrogantly, unbelievably turned a blind

eye to the ugly truth ... I fear that these reforms will

be cosmetic and purely mask the aristocratic aura that

has formed around the organization ... But I’m afraid

that the enforcement program around the reforms

enacted this weekend will show that what the IOC

passed will simply be window-dressing and business

will go on as usual.”26

However, former U.S. Senator Howard Baker, a

member of the Ethics Commission, testified that the

group would hire an ethics officer with a staff that

would be free “to investigate anything that comes to

their attention or they suspect,” and Samaranch

reiterated that the Ethics Commission could

investigate complaints from “everyone.” Baker stated

under oath, “While I was initially sceptical about


whether the IOC would undertake serious ethical and

structural reforms in a fairly short period of time, it

is now my distinct impression that the IOC - its

leaders and its members - fully recognize the need to

restore the Movement’s credibility,”26

Former Senator George Mitchell did not testify

before the House Subcommittee in December, but

basically supported the IOC efforts in a statement he

submitted, “[The Mitchell Commission] made 15

recommendations to the IOC. They largely fell into

three categories: financial transparency, site selection,

and IOC structure and accountability. The actions

taken by the IOC last weekend

As of February 2000, this is the basic status and

a timeline of what has occurred. Reforms are

ongoing, as implementing all of the IOC 2000

Commission recommendations will take several pears

(this was one of the complaints concerning the

recommendations). The FBI investigation into the

Salt Lake City Bid Committee continues as of this

writing, and i t was recent ly announced that

Samaranch will travel to the United States to testify

before the FBI committee investigating Salt Lake City.

A number of questions remain, and although I cannot

delve into these in detail

represent progress in all three “While I was initially herein, I will broach them

categories. ... In the first two and discuss them briefly.

categories - financial sceptical about whether the - Why did the Olympictransparency and site selection

- the IOC’s actions wereScandal occur and why

significant. They generallyIOC would undertake serious did these problems

were cons i s t ent wi th theseemingly hit all at once?

recommendat ions o f our ethical and structural reforms - Did the IOC know about

commission. In one and turn its head to itsimportant respect, on the in a fairly short period of members and its bid citiesmatter which sparked this breaching their guidelines?controversy - visits to bidding

cities by IOC members - thetime, it is now my distinct

- Will the new reforms

ban adopted by the IOC goes

even further than weimpression that the IOC - its

undertaken by the IOC at

its December 1999

recommended. In the thirdleaders and its members -

session be adequate to

category, structure and

accountability, the actions taken

by the IOC, while positive. fell

short of our

recommendations.” Mitchell

also applauded the IOC for its

e f f o r t s t o h a v e t h e I O C

designated by OECD as a

public international

fully recognize the need to

restore the Movement’s

credibility.”

address the problems?

W h y d i d t h e O l y m p i c

Scandal occur and why did

these problems seemingly

hit all at once?

AS has been well

organization, as his commission

had recommended.26

Member of the Ethics Commission, former documented elsewhere, the

U.S. Senator Howard Baker IOC was once broke, and it

was only in the 1980s that it

began to achieve financial independence. But all thisIn the United States press, reviews of the IOC

reforms were decidedly mixed. It was felt that too

m a n y o f the current IOC Members were

grandfathered in under the: old rules. In addition, the

re-election process, which will be done by the IOC

Session, was questioned, a s the members a re

effectively voting for themselves. Further, gifts to

IOC Members by bid cities were nor completely

banned, although at the House Subcommittee

hearing, Samaranch stated, after being pressed on this

matter, “we will ban them.26

happened quickly, too quickly for the IOC to adjust.

And it is unlikely that the problems described here

began only with the Salt Lake City bid. There were

similar allegations going back to the mid-1980s.

During his testimony before the United States House

of Representatives on 14 October 1999, the IOC

D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l , F r a n ç o i s C a r r a r d , s a i d ,

“Unfortunately, while the Games evolved, our

organizational structure did not keep up with the pace

of change. In effect, we did not realize we were going



through a growth crisis. The result of an old

fashioned structure managing modern Games was not

corruption, but a situation in which some of the less

responsible members - a small minority - showed

poor judgment and abused the system. Our problems

were caused by weak people, structures, and

procedures.”22

Did the IOC know about and turn its head to its

members and its bid cities breaching their

guidelines? Certainly the 1991 report produced by

the Toronto Bid Committee for the 1996 Olympic

Games and sent to the IOC, would imply that the

IOC had knowledge of these problems well before

1999.20a That report noted, “26 [IOC] Members broke

established rules [concerning visits to Toronto]“ and

that ”... at least 18 [IOC] Members and their

companions materially benefited from [abuses related

to their trips to Toronto].”20a The report notes that

these abuses may have cost the Toronto Bid

Committee $700,000-800,000.20a

The IOC and Samaranch have replied that Toronto

did not name names, which is true20a, and would not

give the IOC enough specifics for them to investigate

further.26 It has been noted by IOC Members that the

problem faced by the IOC in this regard is that they

do not have policing status and cannot require all bid

committees to fully open their records. While this

may be true to an extent, the IOC should be able to

police its own members. Although it now appears to

be doing so in response to the scandal, it seems that

the IOC was not aggressive in responding to the

allegations in the past. As regards policing their own

bid committees, the new recommendations requiring

greater financial transparency by the IOC and other

members of the Olympic Movement, should obviate

this problem.

Will the new reforms undertaken by the IOC at its

December 1999 session be adequate to address

the problems? The media have been critical of these

reforms and sceptical that they will truly solve these

problems. They note, among other things, that the

IOC may not truly change for 20 years because

current members will be grandfathered and not

subject to re-election. They have also noted that the

re-election procedure will allow the IOC Members to

e f f ec t i ve ly “ re -e l ec t themse lve s . ” The e th ic s

commission has been criticized because it contains

several IOC Members, but this seems a specious

Sources

argument, as initially greater than 50% of the

commissions consisted of independent members.

The election of Charmaine Crooks (CAN) as an

Athletes’ Member of the IOC brings this number to

exactly 50%.

Some of these criticisms are valid, but as George

Mitchell noted, in many ways the IOC has either

enacted all of his Commission’s recommendations,

and in some cases, gone even further than they

recommended. The IOC seems willing to change and

they are doing so. When they were broke, Juan

Antonio Samaranch and Dick Pound took steps to

alleviate that problem, and the IOC is not blind to the

necessity to change in order to adjust and survive.

Samaranch recently commented, “The world has

changed a great deal in the past two decades and the

expectations of the public - especially as the Olympic

Movement has become so important in the lives of so

many people - [are] to be more open and accessible.

We have taken and will continue to take action in

order to meet this demand.”5 The actions taken by

the IOC in late 1999, implementing the many

recommendations of the IOC 2000 Commission,

though probably not the final answer, are at least a

step in the right direction to ensure that many of

these problems will never occur again. And the IOC

knows it must make these efforts if it is to overcome

the Olympic Scandal and survive and prosper into the

next millennium Perhaps Juan Antonio Samaranch

summed it up best when he said, “No revolution has

been possible without scandal.”5

Because of the nature of the above article, I have

chosen only to provide sources and footnote it as

done in medical texts - footnoting only the source and

not giving specific page numbers. This is because

footnoting any more than the source is not possible in

most ca se s , a s the bu lk o f the source s were

downloaded from Internet material. Page numbers in

these cases are not pertinent as they would differ

from one computer user to another.

1. The Age, Chronology of events in bribery scandal.Released 25 January 1999, downloaded fromwww.theage.com.au/daily/990125/news/news27.html

2. Associated Press. Key events in the Olympic briberyscandal. Released 9 September 1999. From AssociatedPress Wire Service reports.


3. Bell, Griffin B. Test of Olympic Report to Congress.Released 16 September 1999, downloaded fromwww.accessatlanta.com/partn.../reports/Olympics/bell_report.html

4. Board of Ethics of The Salt Lake Organizing CommitteeFor The Olympic Winter Games of 2002. Report To TheBoard Of Trustees. Released 8 February 1999,downloaded from URLwww.slc2002.org/news/html/report.html

5. Dodd, Mike. “IOC’s reform path at crossroads,” USAToday, 8 December 1999, pp. 1-2A. 10C.

6. Harper’s. “[Profiles] Let the Gifts Begin,” December1999, pp. 150-151.

7. IOC. Amendments to the Olympic Charter, Lausanne,12 December 1999. Downloaded via Acrobat Reader offIOC web site, www.olympic.org

8. IOC. IOC Ethics Commission. Downloaded from IOCsite at www.olympic.org/ioc/e/org/ethics/ref_ethics_com_e.html

9. IOC. IOC Code of Ethics. Downloaded from IOC siteat www.olympic.org from Acrobat Reader.

10. IOC. Intermediary Report of the IOC 2000 Commission.2 June 1999. Downloaded from the IOC site atwww.olympic.org from Acrobat Reader.

11. IOC. IOC Crisis and Reform Chronology Downloadedfrom IOC site at wwv.olympic.org from Acrobat Reader.

12. IOC. 110th Session Voting on IOC 2000 CommissionRecommendations. Downloaded from URLwww.olympic.org/ioc/e/news/110session/l110_vote_e.html

13. IOC. Report by the IOC 2000 Commission to the 110thIOC Session, Lausanne, 11th and 12th December 1999.Downloaded from the IOC site at www.olympic.org fromAcrobat Reader.

14. IOC. Second Report of IOC ad hoc Commission toInvestigate the Conduct of Certain IOC Members and toConsider Possible Changes in the Procedures for theAllocation of the Games of the Olympiad and OlympicWinter Games. Presented to the IOC Executive Board,11 March 1999. Referred to as the “Pound Report.”

15. Joklik, G. Frank. Statement. 8 January 1999, provided bySalt Lake City Organizing Committee for the 2002Olympic Winter Games.

16. Pound, Edward T. and Johnson, Kevin. “Exec pleadsguilty in IOC bribery case,” USA Today, 4 August 1999,pp. 1A, 10C.

17. Reuters. Olympics Chronology of Olympic briberyscandal. Released 11 March 1999. From Reuters WireService reports, provided by Christine Brennan.

18. Sheridan, T. A. Examination for SOCOG: Review ofRecords of the Sydney Olympics 2000 Bid Ltd byIndependent Examiner. Released by Mr. Sheridan 12March 1999, downloaded from URLwww.deloitte.com.au/content/socog_report.asp Referredto as “Sheridan Report.”

19. Special Bid Oversight Commission. Report of TheSpecial Bid Oversight Commission. Released by theCommission on 1 March 1999, chaired by Senator GeorgeJ. Mitchell. Downloaded from US Olympic Committeeweb site at www.usoc.org Referred to as “MitchellReport.”

20. Text of interview with Senator George Mitchell, fromMcNeil-Lehrer Newshour. Released 1 March 1999,downloaded from www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/sports/jan-june99/olympics_3-l.html

20a. Toronto Ontario Olympic Council. Report to theInternational Olympic Committee by the Toronto OntarioOlympic Council on the Candidature of the City ofToronto to Host the Games of the XXVIth Olympiad.Paul F. Henderson. Arthur C. Eggleton, and Norman M.Seagram, eds. Toronto: author, January 1991.

21. United States’ Congressional Testimony. WrittenStatement of Anita DeFrantz, Vice President.International Olympic Committee, before the U.S. SenateCommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,April 14, 1999. Downloaded from IOC web site atwvw.olympic.org via Acrobat Reader.

22. United States’ Congressional Testimony. WrittenStatement of François Carrard, Director General,International Olympic Committee, Hearing on theSelection Process for Olympic Host Cities, before the U.S.House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations, October 14, 1999. Downloaded from IOCweb site at www.olympic.org via Acrobat Reader.

23 United States’ Congressional Testimony WrittenStatement of James L. Easton, Member, InternationalOlympic Committee, Hearing on the Selection Process forOlympic Host Cities, before the U.S. House CommerceSubcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October14,1999. Downloaded from IOC web site atwww.olympic.org via Acrobat Reader.

24. United States’ Congressional Testimony. WrittenStatement of Anita DeFrantz, Vice President,International Olympic Committee, Hearing on theSelection Process for Olympic Host Cities, before the U.S.House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations, October 14, 1999. Downloaded from IOCweb site at www.olympic.org via Acrobat Reader.

25. United States’ Congressional Testimony. WrittenTestimony of Richard W. Pound, Vice President,International Olympic Committee before the U.S. SenateCommittee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,October 20,1999. Downloaded from IOC web site atwww.olympic.org via Acrobat Reader.

26. United States’ Congressional Testimony TestimonyDecember 15, 1999 Mr. Juan Antonio Samaranch,President, International Olympic Committee, US. HouseCommerce Subcommittee on Oversight andInvestigations. Hearing on the Olympic Site SelectionProcess and Review of the Reform Effort. Downloadedfrom Congressional Universe, a private Internet accessdevice available at major libraries.

27. Wall Street Journal Staff Reports. “Franco’s Ghosts: ForMr. Samaranch, IOC’s Transformation Has Been His asWell.” Wall Street Journal, 7 December 1999, p. 1.


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